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NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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2371st MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 2 June 1982, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL
(France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2371)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Question concerning the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas):
Letter dated 31 May 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15145)

The meeting was called to order at 5.15 p.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): As this is the first meeting of the Council in June, I should like to pay a tribute, on behalf of the Council, to Mr. Ling Qing, the representative of China who served as President of the Council during the month of May. As President, Mr. Ling guided the work of the Council last month with great diplomatic skill and tact and unflinching courtesy.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas):

Letter dated 31 May 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15145)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Argentina and Brazil, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice,

I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ros (Argentina) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Corrêa da Costa (Brazil) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council is meeting today in response to the letter dated 31 May from the representative of Panama to the President of the Council.
4. I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to document S/15151, which contains the interim report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).
5. Members of the Council have received copies of three letters dated 2 June from the representative of Argentina to the President of the Council, distributed under the symbols S/15152, S/15153 and S/15154.
6. I now call on the Secretary-General.
7. The SECRETARY-GENERAL (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, while the interim report has already been distributed to members of the Council and does not, I think, require further explanation, I wish, with your permission, to read it out.

"1. The present interim report is submitted in pursuance of resolution 505 (1982), which the Security Council adopted at its 2368th meeting, on 26 May 1982. In resolution 505 (1982), the Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, bearing in mind resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982; to enter into contact immediately with the parties, with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, and to submit an interim report to the Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the resolution.

"2. In the afternoon of 26 May, I met separately with the parties and requested that each provide within 24 hours a statement of the terms it con-

sidered acceptable for a cease-fire. It was my hope, as I explained to the parties, that on the basis of their replies terms could be developed which would be mutually acceptable. I indicated that arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of a cease-fire as mentioned in resolution 505 (1982) could be made on short notice, with the approval of the Security Council.

"3. On 27 May, I received a message from the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, providing an indication of the terms acceptable to the United Kingdom for a cease-fire. On the same day, I received a first response from the Argentine Government, which was supplemented on 28 May by a communication on the terms for a cease-fire acceptable to Argentina.

"4. I have had extensive exchanges with the parties, including conversations by telephone with the Minister for External Relations and Worship of Argentina. During these exchanges, which continued until this morning, I explored various approaches in seeking the degree of agreement necessary for a cease-fire.

"5. It is my considered judgement that the positions of the two parties do not offer the possibility of developing at this time terms for a cease-fire which would be mutually acceptable. In accordance with the mandate given to me by resolution 505 (1982), I shall nevertheless maintain close contact with the parties if an opportunity can be found in which the exercise of my good offices can contribute to bringing this tragic crisis to an end." [S/15151.]

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to thank the Secretary-General for his statement and also pay a tribute to him for the outstanding efforts he has made with such devotion, intelligence and imagination to resolve the conflict. I have no doubt that his experience and authority will continue to be of the greatest use to the Council in this matter.

9. Mr. de PINIÉS (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Sir, it is indeed an honour for me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. There is no need to reaffirm the friendship which unites our two peoples and Governments; hence, in the performance of your tasks you can be assured of the co-operation and assistance of my delegation.

10. I should like also to pay a tribute to the representative of China, whose skill, ability, zeal and competence were all that we expect of the President of the Council, and I congratulate him.

11. I thank the Secretary-General too for the efforts he has been making and, although it might seem un-

necessary, I urge him to continue with those efforts, despite the fact that the report he has just submitted to us is not really hopeful. In any case, in our profession, in diplomacy and particularly in this building, we must always be hopeful and not fearful.

12. My delegation has taken part in the debate on this subject on several occasions, most recently on 26 May, when resolution 505 (1982) was adopted. I wish to recall the following points from the statement we made then:

"The draft resolution submitted to us now does not order the immediate cessation of hostilities. It contains only one formula, under which the Secretary-General is to enter into immediate contact with the parties 'with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire'.

"In the view of my delegation, it would have been preferable for this body, which has been entrusted with the maintenance of peace and security, to have ordered an immediate cease-fire and to have given a more specific mandate to the Secretary-General." [2368th meeting, paras. 61-62.]

13. Unfortunately, those words have now been confirmed. It would seem that wisdom has deserted us and that this body, which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, has no authority, because there is an attempt to block something as noble and worth while as a cease-fire.

14. Those of us seated at this table should not accept that the only way to put an end to a conflict is through force of arms.

15. In this connection, and bearing in mind the seriousness of the situation, the victims who have already fallen and those who may fall in the immediate future, my delegation, together with that of Panama, has decided to submit, as a matter of urgency, in order that it be put to the vote today, the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

"Reaffirming its resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the need for implementation of all parts thereof,

"1. Requests the parties to the dispute to cease fire immediately in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

"2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to use such means as he may deem necessary to verify the cease-fire;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on compliance with the present resolution within 72 hours." [S/15156].

