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Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 66

**Declaration concerning the peaceful coexistence of
States (A/3673, A/C.1/L.198) (continued)**

1. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) stressed the importance of hearing the views of the small and medium States on the problem under discussion because, as in any democracy, the views of the man in the street must be respected. Moreover, owing to their geographical situation, their economic, political and spiritual background, and the feeling of universality which bound them together, those States were in a position to express a spontaneous and impartial opinion. Many useful points had been made in connexion with the very broad question before the Committee: the USSR representative had presented his case (935th meeting) with moderation and courtesy, indicating a beginning of possible understanding of the complexity of the problem; there were many aspects of the recent letter from Premier Bulganin which should also be taken into account; and the Committee should bear in mind the observations made by the United States representative at the preceding meeting in defence of the economic and political organization of the Western countries.
2. The realistic basis on which a solution of the world situation should be sought was the recognition of the sources of greatest danger. Recent scientific developments, in particular the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile, had basically altered the "nuclear balance" that had existed previously, had provided a supreme weapon with which to establish psychological supremacy, and had intensified fear throughout the world. Although it was evident that the use of such weapons would mean the ultimate destruction of aggressor and victim alike, military theorists were frantically seeking methods of countering surprise attack and of reducing the advantage of the adversary. There was no guarantee that at any given moment there would not be a temptation to employ the super-weapon and to apply the methods of counteracting it. Thus, an extremely dangerous mentality had been created, necessitating a supreme effort to bring about an atmosphere and a psychology of peace.
3. The declaration set forth in the USSR draft resolution (A/3673) was not adequate to cope with the

dangerous situation confronting the world. It did not engender a feeling of security. There was a risk that the very word "coexistence" might lull people into a false sense of security and create the illusion that a remedy had been found. Unless the word was defined, elucidated and placed in the context of the United Nations Charter, and unless it was followed by deeds indicating a decision to work constructively and co-operatively, it would be nothing more than a dangerous hoax. In metaphysics, "existence" applied mainly to inert matter. That was why the Spanish-speaking countries spoke rather of convivencia, a living together in harmony for the achievement of common purposes. Indeed, that was the sense of the Charter: it called upon States to develop friendly relations and to live together in justice and respect for human rights. Those relations were to be dynamic, constantly developing, not sterile or inert, like inanimate matter.

4. There was a distinct contrast between the Soviet declaration and the United Nations Charter which did not show the former in a favourable light. It was illogical for the USSR to assert its adherence to the first of the five principles it had enumerated when all the world knew that it was a great monolithic State which had built an empire by absorbing many peoples and much territory. The statement of the second principle was inadequate: it failed to take account of the injunction in the Charter against the threat as well as the use of force as an instrument of international policy, and therefore, of indirect aggression. The Charter actually created an alliance against aggression, provided collective measures to prevent it and penalties for aggressors. The Soviet Union would have done better to use the language of the Charter; it would be noted that the Latin American States had accepted the principle of non-aggression with all its connotations. The fourth principle enumerated by the USSR referred to equality in law and should not be subject to any conditions; there was no justification for coupling it with the concept of economic or cultural benefit. Finally, the operative paragraph of the draft resolution was inadequate, because the Charter provided the peaceful means by which all disputes were to be settled. Apart from those inadequacies, the Soviet draft resolution contained no assurance that the USSR was prepared to respect and comply with all the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, and in that way, to enhance the authority of the Organization. Moreover, it omitted all reference to human rights; the very word "freedom" was conspicuously absent, notwithstanding the fact that the Charter established an indissoluble link between social progress and a broader concept of freedom. In style, in substance, and in the selection of basic principles, the Soviet declaration was less forthright than the Charter; it was not a departure from it, but a toning-down and mutilation of the precepts established by the Charter. The USSR would have done better to assert without

reservation and with renewed zeal that a solution of the dangerous situation prevailing in the world was contingent on full compliance with the provisions of the Charter, on full implementation of the Purposes and Principles enunciated in it. That was essentially all that was required. Accordingly, the Peruvian delegation could not support the USSR draft resolution. It was prepared to vote for the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198), which it considered to be closer to the Charter.

