

United Nations  
**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

NINTH SESSION  
Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 720th  
MEETING**

Wednesday, 17 November 1954,  
at 10.30 a.m.

**New York**

**CONTENTS**

	<i>Page</i>
Agenda item 67: International co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy: report of the United States of America ( <i>continued</i> ) .....	359

**Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).**

**AGENDA ITEM 67**

**International co-operation in developing the peaceful  
uses of atomic energy: report of the United  
States of America (A/2734, A/2738, A/C.1/  
758, A/C.1/L.105) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. MENON (India) stated that the reaction of his delegation to the plan presented by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953 (470th plenary meeting) had been made known very soon after that speech had been delivered. Subsequently, on 10 May 1954, the Prime Minister of India, speaking in the Indian Parliament, had welcomed President Eisenhower's approach to the question. Mr. Menon recalled that, in his speech on 6 October 1954 before the General Assembly (492nd meeting), he had welcomed the proposal submitted by the United States delegation. He also recalled that he had stated in the Committee (684th meeting), when time-tables were discussed, that he hoped the United States would give delegations sufficient time to consider the pattern of the proposal put forward and enable the countries' experts in that field to be present at the debate.

2. The problem of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was of great importance, and it would create great changes in the economic and also, perhaps, political relations of the world. It was therefore absolutely necessary that it should be considered with objectivity and without emotion. The lack of emotion on the part of the Indian delegation should not be construed as a lack of enthusiasm for the proposal. While welcoming the proposal, the Prime Minister of India had already stated that the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was far more important for a country like India than it might be for other, advanced, countries.

3. The pattern of the current debate was that each delegation stated its position, its achievements, its resources and its desire to join in the effort to evolve a scheme for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. With regard to the joint draft resolution, there was a general willingness to accept the intentions of the sponsors and to wait to see how the details outlined in the draft resolution would be presented in the course of the debate.

4. Mr. Menon stated that in India there was fortunately no resistance of a mental or institutional character

to scientific research. The notion that there was no difference between mass and energy which, from the point of view of actual reaction and approach, was perhaps revolutionary to the Western world, was not so to the Oriental mind. A child in India would speak of matter and energy as the same. Therefore the educated strata of his country were almost predisposed to adopt that approach. Moreover, the tradition of scientific investigation in India went back thousands of years. There had been a continuous spirit of scientific inquiry, the origin of which was lost in the remoteness of time. The system of writing numbers had been known to Indian civilization many thousands of years before.

5. Mr. Menon enumerated the main contributions of ancient Indian scientists in the field of mathematics. The Indian mathematicians had also been the first to use the letters of the alphabet to denote unknowns, which had contributed to the advance of algebra. Mr. Menon then reviewed the contributions made by Indian scientists in the realm of physics. He added that translations and interpretations of ancient Indian writings in Sanskrit showed that the Indian scientists in those times had been familiar with the concept of motion, both atomic and molecular, as underlying the physical phenomena of sound, light and heat.

6. Mr. Menon then traced the progress of Indian scientific thought until the time that India came into contact with the industrial civilization of the West. In 1784, the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal had been established, which had started a resurgence, and modern scientific methods had received an impetus in India. As a result of that, a number of scientific institutions had been established and considerable advance had been made in scientific research in various fields.

7. The emergence of an independent India in 1947 had given further impetus to the establishment of new institutions for carrying on research in the various fields of science. The two most important of India's institutions were the Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore and the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research at Bombay. The Institute at Bangalore was associated with the name of Sir Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman, the discoverer of what was known as the Raman ray and the Raman effect. The revolutionary discovery in 1928 of the Raman lines had been of the greatest importance for molecular research. Beside Raman, other Indian scientists, prominent among whom were Dr. Saha, Dr. Kothari, Dr. Bose, Sir Kariamanikkam Srinivasa Krishnan, and Dr. Bhabha, had also made important contributions to scientific research in the atomic field.

8. In 1948, the Indian Parliament had passed the Atomic Energy Act for the development and control of atomic energy. As a result of the passage of that Act, an Atomic Energy Commission had been established in August 1948 under the chairmanship of Dr.

