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Chairman: Mr. Djatal ABDUH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 58

**The Cyprus question (A/3616 and Add.1, A/C.1/803,
A/C.1/L.197) (continued)**

1. Mr. GUNWARDENE (Ceylon) said that at the current stage of the discussion of the Cyprus question, it was unnecessary to go into the question of atrocities on the one side or repressions on the other side. Terrorism was only a manifestation of frustration and desperation; repression was an answer to terrorism, a desperate effort to bring about law and order by the administering country.

2. As the problem of Cyprus, in most of its facets closely paralleled the problems that had faced Ceylon before it had gained its independence, he would draw analogies where applicable in the hope of contributing in some small measure to the peaceful solution of the question of Cyprus with, he hoped, the same happy results as in the case of Ceylon.

3. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples endorsed in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, in the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights^{1/} and in various resolutions of the General Assembly had been consistently recognized and applied by the United Kingdom Government wherever the question of the independence of non-self-governing people had arisen in the past. The fact that countries such as India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana and the Federation of Malaya were now fully independent and sovereign nations provided eloquent testimony of the United Kingdom position. Similarly, it was to be hoped that Nigeria and the proposed federation of the West Indies would within a short time become independent and sovereign countries within the Commonwealth.

4. Cyprus was, in constitutional law, what had been described as a crown colony. That had also been the status of all the countries just mentioned before they had become independent. He could not see how the fundamental basis of British colonial policy through the years could in any way be regarded as contrary to or inconsistent with the universally recognized principle of the right of self-determination of peoples. If his interpretation of British policy was correct, there could be no reason why the people of Cyprus should not eventually determine their own future, as the

^{1/} Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 7, annex I B.

people of Ceylon had been given the opportunity to do in 1948.

5. In the view of his delegation, the two parties to the problem under consideration were the Government of the United Kingdom and the people of Cyprus. There was no justification whatsoever, by reason of history or logic or even of expediency, for complicating the problem by introducing, or seeking to introduce, the views of parties other than the people of Cyprus itself.

6. It was true that the population of Cyprus consisted of two ethnic groups, namely, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and also that the Turkish Cypriots had raised objections in regard to possible dangers that might arise from permitting the principle of self-determination to be applied to the territory. But whether the parties were Greek or Turkish Cypriots, they were, above all, Cypriots, people of the island of Cyprus.

7. In Ceylon, in 1948, there had been approximately 1 million citizens of Indian origin, out of a total population of 8.5 million. Fortunately the Government of India had not taken a position similar to that now being taken by the Government of Turkey nor had the United Kingdom Government sought the views of the Government of India regarding the question of the Indian minority in Ceylon as it now seemed to have done in seeking the views of the Government of Turkey on the future of Cyprus. The question of the Indian minority in Ceylon had been taken into consideration by the Royal Commission on Constitutional Reform which had visited Ceylon for the purpose of advising the United Kingdom Government. He was certain that the position of the Turkish Cypriots would be taken into consideration in a similar way and that adequate constitutional protection would be given to them if they decided to remain Cypriot citizens in any democratic arrangement for the future of Cyprus.

8. The problem of minorities was not new. Indeed there was not a country which at some time in its historical evolution had not been faced with problems of minorities, but all those problems had been satisfactorily overcome with patience, with understanding, and with the recognition of the rights of minorities. The United Kingdom Government had successfully overcome the problem of minorities in all the former crown colonies which were now independent countries.

9. In Ceylon a similar minority problem had arisen and the minority had expressed a claim to autonomy because it feared that the granting of self-determination to Ceylon might result in a swamping of their rights by the majority race. With characteristic statesmanship, the United Kingdom Government had sent a Royal Commission to Ceylon to examine the problem and, as a result of the unanimous recommendation of that Commission, Ceylon had become a sovereign

independent State in February 1948 with a unitary constitution guaranteeing all rights and freedoms to all the minorities, whether racial or religious. If, instead, the country had been divided into two racial units, the consequences would have been detrimental to all the parties concerned.

10. If, in Cyprus, the solution of the question was based on a recognition of the existence of two separate units, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, the inevitable and logical conclusion would be that Cyprus, small as it was, would have to be divided, a course of action which would harm not only the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots but also the neighbours of Cyprus who had a legitimate interest in the area, and to whom a prosperous, united and satisfied Cyprus was of supreme importance.

