



Security Council

Fifty-third Year

3890th Meeting

Saturday, 6 June 1998, 11.40 a.m.

New York

Provisional

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Monteiro	(Portugal)
<i>Members:</i>	Bahrain	Mr. Buallay
	Brazil	Mr. Amorim
	China	Mr. Qin Huasun
	Costa Rica	Mr. Niehaus
	France	Mr. Dejammet
	Gabon	Mr. Dangué-Réwaka
	Gambia	Mr. Jagne
	Japan	Mr. Owada
	Kenya	Mr. Mahugu
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Slovenia	Mr. Türk
	Sweden	Mr. Dahlgren
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir John Weston
	United States of America	Mr. Richardson

Agenda

The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security

The meeting was called to order at 11.40 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Petrella (Argentina), Ms. Wensley (Australia), Mr. Fowler (Canada), Mr. Elaraby (Egypt), Mr. Kharrazi (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Tello (Mexico), Mr. Powles (New Zealand), Mr. Aass (Norway), Mr. Kamal (Pakistan), Mr. Lee (Republic of Korea), Mr. Yel'chenko (Ukraine), and Mr. Samhan (United Arab Emirates) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/1998/476, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Costa Rica, Japan, Slovenia and Sweden.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following other documents: S/1998/450, letter dated 1 June 1998 from the Chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1998/458, letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1998/463, letter dated

2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1998/464, letter dated 4 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1998/468, letter dated 3 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; and finally, S/1998/473, letter dated 5 June 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. Owada (Japan): Quite recently, the Security Council issued two presidential statements in which it strongly deplored the nuclear tests carried out by India on 11 and 13 May, and then by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May. By those forceful and direct statements, the Security Council has addressed the specific acts perpetrated by the two countries concerned.

On top of that, we are adopting today a draft resolution in order to address the new critical and dangerous situation triggered by the acts of the two countries. There is now a serious danger that the tensions in South Asia could heighten further and escalate to a nuclear confrontation.

Yet another danger which has been created is that the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself is being threatened and that the international community could drift into an uncontrollable world of nuclear proliferation. The situation is of critical importance to the security of the entire international community and requires its urgent attention. The Council, entrusted with the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, is duty-bound to take action to fulfil its responsibility incumbent upon it under the Charter of the United Nations.

I have to express, first of all, the grave concern of my country at the serious negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia. Furthermore, the deterioration of the relationship and the risk of nuclear confrontation between the two major countries on the sub-continent cannot fail to produce serious implications for the maintenance of international peace and security beyond that region. In order to avoid any such negative effect, the Security Council must address this situation with firm determination, with a sense of urgency and with an awareness of its heavy responsibility.

It is against this background that in the draft resolution before us the Security Council urges India and Pakistan to exercise the maximum restraint and to resume dialogue on all the outstanding issues in order to remove the tensions between them and to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of these tensions, including Kashmir.

As a fellow Asian nation, Japan strongly hopes that India and Pakistan will move in the direction of a historical reconciliation through strenuous efforts to build mutual confidence and dialogue rather than confrontation and an arms race.

Secondly, by embarking upon an attempt for the development of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan are seriously jeopardizing the international regime of non-proliferation, which is the indispensable cornerstone for safeguarding the international community from the horrors of nuclear holocaust.

Japan is particularly shocked by the recent nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, inasmuch as we the Japanese people know first-hand the unspeakable horrors of nuclear weapons and are determined not to allow nuclear tragedies such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki ever again to visit us on our globe. It is precisely for this reason that Japan has been placing supreme importance on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Japan has been making strenuous efforts in encouraging countries in all parts of the world to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) regimes. The international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, with the NPT and the CTBT, should be maintained at all costs, for this is the only guarantee that can prevent nuclear weapons from spreading on the globe.

It is out of this conviction that Japan has lodged strong protests with both India and Pakistan and has frozen its economic assistance for new projects, which is meant for the peaceful development of the country. Their actions jeopardize the very international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, for the protection and promotion of which we have been working so tirelessly.

For all these reasons Japan is firmly convinced that through this draft resolution the Security Council should demonstrate in no ambiguous terms its grave concern about the challenge that the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and should urge them to become parties to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions.

In this connection, it should be made clear that there is no way for India and Pakistan to claim a nuclear status. The draft resolution declares that under the NPT regime India and Pakistan cannot have a nuclear-weapon-State status.

Before concluding, I should like to make a brief but important reference to the question of nuclear disarmament. It is the considered view of Japan that in parallel with our efforts to promote the international regime for non-proliferation, steady progress for nuclear disarmament is essential for a safer world. Japan makes it an article of faith to uphold its own three non-nuclear principles — not to produce, not to possess and not to introduce nuclear weapons — and seeks to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. On this basis it has consistently appealed to the international community to aim at steady progress in nuclear disarmament through concrete and practical measures on a step-by-step basis.

In this context, my delegation notes with satisfaction that in its preamble the draft resolution recalls the successful outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and refers to the joint communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of the five nuclear States, in which they declared themselves to be determined to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of that Treaty.

It was in the light of these considerations that on 30 May Japan took the initiative to call for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to draw the attention of the Council to the grave implications of the recent nuclear

testing by India and Pakistan for international peace and security, and it has since been strenuously working for a draft resolution on this critical issue, in cooperation with Costa Rica, Slovenia and Sweden. We, the sponsors, have been engaged in active and close consultations with each and every member of the Council to improve the content of the text. The draft resolution now before us is the result of such consultations. It is my firm conviction that this document represents the united voice of conscience of the international community on the existential problem that we, together, face.

I wish to conclude my statement by saying that the adoption of this draft resolution will be only the beginning of a long battle to consolidate the international regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to secure future generations against the scourge of a nuclear tragedy. In the interests of the future of humankind we cannot afford to lose this battle. The Security Council should remain actively seized of the matter addressed in this draft resolution and be ready to consider further how best to ensure the implementation of the present draft resolution.

Japan, as a member of the Security Council, as a member of the Group of Eight, which is to meet next week to address the same issue, and as a peace-loving nation in Asia gravely concerned about the wider implications of the recent nuclear tests, will spare no efforts in joining the international community in its endeavour to contain the present crisis triggered by the recent developments.

Mr. Dahlgren (Sweden): Since the first nuclear bomb fell on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 the whole issue of peace and survival has gained a new dimension. The development of nuclear weapons, and their proliferation, came to pose a new threat to mankind. And it was a unique threat, because we reached a stage where it was possible not only to destroy the enemy and oneself with these terrible weapons, but also everyone else, and all and everything that would come after us. The entire future of civilization was at stake.

We have all become aware of this in the years that have lapsed since 1945, and many efforts have been made to help reverse the trend — to stop proliferation, to halt nuclear testing and to start real nuclear disarmament.

This is one reason why my Government has taken the events of the last few weeks so seriously. We have condemned the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. Those tests constitute a serious setback for the hope for a world free from nuclear weapons. They are in complete disregard

of the will of the international community to ban all nuclear testing. And they also create grave risks for regional security in South Asia and beyond.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is indeed a threat to international peace and security. It is of great significance that the Security Council, by today's draft resolution, will put its weight and its authority behind the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This will strengthen international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

It is not enough to stem the flow; we must also turn the tide. The ultimate goal is to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction. The five nuclear-weapon States bear a particular responsibility to make that possible. But this in no way reduces the duty of other States to contribute to disarmament and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

My Government utterly rejects the notion that nuclear weapons increase security and international standing, and we believe that today's message to India and Pakistan is very clear: nuclear testing will not give them more security — only the opposite. Nor will it enhance their status and standing among other nations. Instead, through their own actions these two countries, in one essential field, have removed themselves from the mainstream of the international community. We want them to return. The one road to take for India and Pakistan is the one taken by South Africa: to reconsider, to renounce their nuclear option, and to join the treaty regimes.

We recognize the complex political and historical background to the tension in South Asia. We wish to encourage India and Pakistan to resume and strengthen a political dialogue on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir. The international community should stand ready to facilitate such dialogue, at the request of the parties, in order to reduce tension and build confidence and security between them.

The Security Council itself can never — and nowhere — abdicate its responsibility for international peace and security. That is also the reason why Japan and Sweden, together with Costa Rica and Slovenia, initiated today's draft resolution. We deem it a significant response to a perilous international situation.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*interpretation from Russian*): The draft resolution that we are considering today is a very timely and important response by the Security Council to the situation that has arisen as a result of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. The world learned with profound concern about the nuclear explosions that reverberated in the region of southern Asia. The many years of confrontation and rivalry between India and Pakistan have taken on a new, extremely dangerous, nuclear character. Under conditions of a virtually comprehensive moratorium on nuclear tests, such actions create significant additional difficulties in further reducing nuclear weapons and damage the existing regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The general thrust and specific provisions of the draft resolution must be a unanimous and appropriate response by the Security Council to this challenge as it meets its chief responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Of great importance in this respect were the results of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, China, Russia, the United States and France, held in Geneva on 4 June, which were then endorsed by the Security Council. Having condemned the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, the five permanent members of the Council firmly stated that no threat to stability should come out of South Asia and the conflict between India and Pakistan should not develop into a nuclear scenario. The five Ministers called on both countries to refrain from carrying out new nuclear tests, from the deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles and from the production of fissile material. They appealed to Delhi and Islamabad to adhere to the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, based on the fact that India and Pakistan, in accordance with these treaties, do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States. All these ideas are fully reflected in the draft resolution, for which we are grateful to the sponsors.

At the same time, we stress our readiness to help India and Pakistan in their search for reconciliation and cooperation through direct dialogue. We are convinced that we can find points of contact in the approaches of Delhi and Islamabad to resolve their conflicts, and that they can try to develop mutually acceptable forms which, without interference in their internal affairs and without attempts to raise the existing problems to an international level, would help them to reach agreement.

In this connection, Russia views the adoption of any type of sanctions against these States unjustified from the international legal, political and humanitarian points of view. The draft resolution does not contain the slightest hint of any type of sanction.

We note with satisfaction the common understanding of the members of the Security Council of the need to continue efforts to reduce the danger which has arisen from the nuclear tests carried out by these two States of South Asia and aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The last few years have seen real progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. The process of reducing Russian and United States nuclear armaments has become broad. We hope that soon we will reach a new phase in negotiations which will result in lowering the ceiling for the number of nuclear warheads of both powers and in adherence by other nuclear States to this process.

One of the priority areas in multilateral disarmament is the task of strengthening the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction. We are convinced that the global non-proliferation regime that has been created must be strengthened by fresh concrete steps oriented towards those regions and States that are causing particular concern in terms of non-proliferation. Russia, for its part, will continue to do everything it can in order to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to prevent its undermining or erosion.

Mr. Türk (Slovenia): Today the Security Council will take action on an important draft resolution which addresses one of the fundamental issues of international peace and security, the issue of nuclear weapons. Slovenia is a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, and we strongly deplore the nuclear tests recently conducted by India and Pakistan. By participating in the drafting of this resolution, we wish to add our voice to the overwhelming international concern at this unfortunate development.

