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Chairman: Mr. Djatal ABDUH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 66

Declaration concerning the peaceful coexistence of States (A/3673, A/C.1/L.198) (continued)

1. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) said that, while the peaceful co-existence of States should be the consequence of their conduct rather than of General Assembly resolutions, such resolutions carried great authority. It might be argued that a declaration on the lines of that proposed by the Soviet Union in its draft resolution (A/3673) was superfluous inasmuch as the principles set forth in it were in any case contained in the United Nations Charter. However, the proposed declaration contained matters which were not sufficiently emphasized in the Charter, and emphasized and strengthened some provisions which should be given new emphasis in view of prevailing conditions in the world. Furthermore, if it was contended that coexistence was a necessity imposed upon all States by the knowledge that total war now meant world suicide, and that a declaration was therefore not useful, he would answer that there were many who still believed in the inevitability of war and based their policies on that belief, thus committing the initial error which led to war. Thirdly, despite the realization that war would be a political mistake so irreparable that no responsible party would make it, there were forces working unremittingly for war, either deliberately or unwittingly. Among those forces were the arms race, the attempts to impede free economic, political and cultural co-operation between nations, the policy of maintaining colonial domination in one form or another, and the efforts to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

2. The Syrian delegation believed that a clear resolution, easily understood by all peoples, on peaceful coexistence would be useful and timely. Of the two draft resolutions before the Committee, it preferred the Soviet text (A/3673), but if it should not be voted on, his delegation would vote for the three-Power text (A/C.1/L.198). It would be a fitting culmination of the debates at the current session if the General Assembly adopted a declaration echoing the world-wide yearning for peaceful coexistence.

3. Since the end of the First World War far-reaching changes had taken place in the world which made a declaration on peaceful coexistence imperative. One-third of the world now lived under a socialist system

and the socialist ideology had found wide acceptance among the population even of non-socialist countries. Many countries in Asia and Africa had attained independence in the past ten years, and had rid themselves of foreign economic exploitation. In 1955, their representatives had met at the Bandung Conference and proclaimed principles which were reiterated in substance in the two proposals before the Committee. Those principles formed the basis of Syrian international policy.

4. Another recent phenomenon was the rapid development of under-developed countries, in consequence of which the economic forces of the world were being re-distributed and there was less inducement for some countries which enjoyed superiority in means of production to try to influence the life of other nations. Those changes had induced fear, particularly in the States of Western Europe and North America which were apprehensive of the loss of their former dominating position. Accordingly, the forces for change were being countered by attempts to maintain the status quo; progressive development was being met by conservatism. That trend had manifested itself in the separate grouping of the conservative nations, of the socialist countries, and of the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa, which were determined to oppose colonialism and hold a neutral position in the "cold war". The latter group did not, however, constitute a bloc. The under-developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America were attempting to accelerate their development through the United Nations. The socialist bloc tended to understand and support their efforts and their aspirations towards national liberation, while the former colonial countries viewed them with apprehension. That apprehension had led to the adoption of a policy of containment of socialist trends by alliances, by aid, by power blocs and by massive retaliation, and of opposition to newly independent countries for their support of liberation movements in other areas. In some cases, it was sought to reimpose colonialism where it had already been defeated.

5. Syria was situated in a region where attempts were being made to practise colonialism and to exert pressure on Governments. The attack on Egypt and the efforts to maintain colonial rule in Algeria, Oman and Cyprus were cases in point. When Syria had sought to further its development by means of loans, not direct assistance from the Soviet Union, it had been accused of becoming a Soviet satellite; yet many other countries had accepted such loans. The United States, in particular, had sought to represent the Syrian policy as one of alignment with the Soviet bloc. In reality, Syria was pursuing a policy of non-alignment; it was seeking to improve relations with the United States, and was prepared to resume its relations with the United Kingdom and France when those Powers were ready to deal with the countries of the Middle East as genuinely independent nations. The

oligarchical leadership of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in Asia and Africa was not acceptable to the Syrian Government, not least because the policy of those countries was strongly influenced by Zionism. His Government was determined not to follow any Power that pursued purely selfish interests. The Syrian policy was based on the desire for true international co-operation and peaceful co-existence.

6. Syria strongly opposed spheres of influence, particularly in the Middle East. One group of Powers wanted to maintain the area as their special reserve, in which they would be free to interfere in internal affairs while excluding any other group of Powers from relations with the area. In support of that policy, the now discarded theory of massive retaliation as a deterrent to potential trespassers had been developed. A corollary theory persisted, namely, the deterrent effect of the stalemate between the two opposing Power blocs resulting from fear of total war. The theory was fallacious since the deterrent affected both sides; moreover, it was contrary to the principle of peaceful coexistence. There should be no spheres of influence in the Middle East. Naturally, both the Western and the Soviet blocs had vital security interests in the region and could not remain indifferent to international matters affecting it. But the Arab peoples refused to be placed in either camp; other Powers could only deal with them by responding to their national aspirations.

7. He commented on the United States policy in the Middle East known as the "Eisenhower doctrine". As far as he could gather, the doctrine seemed to imply that the United States might interfere in the Middle East against any country which, in the sole judgement of the United States, was influenced or controlled by international communism. In other words, the doctrine contemplated the possibility of unilateral action. To that extent, he thought the doctrine was at variance with the principles which the United Nations stood for. Secondly, the doctrine suggested that the United States might offer protection to some Arab States on the pretext that the latter desired to be protected, thus by-passing the United Nations again. A third implication of the doctrine was that the United States would fill the vacuum created in the Middle East by the diminution of British and French influence. That was an equally undesirable feature, as was the apparent notion that Islam stood in need of protection. He added that the dangerous interpretation of the Eisenhower doctrine he had outlined had not been accepted by any Arab States.

8. Syria sought genuine and free co-operation with the United States and all other countries. It was suffering from the lack of such co-operation and from the policy of using the East-West stalemate as a pretext for attempts to create spheres of influence in the Middle East. It had been heartened by the statements to the effect that disarmament talks might be resumed in the near future. He hoped that the great Powers, on which the future of disarmament rested, would seek agreement through the diplomatic channel or by other means as a step towards peaceful co-existence.

