

Monday, 9 December 1957,
at 10.30 a. m.



NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Agenda item 58:	
The Cyprus question	345

Chairman: Mr. Djatal ABDUH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 58

**The Cyprus question (A/3616 and Add.1, A/C.1/803,
A/C.1/L.197)**

1. The CHAIRMAN invited those members of the Committee who wished to speak in the general debate to direct their remarks at the same time to the draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/C.1/L.197), which had just been circulated. As the Committee must complete its work by 13 December 1957 at the latest in order to be able to report in time to the General Assembly on the questions it had considered, it would be necessary to hold a night meeting on Wednesday, 11 December.

2. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) stressed that his country had ties of friendship and alliance with the Governments of Greece and Turkey. The three Governments, whose heads were shortly to meet in Paris, should reaffirm that friendship, for many difficulties could be resolved if approached in a spirit of amity and co-operation. His delegation hoped that the Committee's debates would create an atmosphere more favourable to the solution of that question: it would be infinitely regrettable if they were to damage the prospects for fruitful negotiation.

3. Some had claimed that the dispute was a colonial matter. Such an assertion was particularly out of place in a year in which Ghana and the Federation of Malaya had become Members of the United Nations. The Cyprus problem was an international one. The Greek and Turkish Governments held widely differing views on that question, and the United Kingdom Government was endeavouring to find a solution acceptable to all concerned. It was ready to discuss it at the international level, but would point out at the same time that the difficulties it was encountering inside Cyprus fell exclusively within its jurisdiction and were not a matter for international discussion.

4. Only a compromise solution could satisfy all concerned. It had been said that his country had a genius for compromise. His Government would like to prove that, but the other parties concerned must show a like spirit. It was precisely because it had recognized that a quiet discussion in a peaceful and friendly atmosphere was necessary in order for a compromise solution to be reached that the General Assembly had, on 26 February 1957, adopted resolution 1013 (XI). There had been some progress after

the adoption of that resolution. It was important to continue along the same lines and to find a solution acceptable to the people of Cyprus and to the Government of the United Kingdom as well as to the Greek and Turkish Governments.

5. The United Kingdom's policy had been to promote self-government in Cyprus. Thus, after the Second World War, it had made proposals for a liberal constitution. Those proposals had been rejected, not only by the Communists but also by the nationalist movement headed by the Orthodox Church, whose declared aim had long been union with Greece. In 1954, his Government had made a new proposal but that, too, had been rejected. That year the Greek Government had launched a campaign for enosis (union with Greece). It had brought the question before the General Assembly at its ninth session and after an unfruitful debate the Assembly had decided (514th plenary meeting) not to consider the Cyprus question further at that session.

6. In 1955, the terrorist movement had made its appearance in Cyprus and Athens Radio had incited the Cypriots to violence. Official protests had failed to bring an end to the campaign. It had been the active support for enosis and terrorism on the part of Greece that had made the question an international one.

7. In September 1955, a tripartite conference had been held in London.^{1/} His Government had proposed that the three Governments should immediately form a permanent committee which would, in the first place, consider a constitution for Cyprus and then try to smooth out the difficulties which might arise in the functioning of self-government.

8. It had been clearly understood that the co-operation of the three Governments would not prejudice the eventual status of Cyprus. The conference was to have been reconvened, when self-government was working, with representatives of the Cypriot communities in order to study that status. Three weeks after the break-down of the conference, the Governor of Cyprus had begun conversations with Archbishop Makarios as well as with Turkish Cypriot leaders. Those conversations had ended in February 1956, when the Archbishop had refused to take a stand against violence, had insisted that a Greek Cypriot majority in the assembly should be conceded before safeguards for the Turkish community were discussed and had demanded that the control of the police should be placed in the hands of the Greek Cypriots. Quoting a passage from the diary of the chief of the terrorists, Colonel Grivas, he said it had become clear, more-

^{1/} Conference on Eastern Mediterranean problems and the Cyprus question, held at London from 29 August to 7 September 1955, between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

over, that the terrorists took their orders from the Archbishop. That was why it had been necessary to deport him. The United Kingdom Government had, however, clearly indicated that it was prepared to discuss self-government with a representative group of Cypriots, including the Archbishop.