Bhabha. The Commission was directly responsible to the Prime Minister of India. The functions of the Commission included the promotion and control of research in nuclear sciences and the survey and development of the mineral and other resources of the country which might be of use in the production of atomic energy. The research programme of the Commission was being carried out at the Tata Institute and several other institutions. Mr. Menon then quoted from a book by Mr. Gordon Dean,<sup>1</sup> former Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in which it was stated that, among the nations in Asia, India had the largest and most advanced atomic energy programme, that India had made considerable progress in recent years in cosmic ray research, that it had the world's richest deposits of monazite, which contained thorium, and that, under the leadership of some very able scientists, India was making a determined effort to keep itself informed about nuclear research developments all over the world.

9. The Indian Government was fully aware that no great advance could be made in the field of atomic research by having only a few well-known scientists, and it had therefore established a number of well-provided and well-staffed laboratories where research could be carried on by younger scientists. Similarly, most of the Indian universities were receiving grants from the Government or from public institutions for the encouragement of nuclear research. As a result, there were today in Indian universities 96,000 students being trained in scientific study and research and 116,000 in technical projects.

10. Describing India's atomic energy resources, Mr. Menon stated that very big deposits of low-grade uranium ore had already been found in various parts of the country. In addition, there were monazite reserves estimated at over one million tons, containing over 0.3 per cent uranium. Uranium-bearing belts had also been discovered in eastern and central India. To stimulate the mining of uranium by private concerns, the Atomic Energy Commission had offered to buy all stocks of uranium ore. As a further incentive, rewards were offered for the discovery of new deposits, and grants-in-aid were given for mine development. The government geologists also gave advice to private prospectors and samples of ore brought by them were analysed free of charge. The Indian Rare Earths Ltd. was also exploiting other material resources in that field. The Raw Material Division of the Atomic Energy Commission was also carrying out extensive survey and drilling operations for atomic minerals.

11. A plant with a capacity of 3,000 tons of monazite per annum had been set up in 1952 in southern India and another plant to process thorium and uranium to commercial purity was also in an advanced stage of construction and would be in operation in 1955.

12. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission laid great stress on the application of its work to the population as a whole and to the development of applied science. It had added a biological and medical research department, which was working in close co-operation with the Indian Cancer Research Centre. The application of atomic energy to agriculture was also in progress.

13. India had made considerable progress in cosmic ray research, for which its geographical position was

particularly favourable. A major development in that field had been the establishment of a laboratory at Gulmarg, in Kashmir, 9,000 feet above sea level; other research centres existed in different parts of the country. Cosmic ray research in India had received further impetus with the launching of a joint Indian-American programme of research, in October 1952, on the nature and behaviour of cosmic rays in the thin air region nearly twenty miles above the earth. The programme was sponsored by two American institutions, the National Geographic Society and the Franklin Institute, and by the Aligarh University of India.

14. Turning to the plan initiated by President Eisenhower, Mr. Menon stated that his Government saw no reason why the development of the industrial uses of atomic energy should not take place irrespective of the question of banning atomic weapons. The banning of atomic weapons was an absolute necessity in itself, but should not be confused with the other question.

15. Mr. Menon wished to deal next with the question of the relationship of raw materials to industrial expansion in the modern world. He drew attention to the fact that certain countries, like his own, possessed vast resources of raw materials, and emphasized that those countries must not be placed in the position where they supplied their raw materials to the industrially advanced countries, receiving in return processed material, and even complete atomic reactors. The United Nations should not, directly or indirectly, find itself in a situation of assisting colonial exploitation. It must therefore be emphasized that any country which contributed raw materials to the international pool must have the right progressively to contribute those materials in a more processed and finished form, and that no impediment should be put in the way of its technical and industrial development.

16. On behalf of his Government, Mr. Menon declared that India had no objection to supplying considerable quantities of uranium- or thorium-containing substances, provided it was clearly understood that India would deliver such supplies, with the passage of time, in a more and more finished form. The ultimate criterion should be self-sufficiency; that criterion should be accepted as a basic principle, although it did not in any way preclude exchange or co-operation with other countries. The Indian delegation only wanted to make sure that in the atomic age there should not be a repetition of the former relationship between the manufacturing country and the country which produced raw material, the latter remaining permanently a supplier of raw material, and no more.

17. Mr. Menon then declared that his country must have some assurance that the material it supplied would not even indirectly be used for manufacturing atomic weapons; as for the question of the direct use of such material for such purposes, that would be covered by bilateral agreements.

