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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Agenda item 91:	
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (<i>continued</i>)	
General debate (<i>continued</i>)	1
Organization of work	9

Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 91

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (*continued*) (A/6663, A/6676 and Add.1-4; A/C.1/946)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. FAULKNER (Canada): In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 1967, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin, expressed the following views on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [A/C.1/946]:

"I am sure we would all wish to congratulate the States of Latin America and the Caribbean for reaching agreement to establish the first nuclear-free zone in an inhabited part of the world. This Treaty will lend impetus to the non-proliferation negotiations, which have now been intensified in Geneva and will shortly be before this Assembly." [1569th plenary meeting, para. 113.]

Since time did not permit Mr. Martin to elaborate further on the views of the Canadian Government, I propose to do so in this Committee.

2. From the outset Canada has followed closely the efforts of the Latin American nations to create a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of the Western Hemisphere. We supported resolution 1911 (XVIII) of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly and were represented by an observer at the last three meetings of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. It was thus with a genuine sense of approval that we greeted final agreement earlier this year after the painstaking and often difficult negotiations.

3. While Canada lies outside the zone, it is by no means uninterested in or unaffected by the Treaty. We are after all a nation of the Western Hemisphere ourselves and we enjoy friendly relations with all the nations of Latin America and

the Caribbean. We welcome any measure which will contribute to the stability, security and peace of the area and particularly one which recognizes and precludes the folly of a nuclear arms race.

4. Let me deal briefly with some of the more important aspects of the Treaty. We think it advantageous that the Treaty should be designed to embrace all sovereign States in the area, although we note that by virtue of article 25 and an associated resolution relating to territorial disputes, one State in the region and another potential one are at the moment barred from acceding to the Treaty.

5. The most interesting and indeed ingenious feature, in our view, are clauses under article 28, which will permit the Treaty to enter into force for those States choosing to waive conditions of prior ratification by all sovereign States in the area, by extra-regional States with dependencies in the area, and by all nuclear Powers. We hope that all sovereign States in the area will see fit to accede to the Treaty in the near future. Pending such a development, we hope that the necessary number of States will waive conditions in order to bring the Treaty into force.

6. We note that nuclear weapon Powers and extra-regional States with dependencies in the area are called upon to associate themselves with special protocols to the Treaty. Four of five nuclear Powers have made constructive statements of position on the Treaty, as has the Netherlands in respect of its dependencies in the hemisphere. We hope those statements will add momentum to the current efforts to bring the Treaty effectively into force.

7. We consider as particularly important those provisions in articles 12 to 16 which deal with control and verification of the Treaty. They constitute a practical model for other arms control agreements, be they regional or global. They fully and carefully define the scope of the control system and the terms of reference of the treaty organization and of the International Atomic Energy Agency in applying it, so as to ensure that the Treaty provisions are being observed by the parties. Of equal significance is the provision for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to the nuclear activities of the parties by multilateral or bilateral agreement with the Agency. That provision promises to lead to further consolidation and extension of the international safeguards system, an objective which Canada earnestly shares.

8. It is, we believe, unfortunate that there are differences over the interpretation of articles 5 and 18 as they relate to explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. We interpret the Treaty to preclude parties from conducting such explosions themselves although, of course, not from deriving full benefits from peaceful nuclear explosive

technology. As Mr. Martin said on 27 September in respect of the draft non-proliferation treaty:

“There is no distinguishing between military and civil nuclear explosive technology, between the destructive power of a nuclear bomb and a nuclear excavating charge. A . . . provision for peaceful nuclear explosions would represent a fatal loop-hole by means of which non-nuclear States could acquire military nuclear technology. That is not to say that we should not expect the nuclear Powers, perhaps in this Assembly, to give an explicit undertaking to extend nuclear explosive services on reasonable terms upon request once they become technically feasible” [*Ibid.*, para. 116].

9. We think it should be possible to work out satisfactory arrangements in the context of non-proliferation negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee of the United Nations.

10. In this same connexion, I should like to emphasize that we interpret article 17 of the Latin American Treaty as guaranteeing parties the unrestricted right to develop and apply nuclear energy for all legitimate civil purposes. As a country with an advanced peaceful nuclear capability, Canada is particularly conscious of the role nuclear energy is destined to play in the economic and social progress of the world.

