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#### **NOTE**

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## SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held in New York on Sunday, 28 July 1974, at 9 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Javier PÉREZ de CUÉLLAR (Peru).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1786)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
  - (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
  - (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
  - (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348);
  - (d) Letter dated 28 July 1974 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11389)

*The meeting was called to order at 9.35 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### The situation in Cyprus:

- (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
- (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
- (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348);

(d) Letter dated 28 July 1974 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11389)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [1779th-1781st meetings], I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey), and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In view of the limited number of places available at the Council table, I propose to invite the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the usual understanding that they will be invited to come to the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kikić (Yugoslavia), Mr. Datcu (Romania), Mr. Jaipal (India) and Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council table.*

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have convened this urgent meeting of the Security Council at the request of the Acting Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union which is contained in document S/11389 and is the subject of agenda item 2 d.

4. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, the Soviet delegation, on instructions from the Government of the USSR, has requested you to call an urgent meeting of the Security Council in order to consider the question of the implementation of resolution 353 (1974) concerning the situation in Cyprus.

5. The need for the urgent convening of the Security Council arises from the fact that resolution 353 (1974) is not being implemented in its basic provisions; in fact, so far not a single one of its provisions has been implemented.

6. The foreign military intervention in the territory of the independent State of Cyprus is still continuing. There has been no restoration of the legal constitutional Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which is headed by President Makarios; the institutions of that Government have not been restored and are not functioning. As a direct result of the non-implementation of resolution 353 (1974), there persists in Cyprus an explosive, tense situation which is a direct threat to international peace and security.

7. Gravely concerned by what is happening in and around Cyprus, the Soviet Government has today issued a new statement concerning the situation which is developing in Cyprus. Allow me to read out the full text of that statement:

[The speaker read out the text of the statement contained in document S/11390.]

8. As is emphasized in the statement by the Soviet Government, the Security Council must take urgent and effective measures to implement the key provisions of resolution 353 (1974). This is precisely what the Soviet delegation has said repeatedly and persistently at all the recent meetings of the Council. In particular, no later than at yesterday's meeting of the Council, the Soviet delegation once more drew the attention of Council members to the urgent need to adopt effective measures aimed at implementing the decisions taken by the Council concerning Cyprus, and in particular resolution 353 (1974).

9. The Soviet delegation feels that the Council must urgently take a decision requesting all interested Governments to take without delay all necessary measures for the practical implementation of its resolution 353 (1974) in its entirety—in other words, in all its parts and provisions.

10. Up to this time, the situation with regard to the implementation of resolution 353 (1974), which defines the basis for a political settlement in Cyprus, remains unsatisfactory. That is why the USSR delegation feels that, in the present situation, it is not sufficient merely to request all interested States to take urgent and effective measures for the implementation of resolution 353 (1974) in its entirety. It is necessary at the same time to insist on the urgent withdrawal from the island of the Greek military personnel whose blatant intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus has been, as everyone knows, the main cause of the present crisis. But that is not all. It is also necessary to secure the speediest possible withdrawal from the island of all—I repeat, all—foreign forces which are in Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Otherwise, the situation might lead to the consolidation of the occupation of the independent and sovereign State of the Republic of Cyprus and the division of that State into separate parts, which

would mean in practice the destruction or elimination of the Republic of Cyprus as a State.

11. At the present time, when the Security Council has a specially heightened responsibility for the urgent implementation of resolution 353 (1974) in its entirety, it should, in our view, have direct knowledge of what is going on in Cyprus. The Council should receive information about Cyprus from its own representatives. It should ascertain directly the reasons why the resolution that it adopted on 20 July is not being implemented.

12. It is also quite clear that if, in the future, through anybody's fault, resolution 353 (1974) is not implemented, the Council will then have to consider and adopt measures which would really ensure the implementation of all the provisions of that resolution. This is incumbent upon the Council under the Charter, under which the Council has every means for discharging this responsibility.

13. It is the first duty of the Council to ensure that the constitutional Government of the Republic of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios, has the opportunity to exercise its power in the country to its fullest extent.

14. The Soviet delegation would like to stress once again that, if the Council does not fulfil the responsibility entrusted to it and does not secure the restoration of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, the situation in Cyprus may become even more acute and lead to the creation of a permanent hotbed of military conflict.

15. This is precisely why we urgently appeal to the Council without delay to adopt measures to ensure the complete and immediate implementation of resolution 353 (1974).

16. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

17. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Mr. President, having been brought here by the Soviet Union at 9.30 on a Sunday evening, may I ask you, on a point of order, whether it is not perhaps appropriate for the Soviet Union to make its position clear and, since we have been considering resolution 353 (1974), may I ask the Soviet Union a specific question to which I hope I may get a specific answer? Is the Soviet Union calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops at present on Cypriot soil, and is the Soviet Union of the view that resolution 353 (1974) calls for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops on Cypriot soil? I regret having to interrupt in this way, but it would seem to me that, if this is an emergency meeting of the Security Council called to consider the implementation of resolution 353 (1974), it might

perhaps be desirable if the Council were to be told by the Soviet Union which troops it is calling for to be withdrawn from Cyprus—the Turkish troops or not?

18. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Of course we reserve the right to judge whether the representative of the United Kingdom was speaking on a point of order or whether he put a question. This is not clear to us. However, if he has put a question, we shall answer it.

19. The statement by the Soviet Government which I read out refers quite clearly to the Soviet Government's insistence on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the sovereign State of the Republic of Cyprus.

20. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): In view of that last answer from the representative of the Soviet Union, I can be brief. I was both irritated and curious, as I am sure the rest of the Security Council was, to know why we were brought here this evening. We have met on the issue of Cyprus seven or eight times in the course of the last 14 days. We have been here in connexion with Cyprus no fewer than six times within the past eight days. We were indeed here—as all of us will remember—even as recently as last night. What has changed between last night and this evening? The answer is, nothing at all except that apparently the Soviet Government decided to make a statement. Of course the Soviet Government is perfectly entitled to make a statement on the affairs of Cyprus, as indeed is any other Government, but, with respect, I must say that I do not think that the Soviet Government is entitled to bring people here at 9 o'clock on a Sunday evening merely to listen to a piece of propaganda which has been distributed this afternoon in Moscow. There are other ways, I submit with great respect to the Soviet representative, particularly in a free democracy, for distributing governmental statements that do not require the personal intervention of the members of the Security Council.

