4. The session was convened in accordance with rule 8 (b) of the rules of procedure, at the request of the Security Council [A/4496]. It was necessary to convene this fourth emergency special session because the Security Council failed to secure unanimity of its permanent members with respect to a question affecting the maintenance of peace and security in the Congo.

5. States Members of the United Nations have been much gratified by the efforts of the United Nations in the Congo made possible by the resolutions and debates of the Security Council concerning the responsibilities assumed to safeguard law and order in the Congo and to ensure international peace and security. This grave responsibility now falls on all the Members of the United Nations composing the General Assembly.

6. In the situation with which we are confronted there are many complex and confused elements, but we have to guide us the Charter, the resolutions of the Security Council, and the clear and precise directives issued by the Secretary-General in strict compliance with the Charter and with the Security Council resolutions. On the basis of these firm principles and the standards of action already established, the General Assembly will without doubt accomplish its task of ensuring continued United Nations action, advancing further towards its objective of peace and progress for the Congolese people and the elimination of threats to international peace and security.

7. I think that I am speaking for all here when I say that we are aware that present events will determine the political and economic stability of a sister Republic, which has just embarked upon the adventure of freedom and independence, the equilibrium and peace of the African continent and the prestige of the United Nations itself.

8. Before we go on to electing the Credentials Committee, I should like to draw the Assembly's attention to the note by the Secretary-General [A/4496] entitled "Summoning of the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly". It contains the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 906th meeting, whereby the Council decided to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General's note also confirms the telegram dispatched to all Members notifying them that the fourth emer-
cency special session would meet at Headquarters on 17 September 1960 at 8 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 3

Appointment of a Credentials Committee

9. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We shall now proceed to appoint the Credentials Committee. Rule 26 of the rules of procedure provides that that Committee shall consist of nine members, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly on the proposal of the President.

10. I think that it would be correct and in accordance with the rules of procedure to propose that the Credentials Committee at this emergency special session should consist of the same members as that appointed for the fourteenth regular session.

11. The Credentials Committee will accordingly consist of the following States: Afghanistan, Australia, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Italy, Pakistan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. If there are no objections I shall take that the Assembly agrees to this.

It was so decided.

12. The PRESIDENT: May I be allowed to add that the Secretary-General, in his telegram convening the session, stated that the credentials of representatives not yet authorized to represent their Governments in the General Assembly should be forwarded in conformity with rule 27 of the rules of procedure and could be submitted by telegram.

AGENDA ITEM 4

Adoption of the agenda

13. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The present emergency special session was convened by the Security Council. The General Assembly will now proceed to the adoption of the agenda. The provisional agenda is contained in document A/4497.

14. The representative of the United States has asked to speak on a point of order.

15. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): On a point of order, the United States delegation requests that the General Assembly decide as an extraordinary measure to suspend rule 19 of its rules of procedure to permit the Assembly to consider now the applications of those States which have been recommended by the Security Council for membership in the United Nations. These applications, I may remind the Assembly, would have been considered in any event next Tuesday at the regular session of the Assembly. The fate of the Congo is of extraordinary and vital importance to the future of the rest of Africa, and the United States therefore believes that those most directly concerned should be permitted to participate in our discussions and our decisions on the Congo.

16. In conclusion, I would suggest that if the Assembly were to decide to admit States now, we would still contemplate that the ceremonies planned for next Tuesday, in connexion with new Members, would proceed as planned.

17. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have to consider the proposal, put forward as a point of order by the representative of the United States of America, that we should include the item concerning the admission of new Members in the agenda for this session. If nobody wishes to speak, I shall declare this item included in the agenda.

18. This session was called by the Security Council with the specific purpose of considering the question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on 16 September 1960. In accordance with rule 65 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the Assembly will convene in plenary session only and will proceed directly to consider the item proposed for consideration.

19. I take it that the United States delegation, in introducing the new item, wishes its inclusion in the agenda to be voted on now, so that the order of items may be decided later. I ask the United States representative to give us his view on this subject.

20. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): It is the desire of the United States delegation that the item concerning the admission of new Members be placed before the item for which the session was called and, in accordance with the decision of the Assembly, be adopted as soon as possible.

21. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The proposal of the United States has now been put very clearly. If there is no objection, I will take the item entitled "Admission of New Members to the United Nations" has been included in the agenda unanimously.

It was so decided.

22. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As the representative of the United States has suggested, the ceremonial part of the admissions will be postponed until the fifteenth session of the General Assembly.

23. Since the Assembly's decision to proceed to the admission of new Members requires some preparation to put it into effect, and will perhaps involve some statements, may I suggest—if the representative of the United States, to whom I owe this courtesy, agrees—that we proceed to consider, without voting, the item for which the Assembly was convened, and when the material for the admission of new Members has been prepared by the Secretariat, we will proceed to vote on that item. Then we would vote on the draft resolution concerning the principal item on the agenda.

24. I call on the representative of Brazil on a point of order.

25. Mr. DE FREITAS VALLE (Brazil): There is nothing of more importance to us than the welcoming of new Members into our Organization. The representative of the United States has proposed that we vote now on the admission of the new Members recommended by the Security Council. I think that the decision of the Assembly cannot be delayed simply because there are ceremonies to be performed. I submit that we must vote now on the admission of the new Members.

26. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We are all in agreement and desirous of proceeding to the question of the admission of new members which we voted unanimously to include in the agenda. The only difficulty lies in the necessary administrative formalities, but I hope that they will be completed as soon as possible. The Secretariat thinks that half an hour would be enough to complete the necessary documents, so we shall adjourn for that length of time.
27. The representative of the USSR has the floor on a point of order.

28. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We are attending an emergency session held under special circumstances. The session was convened as a matter of urgency and now the representative of the United Nations is proposing that, as a matter of urgency, the new Members should be admitted in a bloc.

29. We have absolutely no objection to taking a decision on that question at this session and we also consider that the Assembly ought to admit the new Members according to the fixed and established procedure. Therefore, since we have decided to include this item on the agenda and since we have no objection to considering it first, I propose that it should be discussed thoroughly and that we should give all delegations an opportunity to prepare for its discussion and to hear statements both from the delegations which wish to speak on it and from the parties concerned. I should like to ask the Secretary-General whether representatives of the United Nations are in or near New York so that we could consider the matter when these representatives are here and not when they are absent and so that we could, for instance, hear statements from their delegations. We could then avoid any hasty, ill-considered steps that could only undermine the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of these new States which we regard as worthy of admission to membership in the United Nations.

30. I therefore feel we should be taking things too lightly if we tried to prepare for an Assembly decision on such an important question, lastly, in the space of half an hour; it seems to me that a great deal more time is required for preparatory work on this question.

31. Since we have included in the agenda a new item on which obviously none of the delegations is specifically prepared and on which they do not have the relevant documents, it would seem more appropriate to begin our session tomorrow morning in order to give the time to get ready and to give all delegations an opportunity to prepare their statements; the delegations of the countries which we are to admit to membership would also be able to be present at the session and could prepare their statements beforehand. We must remember that it will be their first appearance in the Assembly.

32. I think this is entirely reasonable. Unless we want to turn the admission of new Members into a farce, we can hardly act otherwise.

33. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): My delegation has listened with great attention to the points that have been made by the representative of the Soviet Union. One or two very small corrections, I think, are in order. In the first place, I did not say that the United States or the President—I do not know from which of them this idea emanates—considers that the admission of new Members is necessary merely as a formality, I think that such an attitude is unworthy of our Assembly.

34. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have noted the proposal just made by the United States representative. I think, in the absence of any more definite ruling from the Assembly, that we might now open the debate on the principal item. The admission of new Members has been approved unanimously as an item of the agenda, and I understand that the United Nations representative's comments refer to procedure. Consequently, without prejudice to the admission of Members at this meeting, we can devote this evening, while the Secretariat is preparing documents and completing the necessary formalities, to a discussion of the principal item. It is understood that this item will not be voted upon until the new Members have been admitted, on the basis of the documents prepared by the Secretariat.

35. If there are no objections, we shall proceed to the debate on the principal item on this understanding.

36. The representative of the USSR has the floor on a point of order.

37. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I do not quite follow what the President has just said. As I see it, the point of admitting the new Members is to enable them to take part in the work of this session; that is the whole point of transferring the question for decision from the eleventh session to this emergency session and it seemed to me that this was what the representative of the United States had in mind. But if the representative of the United States or the President—I do not know from which of them this idea emanates—considers that the admission of new Members is necessary merely as a formality, I think that such an attitude is unworthy of our Assembly.

38. We are in favour of admitting the new Members and also of allowing them to participate in the discussion of a question which is undoubtedly of interest to them. But if the suggestion is that the admission of new Members should be treated as a purely formal or ceremonial matter, we regard such a course as improper and we flatly oppose it. Therefore, since the representative of the United States did not object to dealing with the admission of new Members tomorrow morning, I propose that we take up this item on the agenda tomorrow in its proper order, and that we do not open our discussion today with the principal item on the agenda. We do not follow such a procedure in the Assembly unless a decision is taken to that effect. We regard it as quite irregular to go on to a consideration of the principal item on the agenda before the item on admission has been disposed of and when, furthermore, the participation of fourteen States in the debate on the question depends on the decision taken on the other item. If the object is to deprive these new Members of an opportunity to participate in the discussion of a question that concerns them, we consider this to be quite improper and incompatible with the interests of the United Nations.

39. Hence, I propose that we take up the item on the admission of new members tomorrow morning at the time suggested by the President and that we do not discuss the principal item today, but take it up after the item on admission has been debated.

40. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The representative of the Soviet Union has raised an objection to the formula I proposed. Naturally, the Assembly is master of its own proceedings. The Secretariat has asked for a delay in order to submit the
documents required for voting on the admission of new Members. Matters now stand as follows: the Assembly has agreed to consider first the item on the admission of new Members and then to take up the principal item, the question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting. There is a material obstacle to proceeding with the first of these items, there being some difficulties over the documents which have to be submitted by the Secretariat. I shall consult the Secretary-General as to when we may have these documents; because the comments of the representatives of both the Soviet Union and the United States reflect a desire for the participation of the new Members, at least in the most important stage of the debate. I think that on this point both delegations are in agreement, and I am gratified that this should be so. In view of the obvious urgency of an item of such importance to the Republic of the Congo, the African continent and the United Nations itself, we suggested that we might perhaps make progress tonight by suspending the debate on the principal item in order to get on with consideration of the item on admission.

41. Mr. QUAIISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I am very sorry to have to intervene at this juncture in regard to the question of admission of new Members. All of us are very anxious that those new Members who are going to be with our Organization be admitted as soon as possible. In fact, as the delegations know, most of these come from Africa.

42. I want to make an appeal to the representative of the United States not to press the point that the admission of the new Members be made before the fifteenth session. To us, joining this Organization is always a momentous occasion, and I think that the opportunity should be given for the ceremony attached to admission of new Members to be properly carried out. Therefore, I shall appeal to the representative of the United States not to press the point. I suggest we drop the matter and admit our friends from Africa at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly.

43. Mr. WADSOWORTH (United States of America): I think I should content myself with saying, in answer to the request of the representative of Ghana, that the item has been unanimously adopted and is part of our agenda. At the same time, I wish to repeat what I said in my first intervention, which has also been repeated by other speakers here, namely, that the ceremonials connected with the accession of these Members to our Organization should be, and under our plan would be, carried out next Tuesday.

44. The reason, of course, for the unusual request I made earlier this evening was the unusual situation in which we face an item of the utmost importance to the African States. I hoped that such a procedure would not in any way make the about-to-be Members unhappy with the Assembly, and that they would be invited to participate in the discussion of the most important subject as long as we did not deprive them of their rightful ceremonial in being admitted to this Organization.

45. The President (translated from Spanish): We are faced with a rather confused situation, and I would ask members to act in a spirit of tolerance.

46. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translated from French): The situation now confronting the Assembly is somewhat confused, but at the same time the source of the confusion is also evident. I think it would assist my delegation—and I hope others, if we are to act with full knowledge of the facts—to have a reply from the Secretary-General on the question put to him a short time ago, whether the representatives of the States to be admitted to membership in the United Nations are present in New York. If not, what information has the Secretariat with regard to their arrival? We agreed to place this new item on the agenda of our emergency session because we thought it only right that the delegations of countries which are so soon to become members of our Organization should be present at the discussion, which is primarily of interest to the peoples and States of Africa.

47. I therefore suggest that before the Assembly takes any new decision the Secretary-General should tell us whether the representatives of the countries which are to be admitted as Members of the United Nations are in New York. If not, can he inform us when they can be expected to arrive and consequently be in a position to take part in our discussion?

48. The Secretary-General: Here and now I have no exact information which I could give to the Assembly. I will ask the Protocol and Liaison Section, and as soon as I have the exact information it will, of course, be communicated to the Assembly.

49. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translated from French): I feel, that before the Assembly is called upon to take any new decision we should have a definite answer to the questions I have put to the Secretary-General.

50. The President (translated from Spanish): I think that the position is clear. We are in agreement on the main points: the item that we are to consider first is the admission of new Members, but in order to get on with that item, we need certain material which must be submitted by the Secretariat; the next item is the specific one for which this session was convened, which were approved by the General Assembly line and the President has taken in such an important matter. At the same time, when the new Members have been admitted, they can take part in the debate on the item for which the session was called.

51. I venture to suggest this course for the purpose of gaining time, because perhaps in the preliminary discussion there will be no real need for intervention by new Members, who will in any case be admitted before a vote is taken. And that is the crux of the matter.

52. As I said, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed that the new Members should take part in the debate. The most important point is to obtain their opinion before any draft resolution is put to the vote. If there are no objections, I think that we might get on tonight and begin the discussion of the principal item on the agenda.

53. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I am surprised by the line the President has taken in such an important matter. The President, who, as we know, enjoys the highest confidence of the whole Assembly, should observe—and always does observe—the rules of procedure which were approved by the General Assembly and which are meant to be his guide. Rule 83 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly says in part: "When a proposal has been adopted or rejected it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless
the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, so decides."

54. We have just unanimously decided to discuss first the item on the admission of new Members. This decision cannot be reconsidered by an arbitrary ruling given by the President alone. We would have to vote on this proposal and it would have to be supported by a two-thirds majority. So I think it would hardly be desirable to take a vote and reconsider the decision now. In my opinion, we should follow the logical natural order, that is, consider the first item first and then the second. As the first item has been included and as we cannot take it up immediately because we are awaiting information from the Secretary-General, I consider that it would be quite reasonable to postpone its discussion till tomorrow. We will try to begin our discussion tomorrow, and the Secretary-General will no doubt take steps to ensure that, so far as possible, the representatives who are to participate in the discussion of this question are present. That is my first comment.

55. My second comment concerns the President's statement. I have a great respect for his pronouncements, but I also beg leave to criticize him when I find that his attitude is not quite correct. He said that the new Members are about to admit should only take part in the discussion—I do not know why—of those statements which he considers to be important. But it is not, of course, within the President's competence to decide which statements are important and which are less important; that is a matter for the whole Assembly, it is a matter for each individual representative. Those who are to take the decision should not remain in ignorance of what is said today. After all, we are not admitting new Members merely so that they shall raise their hands in favour of this or that resolution which may be proposed. We want them to take a fully informed part in the discussion. This being so, they should take part in the debate from the very beginning so that they can follow the whole course of the discussion, including statements that are important and statements that are less important.

56. I feel, therefore, that the arguments put forward by the President are untenable. They are simply erroneous, and I do not think they will be accepted by them, although as a rule we are accustomed to deferring to the Secretary-General, who has produced a sound solution to many problems. But in this case, I am afraid that I cannot subscribe to his views.

57. The President (translated from Spanish): I must suggest to the representative of the Soviet Union that there may have been an inaccuracy of interpretation. There is no question of reconsidering the decision we have taken. The decision is clear: the first item that we are to discuss is the admission of new Members. What we are dealing with is an additional proposal concerning the order of the debate. As we cannot proceed forthwith to the admission of new Members, because that requires some time for the Secretariat to complete the necessary formalities, I made a suggestion, but on the understanding that the Assembly is master of its own procedure and therefore any representative can propose a motion on which I would invite debate and then call a vote.

58. I only suggested, for the purpose of gaining time, that we should stop the debate on the item for which this session was called. It is a supremely important item on which a resolution must be produced to restore peace to the African countries. Of course I am not trying to impose my own views and any delegation which wishes to suggest an alternative to the formula I have proposed is free to do so.

59. Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish): It would be difficult for the Assembly to embark immediately on considering the admission of new Members, because not only has the Secretariat still to circulate the documents containing the Security Council's recommendations, but also because, as soon as we have the Council documents before us, delegations will have to prepare the corresponding draft resolution.

60. As representatives will remember, the custom is that each application for admission embody a draft resolution with one or more sponsors. So that really the Assembly would need about an hour for the circulation of documents and for consultations prior to the submission of draft resolutions. Now there are two possibilities: either the consideration of the item on the admission of new Members could be postponed and we could continue tonight with the other item, a course to which the Soviet delegation has objected, or the other possibility originally suggested by the President which perhaps, in view of the existing disagreement, would be the best, i.e., that this meeting should be suspended for a period of time so that documents may be distributed and draft resolutions submitted.

61. I venture to suggest that in view of the existing disagreement—an unfortunate disagreement, as the admission of new Members should take place in an atmosphere of harmony—the easiest way would perhaps be to suspend the meeting for a time. That being so, and in order to facilitate matters and to avoid a regrettable procedural debate, I venture, under rule 78 of the rules of procedure, to move that the meeting be suspended for forty-five minutes. Under the relevant rule this motion may not be debated, but must be immediately put to the vote.

62. The President (translated from Spanish): I take note that, under the rules of procedure, there can be no debate on the motion. Consequently I have to put it to the vote without debate.

63. The representative of the Soviet Union has the floor on a point of order, always provided that it is for a period of time so that documents may be distributed and draft resolutions submitted.

64. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Rule 78 says in part: "During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting." But we are not yet discussing any item on the agenda, and so rule 78 is not applicable to the present case.

65. The President (translated from Spanish): I consider that a motion has been made and that under the rules of procedure a vote must be taken without debate. I therefore put to the vote the motion of the representative of the Soviet Union, that we should suspend the meeting for forty-five minutes. Those in favour of this proposal will signify it by raising their hands.

The motion was adopted by 45 votes to none, with 26 abstentions. The meeting was suspended at 9.30 p.m. and resumed at 11.10 p.m.

66. The President (translated from Spanish): I give the floor to the Secretary-General, so that he may give the information which has been requested of him.
67. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As I promised, I looked into the matter of the presence of representatives here in New York. According to information available to Protocol, we are not certain about the presence of more than, let us say, a maximum of two delegations. We are informed, of course, about the composition of various delegations but not about their time of arrival, apart from a few cases. My guess would be that practically all delegations will come at the latest on Monday.

68. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We shall now continue with the item on the admission of new Members. There are several applications for admission submitted by States which have recently attained independence. In each of these cases, the Security Council has approved the application and consequently we shall consider separately each of the draft resolutions now before us. Members of the Assembly will have an opportunity, during the ceremony which will be held on Tuesday, 20 September, immediately after the opening of the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly, to take the floor and welcome the new Members of the Organization.

