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*Chairman:* Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (concluded)  
(A/5976, A/5986-DC/227, A/C.1/L.337, A/C.1/  
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CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (con-  
cluded) (A/C.1/L.337, A/C.1/L.338, A/C.1/L.339)

1. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that at the 1372nd meeting he had suggested the inclusion, in the preamble of the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.339), of a paragraph referring to the restraint shown by the non-nuclear Powers possessing nuclear potential in not proceeding further towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As he now understood that any revision of the eight-Power draft resolution would involve a considerable loss of time, he would not press his suggestion; the fact that it was mentioned in the summary record of the 1372nd meeting would in itself indicate due recognition of the constructive role played by the non-nuclear Powers in question.

2. Mr. FAHMY (United Arab Republic), speaking on behalf of the eight non-aligned countries participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which had submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.339, said he wished to make it clear, first, that though the text of the draft resolution had been prepared on the initiative of the eight Powers concerned, it was the product also of long and detailed negotiations with other delegations, and the sponsors hoped that it would receive the Committee's overwhelming support. Secondly, while the sponsors had benefited from advice, constructive suggestions and proposals offered by many countries, they had held extensive negotiations with the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union in particular. Thirdly, the eight-Power draft was a compromise text. It was possibly open to improvement, but it was equally possible that amendments would upset the delicate balance of the existing text; moreover, it would be agreed that it was now rather late to start drafting the text afresh. Fourthly, the draft resolution was a compromise text even as far as the eight sponsors themselves were concerned, and as such it did not necessarily reflect the basic position

of each of the sponsors. Fifthly, he could safely say that the Soviet Union and the United States endorsed the draft as it stood. Sixthly, all the sponsors were anxious above all that negotiations on a treaty which would genuinely prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be resumed as soon as possible.

3. Operative paragraphs 1 and 2 (a), (b) and (c) of the draft resolution were self-explanatory. Operative paragraph 2 (d) contained a reference to "acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty", since any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would have to be completely effective, if it was to be a genuine instrument of peace. Some methods of ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty had already been proposed in the Committee, but other possible methods could also be considered. The sponsors believed that observance of the principle set forth in operative paragraph 2 (e) would help to make the treaty more effective.

4. If the draft resolution met with general approval in the Committee, he hoped that the United States and USSR delegations would not press their respective draft resolutions to the vote.

5. He accordingly moved that the Committee should proceed forthwith to vote on the eight-Power draft resolution. He urged the Committee to adopt the draft resolution, so that negotiations at Geneva could be resumed as quickly as possible.

6. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the sponsors of the other two draft resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were ready to yield priority to the eight-Power draft resolution.

7. If there was no objection to the motion by the representative of the United Arab Republic for the closure of the debate, he would declare the debate on agenda item 106 closed.

*It was so decided.*

8. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee) said that, in accordance with rule 154 of the General Assembly's rule of procedure, the Committee would wish to be informed of the financial implications of the eight-Power draft resolution.

9. The budget estimates submitted by the Secretary-General for the financial year 1966 included in section 2, chapter III, a request for funds for meetings of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1966. Accordingly, the Secretary-General wished to inform the First Committee that the adoption of the eight-Power draft resolution would not involve any additional appropriation for 1966.

10. The CHAIRMAN put the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.339) to the vote.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Panama, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Romania, Cuba, France, Guinea, Mali, Pakistan.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 83 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.*<sup>1/</sup>

11. The CHAIRMAN said that he would now give the floor to those representatives who had asked to speak in order to explain their votes.

12. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) said that, though his delegation had supported the eight-Power draft resolution as an act of faith in the future, it still had serious reservations regarding the proposals made by certain delegations in the Committee on the methods to be used for solving the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

13. Non-proliferation was only one aspect of the very complex problem of disarmament. It was, of course, highly desirable that the nuclear Powers should stop disseminating their nuclear weapons and should ask countries not already possessing nuclear weapons to renounce any intention of obtaining or producing them. But it was obvious, at the same time, that the existence of a nuclear club created a category of privileged super-Powers which could at any time engage in nuclear blackmail.