5. There were a great many obstacles to the restoration of harmonious relations between States, and the Peruvian delegation was not maintaining that the considerations enumerated by the USSR should not be taken into account. The essential need, however, was for a spirit of understanding which would make it possible to appreciate the obstacles. In his view, the principal obstacle to understanding had been the change in Soviet values: the goal of social justice, which had been the objective of the Soviet revolution, had given way to the goal of creating the invincible State. Originally, the revolution had recognized the need for a powerful State as a means of achieving social justice inside the country and ensuring its security against outside forces. The means had now been substituted for the end. While it remained true that the Soviet Union had a right to defend its security, there had been a drastic change of emphasis: its energies had been directed to building an empire, an omnipotent military State, rather than to establishing social justice and human rights for all its citizens. The difficulty arose not because the Soviet Union was a socialist State, but because it was not socialist enough. There was no longer any question of dividing the world into spheres of influence; the Soviet Union had assured the world that the purpose of the meeting it proposed between the statesmen of East and West would be to seek understanding and means of achieving peace; but deeds, not words, were needed.

6. The Soviet Union should ponder the immense advantages of the elimination of armaments to the man in the street in a socialist State. It should abandon some of its political and military supremacy in favour of greater social justice. As a first essential step, it should negotiate on the armaments question. Irrespective of the membership of the negotiating body, it should be prepared to settle points on which agreement in principle had already been reached. On the others, it should negotiate. If the Soviet Union decided to negotiate in a business-like manner, with all its cards on the table, and to agree on specific measures such as the closing-down of nuclear plants in both the USSR and the United States, it would be responding to the overwhelming desire of people everywhere, including the people of the USSR itself. Obviously, the General Assembly could not force that decision on the Soviet Union by a resolution; it could, however, by giving expression to the views of the small States, point out the direction, the right direction, towards the solution so urgently needed.

7. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) said that although the question under discussion had been included in the agenda by an almost unanimous recommendation of the General Committee, it was inevitable that the approaches to it should differ in view of the difference in political régime, economic situation, historical background and aspirations of the States represented

in the United Nations. The debate would naturally bring into relief the divergent positions, but that did not matter much so long as all were united in a desire to work towards the implementation of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. While an emotional approach to some problems which came before the General Assembly was inevitable, an integrated approach to the world situation had become essential. The United Nations was still discussing the survival of the human race; it had been dealing with that basic problem when it had debated disarmament and it was now considering another aspect of the same problem: the factors operating against peaceful relations. For even if a measure of disarmament could be obtained, there would be no peace unless States decided to live in harmony and in the conditions laid down in the draft resolution which India had co-sponsored (A/C.1/L.198).

8. The Indian delegation had been gratified by the tenor of the remarks made by both the representative of the Soviet Union (935th meeting) and the representative of the United States (936th meeting). Mr. Kuznetsov's intervention had been very different in tone from the memorandum accompanying the USSR draft resolution (A/3673); it had contained fewer controversial points than usual and had indicated an effort to approach the problem with greater tolerance. The Government of India was primarily concerned that States should find ways of conducting their relations with mutual tolerance. Indeed, the Committee was discussing how to extend to the international field the democratic conditions of tolerance imposed by necessity on all human communities.

9. India attached no great importance to the number of principles of peaceful relations enumerated in various resolutions. It would note, however, that many States on various occasions had subscribed to the principles mentioned in the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198). The United States, for example, had proposed to Japan, even before the Second World War ended, a declaration of policy which was to include the inviolability of territorial integrity and the sovereignty of all nations, non-intervention in internal affairs, equality between States including commercial equality and treatment, and reliance on international co-operation for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Peruvian representative had said that it would suffice to let the Charter of the United Nations speak; yet the Charter of the Organization of American States signed at Bogotá included precisely the concepts of non-aggression, economic co-operation, and non-intervention. Indeed, some twenty countries of Asia, Africa, Europe and America were direct signatories of declarations containing the five principles which the Peruvian representative had described as inadequate. Friendly co-operation and peaceful coexistence irrespective of political or social structure had been specifically mentioned in the joint statement of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union issued on the occasion of the visit of Premier Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev to London. The United Kingdom had again subscribed to those principles through its Ambassador to India. The United States Ambassador to India in 1955 had also expressed adherence to them. Finally, Mr. Gromyko had stated them in the General Assembly (681st plenary meeting), and they were embodied in the Soviet draft resolution (A/3673).