16. Members will observe that this draft resolution does not bring the Council's action to an end, since we ask the Secretary-General to report to us with regard to compliance with it within 72 hours of its adoption.
17. This will allow us to adopt a draft resolution on the immediate withdrawal of the forces, and from that moment negotiations can begin with the least possible delay on full compliance with resolution 502 (1982), which is basic to the settlement of the present conflict and paragraph 1 of which demands an immediate cessation of hostilities, and with resolution 505 (1982).
18. To prevent a cease-fire would be to assume a very heavy responsibility before the international community and, of course, would show that what is desired is not to end the conflict but to defeat the other party. This would open a breach between two countries of the same culture, both Western, which could have disastrous consequences and destroy the balance through which international peace and security are today maintained.
19. Mr. KAM (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, Sir, my delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council yesterday, at a time which is indeed difficult. We trust that your great skill as a diplomat and your vast talents will enable us to move forward and succeed in the difficult tasks before the Council this month.
20. My delegation would like to pay a tribute to Mr. Ling Qing, of China, who as President of the Council last month did honour to the best traditions of the great nation he represents. My delegation extends its gratitude to him.
21. My delegation also wishes to express its sincere thanks to the Secretary-General for the report which he has formally submitted to us this afternoon. We wish to thank him for his tireless efforts to find a peaceful solution to this dispute, which has gone on for far too long and which has caused heavy loss of life and thrown a dark shadow over international peace and security. That is why the Government of Panama took the step of requesting an urgent meeting of the Council, a meeting which we are happy to see taking place today. I should like to thank the members of the Council for agreeing to hold this meeting.
22. I have listened with great interest to the report of the Secretary-General, a report which is not at all encouraging. My delegation would have greatly preferred an encouraging report, one proffering hopes for peace in that region of our continent. There is no doubt in my mind that if we do not have an encouraging and hopeful report, it is the domineering and intransigent attitude of the United Kingdom in continuing its colonial aggression against Argentina that has prevented us from having one.
23. My delegation has nevertheless asked for this urgent meeting because we believe in the Security Council and because we believe in the understanding of its members. We believe that its members are aware of the magnitude and seriousness of the problem in the region of the Malvinas Islands. That is why, together with the delegation of Spain, we have submitted a draft resolution with the sole aim at this time of calling upon both parties for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire so that opportunities can be opened up to move forward with the peace-making process which we all hope will take place without delay.
24. The position of Panama on the question of the Malvinas has been clearly and categorically expressed in the Council. It is therefore not necessary for me to reaffirm the staunch and vigorous support of Panama for the legitimate claims of the Argentine nation to the Malvinas. With equal vigour we deplore the fact that the United Kingdom persists in its rash venture of trying by force to reimpose on our continent an obsolete colonial system. As we have so often said, that action is an aggression which that country has attempted to pass off as self-defence. That concept is completely at variance with the spirit of the times. We cannot accept that the concept of self-defence can be used as a pretext for actions designed to reimpose colonialism in our region or to maintain colonialism in Latin America.
25. Our own experience has shown, as we have so often said, that no form of colonialism will last 150 years in Latin America and that no Latin American would endure it, and the Argentines have proved as much. We are faced with this conflict precisely because this is what can be expected when peoples lose patience and colonial Powers run out of excuses.
26. My delegation simply wishes to repeat that we have taken the step of submitting this draft resolution in the hope that it can be voted on this afternoon, in view of the urgent nature of the action which we are asking the Council to take.
27. We have already said that we were placing a very heavy burden on the shoulders of the Secretary-General and that we fully trusted in his experience and abilities. Unfortunately, his efforts have been hampered by the lack of co-operation from one of the parties, which should have co-operated in ensuring the success of the Secretary-General's efforts. The Secretary-General has reported to us on what he has done, although he has not, of course, been able to give us the full details, but I believe there would be no point in dwelling on those details.
28. My delegation wishes to appeal to the members of the Council to shoulder the responsibility which the international community has entrusted to them. The Council should not continue to delegate its functions, but should begin to act promptly and

effectively, and we hope it will do so on the draft resolution that Panama and Spain have submitted for its consideration.

29. Mr. NUSEIBEH (Jordan): I should like to extend to you, Mr. de La Barre de Nanteuil, of friendly France, my warmest congratulations and best wishes on your assumption of the presidency for this month. I am certain that the great diplomatic traditions of France will be fully reflected in your incisive wisdom and extensive experience at this trying period.

30. It also gives me great pleasure to pay the highest tribute to your predecessor in the presidency, Mr. Ling Qing, of the friendly People's Republic of China, whose wisdom, patience and versatility shone so brightly in the bleak and troubled days of May when the Council and the world at large found themselves in the throes of conflicts which unhappily remain precariously and dangerously unresolved.

31. That the Council and the international community are still so deeply disturbed by what is happening is certainly not because of any lack or dearth of trying, as the report of the Secretary-General so starkly shows. My delegation shares the very profound appreciation and gratitude of all the Member States for the tireless, judicious and dedicated efforts of the Secretary-General, who has laboured indefatigably to fulfil the mission of peace which he has been carrying out over the past two months, at his own volition but with the full blessing of the Council, reinforced by a formal mandate contained in resolution 505 (1982).

32. It is deeply saddening that all these efforts have been of no avail, since it is necessary for the two parties to the dispute to achieve a confluence of minds for any good offices of the Secretary-General to succeed. Tragically, this has not been obtainable, and today we find ourselves making additional efforts and assessments to stop the hostilities, the blood-letting and the long-range ramifications which a failure of diplomacy inevitably generates.

33. There are in the Charter of the United Nations principles to which we are all pledged and which must be paramount in all our deliberations and the shouldering of our responsibilities. My delegation voted for resolution 502 (1982) in all its aspects because it is totally consonant with the Charter. Jordan's position in this regard remains unchanged, and we are still anxiously awaiting its implementation.

34. Since the adoption of that resolution, disagreements over its implementation or even the nature of the conflict have aborted the Secretary-General's efforts to bring about a diplomatic solution. Hostilities have broken out, with grievous loss of valiant lives on both sides, which has saddened all of us. The armed conflict has inevitably generated a momentum of its own which has aggravated the situation.

35. Whatever the outcome of the armed conflict, with tens of thousands of troops on both sides, not to speak of aircraft, ships and everything else, it is the considered view of my delegation that it is not too late to contain the conflict and to save numerous lives, as well as gradually to restore goodwill.

36. We are fully cognizant of the logistics and the configuration of the battlefield. We are, furthermore, fully aware that a prompt cease-fire cannot magically be implemented by pressing a button. And this is where the experience and ingenuity of the Secretary-General come in. We support, as we are obliged to do under the Charter, and in good conscience, any call for a prompt cease-fire, not only in order to prevent further loss of precious lives on both sides but also to make possible a cessation of hostilities and implementation of the relevant provisions of resolution 502 (1982), and, last but not least, the resumption of diplomatic efforts in an atmosphere of tranquillity after aroused and understandable passions have subsided. The Secretary-General will no doubt act with the same dedication and statesmanship that have marked his ongoing efforts.

37. This is an immediate remedy to which there seems to exist no alternative except intensified and prolonged hostilities. Whether this sincere approach is found acceptable or not, as members of the Council we can at least draw comfort from the fact that we have been supportive of a peace effort based on Charter principles, justice and long-range amity between two friendly nations.

38. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Argentina, on whom I now call.

39. Mr. ROS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): You are, Sir, called upon to assume the presidency of the Council in especially difficult circumstances, since this is the third time that the Council has had the responsibility of considering the situation in the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, a situation whose present characteristics seriously affect the maintenance of international peace and security.

40. In conveying to you the cordial greetings of my delegation, we are convinced that you will lead the Council with the same ability and dedication as your predecessor, the representative of the People's Republic of China. To Mr. Ling Qing I wish to express the sincere appreciation of my Government for his efforts and the dignity with which he faced his important and delicate functions during the month of May.

41. I also wish to express the deep appreciation of the Government of the Argentine Republic to the Secretary-General for the dedication with which he has tirelessly sought a peaceful solution to the con-

flict. I also wish to express our appreciation for the report he has read out to us on the results of the steps he has taken in compliance with the mandate given him by resolution 505 (1982), in paragraph 4 of which he was requested "to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire".