21. There is not even a draft resolution in front of us tonight. There is a piece of paper, which most members have seen, and which apparently the Soviet Union has not had the forensic courage to present to us. And if one looks at this document, what does it do? First, it demands that all States take urgent and effective measures towards the practical implementation of resolution 353 (1974). Secondly, this document insists on the speediest withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel at present in Cyprus in violation of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. We are very grateful for one thing this evening at any rate, and that is that for the first time we now know that the Soviet Union is calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops in Cyprus as well as for the withdrawal of the Greek troops at present in Cyprus. Thirdly, this document

calls upon the Security Council to send a special mission to Cyprus composed of unspecified and as yet unknown members of the Council. Finally, it asks that the Council consider the question of further measures to be taken.

22. I took the trouble before this meeting started to inquire of the Soviet delegation what was the status of this piece of paper. I was told it was not a draft resolution. I was told it incorporated the thoughts of the Soviet Union concerning the situation in Cyprus. It is perhaps unfortunate, if these are the considered opinions of a Government as substantial and as important as that of the Soviet Union, that no one could have been found to sponsor it so as to bring it in front of the Council this evening, when no doubt we should have been able to consider it.

23. This is a mischievous meeting. It has been called in a mischievous way. It is a propaganda exercise which has been indulged in by the Soviet Union in what, if I may say so, has been an unworthy manner, at a time when negotiations which this Council in fact sanctioned in resolution 353 (1974)—adopted, may I say, unanimously a week ago yesterday—are still going on. For us to have been subjected to the sort of speech that we have heard this evening from the Government of the Soviet Union is nothing less than a contempt of the Council and a contempt of the United Nations.

24. Finally, may I say this. The representative of the Soviet Union made one point this evening that was new. He said that he insisted upon the direct representation of Cyprus at the talks in Geneva. That is the first time that point has been made by the Government of the Soviet Union. I took the trouble while he was speaking to go through all the verbatim records of this whole debate since we first talked about it, and they are in front of me here. There is not one word in them by the representative of the Soviet Union in which he dissented from the propositions that were made by me in the Security Council eight days ago concerning the Geneva conference. There has not been one word from him to suggest that that conference was not taking place in the way in which it should have been taking place.

25. I will say no more. I have perhaps said too much, but I must say that I regard this exhibition this evening as something which does the United Nations no good whatsoever.

26. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

27. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, may I point out to you that, in blatant violation of the provisional rules of procedure, the representative of the United Kingdom, having asked to speak on

a point of order, has in fact made a statement on the substance of the item now before the Council. I categorically protest against that. That is the first point I wish to make.

28. Secondly, the United Kingdom representative, having asked to speak on a point of order and having taken advantage of that to talk about the substance of the item, did his utmost to distort our position. All the members of the Council know exactly how the Council should function. There is already a list of speakers wishing to take part in this debate. But the United Kingdom representative, disregarding the usual practice of this body, suddenly begins to make a statement. We are simply amazed at this behaviour on the part of the United Kingdom representative. If he had wished to speak on the substance of the item, if he had wished to comment on our statement or if he had wished to comment on the statement by the Soviet Government, he could have had his name included in the list of speakers and could have made his statement after you, Mr. President, had called upon him. But, without waiting to be called upon, he started to speak and you, Sir, did not interrupt him. We cannot accept such a blatant violation of the provisional rules of procedure, and request that in future the United Kingdom representative strictly respect those rules. Of course, we must allow for the fact that he is a comparative newcomer to the United Nations. Perhaps he has not yet sufficiently studied the provisional rules of procedure and at the same time the rules of propriety adopted in the Organization. But he has advisers: let them prompt him as to the proper way to behave in the Council.

29. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Point of order.

30. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I have not finished, Mr. President. Since the United Kingdom representative, in blatant violation of the provisional rules of procedure, has spoken on the substance, I shall not waste the Council's time but shall proceed now to answer one question of substance that he raised. He blatantly distorted the truth by saying that the Soviet delegation had never raised the question of the direct representation of the Republic of Cyprus at the tripartite talks in Geneva. That is not true, and he knows better than any other member of the Council that it is not so. The fact is that the Soviet delegation, during the consideration of the draft resolution that became resolution 353 (1974), suggested to the United Kingdom delegation that a special paragraph should be added, or a provision inserted in paragraph 5, regarding the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the Geneva talks. And it was Mr. Richard, the representative of the United Kingdom, himself, who categorically disagreed with that proposal. That is the truth; that is what actually happened. But now we hear the United Kingdom

representative hypocritically asking why we did not make such a suggestion from the very beginning, and why such a provision was not included in the resolution.

31. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom on a point of order.

32. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): It is perfectly true that I am newer in the ways of the United Nations than is the representative of the Soviet Union. I am, however, much older in the ways of a free parliament than he ever will be.

33. May I also say this to him. He has accused me of ignoring the provisional rules of procedure. As I understand the provisional rules of procedure, the members of the Security Council are entitled to be heard in general debate before the representatives of those nations that have been invited to sit at the table are heard. At the time when I asked to speak and you, Mr. President, were kind enough to call on me, the list of speakers had the names of two countries on it: one was the Soviet Union and the other was Greece. The representative of the Soviet Union had made his intervention; indeed, we had all heard him. The only other name on the list of speakers, therefore, at the time when you, Sir, called on me was Greece. Greece, as we know, is not a member of the Security Council—although we are, of course, very happy to see its representative sitting at the table. Hence, new in the ways of the United Nations as I am, it would not seem to me—with great respect—that I have violated any rule of procedure whatsoever.

34. What the representative of the Soviet Union is really complaining about is not that I have violated the rules of procedure but that I have exposed this evening's effort for what in fact it is.

35. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

36. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): We wish to reaffirm our view that the representative of the United Kingdom is not fully acquainted with the provisional rules of procedure. He would have had the right to speak after we had finished if there had been no other name on the list of speakers; in that case he could have spoken on the substance of the item. But he asked to speak on a point of order and proceeded to speak on the substance. That is where the violation of the provisional rules of procedure occurred.

37. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I apologize, Mr. President.

38. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Greece, and I now call on him.

39. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I was of course very interested to hear the question put by the representative of the United Kingdom and the answer given by the representative of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that in his statement the representative of the Soviet Union did not mention the Turkish army which invaded Cyprus, I take it that he had in mind all foreign armies which are now in Cyprus—and that includes the Turkish army. If I am mistaken, I would expect the Soviet Union representative to correct me.

40. The representative of the United Kingdom said that nothing new had happened in regard to Cyprus since the Council last met. I consider that to be somewhat of an understatement. As a matter of fact, today has been a very difficult and a very confused day in Cyprus and in Geneva. There were news reports that Greece was asking for a meeting of the Council. As a matter of fact, today there were very many violations of the cease-fire in Cyprus. Furthermore, in Geneva Turkish conditions were being put forward which it would be very difficult for Greece to accept. Those conditions were put forward by Turkey as non-negotiable conditions. My Government had indeed thought of asking for a meeting of the Council on the subject. If we did not do so it was because in the early hours of the afternoon, New York time, things seemed to be going a little better in Geneva, and my Government is very anxious not to do anything at all that might endanger the talks in Geneva.

41. My files are full of information on violations of the cease-fire that have occurred today in Cyprus. I have all the details. My files are also full of information on everything that was asked today by Turkey at the Geneva talks. But I am not going to enter into this; I am not going to go into the details, in the hope that the Geneva talks may eventually go better.

42. I should like to turn now to the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union. He spoke of the withdrawal of all military personnel and all foreign troops from Cyprus. He mentioned the Greek military personnel in Cyprus; he did not mention the Turkish troops in Cyprus. That gives me the opportunity to explain several facts about this Greek military personnel in Cyprus.

43. This personnel was requested from Greece by the Government of Cyprus, and I am sure that Mr. Rossides will not deny that. It was asked for because the Republic of Cyprus thought that it needed to set up an army and that it needed that personnel. If there had been no threats on the part of Turkey, I think that Cyprus would have never asked for the Greek military personnel, and that would have been much better for all of us. It did happen that that

Greek military personnel stationed in Cyprus was mixed up in the coup which took place in Cyprus. We consider that an unfortunate action and I should like to declare here, before this Council, that we have no difficulty whatsoever in withdrawing that military personnel from Cyprus at any time. We would be very happy if we could withdraw all of that personnel by tomorrow morning.

44. But the Council would have to agree that there is a difference between a country which comes here and says to the Council, "All right, we had in a foreign country personnel which carried out a regrettable action, which we ourselves consider regrettable, and we are ready to repair it at any time", and another country which carries out an invasion in Cyprus with a big army, without being asked to do so by the Government of Cyprus, and not only does it not agree to withdraw its army when the reason for which it carried out the invasion has disappeared, but it accepts a cease-fire and is not gallant enough to honour it.

45. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

46. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I did not understand why we had to meet tonight and I continue not to understand, but so much has already been said around the table that I had to make certain notes to try to unravel this complicated situation and give answers to certain points which have been raised. The situation—and I beg to differ with those who have a different opinion about it—both in Cyprus and in Geneva certainly does not warrant a meeting here. I say that because my information—and I am not boasting—is certainly more accurate than any information emanating from Manhattan or, for that matter, from many of the capitals of the member countries around this table. Now, negotiations are continuing in Geneva, and I was pleased to hear from the representative of Greece that there are some hopes in Geneva. That is a feeling I share with him. The negotiations are hard, difficult, sometimes bordering on hopelessness, but they are continuing, and this afternoon my Prime Minister asked to meet his Greek counterpart. All this I at least would consider as genuine steps towards the better, if not the ultimate good.

47. I was going to make a longish speech on the Greek presence in Cyprus. I had a few points to make, but I think that after at least some of what has been said by the representative of Greece there remains little for me to add. They say they are sorry, that they have made a mistake. For the past 15 years they have been there as a result of a request by some people in Cyprus, who felt that it would be better to have Greek troops over there. A great number of them were introduced under false pretences, armed to the teeth with all kinds of weapons—and

we have had occasion to see in recent days the arms which were introduced.

48. I have had the occasion to speak on this subject at length in the Council several times—as did my predecessor and his predecessors before him. It had to do with armaments which were introduced as agricultural implements, arms which had been brought in under the custody of the United Nations Force in Cyprus: arms, arms, arms, all the time. We have seen them in action, used by Greek soldiers, tens of thousands of them. They were there to train the praetorian guard of the Archbishop, I suppose.

49. Turkey would like to remind the Council of what has happened in the past 15 years in—as now evidenced by what has been said by the representative of Greece—a situation of total lawlessness, this for the greater glory of Hellenism, I suppose. But all that has not aroused the indignation of the Council, despite the numerous times that the Turkish representative sitting here has warned that it was leading to a dangerous situation. And the dangerous situation we were thinking of was a kind of sudden announcement of the realization of the ultimate aim which has never been denied by any Greek statesman. I suppose you cannot both deny it and remain a Greek statesman either in Cyprus or in Greece. Yet, this has not happened as we thought it would—with a sudden declaration of enosis. It took the form of the toppling of a régime which was not giving the movement towards enosis enough speed. They were more cautious about it.

50. As a matter of fact, I cannot help but note—as many around this table have, I am sure, noted—the most recent change in the seating arrangements, which are probably an indication of a return to the previous enosis formula of the soft approach as opposed to the brutal one we all feared would be the result of the Sampson coup were it not for the Turkish action.

51. And again today Greece has spoken for Cyprus. If that is the result of any doubt concerning legitimacy, I cannot dispute it. But I would suggest that where we stand I have as much right as the representative of Greece to speak on the subject—no more, no less.

52. There are in Cyprus two communities, a Greek community and a Turkish community, the Turkish community having always been voiceless but for the representative of Turkey, who from time to time has had occasion to speak of what they have been subjected to.

53. Now, many points have been made around this table. The representative of the United Kingdom has placed special stress on the question of the presence of the Turkish troops. That is the kind of question that will raise so many side issues that I

would prefer his Government to raise the whole matter in Geneva.

