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Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDON (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 23

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/3672, A/C.1/795) (continued)

1. Mr. ULRICH (Czechoslovakia) said that the United Nations had failed to reach an equitable solution of the Korean question. For four years, the group of States that had taken part in the Korean war, headed by the United States, had been forcing one-sided resolutions on the General Assembly which could not be the basis for a solution in the interests of the Korean people and of peace and security in the Far East. Moreover, the absence from the Assembly's deliberations of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the People's Republic of China, States directly concerned, had rendered the debates fruitless and prevented a constructive solution.

2. According to paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement (S/3079, appendix A), the Korean question was to be settled by negotiations between the parties concerned which were to take place at a political conference. At the Korean Political Conference, held at Geneva in 1954, the United States had obstructed a settlement and had prematurely ended the deliberations by pressing for the adoption of the Declaration by the Sixteen (A/2786, annex) which would impose on the Korean people one-sided, false terms for its reunification. The repeated confirmations by the General Assembly of that Declaration merely stressed the existing unfavourable situation. So long as the sixteen States adhered to their Declaration and insisted on the special position of the United Nations in a solution of the question, and on so-called free elections to be held under United Nations supervision and in the presence of interventionist United States forces, there was no hope of a settlement. In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, the time had come to abandon all attempts to force a partial solution and to seek a new basis for a settlement in the spirit of the Armistice Agreement. The early establishment of a unified and independent Korea by peaceful means would satisfy the desires of the Korean people and ease tension in the area. The settlement of the Korean question was primarily a task for the Korean people itself; any solution imposed from the outside without regard for Korean interests could not ensure peace.

3. To deal with the Korean problem effectively, the Assembly must recognize the existence in Korea of two separate States with different social systems which could be unified and rehabilitated only by agreement between them in the interest of the whole people. The different political and economic development of the two States had created barriers which must be eliminated by the establishment of contacts between the respective populations and the development of economic and cultural relations. Towards that end, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic had been submitting proposals to the South Korean authorities for a number of years, only to be met with a South Korean refusal to consider them. The essence of the proposals was that unification of the country should be achieved by all-Korean elections to be held on a democratic basis without foreign interference. The political, economic and cultural rapprochement of the two parts of Korea would facilitate the attainment of that objective and negotiations between their respective representatives should start as soon as possible.

4. The position of the United States and of the South Korean authorities dependent upon it constituted the main obstacles to a Korean settlement. Not only was the United States unwilling to withdraw its troops in accordance with paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement as a precondition for all-Korean elections, but it was systematically violating other provisions of the Agreement. It had, for example, in 1953 concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea under which United States armed forces were authorized to occupy that part of the country on a permanent basis. It had built a large army in South Korea, said by the United States Press to be the largest and best equipped army in the Far East.

5. In contrast, the People's Republic of China had withdrawn nineteen divisions of volunteers since 1956 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had unilaterally reduced its armed forces by 80,000 men. Moreover, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic had proposed the convening of a conference on the reduction of armed forces and armaments budgets and had urged upon South Korea a joint declaration renouncing the use of force as a means for achieving the reunification of the country. Its proposals had been categorically rejected. That rejection clearly indicated which side was responsible for obstructing the reunification of the country. It was consistent with United States and South Korean policy: the United States counted on Korea as a strategic base close to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, and South Korea continued to press for a denunciation of the entire Armistice Agreement.

6. As the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) had recalled in its report (A/3672), the South Korean Government had refused to sign the Armistice Agreement in

1953 and had repeatedly called for its annulment. Consequently, it had welcomed the stand taken by the United Nations Command with regard to sub-paragraph 13 (d) of the Agreement. The United States had further refused to consider the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, including the most recent one made by the former on 26 June 1957, for the convening of an international conference of all the States concerned in order to settle the Korean question.

