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**Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

**AGENDA ITEM 78**

**Complaint by Cuba of threats to international peace and security arising from new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba (A/4832 and Add.1, A/5072, A/C.1/845, A/C.1/847, A/C.1/851, A/C.1/854, A/C.1/866, A/C.1/L.309) (continued)**

1. Mr. HASEGANU (Romania) said that Cuba had been entirely justified in bringing its complaint before the United Nations, since the aggressive actions undertaken by the United States Government were a grave threat not only to the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Cuba but also to world peace and security. In present circumstances, any armed conflict in any part of the world could well lead to a devastating world war. Moreover the threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cuba could only too easily set a dangerous precedent for similar actions against the independence and territorial integrity of other States of Latin America or other parts of the world. The United Nations, which was based on respect for the principles of the sovereign equality of its Members, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means—principles which were today being flagrantly flouted by the United States Government in its attitude towards Cuba—must therefore call upon the United States to put an immediate end to its provocations and actions against the Republic of Cuba.

2. Many facts which had come to light since the events of 17 April 1961 had confirmed that the armed aggression then undertaken against Cuba had been organized and financed by the United States. That was also clear from the statements that had been made by such people as the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, the former Vice-President, Mr. Nixon, and the President of Guatemala, as well as from numerous articles in the United States Press. In a television interview given on 31 December 1961, Mr. Allen Dulles, the former head of the American espionage system, had even given details of the preparations made for that aggression. Recent events had shown that the United States Govern-

ment was continuing its efforts to work up the campaign against Cuba while at the same time trying to draw other countries into its aggressive actions with a view to paving the way for collective intervention under the auspices of the Organization of American States. The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta del Este in January 1962, had been organized as a result of United States pressure on certain Latin American countries. The convening of that meeting had itself been a violation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947<sup>1/</sup> The United States, giving an arbitrary interpretation of article 6 of that treaty, had alleged that the present Cuban régime was a danger to the security of the Western hemisphere, whereas the real aim of the meeting had been to prepare a legal and ideological basis for further aggressive action against the Republic of Cuba. The United States Government had hoped to isolate Cuba and to induce the other Latin American countries to take direct action to liquidate the Revolutionary Government of Cuba. According to reports in the American Press, it had even proposed setting a time limit of sixty days for Cuba to accept unconditionally the decisions imposed on the Punta del Este meeting by the United States, something which, for Cuba, would have entailed the total surrender of sovereignty and national independence.

3. The indictment of Cuba presented to the Punta del Este meeting represented a gross interference by the United States in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Cuba. It clearly showed that the United States was working for the liquidation of the present Cuban Government, which had the support of the entire Cuban people, and for the installation of a tractable régime which would enable the American monopolies to regain their former control over the political and economic life of Cuba.

4. What were the United States charges? In the document entitled "The Castro régime in Cuba" published by the Department of State and in other documents submitted to the Punta del Este meeting the Cuban people were accused of having installed a régime that accorded with their own aspirations. The State Department doubtless considered that the peoples of that part of the world had no right to set up the kind of political system which they wanted. The United States accused the Cuban Government of having carried out internal reforms which had given the peasants ownership of the lands they tilled and which were leading to the industrialization of Cuba, the elimination of unemployment, misery, illiteracy and backwardness. Perhaps the State Department considered that such reforms should be approved by the American monopolies which had exploited Cuba? The Republic of Cuba was accused of having concluded, as soon as an embargo was placed

<sup>1/</sup> United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 21 (1948), No. 324 (a).

on its trade with the United States, trade agreements with other countries that were ready to do business with it under mutually acceptable conditions. The State Department doubtless considered that the Cuban Government should give in to United States pressure. The United States accused the Cuban Government of having taken appropriate measures against internal and external enemies who threatened the independence of the State or the revolutionary gains of the Cuban people. Presumably, the State Department regarded the struggle for independence and national sovereignty of the less developed countries as an international danger. The United States even went so far as to reproach the Cuban Government for the fact that in the United Nations the Cuban delegation voted in accordance with the instructions of its legal Government. Perhaps the State Department considered that it had a right of censure over the votes of the representatives of other countries.