54. The representative of the USSR has spoken about the necessity to reinstitute a legal government in Cyprus. I certainly do not dispute that necessity. At this moment it is my feeling that it is not for this Council at this late hour on a weekend to try to solve the problem. The implementation of the constitutional process in the State of Cyprus, or what is left of constitutionality there, is certainly a problem for the islanders themselves to solve. The present situation in Cyprus, as far as I know, is that there is, if I am not mistaken, an acting head of State—a normal procedure when the head of State is absent.

55. What I find a bit difficult to understand is the over-dramatization of an already tense situation and the present way in which this situation is being handled. I have said—and I insist that it be said for future reference—that if the Council is to be called to meetings as a result of information or impulses received from hotel rooms on the island of Manhattan instead of the island of Cyprus, without due consideration of the local situation and without taking into account the superhuman efforts being spent in Geneva to try to achieve an acceptable solution, a peaceful solution, or at least the first steps towards such a solution, I think we are in danger of not achieving what I am sure is our common purpose around this table—a return to normalcy.

56. In Cyprus now the Turkish Cypriots are making every effort to become once more the masters of their own fate in a Republic in which, until a fortnight ago—and I insist on that: until a fortnight ago, before the coup and after the coup—the Greek Cypriots were the only ones who were supposed to have a voice on their own fate and on the fate of what we considered, I hope not mistakenly, to be their common State. Therefore I am very pleased that those views seem to correspond with those expressed a moment ago by the representative of the Soviet Union.

57. Again, the Soviet representative has also touched upon the intention of the rebel Government to achieve enosis. But I think that this statement needs correction. Of course, we do not quarrel with the contention of the Soviet representative that that was the intention of the rebel Government—that is, the Sampson Government. But that goal was not a new one. It has never changed, whatever régime has been in power on the island, before or after the coup.

58. I want to remind the members of the Council—and I am sure that I have been doing so *ad nauseam*—that when I, during the more or less six-monthly meetings of the Council on this subject, have challenged Mr. Rossides to state solemnly that the Greek Cypriot administration rejects the idea of enosis he has never been able to do so. I certainly cannot hope he will do so this evening, but were he



to do so I would still have questions on this same subject to ask him.

59. I should like to make one more, and final, point. When explaining the presence in Cyprus over 15 years, or 10 years, or whatever it is—and it is at least a decade—of a great number of Greek troops coming from the mainland, or the motherland, or whatever they like to call it, the Greek representative has said they were requested by the Government of Cyprus. My question is this. Under which Constitution? The one torn to pieces because it gave a kind of equality to the Turks? If that were so, we should be faced by a strange situation, because under that Constitution, which was trampled by the last constitutional administration of the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, defence questions should have had the endorsement of the Vice-President. I have never imagined he was consulted before Greek troops were invited to be present in Cyprus.

60. Now, at this late hour, all this could not lead us to any constructive result concerning the Cyprus problem. The Cyprus problem has a long history; it has been on the agenda of the Council for 10 years, and for certain reasons. It is not here because the Turkish Government, after 10 years of constant provocations, after having witnessed the increase to an insufferable level of the presence of Greek troops in Cyprus, has taken the steps with which all members here are familiar and which have led to the restoration of some kind of legality in Cyprus, to the return to what we all hail now as democracy in Greece, and to what we still continue to hope might be the beginning of a definitive solution of the Cypriot problem.

61. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Greece to exercise his right of reply.

62. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): This will be only a very brief answer to my Turkish colleague in reference to the seating arrangement he mentioned. I should like to assure him that I had nothing to do with it. As a matter of fact, I should like to assure him that I very much enjoyed his company yesterday. It was probably one of the few initiatives the Secretariat takes, and I shall take the liberty to ask the Secretariat to put me on the other side next time.

63. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

64. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We have just heard the representative of Turkey make a very rambling statement about all sorts of immaterial happenings of the past. He has even referred to statements made during the periodic meetings of the Security Council to renew the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. But the point is, what is the situation in Cyprus today? What is happening in Cyprus that has

never happened before? Is this the time for levity, for the remarks made by the representative of Turkey about the seating arrangement and so on?

65. Cyprus has been virtually slaughtered; it has been subjected to an attempt at dismemberment through aggression and invasion from Turkey. Its open cities, wholly undefended, have been strafed from the air by Turkish military jets and burned by incendiary bombs; its farms have been ablaze for days, and its people have suffered the agonies of napalm bombs; its hospitals and institutions appear to be almost special targets in the frenzy of destruction.

66. And all this was done even after Security Council resolution 353 (1974) had called for a cease-fire and that cease-fire had been accepted and consented to by all the parties. For a whole week after the adoption of that resolution the attacks continued, in even greater strength. Instead of withdrawing its armies, the Turkish Government has been continually pouring in war *matériel*—tanks and so forth—in order to continue its frenzied attack against an almost defenceless population.

67. In view of that continued attack, the Security Council realized the seriousness of the situation and demanded a cease-fire more emphatically. The day after that demand on 24 July, there was quiet; but after that, the aggression resumed, with even greater force.

68. At previous meetings I have given the names of the cities and townships and villages that have been occupied by force after the cease-fire. It is a long list revealing that the areas of occupation in the north of Cyprus, including the corridor towards Nicosia, have been broadened. What was the purpose of that occupation? By what right was it done? Is the Charter of the United Nations not functioning at all? What has the Security Council done in the face of this defiance of its resolution, resulting in the desolation and destruction of a small country undefended and abandoned to the tender mercies of the aggressor? What have the big Powers, the permanent members of the Council, the guardians of peace, justice and freedom in the world, done? Nothing of any effectiveness. All they have done is to delay the obviously needed measures for the implementation of the cease-fire resolution and the other measures called for by that resolution. Even the inclusion of the usual provision in the resolution that territory should not be acquired by force after the cease-fire and that in the case of such acquisition the troops should return to the positions they occupied at the time of the cease-fire on 22 July—as suggested by the Secretary-General—was objected to. Of course, the fact that such a provision was not included is an invitation to any of the belligerents that have accepted the cease-fire to proceed further and get more territory, since there is no question of its having to be returned. The absence of such a

provision was obviously an inducement that Turkey could not resist, and it therefore proceeded further.

