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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891 and A/C.1/676) (*continued*)¹

[Item 18]*

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. HOOD (Australia) stated that in supporting the "Uniting for peace" resolution 377 (V) of the General Assembly the previous year and in taking part in the work of the Collective Measures Committee his delegation had not wished to detract in any way from the powers of the Security Council under the United Nations Charter. Unfortunately, however, it had been demonstrated that the Security Council could not always work in the manner contemplated by the founders of the Organization. It had therefore been felt that alternative security machinery, which could be called into action in the event of the Council's failure to act, should be provided. The Security Council itself, however, had not been excluded from using the collective measures envisaged by resolution 377 (V) of the General Assembly. Although the security system of that resolution was an alternative to that envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter, the two systems were not incompatible and were indeed complementary.

2. Dealing with the report of the Collective Measures Committee, Mr. Hood stated that though not all Member Governments had yet reported on the measures taken by them to give effect to section C of resolution 377 A (V), concerning the "earmarking" of portions of the armed forces of Member States for service as United Nations units, the initial response offered hope for further constructive developments as the collective measures system developed.

3. With regard to the setting up of a United Nations panel of military experts, also provided for under Section C, the Australian delegation was in general agreement with the nature and functions of the panel as envisaged by the Collective Measures Committee. In particular, any question

of further guidance to the panel should be considered by any group which may be created for the continuation of the work on collective measures. The tentative view of his delegation was that the study group might find that the "Uniting for peace" resolution contained in itself sufficient guidance. The working group which had been established to deal with the matter of the panel had thought that the allowances and expenses should be borne by requesting States. Some members of the Collective Measures Committee, including Australia, however, had felt that the cost of technical advice concerning United Nations units should be borne by the Organization itself. His delegation might raise that question in the Fifth Committee at the appropriate time.

4. Although the report of the Collective Measures Committee set out certain guiding principles which might be of general application in undertaking United Nations collective action, it deliberately avoided any attempt to differentiate between the various measures described. Thus, the Security Council or, in the event of the Council's failure to act, the General Assembly would decide in each case which particular measures, in the political, economic or military field or in all three, would be appropriate in specific circumstances. The report of the committee did not represent a new United Nations doctrine and its acceptance did not imply any commitment to make use of particular measures in particular situations. The Collective Measures Committee had attempted to set out as clearly as possible, in the form of a study, the various measures which the United Nations could take to maintain collective security. Only when action might be called for would the real needs be known, and only then could Member Governments accept commitments not already spelled out or provided for in the Charter, to take in particular economic, political or military measures. The choice of techniques rested in each case with the Security Council or the General Assembly. Flexibility was a necessary characteristic of any effective collective security system, as the experience of the League of Nations had demonstrated.

5. The measures listed in the report were United Nations measures in the fullest sense of the term. They were not designed for use against any particular State or group of States, and no particular set of circumstances calling for application of the measures had been envisaged. The union of strength of the peace-loving countries to achieve collective security against aggression would threaten nobody. No one

¹ See the 462nd meeting.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

but an aggressor need have any misgivings about the strengthening of United Nations security measures.

6. The Collective Measures Committee had avoided thinking in terms of specific situations because the circumstances of each case would be bound to be different. The United Nations, by virtue of its nature could not engage in military planning as distinct from an inventory of methods and the organizational arrangements contemplated under Article 43 of the Charter; this was implicit in the whole of the committee's report.

7. As the report recognized, collective measures would only be effective in so far as they reflected the "area of collective will". All had the obligation, regardless of the extent of individual resources, to play a part in the development of the United Nations collective measures programme.

8. Mr. Hood, referred to the ninth paragraph of the preamble and paragraph 7 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676). The wording placed some emphasis on economic co-operation by non-members which, in some cases at least, might be more feasible and perhaps more necessary than co-operation in political and military sanctions, though the wording did not exclude the latter.

9. The Australian Government recognized the desirability of advance consideration of the problems involved in providing assistance and facilities to United Nations armed forces engaged in collective security measures, but held that any action taken under paragraphs of the joint draft resolution would have to be determined by governments in the light of particular circumstances prevailing.

10. His Government had also had under review for some time the matter of removing any obstacles to prompt action in support of collective measures. It believed, in the light of the immediate response which Australia had been able to make to the United Nations action in Korea that no further action was required of Australia at present, though it was intended to keep the matter under review.

11. He agreed generally with the principle of equitable sharing of economic burdens in relation to collective measures, dealt with in paragraph 5 of the joint draft resolution, but believed that the extent to which such sharing was in fact practicable and equitable should be determined in each case, as had been recognized in the Collective Measures Committee.