11. The world was currently struggling with the problem of three territories artificially divided by political action: Germany, Korea, and Viet-Nam. The United Nations should not in any way contribute to the creation of a fourth territory artificially divided in the same way. The United Nations was based on the ideals of unity and reconciliation. Accordingly, the only correct, proper and just way to approach the so-called problem of the minority in Cyprus was to consider the inhabitants of Cyprus as Cypriots rather than as Greek or Turkish Cypriots. Any negotiations, therefore, must be bilateral negotiations between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Cypriot people.

12. It had been suggested that, because of the proximity of the island of Cyprus to the territory of Turkey, it was in the strategic and other interests of Turkey to maintain the status quo. If the contention that the people of Cyprus were Cypriots and not Greek or Turkish was valid, then the interest of Turkey in the matter could not be such as to prevent the execution of an otherwise reasonable and logical process of constitutional development. It was difficult to see on what basis either Turkey or Greece should regard themselves, or be regarded by others, as interested Powers. Some islands governed by Greece were very much closer geographically to the Turkish mainland than was Cyprus. The argument of proximity to Turkey was also not convincing because it nullified the concept of common frontiers.

13. From the strategic point of view, it was difficult to understand why either Greece or Turkey should see any danger to their territorial integrity or to their physical safety if the people of Cyprus were permitted to determine their future as they wished. The first consideration from a strategic point of view should be the loyalty of the people of the territory.

14. While, when violence prevailed, firm measures must be taken to restore law and order, police action and harsh legislation could not effectively stifle movements springing from the souls of the people. He urged the United Kingdom Government to withdraw any repressive measures still in effect and to declare a political amnesty as proof of its sincerity and good will. In view of the comparative tranquillity currently prevailing in Cyprus, it would be tragic if the United Kingdom Government and the leaders of the Cypriot people failed to seize the opportunity of entering into negotiations with a view to finding a just and lasting solution. The new Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, had, from all reports, begun his tenure of office in an atmosphere of co-operation and understanding. The

next logical step should be for Sir Hugh Foot to recommend the desirability of appointing a royal commission to decide the future of Cyprus, having regard to the views and the desires of the people of Cyprus. Such a commission would certainly realize, as a similar commission had done in Ceylon, that to apply the principle of self-determination separately to the majority and the minority would be disastrous to everyone from every point of view. To partition an island territory as small as Cyprus on a misinterpretation of the term "self-determination" would be not only to create further problems but also to constitute a permanent cause of friction between Greece and Turkey.

15. The Commonwealth of Nations was an institution which was unique. In view of British statesmanship through the years, he expressed the hope that Cyprus might follow the path of Ceylon, an island which was similarly placed, which had similar minority problems and which was of similar strategic importance. The people of Cyprus, whether Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots, should be given the right to determine their own future and then to associate themselves with any Power or group of Powers they wished to. British statesmanship could hardly continue the state of uncertainty currently existing in Cyprus.

16. He urged the United Kingdom Government without delay to co-operate with the people of Cyprus in achieving a basis of understanding that would commend itself to the two parties and to the United Nations.

17. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) noted that at the preceding meeting he had replied briefly to a few specific points raised by the Turkish representative. He now wished to show that the arguments of the Turkish representative were unfounded, but in so doing he would refrain from making any personal attacks.

18. In answer to the repeated threats that had been made, he wished to state officially that the Greek Government was prepared to face the consequences of its policy because it was championing a just cause exclusively through peaceful means. Regardless of what others had done, Greece had never given offence or harmed anyone. It sought friendly relations with both the United Kingdom and Turkey and was willing to make great sacrifices to maintain its friendship with those two nations. The Greeks could not, however, agree to betray their Cypriot brothers, to agree that an 18 per cent minority of the population should determine the fate of the 80 per cent majority or to allow the people of Cyprus to live forever under colonial rule.

19. He wished to make it clear that the great sacrifices Greece had made in the cause of freedom from 1940 to 1949 had never been invoked to justify the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. After sacrificing almost one-tenth of its population in the cause of freedom, the Greek people had the right to request freedom for the people of Cyprus.

20. In reply to the astonishing accusation that the Greek delegation had collaborated with Archbishop Makarios or that the Greek Government had used or been used by him, he stated that in dealing with an important colonial question on behalf of 80 per cent of the people of Cyprus it was natural that the Greek Government should consult with the representative of that majority without having its action questioned or misinterpreted.

