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Chairman: Mr. Djatal ABDUH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 59

**The question of Algeria (A/3617 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.194
to A/C.1/L.196) (concluded)**

1. Mr. NESBITT (Canada) replying to comments made regarding the three-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.196), pointed out that the original text was in English and that was the text which the sponsors were submitting.
2. With regard to the substance of the question, the Canadian delegation was interested only in finding a means, if possible, of expressing the consensus of the General Assembly. It had been gratified by the moderation which had marked the debate on the Algerian question at the current session. The more constructive tone of the debate gave grounds for hope that a positive result might be achieved.
3. The problem under discussion could not be resolved by a wholesale concession by one side or the other. The path of progress lay in the direction of mutual accommodation rather than in insistence by one side that its objective or its methods provided the only solution.
4. Notwithstanding the differences of opinion expressed in the Committee with regard to the methods to be adopted, the majority were surely not divided on the fundamental aim, which was to put an end to the present situation in Algeria and to promote a peaceful solution in accordance with the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations. The main difficulty appeared to lie in the definition of the methods, or more specifically, in the precise statement of how the parties should proceed. That was the impression which the Canadian delegation had gained from the many consultations and discussions which had taken place in the past few days. It had reached the conclusion that it should be possible to find a formula which, although it might not be accepted unanimously, might win the support of a large majority. It doubted if either of the draft resolutions before the Committee met that test. Each had its merits, but neither had what was required if there was to be any real progress towards a solution of the important problem under consideration.
5. In practical terms, the Canadian delegation believed that the course to follow was to amend the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.194). That text came closer to meeting the requirements, not only of the parliamentary situation in the Committee, but of the problem the parties faced in Algeria. The draft resolution could, however, only be effective if it had the widest possible support in the General Assembly. The Canadian delegation was inclined to think that, in its present form, the draft would not obtain that support. In order to make the draft more widely acceptable, the Canadian delegation had joined with the delegations of Ireland and Norway in submitting the amendments in document A/C.1/L.196. In its view, the amendments reflected, not the position of either of the parties, but the attitudes of the delegations concerned with both sides of the question.
6. Mr. DRAGO (Argentina) announced that the sponsors of the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.195) would vote in favour of the three-Power amendments, which, in their view, had been prompted by the same motives as their own draft.
7. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) said that the seven-Power draft resolution, despite the conciliatory intentions of the sponsors, was not, in his view, adequate. Its rejection by the Arab countries would make it pointless, just as France's opposition would make the seventeen-Power draft resolution inapplicable in its present form. It was therefore absolutely essential, either before the vote in the First Committee, or later, before the vote in the plenary meeting of the Assembly, to work out a text capable of obtaining unanimous support.
8. He therefore suggested to the sponsors of the seven-Power draft resolution, whose conciliatory spirit and constructive attitude were obvious, that they should consider the possibility of acting on the proposal made by the representative of Iran at the 924th meeting.
9. He considered that the amendments submitted by Canada, Ireland and Norway were well balanced. Nevertheless, he reserved his position until he knew whether the sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution found them acceptable.
10. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) expressed the gratitude of the sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution to the delegations of Canada, Ireland and Norway for the initiative they had taken towards achieving a peaceful solution acceptable to all. Their sincerity was not in doubt. He admired the position they had taken during the debate and fully respected the explanations they had given in support of their amendments. Nevertheless, he considered that the question should be judged on the basis of principle and substance.
11. It would be difficult for the sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, and, he believed, for any Member of the United Nations, to accept the deletion of a paragraph referring to the principle of self-determination as a right to which the Algerian people was entitled. In his view, the principle of self-determination could not be a matter of dispute. The

sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution had not invented it: the expression was drawn directly from the Charter. The sponsors of the amendments had not, in the view of the Saudi Arabian delegation, given any reason which would justify the deletion of that expression.

12. What was the meaning of the phrase "Recognizing that the people of Algeria are entitled to work out their own future in a democratic way", which appeared in the first amendment? If it meant that the Algerian people should enjoy the right of self-determination, the terms of the Charter should be used. If, on the contrary, it meant a denial of the right of self-determination to the Algerian people, the sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution could not accept it unless the Members of the United Nations were prepared to revise the Charter and delete any mention of that principle. Moreover, the provisional translation of the first amendment in the various languages had given rise to a number of protests: why, then, use a new terminology which was so debatable when the translation of the Charter had been accepted by everyone? There was no dispute either as to substance or as to translation when the phrase "principle of self-determination" was adhered to.