18. Referring to the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.105), Mr. Menon stated that he had the assurances of its sponsors that it was not their desire to exclude any part of the world. As far as his country was concerned, it was in a position to make a proper contribution to the present task from the beginning. Mr. Menon wished to point out that India possessed natural, scientific, technical and financial resources to develop atomic energy on its own, without any assistance from any foreign country; at the same time,

<sup>1</sup> Dean, Gordon, *Report on the atom; what you should know about the atomic energy program of the United States*, Knopf, New York, 1953.

its programme would, of course, be expedited through co-operation with other nations.

19. With regard to the offers of training facilities, made by the United States and the United Kingdom, his Government believed that time and funds should not at present be spent in establishing any new central institutions. On the contrary, the existing facilities in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and, in a smaller way, Norway and India, should be utilized and facilities should be developed in other countries which desired such development. Centralization was not the way to achieve the objective envisaged in the present plan, especially in the initial stages. As he had already stated, the criterion should be ultimate self-sufficiency in the production and processing of the necessary raw material.

20. The Indian delegation had no intention at present of submitting amendments to the joint draft resolution; it had, however, certain suggestions to make to the sponsors of that draft. Mr. Menon then referred to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom (718th meeting) to the effect that the States negotiating the establishment of an international atomic energy agency would wish to consider the views of other Member States on that subject. Mr. Menon desired further clarification on that point. He wished to know in what manner those consultations would begin and whether they would be restricted to one or two members of the negotiating Powers, with one or two countries outside their circle. He hoped that, after further consideration, it would be possible for the sponsors of the joint draft resolution to make such changes as might be necessary to prevent any formal restriction or any formulations of a character that might impede the joining of such countries as were willing to join in the negotiations in the initial stages. According to the statement of the representative of the United States (717th meeting), no State would be debarred from joining in the planning of the agency as the programme advanced. It would therefore be advisable for the General Assembly to suggest to Member States that were willing and able to join in such a project that they should co-operate in it.

21. In the opinion of the Indian delegation, there was one outstanding weakness in the joint draft resolution, namely, that it did not state that the General Assembly favoured the establishment of the international atomic energy agency. He hoped that, during the course of the revision of the draft resolution, some reference would be made to such endorsement of the agency by the General Assembly.

22. Mr. Menon then suggested the deletion of the words "similar to those of the specialized agencies", in paragraph 1 of the operative part of section A of the joint draft resolution. Such deletion would have the advantage of not excluding the Security Council without in any way establishing any special relationship between the agency and the Council. However, if some qualification was necessary, it could just be "in accordance with the Charter" or something similar. The phrase "similar to those of the specialized agencies" might create a certain confusion, as the specialized agencies differed in their structure and relationship with the United Nations. Moreover, if the agency was to be established under the United Nations as a whole, it would be better to omit that phrase, as most of the specialized agencies came under only one of the

organs of the United Nations, namely, the Economic and Social Council.

23. Mr. Menon also suggested that paragraph 3, in section A, should include the words "and the Secretary-General", so that not only the Member States but also the Secretary-General be informed as progress was made regarding the establishment of the international agency.

24. Although the Indian delegation did not want to enter into any controversy with regard to the holding of the scientific conference, it wished to suggest that such a conference should be held at the governmental level; it might be advisable, therefore, to insert the word "governmental" in the text of section B of the joint draft resolution.

25. Mr. Menon concluded by stating that he hoped that the suggestions made by his delegation would receive due consideration by the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, even if there were agreement on the draft resolution by the United States and the USSR. While he welcomed such an agreement, he felt that the views of other countries should not be excluded from consideration.

26. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), pointing out that the general debate was to be closed that day, reserved the right to return to the important and interesting questions raised by the representative of India during the subsequent discussion of the draft resolution before the Committee.

27. The Soviet position in the present debate had been that it was of the utmost importance to achieve international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy and ensuring that that energy was used only for the benefit of mankind. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that, at the beginning of 1954, the USSR Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, had handed to the United States Secretary of State a draft declaration (A/2738, communication No. 3) to be issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Chinese People's Republic and the USSR, stating that those countries desired to make every effort to ensure that the great discoveries in the field of atomic energy were used only for peaceful purposes and for raising standards of living. The objective expressed in that draft declaration was the selfsame objective which had determined all the efforts of the Soviet Union in that field; that was also the objective which the Soviet delegation had pursued throughout the discussion of the present problem, which was of such fundamental importance for the peoples of the world.