9. The United Kingdom had always supported the principle of self-determination, as the development of the Commonwealth proved. That principle must, of course, apply equally to the Greek and Turkish communities. But it was necessary to make sure that it did not create greater problems than it solved. The United Kingdom Government had accordingly proposed a draft constitution, prepared by Lord Radcliffe, which provided for a democratically elected assembly, with a Greek Cypriot majority and a government which would have the confidence of the assembly.^{2/} Only the police, defence and foreign affairs would have remained in the hands of the British Government, which was responsible for keeping the balance between the communities and for helping to maintain the peace and stability of the area. Unfortunately, before the United Kingdom Government had been able to speak to the Cypriots, Athens Radio had announced Greek opposition and declared that any Greek Cypriot who showed interest in the proposals was a traitor. The United Kingdom offer had consequently been rejected without consideration.

10. After the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI), the United Kingdom had taken constructive measures to improve the situation: it had released Archbishop Makarios, had offered a safe conduct out of Cyprus to all terrorists and had relaxed the emergency regulations. It had accepted the offer of good offices which the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had made to the parties concerned.

11. The United Kingdom Government had then held talks with the Greek and Turkish Governments, with the clear intention of bringing in representative Cypriots as soon as any broad agreement could be reached. It had proposed a scheme for partnership, which had been rejected by the parties concerned, and had then reverted to discussions with representative Cypriots, asking the Greek and Turkish Governments for their assistance. That procedure had also broken down. An invitation to the Cypriots to discuss measures to secure the progress of self-government, coupled with a clear statement on the principle of self-determination, had failed to change the situation.

12. Convinced that all the parties ought to realize that the opinions of their opponents were equally strong, and that solution required a willingness to compromise, the United Kingdom Government had then proposed private discussions between the United Kingdom, Greek and Turkish Governments, without insisting in advance on any particular solution to the problem. There would have been no fixed agenda. The purpose had been to find a solution of the international aspects of the problem and thus pave the way for a settlement of the internal problems in direct discussion with Cypriot representatives. The Turkish Government had accepted that suggestion. But the Greek Government had insisted that the basic outlines of a solution must first be agreed upon between the Gov-

ernments concerned through diplomatic channels. It had been impossible to reach agreement. It has also been thought that discussions could not usefully be held before the Turkish elections in October 1957, or before the current session of the General Assembly.

13. In the past two months, there had been some recrudescence of terrorism, doubtless with a view to exerting pressure on the United Nations. The Committee should impress upon those who had dedicated themselves to violence that they could only harm the prospects of a settlement. The United Kingdom Government had recently appointed a new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, who had a reputation for wise, liberal and progressive administration.

14. In the meantime, exchanges of views between the parties had been continuing. The United Kingdom Government hoped that it would be possible to make progress towards a solution, but it still believed that a meeting free to discuss all relevant questions would be most helpful. The United Kingdom had the welfare of the peoples of Cyprus deeply at heart. It was also anxious lest the continuance of the dispute should impair the stability of the area. It was prepared to entertain any suggestion likely to bring about the settlement of the problem, if it provided for good order, internal security and good government, and for the protection of the rights of all the people. It was also under an obligation not to neglect the strategic responsibilities which it had assumed as a member of organizations of collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. But these duties and interests left a margin for compromise. That was the underlying idea of the resolution adopted in February 1957.

15. In conclusion, he said that he had just seen the memorandum from the representative of Greece (A/C.1/803), and that he might exercise his right of replying to it in due course.

16. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) said that the United Kingdom representative's statement was bound to cause great disappointment both in Greece and in Cyprus. Before referring to the substance of the question, he wished to comment on certain points in that statement.

17. The United Kingdom representative had again accused the Greek Government of sending supplies to the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). In that connexion, he recalled that at the eleventh session (849th meeting) he had given proof, supported by documents, that it had been the United Kingdom authorities which had sent arms to Cyprus in the form of shipments from Greece. He had then asked that a committee should be set up to examine the documents and to verify the assertions of the Greek Government.

18. The United Kingdom representative had further stated, on the basis of the so-called diary of Colonel Grivas, that Archbishop Makarios was the leader of those whom he had described as terrorists. If that were so, there was reason to ask why that prelate had been swiftly exiled, instead of being brought before a court martial and given a chance to prove his innocence.

19. With regard to the draft constitution prepared by Lord Radcliffe, the Greek delegation wished to stress

^{2/} Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.

that, since that constitution gave the Governor the right of veto in all fields, it was not likely to promote a settlement of the question. The purpose of the constitution was, rather, to cover up the continuation of the colonial system.