10. India claimed a monopoly of those concepts:

they constituted a purely pragmatic approach to the world problem. The Indian delegation had no intention of prescribing what was good for other countries. In view of the fact, however, that India had succeeded in establishing good relations with countries with very divergent systems on the basis of mutual respect and observance of the other precepts mentioned in the joint draft resolution, it hoped that its approach would find favour; it sought to take account of the views expressed in the Committee by formulating those principles in a somewhat different way from the USSR delegation. In the course of conversations with Soviet statesmen, during a recent visit to Moscow, Mr. Nehru had expressed fears regarding the imposition of ideologies on others; as a result, the reference to non-intervention had been changed to non-interference in each other's internal affairs for any reason of an economic, political or ideological nature. Incidentally, the Prime Minister of Pakistan had recognized the improvement in the wording.

11. It was clear that there was a general desire to implement the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and the five principles *inter alia*. India had no intention of rewriting the Charter or restricting its provisions, as would be seen from the reference to the Charter in the joint draft resolution. It agreed with both the Soviet Union and the United States that a declaration of principles was not enough, that it must be followed by deeds. On the other hand, even deeds were not enough, because if they were to be performed properly or understood properly, they must be approached in the right way. The reiteration of an approach to the world problem had great value; it did not mean that the Charter was not an adequate instrument. India's relations within the British Commonwealth and its economic relations had been based on the approach outlined in the joint draft resolution. Wherever progress had been made—in Indo-China, in Korea, in Trieste, to cite only a few examples—it had been based on negotiation and friendly relations. A notable example of such relations were those between India and Communist China, with which it had a common border of more than 3,000 miles.

12. As the General Assembly reached the end of its session, and especially in view of recent developments, if all States could come together in unanimous support of a common declaration of policy, they would be doing much to reduce tension and restore confidence. It was true that no declaration or resolution would solve all problems, but neither had the Charter done so. The existence of the problems made a new approach to them all the more essential. Especially in a world divided into two armed camps and caught in a deadlock caused by mistrust, it was important to show the way towards solutions. The General Assembly's unanimous support of the joint draft resolution would be an inspiration to all countries to develop good relations and would thus enhance faith in the United Nations.

13. The joint draft resolution did not mention "co-existence", but it went further than mere coexistence; its approach was more positive. India could not subscribe to any resolution containing a judgement of the conduct of specific countries. It was gratified to find the five principles enumerated in the USSR text and it hoped that the Soviet delegation would not misunderstand its motives in submitting an alternative

text which seemed more likely to secure wide support. The Indian delegation requested that the joint draft resolution be given priority in the voting.

14. Mr. NAJIB-ULLAH (Afghanistan) said that he supported whole-heartedly the ideas underlying the Soviet draft resolution (A/3673) and the draft resolution submitted by India, Sweden and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.198). The principles stressed in those documents had always been the basis of Afghan foreign policy. That was why Afghanistan had always found it easy to adhere to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter and had spontaneously supported the resolutions approved at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Their belief in those principles had also enabled Afghans to defend the freedom and promote the development of their country and to maintain friendly relations with their neighbours.

15. While the ideas contained in the two texts before the Committee were essentially the same, the Afghan delegation felt that the joint draft resolution might be more generally acceptable. Its adoption would greatly improve the international atmosphere and thus help to bring about the solution of many problems that were pending. It was a matter of the utmost importance, however, that the draft resolution should be adopted unanimously.