42. When resolution 505 (1982) was adopted, we told the Council that it should have been up to this organ to decide upon a cease-fire, in accordance with the direct responsibility vested in it under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, but that:

"the Council has been prevented by the intransigence . . . of more than one permanent member of the Council from taking such a decision and is now transferring a heavy responsibility to the Secretary-General" [2368th meeting, para. 114].

43. The experience of my delegation throughout the negotiations conducted through the Secretary-General has shown that that opinion was correct and that in the United Kingdom there was no intention at any time to accept the appeal made to it and that its only purpose was to continue its military aggression for the sole purpose of once again establishing on American soil another shameful example of colonial imperialism through aggression. The United Kingdom is attempting to establish on the islands a military presence in order to control the South Atlantic. This unmasks the alleged defence of the "wishes of the inhabitants" and clearly shows that the Government of the United Kingdom has tried to deceive the international community by rhetorical statements to the effect that it is acting in defence of principles, when its chief interest is that of ensuring its military predominance in the South Atlantic.

44. Indeed, the British Foreign Secretary said, in a statement published in *The New York Times* on 24 May:

"And I think we, at the same time, would want perhaps to talk to lots of other countries to see whether, on a broader basis, we could establish some pattern of defence."

45. According to statements by British officials transmitted by UPI on 28 May:

"Under consideration is the idea of solving the Malvinas Islands crisis by asking the United States of America to install troops on the islands on a permanent basis once the islands have been recaptured."

The dispatch continued:

"The Ascension Island solution has been discussed at a high level by Prime Minister Thatcher's Government. The idea is, once the United Kingdom successfully retakes the islands that were

invaded by Argentina on 2 April, to convince the United States of America that it should build a major air-naval base on one of those wind-swept islands."

46. The British newspaper *The Guardian* also discussed this matter in an article dated 31 May on a "solution envisaging a status comparable to that of Ascension Island".

47. The British Foreign Secretary also said that for his part, he was "in favour of obtaining the assistance of other countries, in particular the United States, to guarantee the future security of the islands". He added: "Under this theory, the Malvinas would continue to be British and would be the site of a major naval and air base built by the United States for the defence of the South Atlantic."

48. In an article in *The New York Times* on 30 May, Flora Lewis wrote:

"The war has also drawn attention to the fact that while the [Malvinas] haven't much strategic importance now, they could be vital if the Panama Canal were ever denied to the United States or if the Soviet Union or others violated the treaty forbidding militarization of the Antarctic."

49. The reasoning underlying all those and other arguments is not unknown to us.

50. The United Kingdom, in the nineteenth century, besieged and attacked the Malvinas Islands because it considered them to be vital for controlling the maritime communication lanes in the South Atlantic. Unfortunately, now, in a different political context, history repeats itself.

51. Responding to the appeal addressed to the parties in paragraph 3 of resolution 505 (1982) "to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the . . . (Islas Malvinas)", the Government of Argentina promptly replied to the Secretary-General by submitting a proposal related to paragraph 2 of that resolution so that, simultaneously with the agreement on a cease-fire, negotiations would begin on a withdrawal of forces of both parties and on the interim administration of the islands by the United Nations.

52. The Argentine proposal consisted of a simple cease-fire procedure, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 505 (1982), and on the basis of a strict interpretation of paragraph 2 of that resolution, which:

"Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices, bearing in mind resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982."

53. The main points of the Argentine proposal were these: simultaneously with the beginning of the cease-fire, negotiations would resume on the withdrawal of both forces and on the interim administration of the islands by the United Nations.

54. Regarding the cease-fire, the following elements were set forth.

55. First, it would be unrestricted, with the suspension of all operations by troops, vessels and aircraft, which would remain in the places where they were at the beginning of the cease-fire.

56. Secondly, simultaneously with the acceptance of the cease-fire by the parties, a United Nations mission would be dispatched to observe compliance with it.

57. Thirdly, if necessary, disengagement zones would be established on land and sea.

58. Fourthly, in no circumstances would the parties be able to undertake military reinforcement operations in the areas of operation and in the areas of communications of the respective forces.

59. Fifthly, the United Nations would facilitate operations for the supply of food, clothing and health services to the personnel of the land, air and sea forces and the inhabitants of the islands, for the period of time the negotiations would require.

60. Sixthly, the cease-fire would begin at "H" hour, which would coincide with the arrival of United Nations personnel.

61. Those points show that the Government of Argentina made a genuine effort to enable the Secretary-General to comply with the difficult mandate given to him by the Council. Argentina accepted the cease-fire and emphasized its readiness to negotiate. The British took the opposite attitude. In explaining its vote on resolution 505 (1982), the British delegation stated that the objective of its Government was to obtain Argentina's commitment to undertake practical and irrevocable arrangements for the unilateral and immediate withdrawal of the Argentine forces. This distorted the basic concepts contained in that resolution, as well as those contained in paragraph 1 of resolution 502 (1982). But the British claim would go even further, by trying to use the means established in paragraph 4 of resolution 505 (1982) to set forth an ultimatum. In fact, the points which were submitted by the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General and transmitted by the Secretary-General to my delegation were the following: first, the primary British condition for the cease-fire is the withdrawal of the Argentine troops within a deadline; secondly, the concept of simultaneous withdrawal of troops is not accepted; and thirdly, the withdrawal of British troops would be considered only after the following

objectives had been attained: (a) repossession of the islands; (b) restoration of the British administration, that is to say, a return to the *status quo ante*; (c) reconstruction; and (d) consultation with the inhabitants.

62. The withdrawal could take place once these four stages had been met and in the context of an international security arrangement for the islands which would include the participation of United States forces.

63. Those were the British ideas. The intransigence of those ideas and their firm military objective continually blocked the various alternative formulas for negotiation through systematic rejection of a cease-fire implying a cessation of military action; rejection of any form of United Nations presence in the implementation of a cease-fire; rejection of the participation of the "blue helmets" and of their take-over of the areas occupied by the Argentine forces upon their withdrawal—in short, rejection of the cease-fire.

64. The situation is clear: the Council, in the view of the United Kingdom, should validate the restoration of a colonial situation, with a military force to secure it, and the United Nations would not necessarily participate in that force, but a super-Power, a permanent member of the Council and an ally of the United Kingdom in this conflict, would participate in it.

65. Thus, one can quite clearly see the constant line which the Government of the United Kingdom has followed as its policy with regard to this serious question: threat and aggression.