20. On the other hand, if the United Kingdom Government were to recognize the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination, it would receive all the necessary support from that people and from the Greek Government, always provided that that recognition entailed self-government as the United Kingdom Government had defined it until June 1956, and not self-government based on the partition of the island.

21. Finally, the confidential exchange of views to which the United Kingdom representative had referred had made clear the position of principle held by the Greek Government, namely, that the question of Cyprus was definitely a question between the United Kingdom Government and the people of Cyprus.

22. Turning to the substance of the question, he observed that the freedom, the well-being and the dignity of half a million human beings depended upon the Committee's decision. At the same time, however, a colonial problem with broader political implications was involved. Although he thought it unnecessary to refer to the history of a question which had already been discussed at length by the General Assembly at the time of the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI), he wished to recall the facts as dispassionately as possible. That recapitulation was necessary because because any falsification of the fundamental data would change the whole substance of the problem.

23. In the first place, the allegation that the Cypriots were Levantines without the characteristics of an ethnic personality was unfounded. The composition and ethnic homogeneity of the Cypriots had not changed for centuries. According to United Kingdom statistics, 80 per cent of the population of the island were Greeks, 18 per cent were Turks and 2 per cent belonged to various ethnic groups. A plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, which the Greek Government had always advocated, could not fail to show that the overwhelming majority of the population was Greek in race, language, religion, mores, culture and feelings. But the test which would show the absolute ethnic homogeneity of Cyprus had been refused.

24. It had also been alleged that the Treaty of Lausanne,^{3/} which granted certain rights to Turkey, precluded any change in the status of Cyprus. But neither in the Lausanne Treaty nor in any other treaty was there any provision which directly or indirectly precluded a change in the status of Cyprus. The Treaty of Lausanne had been drafted very carefully and was absolutely clear.

25. It had also been argued that the future of Cyprus affected the national security of certain countries, owing to the strategic importance of the island. If reasons of strategy could be invoked, the interests not only of certain countries but of several neighbouring countries should also be recognized. To admit that a whole people could be deprived of its freedom

and dignity for strategic reasons would create a most dangerous precedent. All countries, particularly the great Powers, could then claim the right to occupy certain regions which had strategic interests for them. There were, of course, areas which had special importance for the security of neighbouring countries. Those countries naturally wished to protect themselves from the possible use of those areas as spring-boards for attack. The experience of the First World War had abundantly proved that Cyprus was a very defective military base; nevertheless, if it was still felt that the island was so vitally important from the strategic point of view, there was nothing to prevent its being given a status which would make it impossible for anyone to use it for military purposes, just as certain areas had been neutralized or demilitarized by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Cyprus therefore presented no danger. In actual fact, the intention was to perpetuate the colonial régime of the island, to serve the strategic needs of certain Powers.

26. The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1013 (XI) was a vitally important political and juridical act in the history of Cyprus. Although it was true that that resolution was limited to recommendations, since the Assembly had no judiciary or executive power, it nevertheless constituted a formal recommendation by the United Nations, which could not remain indifferent to the future of a civilized people that had long claimed its freedom and was fighting for it. It was clear from the text of the resolution that the pacification of the island was sought as a prerequisite of negotiations.

27. It was interesting to compare the responses of the Cypriots and of the United Kingdom Government to the United Nations appeal. The day after resolution 1013 (XI) had been adopted, the Council of the Ethnarchy of Cyprus in an official communiqué expressed its satisfaction at the action taken by the United Nations. Several days later, the mayors of Cyprus, the elected representatives of the people, had published a similar communiqué. On 14 March 1957, the EOKA had issued a proclamation, stating that the organization, complying with the spirit of the United Nations resolution and in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations, was prepared to order the suspension of all operations as soon as Archbishop Makarios was released. Since then the EOKA had completely ceased all action.

28. The United Kingdom representative had stated that the EOKA had violated the armistice by causing several incidents; to that he would reply that there was no proof by which those acts might be imputed to the EOKA. One of the incidents in particular, a bomb explosion in front of the offices of The Times of Cyprus, could in no way be attributed to the EOKA, since that newspaper had always upheld the cause of the Greeks of Cyprus. It should always be noted that the building in which the newspaper had its offices belonged to the Orthodox Bishopric of Cyprus. Furthermore, it was a well-known fact that on 22 March 1957, Archbishop Makarios had addressed an appeal both to the Cypriot combatants and to the United Kingdom Government to re-establish peaceful conditions on the island; on 29 March 1957, he had reiterated the hope that the EOKA would suspend its activities and that the United Kingdom Government would revoke its emergency measures.