11. Canada wishes to commend the States which brought the Latin American Treaty into being. We think it is a unique achievement and an example of what can be accomplished in the sphere of nuclear arms control when the will to make progress exists. Let us hope we can all benefit from that example and go on to contain the spread of nuclear weapons through an international agreement of universal scope—through a non-proliferation treaty—which we shall subsequently be considering in this Committee.

12. Mr. REYES (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): The establishment of a military denuclearization zone in Latin America is not a matter affecting Latin America alone; it is also of concern to all the Members of the United Nations. To ensure the complete effectiveness of the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in a particular part of the world, pledges and co-operation by countries outside that region are just as necessary as the commitments of the States belonging to the region itself. In absolute terms, the co-operation of all States is necessary.

13. This justifies the inclusion in the agenda of our Committee of the item “Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America”, which now makes it possible to look at the general implications of an international agreement already signed by twenty of the twenty-one members of the Preparatory Committee which adopted it, and ratified a few days ago by Mexico.

14. Chile was involved from the outset in the international event that culminated in the Treaty: the joint Declaration by five Latin American Presidents on the denuclearization of Latin America, dated April 1963.¹ Subsequently, we played a decisive part at each stage as it was gradually given

shape, from resolution 1911 (XVIII), adopted by the Assembly in November 1963, to the successive meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America, the resolutions adopted by it, and the Treaty now before us. We have also participated in other United Nations resolutions having objectives similar or complementary to those which led up to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America [*A/C.1/946*], for as I have said, as far as Chile is concerned the military denuclearization of the region of which our country is a part is linked with the other measures designed to free the world from the potential threat inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons, just as the Treaty is bound up with participation in its basic obligations by the States possessing nuclear weapons and co-operation by the other countries of the world.

15. The four international instruments to date containing provisions banning the testing or possession of nuclear weapons—the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Moscow Treaty of 1963², the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of 1967, and the Latin American regional Treaty—have all been duly signed by Chile.

16. Participation in these agreements signifies, in our view, three things: (1) co-operation in international action designed to reduce the risks implicit in the existence of nuclear weapons, and delimitation of the areas in which they may be found; (2) the undertaking not to acquire or stockpile military atomic devices on national territory; (3) elimination of the possibility of such weapons being introduced into national territories, thereby impairing security and threatening international peace.

17. Co-operation in joint operations designed to ban nuclear weapons or to circumscribe their presence presupposes the confident belief that activities undertaken and general commitments such as those I have mentioned will not have the effect of perpetuating military situations in which national status and freedom of action depend on the possession of nuclear weapons or the prospect of access to them. In other words, we have co-operated on the understanding that the military denuclearization measures, those banning atomic weapons from Antarctica and outer space, and those which put a brake on the development of such weapons by prohibiting testing in certain areas, are not isolated measures establishing a kind of military “reservations”. On the contrary, they are partial and collateral measures in the disarmament of the more developed countries, taken specifically to help to solve the problem of development of the smaller countries by means of economic and political resources not hampered by the burden of military effort. Is this a Utopian ambition? I do not think so.

18. The traditional ineffectualness of meetings to discuss disarmament, and the frustration of some of the moves in that direction, may give way to more propitious results in the case of nuclear weapons, precisely because nuclear development for warlike purposes is inseparable from peaceful nuclear development to a degree traditionally unknown in the relations between industrial capacity and

¹ *General Assembly Official Records, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 74 (A/4515/Rev.1, annex).*

² *Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, 1963, No. 6964).*

military capacity. "Nuclear Power", "State having access to nuclear weapons", "highly developed country"; they are all correlated terms. The obligations of the developed countries towards those which are not developed also include today the need to free industrial areas and financial and human resources from military commitments so as to steer them towards the new commitments of peaceful and harmonious development for all mankind. It is the task of developing countries like my own to point out that necessity.

19. Renunciation of access to nuclear weapons, however remote and gratuitous it may appear to some, entails a multiplicity of obligations which in the Treaty of Tlatelolco³ range from the commitment to use exclusively for peaceful purposes any materials and nuclear installations within the State's jurisdiction (which covers the whole area in which it exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own laws) to the obligation to prohibit and prevent within that area the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition, delivery, stockpiling, installation, emplacement or any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, for or on behalf of third parties, or in any other form or manner. It also embraces the undertaking to refrain from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon, or from participating therein in any other way.