14. The representatives of certain nuclear Powers had informed the Committee that their Governments were prepared to give a solemn guarantee to the non-nuclear Powers in exchange for an undertaking by the latter not to acquire nuclear weapons. But promises of that kind were at the mercy of shifting

<sup>1/</sup> The representatives of Chile and Togo stated later in the meeting (see paragraphs 49 and 53) that if they had been present when the vote was taken they would have voted in favour of the draft resolution, and the delegation of Malawi subsequently informed the Chairman that it wished to be put on record as having cast its vote in favour of the draft resolution.

circumstances and changes in military alliances. Any treaty on non-proliferation should include a specific and formal undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use their atomic weapons and not to exert any pressure, political or military, based on the possession of such weapons. It was in that sense that his delegation understood operative paragraph 2 (b) of the draft resolution.

15. In their joint memorandum on non-proliferation dated 15 September 1965,<sup>2/</sup> the eight non-aligned countries members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had said that a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but should be followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons. He hoped that principle would be given due weight by the Eighteen-Nation Committee when it resumed its work at Geneva.

16. Lastly, he observed that two of the nuclear Powers—the People's Republic of China and France—would not be participating in the Geneva negotiations. He wondered what certainty there could be that those two Powers would feel themselves bound by a treaty which had been drafted without their participation.

17. Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) explained that his delegation had abstained from voting on the eight-Power resolution because, though it recognized that the compromise embodied in the draft had some positive features, it did not believe that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was at present the most fundamental or the most urgent aspect of the nuclear weapons problem. The conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation would in fact mean that the non-nuclear Powers, which constituted only a hypothetical danger to mankind, would have to renounce some of their sovereign rights. They would of course be quite prepared to do so if the nuclear Powers, which represented an immediate danger to mankind, were ready to make some corresponding sacrifice. But the nuclear Powers were intending merely to legalize their existing monopoly of nuclear weapons; and they would still be in a position to use nuclear weapons whenever they believed that their supreme national interests were in jeopardy.

18. Further, a treaty on non-proliferation would be of little value without the participation of the People's Republic of China, which was now a nuclear Power. His own country, which had neither the intention of producing nuclear weapons nor the means to do so, had declined to sign the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, on the ground that it was only a partial and one-sided solution to the problem of nuclear weapons in general; and his delegation had abstained from voting on the eight-Power draft resolution for the same reason. When the present temporary enthusiasm had passed—and even, perhaps, when a treaty on non-proliferation had been signed—the Committee would be compelled to face the fact that the only solution to the nuclear weapons problem lay in general and complete disarmament.

19. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) said his delegation particularly welcomed the fact that the

<sup>2/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. E.

draft resolution just adopted called upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to begin negotiations as soon as possible on a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The First Committee's debate would undoubtedly serve as an incentive to all the negotiators at Geneva to reach early agreement on an effective treaty. Under the circumstances, the United States would refrain from pressing its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.337) to the vote, if the Soviet Union would do likewise.

20. His delegation supported the principle, stated in operative paragraph 2 (a) of the draft resolution just adopted, that the treaty should not permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, in any form. The United States draft treaty<sup>3/</sup> left no loop-holes that would permit any such proliferation. It would bar any action, either direct or through the indirect route of a military alliance, which would result in an increase in the total number of entities having independent power to use nuclear weapons; no proposal which the United States had considered in NATO would place control of nuclear weapons, or information on their manufacture, in the hands of any non-nuclear country. Operative paragraph 2 (a) was therefore compatible with the United States position.

21. Although a treaty on non-proliferation was at least as much in the interest of non-nuclear States as in that of nuclear States, the feeling of many non-nuclear States that there should be a balance between the obligations assumed by the respective groups under the treaty was understandable. In the United States view, operative paragraph 2 (b) was directed essentially to association of a treaty on non-proliferation and various collateral measures. His Government, agreeing that an agreement on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, continued to advocate specific proposals for related measures; it was important, however, not to permit the absence of agreement on any one measure to interfere with progress on any other.

22. He regretted that operative paragraph 2 (d) failed to reflect more clearly the wide support voiced in the First Committee for the application of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities.

23. Recognizing that a treaty on non-proliferation might not by itself completely meet the security needs of all countries, his Government was prepared to consider further what could be done to provide additional assurance. Yet his Government considered that a treaty on non-proliferation would make a very significant contribution to international stability and peace, and no effort would be spared to achieve a treaty.

24. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said it was still his view that any treaty on non-proliferation should be supplemented by other basic measures if it was not to establish a monopoly under which the nuclear Powers would enjoy privileges without being subject to corresponding obligations. Although the draft resolution adopted by the Committee lacked some points

which the Peruvian delegation would have liked to see included, and although its formulation of certain principles was incomplete, the very fact that a resolution had been adopted would help to reduce international tension and foster co-operation between the great Powers. Moreover, parts of the draft resolution encouraged the hope that a treaty on non-proliferation would be followed by the signing, or at least the frank discussion, of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

25. He welcomed operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, which would ensure that the Eighteen-Nation Committee was able to benefit from the debates in the First Committee. The reference to the Italian proposal for unilateral declarations of non-acquisition was also valuable; the adoption of such declarations would create a favourable climate for further progress towards general and complete disarmament.

26. He thanked the United States representative for his clear exposition of the sense of operative paragraph 2 (a). Operative paragraph 2 (b) rightly stressed the need for the treaty to embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations as between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Lastly, he wished to stress the importance of operative paragraph 2 (d), which dealt with the need for provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty; he felt, however, that specific reference should have been made in that connexion to the Charter and the various organs of the United Nations.

27. Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria) expressed satisfaction that it had been possible to produce a draft resolution which enjoyed such wide support, but pointed out that the text had a number of shortcomings. In particular, though the suggestion made by the Nigerian representative (1356th meeting) that the nuclear Powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers in any circumstances whatsoever had been endorsed by many members of the Committee, it had not been accepted either by the United States or by the Soviet Union, and had not been included in the draft resolution.

28. If the nuclear Powers really desired agreement, and expected the non-nuclear Powers to forswear for ever the right to acquire nuclear weapons, they must be prepared to pay the reasonable price asked by the non-nuclear States. Perhaps a line would have to be drawn between the security requirements of those non-nuclear Powers which were members of alliances which included nuclear Powers and those of non-nuclear Powers which were not.

29. His delegation took some comfort from the thought that operative paragraph 2 (b) of the draft resolution, although less explicit than might have been desired, would permit further discussion of that question at Geneva; he hoped that when the Eighteen-Nation Committee came to give the problem more detailed consideration the nuclear Powers would accord a more favourable and sympathetic reception to the views expressed in the First Committee by representatives of the vast majority of the non-nuclear world.

30. Mr. MALITZA (Romania) said his delegation believed that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. A.

give priority to urgent measures of disarmament which could prevent war and reduce international tension: the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the destruction of nuclear stockpiles, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops stationed on foreign soil. Since the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.339 failed to take account of that view, held by Romania and other States, his delegation had been obliged to abstain from the vote, just as it had abstained from voting on the Disarmament Commission resolution of 15 June 1965.<sup>4/</sup>

31. Mr. RONAN (Ireland) said that the adoption of the eight-Power draft resolution should not preclude the nuclear Powers from negotiating a draft treaty on non-proliferation directly between themselves and opening it for signature by all States—a possibility which was in accordance with the terms of operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should continue its work at Geneva; and if, following the precedent of the partial test ban treaty, a draft treaty on non-proliferation was negotiated by the nuclear Powers and opened for signature, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should then tackle any residual problems, since the treaty on non-proliferation would presumably include provisions for amendment.

32. Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) said that his Government had always pressed for the adoption of concrete and practical measures which would prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons by any State did not contribute to world peace or security, which could be ensured only by general and complete disarmament. His Government was also in favour of interim measures of nuclear disarmament, such as the extension of the scope of the partial test ban treaty to include underground tests, the progressive destruction of atomic stockpiles and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses and the creation of nuclear-free zones. Nevertheless, any such measures, and the progress already achieved in certain limited fields, would be fruitless unless a firm, clear and immediate line was drawn to limit the "nuclear club" to its present membership of five. The immediate problem was not to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to many Powers, but to prevent the emergence of the sixth nuclear Power.

