



CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 28:</i>	
<i>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (con- tinued):</i>	
<i>(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen- Nation Committee on Disarmament. . . . .</i>	<i>1</i>

*Chairman:* Mr. Ismail FAHMY  
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-DC/230 and Add.1, A/7080)

1. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): This is my first opportunity to speak in the United Nations and I am delighted to be able to do so in this Committee in which we are engaged upon the most important subject facing mankind—disarmament.

2. It is also, Mr. Chairman, a privilege to sit under your direction. I am confident we shall all benefit from your wisdom and guidance and your able conduct of our proceedings from the Chair.

3. The question of the non-proliferation treaty that is before us is not only of great importance, it is one of very great urgency. At past sessions, this point of view has been expressed many times with great force and clarity and has been embodied in many resolutions, beginning with the Irish resolution of 1961 [resolution 1665 (XVI)], which have received almost universal support. I agree with these sentiments. Now that we approach the point of decision, of turning words into effective action, I am confident that the same sense of urgency remains. I hope that the existence of a draft treaty on the table before us,<sup>1/</sup> and the desire of its sponsors to open it for signature at the earliest possible date, will in no case still the eloquence of the members of this Committee or blunt their resolution to make the progress which past sessions of the General Assembly have enjoined on us.

4. The two co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, have already covered admirably the detailed provisions and purposes of the text. It is not, therefore, my object to go over this ground again but to concentrate my remarks on trying to answer three questions:

(a) What benefits will come from the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(b) Why I consider the draft before us adequate for this purpose; and

(c) Why it is urgent that the treaty should be concluded as soon as possible.

5. In answering these questions, I seek to make clear the reasons which prompt my Government to give its full support to the treaty and explain our desire to see it implemented at an early date.

6. Against the background of the debates in this Assembly, it is hardly necessary to argue that the proliferation of States possessing nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. This seems to me a self-evident proposition. Already in the partial test-ban Treaty, signed in Moscow in 1963, we have taken a significant step towards removing this danger, and a non-proliferation treaty, followed soon I hope by a comprehensive test-ban treaty, is the logical next step. Of course, the prohibition of testing is not enough. It needs to be reinforced by a prohibition of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one State from another as well, and by adequate safeguard procedures, that is, an international system of inspection to ensure that the security of a non-nuclear State is not undermined by the clandestine diversion of nuclear resources from civil to military purposes by a potential enemy.

7. In addition, there is a need for the nuclear-weapon Powers to give security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the possibility that they may be subject to nuclear attack or the threat of such attack. These assurances are set out in the draft resolution for the Security Council resolution which is included in the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and which was submitted jointly by my Government and the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>2/</sup> It is also our intention to make a declaration in the Security Council when this matter is considered. In our opinion, it is right that these assurances should be given to non-nuclear signatory States in the framework of the United Nations and the Security Council, and, further, that they should not be of the kind which would be given under a military alliance. As I understand it, the countries which have understandably asked for and attach great importance to security assurances do not themselves want assurances of that kind.

8. But the treaty is much more than a simple ban on proliferation. Because it is necessary to provide a balance within it, and because of the great potential importance of harnessing nuclear technology in constructive and peaceful uses for the benefit of mankind, especially for the developing countries, it is essential

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., annex II.

to provide that the treaty should encourage and not impede the progress of nuclear technology for civil purposes.

9. Finally—and this for me is the most fundamental requirement of any non-proliferation treaty—it must provide a basis of confidence on which further and, I sincerely hope, rapid progress on other measures of disarmament and arms control can be made. Indeed if they are not made, I am certain the non-proliferation treaty itself will not succeed in its objective and will collapse.

