

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SIXTH SESSION

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FIRST COMMITTEE 472nd

MEETING

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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Complaint of aggressive acts of the United States of America and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as instanced by the appropriation of one hundred million dollars to finance the recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and a number of other democratic countries, as well as outside the territory of those countries (A/C.1/685)**

[Item 69]\*

## GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the text of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, signed by the President of the United States on 10 October 1951, made it clear that it was designed to finance armed groups in the territories of the USSR and other countries, to be recruited from war criminals and similar persons, who were to perpetrate various subversive and criminal acts. That legislation constituted an unprecedented violation of all standards of international law and was wholly incompatible with the maintenance of normal relations between nations. It could only be regarded as an aggressive act designed to aggravate the international situation, as the USSR note to the United States Government had made clear. That note had also pointed out that the adoption of such legislation constituted gross violation of the obligation assumed by the United States on the basis of the exchange of letters of 16 November 1933 between the USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the President of the United States, by which the two Governments had undertaken not to create, and to refrain from subsidizing or supporting, military or other organizations having as their aim an armed struggle against the other party. The two parties had also undertaken to prevent any recruitment for such organizations or groups.

2. The Act of the United States Congress completely exposed the hypocritical character of the protestations made by the United States delegation, to the effect that

the United States sought only an abatement of tension in international relations. The sponsors of the so-called Mutual Security Act obviously hoped to foment revolt in order to bring about by force a change in the political or social order of the USSR and other countries.

3. The USSR therefore requested the General Assembly to intervene to remedy the situation by condemning the Mutual Security Act of 1951 as an aggressive act and as intervention in the internal affairs of other Members of the United Nations which was incompatible with the United Nations Charter and with international law. The USSR likewise urged the General Assembly to recommend to the United States Government that it take appropriate measures in connexion with the condemnation.

4. Mr. MANSFIELD (United States of America) declared that his Government denied, without reservation, the USSR allegation that the United States was interfering in the domestic affairs of the USSR or the States responsive to the USSR's control. The United States had not committed and would not commit any act of aggression against any country, and the history of its people demonstrated that it held aggression to be a criminal act.

5. The USSR charge was based exclusively on the language of an amendment to the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951 which had to be understood in terms of the purposes of the Act itself. The broad objective of the latter coincided with the purpose of Article 1 of the United Nations Charter to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. Quoting the language of the Act, Mr. Mansfield stated that it was only the latest illustration of the fundamental United States policy to help in the building of a healthy international community through economic development and collective security.

6. The representative of the United States recalled that the economic policy had grown out of the need of various countries following the Second World War. The concept of mutual assistance involved a parallel and related effort to achieve collective security against any act of aggression or a general war. That effort had been made

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

necessary by armed communist *coups d'état* in eastern Europe and attempts to extend the "iron curtain" into other free countries. It had produced such regional defence associations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The communist attack on the Republic of Korea, which had called into action the collective security system of the United Nations itself, had inevitably led to an intensification and acceleration of the programmes of military assistance.

7. The amendment to the Mutual Security Act which authorized the President of the United States to provide funds for people who had fled from persecution and tyranny behind the iron curtain and who wished to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's defence forces had not been quoted in its entirety either in the USSR note to the United States or in the charge submitted to the United Nations. The Act also made reference to people who escaped from the Baltic States seized by the USSR in 1940, from the USSR Zone in Austria, and from East Germany, from which people had been escaping at the rate of more than 15,000 a month. The USSR placed little emphasis on the real purpose of the amendment: to assist refugees from political persecution to take part in the defence of the North Atlantic community, if they elected to do so. The USSR case depended almost entirely on the assumption that the use in the amendment of the words "residing in" constituted a *prima facie* case of aggression and domestic interference.

8. The United States Congress, which had passed the Act, was the best authority as to its meaning. The intention of Congress was best expressed by the report of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services which had stated that it was intended to form selected escapees from iron curtain countries into elements of military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that persons who might be formed into such units would do so only of their own free will. The amendment applied only to those who had managed to flee from the other side of the "iron curtain". While the President could use the authority and the funds given him under the amendment, it was not mandatory upon him to do so and the ultimate determination as to whether those people would form part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defence forces would depend upon the decision of the members of the Organization. No action of any kind had so far been taken.

9. Only a régime which projected its own image upon the world outside would see the North Atlantic Treaty as an aggressive threat. The lack of confidence of the Soviet type of State in the people it dominated led the régime to an obsession with its physical safety. Thus, no member of the Communist Party was safe from being devoured by it. In view of the state of affairs in the "iron curtain" countries, was it to be wondered at that thousands yearned to escape and that many insisted that they be allowed to join any defensive effort to prevent extension of the system from which they had escaped?

10. There were no safety valves for legitimate political opposition behind the "iron curtain". Any fifth column which might exist there had nothing to do with the United States Mutual Security Act or with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but would be the product of the brutal conditions existing in the Soviet world. If the unfortunate people who managed to escape were granted asylum, if they were permitted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defence forces at their own request, it did not follow that the United States or the North Atlantic Powers collectively were interfering in the domestic affairs of the USSR and other communist States.