Slovenia is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and a signatory of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We are strongly committed to the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Like many other Member States, Slovenia considers these two treaties as essential

foundations for the efforts towards nuclear disarmament and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan represents a serious setback to these efforts. While these two countries have not acceded to either the NPT or the CTBT, and consequently legitimately argue that they have not violated any of their treaty obligations, we believe that their recent actions had an adverse effect on universal aspirations to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. The principles of nuclear non-proliferation and of prohibition of nuclear tests have been accepted so broadly that their legal effects equal the effects of solemn declarations of the General Assembly. As such they cannot be simply ignored by States not parties to these two treaties. Moreover, the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan can have a serious negative impact on stability in the region and beyond. It is impossible to ignore the expressions of concern voiced in Asia and the Pacific, as well as worldwide.

We are of the view that acquisition of nuclear weapons is not the way to solve any problems. It will not bring the coveted status of a nuclear-weapon State. It also will not help resolve any outstanding political issues. Instead, it may spark a costly nuclear-arms race which would not benefit the security, stability or economy of either contender.

The legitimate security concerns and political issues in the region need to be addressed by dialogue and other political means. In dealing with the present situation, it is necessary for the Security Council to act with determination to prevent the reversal of important achievements in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and to strengthen the efforts towards nuclear disarmament. This is why the draft resolution demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests and urges them, and other States that have not yet done so, to adhere to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions.

It is particularly important that India and Pakistan refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons or missiles and from production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In this context, we note some encouraging indications in both countries with respect to measures of self-restraint.

The draft resolution before us expresses support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage dialogue between India and Pakistan. We urge them to avail themselves of his offer to assist in conducting a constructive dialogue. The existing mechanisms of bilateral

dialogue on all political and security issues need to be fully utilized. We are of the view that the Secretary-General can and should play a useful role, in accordance with the Charter, in the efforts made to reinvigorate the dialogue.

Slovenia reiterates the importance of universal adherence to the NPT and the CTBT which are essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation and prohibition of nuclear testing are not in themselves sufficient to eliminate the nuclear danger. Progress is needed with respect to effective measures of nuclear disarmament. We should not allow the nuclear testing in South Asia, or anywhere else, to jeopardize our efforts in this path. Instead, we should reaffirm our commitment to proceed with effective implementation of all the provisions of NPT, including its article VI, and to pursue with renewed vigour the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Niehaus (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Costa Rica is grateful for your decision, Mr. President, which has made it possible in a short period of time to have this open debate with the presence of the Secretary-General in order to consider and adopt a draft resolution consistent with the responsibilities of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Costa Rica, a sponsor of the text before us, would like to express on this occasion its gratitude to the delegations of Japan, Sweden and Slovenia, whose active leadership was an essential factor in order for us today to be considering this draft resolution.

In addition, we thank the other members of the Security Council who have once again given proof of their firm commitment to the cause of international peace.

My country has made disarmament more than just a foreign-policy objective. We have been a disarmed country for 50 years, and accordingly, on both the national and international levels, have maintained a constant, invariable policy in favour of disarmament of all kinds. On every occasion and in every forum we have expressed our rejection of the arms race in all its forms.

In this regard, we have been firm in stating that the arms build-up is contrary to the modern world's objectives of peace, security and development. Time and again we have said that the economic resources that the

world devotes to conventional and nuclear weapons should be redirected in order to promote genuine economic development and social equity for all peoples.

This constant policy of Costa Ricans has been applied with particular intensity to the question of nuclear weapons, which are an irrational instrument that threatens the existence of all of humanity and the world as we know it.

In the case now unfortunately before the Security Council, we are facing the sad reality of two countries of the developing world which have pressing and urgent economic and social needs to take care of, but which are instead devoting their financial resources and the intelligence of their scientists to an objective that is senseless and shows a lack of commitment to the true values and principles of coexistence established in the Charter of the United Nations.

This is no longer a bilateral territorial dispute. Now it goes much further. On the pretext of maintaining their own national security, both countries have committed themselves to beginning a nuclear arms race which, beyond its effect on regional tensions, is a genuine threat to international peace and security.

In this connection, Costa Rica would like to use this opportunity to issue a vehement and vigorous appeal to India and Pakistan to cease immediately the development of nuclear weapons and, as soon as possible, to accede unconditionally to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Faithful to its commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, Costa Rica urges India and Pakistan to resolve all of their pending disputes, including the question of Kashmir, through dialogue and negotiation. In this connection, we would like to underscore the potential role of the Secretary-General.

The text of the draft resolution we have before us today is realistic, sensible and balanced. It reflects a clear commitment on the part of this main organ of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, which, ultimately, is the Council's fundamental obligation. Costa Rica considers it is important to note that, while in the past, for reasons of global balance, the Council has not condemned the conducting of nuclear tests, this cannot be invoked as a precedent to justify not now adopting — above all, with a view to the future — a clear,

forceful position against such actions, irrespective of where they take place or who is responsible for them.

From this moment, which my delegation deems historic, it should be possible to say that, yes, the Security Council has a substantive policy of condemning test explosions of nuclear weapons as well as any other type of nuclear explosion, in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Given the serious and urgent nature of the situation and in accordance with the provisions of the draft resolution, we trust that in the very near future the Secretary-General will be able to inform us that India and Pakistan have initiated the process of implementing all the provisions set forth in the draft resolution we are going to adopt.

For all these reasons Costa Rica has proudly sponsored the draft resolution before us.

Mr. Mahugu (Kenya): In the first place, we would like to express our gratitude to the delegations of Japan, Sweden, Slovenia and Costa Rica which, through their tireless efforts and persistence, have brought us to the point we are at today. Ambassador Owada in particular deserves our admiration and appreciation for the manner in which he has conducted our negotiations.

Kenya has continuously and vigorously pursued an active policy of nuclear non-proliferation and, with others, has promoted the goal of complete nuclear disarmament and the elimination of such weapons. Consequently, we are a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to the Pelindaba Treaty establishing the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone; a signatory of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and, indeed, one of the first 21 members of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is through that prism that we learned with regret and concern of the underground nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. The tests will no doubt be remembered as having dealt a serious blow to our aspirations to a world free of nuclear weapons.

We encourage India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and to refrain from carrying out any further tests. We note the assurances contained in their Government press statements and expect them to exercise maximum control over the deadly technology they have acquired, to remain committed to the Non-Aligned Movement's goal

of nuclear disarmament, and to participate with others in negotiating a fissile-material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

It is regrettable that the insecurity created as a result of the lack of serious commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to move towards disarmament has provided others who may have felt the need to ensure their own security with an excuse to test. Deplorable though these countries' actions may be, a wake-up call has most definitely been sounded.

To this end, the need for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the even more urgent need for renewed efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons cannot be over-emphasized. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to start the ball rolling. The rest of us expect them to take seriously their responsibility to finally remove the threat of nuclear weapons, which since the end of the Second World War has continued to hang over our heads.

Security Council presidential statements on the tests carried out by India and Pakistan expressed the view that such tests run counter to current global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It is Kenya's conviction that testing of any kind, underground or otherwise, should not be carried out, and that all tests pose a threat to all of us by increasing the chances of proliferation and, indeed, of an arms race. In this regard, we welcome the renewed commitment contained in the Geneva communiqué of the five States permanent members of the Council, which *inter alia* expresses their determination to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT.

Kenya will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us because we feel that, although it does not cover all the areas it should have covered, it nonetheless addresses our main concerns with respect to nuclear non-proliferation; contains a commitment on nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States; and, finally, calls on India and Pakistan to choose the path of reason and, indeed, dialogue.

Mr. Richardson (United States of America): Nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in recent weeks represent a profound blow not only to the stability and security of their region but also to the international non-proliferation regime on which we all depend. In a few minutes, this Council will vote on a draft resolution that condemns those tests. No other response by the international community is possible in the face of such acts.

The draft resolution however does more than condemn. It also makes clear the path India and Pakistan should follow to restore their standing before all nations. It calls upon India and Pakistan to refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons to avoid a ballistic missiles arms race and to avoid further proliferation by exporting this technology. It also urges India and Pakistan to resume the diplomatic dialogue between them, which is the path to true peace.

This draft resolution endorses, in full, the Joint Communiqué of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States in Geneva on 4 June. At the conclusion of the meeting in Geneva, Secretary of State Albright noted that in the coming weeks China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States will be engaging additional concerned States in our shared effort to bring peace and stability in South Asia. Council adoption of this draft resolution is an important step along that path.

The Geneva meeting was part of what we expect to be a continuing process that will include numerous participants in various forums and will address the entire range of South Asia security issues, nuclear and non-nuclear. Through that meeting and those scheduled in the future, we hope to reach out to India and Pakistan. Our intent is not to make them pariah States, but to engage and to convince them it is in their own national security interests to do what the international community is urging them to do.

We have called upon India and Pakistan, and continue to do so, to take steps to avert an arms race and reduce tensions. Both nations should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty immediately and without conditions. They should also refrain from deploying missiles of all types. They should cease production of fissile material and should enter into negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, and do so in good faith. They should also formalize their pledge not to export dangerous weapons and technologies. They should refrain from missile testing of any sort, since any such test is a provocative action.

They should do all of these things not only because the Security Council or the nuclear-weapon States proclaim the importance of immediate steps to halt a dangerous arms race in South Asia. They should do so because it is in their own best interests to take these steps. The path they have started down does not add to

their security but diminishes it. We call upon them to turn back now.

India and Pakistan must also understand in no uncertain terms that their tests and subsequent declarations do not make them nuclear-weapon States. We will not support amendment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to permit their accession as nuclear-weapon States, because to do so would completely undermine the very purpose of the NPT and the international non-proliferation regime.

We also call upon Pakistan and India to work towards a reduction of tensions between them. Each has legitimate security concerns. We have already extended our hand to the parties to offer our assistance to help improve their confidence and thus their security. I repeat the offer again on behalf of my Government.

The Kashmir region has the potential to be the spark that ignites a conflict no one may be able to stop. We urge both India and Pakistan to work to avoid striking the match. We believe there are a number of steps they can take to reduce the chances that a miscalculation or misunderstanding leads to a situation neither side can truly want. They should avoid threatening movements near the line of control, any crossing of the line by military or security forces, cross-border infiltrations, or other provocative acts in the area.

The United States calls upon India and Pakistan to take heed of both the Communiqué issued by the five permanent members on 4 June in Geneva and the message contained within the draft resolution we are about to adopt. They are not calls for punishment or penalty. They are instead a call by the international community for restraint, for caution and for good sense. We strongly and sincerely urge the leaders of both nations to resist the temptation to act rashly today so that their children will have the opportunity to live in a stable and peaceful South Asia tomorrow.

Mr. Amorim (Brazil): Let me state first of all that on repeated occasions the Brazilian Government has deeply deplored the nuclear tests conducted on 11 and 13 May by India, and on 28 and 30 May by Pakistan. That expression of concern and consternation was forthright and unequivocal.

