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Chairman: Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 106

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued)
 (A/5976, A/5986-DC/227)

GENERAL DÉBATE (continued)

1. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia) said that the world was today faced with a choice between nuclear war and a concerted endeavour by all States and peoples to avert that danger. The most radical way to eliminate the menace of thermonuclear war was the total prohibition of atomic weapons themselves, the elimination of all stockpiles and the achievement of general and complete disarmament. The efforts of the peace-loving countries to bring about such disarmament had thus far been frustrated by the policy pursued by the Western Powers; an attempt must therefore be made to reach an agreement on partial measures such as the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water—which represented a first important practical step towards general and complete disarmament—and the understanding that no objects carrying nuclear weapons should be launched into orbit around the earth.

2. One such partial measure which could contribute to the solution of the central problem and at the same time reduce international tension would be the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was already evident that in the near future a large number of States might be in possession of nuclear weapons. The larger the number of States producing or having access to nuclear weapons, the more difficult it would be to control their use, to avoid nuclear war and to reach agreement on disarmament. That being so, the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was of the highest urgency and was bound up with the solution of many other current problems. Aware of that situation, many peace-loving countries had repeatedly submitted concrete proposals, such as the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world and a freeze of atomic armaments in Central Europe. In October 1964 at Cairo, the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government

of Non-Aligned Countries had taken a decisive stand in favour of an agreement on non-proliferation.

3. On the other hand, certain Powers, while professing to be trying to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons, were endeavouring to help their allies in aggressive military blocs to gain indirect access to such weapons. That had been made clear by the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,^{1/} by the various versions of a plan aimed at creating a multilateral nuclear force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and by other manoeuvres such as the plan for the creation of a NATO nuclear fleet. The aim of all those plans was to give the revanchist and militarist forces of West Germany access to nuclear weapons. The idea followed from the military strategy of the United States Government, under which the Bundeswehr was given the role of NATO striking force in Europe. The disastrous consequences that would result from the realization of such a plan were evident in the expansionist policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which was laying claim to the territory of neighbouring States and was firmly opposed to any relaxation of international tensions. In order to carry out their aggressive plans, the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany were attempting to obtain access to nuclear weapons, and were already working out monstrous plans which included the establishment of a belt of nuclear mines on the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. It was easy to understand why Bonn always rejected the constructive proposals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic that the two German States should renounce nuclear weapons in any guise and settle the German problem peacefully in the interest of the German and European peoples. The leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany saw the NATO multilateral nuclear force only as a step towards the full possession of nuclear weapons; indeed, in some United States circles that fact was not concealed. It had been suggested that the creation of a multilateral nuclear force was designed to prevent West Germany from possessing nuclear weapons; but that explanation had no other purpose than to delude world opinion. The peoples of the world did not want a "nuclear Munich" which would be even more dangerous than the Munich that had preceded the Second World War; if it was not prevented, the countries which were conniving at the nuclear arming of the Federal Republic of

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, DC/227, annex 1, sect. A.

Germany would have to bear full responsibility for the grave consequences of their policy.

4. No one in the United Nations denied the urgent need for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Mongolian delegation was gratified to note that the proposal to take up that question at the twentieth session of the General Assembly had been submitted by one of the five nuclear Powers, the USSR, which had also submitted a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/5976). That draft, which closed every loop-hole for the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the Soviet representative's statement in the First Committee, proved the sincerity of the Soviet Government's proposals and showed that it was ready to contribute in every way to maintaining the peace and security of peoples. The Soviet representative had stated that his country was prepared to agree to the destruction of nuclear weapons, stockpiles and delivery vehicles and to the obligation not to use atomic weapons. So far as was known, the Government of the People's Republic of China had made similar statements. His delegation believed that if the United States, the United Kingdom and France were prepared to do likewise, there should be no difficulty in reaching a positive solution on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of an international non-proliferation treaty which would apply to all Powers, both nuclear and non-nuclear, would be of great importance for peace and for peaceful co-operation between States and would have favourable political and economic effects. Moreover, the prestige of the United Nations would be enhanced by its help in solving that vital problem.

5. In supporting the Soviet Union's draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, his delegation wished to declare that, together with the representatives of the socialist States and of all peace-loving countries, it would do its utmost to contribute towards a positive solution of the problem.

6. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) said that in his address to the General Assembly, one without precedent in the history of the United Nations, His Holiness Pope Paul VI had placed particular emphasis on the necessity for disarmament. It now rested with the First Committee to translate his appeal into practical terms by working tirelessly towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and by doing whatever was immediately feasible. At the present stage of its work, it was the task of the Committee to assess the state of disarmament negotiations and give them a new impetus, for which purpose it had at its disposal the resolutions of the Disarmament Commission, the reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the proposals submitted in the course of the general debate.

7. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had received documents and proposals which gave ground for hope of progress on the two problems which were at present most urgent, namely, the prohibition of underground nuclear tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The latter question, which the First Committee was now discussing, had been debated at length in the Eighteen-Nation Committee; the delegations of the non-aligned countries had submitted a very

valuable working paper,^{2/} which had not yet been examined, and proposals had been submitted by the United States^{3/} and Italian^{4/} delegations, to which should be added the recent proposal of the USSR (A/5976).

8. He reminded the Committee of his delegation's general views on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. While the seriousness of the other problems should not be underestimated, Italy considered that the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons was the most urgent and perhaps the most important at the present time, both because of the dire consequences that might result if no agreement was reached on it and because of the beneficial effects which, in contrast, would result from the conclusion of an agreement. Unless restrictive measures were taken very soon the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would become only too real, and the nuclear arms race which might result would be fatal to world stability and disastrous for national economies. Italy was determined to do everything possible to overcome that deadlock.

