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**Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL (Sudan).**

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Enckell (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

AGENDA ITEM 90

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5197, A/5200, DC/203, A/C.1/867, A/C.1/871, A/C.1/875, A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. LECHUGA (Cuba) said that his country was in favour of general and complete disarmament and the complete elimination of all instruments of destruction. Every possibility of war should be removed, and the vast economic resources now devoted to armaments should be used to improve living conditions, particularly in the under-developed countries.

2. Cuba, which for the past four years had been forced to defend its independence against both economic and military attack by powerful enemies, was entitled to ask the United Nations to use its influence to bring about an early agreement that fully met mankind's desire for peace. At a time when detailed plans for disarmament were under consideration and when representatives of all countries were calling for a final solution of the problem, the United States, flouting the principles of the United Nations Charter, was continuing to commit acts of aggression against Cuba. The United States Navy was maintaining an illegal blockade of the country, endangering the Cuban people's food supply and the operation of its industries. United States aircraft were carrying out constant flights over the country for purposes of espionage and provocation. The installation of strategic weapons in Cuban territory had been an act of self-defence. Those weapons had now been withdrawn under the supervision of the United States Navy, but flights over Cuban territory continued to be made for the purpose of photographing not only the dismantled installations but also—with a view to future sabotage—the country's industrial centres. For that reason, as

the Prime Minister of Cuba had said that day, in a letter to the Secretary-General, all planes flying over Cuba for purposes of espionage would henceforth run the risk of being destroyed by Cuban anti-aircraft fire.

3. Respect for the national sovereignty of small countries was essential to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to disarmament efforts. He felt, in that connexion, that the establishment of denuclearized zones would greatly help to reduce international tension. The four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2) represented a praiseworthy initiative along those lines. However, certain provisions should be added with a view to strengthening the resolution and enabling it to achieve its purpose more effectively. For example, it was not sufficient for the countries of Latin America to undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons; the nuclear Powers too must provide guarantees that they would not employ their nuclear weapons against that part of the world. Furthermore, the principle of denuclearization should be applied to Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone, which were part of Latin America. Finally, all military bases in the region should be eliminated, including in particular the Guantanamo base, which was maintained by the United States against the will of the Cuban people. He wished to say in conclusion that his delegation was prepared to co-operate in any genuine effort to achieve disarmament and to bring about a peaceful solution of international disputes, without prejudice, however, to the dignity, sovereignty and independence of nations.

*Mr. Adeel (Sudan) took the Chair.*

4. Mr. TARAZI (Syria), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, noted that the representative of Israel had accused him of attributing to the Prime Minister of Israel certain remarks which the latter had never made. In fact, the statements to which he had referred the day before had been taken from a document entitled *Government Yearbook, 5712 (1951-1952)*. The statements by Mr. Ben-Gurion appearing on pages X and XXV of that document clearly revealed Israel's expansionist designs.

5. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) said that the Cuban crisis should serve to remind the Members of the United Nations, firstly, that the danger of nuclear war was always present, and secondly, that the United Nations had thus far failed to meet its responsibilities with regard to disarmament. Disarmament had become a routine item, and despite the twenty or more resolutions adopted on the subject and the numerous reports submitted by the various disarmament bodies, no progress had been made. He was therefore unable to share the optimism voiced by the United Kingdom representative, who felt that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Dis-

armament at Geneva had achieved some measure of progress, limited though it might be. In reality, the countries of the world had been engaged in an arms race since the start of negotiations in 1946, with the result that each time the problem was discussed, the level of armaments was higher than it had been on the previous occasion. Thus, not only had nothing been accomplished with regard to disarmament but, on the contrary, countries had armed on a huge scale. Most serious of all was the fact that weapons were now not only more numerous but also infinitely more powerful than before. He cited figures showing that present-day weapons were several million times more powerful than those used during the Second World War up to the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima. Even the Hiroshima bomb was completely dwarfed by the bombs now manufactured, whose victims would be reckoned not in thousands but in tens of millions of dead. Thus, the assertion that progress had been made towards disarmament was false and served only to deceive public opinion.

6. Future efforts to achieve disarmament should be guided by past experience. Until now, it was the problem of priorities and phases that had been dealt with, but no agreement had been reached; after sixteen years of effort, as Lord Home had observed in the Assembly's general debate (1134th plenary meeting), negotiations had as yet not even reached the approaches of general and complete disarmament.

7. If the two sides continued to disagree on the question of control, disarmament would never be achieved, since new weapons tended to make previously contemplated control programmes obsolete. Whereas under the Baruch plan<sup>1/</sup> an effective system could have been set up simply by controlling raw materials, the existence of stockpiles now made it necessary to think in terms of a far more complex programme for inspecting the means of delivering nuclear weapons. Underground, undersea and mobile missile-launching sites were even more difficult to detect. He could not understand why the Western Powers were placing their reliance on control when control was becoming increasingly unreliable. It was trust, far more than control, that was needed; by over-emphasizing the question of control the Western Powers were creating obstacles to the achievement of disarmament.