Once more, the Brazilian Government calls upon both India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to contribute towards the

entry into force of that instrument. Brazil also appeals to both Governments to exercise restraint, reduce tensions, promote dialogue on the peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues and engage in a process of meaningful cooperation. Such steps would not only bring concrete benefits to the peoples of the two nations, but also enhance their status and prestige before the international community.

When President Fernando Henrique Cardoso asked for Congressional consent to the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 20 June 1997, he stressed that in today's world, nuclear weapons represent only "a drain in resources and a source of risk and uncertainty".

We therefore noted with extreme concern a chain of events that brought South Asia to the brink of a nuclear-arms race, endangered the nuclear non-proliferation regime and made global efforts towards nuclear disarmament even more difficult. These regrettable events reinforce the urgency of the adoption by all nuclear Powers of concrete measures for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Brazil associates itself with the statements of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Policy Coordination — the Rio Group — issued in Panama City, and with resolution C/E/Res.39 of the Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).

The Rio Group deplored the conduct of nuclear tests anywhere in the world and the negative effects of any such tests on international peace, the environment and human health. The Rio Group also appealed to the international community to start immediately negotiations on nuclear disarmament, with a view to setting up concrete measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Brazil took an active part over the last three decades in the campaign for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and most recently in the initiative that led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 50/70 A, of 12 December 1995, on "Nuclear testing". That resolution, besides deploring the nuclear testing then being conducted by two nuclear Powers, reaffirmed in its second preambular paragraph that

“the cessation of all nuclear testing will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and therefore to the further enhancement of international peace and security”.

This remains our view.

We welcome, in this context, the statement of the Foreign Ministers of the five nuclear Powers on 4 June 1998, in which they reiterate their determination to fulfil their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT. By endorsing in operative paragraph 2 the Joint Communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers of those countries, the draft resolution before us enhances the legal value of that statement.

Brazil will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. Jagne (Gambia): My country's policy on the issue of disarmament in general, and the strict observance of the regime on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction in particular, has always been consistent. This is why we still acclaim the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as beacons of hope in our collective endeavour to make this world a safer place for present and future generations.

Let me hasten to point out, however, that continued adherence to the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will depend to a large extent on the equal treatment of all States. Having one set of rules for some and another for others cannot be justified and is therefore unhelpful and untenable. It goes without saying that the world would have been a much safer and saner place if we had all played the game according to the same rules.

The Gambia's long-established relations of cooperation and friendship with both Pakistan and India allow us to state in no uncertain terms that common sense and goodwill will always prevail and we are therefore reassured in our assessment of the situation that the much dreaded nuclear arms race in South Asia will not even be contemplated and should not be contemplated.

Finally, by voting in favour of this draft resolution, my delegation will simply be reiterating its firm conviction that nuclear disarmament is an obligation of all States without exception.

Mr. Dejammet (France) (*interpretation from French*): The nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May, together with the tension in South Asia, have aroused profound concern throughout the world.

France has deplored and condemned these tests, which run counter to global efforts against nuclear proliferation and to the very broad international adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The Foreign Ministers of China, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and France met on 4 June in Geneva. In a Joint Communiqué, they made specific proposals and outlined future action which the Council will endorse when it adopts today's draft resolution.

Given the situation in South Asia, France feels that it is a matter of priority to preserve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime established under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). France reaffirms its attachment to the implementation of the decisions and the resolution adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

We call on India and Pakistan, as well as on the other States that have not yet done so, to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions. Our objective remains the accession of all countries, including India and Pakistan, to the NPT as it stands and without modification.

We call on India and Pakistan to participate, at the Conference on Disarmament and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We take note of the response of those two great countries to our requests.

We cannot underestimate the regional dimension of the tension in South Asia. The disputes between the two countries, particularly on Kashmir, are at the root of today's problems. It is essential that we actively seek a solution to these problems through direct bilateral dialogue, as well as through the establishment of confidence-building measures. To ensure peace, security and stability in the region, it is our duty to encourage India and Pakistan to make that choice.

If we are to attain all these objectives, we feel that it would be desirable to continue to promote dialogue and cooperation with India and Pakistan and to avoid coercive

measures. But these two countries must also display restraint and demonstrate, by acting in accordance with the Security Council's requests, their willingness to commit themselves to this path.

It is in this spirit that the French delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. Dangué-Réwaka (Gabon) (*interpretation from French*): Once again, we are facing the threat of a nuclear arms race. In similar circumstances, the ideal would be for the Security Council to adopt a consistent attitude of firmness and disapproval, regardless of who stands accused. We are obliged to note, however, that in fact, in certain cases, the Council's assessments are subject to equivocation and some subjectivism.

That is why we would have preferred, *inter alia*, that operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution under consideration be worded in the same terms as the statements adopted by the Council in similar circumstances.

Having said that, in our desire for unity and a constructive spirit, we will associate ourselves with the consensus.

Mr. Buallay (Bahrain) (*interpretation from Arabic*): At the outset, I wish to express the gratitude and appreciation of my country's delegations to the delegations of Japan, Sweden, Slovenia and Costa Rica for their commendable efforts to achieve a consensus formula on the draft resolution before us today.

Bahrain, which is committed to international peace and security, has on several occasions called on the international community to strive for nuclear non-proliferation and the complete banning of tests. We are convinced that these destructive weapons, which could destroy all mankind, must be banished from our world.

On this basis, Bahrain invites the two neighbouring countries, Pakistan and India, with which we are friends, to demonstrate the utmost possible restraint and to take the steps necessary to reduce and eliminate the causes of tension between them through dialogue. In this way, they may find solutions to the problems that hamper relations of good-neighbourliness between them.

My country welcomes the efforts of the Secretary-General in this respect. We are convinced that dialogue between the two countries is the best way to ease tensions in South Asia.

Having raised the issue of peace and stability in South Asia, we are prompted to raise that of peace and stability in a neighbouring region of no less importance: the Middle East. My country has constantly called for its establishment as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. We are convinced that peace and security must be achieved in that region and that nuclear war and its potential effects on property and human beings must be avoided there.

Mr. Qin Huasun (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): In total disregard of the opposition and protest of the international community, India conducted five nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May, thus suddenly bringing tension to the South Asia subcontinent. Then Pakistan carried out its own nuclear tests. This serious development of events has posed grave challenges to international peace and security in the post-cold-war era and aroused the concern of the whole international community.

To prevent an arms race in South Asia, halt the further escalation of tensions in the region and safeguard the international non-proliferation regime, the Foreign Ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council met in Geneva on 4 June and issued a joint communiqué. The ministers made a coordinated response to the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan. They expressed their deep concern about the tension in the subcontinent and pledged to cooperate closely to prevent an arms race in the region, to bolster the non-proliferation regime and to encourage the peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan.

The ministers also pledged that they would actively encourage India and Pakistan to try to build confidence rather than seek confrontation, and to find mutually acceptable resolutions through dialogue that addressed the root causes of the tension, including the question of Kashmir. In that connection, the ministers urged both parties to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations and other provocative acts. The coordinated action taken by the ministers of the Five under the present circumstances is of great and far-reaching significance. The draft resolution before us, by giving its endorsement to the joint communiqué, fully acknowledges the positive results of the meeting.

We hope that the joint efforts of the Council and the rest of the international community will prevent an arms race in South Asia, strengthen the international non-

proliferation regime, move the countries concerned to peaceful resolution of their differences and eradicate the root causes of the tensions.

The nuclear tests carried out by India and then by Pakistan have dealt a heavy blow to international non-proliferation efforts. Under the present circumstances, what is most urgent, in our view, is to take measures to call on India and Pakistan to exercise restraint, stop all further nuclear tests, abandon their nuclear-weapons development programme, make a commitment not to weaponize or to deploy nuclear weapons and pledge to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons immediately and unconditionally.

The draft resolution before us fully confirms the importance of those two treaties and the determination of the international community to continue to adhere to the treaties, and makes corresponding demands of the two countries in explicit terms. This is an extremely wise and necessary thing to do.

The recent nuclear tests have also further strained the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and have undermined the relative peace and stability in the subcontinent. What is worrisome is that the two countries have once again entered into military engagement in Kashmir. There is no doubt that the escalation of the Kashmir dispute will cause the situation to further deteriorate, which will not only bring untold suffering to the two countries and their peoples, but will inevitably endanger the peace and stability of South Asia, Asia and the world at large.

In order to defuse the tensions in the region, we call upon India and Pakistan to be calm and restrained, to resume talks between them, to halt any statements or movements that might further escalate the tensions, and to refrain from engaging in an arms race. In Kashmir, they should respect and adhere to the control line. They should under no circumstances step across the control line or seek to change the state of affairs in the region unilaterally. On this basis, the countries should look for a solution acceptable to both sides, in accordance with the principles in the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Simla Agreement, and through peaceful negotiations. We are opposed to any action which pursues regional hegemony.

The draft resolution before us is the Council's response to the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan, as well as to the tension in South Asia. We

hope that India and Pakistan will respond to the call of the international community and implement the draft resolution in earnest. The international community should continue to follow closely the development of events in the subcontinent and encourage and create a favourable external climate in which India and Pakistan can resolve their differences peacefully. In the light of the nature of the dispute in the subcontinent, the Council should play a major and pivotal role.

In addressing and helping resolve the situation in South Asia, China will as always take a fair and responsible position and continue to play a constructive role.

In view of what I have said, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Portugal.

I would like to state that in voting in favour of the draft resolution before us, Portugal's position is fully reflected in the statement that will be made by the presidency of the European Union.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/1998/476.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Bahrain, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, France, Gabon, Gambia, Japan, Kenya, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1172 (1998).

I now call on the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General: The nuclear tests in India and Pakistan are unquestionably disturbing developments with far-reaching consequences for the region and for the international community. They affect the peace and stability of South Asia, a region that has been one of the

cradles of human civilization, a region with great potential for economic and social development. They also impact seriously on the ongoing process of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and its future, and on our common security.

It is significant that the Security Council, which under the Charter has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should speak with one voice and without delay on these developments. I thank the sponsors for their initiative and for their hard work to achieve a resolution which addresses the concerns of all members of the Council.

I would like in particular to welcome the call to India and Pakistan to resume their bilateral talks on the issues that have sadly divided them. I will continue my own efforts to encourage this dialogue, in the hope that it will reduce tensions and the danger of an escalation into a nuclear arms race.

Over the past several years there have been encouraging signs that the world might be moving towards ending the global nuclear arms race as the process of nuclear disarmament continued to be implemented in terms of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Developments that contradict or impede this process must certainly be avoided as we move together towards the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons in a safer and better world for us all and for future generations.

Sir John Weston (United Kingdom): I have the honour to make the following statement on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union — Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia — and the associated country Cyprus, as well as the European Free Trade Association country member of the European Economic Area, Iceland, align themselves with this statement.