69. We shall now consider the application of the Republic of Cameroun for admission to membership in the United Nations. The relevant draft resolution [A/1278] is sponsored by France and Tunisia.

70. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I feel that the action the President suggests we should now take is contrary to the best interest of our work and to the procedure which has always been followed in connexion with the admission of new Members. In the absence of delegations from the countries we are to admit, he proposes that we should proceed with the admission of those countries and should formally place it on record that such and such countries have been admitted. But the whole point of admitting the new Members today is to enable them to participate in the discussion of a question which is of vital interest to them. That is what I understood from the statement by the United States representative, who made the proposal. But what is the point of admitting the new Members now, when we are about to open our discussion of a question which concerns them, but when these new Members are not here and, as the Secretary-General has stated, may not be here till Monday? It would mean that we would admit the new Members formally and record that fact as if they had been present, whereas, actually they were not. What, then, is the point of all this haste to admit the new Members immediately and to make it look as if they, the African States, were taking part in the discussion of a question of vital concern to them?

71. I regard this as entirely incompatible with the dignity of the Assembly, and therefore see no possibility of taking up the matter immediately. We asked the Secretary-General what the position was with regard to the presence of delegations and we have been informed that, many, indeed the majority, are not here and that they cannot be present until Monday.

72. If that is so, we must consider the question of when we shall admit the new Members. But we cannot take up this item in the absence of those whom we are admitting. This is my first point.

73. My second is as follows. We have decided to include in our agenda an item on the admission of new Members. But whenever we have adopted an agenda containing this item, there has been a list of the States that are to be admitted. We do not know who is to be admitted; we have no list. In particular, with the best will in the world I have not been able to find among the documents which have just been circulated any document relating to the Security Council's decision on the admission to membership of the Republic of the Congo. Why is such a document missing? The reason is not quite clear. Do we want to admit that Republic or not? I, at least, do not have such a document. Perhaps there has been a technical error, perhaps we are to admit the Republic of the Congo today or tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow. I should be glad if the Secretary-General would enlighten us on that point.

74. In any case I feel no object would be served by discussing this question now, in the absence of delegations from these countries. I see no point at all in such a discussion. If the suggestion is that this discussion is merely a formality necessary for protocol purposes, we ought not to adopt such a formal approach so important a question as the admission of new Members. If the discussion is necessary for political reasons of some kind, then perhaps the sponsors of the proposal will kindly make the position clear.

75. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The representative of the Soviet Union has made some comments, but it would be as well to know what is the point of order is and what specific action he is proposing that the Assembly should take. I may say that the decision was unanimous and that the decision that we should proceed immediately to deal with the first of the two items before the Assembly, after a forty-five minute recess, was also taken unanimously. Representatives cannot confine themselves to making a few comments. Every statement must be designed to produce action. What action is the representative of the USSR proposing? I will submit a proposal for action to the Assembly as a point of order. Otherwise, I shall have to proceed with the item which the Assembly has started to consider as the result of a unanimous decision.

76. As there is no formal motion, I shall proceed.

77. I call upon the representative of the USSR on a point of order.

78. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I asked the Secretary-General and the President to be good enough to say who are the new Members to be admitted. I should like a list of all the States concerned to be read out.

79. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Documents proposing admission are distributed as they are received and processed. As to the list of new Members which have been recommended by the Security Council, it is as follows: the Republic of Cameroun, the Togolese Republic, the Federation of Mali, the Malagasy Republic, the Republic of Somalia, the Republic of the Congo (capital Leopoldville), the Republic of Dahomey, the Republic of Niger, the Republic of Upper Volta, the Republic of the Ivory Coast, the Republic of the Congo (capital Brazzaville), the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Cyprus, the Gabon Republic and the Central African Republic.

80. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call upon the representative of the USSR on a point of order.

81. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I formally propose that we do not alter the procedure for the admission
of new Members, that is, that we should admit the States when their delegations are present and that the ceremony for the admission of new Members should take place at the same time.

82. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The representative of the Soviet Union is in fact proposing reconsideration of the decision taken unanimously by the Assembly, that the admission of new Members should not take place while those who are to be admitted are not present, or without the appropriate ceremony.

83. The decision taken by the Assembly was precisely that we should proceed with the admission and that the ceremony should be deferred until the fifteenth session. As the Soviet Union has formally moved a proposal for reconsideration, in the sense indicated by him, I shall be compelled to put it to a vote.

84. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I repeat that I am afraid the President's statement does not correctly reflect what we decided. We were all here when we decided that the first item that we were to examine was the admission of new members, but we certainly did not decide that that item on the agenda should be discussed today. We asked the Secretary-General to let us know when the delegations would be present and we received that information. I am now formally proposing that we should discuss the item when all the delegations are here and when we are in position to follow the established procedure. I ask that this procedure should not be revised.

85. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The representative of the Soviet Union must remember that there were two proposals: one by the United States and one by Ecuador, on the basis of which we were to proceed tonight to deal with the item concerning the admission of new Members. The representative of the Soviet Union has a perfect right to ask for the reconsideration of that decision and I will put that request to the vote.

86. I call on the representative of Poland on a point of order.

87. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland): I feel obliged to speak at this moment because my delegation cannot agree with the President's suggestion that we should vote now on the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union, in accordance with rule 83 of the rules of procedure.

88. The representative of Ecuador mentioned two possible ways out of the confusion which seemed to be spreading after the proposal made by the representative of the United States. When the representative of Ecuador was speaking we had not had the Secretary-General's answer to the question asked by several representatives regarding the presence in New York of representatives of the new States applying for membership. It seems to me that the delegation should be of the utmost importance that those representatives should be present here and that we should not create a precedent by considering the item on the admission of new Members without their presence.

89. In the opinion of my delegation, it is not a question of reconsideration of the motion because the suggestion made by the representative of Ecuador was made at a time when the full situation was not known to the Assembly.

90. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The decision of the Assembly was to deal with the first of the two items before the Assembly. However, I shall leave the matter to the General Assembly and I shall put to a vote the Soviet Union proposal that we postpone the admission of new Members.

91. I call on the representative of Guinea on a point of order.

92. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (translated from French): As has just been pointed out by the preceding speaker, the representative of the United States proposed the inclusion of this question in the agenda at a time when the matter was not at all clear to some delegations. Meetings were being held in many different rooms and some representatives arrived late.

93. My delegation is wondering why the question of the admission of new Members is being raised tonight, since the only decision taken yesterday evening was to call an emergency session of the General Assembly to discuss that painful problem, the problem of the Congo. Yet now we are being asked to discuss a different and entirely new question.

94. We African countries are not of course likely to oppose the admission of new Members to the United Nations—in fact we shall perhaps be the first to welcome it—but we should like to raise a question.

95. How, for example, will delegations vote this evening on the request for admission of the Federation of Mali? You all know that President Mobido Keita wrote to the Secretary-General on 23 June stating that the Federation of Mali had acceded to full independence on 20 June 1960 [A/4394]. But events move rapidly in Africa, and by 20 August the picture had changed. The Federation has now broken up, and a telegram asking for admission to the United Nations has just been received by the Secretary-General from Senegal [S/4470, annex I], which was partner of the Sudan in the Federation. If we vote this evening on a resolution admitting Mali to membership of the United Nations, we shall be making a gross error; for what can our attitude be tomorrow—since we know that the Federation of Mali includes Senegal and Sudan—when we are faced with the request from Senegal?

96. Let us not proceed without due thought. We are firm supporters of the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and we find it difficult to understand why those who so often delay the granting of independence by their neo-colonialist manoeuvres are now taking the initiative in requesting that these new countries be admitted. It seems to us paradoxical.

97. I give another example. I have before me the request for admission of the Republic of the Congo (capital Leopoldville) [A/4420] and the request is signed by Patrice Lumumba, but certain members of the Security Council have denied the delegation sent by Patrice Lumumba the right to sit at the Council table.

98. We fail to understand such manoeuvres. The Secretary-General has just informed us that the delegations of the new States are not yet in New York and the Heads of many new African States are expected to arrive shortly. Let us therefore defer the discussion of this matter, which appears as item 20 on the provisional agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly [A/4420]. Insistence on discussing the matter this evening would amount to an attempt to stifle the independence of the young African countries.

99. I therefore propose formally that the debate on this question be adjourned under rule 76 of our rules of procedure, which reads as follows:
"During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. In addition to the proposal for the motion, two representatives may speak in favour of, and two against, the motion, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule."

This motion is very clear and I shall be grateful to the President, if he would put it to the vote.

100. The President (translated from Spanish): I think it is my duty to submit the motion for adjournment of the debate to the consideration of the Assembly, and under the rules of procedure I shall allow two speakers in favour of, and two against, the motion.

101. Mr. JHA (India): It seems to my delegation rather unfortunate that an item which we should have considered in the most joyous atmosphere without any contention, without being bedevilled by procedural discussions, has really become involved. We should have preferred that the admission of new Members—not one, but fifteen or sixteen—would be one of the most significant, one of the most important occasions in the General Assembly.

102. As the representative of Guinea said a short while ago, this is a great moment not only for Africa, not only for all dependent peoples, but for the General Assembly itself because the admission of so many Members from Africa and elsewhere really makes us move towards the complete universality of our Organization.

103. Therefore, while my delegation entirely appreciates the sentiments of the representative of the United States when he moved there should be no delay in the admission of the members—not even two days, because after all the regular session is only two or three days off—we feel that whatever may be the procedural considerations we shall really be doing the right thing by not dealing with this matter. This item was, is quite true, included in our agenda. There was no opposition. But I believe that we took the decision for its inclusion rather hastily. I invite attention to rule 16 of the rules of procedure which says:

"The provisional agenda of an emergency special session shall be communicated to the Members of the United Nations simultaneously with the communication summoning the session."