21. The Turkish representative had propounded an original and novel thesis: the complete elimination of the universally recognized concept of majority and minority. In Cyprus, according to the Turkish thesis, the 80 per cent majority of the population was not a majority but merely a community, of Greeks. Similarly, the minority of 18 per cent was not a minority; it was a community, of Turks. Those two communities were to enjoy full equality with each other. That thesis, if universally applied, would enable minorities to separate themselves at will from the rest of the nation to which they belonged. The novel Turkish doctrine would not apply to independent States but would, at least for the time being, affect only Non-Self-Governing Territories. While professing his country's liberalism and anti-colonialism, the Turkish representative had in fact restated the colonial maxim "divide and rule". In his attempt to recognize the right of self-determination of minorities, he had invoked Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, which related to colonial administration rather than to the right of self-determination. Two distinct questions were involved and, as the Turkish representative was well aware, colonial questions involving the application of Article 73 were referred to the Fourth Committee, while problems relating to the right of self-determination, political problems par excellence, were dealt with by the First Committee.

22. Article 73 was not applicable in the case under consideration because the people of Cyprus believed that they were ready for independence and wished to exercise their right of self-determination. There was, however, nothing in the Charter to justify the thesis that minorities enjoyed the right of self-determination. In the debate on the Algerian question, for example, France had never claimed that the European minority in that country had, as a minority, the right of self-determination.

23. Article 73 b of the Charter, which the Turkish representative had invoked, related to the obligations of the Administering Power but had nothing to do with the right of self-determination. He recalled that in the case of Togoland under British administration, a plebiscite had been held and that, in accordance with normal democratic processes, the will of the majority had prevailed over the will of the minority. It was therefore clear that Article 73 was not relevant to the question under consideration.

24. The question of the hostility between Greek and Turks in Cyprus, which had been raised by several speakers, was important and required a brief analysis. That hostility had been deliberately manufactured by the colonial administration in order to sow discord between Greeks and Turks; for more than 300 years before that time the population of the island had lived in peace, friendship and understanding. The colonial authorities had drawn almost exclusively upon the least desirable elements of the Turkish population in organizing their instrument of repression in Cyprus, the so-called auxiliary police, whose activities were a disgrace to the Administration. A large number of the torturers used against the population of Cyprus had been members of the Turkish minority. A file containing detailed reports on the matter was in his possession and would be made available to any representatives who wished to examine it.

25. In pursuing that policy, the colonial administration

had been guilty of a real crime, for to transform a small minority into an instrument of aggression against the overwhelming majority of the population was to attack the unity and harmony of the people of Cyprus. But the colonial Administration had gone even further. It was significant that although the struggle in Cyprus had gone on for more than two years, only Greek houses and shops had been burned; not a single Turkish house or shop had been burned. Moreover, it had been reported in the Press only a few days ago that a new Turkish organization had threatened to assassinate Archbishop Makarios if he returned to Cyprus. Such attempts to set the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus against each other were a direct threat to world peace. His delegation hoped that the United Kingdom Government would take action to put an end to those dangerous machinations. The United Nations must also do its duty before it was too late.

26. The Turkish representative had gone to great lengths to prove that there were people in both Greece and Cyprus who desired enosis (union with Greece)—a fact which no one denied. The representative of Greece asked whether there were not also people in Turkey who proclaimed that Cyprus was Turkish. Whether or not there were supporters of enosis in Greece, his Government had stated, and wished to state once more, that it solemnly undertook to respect the decision of the people of Cyprus, whatever that decision might be, and to regard it as a final settlement of the question. Instead of making the same declaration, which was the only one in conformity with genuinely democratic principles and with the Charter, the Turkish representative had stated that the Turkish minority, which made up 18 per cent of the population, would not accept the decision of 80 per cent of the population, and had attempted to prove, with the help of sophistries, that the Turkish minority was not a minority but a community, and so on.

27. The Turkish representative had also referred to the case of Trieste to show that partition was a solution that could be applied to Cyprus. In the case of Trieste partition had been practicable because the two populations occupied distinct parts of the territory. But to claim that such a solution could be applied to Cyprus, where the Turkish minority was wholly intermingled with the overwhelming Greek majority, and where there was not a single district, however small, with a Turkish majority, would be to demonstrate a lack of realism and a political naïveté which Turkish statesmen certainly did not possess.