13. With regard to the second amendment, he noted that the term "negotiations" used in the seventeen-Power draft resolution was the one recognized in international usage. It was to be found in the United Nations Charter. Why then replace it by the words "effective discussions", the meaning of which was dubious? The representative of France himself had frequently used the word "negotiations". He had offered negotiations to the Algerian people. Why then should the United Nations show itself to be less generous than France and use expressions which lent themselves to conflicting interpretations?

14. The sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution were not prepared to compromise on principles or to accept amendments which would distort their draft resolution. It would no longer be the seventeen-Power text and its sponsors would no longer be able to stand by it. They considered it their duty to be candid and quite clear, for candour and clarity alone would make possible the solution of so important a problem, involving the life or death of a whole people.

15. It was not a matter of compromise with regard to language; the issue was more basic: it was one of principle. Was the Algerian people a people and did it have the right to self-determination? If the answer was "yes", it should be stated in black and white. If it was "no", the Algerian people should be told that it was not a people and that it was not entitled to the right of self-determination.

16. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) hoped that the virtual ultimatum which the representative of Saudi Arabia appeared to have presented would prove to be only a temporary setback and that the calm and conciliatory atmosphere which members had welcomed at the 925th meeting would be restored.

17. Although the Colombian delegation had placed its name on the list of speakers in the debate, it had refrained from speaking in order to avoid lengthening a debate in which everything had been said, including things that might better have been left unsaid.

18. His delegation could in fact only have reaffirmed the formal reservations it had already expressed regarding the General Assembly's competence in the matter. Colombia had consistently upheld the principle of respect for the sovereignty of peoples. That was a basic provision of the United Nations Charter and should be observed by every Member State, particularly the Spanish-American countries which, in the course of their troubled political history, had built their international law on the principle of non-intervention in matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of States.

19. He associated his delegation with the tributes which had been paid to France in the course of the debate. The strongest arguments against the French position had been taken from speeches by French statesmen and articles by French writers and journalists. That was certainly the greatest tribute which could be paid to a country which was, the representative of Bolivia had said (919th meeting), the world's most complete democracy. France could well be proud, not only of the position its Government had taken in permitting the inclusion of the question of Algeria in the General Assembly's agenda, but also of that involuntary tribute.

20. Turning to the draft resolutions before the Committee, he said that he appreciated the good intentions of the sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft but felt that the text represented a step away from the goal of conciliation. At its eleventh session, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted resolution 1012 (XI), in which it had expressed the hope that a solution to the question of Algeria would be found.

21. In a tragic situation of the kind that existed in Algeria, which was causing such bloodshed in that country and such oratory in the General Assembly, the main thing was to arrange an effective cease-fire. From both the political and humanitarian points of view, it was essential to do so.

22. At the eleventh session, eighteen Powers—sixteen of the sponsors of the present draft plus Iran and Pakistan—had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) in which reference had been made to the cessation of hostilities, in other words, to a cease-fire. That was no longer mentioned in the seventeen-Power draft resolution. Praiseworthy as the reasons for the deletion might be, it nevertheless represented a step backward.

23. The First Committee should adopt unanimously the amendments to the seventeen-Power draft resolution proposed by Canada, Ireland and Norway. In substance, they did not greatly alter the draft resolution. It might be said, in reply to the representative of Saudi Arabia, that the amendments in no way affected the principles. Only the language had been changed in an attempt at conciliation. Principles, which were intangible and should be observed, should not be confused with the words in which they were expressed. The phraseology and forms of words used might change and there was no reason to be so literal that the word "self-determination" had to be used for the principle to be understood.

24. Although the word "labrar" in the provisional Spanish text of the first amendment was open to objection, there appeared to be no difference between the wording proposed in the amendment and in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. Indeed, the wording of the amendment

was, in his view, happier. No one could conceivably object to the new wording, which referred to the principle of self-determination in more conciliatory, flexible and practical terms.

25. The purpose of the second amendment was obvious. It sought to reconcile the parties, not to divide them. A reference to negotiations would have meant a return to the point dealt with so brilliantly by the representative of Peru (920th meeting). Negotiations implied recognition of the parties undertaking them. On the other hand, the word "discussions" was a more flexible, diplomatic term which did not change the substance. The point was not to adhere strictly to specific forms of words, but to interpret principles correctly and not to go back on what had been agreed at the eleventh session.

