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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
 (Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 77

The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873, A/C.1/874, A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-4, A/C.1/L.311) (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
 (continued)

1. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) said that the dominant concern of the members of the Committee, which was to put an end to all nuclear tests, was expressed by the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-4), of which his delegation was a sponsor. That text represented the very least that anguished mankind could ask of the nuclear Powers, and, if the latter complied with its provisions, there was every reason to hope that they would be able to continue their negotiations in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament.

2. While his delegation endorsed most of the Canadian amendments (A/C.1/L.313), it had definite reservations about the fourth, providing for a new operative paragraph 6, which was at variance with the basic objective of the draft resolution: to bring about the immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The proposed new paragraph 6 would be acceptable if the partial treaty for which it provided was supplemented by the institution of a moratorium while negotiations were under way.

3. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.311) was a statement of good intentions which, while praiseworthy in itself, was not adequate to deal with a problem on which the fate of mankind depended. Indeed, the draft resolution merely referred the matter back to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; the practical result of that step would be a new series of speeches, during which the nuclear Powers would continue their tests. His delegation could not support any draft resolution that served, even by implication, to legalize nuclear testing; it would therefore vote for only the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution, and hoped that it would be the only one adopted by the Committee.

4. Mr. ZEA (Colombia) said that the dramatic events of recent days, which had for a time brought the world closer to the prospect of a nuclear war, had made the cessation of nuclear weapon tests even more urgently necessary. It was the duty of the United Nations to do everything in its power to attain that objective, since success in its efforts would mark the greatest achievement in its history. The Committee could contribute to that result if its members refrained from pressing for the adoption of preconceived formulae and from selfishly pursuing various political interests. Its task was so to act that the nuclear Powers arrived at an agreement banning nuclear tests. It should, for that purpose, study the positions taken by those Powers and try to determine whether those positions were reasonable or were dictated solely by political or tactical considerations.

5. In the view of his delegation, it would be unrealistic at present to insist on an uncontrolled ban on all tests, since two of the great nuclear Powers had categorically stated that, for security reasons and because of technological limitations, they could not agree to that approach. It would therefore be advisable, instead of rejecting a good solution in the illusory hope of achieving a better one, to adopt the proposal for the immediate suspension of tests in the three environments in which they presented the gravest threat to human health. The problem of a nuclear test ban was too serious for it to be permitted to become a "cold war" issue. His delegation would, for its part, express its views in an objective manner and not as a proponent of any particular ideology. It would vote for the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution, which faithfully reflected the hopes of mankind, and for the Canadian amendments thereto. It would also vote for the draft resolution of the United Kingdom and the United States since it felt that it was essential to put an end to tests in the atmosphere without delay. Once a treaty on the cessation of those tests was signed, an agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests in all environments would soon follow. In fact, the recent crisis had made it clear that the Soviet Union no longer considered international inspection to be an insurmountable obstacle; moreover, it was to be hoped that the rapid advance of science would soon enable all Powers to detect and identify all tests in all environments.

6. His delegation continued to hope that mankind, regaining its sanity, would discard the weapon with which in a moment of mental aberration it had thought of committing suicide. The world was sometimes badly informed, but it was a good judge: it would be able to tell who was responsible, if the efforts exerted to eliminate the nuclear danger should fail. But it was unthinkable that anyone should accept the responsibility for an irreparable catastrophe, and he was therefore convinced that a solution was at hand and that it would be possible to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests before 1 January 1963.

7. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) believed that, since the area of agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other had been widened and a solid basis had been established for the banning of nuclear weapon testing in all environments except underground, there was no justifiable reason why an agreement banning explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should not be reached immediately, without becoming involved in the difficulties of finding machinery for international control and inspection. Of course, it was necessary to ensure that the agreement reached would be observed. In the existing state of scientific knowledge, international verification was indispensable for the effective prohibition of underground tests.

8. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.311) fully met the position of his delegation, which would therefore vote for it. As for the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-4), it was basically the product of sincere efforts made by the eight nations which had newly participated in the Geneva negotiations. As he had said earlier (1248th meeting), his delegation was not convinced that a moratorium would in itself be sufficient to guarantee the faithful observance of a ban on all underground tests. However, operative paragraph 2, which asked that all nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963, was not a call for a moratorium pure and simple. In his delegation's view, paragraph 2 was an appeal to the nuclear Powers to stop testing, thus preventing possible subsequent testing, and did not touch upon the means required to achieve that end. Operative paragraph 4, which called for negotiation to reach agreement urgently, further substantiated that interpretation of the meaning of paragraph 2. His delegation therefore considered paragraph 2, and the draft resolution as a whole, to be not inconsistent with its basic position as he had stated it. For those reasons, his delegation would also vote for the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution, as well as for the Canadian amendments (A/C.1/L.313), which in its view would improve the original draft; his delegation sincerely hoped that that draft resolution, when adopted, would facilitate the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the conclusion of a treaty providing for effective international verification. In that connexion, however, it felt some concern lest one of the parties might insist on a moratorium, rather than on a treaty, at Geneva. It was to be hoped that the eight members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee whose efforts had culminated in the submission of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-4 would guide the course of the negotiations towards the prompt conclusion of an effective test ban treaty. In any case, the General Assembly, when it received a report from the Eighteen-Nation Committee, would have an opportunity to review the progress of the Geneva negotiations and to give the Eighteen-Nation Committee whatever new directive the Assembly itself might deem necessary in the situation then existing.

9. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) believed that the Cuban crisis, which had underlined the urgency of the nuclear problem, should help to hasten its solution. In his recent message to the Acting Secretary-General (S/5200), the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, had stressed the necessity of urgently eliminating the causes leading to such situations. It was nec-

essary, first of all, to overcome the differences which still subsisted with regard to the control of underground tests—differences which, in the light of all that had been said before the Committee, could not be regarded as intractable. The peoples of the world had every right to expect that the nuclear Powers would show the necessary degree of flexibility and realism to reach an early agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests. A solution of that question would contribute very substantially to the improvement of international relations, and would facilitate further disarmament measures—such as the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and various denuclearization measures—as well as the implementation of certain practical proposals, such as that of the Brazilian Government.

10. He was convinced that the General Assembly at its seventeenth session could and should play an important role in that regard. It could not rest content at that time with merely appealing for a continuation of negotiations, still less with issuing contradictory directives. It must endeavour to provide the Geneva negotiators with the necessary basis and impetus for the successful completion of their work. The thirty-seven-Power draft resolution had precisely that end in view. That proposal, which was the result of the efforts made by a considerable number of delegations, gave expression to the valuable ideas and suggestions which had been put forth at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and with regard to which a considerable measure of agreement had already been achieved in the First Committee. If there was a genuine desire to embark upon a course leading to understanding and to an improvement in international relations, to put an end to the arms race and to set in motion the process of general and complete disarmament, then the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests was the obvious first step to take. The attitude of those who criticized the proposal, in particular by labelling the demand for the cessation of all tests as a moratorium, was unrealistic and obstructed the efforts towards disarmament. In any case, as had been pointed out by the Swedish representative at the 1260th meeting, in view of the improvement of methods for detecting and identifying underground tests, the idea of a moratorium no longer had the meaning which had previously been invoked to justify its rejection. In fact, the intentions and objectives of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution were so reasonable and so clearly stated that it was difficult to imagine that it would fail to obtain unanimous support in the Committee.

11. On the other hand, the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States did not meet either the needs or the possibilities of the existing situation. It merely expressed a unilateral viewpoint which had already shown itself to be unacceptable as a basis for negotiations. It was not in accordance with the essential goals which most members of the Committee had already set themselves, in particular with regard to the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests; and the eight-nation memorandum was given a merely perfunctory mention, in the preambular part. It was therefore to be hoped that the sponsors of that draft resolution would not insist that it be put to a vote.

12. His delegation could not accept the fourth amendment proposed by Canada, as it was not in keeping with the basic purpose of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution. It was ready to accept the other Canadian

amendments, which usefully complemented the draft resolution and brought it up to date.

13. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) favoured the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of a test ban agreement which would give to each of the parties a reasonable assurance that the agreement would be observed by all. Only then would tests be permanently ended. Efforts to achieve that agreement must therefore be intensified. In any case, Burma would not support a treaty providing for an unlimited, unverified, uncontrolled and unconditional moratorium, in view of the grave dangers attending such a moratorium. However, it was not opposed to a moratorium in principle.

