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Chairman: Mr. Djajal ABDUH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 59

The question of Algeria (A/3617 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. GERBI (Libya) considered that the debate at the eleventh session had revealed the true character of the question of Algeria, namely, the struggle of a once sovereign nation to regain its independence and obtain recognition of its right to dignity and a decent life.

2. The Algerian war was causing great suffering. Many lives had been lost and thousands of people had been driven from their homes. According to an article by Mr. Thomas F. Brady in *The New York Times* of 9 November 1957, French military losses during the three years of the insurrection totalled 4,920 killed and the rebel losses were about nine times that number. In that three-year period, according to French estimates, the insurgents had killed 1,230 European civilians and 7,625 Moslem civilians. The 16 November 1957 issue of *Le Monde* gave similar figures. For its part, the National Liberation Front (FLN) assessed the casualties among the Algerian civil population at 200,000 killed. The so-called "operation" of 20 August 1955 in the Philippeville district alone had caused the death of 3,000 persons, according to the French Press.

3. France was waging a typically colonial war in Algeria which it described as "pacification". The pacification methods were particularly ruthless with regard to the populations of the combat areas who were accused of "conniving" with the freedom fighters and dealt with accordingly. Often their villages were attacked and destroyed and survivors were thrown into concentration camps, tortured or executed. In that context he quoted a message from an article published on 17 August 1957 in the London periodical, *New Statesman*, regarding the systematic and deliberate violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights observed by the International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices, which had investigated the situation in Algeria. The Commission's report had not aroused public opinion and the Press in France and the few French journalists who had protested against the methods employed had been prosecuted and their newspapers seized or suppressed.

4. He noted that the Algerian war had created vast numbers of refugees, 200,000 in Tunisia and 100,000 in Morocco. Those refugees were a heavy economic burden on the two host countries. Moreover, the war

was extremely costly for both sides. France maintained 700,000 troops in Algeria at a cost of \$3 million per day. It had so far spent more than \$1,000 million to maintain a people of 12 million in servitude. The Algerians also suffered because of the war. They were peaceful by nature but, convinced of the justice of their cause, they risked their lives and their property to carry on a war forced upon them by French intransigence. The scale of the war was constantly increasing, disrupting peace in the whole area and indirectly threatening world security. Incursions by French forces into Tunisian and Moroccan territory were almost a daily occurrence. In October 1957, a detachment of French armoured forces, supported by an Air Force unit, had penetrated into Libyan territory.

5. He noted with regret that resolution 1012 (XI), which was a unanimous expression of United Nations concern with the Algerian problem, had not produced the desired results because France had maintained its position and intensified its military efforts in an attempt to crush the Algerian National Liberation Army. In contrast, the Algerians had constantly made efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution through negotiation. Those efforts had been of no avail. The French attitude stemmed from the erroneous conception that the Algerian question was a matter of French national sovereignty and France hoped to settle it in accordance with its colonial ambitions.

6. The position of the present French Government was the same as that of its predecessors. In his statement to the French National Assembly on 5 November 1957, the French Prime Minister, Mr. Félix Gaillard, requested the Parliament to renew the special powers granted to previous governments and resume the debate on the *loi-cadre* (basic law) to indicate not only to Algeria but to the entire world that French policy was not limited to the re-establishment of order in Algeria but also provided for the political future of a territory that could not but remain closely associated with France. The present French policy was based on three principles: continuation of the war under the special powers; the *loi-cadre*; and association of Algeria with France. Those three principles, in the view of his delegation, would preclude any understanding between the two parties.

7. The *loi-cadre* was reminiscent of the traditional colonial tactic of "divide and rule". The new law which was extremely complicated sought to maintain the political privileges of French settlers through indirect means by dividing Algeria into five political units. Thus the settlers would have the upper hand in the regions where they were in the majority; the Algerians would become citizens of the territory of their birth and would have to acquire a new status each time they moved from one territory to another. That was the provision of article 8 of the *loi-cadre*. Consequently there would be several "Algerias" and several regional nationalities.