9. The clashes of ideas and interests created by a rapidly changing world required tolerance born of the deep conviction that peaceful coexistence was necessary for the future progress of mankind.

10. Mr. PENN-NOUTH (Cambodia) said that ever since it had recovered its independence Cambodia had regarded the principle of peaceful coexistence with all States which respected its sovereignty as a corner-stone of its foreign policy. His delegation therefore looked favourably on any draft resolution recommending a policy of sincere peaceful coexistence between States. It had no ideological or political motives for doing so but supported it in the belief that, even if the USSR draft resolution (A/3673) was no more than a repetition of the general principles set out in the Preamble to the Charter, it might have a salutary effect on international relations.

11. The discussions on disarmament, to which the General Assembly had given priority, had reached a deadlock. While every nation declared that it wanted peace, States continued to arm themselves with deadly weapons and to form alliances for defensive purposes. It was feared that the desire for peace on the part of other States was not genuine which had led to the greatest armaments race of modern times and also to the breakdown of the negotiations on disarmament. Until there was some restoration of confidence, there was no prospect of progress in dealing with the problem of disarmament. In the belief that a declaration of peaceful coexistence might help to reduce international tension his delegation supported it, feeling that it was immaterial whether the expression "peaceful coexistence" or "peaceful relations" was used; what mattered was that the desire to co-operate should be genuine.

12. His country's experience at the Bandung Conference of 1955 had convinced him of the value of such declarations. The Conference had adopted the five principles of peaceful coexistence between States and, in spite of scepticism in some quarters, those principles had since governed the relations of the participants with other States. The Bandung Conference had also proved that normal relations could exist between States with different ideologies, policies and systems of government. That was extremely important, because once normal relations existed, better understanding developed and that could in turn lead to fruitful co-operation.

13. The religion and history of Cambodia also led it to support the USSR draft resolution. It was a Buddhist country and Buddha had taught that ambition, hatred and violence invariably caused conflicts. Cambodia, having learnt from bitter experience that wars caused untold misery and suffering, had been trying for some years to put into practice the principles of peaceful relations and co-operation between States. That policy had had most happy results for Cambodia, in spite of attempts by certain States which, in their desire to help, had wished Cambodia to align itself with them. By refusing to align itself with any group, Cambodia had become the friendly meeting-ground of nations of all blocs.

14. In his Government's view, peaceful coexistence implied not only disapproval of all military action and pacts but also scrupulous respect for the territorial, political and ideological independence of other States. That was the policy to which Cambodia was pledged in its relations with the rest of the world.

15. Mr. LONGDEN (United Kingdom) said that the principles set out in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/3673), which had originally

formed part of the Sino-Indian agreement of 29 April 1954 on trade and transit in Tibet, were unexceptionable; they were in fact all contained in the Charter. But they could not be regarded as a comprehensive list of the basis principles which should govern the conduct of international relations, for no reference was made to the principles of justice and respect for international law, or to the determination to "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained".

16. His delegation was therefore at a loss to understand why the Soviet Union should be so anxious for the General Assembly to endorse those principles, unless it was because, although on paper they looked unexceptionable, they meant something entirely different to the Soviet Union. A consideration of the manner in which the USSR applied them in its relations with other States would clarify that question.

17. The representative of the Soviet Union had deplored the fact that a large part of the world was split into opposing military groups: but, surely, the responsibility for that situation lay with the Soviet Government. The good will of the free world towards the Soviet Union, so much in evidence after the Second World War, had been dissipated. Alone among the Allies, it did not disarm. That fact, coupled with its refusal to release the once sovereign States in Eastern Europe which it had occupied during the war, its unsuccessful attempt to absorb Greece into the Soviet bloc, its absorption of Czechoslovakia, the threat to Iran—frustrated only by the action of the United Nations—and the attempt to starve out West Berlin, had convinced the people of the Western world that they must organize to defend effectively those values on which their civilization was based. That was the origin of the purely defensive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which would continue until such time as Soviet words were matched by Soviet deeds.

18. The Soviet representative's attacks on the colonial policy of the United Kingdom were absurd in view of the United Kingdom's record in granting independence to its dependent territories as soon as they were ready for it. The one region where colonialism subsisted was Eastern Europe. He referred, by way of illustration, to the case of Hungary. Less than five days before Soviet tanks had re-entered Budapest, the Soviet Government had issued a declaration stating that the policy of peaceful coexistence, friendship and co-operation among all States governed its foreign relations and that the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, State independence and sovereignty and non-interference in one another's affairs were the bases of the relations between socialist States. Despite those professions of faith, the USSR continued to ignore the General Assembly's resolutions on Hungary and had even refused to receive the Assembly's special representative, Prince Wan Waithayakon.

19. In the circumstances, it was impossible to interpret Soviet declarations of good intentions favourably, or to accept at their face value the motives of the Soviet delegation in putting forward its draft resolution. To those outside the Soviet system, "peaceful coexistence" meant that countries holding different views about the best method of governing themselves should not interfere in any way with each other's free

choice in those matters. To the Soviet Union it had meant an arrangement under which the Soviet Union remained free to promote the extension of communist control over non-communist countries by all means which would not force those countries to armed resistance, while allowing no possibility for those countries already within the Soviet system to exercise their sovereign rights and liberties.

20. It was not by chance that the Soviet draft resolution (A/3673), unlike the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198), made no reference to "tolerance". The word was not understood inside the USSR which accepted no tolerance of opposing points of view internally and was unable, consequently, to practise tolerance in its external international relations.

21. Convinced that the phrase "peaceful coexistence" meant something quite different to the Soviet Union from its own understanding of the words, his delegation would vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union if it was put to the vote. It would vote for the three-Power draft resolution because, although seemingly there was little to choose between the two texts, it believed that its sponsors attached the same meaning to those words as did the United Kingdom.

22. Mr. ULLRICH (Czechoslovakia) said that his delegation supported the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, because it believed that an appeal by the General Assembly to all States to practise the five principles set out therein in their mutual relations would help to promote a peaceful climate in the world.

23. He declared that the practical application of those principles called for mutual respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of States, non-aggression, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States and equality of rights. They had exercised a favourable influence on the development of friendly relations between those countries which had adopted them.