^{3/} Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, 1924, p. 11.

29. The United Kingdom Government's attitude, however, had been very disappointing. On 27 February 1957, Lord Home, Secretary of State for the Commonwealth, in referring to the Indian representative's statement to the United Nations regarding the need to settle the future of Cyprus without external pressures or intervention,^{4/} had, in point of fact recognized the constructive nature of resolution 1013 (XI). A few days later, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had also made an encouraging statement. But the next day, the Governor of Cyprus had ordered the execution of a young man eighteen years of age because he had been in possession of a weapon, which, moreover, was useless; the execution had roused universal indignation and had prompted United States Senator Fulton to make urgent representations.

30. In the Greek representative's opinion, that tragic episode illustrated the state of mind of the Governor then in office and of his administration. The United Kingdom authorities had failed to restore normal order or to establish freedom of expression as was called for in the resolution. The situation had improved only because the EOKA had stopped hostilities. Colonial repression had not ceased, however; for months the so-called forces of order had oppressed the people with impunity.

31. It was with regret that he had to refer to certain reprehensible acts committed by British troops in Cyprus. The British people, whose nobility and liberalism were well known, could not be held responsible for those acts. Even after the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI), the atrocities had not stopped. It was true that, since that time, several emergency measures had been revoked and that a new Governor had been appointed. But that was not enough to dispel the anxiety of the people of Cyprus. The colonial authorities could still arrest any person they wished and inflict on him whatever kind of treatment they wished.

32. It was not enough merely to replace the Governor; there must be a change of policy. If the struggle against persistent colonialism were resumed, the Governor would obviously be powerless to prevent a return to former methods. It was therefore essential that the United Nations should direct its efforts towards abolishing colonialism in Cyprus; by so doing, it would preserve the lives, well-being and human dignity of the population. Moreover, although it was true that there had been fewer casualties and no further executions, grave abuses were still being perpetrated. For example, a curfew had been imposed on the village of Millikouri for nearly two months. Food had been distributed by the British authorities, but in such small quantities that the people of the neighbouring villages had had to furnish food supplies for their besieged compatriots. Crops and live-stock had been lost, and the sick, children and old people had been completely isolated from the outside world fifty-four days. The reason for that cruelty was that Dighenis and his lieutenants were thought to be in hiding in Millikouri. After numerous unannounced searches had proved fruitless, houses had been destroyed and excavations made beneath their foundations; it had been thought that the EOKA chiefs were hiding in crypts.

^{4/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, First Committee, 855th meeting.

33. The example of Millikouri showed that, when the cause was just, no one feared repression; on the contrary, it encouraged a spirit of resistance and inspired acts of heroism. But when colonialism opposed the people's wishes, those who applied that policy always found excuses for inhuman conduct even during an armistice.

34. The examples of inhuman treatment had been many and varied. There had been long periods of detention without any court decision, investigations and searches in the villages, resulting in damage to crops and the loss of live-stock, collective punishments, and torture during investigations. Those on whom such torture had been inflicted had written and signed detailed statements; they had given their civil status and address, thus exposing themselves to possible further punishment for having openly accused their torturers. Although some of those tortures might be considered "light" by a hardened police officer, others ranged to extreme cruelty. The torturers might even be considered to be sexual perverts, since it was on the genital organs that torture was most often inflicted. The Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations had in its possession detailed documentation on those tortures, which it would utilize according to the decision which the General Assembly would take.

35. He referred the members of the Committee to the memorandum submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/803), which had just been circulated, and to the book which the Ethnarchy of Cyprus had published and recently made available to all delegations. Other tortures had been inflicted since those mentioned in the book.

36. His delegation was convinced that the United Kingdom Government was unaware of those facts, and it was not its intention, in citing those facts, to engage in anti-British propaganda. Moreover, eminent British personages had protested most vigorously against those tortures. The United Kingdom Government, even while bearing the responsibility for such acts, assuredly could not have authorized them; but in refusing to recognize the validity of those accusations, it had indirectly sanctioned the perpetration of such acts. It had thereby indirectly assumed the responsibility of fact in addition to its responsibility under the law.