14. If a comprehensive agreement could not be reached by 1 January 1963, his delegation would be prepared to support an agreement banning tests in only three environments, provided that it was accompanied by a statement of the terms and conditions under which underground tests would be suspended while negotiations for a comprehensive treaty continued. It would be dangerous to conclude an agreement which would permit underground testing; that would be an invitation to new countries to become members of the nuclear club. To be sure, fall-out presented a grave danger; but the nuclear arms race involved even graver and more imminent risks. In fact, a partial agreement would be precarious and even dangerous if underground tests were not suspended while the negotiations continued. Between the extremes of an unlimited, unconditional and uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests and complete freedom to test underground, there existed many possibilities which had not been explored by the nuclear Powers, who were so preoccupied with defending their respective positions that they had no time for anything else.

15. His delegation would vote in favour of the Canadian amendments, with the exception of the fourth amendment, since that would provide for a partial ban. If that amendment was adopted, his delegation would be compelled to abstain on the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution, although it had been one of its original sponsors. For the same reason, among others, it would be unable to vote for the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States.

16. Mr. SANTOS MUÑOZ (Argentina) was of the opinion that the resolution to be adopted must rest on the following principles: it must ensure the complete cessation of tests under international control; failing that, it must provide for the suspension of tests in the three environments in which inspection was not indispensable; and it must attain those objectives in the shortest possible time. Turning to the two draft resolutions before the Committee, he said that there did not appear to be any irreconcilable contradiction between them. Both had the cessation of all tests as their final objective; both recognized that supervision was no longer a problem in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; and both affirmed that the treaty must be concluded promptly. However, the thirty-seven-Power draft, unlike the United States and United Kingdom draft, made no specific mention of the need for supervision and did not propose the conclusion, in the course of negotiations, of an interim treaty prohibiting tests in the three aforesaid environments. Admittedly, the thirty-seven-Power draft did not explicitly rule out supervision; moreover, it referred to resolutions 1648

(XVI) and 1649 (XVI), in which the General Assembly advocated appropriate control, and several of its sponsors had expressed themselves in favour of control at the sixteenth session. It was not possible, however, to leave so essential a question as control open to the interpretation of the parties. The need for control must be explicitly recognized in the text of the resolution to be adopted by the Committee. Also, failing a general treaty, the conclusion of a partial treaty should be considered.

17. His delegation would therefore be unable to vote for the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution unless the Canadian amendments were incorporated in it, it being understood that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider the question of the control to be prescribed. It would, however, vote unconditionally for the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, which was clear and complete and took into account the realities of the situation.

18. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) said that he approved the motives which had inspired the sponsors of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution but that the wording of the text did not correspond to his delegation's position. His delegation would therefore be unable to vote for it unless it was amended. In view of the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust, solid guarantees were necessary if a treaty was to endure, and recent occurrences had confirmed the need for verification. Though it had been said that operative paragraph 2 of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution did not explicitly rule out inspection and guarantees, it was certainly apt to be interpreted as calling for an unconditional moratorium. Such a moratorium would place the parties in a state of permanent suspicion which, in turn, would make it completely ineffective. It had in fact been said that one of the parties could denounce the treaty if it had reason to believe that the other was not respecting it. The more rational course would therefore be to carry out verification in order to dispel any doubts rather than to create a situation in which the doubts might lead to a general conflagration.

19. The Canadian amendments would definitely improve the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution. The vote of the Spanish delegation on that draft resolution would depend on whether all the Canadian amendments were adopted or not. His delegation would in any case vote for the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom, which was consonant with its own position. In so doing, it wished to express confidence in the Western Powers, which were defending the most sacred moral principles guaranteeing the survival of humanity. It was therefore both for moral and for practical reasons that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States.

20. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that as Cyprus was a sponsor of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution, he would comment only on the Canadian amendments. In regard to the first two amendments, he wished to recall that, in the Assembly's general debate (1155th plenary meeting), his delegation had raised the question of a summit meeting especially convened for settling the problem of nuclear tests. Since then, the Heads of Government had made the statements mentioned in the first Canadian amendment, and hence it seemed that in the circumstances it would be ap-

propriate to urge a summit meeting on the question of nuclear tests.

21. As to the proposed new operative paragraph 6, his delegation's position was that all tests in all environments were war preparations and should be suspended as soon as possible. There were, however, two reasons why a separate treaty should be signed immediately on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water: first, the danger of radioactive fall-out came mainly from tests in the atmosphere, and they should accordingly be stopped as quickly as possible; and, second, it was only concerning tests in those three environments that the nuclear Powers had reached agreement. The proposed new paragraph 6 contained a recommendation for the conclusion of a treaty by 1 January 1963 at the latest, while the proposed paragraph 7 provided for the resumption of negotiations on 12 November and the submission of a report to the General Assembly on 10 December. If, however, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was entitled to negotiate until 1 January 1963, it was difficult to imagine what it would have to report by 10 December 1962, save that negotiations were continuing. It would therefore be preferable to replace the date of 1 January 1963 in the proposed paragraph 6 by that of 10 December 1962.