5. In the documents submitted by the United States at Punta del Este great stress had been laid on the alleged danger which Cuba represented for the security of the Western hemisphere; but no serious proof of that danger had ever been produced. In any event, such a charge was utterly ridiculous in view of Cuba's size and population. The truth was that the State Department was profoundly worried that the ideas of the Cuban revolution and the reforms it had brought about might influence the thinking of other peoples of Latin America. It was that fear which had led the United States Government to draw up the plan known as the "Alliance for Progress", which embodied a whole series of promises. But the Latin American people had their own economic and social aspirations, and did not need to be made aware of them by foreign influences. However, for the first time in Latin America they had had the opportunity of seeing that the power of the American monopolies, which each year robbed them of about a quarter of their national income, was no longer invincible. They saw that a small neighbouring people had succeeded in ridding itself of the power of those monopolies and in rebuilding its own economy on a stable basis. That was why the defence of the Cuban revolution had become their own cause. But that fact could not be interpreted as aggression by Cuba against the Western hemisphere or as an act of subversion on the part of the Cuban Government.

6. On the other hand, while the State Department had been unable to find any valid proof of Cuba's alleged aggression against the inter-American system, there was ample proof of aggression by the United States against Cuba. The theory of the incompatibility of the Cuban régime with the inter-American system expounded at the Punta del Este meeting was in flagrant contradiction with the charter of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations, neither of which authorized the taking of discriminatory measures against a Member State on the pretext that it had a different social régime. The theory of incompatibility should therefore be rejected as contrary to the basic principles of the United Nations.

7. Despite the optimistic statements of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, the results of the Punta del Este meeting represented a defeat for the United States. The maximum demands presented by the United States, in particular the demand for sanctions against Cuba, had been rejected, while another series of proposals had been adopted by only an insignificant, unrepresentative majority. Seven Latin American States, representing nearly three-quarters of the popu-

lation of the continent, had remained faithful to the principle of non-intervention. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil had said, according to The New York Times of 7 February 1962, the position of the six countries which had abstained had prevented the adoption of decisions designed to legalize intervention in Cuba and to violate the right to self-determination of the Cuban people. Neither State Department pressure nor Mr. Rusk's threats to reduce dollar allocations had induced the representatives of the six countries concerned to accept the aggressive United States policy towards Cuba. Since the United States had been unable to associate the OAS with its aggressive plans, and so could not cloak its activities under the guise of collective action, the full responsibility for any provocations, interference in the domestic affairs of Cuba and aggressive action would rest squarely upon its shoulders.

8. The United States failure at Punta del Este had in no way lessened the danger of new provocations and aggressions against Cuba. As previous speakers had pointed out, the United States was continuing, on its own territory and that of certain Caribbean countries, to train bands of mercenaries for further armed intervention; indeed, the Cuban representative had listed the military bases where new acts against his country were now being prepared, while further details of those preparations had been given by the United States Press. Such aggressive actions endangered international peace and security, and the United Nations must insist that the United States put an end to them.

9. The Romanian Government, faithful to its policy of peaceful coexistence, would continue to fight to strengthen friendly relations between States on the basis of respect for the principles of equality and non-interference in domestic affairs. It had therefore joined with the Czechoslovak delegation in sponsoring a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.309) which would help to reduce the present tension and to bring about a settlement of differences by peaceful means. The fundamental ideas in the draft resolution were those on which the United Nations Charter were based. At the same time, the sponsors had felt that the General Assembly should call upon the Government of the United States to put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba and to its other actions directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of Cuba. That was the least that could be asked. The Romanian delegation was convinced that the Committee would appreciate the constructive terms of the draft resolution and would approve it.

10. Mr. DE MELO FRANCO (Brazil) said that there was a specifically American international law, which antedated the creation of the Organization of American States and the establishment of the United Nations. It took the form of a complex system of principles deriving from the implementation of treaties and other agreements and from the practices and customs which had become part of the relations between the countries of the American continent. The OAS was founded on the charter signed at Bogotá on 30 April 1948<sup>2/</sup> and had been constituted in full accordance with Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. The regional arrangements authorized under that Article were wholly compatible with the Charter, provided that their activities were consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The Meeting of Consultation of Min-

<sup>2/</sup> United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 119 (1952), No. 1609.

isters of Foreign Affairs was recognized under the charter of the OAS as a juridical organ of the parent body, with its own functions and powers. Thus, American international law, the OAS and the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs constituted the three bulwarks of the inter-American system, enabling it to devise specifically American solutions for international problems arising in the American continent. He considered it necessary to recall those precedents, since the problem before the First Committee was to find a peaceful solution to a dispute which was part of the "cold war", and to do so in keeping with the United Nations principle of the peaceful coexistence of States with different and sometimes conflicting political systems—a principle which had acquired particular urgency in the nuclear era.