24. The nuclear arms race, the formation of aggressive military blocs, and the establishment and further extension of military bases on the territories of foreign States filled mankind with apprehension. It was not surprising in the circumstances that the policies of countries fighting against the danger of war and for peaceful coexistence were receiving ever-increasing sympathy and support from world public opinion; the nations of the world wanted peace.

25. The principles of peaceful coexistence were recognized and practised in everyday life by the socialist countries and many others. In 1954, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India had jointly proclaimed the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and in 1955 those principles had been endorsed by the Bandung Conference. In the fight for the recognition and the application of peaceful coexistence the People's Republic of China had played a most important part. It was today a highly respected, peaceful Power, a fact which could not be altered by the slanderous contentions of the representative of the United States.

26. There had been hopes of relaxation of international tension at the time of the Geneva Conference in 1955, but those hopes had not been fulfilled. Within a few months after that Conference the Council of NATO had decided to arm its forces with atomic and hydrogen weapons. The United States, which had blocked every

attempt to bring about disarmament, was trying to extend its influence over more and more countries and to impose new forms of colonialism on liberated countries. It continued to persist in its subversive activities against the socialist countries. The situation in the Near and Middle East remained tense and the Dulles-Eisenhower doctrine constituted a serious menace. In Western Europe, on the initiative of the United States and the United Kingdom, the military preparations of the NATO countries were being intensified. For example, it had been reported that at the forthcoming meetings of the Heads of Government of the NATO countries, military and strategic plans for the extensive use of atomic and hydrogen weapons were to be discussed, and Western Germany was being fully integrated into the atomic armaments drive.

27. He regretted that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom were not prepared to co-operate on a question of such vital importance to the maintenance of peace as peaceful coexistence and that they had seen fit to make further slanderous attacks on the socialist countries. The United States Government, contrary to the statement of its representative, was interfering in the domestic affairs of the countries of Eastern Europe. From evidence published by the Hungarian Government it had been proved conclusively that broadcasting station under United States control had done everything possible to promote the counter-revolutionary putsch in Hungary. The United States was spending \$100 million a year on subversive, intelligence and terrorist activities aimed at overthrowing the democratic régimes in socialist countries.

28. The principles of peaceful coexistence were practised by Czechoslovakia; it was not only co-operating with all socialist countries, but was also developing contacts with States outside the socialist bloc. Its trade was expanding steadily, even with those Western countries which discriminated against it. Its cultural relations with other countries were expanding and as a consequence fostering international confidence. It was for that reason that his delegation had put forward a number of draft resolutions aimed at expanding economic and cultural relations, and promoting international co-operation in the prevention of the disastrous effects of atomic radiation.

29. Successful negotiations on disarmament, and the related problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, would do much to ensure peaceful coexistence. It was in order to give practical proof of its desire to see the negotiations brought to a successful conclusion that his Government had declared itself ready to renounce the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons on its territory, provided that, as the German Democratic Republic had previously proposed, both German States would agree to the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons in their territories.

30. It was in the spirit of Article 1 of the United Nations Charter that the Soviet delegation had submitted its draft resolution (A/3673). Convinced that the application of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations among States would tend to reduce international tension and extend international co-operation the Czechoslovak delegation would support the Soviet draft resolution.

31. Mr. SERRANO (Chile) said that his delegation had

feared that a discussion of the item concerning peaceful coexistence might serve merely as an excuse for propaganda. Furthermore, the long procedural debates to which it might have given rise would have been prejudicial to the effectiveness of the United Nations as a diplomatic instrument. He was therefore happy that those fears had been groundless. They had been dissipated by the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198). Nothing in it could be interpreted as biased or intended to serve the interests of any political or ideological group. The wording was simple and unambiguous and the principles were clear, and identical with those of the Charter. It had cleared the air and proved that the long debate on the item had been justified.

32. Constructive and far-reaching statements had been made in the course of the debate. In the statement he had made at the 936th meeting, the United States representative had emphasized, *inter alia*, his country's desire to extend economic and other assistance to other countries. In particular, he had stressed the valuable part to be played by the new economic and technical development programme of the United Nations approved by the Second Committee at its 509th meeting. In the same statement, he had appealed to all nations to take constructive steps towards peaceful coexistence.

33. There were therefore good grounds for hoping that the joint draft resolution would be adopted unanimously. In the view of the Chilean delegation, there could be no possible objection to the draft resolution. It went beyond mere peaceful coexistence and although it might be, as some had maintained, a repetition of the principles of the Charter, those principles could not be repeated too often. The United Nations had limitations and it was not perfect, but its very existence was a promise of better things. Because the draft resolution was designed to achieve the same ends as the United Nations itself, it had his delegation's full support.

34. Mr. HOOD (Australia) welcomed the Chilean representative's constructive comments. The principles under discussion were unexceptionable, but the Committee had always the Charter before it. The main business of the General Assembly was to make specific recommendations on situations of fact. The Committee had two draft resolutions before it, the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198) and that of the Soviet Union (A/3673). The question was what situation of fact underlay the USSR draft resolution. Many members of the Committee knew what the real facts were. There could be no peaceful coexistence without good will on all sides. His delegation would support the three-Power draft resolution although it did not seem particularly relevant to the situation currently prevailing not only in Europe but in South-East Asia.

35. Mr. MALOLES (Philippines) said that the term "peaceful coexistence" had a special meaning in the Soviet Union. It had been used by Lenin, who had realized that the young Soviet State had to live in a state of non-belligerency with its neighbours for a time if it was to survive and promote its aims of world revolution. Lenin had been convinced that a clash between communism and the rest of the world was inevitable.

36. The Soviet Union had employed a variety of tactics but they had always followed a pattern which had now

become familiar: it had organized militant groups which appeared to fight for the peace they really sought to subvert. By concealing its real intentions, the Soviet Union had gained the confidence of the world but under the cloak of friendship it had made every effort to promote disunity. Talk of peaceful coexistence was used to relax the vigilance of the free world.

37. Very few people would deny that the Soviet Union had followed to the letter Lenin's instructions that the enemy was to be attacked with boldness, rapidity and decisiveness. Within one decade from the end of the Second World War, nearly all Eastern Europe had fallen beneath the Soviet yoke and another monolithic State in the Soviet image had become a threat to the security of the Far East.