28. The Turkish representative, speaking of the alleged recrudescence of violence in Cyprus, had said that three Turkish Cypriots had been found murdered near Paphos, and that they had been the victims of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). However, the British-controlled Cyprus radio had just announced that two Turkish Cypriots had been arrested on the charge that they had perpetrated the triple murder in question. In that case, as in the others mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, an attempt had been made to create a false impression for propaganda purposes.

29. The Turkish representative had said that the Treaty of Lausanne ^{2/} had established a balance between conflicting territorial claims and that no destruction of

^{2/} Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, 1924, p. 11.

the balance established by that Treaty would be acceptable to his Government. But the Turkish Government's attitude towards the alteration of that balance had not always been the same; for example, it had had no scruples about altering the balance when it had annexed the Sanjak of Alexandretta—and that in spite of the fact that the territory contained nine different ethnic groups and that only 39 per cent of its population was Turkish. Obviously, therefore, the position of Turkey with regard to maintaining the balance established by the Treaty of Lausanne was determined in accordance with a double standard.

30. In seeking to attribute to the General Assembly the intention—which it had certainly never had—that the Turkish Government should be considered a party to the negotiations, the Turkish representative had expressed doubt as to who the experts were on whose opinion the Greek Government had based its view that negotiations should take place between the United Kingdom Government and the people of Cyprus. Those experts had been, first of all, the author of resolution 1013 (XI) itself, Mr. Krishna Menon, the head of the Indian delegation, and the heads of the delegations of Bolivia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ecuador and Yugoslavia, who had expressed the same opinion in explaining their votes.^{3/} That view had in fact been generally accepted, as could be seen from its endorsement by another expert, the United Kingdom Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Home, in a speech in the House of Lords on 27 February 1957.

31. He had replied immediately to the statement by the United Kingdom representative because it had contained some observations which could not remain unanswered. For the rest, the statement bore witness to the divergence of views between the two Governments; those views had already been expressed and needed no repetition. However, in a particularly constructive passage the United Kingdom representative had spoken of "a clear statement on the principle of self-determination". If, in that context, the word "self-determination" must be taken to mean what it usually meant, his Government was prepared to co-operate, and he was convinced that the Cypriots themselves would be prepared to co-operate. No one, either in Greece or Cyprus, and certainly not the Greek Government, had refused to agree to the idea of a period of self-government before the application of the principle of self-determination. Regarded as discussions for the purpose of establishing a form of self-government which would make it possible to apply the principle of self-determination in a democratic manner, negotiations would be desirable and constructive, and his Government was prepared to do everything in its power to ensure their success. The subject of those negotiations should be the form and duration of that self-government, and the guarantees necessary for the full attainment of all the objectives desired. The draft resolution submitted by his Government (A/C.1/L.197) would facilitate that task of conciliation, for it disposed of the question of principle, which was the fundamental difficulty, while leaving the details of the solution to be settled by negotiation. That was why his Government believed that the Committee should support its draft resolution. Those were its intentions, and if the passage he had quoted from Mr. Noble's speech showed that they were also the United Kingdom's intentions he

^{3/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, First Committee, 856th meeting.

believed that a sound and satisfactory solution of the Cyprus question was at hand.

32. Mr. FAWZI (Egypt) said that Egypt maintained the position that the people of Cyprus had the right to self-determination. Its concern over recent developments in the island had been borne out when, in 1956, Cyprus had been used as a spring-board for aggression against Egypt. That aggression would have been opposed by the Cypriots and would have been impossible if they had had a say in the matter.

33. Failure to implement General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) had resulted in continuing violence and repression on Cyprus. The Greek draft resolution offered an appropriate and constructive step towards a solution and Egypt would vote for it. Egypt was confident that common sense, foresight and the norms of international life would prevail and that Cyprus would eventually be able to decide its own future in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

34. Mr. PRICA (Yugoslavia) said that his country was concerned at the developments in Cyprus because of the close geographical, political and historical ties which Yugoslavia had to the area and the friendly relations it maintained with the three Governments directly involved. It wished to see a peaceful settlement of the question which would respect the right of the Cypriots to self-determination in accordance with the principles of the Charter. The Greek proposal constituted a constructive approach.

