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(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 77

**The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1, A/C.1/873, A/C.1/874, A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2, A/C.1/L.311) (continued)**

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS  
(continued)

1. Mr. BAGHELLEH (Tanganyika) said that his Government was opposed to nuclear tests in all environments and would support accelerated efforts to bring about their suspension. However, if the nuclear Powers could reach agreement on the banning of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, that would represent a partial success and might lead to the complete cessation of nuclear testing.

2. The problem of halting tests affected not only the nuclear Powers but the non-nuclear Powers as well. His delegation attributed certain recent occurrences in Tanganyika, such as crop failures and floods, to France's tests in the Sahara and other tests which had been carried out elsewhere. The non-nuclear Powers did not have the means of detecting tests or protecting their people, but as Mr. Kawawa, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, had pointed out in a United Nations Day statement at Dar es Salaam, they now had a voice in international deliberations. The debate was no longer one between the nuclear Powers alone but was also being carried on between those Powers and the non-aligned countries, for it was the future of all mankind that was at stake.

3. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2. It urged the nuclear Powers to re-examine their positions on the entire question of nuclear armaments and to heed the pleas and yearnings of all the peoples of the world. It would be a tragedy for mankind if a decision to suspend nuclear testing on 1 January 1963 was not taken at the present session of the General Assembly.

4. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) expressed the conviction that an agreement could be reached if the Geneva negotiations were resumed in the spirit of the statements made by the Heads of Government of the

USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom in their exchange of communications on 27 and 28 October 1962. Before taking a stand on the matter, the Committee should therefore try to determine how it could best help to narrow the gap between the positions of the two sides.

5. Although his delegation sympathized with the motives which had inspired the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the non-aligned countries (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2), it questioned whether it would help to remove existing differences of opinion. If his delegation supported that document, it would be giving the impression that it was agreeing to the establishment of an uncontrolled moratorium, since the resolution was open to misunderstanding in that regard. Moreover, there was no reason why consideration should not be given, as a first step, to the banning of tests in the three environments in which they could be detected and identified without international controls; the draft resolution of the non-aligned countries was greatly weakened by its failure to mention that possibility. To refuse to ban testing in those three environments would mean assuming a very heavy responsibility.

6. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.311) complemented that of the non-aligned countries. It recognized the necessity of verification without specifying how many inspections would be needed; the number would be possibly about one a month or perhaps fewer, and no country's interests would suffer. The principle of verification had been formally recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union in their joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879). Moreover, the interim treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the three environments in which it was agreed that tests could be detected and identified without international control was intended not as a substitute for a comprehensive treaty but, on the contrary, as a step toward its conclusion.

7. Mr. AUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) said that there was no need for him to review in detail the problem of banning nuclear tests, since all aspects of the problem had been discussed during the general debate. He wished to recall, however, that his delegation had always favoured a controlled ban on nuclear testing.

8. The two draft resolutions had the same objective: the banning of all tests. However, draft resolution A/C.1/L.311 represented a more realistic approach, since it provided for essential measures of verification or, if a comprehensive treaty could not be concluded at an early date, the banning of tests in environments where radio-active fall-out was a matter of international concern. The immediate aim of a ban on testing was, of course, to remove the danger posed by fall-out, but it should be borne in mind that the cessation of testing was not an end in itself but merely one aspect of the larger problem of general and com-

plete disarmament. The real issue was the prevention of nuclear war. It was dangerous, therefore, to try to fix a rigid time limit for the cessation of testing if no provision was made for controls. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States was more flexible in that regard. It would not be possible to eliminate mutual suspicion unless there was an effective system of verification. If the draft resolution of the non-aligned countries (A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2) was adopted, there would be no guarantee that it would be carried out and that the moratorium would not be violated, as it had been in the past. Accordingly, while he endorsed the objectives of that draft resolution, he could not give it his reserved support. However, he would vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.311.

9. Mr. DEJEAN (Central African Republic) deplored the fact that the nuclear Powers, which had been discussing for years the problem of halting nuclear weapon tests, had not yet been able to reach agreement. Although the great Powers professed to be acting on grounds of principle, it was apparent that they wished to preserve certain military advantages or to close certain gaps, and that they feared that concessions on their part would be taken as signs of weakness. Their concern with those matters had been clearly demonstrated during the Committee's debate.

10. The suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests was an urgent necessity, and must be discussed as a matter of priority. The great nuclear Powers must make an effort to reach agreement first on the suspension of nuclear tests and then on general and complete disarmament. That would serve to release substantial resources which could contribute to the development of the under-developed countries. The situation was serious, and the future of mankind was directly threatened. It was time for the great Powers to give unmistakable proof of their desire to preserve peace. In doing that, they would also be demonstrating that they really wished to co-operate in the economic and social development of the under-developed countries.

11. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that he had been glad to hear the United Kingdom representative refer to the encouraging statements recently made by the Heads of Government of the three great nuclear Powers in the communications they had exchanged on 27 and 28 October 1962. He quoted extracts from those messages which indicated a desire to make new efforts to reach agreement on disarmament. His delegation felt that the General Assembly should take note, in one of its resolutions, of those important statements, which marked a new turn in events. After conferring with a number of delegations, it had decided to submit an amendment to draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add. 1-2 along those lines.

12. His delegation also felt that the resolution should call upon the nuclear Powers to agree, as a first step, on a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; his delegation did not share the view of those delegations which held that the banning of tests in three environments would hinder negotiations on a treaty to halt tests in all environments. After reading out his delegation's amendments, which were to be circulated as document A/C.1/L.313, he expressed the hope that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 would be able to accept them, since they were basically in keeping with the spirit of that draft resolution.