8. Inasmuch as contemporary research was directed towards the development of "uninspectable" weapons, it was the advance of military science that was the source of all the evil. It was useless to continue negotiations so long as the parties were conducting research in their laboratories for the purpose of increasing their military power. Politicians might as a result become the captives of technology and science. He therefore proposed that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should give priority consideration to means of banning scientific research for military purposes, and he cited some of the terrifying achievements of such research. A ban of that kind would be easy to control, since appropriations for military research appeared in national budgets. He noted, in that connexion, that between 1939 and 1957, United Kingdom expenditure on military research had increased from £8 million to £204 million and that of the United States from \$27 million to \$5,300 million. It was intensive research of that kind that must be banned, whether it

was devoted to the development of nuclear weapons or of chemical and biological weapons, since its sole purpose was total destruction.

9. After banning scientific research for military purposes, the Eighteen-Nation Committee, instead of taking up the question of the stages of disarmament—which thus far had merely given rise to a sterile dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union—should direct its main efforts towards removing the danger of nuclear war. After that, it should seek to eliminate conventional war. The Committee should give first consideration to the destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and to the elimination of all military forces and bases on foreign soil, as proposed by the USSR, since that was the only way to prevent nuclear war.

10. The United States plan, too, was not without merit. Its suggestions concerning peace-keeping machinery and the codification of international law deserved careful study. The United States representative had said in his statement to the First Committee (1267th meeting) that his Government approved of the idea of regional disarmament arrangements. However, the United States had very recently supplied missiles to Israel. That did not constitute disarmament but, rather, the arming of a country which had been repeatedly condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations and by the Mixed Armistice Commissions set up under the armistice agreements between Israel and certain Arab States. The Arab people and all peace-loving peoples were deeply concerned at the conduct of the United States. The United States said that it had supplied the missiles in question in order to maintain the balance of arms in the Middle East; but it was well known that he who supported an aggressor became an aggressor himself. In the light of the recent events connected with Cuba, it might well be asked how the United States could justify the sending of missiles to Israel. If the United States felt threatened by the little island of Cuba, how should the Arabs react to the danger posed by missiles stationed on Israel territory? The Israel representative had suggested (1276th meeting) the conclusion of a disarmament agreement between the Arab States and Israel. It was difficult, surely, to conclude an agreement with the State that had in 1956 repudiated the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Egypt and Israel,<sup>2/</sup> which had been concluded under the auspices of the Security Council. Whether the issue was general or regional disarmament, the goal must be international security based on justice. That was the objective stated in the Charter of the United Nations.

11. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that the atmosphere now appeared to be more favourable for disarmament negotiations than in the past. The two reports of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been put before the First Committee; at Geneva the eight non-aligned nations had represented world public opinion and had introduced a new element, the spirit of the United Nations, into the negotiations, so that the discussions were no longer a dialogue between the nuclear Powers; the two parties had reached agreement on certain principles; and the exchange of letters between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR showed the desire of the two great Powers to con-

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 1, 1st meeting, pp. 4-14.

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3.

tinue the negotiations in order to prevent a new crisis. It was regrettable, however, that agreement had not been reached on any single aspect of disarmament. Nevertheless, the two sides had clarified their views and made some concessions. The Eighteen-Nation Committee has been asked to bring about the early conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty, and it was to be hoped that the non-aligned nations would be able to make useful proposals in that respect, particularly with regard to the control of underground tests, and that an agreement could be reached in the near future. As to the question of disarmament proper, the principal remaining stumbling-blocks were the question of inspection and control and the priorities to be given in the various stages of disarmament.

12. In his delegation's view, control was necessary in order to verify that balanced measures of disarmament were taken in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879) and in order that security should be ensured equally for all at each stage. Although the possibilities of espionage seemed slight, the Soviet Union's apprehensions would have to be dispelled. That could be done by providing for a United Nations inspection team of international civil servants with United Nations allegiance, preferably recruited from non-aligned nations. As the advance toward a more orderly world continued, a degree of international order would inevitably have to come from the United Nations. As to the armaments reductions to be made in the various stages, each of the parties insisted on viewing its own weapons as defensive and its adversary's as offensive. Since the end of the Second World War, the two sides have often modified their positions, but no result had been achieved.

13. The failure of the negotiations made it evident that as long as the concept of domination by force persisted in the world, efforts to reach an agreement would be unrealistic. Negotiations on plans were not in themselves enough to achieve disarmament. A modicum of world law and order must first be established, so that conditions favourable to disarmament could be created. Unfortunately, no effort had been made in that direction; that was the main cause of the failure of negotiations. The Preamble of the Charter, proclaiming the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, did not mention disarmament but mentioned world law. It was true that the elimination of armaments seemed to be the simplest way to prevent war; but unfortunately that way could not bring success unless an effort was made at the same time to establish world law and to create a climate in which disarmament would be possible. To achieve that goal, the authority of the United Nations must be strengthened; in particular, a permanent United Nations peace force must be organized. The world would then enjoy a measure of security, since even if the nuclear Powers remained very strong the United Nations, with the support of all the non-aligned countries, would be able to play a decisive role.