The European Union warmly welcomes the adoption of this resolution, which reflects the abhorrence of the international community as a whole at the recent nuclear tests carried out first by India and then by Pakistan, and its deep concern about the threat posed to the peace and stability of the South Asia region by nuclear and missile proliferation. As the European Union has already made clear, we condemn these actions, which run counter to the will expressed by the 149 signatories of the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to cease nuclear testing, and to efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

The European Union remains fully committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and calls on all States which have not yet done so to become parties to it. The European Union also remains fully committed to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The European Union urges India and Pakistan to take early steps to demonstrate their commitment to international efforts on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament by signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and moving to ratify it; by contributing actively and without conditions towards the opening of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; by exerting stringent controls over the export of material, equipment and technology controlled under the Nuclear Suppliers' Group trigger and dual use lists and the Missile Technology Control Regime annex; and by committing themselves neither to assemble nuclear devices nor to deploy such devices on delivery vehicles, and to cease development and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

The European Union will follow closely the evolution of the situation and take appropriate action should India and Pakistan not sign and move to ratify the relevant international non-proliferation agreements, in particular the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, without conditions.

The European Union also urges India and Pakistan to engage in a dialogue which addresses the root causes of the tension between them, and to try to build confidence rather than seek confrontation.

The President: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Mr. Kamal Kharrazi. I welcome him on behalf of the Council and invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kharrazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): Permit me to express my felicitations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June. I would also like to express appreciation

to the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador of Kenya for their leadership during the month of May.

The subject before the Council today is a vital issue, one which needs to be addressed comprehensively with an approach that looks to the future. The vital importance to my country of the issue under consideration needs no elaboration. The Islamic Republic of Iran is greatly concerned about the recent nuclear tests, which raise the potential for the escalation of tension, uncertainty and an arms race.

My trip to Islamabad and New Delhi immediately before my trip to New York is an indication of our concern and of the importance that we attach to this issue, not only for the future of our region but also for the implications that it may have for international peace and security. In my discussions with the officials of both countries, I listened very carefully to their arguments and concerns, and the bases of their decisions to conduct nuclear tests. Our discussions centred around the possible dangers, as well as the means to try to avoid an escalation of the situation.

The recent developments in South Asia are the synthesis of a number of historical and legal factors, chief among them the perception of the countries concerned about the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear Powers to heed the call of the international community for comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

Inadequate attention and the failure to adopt concrete actions on global nuclear disarmament, the unpopular insistence on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to remain on the same course, particularly after the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and despite the wish of the international community to make progress on the basis of the near-universal consensus on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and the selective approach to the implementation of the Treaty's provisions are among the reasons that are said to have contributed to the present situation.

Furthermore, the refusal to allow the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and aloofness to the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States during the formative deliberations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are deemed to be instrumental factors in the nuclear tests, which have raised international alarm and which the international community regrets, to say the least. Hence, the wilfully inadequate response to the international

call for serious progress on nuclear disarmament is partly to be blamed for the situation at hand.

The recent nuclear tests have caused serious concern to the entire international community, particularly to the countries in the region. That has been the reason behind our approach to both countries, expressing deep concern to encourage them to sharpen their efforts at defusing the situation and at finding ways to reduce tension.

It is in this context that we view the present Security Council resolution: as an attempt on the part of the international community to manage the situation. The reaction of the Security Council comes as no surprise. Neither is it surprising that attempts are being made to persuade both India and Pakistan to refrain from further nuclear tests, exercise maximum restraint and resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, and to impress upon them the negative impact of their nuclear tests on peace and stability in the region and beyond in order to defuse the situation.

We believe that the resolution would have been more effective and representative of the views of the international community were it to have reflected the broader concerns of non-nuclear weapons States. These concerns include the fulfillment of the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament by agreeing to commence international negotiations on nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework, the necessity of ensuring the universality of the NPT in an expeditious manner through urging all States to join the Treaty without exception and a speedy commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the stockpiling and production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Notwithstanding all these concerns, we believe that capitalizing on an approach marked by positive reinforcement in the subcontinent would be more useful than concentrating on the negatives. Having said this, and in the light of my discussions in Islamabad and New Delhi, as I pointed out at the meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 4 June, I believe that the following areas of common interests to both countries present a basis for initiatives that they could explore.

The first is a renewed commitment to resume and continue a comprehensive dialogue on all outstanding issues in a sustained manner with a view to their early

resolution and with the objective of promoting a friendly and harmonious relationship between Pakistan and India and stability in the region. The dialogue would include, *inter alia*, important issues of peace and security, Jammu and Kashmir, nuclear issues, including joining the NPT and the CTBT, and other measures to build confidence. These issues could be dealt with through pre-arranged mechanisms, which would include discussions at the highest possible levels, where appropriate.

The second is a commitment to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests to ensure the success of the dialogue.

The final area is a commitment to engage in an immediate discussion with a representative group of non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and signatories to the CTBT for the purpose of joining those treaties. In this context, it seems that the removal of export controls and other impediments to access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes is an important consideration for signing the CTBT and for making commitments consistent with the letter and the spirit of the NPT.

In the light of the gravity of events and the strong position of the international community against nuclear tests, these ideas may seem disproportionately inadequate. That may be the case. But if they are implemented, they will be likely to provide a broad basis for a process to be developed which would hopefully gain momentum of its own and disclose the path to a more secure future.

The situation at hand is a good example of an area where the good offices of the Secretary-General can be best utilized. As a neighbouring country, the Islamic Republic of Iran would find some comfort if and when the Secretary-General, as a seasoned and globally respected diplomat and figure of authority, could also be engaged in bringing normalcy to the region. We stand ready to help and support him in this endeavour.

Despite the setback in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in our region, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a party to the NPT and a signatory of the CTBT, remains fully committed to its international obligations under these regimes.

The recent developments in India and Pakistan have highlighted the imperative of ensuring the universality of the NPT. This imperative also applies to the Middle East, where Israeli intransigence in refusing to accede to the NPT

and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards has endangered the entire region. It is therefore necessary to develop a non-discriminatory approach at the international level to the issue of non-proliferation and to exert pressure on Israel to heed the call of the international community and, by joining the NPT, to allow for the establishment of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The President: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Australia. I invite her to take a seat at the Council table and to make her statement.

Ms. Wensley (Australia): Australia is pleased to be able to participate in this extremely important open debate in response to the recent series of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. Nuclear proliferation, with the attendant horrifying risks of a nuclear war, constitutes the worst possible threat to international peace and security. It is therefore essential that the Security Council, with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the Charter, take action on this issue and remain seized of it until it is resolved. It is true that the Security Council acts on behalf of United Nations Member States, but we believe it is vital when such serious threats to regional and global security occur that the wider membership be given the opportunity to present views directly to the Council and thus to contribute to Security Council deliberations by participating in formal meetings of this kind.

Australia has a direct security interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are therefore deeply concerned at nuclear testing by India and Pakistan. After years of calls from the international community, the General Assembly's adoption in 1996, by an overwhelming majority, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) established a powerful international norm against the testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan less than two years after this historic standard-setting action directly challenged the Treaty and the international consensus against nuclear testing that it represents.

These tests also challenge the international non-proliferation regime, threaten the process of nuclear disarmament and set back efforts to work towards the

goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. They are totally irreconcilable with claims by both countries that they are committed to nuclear disarmament.

Beyond this grave threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, the tests undertaken by India and Pakistan's decision to respond with its own tests heighten the tension between them, threaten the security of South Asia and raise the alarming prospect of a nuclear arms race in that region. The pursuit by both countries of nuclear-capable ballistic-missile programmes is an additional cause for alarm and tension.

Australia's response to the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan has been firm and unequivocal. We condemn them as we do all nuclear testing. We have instituted a number of bilateral measures, including the suspension of bilateral defence relations with both India and Pakistan, the suspension of non-humanitarian aid and the suspension of bilateral visits by ministers and senior officials. We have called on both countries — and we reiterate that call today in this Council — to announce immediately the cessation of all further nuclear testing and renounce their nuclear-weapons programmes. We call on them to sign and ratify unconditionally the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to join 186 States by acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We call on them to engage in negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. We call, too, for both countries to take steps urgently to resume constructive political dialogue and negotiations on the issues that divide them, including, importantly, with respect to Kashmir.

We have heard some refer, in connection with nuclear tests in South Asia, to the slow pace of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Australia is committed to the twin goals embodied in the NPT of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. If fulfilment by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT was stalled during the cold war, that is no longer the case. Dramatic cuts in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States have been made under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) process, which, when completed, will further reduce those arsenals to some 80 per cent below cold-war peaks. Beyond the START process, the international community will be looking to a process of plurilateral and multilateral disarmament, with the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We want and we urge all the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate these processes as much as possible. And in this context we do welcome the

reaffirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States in the P-5 communiqué and in the resolution to fulfil their commitment to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT.

But it defies logic and credibility to pretend that the emergence of nuclear weapons in two new States, outside the norms of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, will assist, rather than retard and complicate, the task of nuclear disarmament. The international community has a clear responsibility to respond to such proliferation by stating that we do not want and we will not tolerate the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States.

Australia, therefore, supports fully the Security Council resolution just adopted.

I have already referred in this statement to many of the key elements in the resolution, and I don't want to repeat our support for them here. But the resolution does deal with some other important issues that I have not yet mentioned.

These include the reference to States' preventing the export to India and Pakistan of equipment, materials or technology that could be used to develop their nuclear-weapons capacity. In this respect we would emphasize not only the importance of national policies but also the commitment made by all NPT parties to the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This states that new supply arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon States — that is, to all countries but the five nuclear-weapon States — should require acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

A further important element in the resolution is the call on India and Pakistan to stop immediately their nuclear-weapons development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons and to cease development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

Finally, we also welcome the references to the Secretary-General's efforts to encourage dialogue between India and Pakistan and endorse the request for him to report back to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.

Australia is known for its deep commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We remain deeply committed to these goals. And so do most Member States of this Organization. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan is in flagrant disregard of the will of the international community. It must not go unchallenged. We believe it is very important to speak out clearly and strongly on this matter. We believe also that the international community has a shared responsibility to take action quickly, effectively and without reservation to help reverse both the trend towards proliferation and increased tension in South Asia and the challenge presented to the global non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. The adoption of this resolution is an important initial step in this direction.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of the Republic of Korea. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Lee (Republic of Korea): Let me express at the outset my sincere appreciation to you, Mr. President, and through you to the members of the Security Council, for allowing my delegation to participate in the debate of the Council on the agenda item before it. This being my first occasion to address the Council as the permanent representative of my country, may I also take this opportunity to congratulate you on the assumption of the Presidency of the Council for the month of June.

The Republic of Korea is deeply concerned at the serious threat that the testing of nuclear devices by India and then by Pakistan poses to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, to regional stability in South Asia and, above all, to international peace and security. These tests are all the more regrettable as they come at a time when the international community has made consistent strides towards a strengthened regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament through the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as towards increasing its universality and through the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). My Government has been closely watching the developments with great concern and acute interest, not only as a signatory to the NPT and CTBT but also as a country that declared a denuclearization policy voluntarily and unequivocally in 1991.