69. Now, what did the Security Council do after that? The Council seems to have been leaning so much on the Geneva conference that it has almost shifted to the shoulders of that conference its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, and has almost abdicated its authority on the subject, in spite of the obvious and growing threats to international peace and security, not only in regard to Cyprus.

70. The strange situation is this: one of the participants in the conference, combining its role of so-called guarantor of the independence, security and territorial integrity of Cyprus with the role of the very aggressor against that independence and territorial integrity, is hindering any progress by the conference towards implementation of resolution 353 (1974) in order that it may have the time to continue its aggression against, and invasion of, the territory of Cyprus and to occupy more territory. Every member of the Council can see this by reading any daily newspaper; he does not need to obtain any particular information from his country.

71. Now, the fine idea is: "let us not disturb the calm and cool waters of the Geneva conference". That would be an excellent idea if the Geneva conference were proceeding in accordance with the Security Council resolution. But the Geneva conference is only the child—the outgrowth—of the Council resolution, and it should act in accordance with that resolution. The Council has a responsibility to see to it that the conference does act in accordance with the Council resolution. But does it act in accordance with the resolution when one of the participants is continually violating the resolution by refusing to comply with the cease-fire?

72. And what is still more strange, the country that is the combined guarantor of and aggressor against that independence, as we see in the newspaper today, says to the conference blatantly and without the slightest hesitation, "I will not comply with the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire unless my conditions for the political future of Cyprus are accepted." This means that it turns the discussion on the political future of Cyprus, which is a question before the conference, to the subject of the threat of continued aggression and fire and devastation in Cyprus.

73. Could such an event have been conceived of as possible in the period following the Second World War? It could have happened during or immediately before the Second World War, but not at the present stage of the world's history. This is true. This is reality. I should like to hear from those members who disagree with me if and in what respect I have said something which is not true and not a reality.

I should be greatly obliged and I shall apologize for anything I have said which is not true. But is it not true that Cyprus is subjected to this attack?

74. Now, probably Turkey says, "I am a guarantor, and the guarantee I give to Cyprus gives me the right to invade it, to burn it and to do whatever I like—because I am a guarantor." But the guarantee, as I said before, states that the guarantor, in case of any breach of the provisions, should consult and make representations on measures necessary to assure observance of those provisions. And as representatives know, if in legal language you use one term such as "representations" or "measures" it means that whenever the term occurs it is used *generis* (of the same kind) to mean peaceful measures or representations. The term could not imply invasion by fire and sword or destruction in order to carry out whatever the provisions may be.

75. So Turkey is obviously an aggressor under the Charter of the United Nations to such a point that it is really almost abdicating its authority as a guarantor of Cyprus. That is a problem which has to be considered in time. But again it is a reality. Every day all these newspaper correspondents who see the situation there are writing with almost a feeling of compassion concerning the affairs of Cyprus, almost as if they would act themselves if they were in a position to do so. And yet the Security Council still holds its tongue lest it disturb the waters of the conference. But surely that conference is heading towards nothing practical when it becomes the instrument to force from the other side political provisions that could not be accepted except under the threat, "We are going to pound and destroy Cyprus".

76. For eight whole days Turkey was taking new forces to Cyprus. Over 100 tanks arrived in Cyprus after the cease-fire. Only then, when it was seen that neither Security Council nor the conference would do anything to protect Cyprus, and was Cyprus found to need some weapons from Greece to face a war which the United Nations was not able to stop and which the conference was tolerating without any sort of protest. This is the peculiar situation that has to be seen in its reality.

77. Mr. Denktas said that 20,000 men had arrived from Turkey, and the newspapers say that this is a very conservative estimate because the true figure is as 25,000 men. What did the Greek forces in Cyprus consist of? They consisted of 650 officers who were subject to removal—and they would have been removed long before now if not for this upheaval—and no others except the legitimate contingents.

78. The situation which the representative of Turkey is speaking of is the situation concerning armies that were there five or six years ago.

79. I do not see how the present situation can continue without something being done. The repre-

representative of the Soviet Union brought up the subject in a letter to the President of the Security Council. He states:

“The need for an urgent meeting of the Security Council is created by the fact that the basic provisions of the resolution [353 (1974)] are not being implemented.” [S/11389]

80. What are those basic provisions? They are, first, the cease-fire, and, secondly, the withdrawal of the foreign troops. And the military intervention is continuing. Perhaps the representative of the Soviet Union should have specified more distinctly who the violent aggressor is today. That would have been more proper and would have made unnecessary the pertinent question by the representative of the United Kingdom. But the fact remains that the resolution says all foreign troops. But, of course, “all” includes the 25,000 Turkish troops which are there and the 650 officers which have been there, and perhaps some that have arrived today as well. So we take this to mean, even without saying so specifically, Turkey. Even if the representative of the Soviet Union wanted to be so delicate as not to mention that name in the document itself, the meaning is obvious and undoubted.

81. The representative of Turkey should address himself to that and reply to it. Why are those troops there? What are they doing there? I did not go into this question here because every man in the street knows what they are doing there. Perhaps there are exaggerations; it is possible. I was reading about rapes. I was reading about all sorts of things. I do not know whether they are true or not. I do not enter into that. I do not wish, like the representative of Turkey, to cite all sorts of fantastic things. I read these things in the newspaper, but I do not use them. I use what I see, and what everyone sees, namely, that this is a most blatant, ruthless and brutal aggression against Cyprus that is contrary to all provisions of the Charter and to the Security Council cease-fire resolution.

82. Therefore, the Security Council is meeting on the question of Cyprus. Whatever objections there are about the letter of the Soviet Union is a matter that I am not entering into. We see the situation as one of aggression by Turkey and of the need for the Council to act immediately to stop that aggression and to see that the armies are withdrawn. When that is done, progress in the Geneva conference will be possible—not under the threat of war and through the killing of people and the occupation of territory, but in the free atmosphere of peace, or at least a cease-fire. That is the important matter. I think this is the occasion for considering what is happening and for dealing with it.

83. On 28 July—that is, today—the following violations have occurred. At 1.45 a.m. the villages of Ermolaos and Sisklipos were attacked with mortars.