38. The free world had eventually reacted. The Marshall Plan had been instituted and a far-reaching system of alliances had been set up. The conflicts in Korea and Viet-Nam seemed to have ended the purely military phase of Soviet expansion, at least for the time being. When military aggression had proved unproductive, Soviet policy had been redefined and peaceful coexistence had become the watchword. Among the other compelling reasons which had led to a revival of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence was the fact that the Soviet Union had achieved parity with the West in the production of thermonuclear weapons. A balance of terror had been struck which neither side wished to disturb.

39. One of the most recent and authoritative formulations of Soviet policy had been made Mr. Krushchev on 14 February 1957. He had gone to some lengths to deny that peaceful coexistence was merely a tactic in the war with capitalism or that war between the two systems in force in the world was inevitable but he had left it to be inferred that they were irreconcilable. It followed that, although war was not inevitable, peaceful coexistence was not a permanent solution. If it was not intended to be permanent, the professions of faith in it, could not possibly be sincere. It was only too obvious that peaceful coexistence was not an end in itself but a means to world domination.

40. The principles proposed in the USSR draft resolution (A/3673) were identical with those underlying the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198). By seeking to identify itself with the purposes of the neutral Powers, the USSR was trying to make its own record immaculate. The world was witnessing a resurrection of the pre-war policy of the USSR of encouraging popular fronts, but on a greatly expanded scale. Mr. Krushchev's appeal to the Socialist parties of the world to unite had been another unsuccessful effort in that direction.

41. It might be useful to ponder the question what the USSR hoped to achieve by the current drive for peaceful coexistence. Among the short-term objectives, there were many issues within the United Nations which might be solved in favour of the USSR if peaceful coexistence became a reality. First, the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations would be facilitated. Secondly, the political campaign which had harmed the prestige of the USSR among the captive nations would cease. Thirdly, the reunification of Korea, Viet-Nam and Germany through elections would be affected in important ways.

42. The achievement of the long-term objectives of the drive would have even more frightening results. The USSR was anxious to disrupt the system of alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Such a disruption would be a disaster for the free world. The USSR was also trying to prevent the consolidation of the free countries in Asia and Africa by spreading neutralism over the two continents.

43. The free world must not yield to blandishments, but recognize that peaceful coexistence was only another form of the "cold war". The fate of Hungary, the threats to Norway, the United Kingdom and Turkey and the refusal of the USSR to negotiate further on disarmament were hardly calculated to promote faith in peaceful coexistence.

44. It might be that no genuine peace, but only a state of non-war, could be achieved in the existing circumstances. If so, the world must learn to live with it. Nevertheless, the innate sanity of mankind must recoil from the prospect of perpetual anxiety. Mankind could not, indeed should not, give up hope of peaceful and orderly world of reason and justice, free from want and fear. The first step in the right direction would be to turn its thoughts from war to peace; the United Nations itself had been founded on the basic principle of co-operation between all the members of the human race to achieve that purpose. Much could be hoped of the programme for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament, free world trade, the development of the under-developed countries and many other United Nations efforts.

45. Peaceful co-existence, as practised by the USSR, had no place in Philippine foreign policy. The Philippines strove for friendship with all nations but its security rested on collective defence. It respected the right of other countries to protect their freedom in other ways and it expected its own right to be respected equally. It was free and determined to remain so.

46. His comment had clearly indicated his views on the USSR draft resolution (A/3673). He supported the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198) which was a reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter. If peaceful coexistence was really desired, it must be a coexistence with justice, freedom of speech and respect for human rights, rooted in the Charter. The three-Power draft resolution was a step in that direction.

47. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) said that there had never been absolute freedom and justice for all people. Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, Finland and Poland had not existed as independent peoples in his youth. There had been a community of principles, however.

48. The crucial problem confronting the world was the combination of the national ambitions of the Soviet Union with the powerful forces of Marxist socialism. The greatest Power in the European continent was helped by ideological currents in other countries, just as France had been during the French Revolution.

49. The tragedy of the current time was that the world no longer acknowledged common standards. He had been impressed by the quotations made by the United States representative from statements by the most important men in the Soviet Union proclaiming the doctrinal incompatibility between their system and those of the other Powers of the world.

50. Leading Soviet writers had repeatedly asserted that the only authentic international law was that of the USSR. They asserted that, during the agony of the capitalist world, treaties and other international agreements between the bourgeois and socialist portions of the world were no more than truces or armistices. International undertakings, according to them, could be disregarded whenever it suited the interests of communism to do so.

51. His delegation's position was very far removed from the so-called neutralist trends, for there was a danger that neutralism might harden even more the position of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

52. If the expressions of good will contained in the draft three-Power resolution (A/C.1/L.198) had had a neutralist character, the Spanish delegation would not have supported them. Statements in favour of coexistence merely stressed the obvious fact that nations continued to exist side by side. Nothing must be done which might weaken the defence of the Western world by those countries which had a duty to resist the tremendous threat represented by the combination of national and ideological power to which he had referred earlier. In spite of all his doubts, he shared the hopes expressed by other speakers that the words of peace continued in the joint draft resolution would have some effect.

53. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) said that, whatever the name given to it, the question which was being discussed was that of solving the problems that had emerged as a result of the Second World War, the problems of countries living together under the new political and economic conditions. In that connexion, he preferred to speak of peaceful co-operation between nations rather than of coexistence, which had a somewhat negative connotation.

54. It was essential for the world to put aside its differences, and to plan for peace not like pygmies but like giants, to borrow a term from the statement made by Mr. Lester B. Pearson on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. The challenge confronting humanity was that of making use for positive and constructive ends of all that science and modern technology had made available to it. Lasting peace could not be built on the precarious basis of a deterrent to aggression represented by the possession of untold power of destruction.

55. In the United Nations, Brazil had never ceased to advocate compromise and negotiation. Its conception of peaceful coexistence was typified by its offer to welcome into its territory those who, as a result of unsurmountable difficulties, would have to search for new conditions of life in less troubled surroundings.