We firmly believe that the international community should rise to the challenges posed by the testing in a resolute manner. Failing to do so would undermine the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and prompt the escalation of a nuclear arms race in the region

and beyond. We are particularly concerned that it would also send the wrong message to other parts of the world, further destabilizing the very foundations of the global non-proliferation regime. In this regard, we strongly applaud a series of initiatives taken by the Security Council as the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, and we wholeheartedly endorse the resolution just adopted by the Council today as comprehensive in scope and balanced in content. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its appreciation to the sponsors of the resolution, in particular Japan and Sweden, for their initiative and persistent efforts to produce a text with the broadest possible consensus among Council members.

My delegation fully associates itself with Council members in calling upon all countries concerned to stop their nuclear- weapon development programmes and in strongly urging all States that have not done so to join the NPT and CTBT without delay and without conditions. We are also of the view that recent events once again confirm the urgent need for reaching early agreement on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

We are deeply concerned that the threat posed by the nuclear tests in South Asia could spread to other regions through the transfer of technology for nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles to and from the third countries. We attach particular importance to this danger, as it clearly poses the risk of a domino effect under the pressure of nuclear proliferation. The Republic of Korea firmly believes that the spread of nuclear-weapon technology should be prevented at all costs with concerted action by the international community, as a prerequisite to make the world a safer place in which to live.

Given the gravity of the risks and the uncertainty involved, we believe that the Security Council should remain actively seized of the matter and ready to consider further steps, as it sees fit, to ensure the prompt and full implementation of the present resolution.

My delegation also recognizes the role of the Secretary-General in matters related to international peace and security and therefore welcomes his efforts to defuse tension in the region by encouraging dialogue and reconciliation, as he has done in many parts of the world. In this regard, we are looking forward to his report to the Council, as requested in the resolution.

For our part, I assure you, Mr. President, that my Government will continue to do its best to work with Council members towards the cause of a nuclear-weapon-free world. In this connection, we welcome the decision to allow the participation of non-members today as yet more proof of the strong commitment of Council members under your leadership to enhancing the transparency of the workings of the Council.

To conclude, I should like to reiterate the firm commitment of my Government to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in general, and to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula in particular, as it has manifested on a number of occasions.

The President: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for the kind words he addressed to me and to the members of the Security Council.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Fowler (Canada): I should like to begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for convening an open debate on the situation created by the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. I must, however, express my country's regret that the views of Member States not members of the Security Council are being heard only after consideration and after adoption of such a resolution, dealing as it does with matters of such vital concern to all Member States.

(spoke in French)

We are meeting here today in order to avoid a new nuclear realpolitik. The nuclear tests that India and Pakistan have carried out are a clear and fundamental threat to international security. Thirty years of success in the management of the risk of nuclear proliferation have been compromised, and the consensus of the 186 nations that have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been mocked.

India and Pakistan have returned the world to the dark years of nuclear terror, with dangerous political and security arguments put forward to justify the proliferation of, or to retain, nuclear weapons. The chief result of such a nuclear realpolitik would be the acceptance of India and Pakistan into the circle of nuclear-weapon States. This would mark one of the most serious steps backward in the process of nuclear disarmament.

Canada believes very firmly that the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, should take no measure that would enable India and Pakistan to acquire, de facto or *de jure*, the status of nuclear-weapon States. The NPT recognizes five — and only five — nuclear-weapon States. If this number can be raised to seven, then other countries might want to join the club. The world cannot stand by idly in the face of such a possibility.

(spoke in English)

Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT also have a very particular responsibility. Over the past 30 years, they have acted responsibly, forgoing nuclear weapons of their own while working multilaterally in support of nuclear disarmament. The Security Council and the international community need to invalidate the concept of nuclear weapons as a currency of modern geopolitical authority. According to the Charter of the United Nations, Security Council membership is open to those countries which contribute to the maintenance of peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization. This obligation weighs particularly heavily on the permanent members of the Council.

Countries which deliberately undermine peace and security and flout the will of the international community have voided their claim to Security Council membership, let alone a permanent place in the management of the post-cold-war world.

Canada welcomes the Security Council resolution on this issue and the commitment of the Council to remain actively engaged. Today's meeting, to which all interested United Nations Members have been invited, recognizes that all members of the international community have a vital interest in resolving the current, dangerous situation.

Measures directed at India and Pakistan should be aimed at convincing the two countries to renounce their nuclear-weapon programmes. The people of India and Pakistan — one-fifth of the world's population — and their neighbours have never been in greater danger.

The Governments of India and Pakistan owe it to their people to pull back from the course they have chosen towards a nuclear dead-end. Sustained international dissuasive pressure must be applied to convince these two countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to look beyond it to the NPT.

Canada has taken a number of unilateral measures to signal to these two countries that we profoundly oppose what they have done. These measures have included the recall of the Canadian High Commissioners to India and Pakistan; the ban of military exports to both countries; the suspension of high-level contacts; and the suspension of bilateral aid programmes to these two countries in all areas except for humanitarian assistance. Canadian relations with India and Pakistan are on hold; there is no business as usual.

Action directed at India and Pakistan is obviously not enough. The more of these weapons there are and the more nations that have them, the more likely it is that they will be used. These mathematics are inexorable and ought to be of concern to all of us.

Within the community of nations, we must recommit ourselves to putting nuclear disarmament back on track, and urgently. The future credibility of the non-proliferation process depends not only on a renunciation by these two countries of their weapons programmes, but also on the good faith performance of the nuclear-weapon States. They must keep their end of the NPT bargain — a promise that not all have treated with the same urgency. There must be visible and consistent progress on both sides of the NPT equation.

It is time to take pragmatic steps in nuclear weapons reductions and to ensure transparency in the disarmament process. In supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the enhanced NPT review process provides the means to achieve this and needs to be used to better advantage. It is time for the Conference on Disarmament, the General Assembly's First Committee and the NPT review process to move quickly beyond their current sterile debates. The people of the world need progress on nuclear weapons reduction, and on disarmament more generally.

The international community cannot afford to succumb to nuclear fatalism. We have re-entered a dangerous time, one which challenges each United Nations Member to play its own positive and constructive role.

In addressing this crisis, we need to send three unequivocal messages. First, to India and Pakistan: we condemn your tests and urge you to renounce your nuclear weapons programmes. You deserve no reward for these irresponsible acts.

Secondly, to the nuclear-weapon States: fulfil your commitments to reduce your nuclear weapons stocks.

Finally, to all here present in the body charged with maintaining international peace and security: carry out your responsibility by implementing the resolution you have adopted.

The President: I thank the representative of Canada for his kind words addressed to me. Members of the Security Council certainly took note of his initial remark.

The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The Security Council has convened today to reaffirm its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security, including through the provisions of Article 26 of the Charter, which should be aimed first and foremost at nuclear disarmament, particularly following the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia in May.

These tests are a cause of deep concern to the entire international community, not solely because they represent a real setback for the efforts of the international community to achieve the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific schedule. These explosions should not be considered as falling outside the non-proliferation regime or its effective scope, whether the proliferation be vertical or horizontal.

Time has vindicated Egypt's true far-sightedness when it warned, at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, that the Treaty's indefinite extension — without the achievement of universality through the accession of all States without exception — would provide to the non-Parties to the Treaty capable of producing nuclear weapons outside international control the conditions conducive to developing and producing these weapons, regardless of the grave threat they pose to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The NPT's historic record clearly shows that the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT have always strongly called for the provision of security assurances, in accordance with their commitment under this Treaty not to seek to develop nuclear weapons, to protect them from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is incumbent upon us now to evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguards regime for the non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the NPT. Despite the Security Council's adoption of resolutions 255 (1968) and 984

(1995), the recent nuclear explosions and their aftermath require the Security Council to reconsider the entire range of security assurances and to undertake measures to maintain the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

Resolution 984 (1995) is inadequate in the face of the Security Council's Charter responsibility, as it provides neither the required deterrence to any State that might contemplate the use of nuclear weapons nor the minimum protection or guarantees of urgent and comprehensive assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States subject to nuclear threat or attack.

It is now more urgent than ever that we establish an effective regime of active and passive safeguards by which the Security Council would unequivocally decide that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. Such a threat would require the Security Council's intervention to deter it within the framework of the collective security regime laid out in Chapter VII of the Charter. In this respect, the Council's responsibility for providing urgent and comprehensive assistance to States subject to such a threat should be clear and indisputable.

It goes without saying that this intervention by the Council should in no circumstance be subject to the veto, since the destructive power of nuclear weapons requires that the effectiveness and credibility of the Council's measures be preserved. In other words, the voting rules laid out in paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter should not be in force in cases of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In this context the conclusion of an agreement in which nuclear Powers are committed not to use their nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear States which are parties to the Treaty will serve as a contractual undertaking and an important dimension for the protection of non-nuclear States. The General Assembly — which adopted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 — the Conference on Disarmament and the Conference of the Parties to the NPT have a role to play in maintaining their cooperation, solidarity and continuity of efforts to achieve this goal.

The nuclear dangers which today threaten humanity impose a special responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States far greater than the responsibility they impose on non-nuclear States. Despite some limited achievements,

which we recognize, the nuclear States still hesitate to implement their contractual commitments to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. The failure of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to undertake any objective or significant discussion on nuclear disarmament in the years since the indefinite extension of the Treaty reveals that the nuclear States believed the indefinite extension to be a goal in itself and not a means to implement what was agreed upon.

The foot-dragging by nuclear-weapon States in implementing their contractual commitments with regard to nuclear disarmament is in sharp contrast with the pressing desire of the international community to renounce completely these weapons and may prompt other countries to seek to enjoy the same advantages as the nuclear-weapon States. The report of the Canberra Commission is clear in saying that

(spoke in English)

“The proposition that large numbers of nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used, accidentally or by decision, defies credibility.

“The only complete defence ... is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again.”

(spoke in Arabic)

In this respect we should be guided by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which reaffirmed the illegality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

All this evidence proves just one point: that having nuclear weapons does not serve any special or public interest and that they should be renounced completely.

When we talk about the implementation of what was agreed upon, Egypt feels extreme bitterness over the hesitation of some States to commit themselves to the package deal which was the basis for the adoption of the resolution on the indefinite extension of the Treaty. We who participated in that Conference recall and are quite mindful of the fact that that resolution was adopted within the framework of a package deal which included three decisions and a resolution. The first decision was on strengthening the process of the review of the Treaty; the second was on the principles and objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament; and the third was

on the extension of the NPT. In addition, there was also an important resolution regarding the Middle East in which the international community clearly recognized the danger and importance of the situation in that region.

It was regrettable to witness in the meetings of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Conference, which was held in Geneva last month, that some States are trying to evade their commitments under this package deal and express scepticism on the possibility of implementing parts of the resolution on the Middle East.

Egypt would like to express its deep concern vis-à-vis the consequences of the failure to realize the universality of the NPT, and we reiterate our deep conviction that if Israel were to remain outside the framework of the Treaty — despite its ambiguous nuclear policies and its refusal to place its nuclear installations under the comprehensive safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — this would definitely lead to grave consequences not only for stability and security in the region but also for international peace and security and, even more so, for the credibility and continuity of the non-proliferation regime, at the forefront of which is the NPT. That credibility will be undermined if the international community does not act with solidarity and undertake the necessary measures to face this situation as soon as possible.