66. This behaviour began with the usurpation in 1833 and the expulsion of the Argentine inhabitants of the islands. It was repeated this year when the *Endurance* was sent to the South Georgia islands to expel the Argentine workers. It was reaffirmed by the presence of nuclear submarines in the same region, the launching of the punitive fleet and the declaration of illegal blockades. And it persists today through all kinds of military actions, attacks and bombings, which have already sowed death and destruction.

67. At the conclusion of the meeting of the Council on 26 May [2368th meeting], we said that the Secretary-General was being given a mission which depended solely on the positive attitude of the parties.

68. That mission, as the Council knows, ended with the British ultimatum to which I have referred. We now see the latest British claim, which reveals the true purpose that now guides the United Kingdom: an international security agreement on the islands which would include the participation of United States forces in order to perpetuate the violation of the territorial integrity of my country. This is sadly reminiscent of other situations, such as that of

Guantánamo, and is dangerously similar to the cases of Diego Garcia and Ascension Island. The Council should not forget that the latter island is the key point for aggression against Argentina. We all know what these situations of force mean for third-world countries.

69. The Council, the Argentine nation and, above all, the whole of Latin America must have the assurance of the United States that its Government will not accept that adventurist proposal to build a military base on the Malvinas and that it will not be dragged into this dangerous adventure, which would widen even further the serious breach in hemispheric relations. If some United States strategists are considering establishing troops under a bilateral arrangement with the United Kingdom on the Argentine territory of the Malvinas Islands, which is Latin American territory, this would be to disregard the resolution adopted on 29 May, by the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of External Relations of the States parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. That resolution, which is mandatory on the States signatories to the Treaty, was voted for by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The resolution decided, *inter alia*:

"1. To condemn most vigorously the unjustified and disproportionate armed attack perpetrated by the United Kingdom, and its decision, which affects the security of the entire American continent, of arbitrarily declaring an extensive area of up to 12 miles from the American coasts as a zone of hostilities, which is aggravated by the circumstance that when these actions were taken all possibilities of negotiation seeking a peaceful settlement of the conflict had not been exhausted;

"2. To reiterate its firm demand upon the United Kingdom that it cease immediately its acts of war against the Argentine Republic and order the immediate withdrawal of all its armed forces detailed there and the return of its task force to its usual stations;

"3. To deplore the fact that the attitude of the United Kingdom has helped to frustrate the negotiations for a peaceful settlement that were conducted by Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

"4. To express its conviction that it is essential to reach with the greatest urgency a peaceful and honourable settlement of the conflict, under the auspices of the United Nations, and in that connection, to recognize the praiseworthy efforts and good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to lend its full support to the task entrusted to him by the Security Council;

"5. To urge the Government of the United States of America to order the immediate lifting of the coercive measures applied against the Argentine Republic and to refrain from providing material assistance to the United Kingdom, in observance of the principle of continental solidarity recognized in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance;

"6. To urge the members of the European Economic Community, and the other States that have taken them, to lift immediately the coercive economic or political measures taken against the Argentine Republic". [S/15143, annex.]

70. My country is confident that this resolution adopted by a basic organ of the inter-American system, of which the United States is a part, will cause the Government of that country to reflect.

71. The Council must once again decide whether or not to fulfil its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, which was entrusted to it by the peoples of the United Nations when adopting the Charter at San Francisco.

72. We are facing concrete facts with their terrible sequel of horror and death. We are facing a total escalation of aggression, which neglects no means for attaining its objective. That aggression is in addition to the continued aggression committed by the United Kingdom against the territorial integrity of my country, since colonialism is, to all intents and purposes, a form of permanent aggression. As the Argentine Foreign Minister said in the Council on 25 May [2366th meeting], colonialism is an act of force and it is permanent aggression; it is the opposite of genuine peace; it has been and will be, as long as it persists, the root cause of conflicts and violence. This is why the Argentine Republic will never negotiate the restoration of colonialism to Argentine and American soil.

73. This is the reality in Latin America today on Argentine soil, and it is precisely on this matter that this body, the Council, must focus its attention and its decisions so as to put an end to a state of war and to limit its grave international effects, which undoubtedly endanger international security, in particular that of Latin America.

74. If the abusive attitude of the United Kingdom prevents the Council from complying with its serious and pressing duty, it will once again be shown that that Government bears the responsibility for the continuance of the military action which is resulting in the loss of so many lives and has such dramatic implications for international relations.

75. In conclusion, I should like to recall that the Argentine title is inalienable and has been recognized by the vast majority of the international community.

If Great Britain chooses the path of armed violence to disavow it, the resulting war that is imposed on us will be as long as may be necessary and Great Britain alone will bear the responsibility for having discarded the path of peaceful negotiations; but the only historic outcome will be the ultimate incorporation of the islands into Argentine territory.

76. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Brazil. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

77. Mr. CORRÊA da COSTA (Brazil) (*interpretation from Spanish*):* First, Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for allowing me to take part in this debate. It is a great pleasure and honour to do so at a time when you have just assumed the presidency of the Council. I do not doubt that, with your diplomatic qualifications, you will lead this body to success in its work during the month of June. I should also like to thank the representative of the People's Republic of China, who conducted the proceedings of the Council very correctly and impartially during a particularly troubled month in international relations.

78. Unfortunately, this is the third time that the delegation of Brazil has had to address the Council on the question of the Malvinas Islands. I say "unfortunately" because ever since the beginning of the present crisis my Government kept hoping that a political and diplomatic solution could speedily be found, so as to avoid armed confrontation and bloodshed. Unfortunately, all efforts to that end were thwarted, and the international community is now faced with a grave breach of the peace in the South Atlantic, with serious implications for the future of international relations, especially in this hemisphere.

79. I shall not repeat what I have said on previous occasions about my country's position on the substance of the problem. For Brazil, the Malvinas Islands were, are and always will be part of the territory of the sister Argentine Republic, regardless of the immediate result of this conflict. Neither shall I repeat the efforts that my Government has made to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute between the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic. Not only did President João Figueiredo make a personal, direct appeal to President Galtieri and to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, calling for peace and harmony, but my country's Minister for External Relations, in a letter to the President of the Council dated 24 May [S/15108], made specific proposals that in my Government's view could serve as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

* The speaker spoke in Portuguese. The Spanish version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

80. From the moment that the Secretary-General undertook a process of mediation between the parties, even without a formal mandate from the Council, the Government of Brazil continuously supported his determined efforts. We all know that the Secretary-General was so close to reaching agreement that it is all the more regrettable that one of the parties, the Government of the United Kingdom, chose to break off the negotiations unilaterally, opting for a military solution, while the other party, the Argentine Republic, never ceased to express its clear readiness to seek a diplomatic solution. All of us could already foresee what were the Secretary-General's chances of success in trying to carry out the vague and imprecise mandate entrusted to him by the Council in resolution 505 (1982). The unwillingness of one of the parties to negotiate was made clear immediately after the adoption of that resolution and is reflected in the Council's records.