Further, rule 19 states:

"During an emergency special session additional items concerning the matters dealt with in resolution 377 A (V) may be added to the agenda by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting."

104. As we interpret it—of course, these interpretations can always be different—if it was the intention that this matter should be on the agenda of the emergency session, it should really have been communicated to us right in the beginning along with the Secretary-General’s telegram of convocation. Then, of course, in accordance with rule 19 additional items concerning the matter dealt with in the resolution itself can be brought up as an item after the emergency session has met.

105. However, I do not want to go into that procedural aspect. As I said, different interpretations are possible. But I believe there is a great deal of force in the remarks made by the representative of Guinea. We shall be wise in view of the inadequate notice, the inadequate preparations—and there are other difficulties—to postpone the matter. We do not have the delegations here. They have to be searched for all over New York, to find out if they are there and who they are; nobody has seen their credentials. The question of credentials may raise many difficulties.

106. Our delegation would therefore support the proposal of the representative of Guinea. He has suggested an adjournment. We can achieve our purpose by that method. On 20 September the fifteenth session of the General Assembly will convene and we shall all have the opportunity—and I am sure it will be one of the first items on our agenda for that session—to take up this matter. It should be a great moment for the Assembly, a great moment for those countries. It will have adequate publicity—publicity not in any derogatory sense, but it will be transmitted to peoples all over the world. It will be awaited with interest. It will be expected and anticipated in the countries which are going to be free and going to be admitted to the United Nations as equals of any other nation.

107. Therefore, we feel that although we fully appreciate the sentiments and the motives which actuated the representative of the United States, it will be an act of wisdom not to continue the procedural wrangle over this item which gives the greatest happiness to all of us without any exception. Therefore we would be well advised to support the motion of the representative of Guinea.

108. The President (translated from Spanish): There can still be one speaker in favour of the motion and two against. If there are no more speakers, I shall put to the vote the motion for adjournment proposed by the representative of Guinea.

The motion was adopted by 43 votes to none, with 26 abstentions.

109. The President (translated from Spanish): I have to inform the representatives that the Assembly will meet at a later date, of which representatives will be notified in due course. The adjournment is understood to concern only the item on the admission of new Members. We shall therefore go on to discuss the item for which the Assembly was called.

110. Mr. Mezincescu (Romania) (translated from French): I understand from the statement you have just made, Mr. President, that you now intend to ask the Assembly to proceed with the discussion on the matter which caused this special session to be called. I feel, however, that before we embark on that course it would be proper to consider the situation which has arisen at the beginning of this fourth emergency special session, convened as a result of the resolution adopted by the Security Council.

It was proposed that we should add a new item to the agenda of the emergency special session, namely, the item concerning the admission of new Members on the grounds that the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly already has the question of the admission of new Members on its agenda and will have before it the recommendations of the Security Council concerning, if I am not mistaken, fifteen countries, fourteen of which are African States.

112. An attempt was made to justify the proposal—and successfully, it seems, since no objections were raised by Members of this Assembly—by stressing that the very purpose of calling the fourth emergency special session was to deal with an African problem.

113. Now, as the result of the unopposed vote on the motion submitted by the representative of Guinea, we find that we are adjourning the discussion of the admi-
sion of new Members; and you, Mr. President, have just invited the Assembly to proceed with its discussion of the question put before it by the Security Council, in the absence of the African countries which are very soon to become Members of the United Nations. All this has happened after we have devoted a night meeting to the question of their admission before the originally appointed time in order to enable them to be present at and to take part in this important discussion which is of such interest to them.

114. I wonder whether, in proceeding in accordance with the President's proposal, the General Assembly would be taking the most logical course. It seems to me that, in the present circumstances, we should first of all resume, at a more appropriate moment, the discussion of the problems we have just deferred and therefore that the question now before this fourth emergency special session of the Assembly will be considered within the framework best suited to its proper appraisal.

115. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I appreciate the considerations put forward by the representative of Romania, but, in all impartiality, I must comply with the rules of procedure.

116. Although the debate on the admission of new Members has been adjourned, that decision does not apply to the principal item, which was the reason for calling this session of the Assembly. There would accordingly have to be some motion on this point. As there is none, I must ask the Assembly to take up the principal item of the agenda.

117. I must inform representatives that I am always glad to listen to their speeches but such speeches cannot be simply statements; they must propose motions. When there is no motion, I am not called upon to alter the decisions of delegations or the will of the Assembly; so that until the Assembly decides, whatever the considerations from the theoretical point of view, to adjourn the debate on the principal item, I must continue with my work and point out to the Assembly that it should do the same.

AGENDA ITEM 6

Question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on 16 September 1960

118. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): Before moving into the substance of this question I would crave your indulgence for just one moment, Mr. President, for what might possibly be considered as somewhat of an explanation of vote, or explanation of lack of vote, on the procedural motion which has just been adopted by this Assembly.

119. The original proposal made by the United States was to admit now new Members who would have been admitted in a matter of only two or three days. The reason for this was that we believed that all the present Members, or most of the present Members, would without hesitation wish to make it possible for as many new Members as might be available to participate in this important debate which affects so many of them so closely. I made it clear, however, in an earlier intervention—and I should like to remind Members of this—after the unanimous adoption of my motion that it would be agreeable to the United States to give more time for consideration if that were the wish of the Assembly.

120. I must confess to considerable astonishment that the Assembly has voted for an indefinite postponement in the face of the realities of the day. But since that has been the Assembly's decision, I accept it without further argument, as I indicated I would.

121. To take up the substance of this question, the United States took the initiative in proposing this emergency session because we are convinced that no effort can or should be spared to ensure success for the United Nations action in the Congo. The Security Council had, until last night, been able to act effectively in taking the necessary decisions to support that action. Even last night we believed and hoped that the Council would adopt a useful and moderate draft resolution sponsored by Ceylon and Tunisia [5/4523]. That draft resolution in our view, sought to achieve a reasonable goal that none could oppose—at least oppose and still maintain any appearance of support for the United Nations in the Congo. Apparently our estimation was shared by all but two members of the Council. But an unfavourable vote on the part of the Soviet Union dashed our hopes.

122. Fortunately, a procedure exists precisely to prevent such attempts to paralyse essential action by the United Nations. Thus for the fourth time in its history the Security Council, frustrated by the use of the veto, has called the General Assembly into emergency session under resolution 377 A (V) known as the “Uniting for peace” resolution. Never was that phrase “Uniting for peace” more significant than at this moment.

123. Since the night of 13 July last, the Security Council has dealt with the crisis of the Congo, the breakdown of public order, the outside intervention and all the urgent and far-reaching consequences of those events. Under the Council's mandate the Secretary-General has assembled in the Congo a United Nations Force of some 18,000 soldiers deployed in every province of the Congo. Despite enormous difficulties the United Nations Force has made significant progress in restoring public order and security. It has acted with strict impartiality to protect all those, of whatever faction, whose lives were threatened by mob violence. All of these steps have been reported meticulously and faithfully to the Security Council by the Secretary-General.

124. In addition, the Secretary-General has been able to report activities by the United Nations in providing emergency food rations, emergency medical services, administrative support to departments of the Congolese Government and many other services which have helped to save lives and prevent even more widespread suffering among the people of the Congo.

125. Never in the history of international organization has such a great operation been mounted so quickly. The selfless dedication of the Secretary-General and his entire staff in carrying on this operation, and the ready response and great self-sacrifice—not to say physical bravery—of the men and women serving the United Nations all the way from Ireland to Ethiopia are all beyond praise. In this "year of Africa" we who have supported the United Nations in this great undertaking believe that the future of freedom in Africa, and even the peace of the world, is to a great extent in the hands of the United Nations and that we could not afford to fail. That knowledge has inspired exertions which can well be described, in many instances, as heroic.

126. One of the premises on which the Security Council's action was based, and by which the Secretary-General
was guided in assembling the United Nations Force, was that no permanent member of the Security Council should contribute troops to the Force. This in turn was based on an even more fundamental premise: that if the Congo was to have any future at all, it must not become a battleground in a conflict between great Powers.

127. The United States has been faithful to that principle. We have sent no troops and no weapons to the Congo. We have sent no personnel or material of any kind except at United Nations request and under United Nations authority. We have made extraordinary efforts to support the United Nations action and have placed at the disposal of the Secretary-General and his staff our transport aircraft and many other services. We have not taken one single step in the Congo independent of the United Nations.

128. We followed this course not only out of respect for the Organization, but also because the avoidance of needless conflict between great Powers is a matter of the most elementary prudence. And we honestly hoped that all others would do the same.

129. The United States was by no means alone in expressing this hope and in warning against the danger of great-Power conflict in Africa. The record of the Security Council debates is full of statements on this subject. The same point was made very clearly by the recent Conference of Independent African States in Leopoldville, which warned that the territory of the Republic of the Congo must not become a cold war arena.

130. If that advice had been heeded by all concerned, the General Assembly would not be in session tonight. But it was not heeded. The Soviet Union, alone among the great Powers of the world, chose to defy the Security Council decisions for which it had voted, and to strike out on its own path.

131. In direct violation of the Security Council’s proceedings the Soviet Union dispatched to the Congo hundreds of so-called technicians—whose character may be judged by the fact that only a few days ago the Congolese authorities ordered these men to leave the Congo. Meanwhile, nearly two dozen Soviet transport aircraft and 100 Soviet trucks appeared in the Congo—not to participate in the United Nations programme, not to put themselves under the United Nations authorities there, but to promote strife and bloodshed between Congolese tribes and factions.