13. His delegation also intended to vote for the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.311), feeling that it covered the essential steps which must be taken in order to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing.

14. Mr. LALL (India) felt that the main interest of the discussion lay in the unequivocal indication given by the great majority of delegations that the peoples they represented wanted an end to nuclear testing. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament would find it impossible to overlook that feeling, even if political considerations might lead delegations in the First Committee to vote one way or the other.

15. In point of fact, as had been demonstrated by the Swedish representative, the remaining obstacles to an agreement on the banning of tests were mainly political, not scientific or technical, and the time seemed to have come for the great Powers to prove that they were genuinely willing to renounce nuclear tests.

16. With regard to the amendments submitted by the Canadian representative, he had at first understood that their purpose was the improvement and refinement of a text which might constitute a single resolution expressing the general feeling of the members of the Committee. Unfortunately, in the concluding portion of his statement the Canadian representative had dispelled that impression by indicating that he would vote also for the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.311). If, as was probable, the amended text of draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 received wide-spread support, it seemed unnecessary to put another draft resolution to the vote. Moreover, the adoption of a single resolution would have a more decisive effect on the course of the Geneva negotiations. He hoped that the Canadian representative would come round to that view.

17. For his own part, he accepted the Canadian amendments—which took account of events which had occurred after the draft resolution had been submitted—except for the proposed new operative paragraph 6, about which he had certain doubts. He wondered, in particular, whether the recommendation contained in the new paragraph was compatible with the appeal contained in operative paragraph 2. To be sure, if the new paragraph was interpreted in a certain way, it would not create any contradiction; if the nuclear Powers heeded the Committee's appeal, there would be no more tests after 1 January 1963, even though the technical processes of reaching an agreement of a comprehensive character might still remain to be completed. That, at least, was his delegation's interpretation of that particular amendment.

18. Nevertheless, it would be inadvisable, for several reasons, to fail to provide for the cessation of underground tests at the same time as the cessation of tests in the other environments. It was the view of some experts that the restriction of nuclear explosions to the underground environment would not necessarily eliminate the pollution of the atmosphere. Despite the precautions taken, it appeared that in the case of five underground tests carried out in the United States, radio-active particles had escaped into the atmosphere. The fact that even radio-active waste in hermetically sealed containers involved a serious risk of contamination should open the eyes of those who supposed that underground explosions were harmless. Actually, as had been pointed out by the representa-

tives of Burma, Ghana, Nepal, Saudi Arabia and other countries, the formula of a partial test ban would not solve the problem, since the tests would be resumed in the remaining environment and there would be a risk of their resumption in the others.

19. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that his delegation had not been consulted in connexion with the drafting of the amendments proposed by Canada, and it would give them the most careful study. He drew the Committee's attention to the fact that draft resolution A/C.1/L.311 had not been withdrawn by its sponsors; and they had no intention of withdrawing it. He believed the negotiations at Geneva would be seriously jeopardized if the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States was not voted on.

20. Moreover, the two draft treaties prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom<sup>1/</sup> were still before the Committee. A great deal of time and effort had been spent on those drafts, which were based in part on the eight-nation memorandum.<sup>2/</sup>

21. He did not agree with the Indian representative about the risk of venting of underground tests, and he intended to take that question up later.

22. Mr. BONGO (Gabon) said that in his delegation's view it was urgently necessary to halt all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests in all environments and to seek the complete denuclearization of the whole world. A commission consisting of representatives of nuclear and neutral Powers could verify the implementation of that decision, under the auspices of the United Nations. If disarmament was to be effective, it must be general and supervised. The manufacture of nuclear and conventional weapons would have to be prohibited, and plans would to be made for their destruction. No territory should be allowed to remain free of supervision; and in order to oblige all nations to consent to inspection by members of a control commission, that commission must necessarily include representatives of the country visited, of the great Powers and of the small nations. The small nations had no means of defence, and lived in fear of the cold war being abruptly transformed into an atomic war. Yet it was their right to work to achieve their sole aim of raising the intel-

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. O and P.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

lectual and material standard of living of their populations.

23. His delegation believed that the great nuclear Powers were equally motivated by the desire to ensure world peace. Unfortunately, the mutual distrust between the two parties constituted a serious obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on disarmament. The Soviet delegation regarded on-site inspection as intolerable interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. But according to the assurances given at Geneva by the United States and the United Kingdom, inspections could easily be supervised by the local authorities, and the team responsible for inspection would include representatives of the country visited. It seemed therefore that the goodwill of the Western Powers had not been matched by a similar goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union.

24. His delegation was in favour of any proposal calling for the immediate cessation of all nuclear explosions and, consequently, for general disarmament.

25. Mr. SOW (Chad) said that the newly independent States of Africa, including Chad, attached great importance to the cessation of nuclear tests and believed that the halting of such tests was essential, both to reduce international tension and to protect the health of all the peoples of the world. The delegation of Chad would therefore associate itself with any initiative which sought to assure peaceful coexistence between nations, and would approve any proposal whose goal was the suspension of nuclear tests.

26. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add.1-2 was a serious attempt to reduce the risks of war, and draft resolution A/C.1/L.311, while proposing the same objective, was less firm and less categorical. Since those two draft resolutions were complementary, their sponsors could perhaps be asked to come to an agreement so that a single draft resolution would be submitted. If the sponsors of the two draft resolutions could not agree on that point, the delegation of Chad would vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.310 and Add. 1-2, which was stronger than the one submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. It was to be hoped that the great nuclear Powers would hearken to the voice of wisdom and reason, so as to spare the world a terrible catastrophe.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.