33. It was in that light that his delegation had examined the draft resolution which the Committee had just adopted. He regretted that the statement made by his country's representative at an earlier meeting had been construed by one delegation as inspired by hatred. The development of nuclear weapons by India—should that unfortunate step ever be taken—would give rise to obvious dangers for his country; for Pakistan the further proliferation of nuclear weapons was not an abstract problem or a matter of moral principles but a direct, immediate and serious threat. As the United States representative had said at the 1366th meeting, the problem of proliferation would not be solved by an endless search for agreement on general principles, but by reaching agreement on effective and legally binding provisions which would prevent any State, besides the present

five, from embarking on the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

34. His delegation was aware of the difficulties which the sponsors of the eight-Power draft resolution had faced in their attempt to produce a text reconciling the apparently irreconcilable differences between the United States and Soviet positions; and it readily paid tribute to the good will displayed, and the efforts made, in producing the draft resolution. But he could not help wondering whether the compromise had not been reached at the cost of substance, and whether its deliberate ambiguity did not merely reflect the postponement of difficult decisions and the evasion of questions which defied easy answers. He was not suggesting that a treaty on non-proliferation could be negotiated in the First Committee, and he certainly had no lack of confidence in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. But it was essential to realize that, since two of the five nuclear Powers were not represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, it was neither reasonable nor fair to expect it to produce a generally acceptable and workable agreement on non-proliferation.

35. Further, the draft resolution did not clearly define the problem of proliferation or refer to the three essential components of any solution—namely, an undertaking by the existing nuclear Powers not to transfer to non-nuclear countries nuclear weapons or the knowledge, equipment and material which would enable them to manufacture such weapons; secondly, a renunciation by the non-nuclear countries of the intention to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons; and thirdly, an adequate assurance, in the form of international safeguards and inspection systems, that the undertakings given were in fact being honoured. In read, the guidelines set out in operative paragraph 2 were so vaguely worded that they sounded platitudinous, and their vagueness might lead to conflicting interpretations of their real meaning.

36. With regard to operative paragraph 2 (b), he recalled that one representative had stated in the General Assembly that the only practical approach to the problem of proliferation was for the non-nuclear Powers to renounce the production, acquisition, control of, and access to nuclear weapons, while the nuclear Powers simultaneously undertook to refrain from producing nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and to reach agreement on the reduction of existing stockpiles. If that was the idea reflected in operative paragraph 2 (b), the Committee was taking a retrograde step in endorsing it. Pending agreement between the nuclear Powers on nuclear disarmament, the question of preventing other countries from acquiring, manufacturing or preparing to manufacture nuclear weapons should be considered separately from all other questions of disarmament, as a matter of the highest urgency.

37. Mr. TRIVEDI (India), replying to the representative of Pakistan, regretted that he had reaffirmed his country's hostility towards India.

38. Pakistan's approach to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was inconsistent and contradictory. In September 1962, when there had been four Powers possessing nuclear weapons the

<sup>4/</sup> Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/225.

President of Pakistan had said that no new country should seek to acquire nuclear weapons. However, now the representative of Pakistan had said that a figure of five nuclear-weapon Powers was acceptable, but not six. Doubtless, Pakistan would not object if in the future another of its allies wished to acquire nuclear weapons.

39. If the representative of Pakistan read the records of the Committee's debate, he would note the overwhelming support expressed for India's non-nuclear, non-aligned approach. It was not surprising that such an approach, as embodied in the draft resolution just adopted, did not appeal to Pakistan, which was a member of not one but two alliances, based on existing nuclear-weapon Powers and a potential nuclear-weapon Power.

40. Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) said that he had not made or intended any attack on India, and had no desire to enter into polemics. Pakistan welcomed India's assurance that it would refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. However, many other countries would soon find themselves in the same position as India, and the peace of the world could obviously not be left to their unilateral restraint or moral assurances.

41. Mr. SEATON (United Republic of Tanzania) said that the draft resolution just adopted did not embody three of the six features which, as his delegation had stated in the general debate (1368th meeting), were essential ingredients of any treaty on non-proliferation. Firstly, there was no provision for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons and a commitment by the nuclear States to accept a definite programme for the reduction and eventual destruction of nuclear weapons. Secondly, there was no guarantee to non-nuclear States of protection against aggression. Thirdly, there was no provision for a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests. Those were serious defects, which reduced the likelihood that any treaty or arrangement eventually elaborated would be universally acceptable. His delegation hoped that the principles set forth in operative paragraph 2 (a), (b) and (c) of the draft resolution would be interpreted broadly enough to offset those defects, but regretted that the principles had been stated in rather vague and ambiguous terms.