56. Confronted with the two draft resolutions before the Committee, the Brazilian delegation had decided to vote in favour of the one introduced by India, Sweden and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.198).

57. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) regretted that an item of such importance was being discussed so late in the session. The problem of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social structures was not a philosophical question but a practical question resulting from the appearance on the world scene of a series of socialist States in Europe and Asia. Another recent social and political phenomenon of increasing importance was the growing

number of former colonial territories which had achieved independence and were seeking their own paths of development. Therefore, the future of mankind depended not only on the relationship between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism but also, to a significant degree, on the way in which the free countries of Asia and Africa would develop and the political paths they would choose to follow.

58. In the world of today, where a large number of States with different social systems existed side by side, the fundamental question was what would be the nature of such coexistence. On its solution would depend whether there would be lasting peace and practical co-operation between States regardless of social and political structure or whether States would have to continue to live in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and fear of a terrible new military conflagration.

59. Only political hypocrites and slanderers could deny that the Soviet Union had followed a peace-loving foreign policy during the forty years of its existence. Immediately after the Revolution, the young Soviet Republic had proposed peace and co-operation to all countries and had repudiated the old policy of plunder, violence and expansionism in international relations. Since then, the world scene had been transformed. Now there was a vast zone of peace embracing socialist and peace-loving non-socialist States, which based their relations with other States on peaceful coexistence and actively opposed the attempts of imperialist and colonial Powers to drag mankind into a destructive atomic war. On the other hand, the recent aggression against Egypt had been launched by the force of that "peaceful capitalism" which the United States representative had praised so highly at the 936th meeting.

60. The Soviet Union had survived the attempts to suppress it and was flourishing. Its peaceful policy had proved to be not a temporary but a permanent phenomenon. That policy had once again been reaffirmed at the recent session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which in commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Revolution, had proclaimed to all workers, political, social, scientific and cultural leaders, parliaments and Governments that the Soviet Union, unlike the ruling circles of Western countries, especially the United States, had never laid claim to leadership over other countries, that it respected the independence and sovereignty of all States, and that it sought to develop friendly relations with all countries.

61. The peoples of the world, including the Ukrainian people, had not forgotten the cost of the two world wars launched by the aggressive forces of imperialism and had no desire for a third world war. The only way to avoid a new military catastrophe was to recognize the possibility and the necessity of peaceful coexistence and to renounce the policy of hatred and hostility towards peoples that had chosen a different social system. It was better to trade than to hate, to exchange scientific knowledge, films, art and music than inter-continental ballistic missiles.

62. While most of the previous speakers in the debate had expressed a favourable attitude towards the principle of peaceful coexistence, some of them, particularly the representatives of the United States of America and of France, had, as usual, made insinuations and unfounded statements about the socialist countries, with a view to undermining faith in the possibility of peaceful coexistence. If Mr. Lodge had

proved anything, it was that the ruling circles of the United States were not willing to act in accordance with the policy of peaceful coexistence. The United Kingdom representative had explained his opposition to the declaration proposed by the Soviet Union by saying that it did not include an important principle of the United Nations Charter, namely the practice of tolerance, which, he had added, was not understood in the Soviet Union. If the United Kingdom representative considered the actions of his Government in Kenya, Egypt and Cyprus to be examples of tolerance, then he could only say that that concept of tolerance had no place in the United Nations.

63. Those who opposed the possibility of peaceful coexistence construed it to mean a compulsory neutralism which would help the Soviet Union to destroy the Western world. Nothing was more senseless or more unrealistic than such a distortion of the essence of peaceful coexistence, which simply meant living without war in conditions of peaceful competition. Surely, Mr. Lodge himself did not believe that countries comprising a vast area of the world thinking of destroying the West. However, having failed to find in the principle of peaceful coexistence something that was not there, Mr. Lodge had decided to replace facts with inventions. He had said that the recent declaration of the representatives of Communist parties of socialist countries contained an appeal for the peaceful or non-peaceful overthrow of the régimes of other countries. He (Mr. Palamarchuk) had carefully re-read the declaration and had failed to find the slightest hint of such an appeal. Nor was such an appeal to be found in the Peace Manifesto adopted by the delegations of Communist and workers' parties of a large number of countries. It did appeal to leaders in all walks of life to champion the cause of peace, to demand the prohibition of atomic and nuclear weapons, and to call upon their Governments to carry out in the United Nations a policy of peace and of opposition to the policy of the "cold war". The political acrobatics of the representative of the United States and of certain other countries by which they attempted to show that peaceful coexistence had one meaning for the Soviet Union and another for the United States of America, were designed to prevent the expansion of the zone of peace, which was exerting an increasingly positive influence on the implementation of the purposes and principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter.

64. The main and decisive condition for such implementation was that the foreign policy of all States Members of the United Nations should be in keeping with those purposes and principles. Unfortunately that was not yet the case. Indeed the foreign policy of certain countries, in particular the United States of America, was at direct variance with the Charter since it included such elements as "brinkmanship" and "peace through deterrents". The Declaration concerning the peaceful coexistence of States contained in the USSR draft resolution (A/3673) would not supplant the United Nations Charter. On the contrary, it would be a practical application of the provisions of the Charter and would lay down in specific terms the obligation of States Members of the United Nations to be guided in their foreign relations by simple, clear and straightforward principles, such as mutual respect for one another's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-intervention in one another's domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit,

and peaceful coexistence. There was no reason why those five principles, originally proclaimed by the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India, endorsed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and supported by the peoples of Asia and Africa at the Bandung Conference, could not be endorsed by all the Members of the United Nations, including the great Powers.

65. It was well to recall that at the recent commemorative session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Mr. Khrushchev had declared that the Soviet people had no intention of using any means of destruction provided the Soviet Union was not subject to attack by imperialist States, and that on 13 November 1957 the President of the United States of America had declared that the United States would never be an aggressor. Those were sincere and important statements from the leaders of two great Powers. If the words of the President of the United States were followed by deeds and the United States endorsed the principles of peaceful coexistence, expanding trade and the renunciation of war and "cold war", there would be a lessening of tension between the West and the East, and the peoples of the earth could apply themselves to the task of using science and technology for their well-being and happiness.