11. The OAS reflected the historical and cultural heritage of the American continent. The charter of Bogotá, in its article 5 (d), declared that the solidarity of the American States required their political organization on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy. It followed that any American State which voluntarily turned its back on that system of government broke its bonds of solidarity with the other American States. The Marxist-Leninist form of government differed from representative democracy in such matters as the concept of the State, popular representation, individual rights and property law; indeed, the two systems were diametrically opposed. In the circumstances, an American State whose Government declared itself to be Marxist-Leninist automatically placed itself outside the inter-American system.

12. It might be argued that American States which had suspended the application of representative democracy without adopting a Marxist-Leninist form of government had also broken their ties of continental solidarity. But the Latin American countries which found themselves unable for domestic reasons to maintain a stable system of representative democracy were not thereby rejecting that system; they were temporarily prevented from exercising it, and once they overcame their internal crisis they usually re-established it. The same trend might be noted in Western Europe, where, after the Second World War, there had been a resurgence of representative democracy in several countries without any external pressure. A distinction must therefore be made between an American State which was prevented by circumstances from effectively exercising representative democracy and one which deliberately adopted a system of government incompatible with representative democracy.

13. The juridical implications of such a step were important; however, they differed according to whether they were considered in the light of the charter of the Organization of American States or the Charter of the United Nations. Under the terms of the Bogotá charter, an American State which adopted a system of government opposed to representative democracy could be excluded from the OAS. However, the establishment of appropriate legal machinery was an essential precondition for the effective exclusion of such a State, which might become a threat to the security and democratic institutions of the American continent. Without due respect for international law, the principles of international coexistence would become illusory; and the main sufferers would be the small States. While it was true that the official declaration of a Head of Government that his country was joining a political bloc incompatible with the regional organization to

which it had formerly belonged offered factual evidence that had to be taken into account, it did not imply the automatic application of sanctions against that State, if it recognized its responsibilities. Sanctions could not be applied without due process of law, and it was that due process of law which had yet to be indicated or established within the regional organization. Such legal safeguards were the more necessary in that the imposition of sanctions might have serious political repercussions.

14. For those reasons, the Brazilian delegation considered that in declaring itself a Marxist-Leninist State, the Republic of Cuba had broken its ties of solidarity with the OAS, and that once the appropriate legal procedure had been indicated or established, it could be excluded from the organization. Various special organs of the OAS had been instructed to study that aspect of the problem under the decisions adopted at Punta del Este. Brazil supported the view that the communist system of government was incompatible with the OAS and contravened the principle of American solidarity. However, it had abstained in the vote on the exclusion resolution at Punta del Este because it could not support the application of sanctions in the absence of appropriate legal procedure. It awaited the results of the study being carried out on that subject by the special organs of the OAS.

15. Article 52, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter required that the activities of regional arrangements or agencies should be consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The purposes of the United Nations were to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to achieve international co-operation. It could not fulfil those purposes unless all Member States, whether they belonged to the democratic, the Soviet or the "neutralist" blocs, united in a common endeavour. From its very inception, the United Nations had sought to mobilize the efforts of countries with different and conflicting régimes and ideologies in order to achieve peaceful coexistence and prevent armed conflict. Moreover, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter made it clear that the Organization was based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members and that of non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

16. It followed from those considerations that while the OAS required its members to adopt the specific form of government known as representative democracy, the United Nations imposed no specific form of government on its Members. While any American State rejecting representative democracy automatically severed its bonds of solidarity with the other American Republics, the United Nations concept of solidarity was based on peaceful relations between States with different political systems. Within the OAS, the adoption by any State of a political régime opposed to representative democracy was tantamount to its voluntary departure or self-exclusion from the inter-American system. If such exclusion was to be made effective without violating the principle of non-intervention contained in article 15 of the Bogotá charter, appropriate legal machinery must be applied; however, Brazil, as its Minister for External Relations had explained at Punta del Este, would prefer coexistence, subject to certain freely accepted limitations, to either the isolation or exclusion of Cuba. Under the United Nations system, any American State was free to adopt the form of government which best

sued it, and any coercion exercised against it in that connexion would be a violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Finally, both in the OAS and in the United Nations all States were pledged to resolve their differences by peaceful means in accordance with international law.