81. Resolution 502 (1982) contained three elements: the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Malvinas Islands and the search for a diplomatic solution. Both parties accepted that resolution. It was precisely for the purpose of ensuring its implementation that the Secretary-General made tireless efforts, which have deserved our deepest gratitude and admiration. But it is clear that the implementation that was sought was a complete and not a selective implementation, never a unilateral implementation. If it was the British Government's opinion that the resolution was not being implemented, the British Government should have returned to the Council to have it adopt the necessary measures to ensure compliance with resolution 502 (1982), in keeping with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, it did not have a right unilaterally to assume the task of ensuring implementation, as it affirms it is doing, while the Council had the matter under consideration.

82. My country is convinced that a peaceful, diplomatic solution may still be found. We do not think that a solution based on force can be a lasting one. Aware that an act of force leaves scars which often do not heal, the Council is duty-bound to find an honourable solution, acceptable to both parties. It cannot allow events to follow their course and the already heavy loss of life to increase.

83. As an initial measure, the Council should decide on an immediate cease-fire and envisage the participation of the United Nations as an essential element in the context of a just, honourable and lasting peace, to put an end to an anachronistic situation which has extremely serious implications for world peace, as proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Spain.

84. The ultimate solution to the problem must be sought in the context of negotiations between the parties, as envisaged in resolution 502 (1982). For the

Brazilian Government, it is unacceptable to try to impose formulas on the future of the Malvinas which may extend great-Power confrontation to the South Atlantic. In fact, the Brazilian Government remains convinced that the fate of the South Atlantic can only be one of friendly and peaceful co-operation among the coastal developing countries of Latin America and Africa, based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the present crisis, therefore, any solutions not likely to contribute to the attainment of that objective and any that attract to the South Atlantic interests or activities alien to it must be avoided.

85. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): First let me extend to you and your delegation, Sir, our warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. It is of course a great pleasure for us to have the delegation of your great country, our friend and ally, presiding over our proceedings during this particularly difficult period. I should like also, at the same time, to extend our most heartfelt thanks to the representative of China and his delegation for the patience and diligence with which they looked after our affairs during an exceptionally busy month.

86. I pay a tribute once again to the Secretary-General for the efforts he has made during the past few days to bring about the implementation of resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982). The fact that it has not proved possible to negotiate mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire is in no way the fault of the Secretary-General. We has again displayed the highest qualities demanded of his office.

87. I have said before—but it cannot be repeated too often—that the current breach of the peace was caused by Argentina. It was Argentina that closed the diplomatic channel on 1 April. It was Argentina that remained silent in the face of the Council's appeal not to use force, issued later that same day [2345th meeting, para. 74]. It was Argentina that the next morning invaded the Falkland Islands. It was and is Argentina that has failed to comply with resolution 502 (1982), which demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine troops. Far from withdrawing them, Argentina reinforced them.

88. It is the United Kingdom that was the victim of the Argentine act of aggression. It is the Falkland Islanders who have been the victims of the Argentine use of force to occupy the islands. I do not propose now to dwell on the traumatic experience the islanders have suffered over the past two months. The reports so far are necessarily incomplete, but from those areas where the islanders have been able to talk freely of their experiences under Argentine occupation some very sombre and disturbing facts are beginning to emerge.

89. I have had occasion at previous meetings of the Council to set out the United Kingdom's position in

full detail, and I shall not weary the Council by repeating all my arguments, which I believe effectively refuted some of the more extravagant distortions advanced today by the representative of Argentina. But I must repeat once again that it was Argentina that first used force and began the present crisis. Everything we have done since has been in exercise of our inherent right of self-defence. We have never argued that the United Kingdom was assuming the task of executing a mandate from the Council. The true position is that, in the face of Argentina's flagrant and open violation of resolution 502 (1982), the United Kingdom is simply exercising its inherent right of self-defence, for which no mandate from the Council is required by the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

90. Our objectives have been clear. Aggression must not be allowed to pay. Peoples must not be subjugated against their will. Peoples must enjoy the right to self-determination. Political problems must not be settled by armed force. These are principles which my Government has not been prepared to compromise. They have nothing to do with "colonialism", "imperialism" and outworn shibboleths of that kind. What conceivable reason could my country have for wishing to establish British or other military power in the South Atlantic? If we had had such extraordinary pretensions, I suggest to the Council that we would have kept a larger garrison than 40 Royal Marines on the Falklands before the Argentine invasion.

91. We have done everything in our power, short of compromising the principles I have set out, to bring about the peaceful implementation of the central element of resolution 502 (1982), namely, the unconditional Argentine withdrawal from the islands. This has not so far proved possible, and we have been left with no choice but to defend these principles by other means. We have never broken off or interrupted negotiations. We have negotiated fully and in good faith throughout this long period.

92. I turn now to the recent negotiations for a cease-fire. These negotiations were held in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 505 (1982). As members of the Council will recall, this resolution reaffirmed resolution 502 (1982), by which the Council, now as long ago as 3 April, demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.

93. The United Kingdom's position was that it would welcome a cease-fire which was inseparably linked to the commencement of the withdrawal of Argentine forces and to the completion of their withdrawal within a fixed period. This position was based squarely on resolution 502 (1982).

94. The representative of Argentina has set out in full the responses of his Government during the past

week. He has also purported to set out the positions of my Government. I do not intend to follow him down that particular road of controversy. The Secretary-General has maintained a unique confidentiality about the nature of his negotiations since the outset, and, even in the face of the statement by the representative of Argentina, I do not intend to breach that confidence. I would only say this: that the statement, the explanation, by the representative of Argentina makes clear, in my judgement, that if Argentine pre-conditions had been accepted they would have led us back into the morass of procrastination and evasion which my Government has experienced on the part of the Government of Argentina over the past two months of extremely intensive negotiation.

95. The plain fact is that until the Government of Argentina changes its position, it is clear that the conditions for a cease-fire do not exist.

96. Against this background, the call by the representatives of Spain and Panama for an unconditional, immediate cease-fire is not acceptable to my delegation. A cease-fire which is not inseparably linked to immediate Argentine withdrawal would not be consistent with resolution 502 (1982), because that resolution demands the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. The call for an unconditional cease-fire would leave Argentine forces in position.