66. Instead of the preparations for war, which consumed the greater part of man's efforts, what the world needed was the renunciation of war as a means of solving international disputes, as well as economic and cultural co-operation and competition. Those who did not wish to give up such adventurous doctrines as "positions of strength" and "brinkmanship", were clinging to the concept of armed coexistence, which was based on the view that peace could be preserved only if both sides possessed, qualitatively and quantitatively, equally deadly weapons of mass destruction. The concept of armed coexistence, based as it was on the idea of a balance of power, was fraught with immeasurable dangers to mankind because there was no way of determining objectively at any given moment whether or not such a balance of power existed.

67. The people and Government of the Ukrainian SSR warmly supported the principles set forth in the USSR draft resolution. No country could exploit such principles for selfish political or economic interests. Although at its current session the General Assembly had failed to adopt any constructive proposals on disarmament and the intensification of the armaments race by the NATO countries had given rise to legitimate alarm in world public opinion, the Soviet Government had, in reply to the recent appeal of the Prime Minister of India, expressed the profound conviction that there was still time to avert disaster. The laws of historic development of society had given rise to the simultaneous existence of socialist countries, newly emancipated States, kingdoms, bourgeois republics, empires, and peoples' democracies. Peaceful and lasting coexistence was not only possible, but historically necessary.

68. Mr. VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA (Colombia) said the item before the Committee concerned the basic democratic philosophy of the Charter.

69. He had been impressed by the words of peace spoken by the representative of the Soviet Union. They contrasted strangely with the events in Hungary in

1956 and he hoped that they heralded a change for the better in international relations.

70. His delegation would vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198), as it wished to associate itself with every endeavour to reconcile the two camps into which the world was divided.

71. His delegation would not vote in favour of the Soviet draft resolution (A/3673) because it gave the impression that the five principles in question had come to be applied only recently. Indeed, the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution suggested that the five principles had originated at the Bandung Conference of 1955, whereas in fact the principles of mutual respect, non-aggression, non-intervention, equality and peaceful coexistence were the basis of the much earlier Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States. For centuries the principles in question had been recognized by leading writers on international relations. The statement "that many States have recently begun to base their relations" on those five principles was therefore inaccurate.

72. In addition, the five principles, as expressed in the USSR draft resolution, were in part redundant because non-aggression, peaceful coexistence, and equality and mutual benefit were very much the same thing expressed in different words. It would have been better to quote the Charter itself. The Preamble to the Charter expressed the determination to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law could be maintained. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter dealt with sovereignty. Non-aggression was dealt with in Articles 2 and 39 of the Charter.

73. For those reasons, the Colombian delegation would support the three-Power joint draft resolution, which referred to the Charter.

74. The spread of Soviet influence had led to the formation of alliances for the purpose of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. He did not consider that such regional associations were in any way incompatible with the Charter.

75. Ideological differences were no obstacle to international coexistence; the coexistence of different States was the essence of international law. The Organization of American States, constituted by the Latin American countries and the United States of America, was a family of nations having different political régimes, but none of the States belonging to it tried to impose its political creed on another. The inter-American system exemplified true neighbourly relations and peaceful coexistence.

76. Unfortunately, there appeared to be in the Soviet Union a totally different conception of coexistence. Russian writers rejected the unity of international law and postulated a difference between a "progressive and peaceful" international law and an "imperialist" law. It seemed that to Lenin the word "coexistence" had meant a period during which Soviet policy would abandon the all-out attack on every front against the non-communist world and replace it by the more sober tactics of concluding agreements with some Governments and in some areas while keeping up intense pressure as well. That communist conception of coexistence was quite different from democratic co-

existence. It was not a philosophy or a doctrine. According to Lenin, it was purely tactical and represented a phase that was strictly temporary.

77. The Soviet Union, together with a number of other communist countries, had, at a meeting of Communist parties held in Moscow in November 1947, proclaimed, side by side with peaceful coexistence, a world-wide class war against capitalism. It was difficult to reconcile such protestations of peace with the expression of a policy of socialist expansion by means of the overthrow of capitalism.

78. No one disputed the right of the people of the Soviet Union to choose their own system of government. But it was intolerable that there should exist an international party with world-wide ramifications and controlled from Moscow which constituted a permanent agency for intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

79. Colombia, as a Member of the United Nations, had contributed officers and men to the United Nations forces. Colombia desired coexistence with all States, including communist States, on the basis of mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty of all of them.

80. Mr. EBAN (Israel) said that the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198) was a lucid expression of the obligations imposed by the Charter and that, with the exception of the representatives of Saudi Arabia and Syria, the previous speakers in the debate had sought to attain a due level of tolerance and moderation. While he understood the scepticism concerning the usefulness of general declarations, he considered that the history of Israel had shown that universal ideas proclaimed with solemnity and conviction could have a powerful effect on the life of men and of nations. Great documents, including the Charter of the United Nations, had often had as deep an influence as great events.

81. It was important that all who voted for the three-Power draft resolution should know to what they were subscribing. They were committing themselves to respect the sovereignty, independence and integrity of all States without exception, to develop peaceful relations not only with those States of which they approved but also with those from whose policies and régimes they dissented, and to apply the principles of the Charter to all States irrespective of historical controversies, however profound.

82. The joint draft resolution carried with it the obligation to accept sovereign equality as a guiding principle in the relationships of Member States. Under the Charter no State, however powerful or long-standing, had any juridical identity superior to that of any other State, however small or new. That, perhaps, was the highest among the philosophical concepts of the Charter: equality in rights despite divergencies in power, the concept of democracy within a community of nations.

83. It was therefore not only useful but perhaps urgent that those ideas of the Charter should be restated by the General Assembly in the closing hours of its twelfth session. In view of the deadlock in the matter of disarmament, at least the minimal safeguards against force and aggression needed to be restated. Those safeguards, necessary in 1945, had become indispensable now that mankind was living

with the danger and opportunity of a scientific revolution. Common vulnerability had become the strongest argument in favour of a universal system of law. No State anywhere could have its independence or integrity violently assaulted without every other State, including the assailant, feeling the ground tremble beneath its feet.