35. The people of Cyprus had thus far never had the opportunity of deciding their own fate, an opportunity to which they were fully entitled in view of their high level of economic, cultural and political advancement. The maintenance in Cyprus of a situation which had been created by entirely different historical circumstances and dictated by transitory political and strategic considerations, and of institutions inherited from that past, could not lead to a solution. The development of the people could not be artificially checked or kept within the confines of a colonial system. The Cypriots were a decisive factor in determining the future of the island in a just and democratic way which could not infringe the interests of any of the States directly concerned.

36. The scope and nature of the methods to be used in achieving that goal should be determined by direct negotiations between the representatives of the Cypriots and the United Kingdom. The Greek proposal, by giving priority to implementation of the right of self-determination, refuted charges that territorial claims were being made by Greece or that the Cypriots were prejudging the outcome of negotiations. Obviously, any genuine solution must include clearly defined guarantees regarding the future status of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Yugoslavia would support any proposal for a solution which would ensure self-determination to the people of Cyprus.

37. Mr. MAKIVCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) pointed out that the people of Cyprus had never accepted British domination; they had persistently fought colonialist repression. The United Nations could not remain indifferent to a colonial war waged in Cyprus by the police and military forces. Unfortunately, the General Assembly's appeal (resolution 1013 (XI)) for a settlement in an atmosphere of peace and freedom had not been heeded and tension on the island had increased. The Cypriots were not responsible for

the deterioration of the situation: the leaders of the resistance had demonstrated their readiness to settle the problem peacefully and to create an atmosphere favourable to fruitful negotiations. The EOKA had even announced a cessation of hostilities and declared itself ready for a truce in March 1957. The United Kingdom, however, had rejected proposals for a resumption of negotiations, continued its punitive expeditions against the Cypriots, and enacted new abusive occupation legislation which had filled prisons and concentration camps with Cypriot patriots whose only crime was their desire for self-determination. Surely, the United Kingdom could not argue that progress had been made in implementing the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its eleventh session when its emergency measures had not been revoked, when the most severe penalties were meted out to whole villages, when Cypriots were arrested without warrants, innocent people were tortured and the right of assembly and the right to strike had been suppressed. The United Kingdom was practising colonialism of the worst type.

38. The contention of the United Kingdom and Turkey that any alteration in the status of Cyprus must take into account the Treaty of Lausanne was invalid because the people of the island had not been consulted when that instrument, now outdated, had been signed, and had had no say in the transfer of their country from Turkish to United Kingdom rule. Although the colonial system had in the past been confirmed in legal instruments, those treaties had been superseded by the United Nations Charter, which recognized the right of peoples to self-determination and imposed upon States responsible for administering Non-Self-Governing Territories the obligation to respect the paramountcy of the interests of the inhabitants. Moreover, as would be seen in Article 103, the Charter was to prevail over all other international treaties in the event of a conflict.

39. It was not unusual for a colonial Power to describe the struggle of a people against colonial rule as terrorist excesses which did not enjoy the support of the majority. But if the fighting in Cyprus were nothing more than the action of a wilful band of terrorists, the colonial Power would not be forced to maintain an army there to wage a colonial war. The Ukrainian delegation was in possession of documentary evidence which showed that the struggle in Cyprus was supported by the most diverse groups of the population seeking self-determination, and that the United Kingdom was flouting the will of the majority and violating its promises to respect the Charter by implementing that right. A free decision by the people of Cyprus was the only reasonable solution of the question in the interests of peace and security.

40. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that his delegation had consistently held that a settlement of the Cyprus question must be worked out by those directly concerned. In the absence of agreement among the parties, the United Nations could not resolve the problem; it could, however, be helpful. It had been generally recognized that no settlement was possible which did not take full account of all pertinent interests. Those were the interests of three of the United States' closest allies and of the people of Cyprus. Owing to the character and divergence of those interests, the United States had constantly maintained that quiet diplomacy held the greatest promise for a solution.

41. The avenues for a peaceful settlement laid down in Article 33 of the Charter had not all been exhausted; indeed, some progress had been made in the past year towards improving the circumstances in which one or more of those avenues might be pursued. It would therefore be a mistake for the Assembly to endorse any specific solution. Through restraint and moderation, those directly concerned should seek to create an atmosphere more conducive to further negotiations, in which the people of Cyprus must also have the opportunity to express their views. There could be no lasting settlement without their full co-operation. The United States hoped that there would be stability and calm on Cyprus to foster that favourable atmosphere.