97. As I indicated earlier, the United Kingdom is perfectly prepared for a cease-fire so long as it is inextricably linked to implementation of the demand in resolution 502 (1982) for Argentine withdrawal. We have no wish to inflict or to suffer further casualties. We are ready to discuss honourable arrangements for the departure of Argentine forces in accordance with resolution 502 (1982). But the Council's demand to withdraw must be heeded. Because the call for a cease-fire contained in the draft resolution read out by the representative of Spain does not link that cease-fire with withdrawal, my delegation will be obliged to oppose it.

98. A resolution better fitted to the needs of the present situation would, I suggest, contain the following elements: a reaffirmation of resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) in all their parts; an expression of appreciation to the Secretary-General for his continuing efforts towards peace-making; a reiteration of the demand in resolution 502 (1982) for Argentine withdrawal; and a call for a cease-fire which would come into effect as soon as watertight arrangements existed for Argentine withdrawal within a fixed period in dignity and on an honourable basis. These arrangements would, as a practical matter, have to be agreed between the military commanders of the two sides in the islands.

99. Those are the essential elements of a cease-fire resolution which I commend to the Council. My delegation could support such a resolution.

100. In conclusion, at the risk of repeating myself, I should like to emphasize one thing. The objective of my Government is to set free the people of the Falkland Islands from Argentine occupation, which, by their own democratic decision, they never, never wanted. All we wish to do is to enable those people to resume their peaceful, harmless and inoffensive lives and make up their own minds, in freedom and without constraint, regarding their long-term future. When we talk about security arrangements for the future, we are talking about security arrangements to shield the islanders against any threat of renewed aggression. That is all.

101. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): First of all, Sir, I should like most sincerely to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. The Soviet delegation would like to assure you of its willingness to co-operate with you as you discharge this difficult duty. We should also like to pay a due tribute to your predecessor, the representative of the People's Republic of China, who discharged his duties as President during the month of May in an extremely professional manner.

102. The Council is meeting again today to consider the dangerous military conflict in the South Atlantic. When on 26 May it adopted resolution 505 (1982) on a cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the conflict in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), the Council proceeded from the premise that this resolution should lead to the restoration of peace. To that end, the Council instructed the Secretary-General once again to undertake a mission of good offices, and it called on the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General with a view to the cessation of hostilities in and around the islands.

103. However, as can be seen from the report submitted today by the Secretary-General, his efforts for a settlement of the conflict and the removal of this hotbed of armed confrontation have once again been blocked.

104. It must be said that the members of the Council could not but have been alerted by the statement that the representative of the United Kingdom made immediately after the Council adopted resolution 505 (1982) [2368th meeting].

105. At that time, the British representative virtually rejected the approach supported by the Council and the negotiations between the parties and virtually struck out everything positive that had been achieved with the help of the efforts of the Secretary-General during those negotiations. He said outright that under changed circumstances his Government could not agree to the withdrawal of Argentine troops in any manner whatsoever being linked with a parallel departure of the British troops. Once again the demands of Britain for conditions relating to the cease-fire were

delivered in the form of an ultimatum. And I must say that once again, today, the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom was delivered in the similar form of an ultimatum.

106. Thus, the current round of negotiations, like the preceding one, has ended in failure. The reason for this is clear: it is the stubborn unwillingness of the British Government to settle the problem of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) by peaceful means, by negotiations in good faith. Disregarding all appeals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and decisions of the Council, the British Government at every stage chose to build up its armed forces in the region of the conflict and to broaden the scope of its military actions.

107. No one can doubt that responsibility for the failure of the efforts of the Secretary-General lies with the British Government, which, as can be seen from developments in the conflict now, relied exclusively on armed force and unleashed in the South Atlantic a large-scale colonial war. London's actions demonstrate quite clearly the insincerity of its declared willingness to resolve the dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) by negotiations. The manoeuvring of British diplomacy with the adoption by the Council of the two resolutions and the negotiations through the Secretary-General—all of this has proved to be simply a smoke-screen for the unleashing of large-scale military operations in the South Atlantic. The policy adopted by Britain is to restore by force of arms the colonial status of the islands and to keep a land base for imperialism in the South Atlantic. This return to the policy of the Empire is a direct challenge to the world community, which has unequivocally condemned and rejected colonialism as a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the basic principles and norms of contemporary international law.

108. As has already been noted during consideration of this item in the Council, the British Government would not have ventured to issue such a bold challenge to Argentina—and, really, to all of Latin America—had it not been assured of the comprehensive support, not only moral but very real support, which has been fully provided by the United States. In this difficult hour for the people of Argentina in their struggle to eliminate the vestiges of colonialism, the United States has thrown its political—and not only its political—weight to its ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The role of neutral mediator assumed by United States diplomacy was continued just as long as London needed it, in order to gain time for its military preparations; since then, with a firmness that does deserve a better cause, the Government of the United States has supported the British Government as best it could in its feverish military activities.

109. Some things are not forgotten and, as has been said here by representatives of Latin American coun-

tries, the events of the last two months and the role of various States in these events cannot be forgotten.

110. Recently, still another reason has appeared for this demonstration of British-American solidarity: there are reports—and this has been said here as well by the representative of Argentina today—that one of the parties to the conflict—and naturally this party is not Argentina—claims that the problem of the islands cannot be resolved without the appearance on them of American troops. It seems that British colonialism in the islands must now be supplemented by a permanent American military presence. Thus, they want to add to the many military enclaves of the United States in Latin America still another—this one in the South Atlantic.

111. Other NATO countries have also taken action in this spirit of solidarity with their ally, Great Britain: illegal economic sanctions against Argentina have been introduced, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and have been presented almost as support for diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict. One might well ask oneself: since when have economic aggression and violation of the Charter of the United Nations come to be considered a method of strengthening the principles of that very Charter?

112. We can conclude from the foregoing that we are, in fact, witnessing attempts to extend the sphere of activities of the North Atlantic bloc to conflicts taking place far beyond the confines of Europe and involving the interests and security of the developing, non-aligned countries. This is an extremely dangerous trend, and it deserves very careful attention on the part of the United Nations.

113. The military fever that has now engulfed the leading circles in London has already taken hundreds of lives, British as well as Argentine. International peace and security are threatened. The Council, in accordance with its responsibility under the Charter, must call for an immediate cease-fire; it must stop the bloodshed in the South Atlantic so as to pave the way to a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

114. Mr. de PINIÉS (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Regarding the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, I should like to make some things clear, because it is my impression that either the interpretation did not follow very clearly what I said, or, if it did, I am rather surprised by his remarks concerning my statement. Of course, I do not intend to go into the substance of the question of the Malvinas, to which I have referred in days past. I might add that I was present when resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), among others, were adopted by the General Assembly. I have participated widely in the discussions of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of

the General Assembly and the Assembly's Fourth Committee, but I do not think this is the appropriate forum. We are here considering a situation of war, a situation of active belligerency and a series of hostile acts.