84. Every delegation should support the joint draft resolution in the conscious sense of performing an important act of affirmation. Any Government which had reservations about the draft, or which found it necessary to adopt a selective interpretation, was surely following misconceived policies. He fully understood the embarrassment of the representative of Saudi Arabia with respect to the draft resolution, but it was a healthy embarrassment, and one for which the Charter and the draft resolution offered no consolation or escape.

85. The joint draft resolution could not be reconciled with attempts to subjugate any people, destroy its statehood or impose an unwanted régime upon it. It could not be reconciled with any espousal of a juridical doctrine of war. It could not be reconciled with incitement against any State, false accusations or the institution of an arms race in areas of tension. Moreover the spirit of the draft resolution commanded an urgent attempt to renew the disrupted discussion on disarmament.

86. The adoption of the draft resolution would not of itself solve any international dispute. Its implementation, however, would establish clear limits beyond which a dispute might not be pursued. His delegation unreservedly supported the three-Power draft resolution and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

87. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation fully endorsed the statements which had been made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and others, stressing the importance of adopting the declaration concerning the peaceful coexistence of States, contained in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/3673). The principle of peaceful coexistence was at the very basis of the United Nations; it was the only possible policy between States of varying sizes and with different social and economic systems, and the only way of avoiding a new war. Many countries, including the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and India, were already basing their foreign policies on that principle. Those who pretended to doubt that fact were merely seeking to prolong the "cold war". That applied in particular to the United States representative's statement at the 936th meeting. He had attributed aggressive intentions to the Soviet Union, forgetting the United States' military intervention in the Soviet Union in the early years of its existence and the United States monopolies' enormous investments in the German military economy which had helped to bring about the Second World War. Mr. Lodge had attempted to prove that the real purpose of the declaration which had emerged from the conference of representatives of the Communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries had been the overthrow of authority in the non-Soviet countries, both by peaceful and by non-peaceful means. That was the old charge of the "export of revolution", and was sheer nonsense. At the same time, the United States representative claimed that such aggressive blocs as NATO and SEATO had been formed solely because of

the activities of the Soviet Union. The fact was, however, that the Soviet Union had consistently throughout the post-war years made efforts to reduce international tension, to remove the threat of a new war and to establish trust between States. It was clear, therefore, on which side the aggressive intentions lay. Indeed, NATO was the main instrument in the preparation of a new war and the intensification of the armaments race, and it was the representatives of that bloc which had frustrated all efforts to secure a settlement of the disarmament question in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. The efforts currently under way to unite into a single bloc the members of NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact could only increase the danger of a new war. The Soviet Union was in favour of the dissolution of all military blocs and the conclusion, between the participants in NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, of an agreement for the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means. But the United States, as everyone knew, refused to pursue such a course.

88. The United States representative had also argued that the words and the deeds of the Soviet Union were at variance and had referred to Hungary as an example. But as his delegation had many times shown, the attack in Hungary of counter-revolutionary forces had been organized, financed and directed from the United States and had been put down by Hungarian workers with the help of the Soviet Union. Order had now been restored in Hungary and economic reconstruction was in full swing, much to the discomfiture of United States ruling circles, for the whole purpose of the United States' foreign policy was the overthrow of the existing system in the socialist countries. The United States had, in fact, made subversive activity against those countries a matter of State policy and—to mention only officially acknowledged expenditure—had in recent years spent more than \$600 million for that purpose.

89. A number of representatives had maintained that the five principles for peaceful coexistence enunciated by the Soviet Union were already to be found in the United Nations Charter. It was true that the purposes of the United Nations, according to Article 1 of the Charter, were to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations with different social and political systems. But an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust had arisen between the Members of the United Nations, and in particular the great Powers and the provisions of the Charter had been violated. The Security Council especially, which bore prime responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, was failing to fulfil its proper functions. In view of such a state of affairs, the adoption of a declaration on the peaceful coexistence of States and an appeal by the General Assembly to Member States to act upon the principles listed in it could not but contribute to an improvement in the international situation. The first three principles listed were closely connected and constituted generally recognized norms in international law. That did not mean, however, that they were necessarily observed by States in their relations with others; the United States, in particular, sought to find theoretical justification for the violation of those norms. The United States Secretary of State, in an article published in Foreign Affairs in October

1957, had openly repudiated the concept of sovereignty, in contradiction both of the letter and of the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had supported his view. It was clear that their theory of independence as opposed to the allegedly outdated concept of sovereignty was intended to undermine the efforts of States striving to maintain their independence and sovereignty. Interdependence meant simply dependence on the United States, in the worst traditions of colonialism. Moreover, it presupposed the right of interference in and even attack upon other countries, on the pretext of protecting the interests of the community of countries of the so-called free world as a whole.

90. The need for peaceful coexistence was consequently all the more urgent but the United States representative had opposed the adoption of the declaration, using veiled terms which did not, however, conceal the fact that in so doing he was protecting the interests of the monopolists who had a vested interest in war since they drew enormous profits from armaments production. The United States had forgotten the immense cost, in money, men and materials, of the Second World War and had, ever since its conclusion, been preparing for a further war in pursuit of the goal of world leadership. That was evident from the official statements of that country's successive Presidents. The "position of strength" policy was one instrument towards that end, the "containment" and "liberation" policies and the formation of aggressive blocs such as NATO and SEATO were others. In fact, all the events since the Second World War showed the same intention and had the same ultimate objective. Those countries which linked their fates with that of the United States were embarking on a very dangerous course. It was evident from recent public statements by the United States Secretary of State and by the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom that the United States was turning Europe into an atomic arsenal, thus laying Europe open to the appalling danger of an atomic war. That prospect merited consideration. But indeed, if a new war were to break out, no one would be safe anywhere; all peoples for many generations to come would suffer the unspeakable consequence of such a war. Nevertheless, war was not inevitable for there were in the world powerful forces for peace, capable of restraining a potential aggressor. That did not warrant complacency, however; the battle for peace must be fought every day. That was the most important task before the United Nations. The only sure road to peace was through the adoption of a policy of peaceful coexistence. Many political leaders in the Western countries, including the United States, had been compelled to recognize that fact.