26. As so amended, the seventeen-Power draft resolution should, he believed, be acceptable to all the members of the Committee. In any case, it did not deserve to be rejected out of hand, as the representative of Saudi Arabia appeared to wish.

27. In the absence of a more satisfactory proposal, the Colombian delegation would vote in favour of the three-Power amendments.

28. The seventeen-Power draft resolution failed to take into account all the views expressed during the debate. No mention was made of the position of France, one of the principal parties. The text gave the impression that France had not been represented in the Committee or had remained silent during the debate.

29. The omission was a grave one. It was not the purpose of the United Nations to impose resolutions adopted by temporary majorities; the United Nations was a conciliatory body which should strive to bring together divergent views and not to widen the breach between them.

30. His delegation hoped that if the amendments proposed by Canada, Ireland and Norway were not adopted unanimously, the First Committee would be able to submit to the General Assembly a unanimous draft resolution which would not be a backward step when compared with resolution 1012 (XI). It would be better to adopt no text than to give the Algerian and French people a reply to the effect that the United Nations now stood for continuation of the struggle when, at its eleventh session, it had advocated a peaceful solution.

31. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said that his delegation had not taken part in the debate, but that it considered that in principle the General Assembly was competent to discuss the question at issue and to adopt resolutions which could not in any way have the character of judicial findings. In cases such as the present one, the General Assembly and the Security Council functioned as political organs and their decisions were political decisions with political aims. Consequently, despite the fact that a number of delegations might be moved by their feelings to support one or other of the parties unreservedly, his delegation considered that, if the General Assembly adopted such an attitude, it would be exceeding its competence.

32. The general lines of the seven-Power draft resolution expressed the principles underlying resolution 1012 (XI), but operative paragraph 1, which took note of the attempts which had been reported to the Assembly to settle the problem both through the good offices

of Heads of State and by French legislative measures, was the reason for the opposition of a number of delegations. The intentions of the sponsors were undoubtedly praiseworthy, but the paragraph in question was one of the chief obstacles to the adoption of the draft resolution.

33. With regard to the seventeen-Power draft resolution, the fourth paragraph of the preamble and the operative paragraph had aroused strong opposition on the part of the French and other delegations. In the opinion of the delegation of El Salvador it would be dangerous in the case in point to refer to the principle of self-determination in a draft resolution whose nature and scope were political. To do so might lead to a series of consequences for which the General Assembly one day might well be obliged to hold itself responsible to a degree impossible to foresee. The Assembly did not have to decide in favour of either of the parties involved in that serious question.

34. He had similar objections where the operative paragraph was concerned. Before there could be negotiations, the legal personality, not only of that party—France—which possessed it, but also of the other party, must be recognized, which, from the legal point of view, would be incorrect. If the General Assembly were to adopt that paragraph it would be granting such a legal personality *a priori*, and that, too, would lead to unpredictable consequences.

35. For that reason his delegation had welcomed the amendments proposed by Canada, Ireland and Norway. In that connexion it endorsed the observations made by the representative of Colombia. The delegation of El Salvador considered that those amendments, if adopted, would improve not only the seven-Power draft resolution, but also resolution 1012 (XI). His delegation would therefore vote for those two amendments and, if they were adopted, for the seven-Power draft resolution as thus amended.

36. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) pointed out that except for operative paragraph 1 the seven-Power draft resolution was almost identical with resolution 1012 (XI). Operative paragraph 1 seemed to leave France entirely free to make use of the good offices of the Moroccan and Tunisian Heads of State only in so far as it felt inclined to do so, i.e., simply in order to achieve a cease-fire. The offer of mediation, however, was designed to achieve a solution of the problem as a whole and had a wider scope.

37. Moreover, the phrase "French legislative measures" had no precise meaning. It was not clear whether it meant the *loi-cadre* or other legislative measures such as the act concerning emergency powers in Algeria. In any event it might lead the United Nations into difficulties, since the adoption of that phrase would give the impression that the United Nations approved certain laws which were plainly contrary to human rights.