10. I turn now to the treaty before us and say quite simply that in my opinion it meets these objectives. It provides for effective non-proliferation, it gives security—and incidentally guarantees of security from the nuclear Powers—to the non-nuclear Powers, and it also promises benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addition it also goes as far as is possible, short of actual agreements, to commit all its signatories to meaningful progress towards the ending of the nuclear arms race and towards general and complete disarmament. I do not suggest it is perfect. It has been evolved in arduous negotiations and after long discussions in Geneva in which I had the honour to participate and to propose amendments and make suggestions.

11. This is not the text I would have written if I could have done it alone, just as it is not the text of any one country or group of countries. Treaties must needs be a consensus and, in this context, I would pay tribute both to the skill, patience and dedication of our two co-Chairmen and also to the non-nuclear participants who were responsible for the dramatic improvements in the text achieved—and they can be measured by a comparison of the drafts<sup>3/</sup>—between August 1967 and March 1968. No one here should underestimate the work accomplished by the non-nuclear and non-aligned participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

12. I will be frank and say I am disappointed that, despite the many speeches in this Committee in past years and the resolutions of this Assembly, we have made such slow progress, and five years have passed since the partial test-ban Treaty, the last major measure in this field. I am therefore particularly concerned about the relevance of the Treaty to the general question of disarmament.

13. We all agree that the non-proliferation treaty is not an end in itself. We all share the intention that it should lead on to other measures to stop the nuclear arms race and to limit and reduce existing stockpiles. I believe the draft before us serves that purpose in three ways. First, a treaty concluded on this basis will contribute to that reduction in tension between the two most powerful nuclear-weapon States and their allies which is an essential prerequisite to any significant measure of arms control and disarmament. Second, the preamble makes it clear that this is not an isolated, final measure but is meant to lead to other agreements—and this is reinforced by the very clear commitment in the body of the treaty itself in article VI. Third, there is in article VIII the provision for a review conference which after a comparatively

short time will give all signatories an opportunity to examine whether the purposes and provisions, not only of the treaty but of the preamble as well, are being realized. In short, we are all given five years' notice—the two major nuclear Powers particularly—to produce real progress towards a better and saner world.

14. We meet against a background of a world in tension, at a time when the development of anti-ballistic missiles threatens an increased impetus to the nuclear arms race, not its cessation. It is a responsibility for all of us to do what we can to abate the temperature; but it is, of course, particularly a responsibility for the two major nuclear Powers, the two co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. I believe that they recognize their special responsibilities, and that this draft treaty is a manifestation of their concern to do something positive to reduce the dangers of nuclear war.

15. I cannot prove their sincerity. An act of faith rather than objective data is required. I accept that when they pledge themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the arms race at an early date they mean what they say. Equally, it is the duty of the rest of us to do all in our power to play our part and see that these pledges are fulfilled.

16. This treaty must be followed by further measures if we are, as the President of the United States has said, to retain a capacity to design our fate rather than be engulfed by it. In this connexion I should again make clear the position of my own Government towards further measures of disarmament. We stand for general and comprehensive disarmament. My Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and my predecessor here, Lord Chalfont, have all made clear my Government's desire for and determination to work for agreements of the kind advocated so often in our discussions: for a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles, for a cut-off of fissile-material production, for a reduction of existing stocks, and for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

17. My Government supports those measures as part of the general non-proliferation strategy and as a means of halting the arms race and reducing the stocks of weapons. We see this non-proliferation treaty as a first step in that process. We should, of course, be happy if all those measures could be embodied in simultaneous agreements and implemented together; but there is no one with any experience in this field, certainly no representative here, who thinks that that is within the realm of practical possibility. To ask, therefore, for those additional steps to be taken now, or to delay the non-proliferation treaty because this or that desirable provision is not included, would, in my judgement, be to make the best the enemy of the good.

18. The treaty we are working on will not of course solve all problems of arms control or all problems of security; but it is a vitally important and indispensable step on the road to real disarmament.