91. Peaceful coexistence was inconceivable without economic co-operation between all countries regardless of their social systems. The fourth of the principles enunciated by the Soviet Union was particularly important in that connexion. The Soviet Union had instituted trade relations with sixty-five other countries many of which had a social system differing from its own. Many examples could be cited of the benefits to be derived from economic links between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had, for instance, been the largest purchaser on the world market during the world economic crisis of 1929 to 1933. It had bought large

quantities of industrial equipment, agricultural machinery, machine tools, foundry equipment and so forth from the United Kingdom and the United States. The Soviet Union, he noted, was now producing and exporting such goods itself. The Byelorussian SSR, for its part, was now exporting industrial equipment of various kinds not only to the peoples' democracies but also to non-socialist countries in the Far and Middle East, Europe and Latin America. But the United States was endeavouring to hinder the development of economic relations between the Soviet Union and other countries. The various embargoes and restrictive enactments of the United States Government merely made international relations more difficult. Nor had they achieved their immediate objective; few countries had, as a result of them, firmly desisted from trading with the Soviet Union and the other countries in the socialist camp and the economies of the socialist countries themselves had continued to develop and expand. Trade was in fact a sound basis for the development of peaceful coexistence. The socialist countries at present offered immense opportunities for the development of economic co-operation with all States on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. If the United States, the United Kingdom, France and other Western countries were to take advantage of those opportunities, international relations would improve considerably. The Soviet Union had proposed to the United States a competition in the production, not of weapons, but of goods for peaceful purposes and notably of consumer goods for the benefit of the people.

92. The Soviet Union was seeking to establish cultural as well as economic relations with other States for it believed that cultural ties, too, were a means of preventing world military conflict. In recent years, the Soviet Union, including Byelorussia, had received many foreign tourists and delegations from many countries all over the world. The Byelorussian SSR had also organized cultural exchanges and in various ways demonstrated its desire to contribute to the strengthening of cultural bonds between peoples. The so-called "iron curtain" existed only in the imagination of certain writers in the imperialist camp.

93. The Soviet Government had been constantly striving in recent years to reduce international tension and to achieve peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist countries. The statement of Mr. Krushchev on 6 November 1957, which had expressed the will of the entire Soviet people, had made clear the Soviet policy in that respect. The Soviet people were keenly interested in peace and in peaceful coexistence for they knew what war meant. The aim of the Soviet Government's foreign policy was and would continue to be to ensure peace for the Soviet people. It was with that aim that it had, on 20 September 1957, introduced its proposal (A/3673) for the adoption of a declaration on the principles of peaceful coexistence between States. The General Assembly ought to adopt and implement that declaration for that alone would ensure the peace of mankind. The only alternative to peaceful coexistence would be the most destructive war in history. No one, unless he wanted war, could take exception to those principles and many States were in fact already applying them in their mutual relations. His delegation appealed, therefore, to all Members of the United Nations to support the USSR draft resolu-

94. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) said that the two chief aspects of the debate on the item under consideration had been, on the one hand, that not one delegation had expressed opposition to the principle of peaceful coexistence and, on the other, that a number of delegations had expressed doubt concerning the possibility of such coexistence under existing conditions. He would not examine the causes of that doubt. He would only say that it would not disappear until relations between States were based on complete sincerity. That such sincerity was possible was demonstrated by the relations existing between his country and Yugoslavia.

95. Greece was a part of the Western world, even though on certain serious questions it might have to take a position entirely different from that of the Western world. Moreover, it had a free economy. On its northern frontier was Yugoslavia, a country which had never concealed the fact that it was a socialist People's Republic and which did not have a free economy. Nevertheless, in spite of certain disputes in the past, Greece and Yugoslavia were living in friendship and co-operation. Although Yugoslavia had not become bourgeois and Greece had not become socialist, and although neither of them had abandoned its friends, they were living together in a way that was useful both to Yugoslavia and to Greece, and indirectly useful to other countries inasmuch as their relationship constituted an element of stability. That relationship had been achieved in spite of the many differences between the two countries because it was based on sincerity and mutual respect between them.

96. It would be unrealistic to think that the relationship between Yugoslavia and Greece could be immediately duplicated on a world scale. Nevertheless, it could serve as an example of what sincerity and good will could achieve, if not immediately, then in the course of time.

97. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) recalled that early in the session he had expressed the view in a private conversation that the twelfth session of the General Assembly could be described as the session without fear and without hope. He hoped that the item under consideration would prove the second part of his prediction untrue. The First Committee had done well to place the item at the end of its agenda because by adopting a straightforward draft resolution it could contribute

to the elimination of a depressing feeling of hopelessness. The world had reached a crossroads and it had to choose one of two paths: either to continue along the path of the "cold war" with its dangerous implications or to enter a path which would lead it to real understanding, and the international co-operation without which it could not survive.

98. The ideas of "cold war" and peaceful coexistence were not new. For two hundred years, his country, geographically situated between the British and Russian Empires, had suffered both from the "cold war" and the "coexistence" of its two neighbours. In furtherance of its designs against India, Czarist Russia had sought to weaken the central Government of Iran whereas Britain, in order to make it difficult for the Russians to pass through Iran, had opposed every effort on the part of the Iranian Government to modernize the country. The Iranians had hoped that their situation would be improved if the two Powers arrived at an understanding. However, in 1907 the Entente cordiale had resulted in the partition of their country.

99. Whereas in the past the bone of contention between the great Powers had been of a colonial character, today it was ideological. While he considered the current economic and social system in Iran to be better suited to the interests of his people, he did not consider himself entitled to throw stones at others. All that his country asked was that the others should respect its independence and social system just as Iran respected theirs. Such mutual respect had to be true, and sincere. Any act of subversive agitation, even without the use of armed force, should be dealt with as an act of aggression. That was the real meaning of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

100. The painful history of his own country showed that true peaceful coexistence would not be possible unless it was based on specific principles which were accepted and observed by all. He wished to congratulate the delegations of India, Sweden and Yugoslavia on the draft resolution they had proposed (A/C.1/L.198). His delegation would vote for it and he hoped that, in view of its similarity to the original proposal (A/3673) the Soviet representative would also support it and thereby make the vote unanimous.

The meeting rose on Saturday,
14 December, at 2.15 a.m.