28. The discussion had been useful since it had brought out a number of important questions relating to the organization of international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The debate had centred upon the following problems: first, the principles governing international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy; secondly, the basis on which the international agency should be established; thirdly, the relationship between the international agency and the United Nations; fourthly, the connexion between the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic energy for purposes of war; and, fifthly, the role and importance of the international agency in promoting the economic development of the insufficiently industrialized countries which needed power.

29. As the debate had shown, the questions that had attracted most attention were, first, the question of the principles governing international co-operation in that field and, secondly, the question of the basis on which the international agency should be established and on which its aims, its terms of reference and its practical activity should be determined.

30. Those principles had been set forth, and their significance in the solution of the important problem of the peaceful uses of atomic energy had been made explicit, in the correspondence between the Governments of the United States and the USSR (A/2738). The USSR had stated that those principles were dictated by the Charter, and that international co-operation in that field should be established on the basis of those principles. It had felt that such co-operation, and the appropriate agency, should be established by an international agreement based on those principles. That alone would ensure that no country or group of countries would use the agreement to secure a privileged position in relation to another country or group of countries and thereby impose their will on the latter. Observance of that condition was fundamental for any proper organization of international co-operation. The international agency would be able to perform its functions effectively only if its powers were not used to the detriment of the security of any State.

31. Moreover, the powers, aims and practical activity of the agency must be in full conformity with the basic principles of the Charter. Unfortunately, that was not a universally accepted axiom in international relations. The recognition of that principle, however, must determine the position as to the relationship between the proposed agency and the United Nations and its organs.

32. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky observed that Mr. Dulles in his statement to the General Assembly on 23 September (475th meeting) had declared that the United States would act in close partnership with those nations which were inspired by the ideals of the United Nations, a formula which did not solve the problem of the relationship which should exist between the United Nations and the international agency. The statement made by Mr. Lodge on 15 November (717th meeting) had brought some clarity into the matter, since he had stated that there must necessarily be a relationship between the agency and the United Nations under whose aegis it was to operate. However, that formula was also inadequate and could scarcely serve to remove all doubt as to the practical nature of the relationship.

33. It was still proposed that the relations between the agency and the United Nations should be governed by an agreement similar to those between the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Mr. Vyshinsky repeated that some other formulation of the relationship would be preferable. The proposed agency would differ fundamentally from the specialized agencies in its terms of reference and in its methods, operations and political significance. Any attempt to make its relationship to the United Nations identical with the relationships existing between the Organization and the specialized agencies would be at variance with the principles set forth in the USSR memorandum of 22 September (A/2738, communication No. 12), as well as with the communication in which the United States had expressed its readiness to examine those principles in the process of negotiations with the USSR.

34. As the representative of Norway had pointed out (717th meeting), the problem involved in the organization of the international agency differed fundamentally, in character, from the problems facing any of the specialized agencies. He had concluded that the problem of the relationship between the United Nations and the proposed agency required a radically new agreement, differing from previous agreements concluded between specialized agencies and the United Nations. The report of the Secretary-General (A/C.1/758) came to substantially the same conclusion in saying that there might be good reasons to assume that the pattern provided by the specialized agencies would not adequately serve the desired objectives.

35. It was quite unjustified to say that the USSR insisted upon the paramount role of the Security Council in the matter. It did press for a close link between the future agency and the Council, in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter which were binding on all Members, but that certainly did not mean that it wanted the Council to play a paramount role in all the activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. What was important was that the terms of reference, aims and practical activities of the international agency should be in conformity with the recognized principles of the United Nations Charter; Mr. Vyshinsky believed that other countries, including the United States, shared that view. In its memorandum of 19 March (A/2738, communication No. 8), the United States had said that the agency should submit reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly when requested to by either of those organs. In its memorandum of 22 September (A/2738, communication No. 12), the USSR had said that it shared the view of the United States that the agency should report on its activities to the Council and the Assembly.

36. It was clear that the right of the Security Council to elicit such reports would also give it the right to criticize them, to give instructions to the agency in connexion with them, and to expect the agency to be answerable to it for carrying out those instructions. If that were not so, then reports by the agency to the Council would serve no useful purpose. Once it was agreed that the Council could request reports, it clearly followed that the Council was duty bound to state its views on the reports and to issue such instructions as it deemed fit. In so doing, it must be guided by the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security entrusted to it under Article 24 of the Charter.