132. All the while the Soviet propaganda machine beamed inflammatory broadcasts to Africa inciting civil strife and stymieing the United Nations, its Secretary-General and his representatives. Soviet propaganda pamphlets bearing the same message were distributed in the Congo itself, with Comrade Khrushchev’s picture on the front page.

133. The United Nations operation in the Congo has so far withstood that assault, but the consequences which flowed from the Soviet action have made it necessary to act without delay. If we are to forestall attempts to subvert the Congo and thwart the United Nations. This, and the necessity of providing funds to support the United Nations action in the Congo, was the primary focus of the recent series of Security Council meetings.

134. The Council, after considering the situation, took up a draft resolution sponsored by Tunisia and Ceylon [S/4523]. It contained several important provisions, but none more urgent than that of paragraph 5, which I now quote:

"Reaffirms specifically:
"(a) Its request to all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo, and decides that no assistance for military purposes be sent to the Congo except as part of the United Nations action".

That draft resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and the purpose of the veto was made clear by Mr. Zorin in a statement from which I now quote:

"The representative of Ceylon and, later, the representative of Tunisia themselves stated that we—in this case he meant the Soviet Union—"have no right to deprive the Government of military assistance. They also said that such assistance should be provided exclusively through the United Nations;...

"We consider that it is not possible to take such a course ..." [96th meeting of the Security Council.]

135. Thereby the Soviet Union asserted a unilateral right to introduce military personnel and material into the Congo in defiance of the Security Council and in total disregard of the consequences. The issue was clearly joined.

136. The General Assembly has now met to clarify and reinforce the mandate of the United Nations.

137. Let me now summarize briefly what we believe the General Assembly must do if it is to preserve the vital momentum of the United Nations operation and thereby save the Congo from chaos.

138. First, we believe that the Assembly should uphold the principle that the United Nations in this critical period must be the source of outside assistance to the Republic of the Congo. In this respect we seek to affirm and strengthen the mandate already given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council.

139. Secondly, we would urge Member States to make voluntary financial contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control. The present disruption of the economic, administrative, and judicial machinery of the Congo makes it imperative to furnish aid as rapidly and as generously as possible. The Republic of the Congo faces a dire threat of imminent bankruptcy. Its economic life has been disrupted and crippled by civil strife. The United Nations must forestall the disaster of hopelessness and hunger which hangs over the Congo. Aid must be forthcoming immediately.

140. Thirdly, we would place the full weight of the United Nations behind an appeal to all Congolese to avoid further recourse to violence. There have been encouraging signs recently in this respect. But the threat of civil war still hangs over certain areas of the country and this threat should now be removed.

141. Fourthly—and this is vital—unilateral actions from whatever source must not be permitted to obstruct the United Nations effort in the Congo. It would be particularly dangerous if any Power were again to send personnel or equipment into the Congo which would frustrate the purposes of the United Nations. The alternative to United Nations action to prevent this is
142. This is a critical and vital moment for the future of Africa, and perhaps even more for the future of the United Nations. It is not a moment to falter. We must maintain the authority and the momentum of the efforts we have begun. We must ensure that the Congo is not made the scene of international conflict as the result of outside interference with the United Nations effort. The issue is clearly drawn not between great Powers that belong to the United Nations, but between those who would foment war in the Congo to promote their own ambitions and the community of nations which would seek to place the Congo on the path of true independence and peace. The decision between the two will go far to determine the fate and future of us all.

143. In this year of destiny for Africa may this Assembly make the right decision.

144. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We are meeting tonight in an emergency special session of the General Assembly convened at the request of the United States of America in order to consider the situation in the Congo. We have gathered here after the Security Council has proved unable, through the fault of the United States itself and of its allies, to reach any decision in recent meetings on the further course of United Nations operations in the Congo.

145. The United States has requested the convening of an emergency session, although the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly will open in two days' time and on the proposal of the Soviet Union Government [A/4495], an item entitled "Threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo" has been included in its agenda.

146. How are we to account for the fact that the United States has acted with such unexpected promptness on this particular occasion and has chosen not to wait for the opening of the regular session of the General Assembly despite the fact that this very country has lately tried to impede the discussion of this question in the Security Council by every possible means and in fact sabotaged the Soviet Government's proposal for immediate consideration of the Congo situation?

147. It would seem natural that if the United States Government were truly interested in the execution, under United Nations auspices, of agreed measures that would effectively restore normal conditions in the Congo, if it were truly interested in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 14 July [5/4387] and 22 July [3/4403] and 9 August 1960 [5/4426], it could wish for nothing better than to cooperate in the discussion of the Congo situation at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, in which the Heads of many States and the representatives of new African States will be taking part.

148. Yet, although this is the obvious and logical cause, the United States Government has tried its best to avoid it by requesting the convening of an emergency special session two days before the opening of the regular session. The fact is that the United States Government is trying to avoid a full and detailed discussion of the Congo question because such a discussion would make the true objectives of United States policy in Africa more apparent. That is why it is not endeavouring to find ways of giving practical effect to the Security Council's decisions on the Congo question but is trying, in an artificially created atmosphere of haste and pressure to obtain formal endorsement of its work of subversion in the Congo. In shamelessly sabotaging the recent discussion of the Congo situation in the Security Council, the United States and its associates in military blocs have openly stated that they were taking such action because the situation in the Congo is not yet sufficiently clear and, as Mr. Wadsworth said in the Security Council, it is necessary to wait until certain trends in the political development of the country come more clearly into focus. What trends were the United States and its partners expecting to develop in the Congo?

149. Now that we have begun to receive reports that a gang of insurgents has forcibly disrupted the normal functioning not only of the lawful Government but also of the legislative organs of the country, the United States Government deemed the situation in the Congo at last to be ripe. But ripe for what? Not so much for consideration as for the adoption of hasty decisions which would facilitate the completion of the Congo "operation", to adopt the term used by some people in the United Nations, an operation which was planned a long time ago and which has been progressively carried into effect.

150. Mr. Wadsworth said in his statement just now that the United Nations Force has made progress in restoring public order in the Congo. It is fine progress indeed if it is impossible to find the Prime Minister of the lawful Government, if it is impossible to enter the parliament building, if it is impossible to detect any order even in the functioning of the machinery of government because the insurgents who oppose the lawful Government of the Congo are now in effective control of the country's capital. It is a fine order that has been achieved by the United Nations, including the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command.

151. It can now be said with complete certainty that the United States, which headed the conspiracy against the young African State, was waiting for the moment when its work of subversion would result in disorganizing the Government for which they and the other colonial Powers harboured a fierce hatred. That hatred stemmed from the fact that the Lumumba Government had dared to steer a course of consolidating the country's independence and freeing it from the yoke not only of the Belgian colonialists but of all other colonialists, including those of the United States. The Lumumba Government was unwilling to make any compromises with the Belgian aggressors or their henchmen and in the exercise of its lawful rights it criticized those actions of the United Nations Command and of the Secretary-General personally which were taken essentially in order to protect the interests of the colonial Powers in Africa. The patriotic stand taken by the Lumumba Government presented a threat to the position of the colonial Powers in the Congo, including the United States, which is vitally interested in maintaining control over the vast resources of the Congo. It is, indeed, no secret that the Congo contains extremely rich deposits of uranium, a raw material for the atomic industry. But the uranium, although mined in the territory of the former Belgian colony, went to the United States for, as we all know, has no atomic industry. In this instance Belgium acted purely as a middleman, receiving a certain commission from the resale of a profitable commodity. For the NATO countries, the uranium mined in the territory of the Republic of the Congo, or more precisely in the territory of
one of its provinces, Katanga, is a choice morsel which they can on no account forego.

152. And no matter how many speeches the representative of the United States may make in the Security Council or here in this emergency session of the General Assembly, he will be unable to conceal the fact that in trying to get rid of the Lumumba Government and in trying to dismember the Republic of the Congo, the United States—and that country first and foremost—is seeking to retain control of the Katanga uranium mines. In this matter the United States is not merely acting in concert with all the NATO countries but is instigating and directly organizing activities aimed at undermining the Republic of the Congo. And how indeed could it be otherwise seeing that the real master of NATO is the United States, that this aggressive alliance is used primarily as a tool of United States aggressive policy and that the other members of the alliance have long since become mere accessories?

153. Current developments in the Congo are further proof that NATO is acting as a tool of colonialist policy and that what we are now facing is essentially a collective colonialism which is no longer controlled by the colonial Powers of the United Kingdom and France, that have lost their former ascendancy, but the United States. That country is attempting to raise up the mud-stained banner of colonialism and, pushing aside its now decrepit allies, is seeking to entrench itself in the regions which the United Kingdom, France and Belgium are no longer able to hold.

154. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have formed a united front in regard to events in the Congo; they have done so during the discussion of the Congo question in the Security Council and this is a highly indicative fact. The united front formed by these three Powers is a united front of colonialists. The community of interests of the United States, the United Kingdom and France reveals itself whenever the basic principles of their imperialist policy are called into question, and this was precisely the effect of the events in the Congo.

155. The United States and its NATO allies, as has already been pointed out, saw themselves faced with a direct threat of losing control over a strategically and economically vital region of Africa. What is more, the success of the anti-colonial struggle waged by the Republic of the Congo, one of Africa’s largest States, must inevitably have some effect on other parts of the continent. This also prompted the Western Powers to unite in executing their policy in the Congo, in attempting to preserve their positions in Africa at any cost.

156. It is common knowledge that during the last two or three years, and particularly during 1960—the year of Africa, as Mr. Wadsworth has called it—the decline of colonial domination in the African continent has proceeded at an accelerated pace. The Africa which until very recently was regarded by many as the stronghold of colonialism is throwing off the chains of colonial enslavement and entering on the path of national liberation.

157. Among the African peoples who have won political independence after a long and stubborn struggle was the people of the Congo, a richly endowed country with 13 million inhabitants.