At the same time, 10 ships were disembarking military personnel at Kyrenia port. When there should have been a withdrawal of forces further forces were disembarking, so that the war machine could be further strengthened and further destruction could be wreaked on Cyprus. At 8 a.m. a group of 15 helicopters and another of 10 helicopters landed in Agyrtas enclave. A number of tanks was observed moving from Kyrenia to Karavas, where a unit of the National Guard was stationed. At 8.40 a.m. a Turkish armoured vehicle bearing United Nations ensigns was observed moving from Larnaca to Ayios Pavlos. At 9.50 a.m. the village of Ayios Ermolaos, which the Turks abandoned yesterday evening, was reoccupied—and that means war and fighting and bloodshed, a serious matter which justifies our losing some sleep, so that we may see what can be done by the Security Council, which bears the responsibility. Eight tanks participated in the attack on that little village of Ayios Ermolaos. Previously we had the information, which I gave here, that the people of that village were ordered by the Turks to abandon the village and their property or the village would be bombarded and destroyed. At 10 a.m. four of the afore-mentioned tanks continued their advance towards Sisklipos. At 11 a.m. 14 Turkish helicopters landed at the Nicosia enclave south of Agyrtas village, bringing new personnel. At 12.33 p.m. Turkish vessels disembarked artillery units eight kilometres west of Kyrenia. At 1 p.m. Turkish troops opened fire against the village of Lymbia. So this continues. It is not as if all were quiet in Cyprus. Things are quiet only in the sense that Cyprus has not exploded altogether, while forces are being built up. At 4.30 p.m. the region of Klepini, Pakhyammos and the village of Ayios Epikitios was attacked with artillery and the region was shelled. There were further violations at 6 p.m., at 6.30 p.m. and up to 6.45 p.m., when Turkish troops supported by tanks attacked Greek Cypriot units in the region of Ayios Yeoryios, and Turkish vessels continued disembarking war *matériel*, vehicles and arms in the region of Karavas. This preparation for further war has continued under a cease-fire.

84. I have said before—and I must say again—that something has to be done to stop this, even though it may not seem important to some. How long are we to be left at the mercy of the aggressor, who happens to be a participant in the Geneva conference and who prevents progress towards a solution or implementation of the resolution? This is a serious matter that must be looked into by the Security Council; it should not be left to the conference, whose duty is not to maintain international peace and security but to look for a solution to the problem. The solution to the problem can come only if the Council obtains the implementation of the cease-fire which it called for in its resolution 353 (1974).

85. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey, who wishes to exercise the right of reply.

86. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Out of respect for the members of the Council at this late hour, I will be brief—or at least as brief as I can.

87. The adjective “immaterial”, lightly used by Mr. Rossides about what I had said, reminds me of his attitude and the attitude of the forces he represents towards all the warnings we have given for years in this chamber. I think that it is obvious to those who study this problem in depth that this is the root of all the evils in Cyprus. Mr. Rossides and the forces he represents have lightly disregarded all Turkish rights in Cyprus, the plight of the Turks on the island, the many appeals for attempts to find a workable constitution. But they had the might; they had the superiority. They had also invited the Greek troops to train their forces. Then suddenly one morning we reached a position where these Greek troops ceased to be welcomed and the red carpet was rolled up. Then it was said:

“... armoured cars and tanks had passed the fence ... of the Presidential Palace, which was shaking from mortar shells.”

“... I am afraid that the number of casualties is large and that the material destruction is heavy.”

“... The capture of the airport outside the capital was carried out by officers and men of the Greek contingent camping near the airport.

“... certain photographs appearing in the world press show armoured vehicles and tanks belonging to the Greek contingent in Cyprus.

“... night flights of Greek aircraft transporting to Cyprus personnel in civilian clothes and taking back to Greece dead and wounded men ...

“... the brutal force of the armoured cars and tanks may have prevailed.”

“... It was an invasion, which violated the independence and the sovereignty of the Republic.”  
[1780th meeting, paras. 13, 16, 18-21 and 23.]

Those are not my words.

88. Mr. Rossides has said that Turkish forces numbering 20,000 or 25,000 men are in Cyprus and that this is an invasion. May I ask what is the limit at which the word “invasion” applies? The tens of thousands of Greek forces on the island are not forces of invasion, because they happen to speak Greek. They happen to be there to promote Hellenism. They are there to promote, I suppose, the ultimate goal, to which, again, there is no reference—and I do not expect any such reference, because I know what they think about it, I know what their aim is. Of course, when finally the Turks appear on the island, the Turks are the invaders—not their predecessors.

Their predecessors are the welcome brothers from northern Greece—that is the term used by Archbishop Makarios, not me—coming to the southern part of the country. That was said two months ago, and I have already had occasion to quote it.

89. Mr. Rossides has reproached me for using certain newspapers as my sources. Of course, I have no other sources in regard to what is said by the supreme authorities in the Greek Cypriot administration and I have to read what the press says about that.

90. Mr. Rossides also reproaches me for speaking of the past. What is important is the present, because at present it is the Greeks in Cyprus who are the sufferers. As long as it is not the Greeks in Cyprus that are the sufferers there is no Cyprus problem and there is no reason to bring the matter here. This is a matter of fact. The Turks are a small minority who have to abide by the rules of the game and wait until the day when they become members of greater Greece, even a minor minority in greater Greece. That was the plan, which we have thwarted, and that is the reason for this outburst of indignation on the part of Mr. Rossides.

91. Now, Mr. Rossides, the present is always built on the past. Today's harvest is bitter because the seeds were bitter. I know how you personally, Mr. Rossides, feel about these questions; I know that you want to see a fair solution. But I know also that some of those you have been representing here have not been of the same view.

92. Whenever we have raised the possibility of a State which, like a great number of others around this table and in the United Nations as a whole, would have a kind of federal constitution, the immediate response has been, “You want to dismember the State; you want to occupy it”. But we know that the aim, and the steps used to ensure its smooth achievement, has always been not to give any kind of status to the other element in Cyprus. However, that other element refuses to be Greek; it has never been Greek; it never will be Greek. It will never agree to live under a Greek State—whether that Greek State is called “Greece” or “Cyprus”—which has a strictly Greek approach to the problem of the constitution of the State. I proclaim this very clearly for anyone who wants to hear it: Turkey and the members of the Turkish Cypriot community will never accept a Greek State, a second Greece in Cyprus. That is very clear. Everything has to be done to see to it that the independent, sovereign State of Cyprus faces that reality, which up to now it has refused to face. Everything has to be done to see to it that the two communities which constitute the State, which 10 or 15 years ago willingly decided to live together, can continue to live together on a basis of full equality. That is the only way to ensure that in future the problem of Cyprus does not have to come to the Security Council again at midnight on a Sunday.

93. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Earlier in the meeting I spoke on a point of order to draw attention to the arbitrary way in which the United Kingdom representative used his right to speak on a point of order. I should now like to exercise my right of reply with regard to the matters of substance that he raised.

94. The Soviet delegation requested this meeting of the Council not merely to inform members of the contents of the statement by the Soviet Government dated 28 July—although, of course, the contents of that statement are of the utmost importance and urgency, and we hope that the members of the Council will study the statement carefully.

95. We regret that the representative of the United Kingdom rejected our statement and resorted to the old, stereotyped routine calumny in the spirit of the worst period of the cold war.

96. Now, regarding the fact that the Soviet delegation distributed a document which the United Kingdom representative has described as a draft resolution, a Soviet draft, and so on, I should like to remind the United Kingdom representative that the Security Council follows an established practice known to all: before a given draft resolution is circulated, the members of the Council usually hold consultations and exchange views on the substance of the draft which a given delegation may wish to submit.

97. The Soviet delegation requested the convening of this meeting of the Council because it had certain ideas and proposals to put forward. In keeping with established practice, we have the right, during consultations before the Council meets, to inform all members of our ideas. We respect the views of all the members of the Council; we are prepared to hear their views, and they have heard ours. Why has the representative of the United Kingdom made such a fuss about this, especially in the form of a point of order? Where have we violated the provisional rules of procedure? We have simply followed standard practice.

98. We have taken note of the statement by the United Kingdom representative that he has had considerable experience of the workings of the United Kingdom Parliament. He was a member of the House of Commons. That is very good; we understand the value of that experience; and we respect it. But, fortunately or unfortunately, the rules of procedure of the United Kingdom House of Commons and the rules of procedure of the Security Council differ; they are not identical. In the work of the Council, we have to use as our guide the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

99. Naturally, after consulting all members of the Council, the Soviet delegation would not hesitate or fear to put its draft text on the Council table for

discussion, if need be. If the United Kingdom representative has a draft text to submit regarding this situation, we are ready to consider it very carefully. We are also ready, in a constructive spirit, to listen to any comments he may wish to make on our ideas. It would appear that he is not willing to listen to our remarks, and brushes them aside from the very outset. Yet, for our part, we are prepared to listen to him.

100. I wish to make one final remark regarding the situation in Cyprus and the statement that the situation there remains unchanged. It is not true to say that nothing has happened in Cyprus during the past 24 hours. From the statement made by the representative of Cyprus, and from those by other representatives at this meeting, it is clear that the situation has taken a turn for the worse. The foreign military interference and intervention continues; it has even been stepped up. The Government of Cyprus, the lawful Government of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios, is still unable to function. But the situation has been complicated by the fact that, as pointed out in the statement by the Soviet Government, attempts are being made and preparations are under way to dismember the Republic of Cyprus, a sovereign State, by all kinds of behind-the-scenes manoeuvring elsewhere: in other words, attempts are being made in certain NATO circles, as we have already pointed out, to settle the fate of Cyprus behind the backs of the Cypriot people without regard to their legitimate interests—indeed, to the detriment of their vital interests. Are these not facts? Can anyone present here deny them?

101. Thus, the situation is changing for the worse; it is not remaining static.

102. That is why we ask all members of the Council to make a serious assessment of the present situation with a full sense of the responsibility entrusted to us under the Charter. We therefore request that tomorrow the Council should be convened so that we may continue the discussion of this question.

103. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

104. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I shall not take any time to reply to the representative of Turkey because he has not answered any of the points that I have raised. He speaks about the past and things which have no relation to today. What about the invasion, the bombings, the burnings? What about the violations of the cease-fire? What does he have to say about that? What about his double role as guarantor and as invader and aggressor? None of those things have been answered. Then he talks about all sorts of insignificant things which have been raised and answered on previous occasions.

105. He speaks about the plight of the Turks in Cyprus. Well, all the reports of the Secretary-General

—and they are there on record—speak highly of the conduct of the Government in allowing freedom of movement to all the Turks in Cyprus, even at times when such movement was dangerous because of fighting. Yet, the Greek Cypriots have no freedom of movement and they do not have it today: they did not and do not have freedom of movement over a hundred public roads held by the Turks, while every Turk in Cyprus has had a right to move anywhere in the island, except in military posts, which were equally prohibited to Greek Cypriots. The Turks had this freedom of movement, and it was commented upon. The situation was criticized by many correspondents who came there and said that it was an intolerable situation that the Greek Cypriots, the majority of the population, had no freedom of movement, whereas the Turkish Cypriots had had it for years.

106. So what was the plight of the Turkish Cypriots? Their plight was that they were put in enclaves by their own military and were not allowed to move out except with the permission of the military, and that their political life was stifled by the military. I shall not enter into that matter because those are things which happened in times of peace. But one should not speak about the plight of the Turks. There was no plight. The Turks were in a better position than the Greek Cypriots in many ways. Economically, they would have been better off if they had consented to form one economic unit with the Greek people of Cyprus, as was repeatedly suggested by the Secretary-General. Many offers were made to them to this effect, but they were disallowed by those who were ruling them from outside because they wished to maintain separation with a view to partition. Now they try to achieve partition by blood and iron. On all this the representative of Turkey has given no reply.

107. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

108. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I really apologize to all the members of the Security Council, but Mr. Rossides has to be answered because he has said some things which are not true, to say the least. If Mr. Rossides qualifies the statements of Archbishop Makarios which I read as insignificant, I have nothing to add. But there are some other things I have said which he has also qualified as insignificant. Mr. Rossides should realize that on these insignificant things depend the fate of Cyprus and of the Turkish Cypriots. I referred to their future on the basis of what we know of their past.