20. These obligations cover a very broad field of activities which prior to the Treaty of Tlatelolco were entirely within the legal jurisdiction of every one of the States that signed it. Renouncing those activities, therefore, was not just an empty gesture; consequently, it cannot be accompanied by the renunciation of a possible counter-obligation on the part of the large and medium-sized industrial Powers which are likewise military Powers. Side by side with the process leading to nuclear disarmament measures by these Powers, the progressive, peaceful nuclearization of the Latin American countries parties to the Treaty should be speeded up through international aid and direct assistance to those States. They voluntarily renounce the right one day to possess any kind of nuclear weapons, with the knowledge that even today the preservation of that right can invest a country with powers which are no less effective for being shared with a nuclear Power or because it is economically and technologically dependent on that Power.

21. Article 17 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly for the economic development and social progress of the Contracting Parties, ought therefore to be supplemented by a special system of international assistance towards that development. In that way the international community would be showing that its encouragement and initiative, as in the case of the initiative taken in Mexico, have a practical character. The era of proposals, pacts and covenants on disarmament that are merely suppressive or abolitionist in nature has come to an end. The Utopianism of that old form of disarmament should be replaced by disarmament for development.

22. The third purpose that Chile pursues in subscribing to international instruments such as the Treaty under dis-

cussion is that of making it impossible for nuclear devices for warlike purposes to be set up in the territory of any country in the area, whether partially controlled by that country or not. The security of all depends therefore on making it impossible to introduce nuclear weapons from outside the region into any Latin American State or any territory under the *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility of other States in the region.

23. Hence in order to safeguard security and ensure that peace in the region cannot be jeopardized, it is essential that the nuclear Powers should sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty, and that States which have international responsibility, *de jure* or *de facto*, for territories within the geographical region as defined in the Treaty, should sign Additional Protocol I.

24. The drafting of another international instrument of more comprehensive scope such as that envisaged at Geneva, which by preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons will help to proscribe them, cannot stand in the way of responsible efforts to bring about 100 per cent implementation of this regional treaty. In order to ensure this, it is essential that other countries, morally and politically involved in the undertaking, do not wash their hands of this instrument. The prospect of a future general agreement is not a valid argument for going slow with endorsement and support for a regional document already existing, complete, and effective. Obviously, by its very origin and nature any general agreement to prevent proliferation will have to be worded in general terms that will not cover all situations. On the other hand, a regional treaty such as that adopted in Mexico covers such situations in detail, so that subsequent application of the Treaty will not depend on historical contingencies in which the question of its interpretation arises.

25. Again, the meeting of a regional community of States directly interested in excluding military use as effectively as possible such as took place in Mexico can add to this effectiveness, devising legal and political concepts much more flexibly than is possible for the great Powers in their mutual relations or than would be possible in the event of a relatively heterogenous congress of great Powers, countries of medium development and less developed countries.

26. Thus the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains—not to cite a mass of examples—a definition of a geographical zone of total application of the Treaty which goes beyond the limits of the national jurisdictions of each of the States as defined in their respective laws, and establishes a margin of regional security which had precedents in the Antarctic Treaty and in various continental declarations and covenants. This geographical zone will undoubtedly increase the effectiveness of the Treaty when it comes into full force.

27. Thus too, the definition of a nuclear weapon effectively rules out the possibility that as the peaceful development of nuclear energy proceeds there may be a barely perceptible distortion leading to the manufacture of a device that could become a nuclear weapon. This solution for the knotty problem of the balanced relationship between the peaceful development of nuclear energy and the risk of a warlike purpose being superimposed was unheard of until the Latin American Treaty came into being.

³ The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed at Tlatelolco; Mexico City.

28. Article 18 of the Treaty, on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, has the same effect as a regulatory instrument. The development of technology, full of surprises for those not yet direct participants and in the vanguard of scientific and technological progress, has nevertheless taught us not to overlook the many possibilities for discoveries like that of nuclear energy in the future. Explosions for peaceful purposes of devices that release nuclear energy in a manner similar to that of warlike devices could be used—to cite what has become a classic example—to open up channels linking the oceans. But all the other peaceful uses of these devices are less overt, and not because they are unknown or hardly visualized. Therefore, to renounce the right to control these explosions exclusively, as is done in the Treaty, requires a special system of active international co-operation so as not to limit this form of access to the peaceful development of nuclear energy for economic purposes. Here again, we feel that the more developed countries, far from taking advantage of this renunciation in order to gain control of the legitimate development of other countries, must understand that renunciation by these countries implies an international duty on the part of the great Powers to increase their own co-operation.