158. The heroic struggle of the Congolese people, a struggle which became particularly intense in recent years, forced the Belgian colonialist circles to consent to the granting of formal independence to the Republic of the Congo. But the Belgians calculated that, in collusion with colonialist circles in other countries, they could continue to keep the Congo in a state of de facto dependence upon the western Powers. With this objective in mind, the Belgian colonialists immediately proceeded to back traitors to the Congolese people, putting them forward as leaders of the future Republic.

159. But the Congolese people, despite their lack of political experience, saw through the imperialist plans and gave them a crushing rebuff. The elections of May 1960 brought to power a group of national leaders headed by Lumumba, who despite the manoeuvres of the colonialists were empowered by the parliament of the Republic to head the lawful Government of the Congo.

160. The Lumumba Government did not adopt a policy of carrying out the plans of the colonialists. It sought by all the means at its disposal to consolidate the independence of the Republic of the Congo. But this ran counter to the interests of the colonialist countries, which of course find it more agreeable to deal with divided and weak States, as this makes it easier for them to preserve their prerogatives and former supremacy and also helps them to split the forces of the national liberation movement in Africa.

161. When their original plans failed, the Belgian colonialists resorted to direct armed aggression. As has now become abundantly clear from the testimony of numerous witnesses, early in July 1960—that is, a few days after Congolese independence had been proclaimed—Belgian colonialist circles directly instigated disorders at a number of points in the country. These disorders were, as we know, used as a pretext for armed Belgian aggression against the Republic of the Congo. The young Republic found itself faced with another conspiracy of the imperialist States, this time in the form of open armed intervention.

162. In these circumstances, the Government of the Republic of the Congo was forced to appeal to the United Nations for help in combating the armed Belgian aggression. The peoples of the world, among them the Congolese people, looked to the United Nations to fulfil its duty and take vigorous steps to halt the Belgian aggression and give the Congolese Government the help it needed for the political and economic development of the country.

163. The tragic events which soon followed in the Congo were the direct result of the criminal actions of the colonialist coalition headed by the United States. That coalition unfortunately succeeded in using for its own ends both the Command of the United Nations troops and the Secretary-General himself, Mr. Hammarskjold.

164. The statement of the Soviet Union Government dated 9 September 1960 [S/4497] contains a clear assessment of the developments in the Congo:

"The developments in the Republic of the Congo indicate that the conspiracy of the colonialists against the independence and integrity of this African State, against its people and lawful Government, is assuming an increasingly dangerous nature. Facts, in particular, facts that have emerged in recent days,
prove incontrovertibly that the Belgian colonialists, their NATO allies, first and foremost the United States, and the Command of the troops sent to the Congo under the Security Council resolutions, which has actually become the servitor of the colonialists, are acting in concert in an attempt to snuff out the freedom of the Congolese people. The flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo is really a direct mockery of the Security Council resolutions adopted to protect the independence and integrity of the Congo."

The statement emphasizes that an attempt is now being made to replace one set of colonialists in the Congo by another in the shape of collective colonialism on the part of the NATO countries, under cover of the blue flag of the United Nations.

165. To see the truth of this, let us turn to facts. The main purpose of the Security Council decisions of 14 and 22 July and of 9 August was to ensure the expulsion of the Belgian occupation troops from the territory of the Congo and to safeguard the Congo's territorial integrity and political independence. For that purpose the troops of a number of countries were sent into the Congo and the Secretary-General was empowered to direct their operations. For the same purpose a number of other important measures, including urgent economic assistance to the young African State, were envisaged.

166. In the two months that have elapsed since the Security Council took its first decision on the Congo, many documents have accumulated; they contain statements made on this question by members of the Security Council, the Secretary-General's interpretations of the Council's three decisions, reports from the field by officials of the United Nations Secretariat, and much else besides. Unfortunately, however, one thing, in these two months, has not been done: the main goal set by the Security Council has not yet been attained. The troops of the Belgian aggressors have not yet been completely withdrawn from Congolese soil. The Republic's territorial integrity is being threatened and its political independence has not been fully re-established.

167. Indeed, as is known—and this has been officially recognized by the Secretary-General himself—at least several hundred Belgian officers and men are still in the Congo, not counting the military units camouflaged as experts and specialists.

168. Mr. Wadsworth spoke tonight of "so-called" Soviet technicians and specialists. Everybody knows how they have been employed. They were civilian specialists sent at the request of the legitimate Government of the Congo, and they have been doing work at that Government's instructions. But Mr. Wadsworth did not utter a word about the "experts" and "specialists" who are in fact Belgian military personnel, now in civilian dress but retaining virtually all their military functions of instructing and directing the activities of subversive elements and of political action. That omission, because Mr. Wadsworth, who is thoroughly acquainted with the situation in the Congo, knows the aim pursued by these Belgian "specialists" in their work and the reasons for which, in the interests of the United States, they should not be disturbed.

169. Presenting one untrue account after another and misinforming public opinion throughout the world, the Belgian Government has been doing its utmost to avoid having to comply with the Security Council's decisions on the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Congolese territory. The Belgian Government set several dates for completion of the withdrawal of its troops from the Congo; not one of them has been observed. Yet the representatives of a number of States in the Security Council have, as is known, gone so far as to express appreciation and gratitude to the Belgian Government on the ground that it has loyally carried out the Security Council's decisions; that was done, for instance, by the Italian representative when he spoke yesterday in the Council [905th meeting]. As the saying goes, "Birds of a feather flock together."

170. In the course of one of his statements to the Security Council, the Secretary-General took umbrage at being, as he thought, unjustly blamed for the continued presence of Belgian troops in the Congo, since on 30 August and 4 September he had, as he said, himself informed the Security Council that the Belgian Government had not yet fully complied with the Council's decisions. He had even sent a formal written protest to the Belgian Government. But there was no reason for him to feel offended. The Secretary-General, with the authority granted to him by the Security Council, had every opportunity and every power to ensure that the task entrusted to him was fulfilled. But the essential fact is that, although he had the necessary opportunities and powers, he was somehow unable to secure the expulsion of the Belgian troops from Congolese territory or, more accurately, did not apparently make any very great efforts to that end. This is the first and, we must say, regrettable result of the Secretary-General's activity in the Congo.

171. Whatever the number of speeches made to justify this state of affairs, or of expressions of gratitude to the Secretary-General, there is no getting away from the obvious fact that the Security Council's decisions, which required the immediate and complete expulsion of Belgian troops from the Congo, have not been implemented in their entirety by the Secretary-General.

172. The second regrettable result of the actions of the Command of the United Nations Forces and the Secretary-General lies in the fact that the Republic's territorial integrity has not only not been safeguarded but is now subject to a menace greater than that existing two months ago.

173. Whereas two months ago Tshombé, the puppet of the Belgians, was taking his first timid steps towards betrayal of the Congolese people's interests, that criminal's activity has now become more blatant. How has this insolence of his been caused? It has been caused by the fact that in the past two months the Belgian authorities, with the connivance of the United Nations Command and the Secretary-General, have armed his rebel bands and have supplied him with military specialists and advisors. It has been caused by the fact that the United Nations Command has, in essence, taken these bands under its protection and sheltered them from just retribution at the hands of the people.

174. Before the eyes of the whole world, Katanga is being increasingly converted by Belgium, with the support of its NATO allies, into a camp of forces hostile to the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo. Paradoxical though it may sound, the presence of the United Nations forces in Katanga has in no way hampered the Belgian authorities' actively subversive work designed to separate that province from the Republic.

175. Enjoying the protection of the United Nations forces, the Belgian colonialists have stepped up their activities against the Republic's legitimate Government,
That, too, accounts for Tshombé's increased impudence. The Belgian interventionists, with the direct connivance of the Command of the United Nations Force, are at the same time continuing to organize and equip the army of Tshombé's puppet government. This is being allowed under the pretext of non-interference in domestic affairs. The Belgians continue to equip Tshombé with both light and heavy weapons drawn from NATO depots. The fact that Belgium is supplying arms to the anti-Government forces in the Congo has been officially recognized, in a document by the Secretary-General himself.

176. It is significant that the Secretary-General has been unable to find any convincing arguments to explain how it comes about that, despite the control allegedly exercised by the United Nations Force over all airfields, air communications between Belgium and its puppet Tshombé continue in being, while the legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo was refused any assistance by the United Nations Command in re-establishing control over Katanga.

177. The severance of Katanga, a key province of the Republic, from the rest of the country is being aided by the fact that the Belgian authorities recently armed, in Katanga, the entire male population of European origin, thus in effect raising the number of Belgian troops to 20,000 men. On direct orders from the Belgian authorities, acting on instructions from the Belgian Government and with the permission of the Command of the United Nations Force, all the main strategic objectives in Katanga have been mined. All this was done in order to prevent the entry of the Congolese Government's forces into Katanga, although it was concealed behind the announced wish and call for a 'cease-fire'.

178. Lastly, it is clear to everyone that the activities of the Command of the United Nations Force and of the Secretary-General in person have not consolidated the political independence of the Republic of the Congo. If, today, we have no definite information about the fate of the Republic's legitimate Government—the very government to whom the Security Council had decided to give military and other assistance, and whose request for the Congo's admission to membership in the United Nations had been discussed and approved by the Security Council—a heavy responsibility for this state of affairs rests on those whose duty it was to implement that decision of the Council.

179. These persons will be unable, hard as they may try, to escape from the fact, which is patent to all, that by their actions they have in effect made nonsense of the Security Council resolution of 14 July [S/4387], where we read:

"Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks".