37. His delegation's sole objective was to stop the colonial torturers from committing further atrocities, by exposing both them and their actions, since falsehood and dissimulation were the accomplices of crime. In order to achieve that purpose, his delegation could only ask the United Nations to take measures against colonialism in Cyprus and to consider that painful aspect of the problem and remedy it. The mere fact of such an endeavour would lessen the sufferings of the people of Cyprus.

38. With regard to the negotiations which the United Kingdom representative had just discussed at some length, the Greek representative pointed out that the main issue involved was that of the abolition of colonialism in Cyprus. It was distressing to note that, despite the United Nations appeal, the United Kingdom Government had not made any serious efforts to offer a political solution to the problem. It was true that the United Kingdom Government had put an end to the deportation of Archbishop Makarios, who was the elected spiritual and political leader of the Greeks of

Cyprus. But even though he had been liberated, the Archbishop was still an exile, condemned to live far from his people. With his moral prestige, his firmness and his wisdom, the Archbishop would be not only a factor of stability in Cyprus, but also an element of normalization, because, in accordance with the will of the people, he was the only one who would be able to bring about contacts and to make understandings valid.

39. With respect to the recommendation concerning the immediate resumption of negotiations, the attitude of the Cypriots had been the following. On 26 May 1957, Archbishop Makarios had written to the British Prime Minister to request the abolition of the emergency measures, and the resumption of negotiations concerning the application to the Cypriots of the right of peoples to self-determination. In a letter of 16 July 1957 to the United Kingdom Ambassador at Athens, Mr. Zenon Rossides, speaking on behalf of Archbishop Makarios, had pointed out that the Archbishop's concern was that the minority should not, in participating in talks on the future of Cyprus, be implicitly given a voice equal to that of the majority. He did not thereby refuse the Turkish Cypriots the right to have a voice, as a minority, proportionate to their ratio of the total population. On 30 June 1957, the free trade unions of Cyprus had adopted a resolution stressing the need for the immediate opening of negotiations to settle the question. Lastly, the Greek mayors of the island had on a number of occasions asked the Governor to resume negotiations with their representative, Archbishop Makarios. In addition the EOKA had stated in its above-mentioned proclamation that it had decided to suspend operations in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations.

40. Thus, every initiative and every possible step had been taken on the Cypriot side to comply with General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) by resuming the negotiations which had been begun between the Governor and the Archbishop in October 1955 and had been broken off when the Archbishop had been deported.

41. He drew the Committee's attention to the importance of the armistice which had been proclaimed unilaterally by the EOKA. The Greek Government had always refused to have the slightest contact with that liberation army, because it could not maintain relations with an organization that was engaged in armed action against a friendly and allied country, from which it was separated only by the question of Cyprus. However, the Greek Government had always frankly expressed its admiration for that liberation struggle, which was as heroic as it was unequal. At the current time, that admiration also derived from the fact that EOKA had proved to be capable of proclaiming armistices.

42. He had had the honour, during the Second World War, of carrying on underground activities in the company of his British friends. He therefore knew from experience the dangers to which a secret organization was exposed once it discontinued action: loss of prestige, discrediting of leaders, discouragement and even defection on the part of the members, weakening and even disruption of the techniques of secrecy. Nevertheless, Dighenis had twice proclaimed armistices and put them into effect. The first time had been in August 1956: that armistice had lasted only ten days, because Field-Marshal Sir John Harding had

replied by setting "terms of surrender", a gesture worthy of the fairest days of colonialism. The second time had been nearly nine months ago, when Dighenis had proclaimed an armistice in response to General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI).

43. Unfortunately, the attitude of the United Kingdom Government had changed only superficially after the second armistice, in spite of the resolution of the General Assembly. The British had refused all offers of negotiation. In a letter addressed to Archbishop Makarios on 30 May 1957, the British Ambassador to Athens had rejected the proposals concerning the revocation of the emergency measures and the opening of negotiations. At the end of his letter, the British Ambassador had even threatened that the United Kingdom would partition the island. Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Mr. Profumo, his Under-Secretary of State, had repeated that threat in the House of Commons on 6 July 1957.