7. The situation in Korea had been further aggravated by the declaration of the United Nations Command, made on 21 June 1957, that it did not intend to abide by the provisions of sub-paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement which prohibited the shipment of new weapons to Korea and by the United States announcement of 8 December 1957 that its troops in South Korea were partially equipped with weapons capable of firing atomic warheads. As a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), Czechoslovakia considered those acts to be gross violations of the Armistice Agreement. They had followed upon the United States' refusal on 9 June 1956 to allow inspection groups of the NNSC to carry out their activities in South Korea and to submit reports to that body on shipments of military matériel. The shipment of new combat matériel into South Korea and the United States' refusal to inform the NNSC as provided in the Armistice Agreement gave new emphasis to the role of the NNSC as a neutral organ responsible for watching over the increase of the military potential in Korea and for helping to create conditions necessary to convert the existing truce into a lasting peace. In the present situation, Czechoslovakia was fully aware of its responsibilities as a member of the NNSC: by fulfilling its tasks conscientiously, the NNSC would help to strengthen world confidence in the value of international treaties and to maintain peace in the Far East. The United States' conduct towards the NNSC represented a threat to its very existence.

8. The United States sought to justify its intention not to abide by the provisions of sub-paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement by stating (A/3631) that that action was necessary to maintain a relative military balance in Korea and that replacement weapons were being deployed for defensive purposes only. Such arguments could not conceal the true nature of United States policy: an unlawful act was being hidden from world opinion on the pretext that it was necessary for the preservation of peace and order.

9. The General Assembly should spare no effort to bring about conditions favourable for the final settlement of the Korean question as envisaged in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had already proved its good will; a similar demonstration should be made by the other side and a conference of all the countries concerned should be convened as early as possible. A Korean settlement could be achieved only through negotiation, not by force or threats. Czechoslovakia pledged full support for the Korean people's desire for reunification.

10. Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) said that the discussions held in the First Committee since 1954 had shown clearly that the crux of the Korean question was the problem of reunifying the country. The reunification of the country through free elections under inter-

national control had been the most important of the principles laid down at the Korean Political Conference as the basis for any settlement of the Korean question (A/2786, para. 1), and the General Assembly had regularly reaffirmed that position by substantial majorities. The communist side had, however, rejected those principles and bore complete responsibility for the maintenance of a situation which was contrary to the clearly expressed will of the United Nations.

11. Despite the failure of the attempts to bring about the peaceful reunification of the country, the political and economic development of the Republic of Korea continued to progress satisfactorily, as was evidenced by the latest report of UNCURK. The representative character of the political system of the Republic of Korea had been made clear during the debate at the General Assembly's eleventh session. In North Korea, however, the situation was exactly the reverse. During the last debate on the admission of new Members in the Special Political Committee (48th meeting), the French representative had supplied information which proved that the alleged elections held by the Pyongyang government were only a parody of democracy. The information available about the elections held in North Korea during 1957 confirmed the permanent character of that government's methods and showed the distance which must still be travelled before the country could be reunited on a really democratic basis, that is, in conformity with the freely expressed will of the entire population. That fact made it all the more important to reaffirm the principles already laid down within the United Nations.

12. The Committee had been aware for a long time that Armistice Agreement had been continually violated by the communist side. The combat equipment of the forces stationed in North Korea had been strengthened by the introduction of several hundred jet aircraft, transport equipment, artillery, and so on, while the communist members of the Military Armistice Commission had not reported the slightest change in the composition of their forces and had, moreover, opposed any investigation by the NNSC. It was under those circumstances that the Unified Command, for purely defensive ends, had decided to re-establish the balance of forces, by gradually replacing the obsolete equipment of the United Nations forces in the Republic of Korea. However, although the United Nations Command considered itself relieved of the obligations set forth in sub-paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement, it had solemnly declared that it would continue to observe the other provisions of the Agreement. In the circumstances, the protests which had followed the Unified Command's decision were pure propaganda and in no way corresponded to reality.