37. Mr. Vyshinsky thought it useful to point out that the provision that the agency should submit reports to the Security Council virtually reproduced the wording contained in General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, which had assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission tasks and terms of reference similar to the proposed agency. The objective of that unanimously adopted resolution had also been to ensure that atomic energy should be used for peaceful purposes.

38. Thus the memorandum of 19 March 1954 had reproduced the wording of the resolution of 24 January 1946. Now, however, that the United Nations found itself closer to the practical implementation of the objectives of that memorandum and of the statement of President Eisenhower of 8 December 1953—which, as was well known, had elicited a favourable response from the USSR—it appeared that resolution 1 (I) was

no longer relevant. The United Kingdom representative, for example, had stated (718th meeting) that the Atomic Energy Commission had been tragically unable to perform its function and had urged that emphasis be placed on the future rather than on the unhappy past. But the resolution of 24 January 1946, a splendid and generous document of which the Organization could be proud, was not the unhappy past, and the failure of the Commission to yield good results could not be imputed to that resolution. The failure of the Commission had been due to a number of other conditions and circumstances which Mr. Vyshinsky did not propose to discuss; he agreed, however, that they had constituted an unhappy past.

39. The resolution of 24 January 1946 was still a living source of generous ideas and decisions which could serve as an example; a comparison of paragraph 5 of that resolution with the tasks and terms of reference of the proposed agency emphasized the elements which the two had in common and supported the view that the international agency should be organized in conformity with principles approved unanimously by the General Assembly some years before. Mr. Vyshinsky asked why there was an attempt to discredit and to move away from that resolution. Such an attitude was unfounded. Equally unfounded was the United States position that the work of the proposed agency would be hampered if it was guided by the principles laid down in that resolution.

40. The United States position, indeed, was contradictory. On the one hand, the United States agreed that the agency must be linked with the Security Council and must submit reports to the Council, a provision which implied certain rights on the part of the Council in relation to the agency, since the Council bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. That was laid down in resolution 1 (I), in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter. And on the other hand, the United States maintained that that resolution should not serve as a guide in the present case. As a result of that ambiguous position, there arose the possibility of circumventing the Council and the principle underlying its activity, namely, the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council in deciding questions of substance.

41. The statements which had been made as to the alleged abuse of that principle were designed to discredit one of the fundamental principles of the Organization. The application of the rule of unanimity in the Security Council, as should be perfectly clear, was called for by sheer political necessity. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the United States had initiated the inclusion of that principle in the Charter, and quoted a statement made at the Malta Conference, on 6 February 1945, by the then United States Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, as to the necessity of unanimity among the permanent members of the Council. The United States upheld the principle of unanimity just as ardently as the USSR. Mr. Dulles, in his book, *War or Peace*, had stated that the United States, thanks to a friendly majority in the Security Council, had had no occasion to use the veto in the defence of its interests but that, if that position were to change, the United States would, of course, be anxious to have the right of veto.

2. The answer, of course, would be that the United States recognized the principle of unanimity but did

not abuse it, while the USSR abused it by using it far too often. But in fact, as Mr. Dulles had said, the United States had not needed to use the veto. There were other ways of defeating proposals; for instance, five members of the Council could agree to abstain and then the necessary majority of seven votes could not be obtained. Such a "sit-down strike" defeated a proposal just as surely as negative votes. The USSR, or any other member of the Council, could in theory follow that course. In practice, however, the Soviet point of view was represented in the Council by only one delegation. Even the London "gentlemen's agreement" to the effect that one other seat in the Council would be assigned to a representative of the Eastern European countries had been flouted, and that seat had been assigned to a series of countries which were not members of that group. The USSR had thus found itself in a situation in which Mr. Dulles would find it quite normal for the United States to use the veto, and when it considered a proposal unacceptable, political necessity had left no other way open to it but to use the veto.

43. As for the legality of the right of veto, Mr. Dulles had stated that no great Power would agree in advance to regard itself as bound by any action which might be undertaken against it. Mr. Lodge, too, had repeatedly indicated his support of the principle of unanimity. As recently as October 1954, he had emphasized that he was opposed to eliminating the veto on any question relating to the use of United States troops. In an article published on 8 October 1954 in the *Christian Science Monitor*, Mr. Lodge, referring to the question of the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations, had said that the United States was prepared to use the veto in the Security Council if the need should arise. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the principle of unanimity was also laid down in article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which an invitation to accede to the treaty could be extended only by the unanimous decision of all the signatories.