11. Referring to the USSR contention that the United States had violated what is known as the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement of 1933, Mr. Mansfield recalled the circumstances in which the Agreement had been concluded and the reasons for which the assurances in question had been made. The USSR Government had made a dead letter of the Agreement shortly after it had been signed. The United States had adhered to its reciprocal pledge.

12. Mr. Mansfield reviewed various instances of Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of the United States and other countries, which continued to be one of the chief causes of tension in the world. It was indeed ironical that the USSR should be pressing a charge of domestic interference against any foreign Government, let alone the United States.

13. Mr. Mansfield stated that the USSR Government, when it disagreed with another Government on an important matter of policy, used the particular communist instrumentality in the other country to wreck its policy by every means possible. Thus the USSR had not only refused the invitation to participate in the European Recovery Programme, but had also ordered the subsequent highly unsuccessful effort of the Cominform to sabotage the recovery of Europe. A more urgent order for direct action had been issued to the Cominform two years later when the North Atlantic community had made its first step for rearmament in the face of the aggressive policies of the USSR Government.

14. The American people and others had spoken out against such interference and against the tyranny imposed upon the eastern European countries. It was not an act of aggression to hope that a people in chains would one day be free. It lay within the power of the USSR, whose real security did not and could not rest on the domination of other peoples, to bring about a peaceful and happy change which would permit those who had sought asylum with the free nations to return peacefully to their homes.

15. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) felt that the statement made by Mr. Mansfield would have convinced many representatives that the USSR charge against the United States was well-founded. Everything he had said had demonstrated that the United States Government was highly concerned with the growing threat to its domination over other countries which were protesting against this yoke. The United States had not yet grasped the fact that events in the world were taking a course which was not compatible with the plans of the American monopolists.

16. Mr. Mansfield had repeated a number of fantastic inventions concerning the USSR and other nations with which he had contrasted the supposed paradise that existed in the United States, where the treatment of negroes was advertised as "human rights". Freedom was the concept for which the peoples of Russia had fought and won the glorious October Revolution. The sort of freedom to be found in the United States, to die of starvation, to remain unemployed, to be terrorized by gangs and bosses, was not recognized by the USSR which hoped never to be acquainted with it. True freedom and democracy were to be found elsewhere.

17. It was true that fliers entrusted with flying missions were subject to arrest, to conviction and to punishment pursuant to the legislation of the USSR and of the countries associated with it. Fliers such as those who, after flying over Romania and Hungary, had been forced to land by the USSR air force stationed in Hungary under article 22 of the peace treaty, were arrested. That particular aircraft had been searched and had been found in perfect operational

order, so that there could have been no accidental deviation from the normal course of flight. The equipment of the aircraft, which had included maps of the Ukrainian SSR and other eastern countries, had been such as to make it clear that the aircraft had been flying over that area carrying out intelligence activities forming part of the plans for the hatching of a new world war.

18. With regard to the imprisonment of correspondents, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that such measures were only taken with those who acted as spies. The nature of the espionage activities by diplomats in Moscow could be found in detail in the books of Annabelle Bucar, formerly with the United States Information Bureau in Moscow, and of Ralph Parker, the British correspondent.

19. With regard to the claim that hundreds of thousands had refused repatriation to the Soviet Union, the fact could not be concealed that the United States, British and French authorities had obstructed the liaison missions of the Soviet Union with a view to maintaining those displaced persons for future use as mercenaries. There were even judgments made by United States courts denying the requests of parents in the Soviet Union for the return of their children.

20. The talk about liberating oppressed peoples brought to mind the statements made after the October Revolution in connexion with the armed intervention against the Revolution and the subsidizing of the White Guard terrorists. It was, however, that Revolution which had liberated the people from the bondage of the capitalists. The United States representative had resorted to slander and propaganda and had failed to deal with the substance of the matter. The only point he had made was that the United States did not like the events which had taken place in the Soviet Union and the people's democracies and had therefore decided to intervene in their domestic affairs with a view to making changes. It was that intervention which had led to the complaint of the Soviet Union.

21. The references to the Comintern and the Cominform showed that those organs which were party affairs had been confused with the Government of the Soviet Union. What the United States had taken exception to were party affairs but the Soviet Union was objecting to the enactment of legislation by a government.

22. It could not be asserted that the Mutual Security Act was not directed against the Soviet Union. All that the United States representative had claimed, when accused of violation of the Agreement of 1933, was that the Soviet Union also had violated it. The enactment of a law which would subsidize traitors and maintain armed groups, was clearly an action on which an answer had to be given, unless the law was abrogated. Otherwise the United States should say that it regarded the Agreement as void.