19. I believe I can best summarize what I have been trying to say by asking all who desire to advance towards the effective control of nuclear armaments to consider which situation would offer them the

<sup>3/</sup> See *ibid.*, annex IV, sects. 6 and 8 and 7 and 9.

greater hope; one in which the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty has broken down or run into the sands of procrastination; or one in which the conclusion of a treaty, however limited and however imperfect, has opened the road, and pointed the direction, to further effort in this field.

20. We are faced now with moving from the idea accepted by this Assembly six and a half years ago to turn it into the reality of an effective treaty. I am reminded of what T.S. Eliot said in The Hollow Men:

*Between the idea  
And the reality  
Between the motion  
And the Act  
Falls the Shadow.*

The Shadow is the shadow of the Bomb. We must disperse it by our action here in New York, without delay.

21. This brings me to the final question: why do we need to take a positive decision in the next weeks? Or, as some representatives have put it to me in private conversations: what is all the rush?

22. We all want disarmament and an end to the nuclear arms race. We know from experience that this non-proliferation treaty is a bridge we must cross before any further progress on disarmament can be made. Failure to get a treaty now could damage or even destroy the mutual confidence established between East and West which is an essential ingredient to solving our problems.

23. I said in a book I wrote some years ago that disarmament is like a child learning to walk; the first steps are the most difficult. Progress becomes more rapid as confidence grows. And, as with children, the confidence of nations in each other has to be fostered and not discouraged. I know also the great importance the uncommitted and non-aligned nations here attach to disarmament, and I welcome the conference of non-nuclear nations to be held later this year. It seems to me that such a conference will be better able to give a lead to the world, and to the nuclear countries in particular, if it meets after the positive step of opening this treaty for signature has been made. Such a conference, with the reality of a treaty and the commitment of the nuclear Powers to build upon it, can make a constructive and positive contribution to the vital work of considering procedures for the international control of the civil use of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosives, as well as further steps towards disarmament.

24. The representative of the United States concluded his speech last week with a quotation from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. It is very appropriate to our situation here. But I think the following lines of that play, less frequently quoted, state even more clearly the issue we should have in our minds.

*On such a full sea are we now afloat;  
And we must take the current when it serves,  
Or lose our ventures.*

We have the full sea now. It may not remain so. The stakes for mankind are too high to justify any risk of delay.

25. I therefore urge this Committee to embark upon this treaty at the earliest opportunity with faith and

determination to see that it carries us towards the better and safer world which we are all striving here in the United Nations to achieve.

26. Mr. TOMOROWICZ (Poland): Poland favours an early conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. The wisdom of such a step, in my view, lies in the important role which such a treaty can play in halting the nuclear arms race, lessening the threat of a nuclear conflict and creating premises for further disarmament measures. It is also all too clear that the necessity of making this decisive step arises from the present international situation. This complex situation makes it imperative for us to halt the further course of events which bode ill for peace in the world. The inescapable logic of the nuclear arms race can lead only towards thwarting the chances of any disarmament efforts.

27. With those considerations in mind, Poland has supported the successive resolutions of the General Assembly according to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a high priority both in this Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The Polish delegation has, moreover, expressed its agreement with and support for all the provisions of the draft treaty on non-proliferation submitted to the Geneva Conference by its co-Chairmen.

28. In its approach to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Poland is guided to the same extent by the requirements of collective security and by those of its own national security. The two are irrevocably interdependent. Viewing the problem from that angle, we are aware of the importance that non-proliferation implemented regionally can have for the cause of universal non-proliferation. We gave proof of this conviction by submitting the well-known Polish plans for the halting and limiting of the nuclear arms race in Central Europe: the 1957 Rapacki nuclear-free-zone concept and, in 1964, the Gomulka nuclear-freeze idea for the same area. Before the initiation of the broad discussion on a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, those proposals were instrumental in starting that same discussion in Europe. Thus, they became one of the factors rallying the different political forces of Europe to the task of working out a treaty without loopholes on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