Accordingly, since 1974 Egypt has pursued its goal to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. In this connection, the initiative launched by President Hosni Mubarak on 18 April 1990 to establish a zone in the Middle East free from all weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them is an extension of Egypt's original call to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This call was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly in 1980.

The Arab States, as evidence of their genuine desire to achieve the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, have without exception joined the NPT and placed all their nuclear installations under the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA. The Arab States of Africa have joined the Treaty of Pelindaba in order to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. This was an initiative to demonstrate their complete confidence in this regime. However, this did not result in any response by Israel, which persists in not adhering to the NPT. This has led to a military imbalance in the Middle East which threatens international peace and security and which may undermine the non-proliferation regime.

In this vein, we find that the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 resulted in multilateral negotiations on arms control and regional security in the Middle East. At Egypt's request, this issue is considered one of the essential elements to be agreed upon regionally in order to establish genuine peace and stability in the area, as we believe that security and peace cannot prevail in any region where there is a security imbalance or where one party has the advantage.

Despite the fact that Israel originally called for negotiations to establish that region, the negotiations which took place in the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group under the umbrella of multilateral negotiations have been at an impasse for three years as a result of Israel's persistence in aborting any attempt to begin serious negotiations to establish this zone or even to hold consultations on the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction within the regional framework.

The Security Council's consideration of the consequences of the nuclear explosions in South Asia, where a kind of nuclear military balance exists, should prompt the international community to study the consequences of the general rules governing the nuclear disarmament provisions in a number of agreements aimed at the eventual renunciation of nuclear weapons under strict international control. Yet this should not distract our attention from the more dangerous nuclear military imbalance in the Middle East, which makes it incumbent on the Council, the General Assembly and all the States parties to the Treaty to show their responsibility with regard to that region by persuading Israel to adhere to the NPT and to place all its nuclear installations under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards regime and then to work towards establishing a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as soon as possible.

Under the current circumstances we would have expected the Council to single out Israel by name and urge it to adhere to the Treaty instead of merely introducing a general reference in paragraph 13 of the resolution adopted by the Council today. We would have expected the nuclear-weapon States, especially the depositary countries, to take the initiative to implement in earnest the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, which would be conducive to strengthening regional and international peace and security.

The President: The next speaker on my list is the representative of the United Arab Emirates. I invite him

to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Al-Hosani (United Arab Emirates) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I have the honour of expressing to you, Sir, on behalf of the United Arab Emirates, my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are firmly convinced that your great experience will ensure the success of our work.

The course of international events, in particular the developments in the situation between India and Pakistan, both of which last month conducted underground nuclear tests, has confirmed that the challenges facing the world in the field of disarmament are very difficult and complicated, particularly with regard to weapons of mass destruction. There is still competition between countries in their attempt to produce and acquire some of these extremely dangerous weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, especially in States which have disputes with their neighbours, suffer from a kind of psychosis about military imbalance or threats to the security of their national territories, or seek to retain illegitimate control over the territory of others through force and in violation of international law and legitimate international resolutions.

Despite the growing expectations in the immediate post-cold-war period with regard to disarming all nuclear arsenals, the objectives in this area are not easy to achieve at a time when, as can be seen, certain countries are endeavouring to conduct nuclear tests. It seems to us that this is no less serious than the certain adverse consequences of accumulating nuclear weapons. On the contrary, this clearly sanctions the intensification of areas of tension and increases the possibility that they will explode. In one way or another that is the cause of the justified fears that today's world is not one in which security prevails, as was the case after the cold war.

The United Arab Emirates has added its voice to those of other States and has signed the two treaties — the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty — that are an international cornerstone, founded on world security and peace. Despite this, we wish to state here and now that we agree with all of those who have expressed fears about what happened in South Asia, because that region is very close to ours. We are afraid of this arms race and we are also afraid of certain other countries that are trying to acquire such weapons of mass destruction. It seems to us that this can lead only to destruction and tragedy for all of

humanity and for our peoples, and it undermines stability and international peace and security.

We are firmly convinced that disputes must be resolved by peaceful means and that peace and security must be established in the Middle East and in South Asia. That is why we reiterate the opinion expressed in the official communiqué issued last Monday by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In that communiqué we stated that the underground nuclear tests in India and Pakistan are not beneficial to international peace and security but only intensify tension in the region, which does not help to resolve existing problems. That is why we call upon these two States, to which we are bound by a long-standing friendship, to show restraint and return to dialogue so as to relieve the tension between them and thereby strengthen confidence and arrive at a peaceful settlement of the problems facing them so that they can create circumstances conducive to strengthening economic and social development and prosperity in their countries.

We appeal to the international community, which is represented by the Security Council whose mission it is to preserve international peace and security, to follow that peaceful path and use its good offices as a preventive measure so as to contain any escalation of tensions between these countries.

In this connection, we reiterate that the policy of double standards pursued by the Security Council, by which it makes an exception for Israel — the only nuclear-weapon State in the Middle East, and one that is not subject to the international inspections regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — encourages the arms race. That is why the United Arab Emirates is again asking the Security Council and its members to make these treaties international and binding, without providing an exception for any State, and to make the region of the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

This requires international pressure on the Government of Israel to take concrete, urgent measures to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and rid itself of all nuclear weapons, which have shown their dangerous impact on security, the environment and health in neighbouring countries and the entire region. We believe that Israel's continued possession of these dangerous weapons would constitute a major obstacle to efforts to achieve a genuine, just, lasting and peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the situation in the Middle East.

Finally, we reaffirm that a just and lasting peace in a given region requires the political will of Governments to strengthen dialogue, cooperation and measures to build or restore mutual trust, by putting an end to the arms race in all its forms in accordance with principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

The President: I thank the representative of the United Arab Emirates for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of New Zealand. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Powles (New Zealand): Mr. President, at the outset I would like to express my delegation's appreciation for your successful endeavour to hold this open meeting of the Security Council. In addition, as to the procedure being followed, I would like to associate my delegation with the remarks of the Permanent Representative of Canada made earlier today.

My Government has expressed its condemnation of the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. This is consistent with New Zealand's long-standing opposition to nuclear testing by any country, anywhere. We do not believe that nuclear testing is ever justified in any circumstances.

In the same way, my country considers that nuclear weapons have no legitimate place in our world. We have called for urgent progress towards a nuclear-weapons-free future, and we repeat that call now. The International Court of Justice has confirmed, in a unanimous decision, the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects and under strict and effective international control. That obligation applies just as much to India and Pakistan as it does to other States.

India's and Pakistan's actions in testing nuclear devices, planning for weaponization and deployment of nuclear weapons and claiming an entitlement to nuclear-weapon status are inconsistent with that obligation. At a time when countries like New Zealand want to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament, those two countries are looking backwards to an era of nuclear arms build-up, confrontation and deterrence. It is unbelievable that, as President Clinton has said,

"we are about to start the twenty-first century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the worst mistakes of the twentieth century, when we know it is not necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to national greatness or personal fulfilment".

We are gravely concerned that India's and Pakistan's actions are leading to a nuclear arms race in South Asia, which would constitute a major threat to international peace and security. And we deplore both countries' disregard of international norms against nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation.

We are particularly disappointed that India and Pakistan have acted contrary to their stated commitments to nuclear disarmament. Continued calls for a global ban on nuclear weapons lack credibility coming from a country which has displayed its nuclear ambitions. What is now needed from India and Pakistan are tangible acts of commitment, not words.

If India and Pakistan want to repair the damage they have caused to their international standing, they must forthwith renounce their nuclear-weapons programmes, and adhere unconditionally to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as engage in multilateral negotiations on a fissile-material cut-off treaty.

Until that time, India and Pakistan must understand that their behaviour is unacceptable to the international community. For example, their actions inevitably raise questions about their qualifications for membership of the Security Council.

New Zealand supported the request for this meeting because we consider that recent nuclear testing and the developing crisis in South Asia represent the most serious challenge to international stability since the end of the cold war. We therefore welcome the adoption today by the Security Council unanimously of resolution 1172 (1998) and warmly congratulate its sponsors: Japan, Sweden, Costa Rica and Slovenia. We urge the Council to continue to act decisively and effectively to defuse this dangerous situation and to uphold nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The President: I thank the representative of New Zealand for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Mexico. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Tello (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): There is no need to repeat at this meeting the text of the statements of the Government of Mexico contained in press releases issued on 11 and 28 May 1998, in which we condemn unambiguously the underground nuclear tests carried out by India and by Pakistan. Copies of these press releases were sent to all Permanent Missions accredited to the United Nations.

The new situation in South Asia is a cause of profound concern for the entire international community. We are convinced that India and Pakistan must endeavour to create mechanisms that will enable them to find solutions to their historic differences in order to restore trust and stability between them, and ultimately to the rest of the region. Mexico is convinced and will remain convinced that dialogue and negotiation are the best means for resolving differences.

The legacy of horror of 50 years of nuclear tests is just starting to be known. Some of the damage is irreversible. The nightmare history of the impact on vast areas where enormous quantities of nuclear materials, especially enriched uranium and plutonium, have been stored remains to be written.

On the threshold of the twenty-first century, to allow a new nuclear arms race to begin in any part of the world threatens the objectives and the spirit of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, which establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. It also violates the commitments contained in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and those reflected in the consolidation of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas as a single nuclear-weapon-free zone.

People often forget that until recently the entire world was a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The goal for the international community should be to restore that situation as soon as possible. Neither in 1945 nor now can there be any legal or moral justification for acquiring or using atomic bombs. Let us remember that the history of mankind covers more than 100,000 years. The nuclear age, which covers the past 53 years, barely constitutes a minuscule cancer, which must be removed.

Conducting nuclear tests imperils what the vast majority of States support: the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the complete cessation of nuclear tests as an essential part of nuclear disarmament. Once again we appeal to all — all — countries that have not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

In addition, the possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons endangers international peace and security. Existing arsenals do not strengthen security; on the contrary, they weaken it.

All States, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, have an obligation to undertake and conclude negotiations on nuclear disarmament until the world is free of such weapons. The non-proliferation regime is directed towards facilitating the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the dismantling and elimination of existing arsenals, as well as of the delivery systems for these weapons.

The joint communiqué issued on 4 June in Geneva, at the conclusion of the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, indicates that these nuclear-weapon States are resolved to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This commitment, if put into practice, will surely help revive the stalled nuclear-disarmament negotiations.

The commitment of all States to nuclear disarmament does not stem solely from the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In fact, the historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, of 8 July 1996, establishes unambiguously the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

Mexico firmly believes that the international non-proliferation regime must be preserved and its credibility restored. Given current circumstances, it can no longer be argued that nuclear disarmament concerns only the nuclear Powers. As a result of that limited interpretation, the nuclear-disarmament agenda item in the Conference on Disarmament is in a state of virtual paralysis.