29. The documented information and analysis of the Treaty given us by the representative of Mexico spare my delegation the necessity of examining other aspects of the instrument. Mexico has once again earned our gratitude here. I should also like to endorse the interesting statements made by the representative of Brazil and other speakers.

30. From the very earliest moves which have culminated in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Chile has been keenly interested in ensuring that its provisions should be as effective as possible. We therefore again appeal to the members of the international community not to disappoint the hopes of the Latin American peoples for peace and development.

31. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): It is with the greatest pleasure that my delegation intervenes in this debate because the subject is one which gives us all, and particularly those of us in Africa, great hopes for the future. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America which all but one Latin American country have signed—and we understand the remaining one will also be signing soon—is a milestone in our constant search for a way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to save posterity from nuclear destruction. Ghana was represented at the second part of the session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America at Tlatelolco as an observer. This was unmistakable evidence of our interest in the subject and our appreciation of the notable efforts being made by our Latin American friends in the cause of disarmament.

32. I join those who have preceded me in offering the sincerest congratulations of my delegation to the Latin American countries for their foresight, courage and determination.

33. At the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity held in Cairo in July 1964, a declaration on the denuclearization of Africa was adopted which reads in full as follows:

“We, African Heads of State and Government,

“Conscious of our responsibilities towards our peoples and of our international obligation, under the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, to use our best endeavours to strengthen peace and security,

“Convinced that the conditions ensuring international peace and security must prevail in order to save humanity from the scourge of nuclear war,

“Profoundly concerned at the effects of the dissemination of nuclear weapons,

“Confirming resolution 1652 (XVI) of the United Nations General Assembly, calling upon all States to respect the denuclearization of the continent of Africa,

“Reaffirming the resolution on general disarmament adopted by the Conference of Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa in May 1963,

“Conscious that the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its sixteenth session, called upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons,

“Convinced of the urgent necessity to redouble the efforts to reach an early solution to the problem of general disarmament,

“1. Solemnly declare that we are ready to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons;

“2. Appeal to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking;

“3. Appeal to all the nuclear Powers to respect this declaration and conform to it;

“4. Request the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its nineteenth regular session, to approve this declaration and to take the necessary measures to convene an international conference for the purpose of concluding an agreement to that effect.”⁴

34. Accordingly the General Assembly, by resolution 2033 (XX), endorsed the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa and, *inter alia*, called upon all States to respect and abide by the declaration. Unfortunately, however, the African States have not been able to conclude the necessary treaty to give effect to the declaration. We have always advocated the creation of nuclear-free zones, at least initially in those parts where a beginning could be made, so as to reduce the areas where the potential accidents of nuclear war might occur. There is no reason why Africa or parts of Asia or even of Europe could not be so transformed. It is in this respect that I think the example of Latin America will be an inspiration and guide to all of us, particularly in Africa.

35. There are certain features of the Treaty which I should like to comment upon. The establishment of the Agency

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and its intended close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency is an earnest indication of the desire of the signatories to ensure the maximum efficiency and foolproof guarantee against abuse. This my delegation heartily commends.

36. Another interesting feature of the Treaty which is of great importance to us is that, while it prohibits the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, it provides for the use of nuclear energy for economic development. This is most welcome, for the potentialities of nuclear energy for peaceful use, even though they are yet to be fully explored, appear to be immense, especially for developing countries which are in a hurry to catch up with the developed countries. It is our fervent hope that steps will be taken to ensure that this intended development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will never be diverted to military advantage.

37. My delegation is particularly pleased to note that the Treaty is open to signature by all nuclear Powers, including the People's Republic of China, and that these nuclear Powers are called upon, in the language of articles 2 and 3 of Additional Protocol II:

“...not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies...”

They are further called upon:

“...not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty...”

38. No one can deny the importance and relevance of the People's Republic of China to the future nuclear peace of the world. It is the earnest wish of my delegation that these nuclear Powers, including the People's Republic of China, will find it possible to sign the Treaty and to abide by its provisions. But by the same token we are obliged to take such steps as will make it possible for the People's Republic of China to participate as an equal partner in this important task of mankind.

39. This brings me to the question of what is popularly called “nuclear blackmail”. It seems to my delegation that the Treaty on the denuclearization of Latin America, and indeed all similar treaties which may be concluded in the future, will be meaningless unless the non-nuclear Powers have definite guarantees that their voluntary decision to abstain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons will not leave them at the mercy of the nuclear Powers. Everything therefore hinges, in the last analysis, on general and complete disarmament. This question of nuclear blackmail is of particular importance to us, the non-nuclear Powers, but I intend to reserve our comments here until we take up the whole question of disarmament.