115. For the information of those present, and in view of the fact that the draft resolution sponsored by Panama and Spain [S/15156], has not yet been distributed, I shall read it out again, making the points clear and explaining the scope and meaning of each of its paragraphs.

116. The preambular paragraph reads as follows:

"Reaffirming its resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the need for implementation of all parts thereof,".

In my view, that means, of course, that the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the Malvinas, the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations are all three required. In other words, there are three parts to resolution 502 (1982), and it would not be proper to refer exclusively to paragraph 2 of that resolution, which demands an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). That is why the preambular paragraph of the draft resolution sponsored by Panama and Spain refers to the need for full implementation of both resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982). That is the preamble of the draft, with a reaffirmation of the two Council resolutions referred to.

117. Paragraph 1 of the draft resolution reads as follows:

"1. Requests the parties to the dispute to cease fire immediately in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);"

In other words, a cease-fire is requested but not, as yet, the cessation of hostilities, because that has already been called for in resolution 502 (1982), and the concept of "hostilities" is different from that of a "cease-fire".

118. Paragraph 2 reads as follows:

"Authorizes the Secretary-General to use such means as he may deem necessary to verify the cease-fire;".

In other words, the Secretary-General is called upon to verify the cease-fire in whatever way he considers necessary, practicable or possible.

119. Finally, paragraph 3 reads as follows:

"Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on compliance with the present resolution within 72 hours."

It is precisely that period of 72 hours which enabled me to say in my statement:

"Members will observe that this draft resolution does not bring the Council's action to an end, since we ask the Secretary-General to report to us with regard to compliance with it within 72 hours of its adoption" [para. 16 above].

120. To what end? For what purpose? Simply for the Council then to instruct the Secretary-General as to what the next step should be and to give him instructions. While the Secretary-General has not succeeded so far in bringing both parties closer towards a solution of the conflict, it is very likely that, if the assumptions which have prevailed so far should change, the Secretary-General may then be able to bring positions closer and be moving towards a solution of the dispute.

121. I repeat and reaffirm before the Council that for us what is most serious is the dangerous confrontation and the loss of life. As far as my delegation is concerned, I wish to say that we absolve ourselves of any responsibility for the number of victims of a further military confrontation. Enough blood has already been shed in this conflict, a conflict which should have been ended a long time ago.

122. That is the purpose of the draft resolution which we are submitting as a matter of urgency. The representative of the United Kingdom says that he will vote against it. Of course, he is free to do as he wishes. But I should not like his vote against it to be cast on assumptions contrary to those on the basis of which the delegations of Panama and Spain have decided to submit it. For us, human lives are precious, and we believe that no effort should be spared to save a single life, regardless of whose it is.

123. Mr. LING Qing (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): Sir, first of all I wish to express warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June. Although June will be a rather arduous and turbulent month, we are certain that your wealth of diplomatic experience and skills will enable you successfully to discharge your duties.

124. A week has elapsed since the Council adopted resolution 505 (1982). The armed conflict over the Malvinas Islands has not ended or been reduced but has been exacerbated.

125. During this period, the Secretary-General, acting on the mandate entrusted to him by the Council and specified in paragraph 4 of resolution 505 (1982), entered "into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire". Paragraph 3 of the same resolution

"Urges the parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with

a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);”.

One of the parties, however, relying on its superior military strength, has no intention to effect a cease-fire. The Secretary-General has thus found it impossible to carry out his mission and had to report back to the Council today about the situation. The Chinese delegation deeply deplores this development. Nevertheless, we wish to reiterate our appreciation to the Secretary-General for all that he has done and to express our understanding of the difficulties he has encountered.

126. We should like to point out here that the resort to a show of military might, without any regard to the persistent call of the international community for an immediate halt to the hostilities or to the national sentiments of the people of Argentina and Latin America, might gain temporary success for the party concerned, but this course of action entails far-reaching dire consequences which will ultimately hurt the interests of its own people.

127. We are of the view that, in order to fulfil its lofty duty of maintaining international peace and security, the Council should urge the parties concerned to halt all military actions immediately and agree to an unconditional cease-fire and the resumption of negotiations. The Council should extend the Secretary-General's mandate for mediation.

128. In accordance with the above position, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Panama and Spain.

129. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): I shall be very brief. I just wish to make one or two observations in response to certain statements made by my colleague from the Soviet Union. He accused us of stubborn unwillingness. Yes, we are stubbornly unwilling to compromise on certain principles, and I set out those principles very clearly in my earlier statement. But we have been equally stubbornly willing to exert every effort to bring about the peaceful implementation of a mandatory resolution of the Council.

130. With a sense of anticipation which I never realized that I possessed, I think that I replied to some of the more archaeological comments of my Soviet colleague about colonialism, imperialism and such like in the statement I made before he made his. I would like only to re-emphasize one point, and that relates to the strategic fantasy which my Soviet colleague wove before our eyes. I can only repeat what I said at the end of my statement. Our only reason for requiring adequate security arrangements in the long term in the Falkland Islands is to shield the islanders against the threat or actuality of further aggression. That is our sole purpose.

131. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Argentina.

132. Mr. ROS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall try to be as brief as possible and take up very little of the time of the Council. I have taken note in passing of some of the remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom. He used the word “procrastination” because during the last two months we have been unable to reach an understanding, despite the enormous efforts and flexibility of the Argentine position. I wonder how the Government that he represents can use that word when for 17 years it ignored the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1965, 1973 and 1976.

133. He used the word “principles”. The use of the word “principles” generally has a certain political and propaganda value, but for that there must be a sufficiently clear basis so that those who hear the word can know that those principles have always guided the political behaviour of the Government of the United Kingdom. I need only recall the example of the island of Diego Garcia, and I seriously wonder whether those principles apply only when it is a question of a handful of Anglo-Saxons and are ignored when the people involved are of other races or other ethnic origins.

134. The word “extravagant” has been used to refer to some parts of my statement. The extravagance is found in the statements formulated in London. It is precisely in London, at the highest levels of the British Government, that there is talk of a Camp David-type solution, of an Ascension Island-type model. That is where the destiny of those territories is handled, as if we were back in the nineteenth century.