In an article published in the Express of 13 September 1957, Mr. Gaston Defferre, author of the loi-cadre for the Overseas Territories wrote that by dividing Algeria into several territories, the Government hoped to be able to oppose one against the other so that they would in the end refuse to unite or federate. Further, France reserved for itself some twenty-three areas relating to important activities of the State and merely left relatively secondary powers to the five assemblies and community councils.

8. The third principle, namely, the close association of Algeria with France, was covered by article 1 of the loi-cadre, which stipulated that Algeria was an integral part of France, and by the provision to the effect that its inhabitants were French citizens. Small wonder then that the FLN opposed the law.

9. His delegation asked France to abandon three unrealistic concepts determining its policy, namely, that Algeria was an integral part of France, that the FLN did not represent the people of Algeria and that the French settlers would suffer in an independent Algeria. Algeria was not a part of France either socially, geographically or linguistically. It was considered as French territory only by virtue of unilateral legislation, in the adoption of which Algerians had not participated through democratically elected representatives. As for the concept that FLN did not represent the people of Algeria, the facts were sufficient to prove the degree to which the whole Algerian people supported that movement. Lastly, in the matter of the fate of French settlers, the Algerians had already announced their willingness to give the necessary guarantees. The settlers could choose Algerian nationality and enjoy full political and individual rights. If they did not opt for Algerian nationality, they would continue to enjoy their individual rights.

10. He stated that, if France abandoned the three principles governing its policy, there would be nothing to prevent it from entering into negotiations with the FLN with a view to working out relations between the two countries on the basis of Algerian sovereignty. In that regard, his Government noted with satisfaction the offer of mediation made by the King of Morocco and the President of Tunisia, two particularly well-qualified personalities because of their broad knowledge of Algerian affairs and because of the ties between their countries and France. It was regrettable that France had rejected that offer and that it still hoped to solve the Algerian question on the basis of the loi-cadre which was a complete negation of the aspiration of the Algerian people.

11. In the circumstances his delegation considered that it was the responsibility of the United Nations to find a peaceful solution to the problem in accordance with the principles of the Charter and with the obligation devolving upon it to maintain international peace and justice and safeguard the right of self-determination of peoples. His delegation was convinced that the Algerian question could not be settled by concessions. It must be settled by recognizing the independence of Algeria, which would afford advantages for France itself without prejudice to the French settlers in Algeria. It would enable France to find a way out of a political and economic impasse and to free itself from the heavy financial burdens imposed on it by the war.

12. Mr. LESHCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the General Assembly was

competent to deal with the Algerian question, for one of its purposes was to develop friendly relations between nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Furthermore, since the Algerian crisis was prejudicial to good relations between France on the one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other, it was legitimate to invoke Article 14 of the Charter under which the General Assembly might recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deemed likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The General Assembly could thus make recommendations even in a situation which did not constitute a threat to the peace.

13. Owing to the attitude adopted by France, which did not intend to give up the use of armed force, the present question was one which affected peace and security, particularly, in North Africa and the Near East.

14. The Algerian incidents were the inevitable result of the historic evolution of the peoples who were awakening to national consciousness as the hateful colonial system collapsed. Those who represented the Algerian liberation movement as the work of outside forces intended to deceive world public opinion as to the true nature of the rising.

15. It was to be noted with regret that France had disappointed the hopes placed in it when the Assembly had adopted resolution 1012 (XI). In fact, the situation in Algeria had deteriorated. A number of Member States had drawn the Secretary-General's attention to that matter in a letter dated 15 April 1957, which had stressed the contrast between France's repressive policy and the measures recommended by the Assembly.

16. For more than three years the French authorities had been carrying on a veritable war against the Algerian people who legitimately aspired to the exercise of their sovereign rights. The facts categorically refuted the claims put out by French propaganda that a policy of pacification and reform had been put into operation. As it had done in the past, France was disregarding the Algerian people's right of self-determination; that was clearly proved by the activities of its leaders in Algeria. France's colonialist policy was in contradiction with the historic principles and decisions of the African-Asian Conference, held at Bandung in 1955, as well as with the concept of peaceful coexistence.

17. There was daily proof that that method had no chance of success, that it was not compatible with the reality of the situation; nevertheless, the French authorities were continuing their policy of ruthless repression and the use of force. For every twenty inhabitants in Algeria there was one French soldier. According to the figures given to the French National Assembly, French troops had killed 48,000 Algerians between the opening of hostilities and April 1956. France's policy had ended, not in the promised pacification, but in a military occupation.