16. In conclusion, he wished to express his delegation's appreciation of the encouraging and conciliatory suggestions made by the representatives of the Soviet Union (935th meeting) and the United States (936th meeting). Such statements augured well for the future and showed the readiness of the two Governments to seek some means of reconciling their views.

17. Mr. NASE (Albania) said that the peaceful co-existence of States was one of the most important and urgent problems of modern times, for it involved the fundamental principles on which relations between States must be based if peace was to be maintained. The existing international situation, characterized by the arms race, the existence of hostile military blocs, the policies of "cold war" and positions of strength pursued by the Western Powers, the intervention of those Powers in the domestic affairs of sovereign States, and their intrigues against the peoples struggling for independence, was inherently unstable and presented the world with only two choices: either to establish normal relations between States regardless of their social systems or to allow the continued deterioration in international relations to culminate in a new world conflagration.

18. The experience of history showed that the division of Europe into hostile military groups increased rather than diminished the danger of war, and that theories intended to prove that increases in military power would constitute an additional safeguard for peace were merely intended to mask preparations for war. The peoples of the world realized the danger of war but were convinced that it was not inevitable, and continued to hope that the United Nations would make a serious contribution to the task of avoiding it.

19. The socialist countries had always maintained their desire to establish normal and co-operative relations with other States. From the first day of its existence, the Soviet Union had made the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between it and the capitalist countries one of the bases of its foreign

policy. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had not only reaffirmed that principle but had shown that it was objectively possible to avoid war. The Soviet Union had spared no effort to achieve a solution of the problem of disarmament, which was the key to peace, and if no agreement had yet been reached that was certainly due not to the Soviet Union but to the refusal of the Western Powers to give up their policy of strength.

20. The Albanian people, which was devoting all its energies to the peaceful development of its country and the construction of socialism, wished to live in peace and friendship with all the peoples of the world. The relations of Albania with the other socialist countries were based on fraternity, equality, mutual respect, co-operation and mutual assistance. In pursuit of that policy, his Government had systematically supported every move designed to achieve a wider measure of understanding between States and to relax international tension. Since 1951, a law on the defence of peace had been in effect in Albania; it encouraged action in behalf of peace and punished war propaganda or the instigation of hatred between nations. His Government had established neighbourly and co-operative diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with a number of countries, and was prepared to establish similar relations with all countries. In spite of its peaceful policy however, certain Western Powers, particularly the United States, had adopted a hostile attitude towards Albania simply because they did not like its form of government. The ruling circles of the United States had repeatedly attempted to interfere in his country's domestic affairs and to overthrow the People's Government and restore the old feudal and capitalistic system. It was to be deplored that the United States had not yet abandoned that policy, which was doomed to failure. The Albanian people made no attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of the United States or to pass judgement on the freedom enjoyed by the American people; it therefore had a right to demand that the United States should refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of Albania.

21. The wholly peaceful policy of the socialist States was determined by their very nature, for peaceful relations served the vital interests of those States and were an indispensable prerequisite of their development; there were no classes or groups which could profit from a war. Unfortunately, the Western capitalist countries had for forty years been engaged in an attempt to destroy the socialist countries and still maintained their aggressive policies. Frightened by the disintegration of the colonial system, the imperialist Powers were attempting to perpetuate their domination over Asian and African countries by every means at their command. In Europe, the policy of the United States and its allies had led to the restoration of German militarism and to the equipment of the armed forces of Western Germany with atomic weapons, thus creating a serious threat to peace and increasing the obstacles to the unification of Germany as a democratic and peace-loving State. In order to justify their vast military expenditure, the Western Powers contended that it was necessary to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, and had availed themselves of every opportunity, even the launching of the Soviet satellite, to inflate their war budgets. But in spite of all their efforts they

had never been able to dictate conditions for negotiation to the Soviet Union, and never would.