23. The Act plainly provided for the support of activities which were prohibited by the Agreement of 1933. It provided for the establishment of military formations to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Even if it were conceded for the sake of argument that NATO was defensive, nevertheless it was clearly directed against the Soviet Union. In short, the statement of the representative of the United States only served to substantiate the charge that the United States had enacted a law intended to finance the activities of spies and of armed groups against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.

24. The full intentions of the Mutual Security Act were revealed by the statements of various members of United States Congress and others. At the press conference held by Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Vorys, members of the House

of Representatives, they had claimed that the law showed no evidence of any aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union or the people's democracies. But one of them had said that the law provided for aid to the refugees in order to give aid to the armed forces of NATO. In other words, they recognized that the Act was designed to organize military groups of traitors.

25. Mr. Vyshinsky quoted a statement made by John Foster Dulles in Detroit on 27 November 1951 in which he had called for the organization of strong striking forces disposed about the perimeter of the Soviet Union. He had also called for a co-operative effort to remove the menace of communism. Further, he had demanded new methods for stopping the Red Army without the need for a hand-to-hand struggle. Mr. Vyshinsky observed that the evident intention of Mr. Dulles was to subvert the citizens of the Soviet Union through the use of traitors. The plain objective was the overthrow of the Government of the Soviet Union and the achievement of a change in its social structure.

26. The statement made by the State Department in connexion with the Soviet Union note recognized that the law would give assistance to traitors if such action would serve to aid the forces of NATO.

27. On 19 July 1951 a sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives had been addressed in private by former Assistant Secretary of State, A. A. Berle, Jr. The report of the sub-committee noted, however, that the subject under discussion was the use of traitors for the organization of rebellions in the people's democracies and the Soviet Union.

28. There had been another interesting conversation on 25 July 1951 between Mr. Vorys and Mr. Kersten of the United States House of Representatives. The latter was the author of the amendment providing for the appropriation of a hundred million dollars. Discussing whether the traitors should be incorporated in the United States forces or given their own national formations, Mr. Kersten had favoured the latter course because of the effect that such legions would have on the present governments of their countries. As an example he had mentioned the Polish Legion of General Anders. From that it was clear that the objective of the author of the amendment was the organization of military groups to overthrow and destroy the Governments of the people's democracies. Another point that had come out was that national formations would have the further advantage of being less expensive because of the lower rates of pay. Mr. Vyshinsky warned that those bargain-basement legions would meet the same fate as had met the interventionists thirty years ago. It was worth recalling that throughout history there had never been a successful invasion of Russia.

29. The record at all points showed that the sponsors of the Mutual Security Act intended to recruit mercenaries for the struggle against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies and to subsidize subversive activities. According to the Congressional Record of 17 August 1951, Mr. Kersten had emphasized the necessity of starting on the liberation of the countries of eastern Europe. He had asked for a beginning of the organization of a foreign legion out of deserters to "liberate" those countries. The intention was to overthrow the existing governments and re-install capitalist régimes.

30. On the same day Mr. Kersten stated that his amendment contemplated giving aid to underground organizations. Mr. Armstrong, a member of the House of Representatives, had approved that idea and suggested that it might inspire desertion. Representative Cooley believed that special

measures should be devised to induce desertion. Those remarks made clear the criminal purpose of encouraging terrorist activities against the leaders of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies. Such activities were of a wholly different order from the appeals made by the Comintern in 1935 which were addressed to legal parties permitted by the governments of the States in which they were operating.

31. On the draft agenda of the General Assembly there had been an item relating to the draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind.<sup>1</sup> Paragraph 6 of article 2 of that draft code dealt with the outlawry of the initiation or encouragement of terrorism in another State or the toleration by a State of terrorist organizations directed against other States. The reasons why that item had been removed from the agenda had now emerged. Representative Kersten had become alarmed and insisted that the United States delegation ensure the postponement of the consideration of the code. Mr. Austin had replied by letter that the Mutual Security Act could hardly be regarded as being covered by paragraph 6 of article 2 of the code but that much depended upon interpretation. Mr. Austin had pointed out that the important words in the draft code were "terroristic activities". Evidently Mr. Kersten was

not satisfied and had argued in the House of Representatives that terrorism was essential to the liberation movements in eastern Europe. In his view, propaganda was inadequate and force was necessary. Accordingly, the United States delegation and the delegations of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization arranged for the draft code to be dropped from the agenda.

32. The foregoing were matters of record. In lodging a complaint the Soviet Union was not seeking to foment a quarrel with the United States. The Soviet Union desired the General Assembly to recommend that the United States abrogate the Mutual Security Act which gave rise to such suspicions. Such legislation was incompatible with the maintenance of friendly relations between the parties concerned.

33. The CHAIRMAN, in the absence of objections, stated that the list of speakers would be closed at noon on the following day. He pointed out that that course would not impair the right of speakers who were not listed to make replies.

34. In view of the short time remaining before the Christmas recess, he appealed to all speakers to limit their remarks to the point at issue, namely, the complaint of aggressive acts of the United States and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 9, Chapter IV.*