38. In his opinion the seventeen-Power draft resolution was more in accordance with the realities of the situation. It merely noted that the hope expressed in General Assembly resolution 1012 (XI) had not been realized, without going into the reasons. Furthermore, it simply recognized that the principle of self-determination was applicable to the Algerian people, thus reaffirming a decision taken by the Committee itself at the eleventh session when it had adopted the second paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution con-

tained in document A/C.1/L.165. With regard to the operative paragraph, the sponsors, in a spirit of conciliation, had omitted to name either the parties between which the negotiations should take place or the basis on which those negotiations should be conducted. That fact did not, of course, exclude a cease-fire, but the sponsors of the draft resolution had avoided precise definitions in the interests of flexibility. As a whole, therefore, the draft resolution was moderate and entirely in conformity with the spirit of the Charter.

39. He pointed out several ambiguities in the three-Power amendments to that draft resolution. The expression "population d'Algérie" was misleading since it was the people of Algeria which was struggling for its right to self-determination. Furthermore, the phrase "to work out their own future in a democratic way" did not correspond to any clear political or legal conception and might also give the impression that the Committee endorsed the French position. With regard to the second amendment, the expression "effective discussions" weakened the draft resolution. That amendment had the further disadvantage of giving the impression that a settlement would be reached in two stages, the first consisting merely of opening discussions for the purpose of resolving the present troubled situation and the second to take measures with a view to reaching a solution, which was precisely the order that France proposed to follow.

40. In conclusion he said that the seventeen-Power draft resolution followed logically on resolution 1012 (XI), taking into consideration the events which had occurred since, the worsening of the situation and the evolution of the conscience of France and of the world. For the reasons he had explained, the Tunisian delegation would vote against the seven-Power draft resolution. It would also vote against the three-Power amendments. It would vote for the seventeen-Power draft resolution in its original form.

41. Mr. THORS (Iceland) said that his delegation had always held the view that the General Assembly was entitled to discuss the situation in Algeria and that the interest the United Nations had taken in the matter since the tenth session had had a considerable influence on the parties concerned and on world opinion in general. Ever since Iceland had been a Member of the United Nations it had cherished the principle of self-determination and had consistently voted in favour of its application. It was convinced that the right of Algeria to self-determination would ultimately be recognized and that the country would achieve independence in the near future. The period of colonial domination was drawing to a close and Iceland would support any action designed to hasten that development.

42. The seventeen-Power draft resolution stated a series of undeniable facts. Nevertheless, the delegation of Iceland did not see how negotiations could take place before peace had been restored. France was therefore right in claiming that a cease-fire must first be secured, and the offer of mediation by the King of Morocco and the President of Tunisia should be welcomed. The seventeen-Power draft had merits, but the delegation of Iceland could not vote for that text because it did not consider it likely to lead to any useful and positive results, since one of the parties chiefly concerned with the question, i.e., France, was opposed to it. France could not be forced into any agreement or any negotiations against its will.

43. The same considerations applied to the seven-Power draft resolution, the adoption of which would serve no useful purpose since it had been rejected by the delegations of the Arab countries. The delegation of Iceland therefore welcomed the amendments proposed by Canada, Ireland and Norway in the hope of reaching a generally acceptable compromise solution and would vote in favour of the draft with those amendments, but if the amendments were rejected, it would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution in its original form.

44. He appealed to the Algerian people to consider that independence could be achieved only by stages through constitutional reforms and by means of gradual adjustments. Iceland had passed through the stage of autonomy before obtaining its independence. The delegation of Iceland was convinced that France, which had always been the bastion of liberty, equality and fraternity, would not betray the cause of liberty. It was convinced, too, that the Algerian problem would shortly be solved in a manner consistent with the evolution of the present-day world and in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. In the meantime it was to be hoped that the Committee or, failing that, the General Assembly would be able to agree on a moderate and reasonable resolution.

45. Mr. KALIAN (Yemen) did not think that the seven-Power draft resolution would contribute to a satisfactory solution or help to improve the situation in Algeria. It clearly favoured the French position and there were several contradictions in its text, particularly in operative paragraph.

46. The seventeen-Power draft resolution, on the other hand, submitted in a spirit of conciliation and moderation, represented the minimum that the General Assembly should approve if it wished to bring about a settlement of the Algerian problem. It was fully in harmony with the spirit of the Charter and with democratic ideals and it recognized a principle which was the very cornerstone of the Charter, namely, the right of peoples to self-determination. In the opinion of the sponsors of that draft resolution, negotiation offered the only means whereby the two parties could reach an understanding. To impose conditions with regard to such negotiations would be to put obstacles in the way of a just and democratic solution and would endanger international peace and security as well as harm the interests of France and the United Nations.