It is urgent and essential to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. With political will and without hesitation,

negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be initiated immediately, in order to dispel any doubts about the inescapable commitment of all States to the goal of achieving in the foreseeable future a world free of nuclear weapons. We must take measures commensurate with the gravity of the current situation. Remaining indifferent would only encourage others to follow the extremely dangerous path to nuclear arms build-up.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Ukraine. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Yel'chenko (Ukraine): The delegation of Ukraine is grateful to you, Sir, for convening, although later than we expected, this meeting. I would like to express satisfaction that the appeal initiated and signed by the group of United Nations Member States not members of the Security Council has coincided with a similar appeal launched by members of the Security Council itself.

Needless to say, it is with grave concern that the leadership and the people of Ukraine have responded to the recent developments in the region of South Asia, which forced my country, together with other like-minded Member States, to seek the urgent convening of a special meeting of a Security Council.

There is no doubt that the issue under discussion today — and the name of the agenda item speaks for itself — is crucial to the maintenance of international peace and security. That is why it is a primary responsibility of this authoritative United Nations body.

My Government has already expressed its concern at the nuclear testing conducted by India and by Pakistan. Ukraine condemned these actions as constituting a serious threat to existing international agreements in the field of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our reaction to these events has been clear and, I believe, fully justified. This position is based on the key principles of my country's disarmament policy. Ukraine voluntarily renounced the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal, which it inherited. Thus it assumed the status of a non-nuclear-weapon State, and it continuously demonstrates full compliance with non-nuclear principles, advocating and strongly promoting universal nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, Ukraine, like anyone else, has a moral right to criticize actions that threaten the non-proliferation regime. Ukraine acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1994 and

signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997 as a State whose participation in that treaty was actually essential for its entry into force.

Our position, as well as the positions of the vast majority of States that have signed and ratified both treaties, were based on the belief that such moves would help all of us to ensure an effective non-proliferation regime, to halt the development of nuclear weapons and to create grounds for a step-by-step elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

I have to say that our hopes, beliefs and aspirations have been dashed by nuclear explosions at the Pokaran and Chagai test sites.

It is very important, in our view, that the international community demonstrate all its firmness, cohesiveness and determination to save the principles and the objectives of non-proliferation, to avert the spiral of a nuclear arms race in South Asia and to preserve peace and stability both in this region and globally.

We strongly believe that the one and only way here for India and Pakistan is to become full-fledged parties to the NPT and CTBT without any conditions and without any delay.

Ukraine urges all other States that have not yet done so to become parties to the NPT and to ratify the CTBT in order to expedite its entry into force. We also call upon other Member States to exert every effort to influence India and Pakistan to assume commitments under the NPT and the CTBT.

Ukraine also considers inadmissible any action that could aggravate tensions in the region and — God forbid — cause a major conflict between the two States. In this connection, Ukraine welcomes the declared readiness of India's and Pakistan's leaders to negotiate disputable issues. We are ready to support this process wholeheartedly because we in Ukraine have deep sympathy and great respect for both peoples.

We hope that the Secretary-General will encourage India and Pakistan to enter into an immediate and constructive dialogue, and we welcome his efforts in this respect.

Any other development, even an attempt to preserve the status quo, should be deemed unacceptable. Should this undesirable scenario take place, my Government will

seek consultations with the nuclear Powers which provided the relevant security assurances to Ukraine in connection with its accession to the NPT, in order to look for a new reading of those assurances in view of the latest developments in its close geopolitical environment.

However, we still firmly believe that India and Pakistan will put aside their nuclear ambitions and will not allow any further aggravation of the situation in the region.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to support the main thrust of the resolution just adopted by the Security Council.

At the same time, however, I should like to associate myself with my colleagues from Canada and New Zealand in drawing the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that again, as in other recent instances, United Nations Member States that are not members of the Security Council were not given the option of expressing their positions in the open debate before this important resolution was adopted.

We hope that the voice and the arguments of Ukraine and of other non-members of the Security Council will be duly taken into consideration.

The President: I thank the representative of Ukraine for the kind words he addressed to me.

As I stated previously after the intervention of the Ambassador of Canada, States members of the Security Council certainly have taken note of the remarks made by other Member States.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Argentina. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Petrella (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Allow me to convey to you, Sir, the Republic of Argentina's pleasure at seeing you preside over this meeting. In addition, I wish to express my country's gratitude at the exemplary and dedicated manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Mahugu of Kenya, conducted the work of the Council during the month of May.

Our gratitude also goes to all those who made possible this open debate on an item of grave concern to the international community. We are particularly grateful to

your own delegation and to Japan, Costa Rica, Sweden and Slovenia.

In 1995 Argentina participated actively in the Conference on the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Shortly thereafter, in September 1996, Argentina joined the 130 countries that signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). While we regretted the absence on that memorable occasion of a group of nuclear-weapon States, we had thought it only a temporary situation. Today we see that the non-proliferation regime is in danger, with serious consequences for the established equilibrium and for international peace and security.

It is necessary, now more than ever, for all those States that have not acceded to the NPT or the CTBT to take the necessary steps to become full members of those instruments.

In this connection, we are following closely the process begun in Geneva on 4 June aimed at dealing with the situation created by the recent nuclear tests, because we believe that it is directed towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Argentina, as on previous occasions, expressed in a timely manner its concern about those underground nuclear tests.

The message that Argentina would like to send today is based largely on our own experience. Influenced by the cold-war atmosphere, Argentina debated for decades what turned out to be a spurious dilemma. Having achieved early on complete mastery of the nuclear-fuel cycle, we came to understand fully the dangers and the temptations inherent in the possession of such technology.

Fortunately, however — though not without different kinds of obstacles — we then embarked on a cooperation programme with our neighbour, Brazil. When in 1985 the two countries signed a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, few in either country would have believed that in 1987 the President of Brazil would visit the uranium-enrichment plant in Pilcaniyeu, in Argentine Patagonia, and that one year later the Argentine President would visit a similar installation in Iperó, Brazil. In 1990 both countries implemented this joint nuclear policy, and to this end they created, one year later, the Argentinian-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. This was an unprecedented step in the region.

The increasing cooperation and the encouragement of the international community prompted Argentina, Chile and Brazil to ratify in 1991 the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is only right to emphasize once again here in the Security Council the far-sightedness and leadership of Mexico in the creation of what became the first nuclear-weapon-free zone on earth.

All of these concrete policies led to increased investment in the Argentine energy sector, and our nuclear companies embarked successfully on cooperation agreements with other States as well as organizations such as the European Atomic Energy Community. In addition, with a view to enhancing vital South-South cooperation, Argentine companies transferred technology to neighbouring countries such as Peru and assisted in the construction of nuclear reactors in Algeria and Egypt, *inter alia*. International cooperation also reduced costs for Argentina's nuclear industry, making it possible to channel resources to areas of genuine priority such as health, education and the infrastructure.

Argentina is proud of the role it has played in Latin America and the Caribbean to ease the tensions resulting from those problems. It is for this reason that today we join those countries that have taken the floor to offer alternatives to the situation created in South Asia.

We support the resolution just adopted and in particular the efforts by the Secretary-General to restore stability to relations between India and Pakistan. Our message to the Governments of both countries is simple: there is always time to initiate sincere and productive dialogue. We must not stand idle in the face of a situation that could affect the established equilibrium and the security regime of an entire continent or, even worse, revive the spectre of nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world.

In this respect, we feel that it is precisely those countries that have been able to limit themselves with concrete and transparent measures that could exercise beneficial influence in such a delicate situation, since they offer the best example to follow.

For our part, we trust that the parties involved will take advantage of the experience offered in the reduction of tension and conflict resolution through confidence-building measures. The leaders of Pakistan and India are perfectly familiar with the steps that the international community hopes they will take. We encourage them to take these steps and hope that they will assume the initiative in that direction.

The President: I thank the representative of Argentina for his kind words addressed to me and my predecessor.

The next speaker is the representative of Norway. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Aass (Norway): Norway welcomes the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1172 (1998).

The decisions of India and Pakistan to carry out underground nuclear tests are in clear defiance of international norms and constitute a serious threat to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as to peace and stability in the entire region.

The tests underline the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

There is an urgent need to establish a channel for constructive dialogue between the international community and New Delhi and Islamabad, and to convince India and Pakistan to renounce their nuclear weapon programmes. It is vital to ensure that the situation in South Asia does not deteriorate further to the point of serious instability or war.

We urge India and Pakistan to immediately announce a cessation to all further testing of nuclear weapons and to renounce their nuclear programmes. This is a matter of urgency and essential for generating the confidence needed for security disputes to be resolved through dialogue and negotiations.

India and Pakistan should commit themselves to neither assembling nuclear devices nor deploying such devices on delivery vehicles. India and Pakistan should cease the development and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

We urge India and Pakistan to become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions. We also urge India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Kazakhstan, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ageyev (Kazakhstan) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Kazakhstan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Ageyev (Kazakhstan) (*interpretation from Russian*): It was with profound concern that Kazakhstan learned about the nuclear weapons tests conducted in India and Pakistan in May. We are obliged to note with deep regret that India and Pakistan, carried away by nuclear ambitions, have seriously harmed international security.

This action has threatened the progress made in disarmament and non-proliferation following the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The conduct of nuclear tests is increasing tensions in the South Asian region. Kazakhstan calls on India and Pakistan to refrain from making the nuclear choice and to confirm their desire to achieve a safe and stable world, global partnership and economic development.

Kazakhstan strongly opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and calls on all States to display responsibility and restraint. The leadership of Kazakhstan feels that India and Pakistan should adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kamal (Pakistan): Allow me to begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council and by complimenting your

predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Kenya, on the excellent manner in which he guided the affairs of the Council last month.

Pakistan has kept the United Nations Secretary-General and the Security Council fully informed, at all stages, of the developments pertaining to the current grave situation and security crisis in South Asia. Indeed, to some extent, it was the dereliction of its responsibilities by the Security Council that emboldened India to implement its hegemonic and aggressive designs by crossing the nuclear threshold, threatening the use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan and resorting to nuclear blackmail to impose a military solution on Kashmir. We informed the Council about India's provocative actions and unambiguous expression of intent to commit aggression against Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Council did not pay heed to the impending breach of peace.

Faced with these ominous developments resulting from India's deliberate and calculated actions to alter the strategic equation, Pakistan was left with no choice but to exercise its nuclear option in its supreme national interest to restore the strategic balance and to preserve peace.

For almost 50 years, Pakistan repeatedly drew the attention of the United Nations to the illegal Indian occupation of Jammu and Kashmir. We demanded the implementation of the Council's own resolutions. We sought to draw the attention of the international community to the brutal Indian campaign to deny to the Kashmiri people their inalienable right to self-determination, as provided for in the Council's resolutions.

We repeatedly drew the attention of the Secretary-General and the Security Council to the extremely volatile situation in Kashmir resulting from grave violations of the line of control by Indian troops. We urged the Secretary-General and the Council to take cognizance of this situation and even proposed the strengthening of the present United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.

We regret to note that the Council paid no attention whatsoever to Pakistan's repeated warnings and requests. Today again, the central issue which has bedevilled relations between India and Pakistan and is at the source of all conflicts and tensions in South Asia is being ignored.