44. To sum up, the United Kingdom Government had replied "no" not only to the Cypriots but to the United Nations. That "no" was not very far removed from the "never" with which, until recently, every peaceful request of the Cypriots and the Greek Government had been met.

45. With regard to the tripartite formula the United Kingdom representative had mentioned, he pointed out that, following a cherished and almost traditional method, the United Kingdom Government had had recourse to tactics designed to create confusion and to shift its responsibilities to others. The aim of the tripartite formula it had advocated was to eliminate the people of Cyprus, who were the essential factor in the problem, and say that the only way to solve that problem was by "negotiations between the parties concerned", namely, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. That formula, which had been invented in London, adopted at Ankara and naively given the blessing of certain foreign ministries, was apparently designed also to isolate Greece by forcing it either to betray the Cypriots, of whom it was only the spokesman, or to take the responsibility of breaking off negotiations.

46. The tripartite formula had led to the London Conference in 1955, to which Greece had gone in all good faith, only to discover immediately the atmosphere of isolation which had been prepared for it. That Conference of unhappy memory had ended in total failure and had resulted in the anti-Greek riots in Constantinople on 5 and 6 September 1955, which had seriously disturbed Greco-Turkish relations and about which the Greek Government had always been reluctant to publish the documentation it possessed, which was as copious as it was appalling. The United Kingdom Government still persisted in refusing the Cypriots the right of self-determination, however incomprehensible that attitude might appear in the eyes of those who recognized the liberality of United Kingdom policy in other colonies. The United Kingdom Government did not hesitate to use the tripartite formula once more, with a few variations, the main characteristics of which were that it persistently ignored the party mainly concerned, namely the people of Cyprus, or relegated it to the background, and that it stressed factors which, although they must undoubtedly be taken into consideration, could never take precedence over the interests of the people of Cyprus.

47. The position of Greece in the matter was very clear and devoid of any ulterior motive. Greece had received the mandate to present and defend the cause of the liberation of the people of Cyprus, in accordance with the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. It had accepted that mandate, not only because four-fifths of the population of Cyprus was Greek in origin, language, religion and culture, but also and above all because the cause was just. The people concerned were unable to plead their cause before the United Nations, although their right to self-determination and their right to live in freedom and dignity were recognized in the relevant Articles of the Charter.

48. British and Turkish propaganda accused Greece of nourishing expansionist designs and wanting to seize a territory which belonged to a friendly Power. Such allegations were unfounded. First and foremost, Cyprus belonged to nobody but its own people. Greece was, in fact, the only country to declare that it had no claims on Cyprus, whereas the United Kingdom was trying to assert its colonial rights and Turkey was striving to assert greater rights than were justified by the existence of a minority and by strategic reasons.

49. It was often objected that once they were free the people of Cyprus might decide to unite with Greece. In the view of the Greek delegation, it would be outrageous to maintain that the people of Cyprus should be condemned to perpetual servitude, merely to prevent enosis at some time in the future. The United Nations existed in order to do what was fair and reasonable. The people of Cyprus were entitled to take whatever decision they wished: to choose independence, to opt for partition of the island, to remain in the Commonwealth or to establish close links of co-operation with Turkey, their Arab neighbours and Greece. They could choose to be a rallying-point rather than an apple of discord. Greece was willing to accept in advance any decision which was freely taken by the people of Cyprus; it had already made that declaration officially on several occasions.

50. Judging by previous attempts of the same kind, partition would certainly not be a solution. There was not a single town or district, however small, in which there was a Turkish majority. When the right of self-determination was exercised, the decision was taken by the population as a whole, by a majority vote. That was why the tripartite formula was unacceptable. For its part, Greece would never take decisions for the people of Cyprus which they alone could take and would never settle the fate of the Cypriots in their absence or on their behalf.

51. That thesis, on which Greek policy was based, made any discussion on the meaning of resolution 1013 (XI) and on the number of parties concerned pointless. There was only one party concerned: the people of Cyprus. The United Kingdom was a responsible party rather than a party concerned, for it was the trustee of Cypriot liberties.

52. It was perfectly understandable that Turkey was concerned with the fate of the minority of Turkish origin. It was legitimate, too, that Turkey, Greece, Syria, Lebanon and even the great Powers were also interested in certain aspects of national security in the geographical region of the island. It was only,

however, after the people of Cyprus had been able to exercise their right of self-determination that it would be possible to examine what effects their decision might have at the international level and to consider ways of meeting the legitimate concerns of the other parties. Those concerns should not constitute a veto when the fate of a whole people was at stake.