47. His delegation regretted that it could not accept in their present form the proposed amendment to that draft resolution inasmuch as it felt that they departed too far from the original text and could not properly be regarded as a compromise formula.

48. He appealed to the members of the Committee to give unanimous support to the seventeen-Power draft resolution so that the grave situation in Algeria could be brought to an end as quickly as possible.

49. Mr. FAWZI (Egypt) noted with regret that nearly ten months after the adoption of resolution 1012 (XI) the situation in Algeria was worse than ever. Instead of offering a just and practical solution, France was clinging to the untenable argument that Algeria was an integral part of France and had proposed the *loi-cadre*, which even a number of prominent French statesmen regarded, not as an advance, but as a step backward.

50. In stubbornly maintaining that attitude France was doing great harm to its own interests and was causing considerable embarrassment to its allies as well as to the United Nations. It would be difficult to imagine a more deplorable policy or a more ill-considered attitude from every point of view. The situation in Algeria could not be settled by means of legalistic sophistries; it called for an immediate solution which would be fair to all concerned. To that end his delegation had joined in sponsoring the seventeen-Power draft resolution which was as constructive as it was conciliatory and which merely enumerated a number of indisputable facts and principles. He therefore regretted that some delegations were hesitant to support the solution advocated by the sponsors of that draft.

51. The text of the seven-Power draft resolution had a number of basic defects. It merely repeated, for example, the hopes expressed in resolution 1012 (XI) and prejudged the solution of the problem by leaving it to France to take whatever legislative measures it saw fit. It did not take into account the principles of the United Nations, the dignity of the human person or the right of peoples to self-determination.

52. In conclusion he stated that the Algerian situation reflected the general evolution of principles and concepts in the modern world and constituted one phase of the great process of liberation of peoples. The world was following with keen interest both the conduct of Algeria, which was doing everything in its power to gain its freedom, and the conduct of France, that once so liberal country which might well lose everything if it persisted in its outmoded concepts. It was to be hoped that France would be able to overcome its present crisis of transition.

53. His delegation would vote against the seven-Power draft resolution and against the three-Power amendments. It would vote in favour of the original text of the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

54. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) wished to rectify two serious errors made by the Tunisian representative in his interpretation of the seven-Power draft resolution. It was not correct to say that the reference in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution to the offer made by the Moroccan and Tunisian Heads of State to use their good offices concerned only a cease-fire. The sponsors of the draft resolution had referred to that offer by the two Heads of State in its entirety, as they had made clear in their statements during the debate.

55. The Tunisian representative had made another error with regard to the mention of French legislative measures, for the seven Powers had had in mind only the encouraging fact that the French Parliament had just adopted the *loi-cadre*, which opened up the prospect of a solution of the Algerian problem.

56. The sponsors of the draft resolution were not passing judgement on the substance of the matter. They merely mentioned two positive factors which held out some hope that a solution might be reached.

57. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that he would vote in favour of the three-Power amendments because they corresponded to the realities of the situation and gave the draft resolution a more helpful character; otherwise it would tend to defeat its own purpose.

58. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia) said that the seventeen-Power draft resolution seemed to meet the needs of the

situation. It was a logical sequel to resolution 1012 (XI) and envisaged the only solution of the problem which would be possible under the Charter. The Assembly could hardly do less than to adopt it.

59. The amendments to that draft submitted by Canada, Ireland and Norway were somewhat perplexing to his delegation. They sought to delete from the draft resolution the paragraphs relating to the principles of the Charter and to the methods provided by the latter for settling such disputes. Thus the deletion of the reference to self-determination would seem to imply that that principle was not applicable to the Algerian people, which in turn would mean that the Charter did not apply to certain areas of the world. As far as negotiations were concerned, the parties to the dispute themselves appeared to have agreed to that course. The proposed new text might be interpreted as precluding the possibility of undertaking such negotiations, which alone offered a hope that the problem could be solved without recourse to armed force. If those amendments were adopted, the draft resolution would no longer be the compromise which his delegation was ready to support.

60. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) said that he would vote in favour of the two three-Power amendments, particularly the second one inasmuch as the words "in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" implied that the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter should be observed in all circumstances.