9. It had for that reason welcomed the United States initiative, to which—as the United States representative had recalled—the Italian delegation had contributed. The United States draft treaty had the merit of being simple and clear and of offering fair and necessary guarantees. It met the legitimate demands of the Eastern countries while safeguarding the fundamental interests of the West and of world equilibrium. The Italian delegation would have preferred a text providing for greater balance in the sacrifices to be made, in other words, for the renunciation of the right to acquire nuclear weapons to be accompanied by limitations on existing nuclear arsenals; but a treaty of such broad scope would inevitably have involved long negotiations, and the sense of urgency had prevailed over all other considerations, however legitimate. A simple treaty would be easier to conclude and would have the advantage of hastening a rapprochement between East and West, which would improve the climate for actual nuclear disarmament. For those reasons the Italian delegation had given its sincere support to the United States draft treaty.

10. The Soviet draft treaty demonstrated the desire of the USSR for a prompt solution to the problem and its willingness to negotiate. However, he felt, subject to more detailed examination, that the objectives of the USSR text differed to some extent from those of non-proliferation properly so-called and went beyond them; the text seemed to be aimed not only at prohibiting the establishment of new independent national centres for nuclear decisions—which was a legitimate concern—but also at opposing any kind of nuclear collaboration or integration, even if it were a perfectly natural development within an alliance which would prevent any individual attempt at dissemination while maintaining a balance. The Italian delegation felt that the USSR draft should be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for examination with the United States draft, in the hope that a renewed effort of good

^{2/} *Ibid.*, sect. E.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, sect. A.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, sect. D.

will by both parties would open the way for a compromise formula.

11. While there seemed at present to be no possibility for the conclusion of a treaty linking all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, an attempt should be made to limit the dangers of nuclear proliferation by other means, as the Secretary-General had emphasized at the 1355th meeting of the Committee when he said that whatever would support restraint and give the countries principally concerned more time to solve the problem was an indispensable minimum at the present juncture. With such considerations in mind, Italy had ventured at Geneva to suggest the idea of a nuclear moratorium initiated by the non-nuclear countries, which would undertake, through unilateral declarations, to renounce for a fixed period of time, and under international control, the national acquisition of nuclear weapons. By so doing they would not only be setting an example but giving the nuclear Powers time to reach agreement on a general treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and on practical disarmament procedures. If when the moratorium expired the non-nuclear countries felt that satisfactory progress had been made towards the denuclearization of the nuclear Powers, they could decide to extend it. If not, they would resume their freedom of action. Since the proposal had received a warm welcome, the Italian delegation had submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee a draft unilateral declaration.^{4/} The declaration was not an alternative to a non-proliferation treaty, which remained the only complete and final solution to the problem; it was merely a makeshift intended to fill the gap in the event of delay in concluding such a treaty. It was a unilateral manifestation of will with binding but not contractual force. Any contractual obligation already assumed by a signatory country with regard to the substance of the declaration would remain valid. Each country's declaration would be similar in content and would contain certain identical essential elements. Lastly, a number of problems were ignored in the proposed text because the time had not seemed ripe to submit concrete proposals on them; however, the Eighteen-Nation Committee would be able to consider them at the appropriate time.

12. The two draft treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the Italian draft unilateral declaration were different in character but they were complementary. While the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation was without any doubt the main road to be taken, the declaration was in a sense a short cut. If the non-nuclear countries, particularly those which were close to nuclear capability, agreed to sign the proposed declaration, the world would be

given a useful respite. If the First Committee agreed, the Eighteen-Nation Committee could be asked to develop and improve the Italian draft declaration and to endeavour to ensure its adoption by as many countries as possible, if it seemed that a treaty could not be concluded for a long time.

13. With regard to other disarmament measures, the Italian delegation had noted with interest the proposal put forward by the United States in the Assembly's general debate (1334th plenary meeting), which envisaged for the first time the destruction of a certain quantity of bombs and the transfer to peaceful purposes of the fissionable material thus obtained. An agreement on that subject would be a prelude to the controlled destruction of nuclear weapons. Special emphasis also had to be placed on the cessation of underground tests. The eight non-aligned States in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had submitted a memorandum^{5/} proposing, *inter alia*, that the non-aligned countries should co-operate in the work of seismic detection. The First Committee should encourage the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its work on the basis of that memorandum, in the hope that a progressive improvement of detection systems would open the way to agreement on a test ban, which would in turn facilitate agreement on non-proliferation.

14. The Italian delegation was in principle in favour of a world disarmament conference. It would explain its views in detail when the Committee took up the corresponding item of its agenda.

15. Disarmament was not only a military or political problem, but also an important economic and human problem very closely linked with that of the progress of peoples in the developing countries. The Italian delegation had drawn attention in the Disarmament Commission to the appeal launched by His Holiness Pope Paul VI during his visit to Bombay, the substance of which had been embodied in a resolution of the Commission^{6/} that had been adopted by an overwhelming majority. He expressed the hope that the First Committee would give its support to those generous ideas, so that one day the peoples of the world might create for all persons, in a world freed from the burden of armaments, living conditions compatible with human dignity.

16. Mr. SHALLOUF (Libya) said that his delegation was willing to support the Italian draft unilateral declaration, provided that it also applied to the nuclear Powers.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.

^{5/} *Ibid.*, sect. F.

^{6/} *Ibid.*, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/225.