18. Large segments of the French population did not support that policy. A number of important persons and organizations publicly disavowed it; he cited by way of example, a statement by the Fédération protestante de France and a letter to the President of France from sixty-one scientists. The disapproval of a large

part of the French public was the more easily understandable in that the Algerian war was one of the main causes of the economic and financial difficulties in which France was now floundering. The Algerian operations cost French taxpayers nearly 2,000 million francs a day. They had already cost more than the Indo-Chinese war. In order to meet that cost, new taxes were to be imposed and that was not to mention the cost of the lives of thousands of young Frenchmen.

19. The French Government claimed that Algeria was not ripe for independence. It advocated "interdependence" on the pretext that without its assistance Algeria was doomed to stagnation. It concluded therefrom that the Algerian people ought to try to strengthen their political and economic links with France. The loi-cadre was a political manoeuvre aimed at saving the situation for the benefit of France. It contained no provision compelling it to grant Algeria independence should the Moslem majority so demand in the central legislative assembly. It was based on the untenable idea that Algeria was an integral part of France.

20. The French Government should recognize the right of self-determination of the Algerian people, put a stop to military operations and undertake negotiations with representatives of the Algerian people, taking account of the will of the majority. If the French delegation were to be believed, the exercise of the right of self-determination would inevitably result in the partition of Algeria. The examples of Tunisia and Morocco, however, proved the contrary. Moreover, most of the European minority in Algeria had nothing to do with and were not interested in the colonialist policy and would have nothing to do with it.

21. His delegation hoped that the General Assembly would contribute to the settlement of the problem and that the attainment by the Algerian people of their national aspirations would permit the establishment of friendly relations and fruitful co-operation between France and Algeria.

22. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) recalled that when the Committee had considered the question at the eleventh session the same sharp differences of view had been revealed. Aware of the complexity and of the implications of the Algerian problem, the General Assembly had eventually adopted unanimously resolution 1012 (XI). The United States had believed that that decision which was of great significance to all who were genuinely interested in the maintenance of peace in North Africa would be an encouragement towards a peaceful solution of the question. It had been convinced then, as it was now, that the General Assembly should avoid any step which might reduce the chances of reaching a peaceful settlement.

23. The United States was still hoping for a peaceful outcome of the situation. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pineau, in his statement at the 913th meeting, had urged that his Government should be allowed to continue its efforts to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution. On 29 November 1957, the French National Assembly had taken a step forward by approving the loi-cadre, which provided for a system which would facilitate the establishment of constructive and friendly relations between the communities concerned. In those circumstances it would be advisable for the United Nations to avoid taking any action which might hamper progress towards a peaceful and equitable solution.

24. It was essential to put an end to the violence and bloodshed in Algeria and thereby to create conditions in which the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people might be fulfilled. The United States delegation had been glad, therefore, to hear Mr. Pineau reaffirm France's intention to seek a cease-fire, hold general elections and work out a new political structure in agreement with the elected representatives of the people.

25. The debate so far had revealed the complexity of the Algerian problem. Representatives who had spoken had shown moderation and an evident spirit of conciliation.

26. The States neighbouring on Algeria had a special interest in the settlement of the question. That was why the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments had recently offered their good offices. The United States appreciated the motives underlying that offer as well as the constructive spirit in which it had been made. The success of that initiative would depend on the agreement of those concerned. It could, therefore, succeed only if France accepted the offer. If France did not think that such mediation could lead to a satisfactory solution at the present time, it was to be hoped that in the near future circumstances would make it possible for steps such as those, or others, to be taken which would promote the peaceful settlement of the question. In the meanwhile the United States believed that France should be given a further opportunity to foster political evolution towards the common objective of stability and peace in Algeria in a way which would satisfy the aspirations of all the Algerian people.