53. Furthermore, while the Turks, the Greeks and the British had something to say, they were not perhaps the only ones. If a question were dealt with at the international level, all those who had legitimate interests at stake should participate in the discussions; otherwise it might look as though there was a conspiracy designed to serve the interests of some at the expense of others.

54. In that connexion he quoted the statement that Mr. Krishna Menon, the representative of India, had made before the Indian Parliament on 26 March 1957; that statement endorsed the opinion of the Greek Government in regard to Cyprus. Other delegations had also spoken in a similar way and just as categorically.

55. Even assuming that Greece would betray its mandate, consent to a compromise that would sacrifice the rights of the people of Cyprus, and accept the theory of the "parties concerned" as the basis of negotiations, there would still be the question how a solution could be imposed on those people against their will. The use of force and violence would seem to be the only possible way: the British colonial torturers would have to be supplemented by Turkish gaolers and Greek gendarmes. That was the alliance of gaolers that was being proposed in the guise of tripartism to the United Nations, whose purpose was to bring peace and freedom to enslaved peoples.

56. He would point out that the great majority of the British people recognized the legitimate rights of the Cypriots. The Press of all political parties showed its understanding, sometimes even its sympathy, for the Cypriots. It was within the Labour Party, however, that the Cypriot cause had been best understood and defended. He quoted the resolution that the Labour Party had adopted on the subject on 27 November 1957, during its recent congress, held at Brighton. That resolution had been greeted with admiration and appreciation, not only in Cyprus and Greece, but also by all people throughout the world who believed in liberalism and democracy.

57. It had been pointed out that the Labour Party was in the opposition and that it was easy for it to make promises today that it would not be forced to keep when it came into power. While recognizing how much was truth and how much exaggeration in such assertions, the Greek delegation would point out that the important point was that the resolutions of the Labour Party were a profession of faith, an affirmation of principles, and it knew very well that the British Labour Party respected principles as did the British people as a whole. It therefore asked the United Nations to recognize the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination that the Labour Party itself recognized.

58. In conclusion, he recalled that at the eleventh session of the General Assembly his delegation had accepted the draft resolution introduced by India. It had hoped at that time that the resolution, submitted

by a nation which enjoyed very great moral and spiritual prestige and formed part of the Commonwealth, and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 1013 (XI)), would bring about a real change in the situation and would open the way to the liberation of the Cypriot people.

59. It was for that reason that at the eleventh session (856th meeting) the Greek delegation had not pressed for its draft resolution to be put to the vote at that time. It had, however, declared that it had not withdrawn the draft resolution, which remained in abeyance, and that it would be submitted to the Committee again if the solution looked for in resolution 1013 (XI) had not been brought about before the twelfth session.

60. The hopes of the people of Cyprus had been disappointed. Tyranny continued to reign in the island and the efforts to prolong it were increasing and gaining in force. In order, therefore, to carry out the mandate that the people of Cyprus had entrusted to it, the Greek delegation was obliged to bring forward its draft resolution. The fact was that it was speaking not only on behalf of the people of Cyprus but also on behalf of the Greek people.

61. In 1940, when the hurricane let loose by the Fascists and Nazis had swept throughout almost the whole of Europe, when heroic England had fought alone, Greece had not hesitated for a moment to enter the

unequal struggle, because liberty had been at stake. Tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians killed or wounded, one thousand out of seven thousand villages completely burned out other devastation: such was the tragic reckoning of its struggle. Liberated in 1945, Greece had endured a horrible guerilla war for another three years and a half, in order to preserve its freedom and to guarantee that democratic principles would not disappear from the important crossroads that the Greek peninsula formed. After that there had been the Korean War, in which Greece had played a part equal in proportion to that played by any other nation.

62. Greece thought that those sacrifices gave it the right to ask the United Nations to ensure that the people of Cyprus should no longer live under a colonial régime. It also made that request in the name of the fundamental principles of the current democratic era, which had nowhere been betrayed more clearly than in Cyprus.

63. It was with a feeling of overwhelming responsibility towards the living and the dead for whom it was the trustee, and with a feeling of anguish at the suffering of the Cypriots, that the Greek delegation asked the Committee to vote in favour of its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.197).

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.