40. May I conclude by congratulating once again the Latin American States for their unique example and by expressing the hope—indeed the conviction—that this example will be followed in other regions.

41. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): My delegation wishes to express its great satisfaction that the concerted

and unrelenting efforts of the Latin American States have culminated in an agreed text of a Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

42. Thus the unprecedented initiative actually to create the legal framework for the effective denuclearization of a specific region—apart from Africa, which has certain characteristics of its own—has been brought to a successful conclusion.

43. During previous sessions of the General Assembly and also of this Committee, my delegation has repeatedly stated that the Netherlands Government favours the establishment of denuclearized zones in those areas where there are no overriding obstacles of a political or military nature.

44. It is therefore most gratifying that this Committee is able—at such an early stage of its deliberations—to take note of and to discuss the first complete blueprint for a denuclearized zone.

45. At this point, I would like to assure the distinguished representative of Mexico that I am fully aware that the term “denuclearization” refers only to “the prohibition of nuclear weapons” and that peaceful activities are in no way inhibited. I hope, however, that for the sake of brevity he will bear me no grudge for occasionally using a familiar term which has gained currency in our arms control jargon.

46. Mr. García Robles also underlined the fact that the present item of our agenda is *sui generis* in the sense that it is purely informative in character. I wish to assure you that I do not intend to dwell extensively on the principal elements of the treaty now before us. But since the treaty is of immediate concern to the Kingdom of the Netherlands I shall, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, make some brief comments on those major aspects which seem of particular importance to me.

47. Firstly, the provisions of the Treaty relating to the control system and to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards constitute a dual precedent. In fact, they are no less than a real “break-through” in the question of international verification of arms control measures.

48. The Latin American States are the first regional group of countries to accept the safeguards of the Agency in Vienna, in accordance with article III, A.5 of its Statute. Thus the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons by diverting nuclear materials to warlike purposes will be subject to verification and control by the proper United Nations organ which is expressly designed to exercise such functions. This might be called the “non-production clause” in the treaty.

49. In this connexion, I think it is worth mentioning that *de facto* article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has already been complied with, in anticipation of its entry into force. To my knowledge, all existing nuclear facilities in Latin America are already covered by safeguards agreements of the IAEA, with the possible exception of one or two which are in the process of being covered by such agreements.

50. Furthermore, a unique feature of the Treaty is that it establishes its own Control System, which also covers

activities which do not fall within the competence of the IAEA, such as the “non-acquisition” of any nuclear weapons. From this it will be clear that the relevant articles, taken as a whole, constitute a comprehensive and efficient system of controls for the Contracting Parties to the Treaty.

51. On the other hand, nothing in the Treaty seems to hinder in any way the promotion and expansion of peaceful activities furthering the economic and social development of the nations concerned.

52. This brings me to my second point: I note with interest Mr. García Robles' exposition of the implications of article 18, setting forth the circumstances under which explosions for peaceful purposes may be carried out by the parties to the Treaty. From the text of article 18 it follows that peaceful explosions are permitted only if certain conditions are fulfilled, *inter alia* that, in accordance with article 5, the device used shall not have “a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes”.

53. At this juncture I shall not pursue this question any further, since it appears to me more appropriate to comment on this matter when we have reached the relevant item on our agenda, i.e. the conclusion of a Treaty preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But I do wish to express the hope, here and now, that it will prove possible to devise satisfactory and generally acceptable procedures for carrying out peaceful explosions in the context of such a treaty.

54. From the very beginning, the Netherlands Government has been represented by an observer at the sessions of the Preparatory Commission. Moreover, it has on several occasions declared its willingness to become a contracting party to the Treaty and to assume on an equal footing with the other signatories all the rights and obligations on behalf of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. I am in duty bound to say that it is a matter of regret for the Government of the Kingdom that the faculty to become a party to the Treaty has been denied to it. In response to the hope expressed by the representatives of Brazil and of Chile, I am pleased to state that the Netherlands Government remains prepared to accept the status of denuclearization on behalf of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, provided the Treaty stands a reasonable chance of becoming binding upon a sufficient number of Latin American countries. I sincerely hope that this will soon prove to be the case.