42. In judging all proposals, the United States delegation would ask itself whether they would help to create conditions that would facilitate a solution. It had helped the parties to come together in the past year, and it was ready to help them again whenever circumstances permitted.

43. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that the lack of progress towards a peaceful, democratic and just solution of the Cyprus problem on the lines indicated in General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) was not due to any intrinsic difficulty in finding a solution in accordance with the Charter, but arose from the negative attitude of the United Kingdom, which was the party mainly responsible for the existence of the dispute. The General Assembly must therefore make fresh efforts to persuade the parties concerned to find an appropriate solution.

44. The Cyprus problem was clearly a colonial one and, as such, was international in scope and a legitimate subject for United Nations discussion. The exceptional military and policy measures which the United Kingdom Government still found it necessary to enforce showed that the conflict was between the people of Cyprus and a foreign administration. The fact that the problem had been brought to the United Nations by the Greek Government did not change the fundamental issues. It was, in fact, natural that Greece should have taken such a course, bound as it was to Cyprus by ties of language and culture.

45. The agreement of 1878 between Turkey and the United Kingdom, ⁴/the Order in Council of 1914 ⁵/and the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 had all been negotiated without the consent of the people of Cyprus and therefore could not furnish any legal basis for attempts to prevent them from exercising their right of self-determination. The right of the United Kingdom to be in Cyprus derived from treaties which were contrary to the spirit of the Charter, whereas the aspirations of the people of Cyprus were based on the right of self-determination recognized by the Charter.

46. It had been maintained that the conflict was the result of the action of isolated groups incited from outside and that there was doubt as to the genuineness of Cypriot aspirations to freedom; yet a plebiscite had left no doubt at all as to the force of those aspirations. Neither the strategic interests of the United Kingdom

⁴/ Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, signed at Constantinople on 4 June 1878. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 69 (1877-1878), p. 744.

⁵/ Order in Council relative to the Annexation of the Island of Cyprus to His Majesty's Dominions, London, 5 November 1914. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVIII (1914) (Part II), p. 165.

in Cyprus nor the existence of minority groups in the island could justify the refusal to grant self-determination to its people. On the one hand, the use of the island as a military base for colonialist aggression was all the more reason why the problem must be solved so as to eliminate the possibility of such use in the future; and on the other hand, a decision on the future destiny of Cyprus—and the people had proved by their struggle that they were politically mature enough to take such a decision—could be reached only after the island had been freed from foreign domination.

47. It was not the international situation that made the solution of the Cyprus problem difficult—in fact, its persistence aggravated international tension and its solution would ease the situation in the Near and Middle East and in the world at large. The interests of peace and security were paramount and the United Nations must use all its influence to eliminate colonial domination over Cyprus, thereby creating favourable conditions for the solution of all the other aspects of the problem and strengthening peace and international co-operation in the Mediterranean.

48. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), replying to statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece at the 927th meeting, referred to the current riots and retaliation by Greek and Turkish Cypriots as proof of the importance of discussing the problem quietly and without acrimony and with the intention of promoting a solution. He would have no difficulty in disposing in detail of the stream of Greek charges but did not think that would be conducive to the atmosphere of harmony and statesmanship which the United Kingdom Government desired.

49. He denied the Greek representative's statement that the EOKA had responded to the hopes for an atmosphere of peace in the island expressed in General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI). It was true that at the time that resolution had been adopted the EOKA had declared a truce and refrained for a period from actual murders, but during the past two months the number of terrorist murders per week was the same as it had been in the period preceding the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI) and there had been continued violence and threats against moderate Cypriots. The EOKA had announced its intention of carrying on an all-out struggle until it achieved its objectives.

50. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece had alleged that atrocities had been committed by United Kingdom troops and authorities in Cyprus but had not substantiated the charges. It would have been more helpful if the Greek Government had brought the charges to the attention of the United Kingdom Government before giving them wide publicity. Many of the charges were very old and had been fabricated long after the time at which the incident was alleged to have occurred, solely for the purposes of political and propaganda campaigns for *enosis* and in order to divert the security forces from their task of eliminating political violence and fear from the island. The Cyprus authorities had investigated every allegation precise enough to make investigation possible and would continue to investigate any new allegations as they arose. In one or two isolated cases there had been some irregularity, the authorities had prosecuted, but investigations had shown that most of the allegations had been trumped up for political ends.