13. His delegation reserved the right to speak again when a draft resolution been submitted.

14. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the perennial discussion of the Korean question clearly demonstrated that the United States, with the support of other Western Powers was trying to use the United Nations to conceal the aggressive tactics by means of which it was endeavouring to achieve its objective in Korea, an objective that had nothing in common with the interests of the Korean people. It also demonstrated that bullying, threats to resort to the use of force and attempts to force unilateral decisions on other people, far from solving any

international problem such as the unification of Korea, merely increased international tension.

15. From the outset the United States had had but one objective in Korea: to force the Korean people to accept the South Korean régime. It had vainly pursued that objective in a three-year war and through the many General Assembly resolutions on the Korean question.

16. It was not surprising in those circumstances that the UNCURK report noted that there had been no change in the basic prospects for realizing the fundamental objective of the United Nations in Korea, namely, to bring about, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government for the whole of the Korean peninsula. Obviously there could be no change as long as the Western Powers persisted in their unrealistic approach to the question and failed to acknowledge the facts. The time had come for the Western Powers to take into account the existence in Korea of two States: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the North, and the so-called Republic of Korea in the South.

17. Despite the slanders of its enemies, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was constantly growing and registering new political, economic and cultural successes. It had the support and confidence of the entire people, as had been convincingly demonstrated in the recent elections to the Supreme People's Assembly, in which the overwhelming majority of voters had participated. The United States representative had sought to give the impression that his Government favoured free elections throughout Korea. In its eyes, however, free elections meant elections held while Korea was still under the occupation of United States troops. So much was evident from the rejection of the proposal put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the country prior to the elections.

18. The strength and vitality of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were demonstrated by the country's economic and cultural achievements. The economic ravages of the war had been liquidated by 1956, when industrial production had been almost double the 1949 level. Agricultural production had increased to the extent that North Korea was self-sufficient in bread and rice. Prices had been lowered and workers' wages increased. It was inconceivable that the Korean people would agree to give up the gains they had won and the advantages they derived from a socialist régime.

19. In those circumstances, national unity could be achieved only through recognition of the existence on the Korean peninsula of two separate States with differing social and economic structures and through the gradual rapprochement of those States. Broad political, economic and cultural links should be established between them. Such links would bring the two parts of Korea closer together and contribute to the growth of mutual confidence. They would lay the groundwork for the unification of the country on a democratic basis by the Korean people themselves, without foreign intervention or pressure.

20. In pursuance of its policy of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the unification problem, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly proposed that permanent contacts should be established between the parliaments, Gov-

ernments, political parties and social, industrial, trade and private organizations in both parts of Korea. It had, moreover, made specific proposals on such questions as free passage of the demarcation line, the establishment of postal and telegraphic communications, freedom of fishing, and the supplying of excess electric power, coal and rice from North Korea to South Korea.

21. The establishment of such contacts, coupled with renunciation of the use of armed forces, would be in the interests of Korean people, inasmuch as it would improve the situation, and particularly the economic situation, in both parts of the country and enhance the possibilities of peaceful unification. Nevertheless, the puppet régime in South Korea had consistently rejected the overtures of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

22. The conclusion of an armistice in Korea had disposed of a dangerous hotbed of war in the Far East and a source of international tension throughout the world. Compliance with the terms of the armistice and its conversion into a lasting peace would pave the way for a peaceful and democratic solution of the Korean question. Non-compliance with, and violation of, the armistice, on the other hand, reduced the chances of a peaceful settlement and encouraged the aggressive forces in South Korea, which still hoped to settle the Korean question by force of arms.

23. In its endeavours to bring about a lasting peace and peaceful unification, the Korean-Chinese side complied strictly with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and consistently strove to settle by negotiation any problems which arose in the course of its implementation. The United States military authorities, on the other hand, systematically and flagrantly violated their commitments under the Armistice Agreement. From the day it had signed the Agreement, the United States had violated it by starting to build up the South Korean armed forces.