55. In conclusion, I should like to draw attention to the fact that Protocol II does not carry any provisions concerning a guarantee by the nuclear Powers to the signatories of Protocol I. The Netherlands Government confidently expects that the nuclear Powers which agree to sign Protocol I will be prepared to extend the guarantees embodied therein also to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, after the Kingdom of the Netherlands has decided to sign Protocol I.

56. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): The delegation of Malta also would wish to associate itself with the congratulatory expressions which have been addressed to the countries of

Latin America on their conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It speaks well for the Governments and peoples of the countries concerned that, in the relatively short period of three years, they have succeeded in formulating, within the practical possibilities of a legal framework, a comprehensive instrument for the creation of a militarily denuclearized zone in an area of continental size already inhabited by an expanding population numbering 250 million.

57. We see in the Treaty a voluntary and constructive contribution towards curtailing nuclear armaments not limited only to the area concerned, for the example may provide a stimulus of world-wide significance. In particular, we note that the Treaty makes a useful distinction between the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and its use for military purposes, that it sets out in unmistakable terms the duties and obligations of the contracting parties, and that it makes provision for the application of a system of adequate safeguards under a permanent supervisory organ.

58. We note that in one of its preambular paragraphs, the Treaty states “. . . that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage”. This is a clear expression of principles which re-echoes similar declarations contained in previous General Assembly resolutions. We strongly believe that, even apart from the proposed treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, [A/6817] on which we hope to express our views at greater length in due course, establishment of nuclear-free zones in regional areas would prove to be an effective means against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, we attach such importance to the principles of regional military denuclearization as a step towards general and complete disarmament that, at one of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the proposed conference of non-nuclear-weapon States, my delegation suggested that the establishment of nuclear-free zones was one of the vital issues that could usefully be discussed at the proposed conference.

59. We therefore commend the example of the Latin American States for favourable consideration in other areas where militarily denuclearized zones may be possible, or where at least no insuperable difficulties towards denuclearization exist in conditions prevailing at the present time. Regional agreement on denuclearized zones in continent-wide but still limited areas may be more readily attainable than agreement on a world basis to halt the spread of nuclear armaments. Such regional agreements may well constitute indispensable preliminary steps for an effective global non-proliferation treaty.

60. The Latin American Treaty in article 25, paragraph 2, makes provision for deferring admission to the General Conference of political entities which have certain outstanding disputes. Such a provision is understandable. Yet it would appear to my delegation that the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by States in the geographic regions concerned would render military denuclearization, now and in future, more certain and complete. Indeed, we fear that non-adherence to the Treaty even by a single State could in the long run prejudice the success of this forward-looking Treaty. We venture to express the hope that any existing

difficulties may be overcome so that complete military denuclearization of the area will be assured.

61. We urge nuclear weapon States to make every effort to eliminate any existing difficulties which they may consider as preventing them from fully respecting militarily denuclearized zones. This is an obligation which non-nuclear-weapon States are clearly entitled to expect that nuclear weapon States will assume. My Prime Minister referred to the special responsibilities of the nuclear weapon States when he stated in the general debate this year:

“... we must recognize that the major responsibility for bringing about a relaxation of international tension and for seeking solutions to the major political problems plaguing the world continues to lie with the major Powers, especially the permanent members of the Security Council and in particular, with the two nuclear super-Powers.” [1582nd plenary meeting, para. 106.]

62. It is surely not unreasonable to expect that the positive contribution to disarmament of the States of Latin America should be matched by an equally responsive approach from the nuclear weapon States, not only to enhance the success of this initiative, but also to encourage similar initiatives in other areas. We strongly hope that formal guarantees, in accordance with the provisions of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty, to respect the status of military denuclearization of the Latin American continent will eventually be forthcoming from nuclear Powers.

63. We note in this connexion that the geographic area contemplated by the Treaty is not limited only to the continental part of the Territories concerned. It also covers parts of the oceans outside national jurisdiction. While we support the principle of the freedom of the high seas, it is possible that nuclear-powered submarines, equipped with nuclear weapons, may infringe upon the denuclearized sea zone delimited by the Treaty, and such an eventuality might be in conflict with the comprehensive provisions of the Treaty. A further danger may lie in the fact that a developing technology renders possible the establishment of nuclear military installations on the ocean floor. What is technologically feasible cannot be entirely excluded from the range of possibilities that may merit consideration.

64. We would merely observe in this connexion that the comprehensive Treaty which we are now considering could perhaps be improved if, in due course, specific provision were to be made for the military denuclearization of the ocean floor beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, but comprised within the area covered by the Treaty.