22. The time had come for the Western Powers to realize that, under the existing conditions, war could no longer serve as a means for the settlement of international problems, and that the only way to free the world from the spectre of atomic war was to adopt the policy of peaceful coexistence. The question which was better, the capitalist or the socialist system, must be settled by peaceful competition and not by war. The five principles of peaceful coexistence had already been adopted by many States, and experience had shown that their implementation helped to relax international tension and to safeguard peace.

23. The recent proposal by Mr. Khrushchev for a high-level meeting of representatives of the socialist and capitalist countries had been welcomed by all peace-loving countries, which hoped that such a meeting might constitute an important step towards an agreement among the great Powers.

24. His delegation was convinced that the adoption by all Member States of the principle of peaceful coexistence would best enable them to meet their obligations under the Charter and would make it possible for them to resolve outstanding international problems by negotiation. The adoption by the General Assembly of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/3673) would serve that cause; his delegation would vote in favour of that text.

25. Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France), exercising his right of reply, said that an allusion had been made to the Algerian question in terms which implied that it constituted an obstacle to peaceful coexistence. He agreed that there could be no peaceful coexistence as long as certain States continued their attempts to distort the purpose of the United Nations, and to use the Organization as a propaganda centre for attacking the constitutions and frontiers of other States, or continued to intervene in the domestic affairs of other States.

26. For more than thirty years the slogan of peaceful coexistence had been one of the favourite themes of communist propaganda, but no impartial observer could deny the contradiction between that slogan and the deeds of the Soviet Union, such as its intervention in Hungary and its constant resort to threats. The same contradiction appeared in the manner of presentation of the Soviet draft resolution, for in its explanatory memorandum (A/3673), the Soviet Union, instead of adopting a conciliatory tone, accused the Western Powers of every possible crime against peace.

27. What the Soviet Union really meant by the principle of peaceful coexistence could be deduced from its actions and official statements. The Soviet Government was now attempting to identify the principle of peaceful coexistence with Leninism; unfortunately, however, Lenin never appeared to have discussed the subject except to say that the existence of the Soviet Union side by side with the imperialist States over a long period of time was unthinkable, and that one or the other must finally triumph. The concept of peaceful coexistence had in fact first been defined by Stalin, who had never ceased to praise the idea while simultaneously carrying out a continuous policy of annexation and conquest. The special meaning thus given to

the idea had never been repudiated by Stalin's successors, and recent events furnished grounds for thinking that that meaning had not changed.

28. It was possible that the Soviet leaders now wished to recognize a *de facto* situation which was due simply to the balance between the opposing forces and the will of the Western Powers to defend themselves. His delegation hoped that the Soviet Union sincerely desired the maintenance of that state of equilibrium. Nevertheless, it would be desirable for the Soviet Union specifically to renounce the Stalinist idea that only imperialistic wars were bad; specifically to condemn local limited wars as well as the direct risk of a world conflict, and in particular, to repudiate the aggression committed by North Korea in 1950, which the Soviet Union had fully supported while proclaiming itself the champion of peaceful coexistence. But, far from being prepared to admit that Powers with different ideas could exist side by side with the Soviet bloc, the communist leaders had again proclaimed only recently that peaceful coexistence between the two systems was but an intermediate stage which would end with the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, with the disappearance of the free world.

29. It might be hoped that the Soviet Union, while maintaining its belief that the disappearance of the free world was inevitable, would concede that it was possible to wait for that eventuality in peace. But Mr. Khrushchev himself had stated that communist support of the concept of peaceful coexistence did not imply a relaxation of the struggle against the survival of capitalism in the consciousness of mankind. It was well known that in its bitter struggle against democratic Governments, the Communist Party considered all means of combat legitimate. Whenever the Soviet Union felt that its interests were endangered, the principles of non-aggression and non-intervention were replaced by a policy of intervention. It was difficult to imagine the establishment of the system of European security proposed by the Soviet Union or the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression when the idea of aggression had not the same meaning in the Soviet Union that it had in the West. The attempts of the Soviet Union to modify the foreign policies of other States by the use of threats could not be regarded as being in conformity with the principle of peaceful coexistence.