29. The draft treaty on non-proliferation submitted to this Committee is the result of joint strivings over many years by both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiations, often proceeding in a difficult and untoward international situation, steadily recorded progress which ultimately resulted in the presentation of a full and agreed draft treaty. The non-nuclear-weapon States have contributed prominently to this achievement. Their inspiring contribution was highlighted in the unanimously adopted resolution 1665 (XVI) and in resolution 1664 (XVI) of 4 December 1961, which came to be known respectively as the Irish and the Swedish resolutions. Then let me recall resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 and, most recently, the substantive contribution of the non-nuclear-weapon States to the formulation of the respective provisions of the draft treaty before us. Owing to this unceasing effort, it has been possible

for the draft treaty to meet the vital interests of both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States to the fullest extent possible.

30. This applies, first of all, to such important problems as the affirmation of the right of all States to the peaceful application of nuclear energy and the balancing of obligations and responsibilities of non-nuclear-weapon States with responsibilities and obligations of nuclear-weapon Powers in the field of further disarmament measures. The Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have moreover expressed their readiness to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.<sup>4/</sup>

31. The most significant aspect of the draft treaty is, to our minds, the fact that it incorporates a formula of non-proliferation which effectively closes all conceivable roads leading to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is particularly important in view of the persistent tendency of certain States to gain, directly or indirectly, physically or legally, access to nuclear weapons and a nuclear status.

32. A ban on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is of paramount importance for European States, Poland among them, which are concerned over the insistent and dangerous ambitions of the West German nationalistic forces in the realm of nuclear and rocket armament, ambitions which are matched by the steadily growing industrial and technological ability to manufacture such weapons. For all those reasons, Poland recognizes a non-proliferation treaty as an important factor in the peaceful stabilization of the situation in Europe. We should add with satisfaction that other States in that area, among them the German Democratic Republic, share our views on this matter.

33. In the view of my delegation the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted for our approval meets fully the requirements set forth in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965—a resolution which not only aptly defines the governing principles of a non-proliferation treaty but, in so doing, also expresses the consensus of the international community as to the need for its early conclusion.

34. The international situation prevailing at the time of the presentation of the draft treaty requires that this treaty should be concluded at the earliest possible date.

35. Firstly, as has been most aptly observed by the representatives preceding me in this debate, we are confronted with a very real danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons owing to the rapid development of the technological and industrial capabilities of a number of States. Any further proliferation would be irrevocably detrimental to world security. This danger was stressed in the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. The report stated, in part:

"Additional nuclear Powers accentuating regional tensions could only add to the complexity of the problem of assuring peace. Furthermore, it is impossible to deny the proposition that the danger

of nuclear war breaking out through accident or miscalculation becomes greater, the larger the number of countries which deploy such weapons and the larger the stockpiles and the more diversified the weapons they hold." [A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 82.]

36. Secondly, one must not forget the state of grave international tension so ominous for world peace. The very existence of hot-beds of war favours a further arms race. Against this background, there emerge forces hostile to the idea of peace and the lessening of tension in all regions of the globe, including Europe. Those forces also are seen rallying against a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

37. The argument which is particularly valid in urging an early conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the necessity to proceed to the implementation of tangible disarmament measures. The Polish delegation is convinced that the implementation of the treaty, once it is concluded, will stimulate the negotiating process which should lead to further measures of disarmament.

38. The treaty on non-proliferation is only a beginning, a modest one indeed in relation to the immensity of the disarmament problem; but it is essential, indeed inevitable, if we bear in mind all the political, economic and military factors which make up the picture of the international situation.

39. We are well aware that the difficulties and obstacles standing in the way of disarmament will not be overcome and disappear on the day we conclude an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are convinced, however, that the implementation of such an agreement will greatly facilitate our future task.