65. We would assure our Latin American friends that these modest observations are not meant in any way to detract from the merits of their inspiring initiative or that they are put forward in a spirit of criticism of the excellent and comprehensive provisions contained in the Treaty, which we unhesitatingly welcome.

66. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq): Mr. Chairman, as this is my first intervention in the deliberations of this Committee, I would ask you to permit me to perform a duty which you may not find it desirable for me to perform but which I nevertheless deem imperative; that is, to congratulate you

on your election to the eminent office of Chairman. Your election provides double satisfaction to my delegation, first because of your personal qualities and, secondly, because you hail from the United Arab Republic, a country which is not only a part of the Arab family, but which also, by virtue of its territory expanding across the Suez Canal and embracing both Asia and Africa, has for thousands of years served as an indispensable link between these two inseparable continents and as a useful bridge between their civilizations and that of Europe.

67. My delegation's sincere congratulations are also extended to the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur for the well-deserved confidence placed in them by the Committee.

68. My present statement is inspired by the successful achievement of the Latin American countries in crowning their pioneering efforts towards world peace by concluding the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Those countries, most of whose heads of delegations were generous enough to extol the historic ties that bind them to the Arab world, have set to all Member countries, large and small, an example that should serve as a beacon towards global peace. By their initiative and unwavering perseverance, the Latin American countries have demonstrated to us all, not only that where there is a will there is a way, but also that in their quest for peace countries do not have to look across the street for a green light. Endorsement, even by the major nuclear Powers, may be readily forthcoming upon the mere attempt at, to say nothing of the successful conclusion of, the first steps, as is happily the case now.

69. My delegation naturally desires to see universal denuclearization, but it is not greatly dismayed that no tangible progress has been achieved so far in this direction, as the commendable example set by the Latin American countries may serve as an impetus towards further advancement in that direction. We are therefore extremely happy about the successful endeavour to immunize the Latin sub-continent from the horrors of nuclear warfare, and we sincerely hope that more nuclear-free zones may eventually materialize, until the nuclear fear is totally eradicated from this world of ours.

70. Mr. TINOCO (Costa Rica) (*translated from Spanish*): I apologize for requesting the Committee's attention for a few minutes more; but I would not like to miss this opportunity of expressing the keen desire of the delegation, the Government, and the whole population of my small country to see the Treaty signed at Mexico attain its full force through the accession of the great nuclear Powers to Additional Protocol II.

71. The countries of Latin America have taken a historic step in proclaiming the ban of nuclear weapons for warlike purposes in their territory. Fortunately, none of our nations as yet possesses any nuclear weapons or is in an economic or financial position to possess them in the future. The Treaty we have signed would remain a pious hope, a mere pipe-dream, if the great Powers possessing or in a position to possess this type of deadly weapon failed to accede to the Protocol, to endorse the ideals embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco by signing Additional Protocol II. My delegation has high hopes that this action will be taken

shortly when it recalls the reference made to statements by senior representatives of the two largest nuclear Powers that exist today.

72. Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in a memorandum submitted to this Assembly, stated as follows:

"The Soviet Government considers that, in the interests of strengthening peace and barring the spread of nuclear weapons, not only groups of States embracing whole continents or large geographical regions but also more limited groups of States and even individual countries may assume obligations for the establishment of denuclearized zones . . .

"The Soviet Government is prepared to undertake an obligation to respect the status of all denuclearized zones that may be established, if the same obligation is assumed by the other nuclear Powers."⁵

73. Similarly, Mr. Fedorenko said two years ago in the First Committee:

"Another effective procedure for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be to agree that specific geographical regions, either entire continents or individual countries, should regard themselves as free of the production or stock-piling of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government considers it essential to help to give practical effect to these plans. We are prepared, together with the Western Powers, to offer the necessary guarantees that the nuclear-free zones will be excluded from the areas in which nuclear weapons could be used, either on the basis of regional or group agreements or even where a single country wishes to declare its territory a denuclearized zone."

74. Again, the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Humphrey, affirmed that the countries of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East that took the initiative to establish nuclear-free zones through organs of their own or through the United Nations would win the esteem of all the countries of the world, and that the denuclearization of these areas would represent a great step forward towards world peace.