30. Although the Soviet representative's statement on the subject of peaceful coexistence (935th meeting) contained nothing genuinely new, the French delegation had noted with satisfaction the reference to the development of economic, commercial and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and various European countries. It hoped that the Soviet Government would take the measures necessary to allow such exchanges, and particularly cultural exchanges, to take place in the atmosphere of freedom and confidence which was indispensable and which had thus far been singularly lacking.

31. With regard to the political proposals made by the Soviet representative, more especially the disarmament proposals, the French delegation considered that the obstacles to agreement could be reduced only if a change in the Soviet attitude made it possible to resume the discussions in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

32. France had no objection to the repetition in a

General Assembly resolution of certain principles already embodied in the Charter, but such a resolution would be valuable only if it could be adopted unanimously. That did not seem to be the case with the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/3673), whose emphasis on ideological, political and economic struggle should be replaced by the more lofty and just concept of international co-operation, based not on fanaticism but on tolerance. His delegation believed that the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.198) had been drawn up in that spirit of international conciliation and co-operation, and would therefore support it.

33. Mr. FAWZI (Egypt) said that the changes which the world had undergone since the signing of the United Nations Charter had made it more and more imperative that States should renounce war as an instrument of national policy. As the result of scientific developments, the world now stood on the threshold of an era of plenty, but it was also very easy to bring about the complete destruction of mankind. All should therefore be made to realize that the choice before the world was not one of war or peaceful coexistence but one of war or survival.

34. Since the creation of the United Nations, many countries had derived considerable benefit from technical assistance. Unfortunately, there had been some distortion of the concept of economic aid, which certain States had tried to use as a means of acquiring domination over others. Such an attitude was, of course, inadmissible; assistance should never have any objectives other than those stipulated in the Charter.

35. There had been some similar distortion of ideas in the matter of the supply and control of arms. The provision of weapons should serve only one purpose: to help the recipient countries to defend themselves against aggression; it should never be used as a device for acquiring direct or indirect domination. As far as disarmament was concerned, the record of the United Nations was sadly disappointing. Many who had watched the disarmament discussions had felt that the delegations participating in them had not shown a sufficient willingness to negotiate. It was to be hoped that a new, more imaginative and daring approach would be made and positive results obtained. It was important that an end should be put to experiments with nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, which played havoc with the health, life and sense of security of all mankind.

36. The United Nations should strive to ensure collective security on the broad and world-wide basis envisaged in the Charter. Much less emphasis should be placed on the subsidiary arrangements, which had thus far hindered rather than furthered the cause of peace. In discussing the question of peaceful coexistence, an important point to bear in mind was that no great satisfaction could be derived from the fact that the world was not actually at war. Many situations, though ostensibly peaceful, remained intolerable. Some States still tried to dominate others or to interfere in their affairs in various ways and under various guises. Furthermore, many countries were subjected to incessant pressure and accusations only because they were determined not to belong to any group and preferred to maintain friendly relations with all. The damage caused by those who had created those situations was immense and could only be remedied if all States displayed a respect for sove-

reignty and mutual trust. If they did that, the countries of the world could live in the manner envisaged in the Charter and in the resolutions of the Bandung Conference.

37. Peaceful coexistence was not, as some tended to suggest, a problem affecting only the great Powers. The disturbed condition of the world could be largely attributed to the strained relations between great Powers and smaller countries. All countries were therefore in duty bound to build up the store of good will necessary to the peaceful survival of the world.

38. The draft resolution submitted by India, Sweden and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.198), and the USSR draft resolution (A/3673) concerning the peaceful coexistence of States were both commendable attempts to ensure better relations between nations and stricter adherence to the Charter. The Egyptian delegation would support the joint draft resolution and hoped that it would receive the unanimous support of the General Assembly.

39. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania) said that it might be profitable to assess the positive results already achieved by countries whose foreign policy was inspired by the cardinal principles of peaceful coexistence. Such an appraisal might be particularly useful after the meaningful speeches of the representatives of Finland and Burma (935th meeting) regarding the relationship between their countries and the two socialist States on which they bordered. Peaceful coexistence had ceased to be a theoretical dogma and had become a contemporary reality, deeply rooted in the everyday life of half of mankind. It was still endangered, however, by the fact that its principles were not observed by all countries and that some States even rejected them outright.

40. Peaceful coexistence was still an issue in the United Nations mainly because there was a lack of balanced judgement and an inertia in political thinking. There was now a world-wide system of socialist States, encompassing over one-third of the world's population. Moreover, new independent States had emerged in Asia and Africa to play an extremely important role in international affairs. Those new political and social phenomena had to be accepted.

41. Those who adopted a negative attitude seemed unable to understand that mankind had reached the logical limit in military technology. The Earth had become too small for the new weapons of the atomic age and there were already sufficient weapons of mass destruction to annihilate life and human civilization. It therefore seemed pointless to embark on new efforts to increase the number of those weapons or to discover other fiendish devices.

42. Confronted with new developments, the world must adopt a realistic approach. All differences between States should be resolved not through force but through peaceful settlement. The conscience of mankind was opposed to a new war and to the use of force for the settlement of international differences. The peace-loving States which upheld that view had grown immeasurably stronger, and all reasonable and responsible persons realized that there could only be one solution. The comprehensive programme for peace outlined in Premier Bulganin's letter of 10 December 1957 showed an awareness of current problems and constituted a basis for peaceful nego-

tiation, which had always been advocated by the Soviet Union and the other socialist States, just as it was the only method of settling international differences envisaged by the Bandung Conference. Unfortunately, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still adhered to their old belief in the value of military blocs, apparently failing to realize the absurdity of the "guns instead of butter" formula.

43. Those who consistently thought in military terms and were always assessing the number and quality of the weapons possessed by their supposed enemy could be won over to the cause of peaceful coexistence only if they changed their outlook. The principles of peaceful coexistence derived directly from the United Nations Charter, and opponents of those principles merely demonstrated their unwillingness to accept that document. The Charter had been drafted in the belief that States with different social and political systems could and must exist side by side. The opponents of peaceful coexistence, however, rejected that idea on the ground that it was "propaganda". They failed to realize that mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and equality were principles to which all Member States should necessarily adhere.

44. It could easily be shown that the only vicious propaganda in recent years had been that designed to vindicate aggression, the infringement of the sovereignty of States and interference in their internal affairs. The Romanian delegation would not, however, resort to recriminations, since it was more important at the current time to draw attention to the best means of safeguarding the common interests of all States. The arms race should be replaced by competition in the economic, technical and scientific fields. Any system which insisted that it could only compete in the manufacture of the most destructive weapons, while remaining deaf to the appeal for competition in the field of trade and food production, clearly acknowledged that its day was over. Romania fervently believed in competition in such matters as the production of material goods, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, education and art, and the construction of houses, schools and theatres. It also believed in the development of international co-operation through trade and cultural exchanges, personal contacts between the Heads of States and visits by delegations of scientists, engineers and artists. In that connexion, it welcomed the fact that, despite the continuing difficulties, contacts between the East and West were becoming much more frequent.

45. In its belief in peaceful coexistence, the Romanian Government had initiated diplomatic negotiations for the settlement of outstanding issues with Greece, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States and had broadened its diplomatic relations with many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. It had also recently proposed to all the Balkan States the calling of a conference to consider means of strengthening peace in the Balkans. It had proposed to the Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Albanian Governments the conclusion of a collective agreement based on complete equality of rights, mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. In the field of trade, Romania had concluded inter-governmental agreements with thirty-two countries and had widened its commercial relations with sixty-

eight countries. The Romanian Government had also arranged several exchange visits and had organized international medical and engineering congresses.

46. In conclusion, he hoped that the draft resolution concerning the peaceful coexistence of States sub-

mitted by the Soviet Union would be duly adopted, since that would have a favourable influence on the international climate and contribute to the relaxation of tension.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.