27. Mr. BRATANOV (Bulgaria) said that most of the delegations, like the French public, had expected France to come before the General Assembly at its twelfth session and report considerable progress towards the peaceful solution of the Algerian problem. That hope had not been realized, and disappointment had been particularly keen among the French people who had clearly expressed their views, in the elections of January 1956, by giving their support to political parties and leaders who favoured a speedy, peaceful, equitable and democratic solution of the Algerian question. The colonialist groups, however, had hindered the achievement of the task laid upon its elected representatives by the French people.

28. Bulgaria was opposed to any form of colonialist slavery and believed that a solution in accordance with the interests of the two peoples concerned could be found if both parties showed goodwill and faced the facts of the situation. It must, in particular, be recognized that in Algeria an entire people was fighting for its independence. It could not reasonably be maintained that an army of over half a million men had been waging a full-scale war for more than three years against a few thousand terrorists and bandits. An armed struggle could not succeed without the support of the broad masses of the people. As for the so-called pacification of Algeria, which was allegedly on the point of achievement, it was far from being an actual fact.

29. In those circumstances, any attempt to impose by force of arms a solution based on the fiction that Algeria was an integral part of France or that the Algerian question was a French question, would involve the choice of the least appropriate course of action and the one least in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter or resolution 1012 (XI).

30. The essential fact was that the Algerian people was fighting for its independence and for the recognition of its right of self-determination. It had not taken up arms in order to secure promises of reform from a foreign administration but in order to manage its own affairs. After 127 years of colonial domination, it was a little late to show concern about improving the backward position of the Algerian people. Any promise of reform met with the scepticism of a people who knew from experience what they could expect. In any case, all the new plans of reform were mere palliatives which had come too late, in view of the scale of the liberation movement.

31. The French Government had laid great emphasis on the amount of money which it was spending on the development of Algeria. That money would undoubtedly be more useful in an atmosphere of peace and confidence. The abolition of the colonial system would open new opportunities to the French economy in the Algerian market, which today was limited by the impoverishment of an over-exploited people.

32. The Bulgarian delegation believed that the United Nations should unequivocally affirm the Algerian people's right of self-determination. The Algerian question was an extremely serious one and could not be postponed from one session to the next. All the possibilities provided in the Charter should be used in order to solve the problem, which jeopardized peace and security and impaired friendly relations between a number of countries. The Assembly ought to state clearly that a speedy solution of the problem could only be brought about by negotiations. The Algerian movement of national liberation could not be stifled by force and the international character of the problem could not be denied.

33. Moreover, a peaceful, democratic and just solution, based on respect for the right of free determination, would be in the best traditions of the French people, the traditions of liberty, equality and fraternity which had been a source of inspiration to all the peoples of the world in their struggle against foreign oppression. The real interests of the two peoples concerned demanded that the conflict should be brought to an end and any measure likely to facilitate negotiations should be supported. If the United Nations acted on these lines, it would contribute to the independence of a free nation, whose history had been a glorious one and which would do its share in the community of nations to create a better world.

34. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said that the apparently academic character of the debate, on which some observers had commented, was not a sign of indifference. The world was confronted with a rare psychological phenomenon, resulting from the general astonishment at the war that was being waged by a nation which since 1789 had generously poured out its blood for the triumph of liberty and the lofty principles of justice and fraternity.

35. For sentimental and intellectual reasons hostility to France was impossible. The Bolivian delegation for its part could not change its traditional attitude towards the nation to which the world owed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. It continued to believe that France was still the most complete democracy of our age. It did not believe that French democracy was foundering in anarchy and impotence.

Liberty was enjoyed in France as it had been enjoyed in the Athens of Solon. It was worth remembering that in ancient Greece the enjoyment of complete liberty had permitted the existence of the most widely different points of view, which, far from being a proof of impotence, had always been the most genuine expression of liberty. If a dictatorial or authoritarian régime ever succeeded in establishing itself in France, the free world would have to deplore a setback in the political evolution of nations.

36. It was in that spirit that the Bolivian delegation considered the Algerian problem. If France persisted in its desire to remain in Algeria, it was not for motives of pure self-interest. It was not an ordinary case of colonialism but was due to something which had perhaps ceased to have any meaning in our materialistic age: the love of glory in a people who had always been inspired by a desire for immortality. If the longing for glory and immortality had led the French people to pursue a mistaken course, it was the duty of the United Nations to make the truth plain and to express the hope of the community of nations, which, under the influence of France itself and following its example, longed for political liberty and independence.