75. In very similar terms Senator Kennedy, the brother of the late lamented President of the United States, spoke to the following effect:

"At the present time one of our greatest advantages is that there are no nuclear weapons anywhere in Latin America or Africa. This situation can be maintained if the nuclear Powers undertake not to introduce nuclear weapons into those areas, if the countries concerned undertake not to acquire such weapons, and if appropriate machinery is set up to verify that the commitments are fulfilled. Some countries, particularly in Latin America, have already exchanged pledges of an informal nature to this end. We should encourage them to proceed with this on as broad a basis as possible."

76. I trust that this General Assembly will provide a stimulus, an appeal to the great nuclear Powers of the world to bring to full fruition the hopes centred on the Treaty for

the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In conclusion, I would like to congratulate the Mexican Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on his strenuous efforts and indefatigable zeal to realize a project which for the sons of Latin America is a beacon of hope for a future less perilous than the world in which we now live.

77. Mr. HSUEH (China): Since this is the first time that my delegation has taken the floor in this Committee, I wish to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues in the Bureau of this Committee the sincere congratulations of my delegation on your election to the high posts in this Committee. Recalling with gratification your outstanding achievements, Mr. Chairman, in the service of the First Committee in previous years, my delegation is confident that you will guide this Committee, with your able and impartial leadership, to an efficient and successful completion of its important tasks.

78. My delegation heartily welcomes the consideration of the present item on the agenda. It also wishes to add its congratulations to those of the Chairman and of other representatives who preceded me on the successful conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. This is a happy event which turns a new and glorious page, not only in the history of peaceful co-operation of Latin American countries, but also in the history of man's search for peace. We are indebted to the delegations of the twenty-one Latin American countries for their initiative in presenting this historic document to the General Assembly. My delegation is especially grateful to the head of the Mexican delegation and the representatives of Brazil, Chile and other Latin American countries whose lucid and informative statements made before this Committee have helped us to gain a deeper understanding of the background and significance of the various important provisions of the Treaty.

79. More than three years of tireless efforts on the part of Latin American Governments have resulted in the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Today we see how richly those efforts have been rewarded. By this Treaty a vast zone of peace in Latin America has been created for the first time in our world where there will be no nuclear weapons, where there will be no need to strive to produce such weapons at the expense of people's well-being and where, with the co-operation of the countries of other regions, there will be security against nuclear attacks.

80. But surely it is not only the people of Latin America who will be benefited by this Treaty. The conclusion of the Treaty has already given an impetus to the efforts being made for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The system of verification and control established in the Treaty of Tlatelolco constitutes a powerful suggestion for the solution of the problem in other contexts. In fact, many of the articles in the Treaty, embodying the most up-to-date concepts and perfected by juridical techniques for which Latin America is famous, may well serve as examples upon which future treaties in this field may be modelled.

81. Finally, as has been pointed out by our Latin American colleagues, the Treaty is not an end in itself. It represents an important step towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament, which we all desire.

⁵ *General Assembly Official Records, Nineteenth Session, Annex No. 9 (A/5827, paras. 24 and 25).*

82. Fully realizing the importance of the undertaking of the Latin American countries, my Government has followed closely their work in preparing the Treaty. Early this year, my Government sent an observer to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, whose presence was mentioned by the Chairman of the delegation of Mexico in his statement last Monday [1504th meeting]. I should like to take this opportunity to convey the thanks of my Government to the members of the Preparatory Commission and in particular to the Government of Mexico for the courtesy extended to the observer sent by my Government.

83. There is no doubt that the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been made possible by a few factors which are unique to Latin America. The Preamble to the Treaty mentions the traditional peace-loving outlook in Latin America, which is of course a basic factor. Another tradition in Latin America, as we all know, is a respect for law in international relations. There is also a sense of unity and like-mindedness amongst the Latin American countries, developed and strengthened over many years through their co-operation in such regional systems as the Organization of American States. Therefore the successful conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is no accident.

84. We wish that all other regions of the world were equally fortunate in that respect. But each region has its own features. What is possible in Latin America may not be possible in other regions. We are therefore particularly happy that in this important matter, as in many others, Latin America has led the way and, by its shining example, has shown light to the world.

Organization of Work

85. The CHAIRMAN: As no other representative wishes to take the floor this afternoon, I shall adjourn the meeting. Before doing so, I would inform the Committee that it is my intention to revert tomorrow morning to item 32 and to take up the draft resolutions submitted under that item in the hope that we shall dispose of them early in the morning meeting and then take up item 91 again. If there is no objection to that proposal by any member, I shall take it that it is so decided.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.