17. In voting on any draft resolutions, Brazil would be guided by those considerations and by its desire to reduce international tensions and promote international peace and security. International peace depended in large measure on the economic progress and internal stability of the less developed nations, and Brazil firmly believed that they could achieve both those objectives under a democratic, representative form of government.

18. Mr. ORTIZ MARTIN (Costa Rica) said that although many references had been made to the inter-American system and the Organization of American States, it was not for the First Committee to discuss questions that concerned that regional organization alone; the resolutions adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States at Punta del Este would have to be implemented by the organs of the OAS, and nothing could be done in that field without invading the jurisdiction of that organization.

19. Costa Rica had adopted a strong position at the Punta del Este meeting because it had the ineluctable duty of defending its democratic and representative system against the moral and material aggression of a country ruled by a Government which, without any mandate based on free elections, had adopted the political system of Marxism-Leninism. That duty was a particularly urgent one for Costa Rica because it was geographically exposed to direct aggression through communist infiltration. Its long and unprotected coast was open to invasion and infiltration by a Government powerfully armed not only with the weapons of war but also with those Goebbels-type arsenals of propaganda which perverted the minds of young people and were more effective than mortars in destroying the social and political order. Costa Rica, a small country, thus had to rely upon its regional organization to defend itself against Marxist aggression.

20. Costa Rica wished to defend its free and democratic way of life—a way of life which had not been forced upon it, as was evidenced by the recent elections, in which there had not been a single complaint of official pressure. One of the parties in those elections, which had registered as democratic but had subsequently proclaimed itself "the friend of the Cuban revolution and its Chief, Fidel Castro", had been able to launch the bitterest attacks against the Costa Rican institutions in complete freedom. Yet out of the 350,000 votes cast in the elections—which had been won by the party in opposition to the present Government—only 2,977 had gone to the "friends of the Cuban revolution". This clearly showed that it was not the Government of Costa Rica alone but the whole Costa Rican people which looked to the OAS to defend Costa Rica against Marxist-Leninist aggression.

21. It had been alleged that Costa Rica's political philosophy was adopted on instructions from the United States. That was a profound mistake. The reason why the Costa Rican people were not communist was to be found in their own ethnic and historical roots, in their belief that America was the land of freedom, in the individualism they had inherited from Spain and in the

principles of Christianity. The independence of the Latin American countries had been born of the rights of man set forth by the Encyclopaedists and proclaimed for the first time in the Constitution of the United States. The political ideology of Costa Rica had not been imposed but was rooted in the profound convictions of its own people who, in the recent elections, had reaffirmed their faith in representative democracy.

22. It was also necessary to rebut the argument that the OAS had been created to serve the interests of "Yankee imperialism". The inter-American system was not a United States creation, but a genuine Latin American conception. It was Simón Bolívar who had recommended that the Latin American nations, as they freed themselves, should form a confederation of States of Spanish America, and the roots of the present organization went back to the Congress of Panama in 1826. Within the OAS the member States were sovereign, and their policies were in no way determined by the wishes of the United States or any other State; of that there was abundant proof. For that reason the delegation of Costa Rica was convinced that the OAS, because of its age, its experience, and its judicial and moral capacity, was the organization best fitted to mediate in any difficulties that arose between different peoples of the Americas.

23. His delegation would vote against the draft resolution submitted by Czechoslovakia and Romania (A/C.1/L.309), the untimeliness of which was obvious. It did not feel that there had been aggression only by the United States against Cuba. For that reason it firmly believed that the whole problem should be discussed inside the OAS, where Cuba had a place and where its rights, including freedom of expression, had never been restricted.