22. It should also be noted that the proposed paragraph 6 provided for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the three environments but did not mention underground tests. There was no assurance, however, that agreement could be reached on tests in the atmosphere if the question of underground tests had not been settled. In order to make the resolution more effective, it would have been preferable to indicate what should be done about the underground tests and thus help the two sides to reach agreement on that point also.

23. His delegation would vote in favour of the Canadian amendments to the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution in the hope that the parties would reach agreement also on underground tests and thus ensure the complete suspension of all nuclear tests.

24. Mr. CHANDERLI (Algeria) said that his delegation had joined in sponsoring the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-4) because it had special reasons for participating actively in any endeavour to put an end to nuclear testing. The text of that draft resolution represented a serious effort in that direction. If adopted by a majority as close as possible to unanimity, it would constitute an eloquent directive from the peoples concerned to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. There were in fact no longer any technical, scientific or juridical arguments against the cessation of nuclear tests. The remaining difficulties appeared to be of an essentially political nature. It was therefore for the General Assembly to find political formulae that would enable a final treaty on the subject to be concluded.

25. With regard to the Canadian amendments, his delegation could accept the first two without hesitation, but the fourth appeared to contain implicit approval of the possible continuance of underground tests, and that was contrary to its conception of the need for a general agreement. A partial treaty had in fact no chance of being a lasting one; definitive agreements were necessary on all aspects of the problem of nuclear tests. The unanimous will of the peoples and their Governments must be expressed with clarity and determination, leaving no possibility

of varying interpretations that would lead to reopening a discussion which it was desired to close for ever, just as it was desired to reach an agreement putting an end for ever to the dire threat of the destruction of man and his civilization.

26. The CHAIRMAN announced that two amendments to the fourth Canadian amendment in document A/C.1/L.313—the proposed new operative paragraph 6—had been submitted, one by Ghana (A/C.1/L.314) and the other by Madagascar and Mauritania (A/C.1/L.315).

27. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that his Government had always favoured an immediate and final suspension of nuclear tests. The cessation of tests had already been the subject of previous resolutions, but it was fitting to make a fresh appeal to the nuclear Powers, fixing as a time limit the date of 1 January 1963. Although it was possible that certain nuclear Powers considered their security jeopardized by such an appeal, no State was entitled to invoke its own security to create insecurity for another. The thirty-seven-Power draft resolution could not be regarded as implying an uncontrolled moratorium, which, as shown by past experience, would not be without danger. As one of the sponsors had said, it was clear that the purpose of the draft was negotiation on an agreement that would naturally contain the indispensable element of control. His delegation would also be able to support the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the amendments submitted by Canada to the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution. It particularly favoured the new paragraph 6 providing for the conclusion, if necessary, of a treaty on the cessation of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, those being the environments in which no special international control was required. While some speakers had opposed a partial agreement, it should not be overlooked that those tests were contrary to international law because they affected not only the territory of the States conducting them but also the territory of other States. Underground tests, although no less dangerous, constituted a threat only to the States conducting them.

28. Mr. BINDZI (Cameroon) said that the text in document A/C.1/L.310/Corr.2—containing a correction to the French text only of operative paragraph 4 of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-4)—was not much of an improvement on the original operative paragraph 4; indeed, his delegation had some reservations about the new text.

29. The views of the Cameroonian delegation on the suspension of nuclear tests had already been stated by the Cameroonian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the General Assembly (1140th plenary meeting). His delegation had, moreover, agreed to join in sponsoring the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution.