135. I have just been brought some extracts from an interview given by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the London television company ATV. One need only read them to realize that the United Kingdom is reiterating the importance of a Sinai-type multilateral force with the United States and other countries. I wonder which are the other countries. If they think that they will be Latin American countries, obviously they are not listening to the statements coming from Latin America. What other countries could they be referring to? Could it be countries of Western Europe, members of NATO? I wonder if they are in fact thinking of implanting a defence system which would bring to the South Atlantic waters a European military system. The extravagance is found in those assertions.

136. Resolutions adopted by the Council have been quoted, but always with the skilful mention of one paragraph while ignoring others. Actually, those resolutions form a whole, a doctrine through which to find a solution to these very serious problems which affect the lives of many human beings and the peace and security of Latin America.

137. In the end, what we find in the statements of the representative of the United Kingdom is that they are not interested in the presence of the United Nations, they are not interested in the presence of United Nations observers. To understand that we need only look at the statements that are coming out of London.

138. Finally, I need only add that the word "confidentiality" was also used. "Confidentiality" is a word which astonishes me when I think of the tremendous display of British propaganda covering the whole spectrum of the situation. Such confidentiality applies only while the talks are under way. Once the talks have ended, the parties are free to present their positions, because the Council must know exactly how the negotiations were carried out. We understand the insuperable difficulties the Secretary-General faces in presenting the terms of the negotiations to the Council, but we are duty-bound to tell the Council the truth. That explains why we said what we did in our statement.

139. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We have before us a draft resolution submitted by Panama and Spain [S/15156]. The representatives of Panama and Spain have expressed the wish that this draft resolution be put to the vote as quickly as possible, possibly even today.

140. I should add that during the contacts that I had with a large number of members of the Council before this meeting, I was informed that some members would prefer that there be some time for reflection—not more than 24 hours—and that the draft resolution not be put to the vote until tomorrow.

141. If postponement of the vote until tomorrow is acceptable to the Council, I would suggest that the vote on the draft resolution of Panama and Spain be postponed until the next meeting, the time of which will be established in consultation with the members of the Council.

142. Mr. de PINIÉS (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I know that it is usual for there to be an interval of 24 hours after the submission of a draft resolution before it is put to a vote. At the beginning of this meeting, I myself said that my delegation would have no objection to waiting 24 hours.

143. But I wonder whether there is any need for us to wait 24 hours or whether, now that the draft resolution has been distributed, the representative of the United Kingdom may not have realized that his first interpretation of the draft resolution as I read it out was not correct, and that the draft resolution in fact reaffirms resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982).

144. In short, I should like to know whether that delegation has already decided on its stand, in which case there is no need to wait 24 hours, or whether the

representative of the United Kingdom wishes to submit the draft resolution to his Government and to receive appropriate instructions, on the assumption that he has now been able to read it and has realized that his first interpretation of the draft resolution is not correct. I should like to know the views of the representative of the United Kingdom, if that is possible.

145. Mr. KAM (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As a sponsor of the draft resolution, my delegation, when it spoke earlier, said that the draft resolution was being submitted as a matter of urgency, in view of our alarm about the intensification of the conflict in the region of the Malvinas and the increasing bloodshed. I also expressed the hope that the members of the Council would be responsive to the situation.

146. However, Mr. President, you have said that after consultations with several members of the Council it seems to you that we could vote tomorrow. I understand that these consultations took place and these views were given before the text of the draft resolution was distributed. I am also aware that many countries thought they should see the text before they expressed their views in a vote.

147. Since the text has now been distributed in all the working languages and since this would not be the first time that a draft resolution had been voted on on the day of its submission—although I have been a member of this body for only a short time, I have witnessed draft resolutions submitted by permanent members of the Council being put to the vote on the day of submission—I should like to urge, if the members of the Council will permit me, that in view of the urgent nature of the draft resolution and of its aims, the Council could consider the possibility of voting on it today, unless you, Mr. President, decide otherwise.

148. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I note that the representative of Panama wishes the draft resolution to be put to the vote today. May I ask for the views of the Council on this matter?

149. Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): I should like first of all, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I am quite sure that under your able guidance the Council meetings will proceed smoothly.

150. At the same time, I would pay a high tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing, of China, for the admirable way in which he conducted the Council's business last month. It was indeed the busiest of months, and many problems arose, one after another. But Mr. Ling Qing dealt with them skilfully and efficiently.

151. I should also like to express my great admiration and deep gratitude to the Secretary-General for the tireless and dedicated efforts he has made to bring

about a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Although his efforts have not so far produced the desired results, my delegation still hopes that those efforts will eventually be successful.

152. With regard to the draft resolution presented orally by the representative of Spain and later supported by the representative of Panama, now duly circulated in written form and sponsored by Panama and Spain, my delegation fully realizes the urgency of the matter, but, in view of the importance of the problem, my delegation must naturally seek instructions from my Government.

153. Both my Prime Minister and my Foreign Minister are now in an aircraft on the way to Paris to attend the Western summit meeting. In the circumstances, my delegation feels constrained to request that the voting take place tomorrow rather than today. In saying tomorrow, I do not think that we have to wait until 7.15 p.m., 24 hours from now; the vote could perhaps take place a little earlier than that in view of the urgency of the matter.

154. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Japan has proposed deferring until tomorrow, though not for 24 hours, the vote on the draft resolution submitted by Panama and Spain. If there is no objection, I would suggest that we postpone the vote on the draft resolution until our next meeting, which will take place tomorrow at a time to be set in consultation with the members of the Council.

155. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*):

I would suggest that we do not defer our decision on the timing of the next meeting. Rather, let us agree on the time right now. The representative of Japan has said that he does not need 24 hours, that he would need less time than that. Perhaps we could agree now to meet tomorrow morning.

156. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his constructive statement, but if I understood the representative of Japan correctly, the time most suitable for him might perhaps be the early afternoon. Perhaps we could agree to meet at 3 p.m. tomorrow.

157. Mr. KAM (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation is sympathetic to and understanding of the difficulties or limitations other delegations might have in casting their votes on draft resolutions. Accordingly, out of courtesy, I shall not insist on my request for a vote this afternoon, since I wish to make a gesture of co-operation to the delegation of Japan.

158. However, in view of what you have said, Mr. President, I should like to propose formally that the meeting be held tomorrow at 11 a.m., if that is acceptable to the members of the Council, it being understood that the Council will be meeting in order to vote.

159. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Panama has proposed that the Council meet tomorrow at 11 a.m. Since I hear no objection, it is so decided.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.

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