24. The NNSC had set up inspection teams to control the introduction of armaments into Korea and had considered a number of instances of violation of the Armistice Agreement. Its activities had been severely hampered by the Western Powers. In June 1956 the United States authorities had unilaterally put an end to the activity on the inspection teams in South Korea, despite the protests of the Korean-Chinese side. The situation had deteriorated after the United States High Command had unilaterally announced on 21 June 1957 that it no longer considered itself bound by provisions of sub-paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement prohibiting the introduction of new combat equipment into Korea. The United States Department of Defense had simultaneously announced its intention to send modern armament, including fighter planes, bombers capable of delivering atomic weapons, and tanks, to South Korea immediately and to equip the United States divisions in South Korea with atomic weapons. Furthermore, on 15 July 1957, the United States Department of Defense had officially announced the re-organization of the United States Seventh Division to meet the requirements of atomic warfare.

25. In an attempt to camouflage its activities the United States asserted, without any justification, that the Korean-Chinese side was violating the Armistice Agreement and that the North Korean army was now more powerful than the forces of the United States and

of South Korea put together. That was nothing more than a propaganda move designed to deceive public opinion. It was generally known that, since the termination of hostilities, nineteen divisions of Chinese volunteers had been withdrawn and the forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been reduced by 80,000 men. Over the same period of time, the United States had modernized twenty-one divisions and armed ten new divisions in South Korea over and above its own armed forces there. It was not difficult to see what might happen if the Korean side, in turn, started bringing new types of armaments into North Korea and equipping its forces with modern weapons, including atomic weapons. Such an armaments race would create a situation fraught with the most serious consequences for world peace. The military activities of the United States and the South Korean authorities and their stubborn refusal to abide by the Armistice Agreement seriously prejudiced the attainment of Korean unification and might lead to new complications in Korea.

26. In a way, UNCURK had sanctioned the refusal of the United States to abide by the conditions of the Armistice Agreement and encouraged the aggressive tendencies of the South Korean puppet régime. The stand of UNCURK in that respect clearly showed that its activities were designed to give a screen of United Nations respectability to the aggressive policy followed by the United States in Korea.

27. Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement recommended the convening of a political conference of a higher level of both sides to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. Compliance with that paragraph would mark a great step forward towards the settlement of the Korean question. The United States had not only thwarted any preliminary negotiations on the convening of such a conference after the conclusion of the armistice, but it had made every effort to rule out the possibility of agreement on the Korean question at the Korean Political Conference in 1954. The United States had rejected proposals by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 26 June 1957 and the People's Republic of China on 27 July 1957 concerning the immediate convening of an international conference with the participation of all the States involved for the purpose of restoring a lasting peace in Korea and

bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, proposals which had been fully supported by the Government of the Soviet Union.

28. His delegation considered itself in duty bound to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the crimes and atrocities committed against the people of Korea by United States servicemen. The indiscriminate firing upon Koreans by United States servicemen had recently assumed such proportions in South Korea that the South Korean Press had been forced to recognize that the people's indignation might reach boiling point. The murder of innocent Korean women, children and old people was being reported increasingly often in the South Korean Press, which unwittingly reflected the people's anxiety and mistrust. He cited a number of specific examples of such crimes taken from a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 1957. The United States Government naturally preferred to remain silent about such events which inevitably aroused the indignation of all decent human beings. The United Nations could not ignore the situation. The statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea contained an appeal to the United Nations, drawing its attention to the fact that the crimes had been committed under the United Nations flag. The Soviet delegation supported that appeal and considered that it was the duty of the United Nations to condemn the misdeeds of United States servicemen in Korea and to take steps to see that further suffering was not inflicted on the Korean people.

29. In conclusion, his delegation considered it essential to stress once again that the Korean question could not be solved if the United Nations continued to follow the course into which it had been forced for the last ten years by the United States. The Korean problem could not be solved by force of arms or by attaching North Korea to South Korea by force. The correct approach lay in compliance with the Armistice Agreement and its conversion into a lasting peace and the establishment by the Koreans themselves of political, economic and cultural links between the two parts of the country which would lead ultimately to its unification. By directing its activities to those ends, the United Nations would be serving the interests of the Korean people and strengthening world peace and security.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.