61. Mr. ESIN (Turkey) noted that the divergence between the views of the members of the Committee was becoming ever wider. As the Committee could do useful work only if a substantial number of votes was obtained for the draft resolution under consideration, his delegation would be obliged to abstain from voting on all the proposals submitted.

62. Mr. CHARLONE (Uruguay) felt that the Assembly should try to achieve a compromise solution. The moral weight of resolution 1012 (XI) would be considerably weakened if the Committee failed to adopt a new resolution by the necessary majority. A United Nations principle could be invoked in one of two ways, namely, by reaffirming the appropriate provision of the Charter or by expressing its substance in another way. He was convinced that the three-Power amendments did not alter the substance of the draft resolution in any way. To say that "the people of Algeria are entitled to work out their own future in a democratic way" was to recognize the personality of the Algerian people and their right to choose for themselves in a democratic way the political structure they desired, and that, in the final analysis, was self-determination.

63. The second amendment, like the first, was in accordance with the tenor of the original draft. There could be no negotiation without discussion. Neither of those terms prejudged the final result or the absence of any results. A cease-fire might well be negotiated with the rebels, but the future of Algeria could not be decided in the absence of the one valid party, namely the Algerian people expressing their wishes in accordance with democratic procedures. In any event, the words at the end of the paragraph, "in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations", offered an additional guarantee.

64. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) said that he

would vote against the three-Power amendments for the reasons given by previous speakers and owing to the difference between the provisional French text and the English text.

65. Mr. ENGEN (Norway) pointed out that, although the Committee did not have the power to solve the problem of Algeria, it was under a duty to express an opinion on the measures that should be adopted, taking into account the various points of view that had been expressed. Its task was, in short, to invite the two parties to contribute to the solution of the problem by moving forward, if only slightly, from the positions which they had so eloquently explained. The amendments before the Committee were reasonable and useful and could contribute to a solution of the problem provided that the two parties displayed good will. He hoped that the amendments would be adopted by a large majority and that they would thus contribute to the reconciliation which was a prerequisite for a solution of the problem.

66. Mr. VELA (Guatemala) said that, unless a more specific translation of the English text were provided, he would abstain from the vote on the three-Power amendments.

67. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) made a number of suggestions concerning the wording of the Spanish text of the three-Power amendments. He emphasized that if the Committee voted on the original text, that should not, in his opinion, create a precedent.

68. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) supported the Salvadorian representative's suggestions.

69. The CHAIRMAN said that he would put to the vote the original English text of the amendments as submitted by the three sponsors. The Secretariat would take note of the suggestions concerning the translation of those amendments.

70. Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) said that the French delegation, in keeping with the position it had adopted at the eleventh session, would not participate in the vote.

71. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendments submitted by Canada, Ireland and Norway (A/C.1/L.196) to the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Morocco, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg.

Against: Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,

Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaya (Federation of).

Abstaining: Philippines, Turkey, Bolivia, Cambodia, Guatemala, Liberia, Mexico.

Present and not voting: France.

The amendments were adopted by 37 votes to 36, with 7 abstentions.

72. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yeman (A/C.1/L.194), as amended.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Libya, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Laos.

Against: Libya, Malaya (Federation of), Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia.

Abstaining: Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, Bolivia, Cambodia, Guatemala.

Present and not voting: France.

The draft resolution was not adopted, 37 votes being cast in favour and 37 against, with 6 abstentions.

73. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) felt that, as the amendments had been adopted by a majority of one and as the vote on the draft resolution, as amended, had been equally divided, the Committee could vote on the unamended text of the draft resolution.

74. Mr. DRAGO (Argentina), speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the seven-Power draft resolution, formally requested a suspension of the meeting for ten minutes.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 6.15 p.m. and resumed at 6.25 p.m.

75. Mr. DRAGO (Argentina) announced that the sponsors of the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.195) would not press for a vote on their text in the First Committee. They reserved the right to resubmit their draft resolution at a plenary meeting.

76. Mr. ST. LOT (Haiti) explained why he had been unable to vote for the three-Power amendments. A body with great moral authority such as the General Assembly could do more than "propose"; it could have "recommended". Moreover, the word "discussions"

was hardly appropriate, particularly as there had been no lack of discussion on the Algerian question. Had the Committee wished to avoid the word "negotiations", it could have referred to "conversations" or "contacts". The matter had already gone beyond the stage of discussions because it had developed into a dispute and a war, which was the most violent form of dispute.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.