14. When the Geneva negotiations were resumed, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should give priority to the banning of nuclear tests; after that it should endeavour to reach an agreement on halting the production of armaments and on the creation of de-nuclearized zones.

*Mr. Enckell (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

15. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) declared that the only way to save the world from a nuclear conflict was to achieve general and complete disarmament without delay. For sixteen years that question had been the subject of negotiations which had remained fruitless because of the obstructionism of the United States and its allies. Throughout that time the Soviet Union had done everything in its power to facilitate an agreement. Only recently, at Geneva, it had submitted a detailed draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.<sup>3/</sup> Subsequently, the chairman of the Soviet delegation to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly had submitted a new draft (A/C.1/867) which was even closer to the position of the Western Powers. In that draft the Soviet Union proposed for each stage not only the execution of specific disarmament measures but also the establishment of international control over the reduction and elimination of armaments and armed forces. In the United States disarmament plan (A/C.1/875) only a 30 per cent reduction in conventional armaments and in delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons was proposed in the first stage; on the other hand, the United States wished to establish 100 per cent control not only of the disarmament measures but also of the armaments and armed forces retained by the parties. Later the United States and the United Kingdom had proposed the idea of selective inspection by zones, which would in practice amount to legalizing espionage, and far from relieving international tension would tend to increase mutual distrust. That proposal could serve no other purpose than to enable the Western Powers to gather the military information which they needed to perfect the Pentagon's plan for preventive nuclear war. And the United States draft treaty would permit the Western Powers to halt the disarmament process at the end of the first stage. In short, the USSR and United States positions were so different that it had been impossible to reach agreement on any of the basic questions considered at Geneva, despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and the neutralist countries.

16. The reason why the world was still living under the threat of thermo-nuclear war was unquestionably the warlike attitude of the United States and its allies. That attitude had recently been demonstrated once more during the Cuban crisis, which had been resolved only thanks to the wise and moderate policy of the Soviet Union. While the United States proclaimed its desire for disarmament at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and in other forums, it was continuing to strengthen its armaments and armed forces. It was difficult to believe in the peaceful intentions of a country whose military expenditure for the current financial year amounted to more than \$50,000 million and whose armed forces had been raised to almost 3 million men. Moreover, the United States had set up throughout the world a vast network of military bases which not only threatened the socialist countries but also was used by the United States to suppress nationalist movements and exert influence on the policies of a large number of countries. In recent years the United States militarists, in alliance with heavy industry, had artificially intensified the war psychosis. In the United States, the military effort was not determined by the requirements of the inter-

<sup>3/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex I, sect. C.

national situation; on the contrary, the international situation was adapted to the interests of economic and military circles. Although the United States tried to justify rearmament by raising the bogey of the "red menace", it could not deny that United States heavy industry derived most of its profits from military contracts. The frenzied arms race had had such a heavy impact on certain members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that the United States had been forced to consider measures to save some of them—for example, Greece and Turkey—from economic collapse. Every war required the psychological preparation of the population, and for that reason imperialistic propaganda was trying to convince the man in the street that the prospect of thermo-nuclear war was not so frightful. Prominent individuals, such as Edward Teller, inventor of the hydrogen bomb, and Herman Kahn, of the Rand Corporation, had clearly stated in their writings that in their view disarmament was impossible and it was necessary to prepare for nuclear war. Those warlike elements were at work in all the Western countries; yet the Governments of those countries honoured and supported them, while they imprisoned the defenders of peace.

17. No disarmament plan could be effective at the present time unless it ensured the elimination of the nuclear threat. That axiom had been accepted by the Soviet Union—whose draft treaty provided for the elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and of military bases on foreign territory at the very beginning of the disarmament process—but not by the United States, as was evident from its representative's statements. The United States attitude was equally negative with regard to a number of Soviet proposals whose implementation would help to

reduce international tension and to advance the cause of general and complete disarmament; he referred in particular to the proposal to establish denuclearized zones in certain parts of the world. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) on the denuclearization of Africa showed that many States were interested in that idea. However, the Western Powers still refused to consider those measures—in particular the Rapacki plan, whose implementation would considerably reduce tension in Central Europe.

18. In his delegation's view, disarmament was not only necessary but also feasible. It was to be hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee, bearing in mind the hopes of the peoples of the world, would endeavour to reach an early agreement and that the Western Powers would at last abandon their policy of positions of strength. The General Assembly had the duty at its current session to take measures which would contribute to the realization of disarmament and to the maintenance of world peace.

19. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel), exercising his right of reply, felt that the Saudi Arabian representative's statement would not help to bring about a peaceful world. When Israel had proclaimed its independence, armies of seven Arab States had invaded its territory, with the officially proclaimed purpose of wiping out the State of Israel. In the light of the open or veiled threats made by the Saudi Arabian representative, the members of the First Committee would understand that Israel was compelled to take measures to strengthen its defences, and would commend the countries which were helping it to defend its territory.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.