40. The stipulations incorporated in the draft treaty before us seem to corroborate the function of the treaty as a factor facilitating further disarmament measures. With article VI, the declaration of intention of the contracting Parties to pursue negotiations on disarmament, which appears in the preamble to the draft treaty, has been reinforced by a formal commitment included in the body of the treaty itself. This article, therefore, meets the requirement of some non-nuclear-weapon States that a balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities be ensured in the non-proliferation treaty.

41. Firstly, it commits the States parties to the treaty—primarily the nuclear-weapon States—to "pursue negotiations in good faith". In keeping with the accepted interpretation, it amounts to an understanding that, without running the risk of political responsibility and a moral disapproval, the States cannot evade negotiating. Even more, they should restrain themselves from any activity which could prevent the due execution of the obligation to pursue the negotiations or otherwise frustrate their objectives.

42. Secondly, article VI defines that the subject of the future negotiations should be "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disarmament, and . . . a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". This ensures that the primary subject of negotiations will be concrete steps of nuclear disarmament—steps most vital for the lessen-

<sup>4/</sup> See *ibid.*, annex II.



ing of the risk of a nuclear conflict. And, thirdly, article VI explicitly states that the negotiations relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race should be started "at an early date".

43. The confirmation in article VII of the right of States "to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories" offers a supplement to the disarmament commitment undertaken in article VI. It seems to us that such measures can contribute to increasing the regional effectiveness of the non-proliferation commitments made under the treaty, by combining them with other, farther-reaching measures—first of all, with denuclearization.

44. It follows, therefore, that, parallel to negotiations on the general disarmament problems, article VII leaves the States considerable possibilities for implementing various measures of regional disarmament. This, in turn, allows all States, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, to contribute substantially towards disarmament.

45. As far as my country is concerned, Poland has been traditionally interested in the realization of such limited measures in Europe. This keen interest becomes understandable in the light of its geographical location, and historical experience, as well as the fundamental premises of its foreign policy. Poland has been concentrating its initiatives on a region where, as a result of the existence of the two opposing military alliances, equipped with the most up-to-date and devastating weapons, there exists a dangerous hot-bed of tension.

46. To be more explicit, I should like to recall, with your permission, that my Government has come out with a number of proposals in that respect and is currently engaged in a dialogue with the interested parties to see what can be the most effective and best ways to halt the arms race in Europe. We therefore interpret provisions of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a confirmation of the basic correctness of our diplomatic efforts.

47. We have been and are prepared to continue those efforts to create conditions conducive to lasting security in Europe. With a view to the realization of

this important and difficult task, we shall gladly welcome co-operation from any State which, like Poland, sincerely strives for peace and security.

48. Our fervent hope that the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty will open up the road towards further disarmament negotiations was greatly reinforced by the substance of the statements of the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, at the 1556th meeting. We draw the conclusion from those statements that the two Powers are agreed on the urgent need for resuming negotiations with regard to further disarmament steps. In his statement, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Kuznetsov, explicitly mentioned the directions in which joint future efforts should go. We consider that such problems as the conclusion of an international convention banning the use of nuclear weapons, the halting of their production, the reduction of stockpiles, and the further limitation and, later, reduction of the stockpiles of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles, as well as other suggestions contained in the Soviet statement, deserve careful consideration and full support.

49. To create a situation in which the above-mentioned problems could be more readily solved it is imperative that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons be finalized at the earliest opportunity. Either we will continue to live under the ominous threat of a nuclear chain reaction or we will take a decision which will trigger a peaceful process. Either we will get a non-proliferation treaty with all its benefits or we may face a considerable setback, with all our efforts heretofore to contain nuclear bombs wasted. Our failure to act now could certainly weaken the efficacy of the brakes on the arms race provided in the 1963 Moscow partial test-ban Treaty and the outer space Treaties.

50. Poland opts for the better of those alternatives. We consider that the current session of the General Assembly should approve the draft treaty that has been submitted. We also consider that the treaty should be laid out for signature soon, and we are hopeful that most countries will find accession to the treaty in their own and humanity's best interest.

*The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.*