109. In Cyprus, his country, tens of thousands of Turks have lived as refugees for the past 10 years, and for him to imply that that situation was due to the machinations of some politicians suggests a very strange conception of what went on in his own island. As a matter of fact, the leaders knew so little about what went on in their island that the head of State one

morning had to take refuge in a foreign base on the island—as a result of the machinations of people that he himself had invited in.

110. I have nothing to add, and I apologize once again for taking the floor. If I receive an answer, I shall not take the floor again.

111. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I would not wish at this hour of the night, with the Council in a mood of accustomed good humour, to raise the temperature yet again. I would only, if I might, make two observations. First of all, I do not really think that the representative of the Soviet Union is entitled to be quite so sensitive. If he comes along and makes the sort of speech that he made this evening, and indeed makes it at the sort of hour at which he made it this evening, I do not think he can really be totally surprised if he is answered in the same vein.

112. The Soviet Union representative has made a suggestion that we should definitely have a meeting tomorrow. I wonder if I might make one observation in relation to a meeting tomorrow. I do not know, and I do not think any of us can tell at this time, whether a meeting tomorrow will or will not be appropriate. It may be that something might happen as a result of the Geneva conference that makes a Council meeting desirable and necessary; but it may be that the opposite will take place. I would have thought that, particularly after this evening's experience, it might be better, Mr. President, if you were to consult in the usual way tomorrow, to see whether there was a general feeling among the members of the Council that a meeting was necessary and, indeed, if they felt that a meeting was necessary, at what time it ought to be held.

113. So I do not wish, as I say, to diverge too much from the representative of the Soviet Union on this, but it does seem to me that it might perhaps be more appropriate to hold consultations tomorrow than definitely to take a decision to schedule a meeting now.

114. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

115. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I wanted to point out to the representative of Turkey that what the President of Cyprus said in his statement here about the intervention of the junta régime in Greece has nothing to do with the ordinary conduct of Greek affairs. Secondly, it shows the spirit of independence of Cyprus: there is exactly the same reaction whether it is one side or the other that intervenes by force. But the difference between the two is that in this case the intervention is a partitionist one destroying the territorial integrity of Cyprus. That makes the difference. And then of course there is the war effort, which also makes quite a difference.

116. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Security

Council is entitled to discuss the question of measures to implement earlier resolutions that it adopted on Cyprus, without regard to the progress or outcome of the current talks in Geneva. The Council is not a subsidiary organ of the three-Power talks in Geneva. It is the most important organ of the United Nations; it would be wrong for the Council to be bound by the work of other organs or for its work to be made contingent upon the work of other organs in other places.

117. The Soviet delegation has made a number of constructive and practical proposals which are now under consideration by the members of the Council. The Council can and should meet tomorrow to consider the substance of these proposals. By that time, we expect the Council to have before it a draft resolution on this question. That is why we urge that the Council should be reconvened. The situation is such that the consideration and the adoption of the most urgent measures is imperative, and the Council has the duty to take the necessary action.

118. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): I wonder if we might appeal to the representative of the Soviet Union to respond to the suggestion that has been made by the representative of the United Kingdom. It may be that by tomorrow we shall have some substantive proposals—emanating, perhaps, from the representative of the Soviet Union—to which we can apply ourselves. But my delegation is not aware tonight of any, as it were, definitive proposals being before us. Some rather indefinite ideas have been circulated among us, but my delegation would not at this stage regard them as having anything of the nature of definitive proposals.

119. As I have said, by tomorrow we may have something rather more definitive to consider. Would it not be preferable not to attempt to schedule a meeting of the Council for tomorrow, but rather perhaps, at the discretion of the President, to engage in consultations? It could be that before the end of tomorrow we would find ourselves in a position in which we could usefully meet. But my delegation still does not quite know why we have been called here for this emergency meeting this evening. So far as I can see, this meeting has not greatly helped the cause of Cyprus or the people of Cyprus or aided the restoration of constitutional government in Cyprus.

120. Meanwhile, the latest reports, which are coming in even this evening, tell us that, as far as we can judge, the negotiations in Geneva are still going ahead. We are told that all participants have been working without sleep and are still carrying on the good work, if I may call it that. As far as my delegation is concerned, so long as there is any prospect of some progress towards agreement in those negotiations—and I think that as of 24 hours ago all of us here had agreed that the most important thing for us to wait for, if we could, was some sign of progress in

Geneva—we would not wish the Council to go on meeting simply for the sake of meeting.

121. Therefore I would again address this appeal to our Soviet colleague: Rather than attempting to schedule a meeting for tomorrow now, could we not first see if consultations among us at the request of the President might lead us to determine whether a scheduled meeting would be useful?

122. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): As we see it, a very clear tendency is emerging on the part of certain delegations to carry the discussion of the situation in Cyprus beyond the framework of the Security Council, to discuss the question elsewhere and to make the work of the Council contingent upon the outcome of the Geneva talks—in which, as we know, Cyprus is not participating. Such a tendency is, of course, a dangerous one. It could lead to a situation whereby the Council would be unable at the proper time to implement its earlier decisions, since it might simply find itself faced with a fait accompli. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the prestige of the Council and its obligations under the Charter, it would, of course, be wrong to postpone the work of the Council, to delay it merely because talks are going on in Geneva. That is why the Soviet delegation will tomorrow once again insist that the Council be convened, if the Council does not take a decision to that effect today.

123. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

124. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I have no right to enter into a discussion among members as to whether the Council should meet tomorrow. I should like to refer to another, entirely independent question.

125. I understand from what the representative of Australia has said that he wants the Geneva talks to proceed constructively. Indeed, we all do. But we know from official reports, and also from newspaper reports, that one of the sides is using the question of the cease-fire as a weapon so that the negotiations will be conducted under threat and not in a free atmosphere suitable for finding a political solution of the problem. In those circumstances, as long as the Security Council does not perform its duty of enforcing the cease-fire but instead allows it to be used as a weapon, as a means of making threats in the Geneva negotiations, those negotiations are bound to fail. That is why the Council must meet to solve the problem of the cease-fire.

126. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Does any member wish to speak in connexion with the proposal of the representative of the Soviet Union that the Council meet tomorrow? Since I hear no objection, the Council will be convened tomorrow at 3 p.m.

*The meeting rose at 11.40 p.m.*

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