180. Steps have been taken—such steps, that the members of the Government, in consultation with whom the assistance was to be rendered, cannot now be found! How could that happen? How could the United Nations Command, whose duty it was to support that Government and help it defend the national interests of the Republic, permit the installation, now, not of the legitimate Government, but of unlawful elements who seize Parliament, disperse the administrative organs and are establishing their own power and régime? That was indeed fine assistance to the Central Government about which the Security Council had been talking! Where is the Congo's legitimate Government now? Can it function normally or not? Was the assistance from the United Nations Command and the Secretary-General in person such as to allow this Government to re-establish normal conditions in its country?

181. No positive reply to any of these question is forthcoming, either from the Command of the United Nations Force or from the Secretary-General.

182. It will be appropriate tonight to refer, once more, to documentary evidence showing that the Command of the United Nations Force and the Secretary-General in person have been guilty of carrying out a policy in sabotage of the Security Council's decisions. The letter dated 20 August from Mr. Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, to the Secretary-General [S/4448] contained the following passage:

"... The Government notes that not only does the Secretary-General refuse to provide it with the military assistance it has already required, but that he deliberately refuses to consult it, as stipulated in the resolution of 14 July 1960, with regard to any steps he deems necessary to take. It must be stressed that all the incidents which have occurred between the Government of the Republic and the Secretary-General of the United Nations were precisely the result of the latter's refusal to consult the Government as he is formally recommended to do by the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960. Until now everything has been done as if the United Nations Command in the Congo wanted to take the place of the Government of the Republic."

This letter from the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo was inspired by the fact that the United Nations Command in the Congo had, all along, clearly pursued a policy of discrediting the Republic's legitimate Government and of creating a situation in which that Government would be unable to re-establish order and normal life within the country.

183. Playing into the hands of the NATO countries, and, first and foremost, of the United States, the Command of the United Nations Force, despite the good intentions of the countries which had sent troops to the Congo, used these troops in order, not to implement the Security Council's decisions, but in fact to frustrate them. Therein lies the main fault of the Command of the United Nations Force in the Congo, and responsibility for it also attaches to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

184. From the long sequence of steps taken by the United Nations Command against the legitimate Government, one could single out such measures as the denial, to the Central Government's representatives, of access to the central radio station at Leopoldville, and the blockading of the Republic's airfields. It is pertinent to observe that the United Nations Command relaxed its control of broadcasting and the airfields pari passu with the execution of the plot to remove Mr. Lumumba's Government from power.

185. Could any behaviour be more cynical? The Secretary-General, who never raised the question of disarming the forces of the rebels, armed and incited by the Belgians, asked in his fourth report [S/4482 and Add.1-3] for a mandate from the Security Council
to disarm units of the Congolese army, just when units loyal to the legitimate Government of the Republic were beginning to bring the situation in the country under control. Mr. Hammarskjold even began to give practical effect to his proposal without waiting for the confirmation of the mandate which he had requested. 186. Yet Mr. Hammarskjold is not saying anything about disarming the bands of armed rebels who have new established de facto control over the capital, where they are committing acts of lawlessness and violence against the patriots. Where is the resoluteness of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this particular instance? Why does he not write his fifth report and raise the question of disarming this band of rebels who have risen up against the lawful Government? The Secretary-General now prefers to withdraw into the wings and watch from there the unfolding of the last act of the play, staged by the United States and other members of NATO, in which, unfortunately, he was cast for a specific and significant part.

187. When the Central Government’s forces were approaching the borders of Katanga and there arose the threat of their entry into the province, which would inevitably have led to the downfall of Tshombé’s puppet government, the United Nations Command, with the Secretary-General’s blessing, issued an order for a so-called cease-fire along Katanga’s borders. This order, in fact, forbade the forces of the Central Government of the Republic to enter Katanga, and at the same time constituted military support for the protégés of Belgium in their fight against the Republic’s integrity and independence, which the Secretary-General, under the decisions of the Security Council, had been called upon to protect.

188. Can these actions by the Secretary-General be called anything but abuse of the powers granted to him by the Security Council? In his reports to the Council, the Secretary-General repeatedly stated that the United Nations forces would not take part in internal conflicts. Yet we can see that the United Nations Command and the Secretary-General have all along followed a different course of action. This action resulted in the undermining—temporarily, we are convinced —of the national régime in the Republic of the Congo.

189. By taking part in the struggle against the national régime in the Congo, the United Nations Command and the Secretary-General personally have unmasked themselves as supporters of the colonialists; their pretence of “neutrality” has disappeared, and the unseemly nature of their actions has been fully revealed. By siding with the rebels and the separatists, the United Nations Command and the Secretary-General personally have violated the provision of the Security Council resolution of 9 August which states that the United Nations Force will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise.

190. With regard to the personal role played by the Secretary-General in the events of the Congo, I should like to quote from the Soviet Government’s statement of 9 September [S/4497]:

“...it can properly be said...that the senior official of [the Secretariat]—the Secretary-General—has failed to display the minimum of impartiality required of him in the situation which has arisen”—the implementation of the Security Council’s decisions on the Congo. “...its chief has proved to be the very component which is functioning most unashamedly on the side of the colonialists, thus compromising the United Nations in the eyes of the world.”

191. It is the considered view of the Soviet Government that Mr. Hammarskjold is not carrying out the tasks entrusted to him in connexion with the events in the Congo. Mr. Hammarskjold’s inactivity is, in essence, in line with the policy of the countries which have been, and are, basing themselves on colonialist positions. The course pursued by the United Nations Command in the Congo, and by the Secretary-General, has made it possible for the western Powers to make extensive use of the United Nations as a screen for their imperialist aims in Africa, and particularly in the Republic of the Congo. In this way, the actions of the United Nations Command clearly bear out the assessment made by the Soviet Government in its statement of 9 September from which I have just quoted.

192. Yesterday’s debate in the Security Council showed that the policy of continued interference by the western Powers and the United Nations in the internal affairs of the Congo is meeting with sharp objections and protests on the part of the African States. The representatives of Guinea, Ghana and a number of other African States made statements in the Security Council strongly criticizing the Belgian colonialists who are disregarding the Security Council resolutions and continuing their armed aggression against the Republic of the Congo. These delegates emphasized that the Central Government of the Congo alone expressed the interests of the Congolese people, that it enjoyed the support of Parliament and that all support for separatist forces was tantamount to open encroachment on the sovereign rights of the young African State.

193. However, the voice of the African representatives was not heeded in the Security Council by those who are clearly hoping for further exacerbation of the situation in the Congo, the overthrow of the Republic’s legitimate Government and the transformation of the Congolese State into an obedient tool of the neo-colonialists.

194. It is the opinion of the Soviet delegation that at the emergency session the General Assembly, even with its present composition, must give all-out support to the demands made by the African, Asian and other peace-loving peoples, put an end to foreign armed intervention in Congolese affairs, stop United Nations interference in the internal affairs of the country and recommend such steps as will promote the national regeneration of the Congolese people in freedom and independence.

195. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that at its present session the General Assembly will not play the part of a passive onlooker at a time when the colonialists are weaving webs of intrigue in the Congo and doing their utmost to regain their lost positions there.

196. We want to believe that the General Assembly will not allow itself to be controlled by a handful of monopolists from a number of States who are waxing rich on the looting and exploitation of other peoples, and that the United Nations will pursue a policy which is in the interest of the peoples struggling for their independence and freedom, and not in the interest of the colonialists.

197. The Soviet Union for its part seeks no advantages or benefits, no special rights and privileges, in the African countries. It seeks no bases there. In its
relations with the States of Africa it adheres strictly to the principles set forth at the Bandung Conference, at the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference and at the Conference of Independent African States.

198. The Soviet Government has repeatedly expressed its readiness to co-operate loyally in the execution of such United Nations measures as will effectively help in attaining the aims proclaimed by the Security Council in its resolutions regarding the Republic of the Congo. The Soviet Government has given practical proof of its intention to support such measures. It is in vain that Mr. Wadsworth has tried to cast doubts on our actions. They are universally known and have been described in my reply to the Secretary-General’s note verbaux [S/4503].

199. However, the Soviet Government cannot and will not support measures which are in effect detrimental to the people and Republic of the Congo and run counter to the resolutions adopted by the Security Council. In striving to help the legitimate central Government of the Congo, the Soviet Union has been acting in complete accord with the letter and spirit of the decisions taken by the Security Council regarding the situation in the Congo. In voting in favour of the Security Council decisions which called for assistance to the Government of the Congo, the Soviet Union was guided by the desire to help the young African State hold out in its hard struggle for national independence because, as is known, one of the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy is resolute support for all forces striving for liberation from colonial dependence.

200. The Soviet Union has repeatedly and openly declared its intention to adhere steadfastly to this policy, whether the colonial Powers like it or not. Speaking of future developments, Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR said:

“Time will show how the events in the Congo will develop. One thing is clear—the peoples of the colonial countries will not relax their efforts and will not capitulate to the colonialists. As for the Congo’s political and social development, the Congolese people itself will determine the road which it will follow in the future.”

201. The time has now come to select the correct course for the policy of the United Nations. We want to believe that at its forthcoming session the General Assembly will express its opinion on the situation in the Congo, which is a question of tremendous importance, and that the United Nations will pursue a correct policy in the interests of the peoples struggling for their freedom and independence, and not in the interests of the colonialists. The Soviet Union has been helping and will continue to help the Congolese people in its struggle for independence, so that it can put an end to the colonialist regime all the sooner and become the true master and owner of all the wealth of the Republic of the Congo.

202. The Soviet Government expects that the efforts directed towards the effective fulfilment of the Security Council’s decisions on the Congo will meet with the support of all the States which adhere to the principles set forth at the Bandung Conference and which do not want to see the good name of the United Nations tarnished by shameful complicity with the colonialists.

203. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The representative of the Soviet Union has seen fit to make again the strong personal attack upon me which he made in the Security Council. I replied in the Security Council, and I have no reason to repeat my reply here; the records of the Security Council are available to all representatives. The representative of the Soviet Union also saw fit to repeat a series of specific allegations which I refuted in the Security Council, and again I refer to the record. I wish, however, Mr. President, to reserve my right to return to the matter once I have read the text of the speech. The representative of the Soviet Union used strong language which, quite frankly, I do not know how to interpret. The General Assembly knows me well enough to realize that I would not wish to serve one day beyond the point at which such continued service would be, and would be considered to be, in the best interests of this Organization.

204. Mr. ORTONA (Italy): I had the hard task yesterday of concluding an exhaustive but, alas, unproductive debate in the Security Council. I stated [906th meeting] to my fellow members that the Council, with the adoption of the United States resolution for the calling of the emergency special session [S/4326] was transferring its heavy responsibility to the General Assembly. It was for me a grievous announcement to make both as President of the Council and as a firm believer in the mission and the purposes of the United Nations.

205. The body of our Organization missed what might have been its finest hour. After the debates lasting through five meetings it was to be hoped that a new constructive turn in events might take place so as to enable the United Nations Force in the Congo and the Organization in general to take renewed concrete steps in the right direction in favour of that country.

206. The negative vote cast by the Soviet Union on the constructive draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia made it impossible.

207. My delegation thinks that it might be fitting to mention also in the Assembly what we feel should be the path to be followed in the future and this will also evidence the need for speed and will justify this exceptional convening of the Member States in this Chamber. In the opinion of my delegation we should address ourselves to three main categories of problems: first, the strengthening of the United Nations operations in the Congo through the creation of a fund with the purpose of allowing the Government of the Congo to meet its budgetary and economic difficulties; secondly, the reiteration of the necessity for all Members to refrain from undue interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo; thirdly, the need for inducing the various factions and parties in the Congo to settle their differences.

208. Actually, these three motivations are strictly interwoven one with the other, and one of them cannot be pursued if the others are not similarly explored. These aims were certainly embodied in the draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia, which unfortunately could not be carried because of the Soviet veto.

209. What my delegation wishes to restate very emphatically is that, without trespassing upon the limits of the competence of the Organization, and notwithstanding the present intricacies of the constitutional problem in the Congo, we should discharge our responsibility so as to enable the young republic to move again on the path of economic growth and administrative and political stability. I think that this
responsibility is made greater by the difficulties which have beset that country since it achieved its independence. If no provisions are formulated by us, if we stand idle waiting to see how events will develop, further tragedies, further upheavals, further griefs will be added to the picture.

210. By this none of us wants to imply that action should be taken which could be considered as intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo. On the contrary, in the anxious search for adequate means for the solution of the Congo problem, we have to look for initiatives and provisions which, while completely severed from the international situation of the Congo, will help in building peace and prosperity in that country.

211. It is my feeling that we can do this through two main channels—the moral and the material. The moral: we have to uphold, first of all, the prestige of our Organization in that country, as well as everywhere. This is, I am afraid, certainly not what has been done by the Soviet Union in the last few weeks. The accusations and allegations which have been copiously dispensed serve only, in the opinion of my delegation, to discredit, undermine and cripple our Organization. We have to pull our forces together to avoid, either by our inadvertencies or by our hesitations and inadequacies, the pursuit of any design which might damage our Organization from whatever quarter it might come. And when I refer to the undermining of the Organization I include what has been done in the way of attacks and accusations with regard to the highest executive official of the United Nations, the effective and tireless Secretary-General, whose efforts can be assessed only in terms of the highest praise.

212. My delegation wishes at this point particularly to note that, in its opinion, the Secretary-General has acted with strict and rigid impartiality, has given us the right warnings at the right moment and has scrupulously interpreted the resolutions of the Security Council. As he himself has stated on past occasions, the operation in the Congo, in common with any other human achievement, cannot avoid imperfections, but those we have so far registered are of no great purport if we look at the results so far achieved in pursuance of the resolutions of the Security Council. Through the upholding and the enhancing of the Organization and of its chief executive, as well as of his valiant associates, we will discharge a duty and an obligation and will contribute toward counteracting accusations which are meant to bring not success but failure for the United Nations.

213. So much for the moral contribution which we can bring towards the solution of the problem under consideration. As for the material side of the question, the constitutional picture in the Congo brings us to other features. The crisis with the constitutional framework in the Congo is having, as a matter of fact, serious consequences in other fields. We have all read reports of the economic, financial and budgetary upheavals which beset that country, not to speak of the sufferings endured by the population in a situation which is rapidly deteriorating and which would have become rapidly explosive had it not been for the financial help that the United Nations had unavoidably to extend.

214. As I said the other day in the Security Council [905th meeting], the Secretary-General has presented the Council with a plan for assistance to the young Republic of the Congo. It is an effort of unprecedented importance which will require all the goodwill and courage of the United Nations to turn it into a reality. My delegation supports this plan because we believe in the necessity for it and are confident in the future of the Republic of the Congo. Of course, a financial operation of such magnitude must be framed in the proper perspective and must allow for the observance of the administrative and parliamentary rules and possibilities of each of the contributors, but we think that this is a step to undertake. The United Nations Fund for the Congo, if, as we hope, it materializes, will be not only a powerful element in the economic field but also a determining factor in letting the people of the Congo realize how sensitive the international community is to the practical needs of the nations of Africa. The United Nations Fund should be, in effect, the main track through which to channel help to the Congo. It should be established on a voluntary basis and be of a temporary nature. This would prevent the crisis in that country from reaching the point of no return.

215. Short of steps such as would enable the Secretary-General to count on adequate funds, the United Nations might find itself confronted with eventful decisions as to its presence and as to the size of its operations in the Republic of the Congo, and if there should be a decision to decrease, let alone wind up, the operations it is easy to conceive what the consequences would be. We all know that a situation of such a kind would invite a race by forces and powers which might turn the young republic into an arena in which those forces might clash, bringing into the Congo and into Africa upheavals which we want them to be spared. This explains why we support so strongly the Secretary-General's plan.

216. On the other hand, how are we going to give help of such magnitude to the Congo if in that country political and economic uncertainty prevails, and if the ways and means to cope with the crisis are not devised seriously and quickly? We cannot help the Congo to build itself into a modern and important State if we are not sure that our work can proceed successfully there. That is why my delegation believes in the importance of the Congo and for the future of Africa, the situation in that country must be stabilized. This can best be brought about through the proper economic and financial provisions, to be implemented through the United Nations.

217. Another point, which came to light in our debates in the Security Council and in the draft resolution which we were unable to adopt, was the necessity that Member States should refrain from interventions of a military nature or otherwise, which would imply any interference in the internal life of the country. We do think that this restraint should be exercised to the utmost by all Member States if we want to help the young republic and not complicate its natural growth. This, we can assure the Assembly, is strictly the policy that, contrary to the statement by the Soviet representative which we heard a moment ago—with, to say the least, rather repetitive monotony—is the policy of the NATO countries on the situation of the Congo. The rather unimaginative references to the conspiracies, interventions and plotting of the NATO countries in the Congo, which are now a sort of new "must" in the oratory of the Soviet delegation, have to be emphatically discarded by my delegation as sheer propaganda which cannot find any foundation or proof in the reality of the situation in the Congo.
218. This can be best proved if one looks at what types of contributions the NATO countries are giving to the operations in the Congo—contributions which are strictly in the civilian field, with very minor exceptions which were more than adequately explained by the Secretary-General. As regards Italy, I can only restate that our contributions are in the field of medical aid and an airlift, which has proved highly useful and, indeed, very necessary for the benefit of the civilian population in the Congo. Nobody can challenge the motivations of human co-operation which are at the basis of such Italian contributions.

219. With your permission, I should like now to address myself to a particular aspect of the present session. This is really a session dedicated to African problems. The theme of this emergency session is the Congo, and, in that perspective, Africa. The next regular session of the General Assembly which opens on Tuesday will certainly be of paramount importance in the history of our Organization, but it will have a very wide horizon.

220. But tonight, in our consideration of the Congo problem, we are dealing with Africa because there is no doubt that the situation in the Congo will be a test of the ability of the United Nations to stabilize and to help in the development of the African continent. The Congo, therefore, owes it to Africa to put all the strength and ability it can muster into a great effort to end the present upheavals and to re-establish order and security.

221. The African States, for their part, supported by what we hope will be an overwhelming majority of the Assembly, can act as the best bridge between the Congo and the United Nations. It would be desirable—and my delegation indeed feels that it is essential—that from this session the United Nations operation would emerge supported, defined and expanded. So far the Secretary-General has devoted all his energy and all the resources of his mind to the cause of the United Nations operation in the Congo. I have already paid tribute to the Secretary-General for what he has done. He now fully deserves and is entitled to obtain a mandate from the Assembly to pursue his work.

222. The fund for the Congo should enable him to provide the means for the continuation and expansion of that very operation which we, as Members of a responsible international community, have the duty to further—not in words but in deeds.

223. My delegation feels that the broad lines of United Nations policies have already been effectively dealt with by Tunisia and Ceylon in the draft resolution which, unfortunately, was vetoed last night. To avoid foreign intervention in the Congo; to assist that Republic with a United Nations fund; to emphasize the integrity and the unity of the young State; to enable the Secretary-General vigorously to continue his tireless work—these are the fundamental elements which, in our opinion, will help to stabilize the situation in the Congo. We hope that this will be the result of our deliberations. Such action will prove beneficial to all the African States and, by conceiving the building of a new nation against the background of co-operation, freedom, independence and democracy, it will have its effect felt not only on the African continent, but also in the world at large.

The meeting rose at 1.25 a.m. on Sunday, 18 September.