12. In conclusion, Mr. Hood stated his belief that the joint draft resolution could be accepted without specific economic commitments in advance.

13. Mr. COHEN (United States of America) said that progress towards the creation of a system of collective security under the United Nations was gaining momentum. Ways and means of carrying forward the momentum and of ensuring that the strength of the United Nations and of individual States would not be used *à l'encontre* in the common interest should now be studied.

14. The report of the Collective Measures Committee constituted such a study rather than a political proposition upon which the General Assembly would act. That report and the joint draft resolution were based on the principle that the more effectively the Members of the United Nations were organized to maintain international peace and security, the less likely it was that world peace would be challenged. The report was directed not towards the creation of alliances against any State or group of States but to the organization of peace and law.

15. The hopes that had been conceived at San Francisco for an effective system of collective security under the United Nations had been long deferred. Despite the sombre tragedy of Korea, the resolute United Nations action there had proved that collective action under the Charter could be achieved. The "Uniting for peace" resolution had reflected the determination that Korea should mark the beginning of the progressive development of an effective collective security system.

16. The report of the Collective Measures Committee opened further avenues towards progress, suggesting measures which would contribute to increased faith and confidence in the United Nations and help strengthen the system of collective security.

17. Potential aggression could be deterred only by repelling the aggression whenever or wherever it might occur. An armistice in Korea, which all must hope for soon, would mark the first time in history that an aggressor had been forced to abandon his adventure by the collective action of an international organization.

18. The procedures and arrangements outlined in the report of the Collective Measures Committee could readily be adapted for use, if ever needed, and would obviate any need for improvisation. The conclusions of the report formed the basis for the principal clauses of the joint draft resolution, most of which would ensure that States take the necessary preparatory action for making the United Nations a more effective instrument of collective security.

19. Though the responses from Member States to the recommendation in the "Uniting for peace" resolution that they maintain elements for United Nations service in their national forces had on the whole been encouraging, much remained to be done. What was important was that States should recognize their responsibility to be in a position of readiness to contribute to collective action. The proposed establishment of the panel of military experts was designed to assist States in meeting that responsibility.

20. The joint draft resolution recommended that Member States should, in addition to the individual participation in the collective security system of the United Nations, seek to secure the maximum support from other international arrangements or agencies to which they belonged. The principle of the mutually supporting relationship would bolster the United Nations system.

21. In the existing world, States found it necessary to co-operate in defensive arrangements consonant with the Charter. By relating such arrangements expressly to the universal collective security system, it could be assured that such arrangement would be employed in the service of the principles of the Charter and would not degenerate into mere military alliances for purposes inconsistent with the Charter. The mutually supporting relationship between such arrangements and the United Nations was recognized in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which made it clear that the parties' rights and obligations under the Charter were not affected by the treaty.

22. That was and had been the position of the United States Government in ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty and in relation to the Organization of American States and other defensive arrangements. Until it was possible to reach the goal of universality of membership in the United Nations, sincerely desired by most Members, States not yet members could at least be invited to associate themselves with the organization in contributing to collective measures undertaken under the Charter.

23. With regard to the provision in the joint draft resolution directing the Collective Measures Committee to continue its studies for another year, Mr. Cohen stated that his Government continued to be interested in the possibility of a United Nations legion, as suggested by the Secretary-General and others. The matter should be explored, though practical difficulties might make it difficult to realize in the near future.

24. Quoting the words of Mr. Molotov at San Francisco, to the effect that the need was for creation of an effective organization to protect the general peace and security of nations, Mr. Cohen stated that the programme on which the General Assembly was embarked was not directed against any State or group of States but was designed to meet any aggression from any source. The United States hoped that the USSR Government would soon see that its best interests were served by the development of an effective United Nations collective security system and would lend its active support.

25. The Collective Measures programme, as the report made clear, did not involve anything inconsistent with or in derogation of the prompt application of Article 43 of the Charter, but would rather assist the application of that article whenever that became possible. Mr. Cohen also stressed the connexion between a programme of collective security and a programme of disarmament, noted in the resolution on disarmament approved by the First Committee at its 471st meeting.

26. Some had expressed the fear that emphasis on collective measures in some sense detracted from pacific settlement of disputes. The United States regarded the two as inseparable parts of collective security under the United Nations Charter. As the Secretary-General had pointed out in his annual report (A/1844/Add.1), the greater the ability of the United Nations to foil attempts to solve conflicts by force, the more likely would it be that those conflicts could be settled by negotiation.

27. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) said that the report of the Collective Measures Committee did not go beyond the principles formulated by the General Assembly in its resolution (377 A (V), of 3 November 1950. The report stated that its conclusions constituted a framework within which the United Nations could endeavour to devise further means of discharging its obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace. Where the Committee had proposed methods, it had done so for purposes of guidance, with no intention that they should be applicable in all cases. It had in no way meant to define the obligations in that regard which might devolve upon Member States or to question their freedom of judgment.

28. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/676, of which Belgium was a co-sponsor, was drawn up in the same spirit. It reflected the report of the Collective Measures Committee and was an important contribution to the efforts being made to organize more efficiently the collective action of the United Nations. His delegation hoped that it would be adopted by the First Committee.

29. Mr. VOUGT (Sweden) stated that the report of the Collective Measures Committee dealt with situations which might arise either in the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter or in the General Assembly under resolution 377 (V). However, the report failed to bring out clearly that the legal situations in the two cases were different. Members were obliged to abide by decisions of the Security Council but could themselves decide upon their participation in the recommendations of the General

Assembly. Moreover, the political and military aspects of various situations could differ widely: a recommendation made by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly could not be compared with a unanimous decision of the Council.

30. The report stated in paragraph 9 that the principle of collective measures could be made effective only through an international organization which had the necessary means to enforce its decisions. In other words, collective security had to be based on the idea that the collective forces would be superior to those of a potential disturber of the peace. Accordingly, in the past the problem of security had been linked to the problem of disarmament and it had been thought that the Organization could only be provided with adequate forces if there were progress in the field of disarmament. At the present stage, there were better prospects for the provision of forces, although the outlook for disarmament was dim.

31. When the United Nations was established, it had been believed that the organization of collective security could be successful only if the five great Powers were agreed upon any action against aggression, because they alone could provide the necessary superiority. Indeed, it was understood that the Organization could not take enforcement action against any great Power without leading to a major war. On that basis, the smaller States undertook to conform to the decisions of the Security Council and to that extent surrendered sovereignty while it was left to the great Powers to decide on their own participation. If the great Powers were not unanimous, other States would also retain freedom of action.

32. It was clear that a security system with such a basis was defective. However, no great Power would be prepared to abandon the right to decide upon its own participation nor would other States assume prior commitments to participate in collective measures which had been decided upon only by a majority. The difficulties arose from the disagreements amongst the great Powers.

33. Many States including Sweden were not prepared to undertake to participate in sanctions in a situation which might lead to a world war. A number of them had accordingly resorted to defensive treaties and alliances under Articles 51 and 52. Such arrangements were not surprising in view of the international situation and the capacities of the United Nations.

34. But there were two possible methods of bringing about a better security system. On the one hand, there was the plan under Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter together with agreements for the reduction and limitation of armaments. That course required agreement of the great Powers. The alternative had been initiated by the General Assembly in resolution 377 (V).

35. The intervention of the General Assembly could be useful if the Security Council failed to take action but the method contained dangers for peace in a divided world because majority action might lead to the impression that the division would be permanent. However, the Collective Measures Committee report visualized no specific situation and presented only general and preliminary recommendations.

36. The Swedish Government had no objections to the technical conclusions, but reserved the right to define its position after further examination of the report.

37. Mr. COULSON (United Kingdom) said his Government regarded the report of the Collective Measures Committee as a compromise but none the less valuable.

New ground had been broken although preparation had been made in Article 1 of the Charter. After the experience of Korea, it was sensible to examine the nature and scope of future collective action.

38. In endorsing resolution 377 (V) and the report of the Collective Measures Committee, the United Kingdom delegation believed that they gave practical expression to the principle of voluntary responses to an emergency. The report would not bind Governments to any specific measures, as was made clear in paragraph 19 of the report. None who supported the report would be committed to any particular methods. It was on that understanding that the United Kingdom supported the report and the eleven-Power joint draft resolution.

39. With regard to the proposal contained in the joint draft resolution that the Collective Measures Committee should be continued for another year, the United Kingdom delegation did not think that it should be prolonged indefinitely. However, its work had been novel in character and many Members had felt that more could be done with additional time. The experience which had been gathered ought not to be wasted but one year should be adequate. Subsequently, there might be a need for some group to keep the matter under periodic review and receive additional views from Governments.

40. The CHAIRMAN stated that the list of speakers would be closed at 6 p.m. on the following day.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.