44. In his statement of 15 November (717th meeting), the representative of the United States had pointed out that, if a situation endangering international peace and security arose in connexion with the peaceful uses of the atom in any country or group of countries, it would be a matter of concern both to the Security Council and to the General Assembly and would doubtless be dealt with by the United Nations, so that it was probable that in the interests of international security there would be some relationship between the agency and the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But any kind of relationship between the Security Council and the international agency must be based on the Charter, since no other basis existed. That being so, there were no grounds for objecting to making the agency responsible to the Security Council, as the Atomic Energy Commission had been under General Assembly resolution 1 (I). That was the point which the USSR would like to see reflected in the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.105).

45. Mr. Vyshinsky wished to deal next with the statement made on 16 November (718th meeting) by the representative of the United Kingdom. Mr. Nutting had said that Mr. Vyshinsky's statement of 12 November (715th meeting) indicated the inability of the USSR to state clearly whether it was prepared to join in the

efforts to set up an international agency. Far from that being the case, Mr. Vyshinsky had clearly stated the Soviet view as to the necessity of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, both internally and at an international level. The fact that the USSR had stated that the possibilities of reaching agreement on international co-operation for the peaceful use of atomic energy were not exhausted showed that it wanted such agreement. If it supported the principle of international co-operation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, it obviously supported the implementation of that principle in practice. Of course, agreement must be reached on the conditions under which such co-operation could take place, but the USSR continued to insist on co-operation.

46. Finally, it was difficult to reconcile the statement of the United Kingdom representative with the well-known fact that the USSR was conducting conversations with the sponsors of the draft resolution concerning the amendments which it wished to make to the text so that the First Committee might achieve an agreed solution. The USSR had studied the seven-Power draft resolution very carefully, and had noted a number of flaws which it felt should be removed. That was why negotiations were in progress, and Mr. Vyshinsky trusted that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had examined the USSR proposals with care. The negotiations remained within the framework of the joint draft resolution because, in addition to the shortcomings to which he had referred, it also contained a number of entirely acceptable provisions. For instance, the USSR had no objection to the proposal in paragraph 5 of section B concerning the establishment of an advisory committee. The consultations, which were continuing, required time and patience, because the Soviet delegation, like the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, had to examine thoroughly such points as were still controversial. Both parties appeared to be making every effort to eliminate or compose the differences which existed, and haste would not be appropriate. As the representative of the USSR, Mr. Vyshinsky considered that there should be no question of saying that the negotiations must be completed within one or two days. The saving of one or two days might eventually cost much more, since it might preclude an agreement which would have been possible if enough time had been allowed.

47. Mr. Vyshinsky emphasized the importance of the use of atomic energy to assist the economic development of insufficiently industrialized countries. The momentous importance of that problem had been brought out by a number of representatives of countries needing electric power. As those representatives had pointed out, atomic energy must be used for the development of the economy of all peoples in general and, as far as under-developed countries were concerned, it was not sufficient to be receivers of atomic production. The statement of the representative of Lebanon (718th meeting) that such countries must seek to become active partners in creative science deserved careful attention.

48. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that the representative of Argentina had expressed regret (717th meeting) that some of the sponsors of the draft resolution should have spoken about the considerable time which would be needed before electric power could be produced by atomic energy. That, he felt, was indicative of the fact that the problem was an urgent one and that the time was ripe for pushing ahead with its solution if the interests of the insufficiently developed countries were to be satisfied. Mr. Vyshinsky also drew attention to the statement of the representative of Bolivia (718th meeting), who had spoken of the oppression suffered by his country through the exploitation of its mineral resources, and had asked whether the extraction of uranium would give rise to similar practices. The international agency would have to give that question careful consideration.

49. In conclusion, the Soviet representative reiterated that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy could be fruitful only if it was based on the fundamental principles set forth by the USSR. If those principles were put into practice, there would be no possibility of such co-operation being used to the detriment of the legitimate interests of States. The activities of the international agency must be based on the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.

50. The CHAIRMAN stated that the general debate was closed.

The meeting rose at 1.20 pm.