Now that the Council is seized of the volatile situation in South Asia, we note with regret that the approach that is being adopted is once again devoid of realism. Non-proliferation cannot be pursued by creating or acquiescing in a situation of a security void. This has been and continues to be a major failure on the part of all those who have sought to promote the goal of non-proliferation. It is obviously counter-productive to bank once again on a unidimensional approach to non-proliferation based on selective sanctions, pressures and intimidation.

The Council has contented itself to deal with the non-proliferation aspects. Non-proliferation is no longer an issue in South Asia. South Asia, which we had wanted to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone, is today nuclearized thanks to the encouragement and acquiescence of major Powers. There is a real danger of nuclear conflict. Proliferation regrettably has taken place. No amount of sermonizing and lamentation can rectify or reverse this unfortunate development. If the Council really wishes to have any role in containing the crisis and in preventing the situation from deteriorating further, it must adopt a pragmatic and realistic approach.

We are convinced that a comprehensive approach to the issues of peace, security, confidence-building, conventional imbalance, and conventional and nuclear arms control is the only realistic way whereby the Council and the international community could contribute to defusing the security crisis in South Asia, which has endangered global peace and stability.

The resolution which has emerged from the consultations is deficient in several aspects. Let me first deal with the procedural points.

Under Article 31 of the Charter, any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council, whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected. We deeply regret that the Council has disregarded this Charter provision by not giving us an opportunity to participate in the discussions on this resolution. The attitude of the Council can, in short, be described as, "My mind is made up; please do not confuse me with facts."

While I will be pointing out the substantive inadequacies, let me make a more general point. I wish to state for the record and for posterity that the adoption of this resolution will further marginalize the role of the

Security Council, not only in dealing effectively with the security crisis in South Asia but on global security issues as a whole. The approach that the Security Council has adopted is again devoid not only of realism but also of legality and morality. I wonder whether the Security Council is not about to ignite an extremely short fuse that will destroy the entire global security order as it is envisioned in the United Nations Charter.

Now let me deal with salient aspects of this resolution, which I believe fall in the following three categories: non-proliferation, the security problem in South Asia, and the role of the Council.

As far as the non-proliferation aspects of this resolution are concerned, we cannot help but comment on the extremely short-sighted approach that the Council has chosen to pursue. This resolution is not an expression of global concern about the failure of non-proliferation and ways and means to deal with this serious issue. It is in fact a transparent exercise in self-assurance by the official nuclear Five to seek legitimacy for their possession of lethal arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear Five draw comfort and questionable legitimacy from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Pakistan had never questioned this dubious distinction that they draw from the NPT. Today we are obliged perforce to reconsider our position.

Today for the first time, this sacrosanct institution is being used to confer legitimacy upon the nuclear Five. It is therefore not what is contained in this resolution but what is implied which needs to be seen in its proper legal, strategic and political perspective. For the first time, the Security Council is being asked to play a role in enforcing non-proliferation. This is contrary to the letter and spirit of the various international instruments and treaties on this subject.

Nuclear non-proliferation is the obverse side of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation cannot be promoted in the absence of corresponding progress towards nuclear disarmament. The nuclear Five have continued to use the NPT for a twofold purpose: to legitimize their own possession of huge nuclear arsenals and the right to retain them in perpetuity, and as a blunt instrument to curb further proliferation. It is indeed evident that the resolution welcomes the commitment of the nuclear Five to article VI of the NPT. There could be no more poignant travesty of facts. Treaty provisions cannot be enforced on non-parties. Treaty obligations can only be assumed on a voluntary basis. Any attempt at

imposition of treaty obligations on non-parties is, by its very nature, unequal and unsustainable.

How would the Council deal with the issue so aptly raised by the decision of International Court of Justice on the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons? How would the Council deal with the question of non-proliferation? How would the Council deal with the interlinked issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation? The Council has given its verdict. Nuclear disarmament is apparently in safe hands. Nuclear non-proliferation is the only real issue.

The Non-Aligned Movement has consistently held that there is no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals or for concepts of international security based on a policy of nuclear deterrence. The Non-Aligned Movement has also categorically pronounced itself on the present situation, whereby nuclear-weapon States insist that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits and continue to make feverish efforts to monopolize them. The Non-Aligned Movement has said that this is a highly discriminatory and untenable approach, and one that cannot be sustained.

The Non-Aligned Movement's ministerial meeting in Cartagena recently affirmed the importance of the adoption of an action plan for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework, as well as the need for negotiating and implementing universal, non-discriminatory disarmament measures and mutually agreed confidence-building measures. If the Council is really concerned today about non-proliferation, then the resolution that it has adopted does less than full justice to the predominant views of the Non-Aligned Movement, including those of its members which are parties to the NPT.

Let me once again clarify that the issue for Pakistan is one of security and not one of status. Pakistan has demonstrated its nuclear-weapon capability. We have officially stated that the nuclear devices tested on 28 and 30 May 1998 correspond to a weapons configuration compatible with delivery systems.

We have already stated that South Asia has been nuclearized. We have been compelled to join the process of nuclearization by India's decision to weaponize and induct nuclear weapons. We have been obliged to do so for our self-defence and to restore the strategic balance in South Asia. It is India which has claimed status as the sixth nuclear-weapon State. Does the Council, by its lopsided approach, desire that we also claim status as a nuclear-

weapon State and thus contribute to shredding to bits the myths about the legitimacy or otherwise of nuclear weapons? Moreover, the resolution does not take into account the fact that besides India and Pakistan, there are other States, non-parties to the NPT, which possess nuclear weapons and have acknowledged the fact.

We do not want to complicate the issue. The issue is simple and straightforward. It is about the security crisis in South Asia. We do not want to dilute the focus and enter into academic arguments about non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Neither do we want to link extraneous issues which only serve to detract from the main issue: the security crisis in South Asia, which has endangered global peace and stability.

So a highly skewed and self-defeating approach has been taken by the Security Council in trying to handle non-proliferation, which is strictly not within its competence. The future of non-proliferation cannot be assured by setting aside its very legal and moral basis. This is exactly what is being done today by this Council. It is evident, therefore, that what is at stake is not the future of non-proliferation, but the exclusive privileges and status that the nuclear Five arrogate to monopolize, caring little about the wider aspects. I therefore dread to say that the Council is about to embark on a totally unrealistic and self-defeating course as far as the future of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is concerned.

Pakistan has been subjected to double discrimination. At the regional level we are discriminated against because of a failure by the Security Council to make a distinction between action and reaction, between a provocation and a response, between a cause and its effect. Pakistan has acquired its nuclear capability only in reaction to India's steady development of its nuclear weapons programme. We cannot be asked to give up the right to defend our country against any external threat emanating from conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan reserves the right to maintain the ability to deter aggression by conventional weapons or non-conventional means.

We are also suffering from discrimination at the global level by the nuclear-Five States, who claim for themselves the right to acquire and retain weapons of mass destruction against each other, or against non-nuclear-weapon States, and thus threaten the rest of the world. This discrimination, at the global level, is epitomized by the possession of over 30,000 nuclear weapons, which are in the hands of the nuclear-Five

States, and which they claim they will retain indefinitely while taking coercive measures to prevent any other State from acquiring similar capability, even in the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence. This is totally unjust and unacceptable.

While the Security Council adopts this unjust decision, we are confident that the international community, the majority of the membership of the United Nations and the General Assembly, will reject this unfair and unequal decision and uphold its demand for general and complete nuclear disarmament in the shortest period of time by the nuclear-Five States.

The resolution before the Council presumes to deal with the security aspects of the situation in South Asia. Here again the Council is ensuring that it would, in fact, have at best a disinterested spectator's role. What are the immediate issues in the context of the situation in South Asia? We would have expected the Council to seek to address earnestly and reasonably the following issues: first, reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict; secondly, promoting nuclear restraint and stabilization measures between Pakistan and India; and thirdly, defusing the volatile situation in Jammu and Kashmir, especially along the Line of Control.

Unfortunately, the Security Council is once again abnegating its responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security by adopting a totally unpragmatic and unrealistic approach. This resolution urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations or other provocations in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation. This resolution also urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all matters pertaining to peace and security and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions to address the root causes of tension.

The mere mention of the root cause — Kashmir — is not enough. We regret that even the important element contained in the P-5 ministerial communiqué — their readiness to assist India and Pakistan in promoting reconciliation and cooperation — has been omitted from this resolution. It is evident that by adopting this approach the Council is in fact acknowledging its failure to address the critical elements of the situation.

In short, the Council wants Pakistan and India to settle by themselves the issues bedevilling their relations. If Pakistan and India could have sorted out these problems by

themselves, South Asia would not today be nuclearized. What the Security Council is today asking us to do, in short, amounts to an appeal to two nuclear-weapon States to settle their differences on the basis of the de facto situation. This de facto situation is based on complex factors underlying the power balance in strategic and conventional terms. In fact, what you are today asking us to do is to remain embarked on a disastrous course. You are asking us today to cross new thresholds in nuclear and ballistic system escalation. You are asking us today to set aside the Charter and international law, and to base our conduct on the imperatives of maintaining a strategic balance, whatever the cost. You have once again ignored the fact that the direct cause of the aggravation of the security situation in South Asia was the unilateral altering by India of the delicate strategic balance that had maintained peace in South Asia for the past two decades.

We cannot read any other message in the resolution. The Security Council has once again abandoned its responsibility by asking us to find a mutually acceptable solution. I say this more in sorrow than in anger, for the implications of this approach will be far and wide. It will oblige not only the countries of South Asia, but also 180 States Members of the United Nations, to draw their own conclusions about the pathetic state of the United Nations and the global security order, which is premised to serve the strategic interests of the official nuclear Five.

I regret to say that Pakistan is disappointed. We had pinned our hopes on the United Nations for more than 50 years. We were confident that it would be able to usher in a new era, free from the scourge of war for our succeeding generations. What we have witnessed instead is a tale of missed opportunities, abdication of responsibilities and selective and discriminatory application of the Charter. This track record does not fill anybody with pride. Nor does it conform to the ideals of the founding fathers, or to the principles of democracy.

Let me, however, hasten to add that we will still continue to base our conduct and actions on the noble principles of the Charter. The vision of the Charter will, I hope, one day bring the dawn of a new era. This would come about if the nations of the world would become true adherents to the principles and purposes of the Charter.

The Government and the people of Pakistan have faith in the inherent goodness of humankind. We place great value on the collective civilizational accomplishments of the human race and the eventual triumph of morality. It is in view of these sublime

sentiments that we have taken the liberty, today, to make a critical analysis of the shortcomings of the Security Council, which have only contributed to the spread of chaos and anarchy in various parts of the world.

Pakistan will continue to comply with its obligations under the Charter and international law. We will continue to seek a just resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, in accordance with Security Council resolutions. May I, at this stage, remind the Council of its own resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, which explicitly provide for the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people expressed through a democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan has already stated, and I would like to reiterate, that Pakistan is ready to enter into talks with India on all matters of mutual concern, including a non-aggression pact, on the basis of a just, equitable and expeditious settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

The President: I thank the representative of Pakistan for the kind words he addressed to me and to my predecessor.

There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 3 p.m.