42. It should not be forgotten that large and powerful nations which possessed both the means and the determination to disturb the nuclear status quo were absent from the Committee's deliberations, in some cases against their wishes. It was to be hoped that those nations would not be moved by resentment at that inequitable treatment to reject the Committee's efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

43. In view of the fervent plea made by the sponsors of the draft resolution and on the understanding that the draft had the support of the major nuclear Powers, his delegation had nevertheless decided to vote for it, as an act of faith and an expression of hope.

44. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be a new and important

step towards the consolidation of peace and the solution of other international problems. Of course, a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but it would be a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament. However, an agreement on non-proliferation would effectively contribute to the cause of peace and security only if it set up a real, not imaginary, barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty should close every avenue to the possible spread of nuclear weapons, whether through the direct transfer of such weapons to non-nuclear States, through the granting of access to such weapons or their collective control within military alliances, or by any other means. It was regrettable that because of the position of certain Powers it had not yet been possible to conclude a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

45. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.339, for which the Soviet Union had voted, made it clear that the treaty should have no loop-holes which might permit the direct or indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. The obvious meaning of that provision was that it was necessary to halt the spread of nuclear weapons in any possible or conceivable form, including the granting of access to nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists through military blocs.

46. The overwhelming majority of States wanted to halt the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons before it was too late. However, the statement just made by the United States representative unfortunately showed that the United States was still guided not by the need to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation as soon as possible but by the interests of the NATO military bloc. The United States draft treaty could not serve as a basis for agreement, precisely because it left room for proliferation of the most dangerous kind. The United States representative's statement had been motivated not by a desire to facilitate a solution or to promote the purposes of the draft resolution but by internal political considerations.

47. It was not true that a treaty on non-proliferation would have no significance without agreement on general and complete disarmament; in fact, such a treaty would undoubtedly be an important step towards disarmament. In the common efforts to achieve that goal, patience and consistency were essential.

48. The USSR delegation appreciated the efforts of the non-aligned countries to achieve a compromise. Since the draft resolution submitted by eight non-aligned countries had been adopted unanimously, the Soviet Union would not press for a vote on its own draft resolution (A/C.1/L.338). It would of course not relax its efforts to bring about the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as a step towards the destruction of all stocks of nuclear weapons and the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

49. Mr. ILLANES (Chile) said that his delegation had unfortunately been absent when the vote had been taken; had it been present it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution. The text adopted did not embody all the desired objectives, but it certainly represented all that could be achieved at the present time. It was a

constructive effort and marked an important step forward which would enable the Eighteen-Nation Committee to take up the question of non-proliferation and report its progress in the near future.

50. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Democratic Republic of the Congo), reaffirming the views expressed by his delegation at the 1361st meeting, said that a solution of the problem of proliferation would not solve the problem of international security, which was the principal objective. The question of non-proliferation was in fact only an aspect of the principal problem—general and complete disarmament. Any agreement on non-proliferation should be accompanied by effective and continuing measures to achieve the destruction of nuclear stockpiles and the conversion of armaments industries to peaceful purposes.

51. Although the draft resolution just adopted did not explicitly mention those points, it did set out a number of important principles; he referred in particular to operative paragraph 2 (b), which called for an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. In his delegation's view, the responsibilities of the nuclear Powers should be to refrain from manufacturing additional weapons, to start the destruction of existing stockpiles and to reconvert the producing industries. The main effort had to come from the nuclear Powers, since it was they who possessed the weapons and could use them. The adoption of such measures by the nuclear Powers would strengthen the case for the adoption by the non-nuclear States of unilateral declarations of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons.

52. Subject to reservations concerning the preambular paragraphs which mentioned the declarations adopted at Cairo in July and October 1964, his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution. It hoped that the good will which had permitted the adoption of the draft resolution would also prevail at Geneva in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

53. Mr. KLU (Togo) said that his delegation had unfortunately been absent when the vote had been taken. Had it been present, it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

54. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had concluded its consideration of the first item on its agenda, item 106. The resolution it had adopted was only one step towards reducing the danger of a thermo-nuclear holocaust, but it represented definite progress on the long road to general and complete disarmament. It was to be hoped that the spirit of understanding and compromise which had been noteworthy during the Committee's debate would also prevail in the forthcoming negotiations on the same subject.

55. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali), supported by Mr. DIALLO (Guinea), suggested that the Committee should not hold meetings concurrently with the plenary meetings of the General Assembly devoted to the item entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations".

*It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.