30. Referring to draft resolution A/C.1/L.311, he said that it was a great pity that two draft resolutions had been submitted. It would be better to have a single draft resolution adopted by the greatest possible number of votes so as to impress public opinion and to indicate to the Eighteen-Nation Committee the direction that the Assembly wanted the Committee's work to take. Moreover, in the view of the Cameroonian delegation, that draft resolution was an admission of impotence, because it countenanced the idea that it might be impossible expeditiously to conclude a treaty providing for the immediate sus-

pension of nuclear tests in all environments. That was a dangerous attitude; the Cameroonian delegation would therefore abstain in the vote on that draft resolution. It would vote for the first two Canadian amendments to the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution but, to its regret, was unable to support the fourth amendment. It understood the Canadian delegation's desire for some progress to be made in the event of continued disagreement, but the Indian delegation had pointed out that the proposed new paragraph 6 conflicted with operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. In spite of the words "against all hope", that paragraph gave the nuclear Powers a pretext for not coming to an agreement, even before the resumption of negotiations. In any event, the fact that a Power would be entitled to continue underground testing would introduce an element of distrust between the parties. In addition, underground explosions were not without danger. For those reasons, the Cameroonian delegation could not support that amendment.

31. In preparing the text of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution, the sponsors had not sought to apportion praise and blame or to decide what was just and what unjust; for them, the essential issue was to protect the world from annihilation, and his delegation hoped that a single resolution might be adopted, asking the negotiators at Geneva to conclude a treaty for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests in all environments.

32. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) recalled that he had given the views of his delegation on nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests in his statement at the 1251st meeting. The fact that his delegation was a sponsor of the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution was a clear indication of its position. It had hoped, however, that no amendment would be submitted to it and that it would gain general support.

33. Some amendments had nevertheless been submitted by the Canadian delegation (A/C.1/L.313). He had no objection to the first amendment. As to the second amendment, the last part seemed to be superfluous, for his delegation did not, in principle, like the General Assembly to tell Governments to give instructions, in one way or another, to their representatives; such instructions should not, moreover, be given solely to the representatives of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The proposed new operative paragraph 6 should contain some directives about underground tests. That point was covered by some sub-amendments (A/C.1/L.314 and A/C.1/L.315) which had just been submitted, and although he had not had time to study them in detail, he thought that if the first part of the amendment submitted by Madagascar and Mauritania was added to the last part of the Ghanaian amendment, a generally acceptable text might result. That, however, was a matter for the sponsors of the amendments to consider. The Afghan delegation's attitude to the draft resolution as a whole would, of course, be determined by its final form after the Committee had taken a decision on the various amendments. In that connexion, he requested the Chairman to postpone the vote on the draft resolutions to the next day in order to give the members of the Committee time to study the newly submitted amendments.

34. Regarding the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.311),

the Afghan delegation associated itself with those delegations which had expressed a preference for a single draft resolution. If that draft resolution was put to a vote, the Afghan delegation would abstain.

35. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) explained that he had introduced his amendment (A/C.1/L.314) in order to supplement the fourth Canadian amendment (A/C.1/L.313). There was a serious omission in that amendment, as it said nothing about underground tests. Underground tests, however, were by no means safe, as was clear from the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.^{1/} Furthermore, since such tests could be used to perfect nuclear weapons, they would enable countries to continue the arms race. As there were obstacles to a moratorium, the Ghanaian amendment provided only for a limited interim arrangement, suspending all underground tests on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962. While the method of reaching such an arrangement would be left to the negotiating Powers, the Ghanaian delegation, by referring to the eight-nation memorandum, which mentioned on-site inspection, wished to indicate that inspection should be the subject of fresh negotiations at Geneva.

36. Mr. SOULEYMANE (Mauritania) said that he would of course vote for the thirty-seven-Power draft resolution, as Mauritania was one of the sponsors. Although that draft was not entirely satisfactory, it would provide a framework for discussion by the Eighteen-Nation Committee if it was adopted by a large majority or, preferably, unanimously. The Mauritanian delegation would vote for the first two Canadian amendments. It felt, on the other hand, that there were gaps in the fourth amendment, since it did not provide for the continuation of negotiations after the conclusion of a partial agreement or give any directives for action while the negotiations were going on. It had been to fill that gap that Madagascar and Mauritania had submitted their amendment (A/C.1/L.315) to the fourth Canadian amendment. If their sub-amendment was adopted, he would vote for the fourth Canadian amendment. He would be unable, however, to vote for the fifth Canadian amendment.

37. Mr. USACHEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed with the representative of Afghanistan that it would not be advisable to proceed to a vote at that meeting. Delegations should be given time to study the text of the amendments to the Canadian amendments. He reserved the right to state his position at a later stage on the different texts that had been submitted.

38. Mr. BURNS (Canada) also expressed the view that it would be wiser not to proceed to a vote at the present meeting.

39. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the vote should be deferred to the next day.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

^{1/}Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 16.