37. Bolivia, like all the countries of Latin America, had achieved independence as a result of the teaching of the Encyclopaedists and the triumph of the French Revolution, whose ideals had by an irony of history been spread by the legions of the Napoleonic empire. A similar phenomenon was occurring in North Africa. The Algerian people's struggle for independence was a direct result of the French people's struggle against Hitlerite tyranny. Thousands of Algerians had fought side by side with French heroes in the resistance and in that struggle had learned that the dignity and honour of the citizen could only exist in a state of national independence.

38. It was that fact and nothing else that was the direct cause of the Algerian rebellion. The war which had been going on for three years on African soil was not a war against France. On the contrary, it was the rebellion of minds imbued with French idealism against an outmoded colonial system whose artificial prolongation in North Africa was not only harmful to the Moslems and Europeans of Algeria but also to the 45 million inhabitants of continental France.

39. It was wrong to regard as a war a revolution which was aimed at the reorganization of Franco-Moslem society on new foundations in a spirit of fraternity and equality. It was obvious that the French leaders wished to settle the dispute as a family matter, just as they had done in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco.

40. In North Africa, France had given the countries under its protectorate something which had always been lacking in other colonial administrations: its profound feeling for culture and civilization, based on respect for human dignity and the rights of the citizen. That was why the President of Tunisia and the King of Morocco were understandably reluctant to do anything that might weaken the ties of friendship which linked their countries to France, the home of humanism and the country of all men.

41. The Bolivian delegation thought that it would be useless and even dangerous to draw up a balance of the sacrifices which had been made by the French and the Algerian peoples in the revolutionary war in which

their sons were ranged against each other. It firmly believed that the bloodshed, physical destruction and suffering endured by the two adversaries should be brought to an end as quickly as possible and that the heroism displayed by Algerians and Frenchmen should encourage all nations to seek a satisfactory settlement. For that reason it hoped that the offer of mediation made by the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments might serve as a basis for efforts to reach a settlement, inspired by the principles of the United Nations Charter, in particular the right of self-determination of peoples, which would take into account the just claims of the heroic Algerian people and the legitimate interests of France, established by the tireless efforts of its sons during more than a century.

42. It was not the duty of the United Nations to determine the future political structure of its Member States. There was no reason why, for reasons of geography, culture, strategy and economics, a voluntary association of France, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco should not come into being on the shores of the Mediterranean.

43. The solidarity between France and the Maghreb, which was already foreseen by the best citizens of both, should make it possible to realize the most ambitious plans for economic and social development and to satisfy the general desire to see a Eurafrikan link established between the giant States of the East and West.

44. The Bolivian delegation expressed the hope that the present debate might result in some positive steps which would lead, in the near future, to fruitful co-operation between the people of Algeria, France, Tunisia and Morocco, in a union of free, independent and sovereign States.

45. Mr. NASE (Albania) observed that, despite the hopes expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution 1012 (XI), the Algerian question had again come before the United Nations without the least progress having been made towards a peaceful, just and democratic solution. On the contrary, because of the negative attitude of the French Government, the tragic situation of Algeria had further deteriorated. It was causing growing anxiety and it constituted a real danger to peace in that part of the world.

46. The Algerian people's struggle was one of the many examples witnessed since the end of the Second World War of peoples which were fighting for the termination of colonial rule, for national liberation and for independence. It was easy to understand the re-awakening of national awareness on the part of the Algerian people, toughened by a century of resistance, as well as their desire for independence at the side of their brothers in Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and other countries.

47. The French Government, using fallacious arguments which were borne out neither by the facts themselves nor by international agreements and texts, continued to claim that Algeria formed an integral part of France and that consequently the United Nations had no right to concern itself in the solution of this question.

48. No one could seriously argue that the war which was at that moment being fought throughout Algeria, which had on occasions overflowed its frontiers and had had serious repercussions on Franco-Tunisian and

Franco-Moroccan relations, did not constitute a threat to peace. Accordingly the question had been examined at a number of international conferences, including the Bandung Conference, which had been cited by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Committee in connexion with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. It was being examined for the second time by the United Nations because it directly affected peace and the fundamental principles of the Charter, especially that of the right of self-determination. Lastly, a series of international events relating to Algeria—the conversations between the President of Tunisia and the King of Morocco and their offer of good offices, the meeting in Paris between the French and British Prime Ministers, discussions between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State, proved beyond doubt the international character of the Algerian question.