24. Mr. KIZIA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the item under discussion was one of the most burning questions of the day. A great Power which was a Member of the United Nations was blatantly violating a fundamental principle of the Charter, namely, the obligation of Members to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another, in peace with one another as good neighbours. The Cuban question had revealed the neo-colonialist and aggressive nature of the United States policy towards its Latin American neighbours, a policy characterized by gross disregard of their sovereignty, open interference in their internal affairs and diplomatic, economic, military and political pressure. The United States wanted to keep those countries in its grip forever, refusing to accept the growth of national liberation movements in Latin America, and particularly the revolution in Cuba. It regarded the Cuban people's unwillingness to obey orders from Washington as a threat to its domination of the Western hemisphere—so much so that United States monopolists such as William Randolph Hearst were demanding immediate intervention in Cuba. But the time when the United States could take such action with impunity was past, and it was therefore trying to persuade the Latin American countries themselves to participate in the suppression of Cuba. However, the eyes of the Latin Americans had been opened by recent events on the continent, and they were not to be suborned by promises of dollar aid.

25. Cuba had already been the victim of one attack by bands of mercenaries trained, armed and equipped by the United States through the Central Intelligence Agency. Those mercenaries, however, had not come solely from the United States but also from other

countries which were held in bondage by United States capital. At the time of the invasion in April 1961, for example, the delegation of Guatemala had categorically denied that the mercenaries had bases in that country and had circulated a document<sup>3/</sup> designed to refute the charges made against it. Yet the President of Guatemala, according to The New York Times of 2 January 1962, had openly admitted on 31 December 1961 that anti-Castro groups had been trained in his country and had even asked the United States to mediate in the British Honduras question as a quid pro quo for its services. That not only showed how worthless the disclaimers made by Guatemala at the fifteenth session had been, but also revealed the squalid kind of bargains by which the United States conducted its foreign policy towards its smaller partners. Despite such methods, the Cuban venture, for which the United States President had taken full responsibility, had failed, and the Cuban people had defended their right to live in freedom and independence.

26. The Punta del Este meeting had been a typical United States manoeuvre, designed to conceal that country's aggressive intentions towards Cuba. As the Mexican newspaper Voz de México had said, the imperialists had tried to force the Latin Americans, as a variant of the Monroe Doctrine, to engage in open treachery and renounce the principles of non-intervention and self-determination. But the Latin American countries had not given their blessing to further aggression. At the time of the first invasion, the United States had ignored the OAS, believing that it could get away with a fait accompli. Now, however, the growing opposition of the peoples of the most influential Latin American countries, which followed independent policies of their own, had forced the United States to look to those countries for support. In doing so, it had disregarded the OAS charter, which stated, in article 102, that none of the provisions contained therein should be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the member States under the Charter of the United Nations and which, in article 15, prohibited intervention, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any State. At the behest of the United States monopolists, the United States Government had sought a legal mandate from the Latin American countries for intervention in Cuba to overthrow the existing régime. On 20 April 1961, the President of the United States had said that if the nations of the hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside communist penetration, the Government of the United States would not hesitate to meet its primary obligation, which was the security of the nation. Thus, a mere two days after the defeat of the invaders at Playa Girón the President of the United States had begun to threaten that if the Latin American countries did not join with the United States in preparing further aggression against Cuba it would undertake such aggression on its own. In answer to that statement, the Head of the Soviet Government, on 22 April 1961, had asked what right the United States had to prevent any people, by force of arms, from choosing their own social and political system, pointing out that if that right were granted it could be used against the United States itself. The Soviet Union, by contrast, believed in peaceful coexistence.

27. The threat of unilateral action had failed to produce any results, and the United States Government had

devoted its efforts to other forms of persuasion. There had, for instance, been Mr. Stevenson's mission to Latin America to obtain support for intervention in Cuba, which had proved fruitless. In August 1961, a special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council had been organized in Punta del Este, at which the United States delegation had promised to grant credits and make investments in Latin America amounting to \$20,000 million over a ten-year period, for the alleged purpose of speeding up the economic growth of Latin America. In return it had demanded that Cuba should be condemned both for its internal régime and for its foreign policy. But not a single resolution put forward against Cuba at that meeting had succeeded. As the Argentine newspaper Nueva Era had pointed out, the instruments adopted at that meeting had conceded the possibility of the existence of social systems without free enterprise, thereby recognizing the victory of the Cuban Revolution. The United States, undaunted, had continued its campaign of pressure, promises and blackmail, which had culminated in the convening at Punta del Este of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, intended to provide legal justification for aggression. One of the main charges against Cuba had been its economic co-operation with the socialist countries, which was alleged to make Cuba dependent on the Soviet Union, thus threatening the independence of other Latin American countries. But it was obvious that the disinterested aid provided by the socialist countries strengthened rather than weakened the independence and economic strength of Cuba. For example, while United States monopolists had exacted an interest rate of 8 per cent for their credits, the socialist countries offered credits at the rate of 2 to 2.5 per cent with no political strings attached. In any case, the United States blockade of Cuba had forced it to establish ties with other countries. The Ukrainian SSR, among others, was co-operating with Cuba in the economic and educational fields, to the benefit of both countries.