51. It was alleged in the memorandum submitted by Greece (A/C.1/803) that the Abbot of Machaira had been tortured in February 1957. Complaints about that case had been made by a Greek Cypriot lawyer three weeks after the events were alleged to have occurred and the matter had immediately been discussed with the abbot himself by a senior official of the administration. The abbot, who had been very frightened as he recalled the murder by the EOKA of a brother abbot in his own monastery, had admitted that under severe pressure from the EOKA he had made an allegation which he had known to be false and he had since withdrawn it.

52. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs had quoted correspondence between the representative of Archbishop Makarios and the United Kingdom Ambassador in Athens, but had not quoted the last letter in that correspondence. It was from the United Kingdom Ambassador stating that his Government considered that the Turkish Cypriots were entitled to a proper say in the future of the island, and that if Archbishop Makarios now agreed with that view, his Government would welcome it as a step forward. No reply had been received to that letter.

53. The United Kingdom position was that nothing could be gained by ignoring the difficulties and realities of the situation. The Greek Cypriot leaders wished to join Greece and were opposed in that by the Turkish Cypriot leaders. The Greek and Turkish Governments had played and were continuing to play a considerable part in the Cyprus question. The United Kingdom Government was trying to maintain peace and stability in the island and in the area as a whole. It took the view that any solution must be agreeable to both communities in Cyprus and to all three Governments. It had had talks with the Greek and Turkish Governments and with the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, not excluding any of the parties or giving any of them a favoured position. Its offers of discussions with the Cypriot leaders of both communities remained open. It believed that progress had been made in the spirit of resolution 1013 (XI) and that further talks in a quiet atmosphere, and more progress along the same lines, were now required.

54. Mr. ZULETA ANGEL (Colombia) outlined four basic considerations which should be borne in mind in seeking a settlement of the Cyprus question. In the first place, while it was true that the status of the island had been defined in an international treaty, and Colombia had consistently maintained the sanctity of such treaties, the obligations assumed by the United Kingdom under the United Nations Charter superseded those laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne. They specifically included those established in Article 1 and 55 and in Article 73 b of the Charter.

55. Secondly, the right of a people to self-determination was not an absolute right; it was subject to the fulfilment by that people of specific conditions, including the achievement of a sufficiently high level of economic, social, political and cultural advancement to enable it to create a viable political entity. There was no doubt that the people of Cyprus had fulfilled those conditions and were capable of deciding their own future. The principle of self-determination was therefore fully applicable and it was gratifying to find that the United Kingdom, which had given it practical application in many other cases, was pursuing the same

policy in respect of Cyprus. The negotiations recommended by the United Nations should lead to the implementation of that principle.

56. Thirdly, the principle of self-determination could not validly be invoked to justify territorial claims or the annexation of a territory. Colombia placed its confidence in the reassurance given in respect of enosis by the Greek representative, who had pledged himself to do nothing contrary to the mandate given him by the people of Cyprus.

57. Fourthly, a distinction should be made between self-determination and the protection of minority rights. The only way—and it was the traditional, democratic way—to implement the principle of self-determination was to accept the freely expressed will of the majority. The problem which so deeply concerned Turkey was the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. National minorities deserved special protection and should enjoy all the rights granted to the majority in any country. However, it would be dangerous to recognize the right of any national minority within a country to constitute itself

a State within a State. In Cyprus, full account should be taken of the legitimate interests and inalienable human rights of the Turkish population.

58. Colombia agreed that a settlement of the Cyprus question should be sought through negotiations with a view to implementing the principle of self-determination enunciated in the Charter. It could not agree, however, that talks should be held between the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece towards that end. Only the people of Cyprus could decide their future, and the negotiations which the General Assembly in its resolution 1013 (XI) had urged the parties to resume were negotiations between the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the people of Cyprus on the other. The parties should continue their efforts to achieve the objectives laid down in that resolution; the United Kingdom would thus be fulfilling its obligations under the Charter and acting in accord with its own liberal and democratic traditions. Colombia would support any proposal aimed at implementing the principle of self-determination.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.