49. Of course the French Government could have avoided the question coming once more before the General Assembly at the present session by carrying out the unanimous recommendation made in resolution 1012 (XI) and by trying to reach a peaceful settlement with the representatives of the FLN, who were fully qualified to speak for the Algerian people, and who had always expressed their readiness to open negotiations. Unfortunately, the French Government had, on various pretexts, rejected all such proposals.

50. It had even refused the good offices of the King of Morocco and of the President of Tunisia, who had urged the two parties to enter into negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement on the basis of the independence of Algeria and the safeguarding of French interests. It had rejected that proposal on the pretext, that in its view, the leaders of the FLN were not representative of the Algerian people and that the two mediating Governments could not usefully contribute to the solution of the Algerian problem because they were under the influence of the FLN.

51. The French Government had therefore decided to pursue in Algeria its policy of force and violence based on the colonialist attitude which led it to maintain obstinately that Algeria was an integral part of France.

52. This outlook was reflected in the loi-cadre which the French National Assembly had just approved and which was a measure taken unilaterally by France contrary to many statements made by leading Frenchmen, for example by Mr. Guy Mollet in his speech of investiture as Prime Minister of France on 31 January 1956 and by Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the eleventh session of the General Assembly (843rd meeting).

53. In keeping with the old imperialist motto "divide and rule", the loi-cadre provided for the parcelling out of Algeria into autonomous territories and the establishment of certain federative institutions. The French had claimed that this law would give a large measure of administrative autonomy, but that would not amount to much if the principal powers—i.e., those connected with national defence, foreign affairs, justice, currency, customs, education, etc.—were retained by the French authorities. The loi-cadre settled nothing; on the contrary it encouraged the continuance of the war.

54. The Algerian forces taking part in this struggle for national liberation had almost trebled in the course of the current year. They were increasingly well equipped

especially with arms of French origin. The war of liberation had now spread over the whole country, a large part of which was free from French domination and administered by the fighting forces of the FLN. Apart from guerrilla actions, veritable battles were taking place in various parts of the country. The struggle for national liberation represented an indomitable force and enjoyed the sympathy and moral support of all the Arab peoples and of progressive peoples all over the world.

55. The French forces in Algeria had also increased considerably. The war was costing France about 2,000 million francs a year, to the detriment of the French working masses and of the French economy. To carry on the war in Algeria, France was making use of the French forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, equipped with material supplied by that aggressive organization or with arms obtained direct from the United States. Mr. M. D. Sprague, United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs had stated on 19 June 1957 in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that it was quite probable part of the military equipment supplied by the United States to France was being sent to Algeria. The United States was therefore directly involved in the bloody war in Algeria, doubtless motivated by the intention of taking the place of the French in that territory as it had done in Indo-China.

56. The Algerian war continued and was becoming worse, and the measures of violence and terror being taken against the innocent people of Algeria were

reaching an intensity at which French public opinion was revolted. The French Government had found it necessary to set up a Commission de sauvegarde des droits et des libertés individuels as a consequence of the disclosures on atrocities committed in Algeria.

57. There was only one solution—to recognize the independence of Algeria. It was the only way of bringing peace back to the country and at the same time of safeguarding French interests. It depended on the French Government alone whether the Algerian people achieved independence with France and not against it.

58. Only the co-ordinated efforts of the United Nations could bring about a peaceful solution. The General Assembly should recommend to the parties a settlement of the problem based on the recognition of Algerian independence.

59. The Albanian delegation was sure that the Algerian people would triumph in its noble cause. The history of all the peoples liberated from imperialist bondage, especially since the second world War and Albania's own experience gave every ground for confidence. The Albanian people, which had fought for and achieved its own independence and freedom after an epic struggle, felt profound friendship and admiration for the valiant Algerian people.

60. The Albanian delegation looked forward to the day when the representatives of an independent Algeria would take their seats in the United Nations as representatives of a Member State.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.