28. In preparing for the Meeting of Consultation at Punta del Este, the United States had made great play with the "Alliance for Progress" programme. But the colonialist nature of that programme was becoming quite clear. The New York Journal American of 24 January 1962 had openly stated that allocations under the programme would depend on the positions adopted at Punta del Este with respect to Cuba. The United States was not concerned about the economic development of Latin America, but sought merely, by its talk of the threat of communism, to re-establish its domination over Cuba and the rest of the continent and to set a precedent for interference in the internal affairs of countries choosing an independent path. The workers of Latin America, however, had shown by mass demonstrations their opposition to United States intervention and their support for Cuba. The New York Times, in an editorial dated 23 January 1962, had used the case of Mexico to indicate some of the reasons for that opposition, and on 8 January it had pointed out that the Latin Americans feared United States interventionism more than international communism, and that they had Mr. Castro to thank for the Alliance for Progress programme.

29. In preparation for the new attack on Cuba, and with a view to suppressing national liberation movements in other Latin American countries, the United States was paying particular attention to the creation of a special committee for hemisphere defence. The

<sup>3/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 90, document A/4716.

Wall Street Journal of 29 January 1962 had described the functions of the proposed committee as being to collect intelligence data, combat subversive activity, investigate suspected communist infiltration and set up anti-guerrilla forces. In other words, the committee was to act as a watchdog for United States interests throughout Latin America, instigating coups d'état, acts of aggression and so on. The committee would naturally have an important part to play in the preparation of aggression against Cuba. The watchdog attitude, however, could lead only to disaster, and the Punta del Este meeting had been no victory but a rebuff for the United States; those were the views expressed in a letter to The New York Times of 6 February from a professor of Latin American history at Smith College.

30. In the United States preparations for an attack on Cuba, a special place was reserved for the military base at Guantánamo. As the Head of the Soviet Government had said in his message of 24 April 1961 to the United States President, the United States was the strongest Power in the Western hemisphere and had no reason to fear attack from countries in the area. Thus its only reason for maintaining the Guantánamo base against the wishes of the Cuban people was to keep Latin America in a state of political and economic subservience. Ultimately, however the United States would have to abandon the base under pressure from the Cuban people and world opinion.

31. The Cuban question was an international one. Those who threatened Cuba also threatened the peace and security of all nations, running the risk of nuclear war. An end must therefore be put to United States threats against Cuba and direct intervention in Cuban internal affairs. For those reasons, his delegation would vote for the moderate draft resolution submitted by Czechoslovakia and Romania (A/C.1/L.309).

32. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba), replying to the observations of the representatives of Brazil and Costa Rica, said that while he did not question the existence of an inter-American international law, it was an international law in crisis, for it had proved incapable of compelling a powerful and persistent aggressor to desist from intervention not only in Cuba, but in all the republics of the American continent. No

international law of any genuine significance could remain inoperative in the face of the cogent evidence of United States aggression adduced by the Government of Cuba and of the avowed designs of the United States Government.

33. Much had been said about representative democracy, free elections and human rights, but he would ask the members of the Committee to judge for themselves the meaning and implementation of those institutions in Latin America. In point of fact, the Cuban dictator Batista had been a product of Latin American representative democracy, and he could cite many cases in Latin America in which elected Governments had subsequently been taken over by military or political oligarchies under which human rights were still being violated. Indeed, the powerful country which was seeking to teach Cuba the virtues of self-determination and the observance of human rights was oppressing and enslaving minorities within its own borders.

34. And with regard to inter-American conferences, the purpose of the Tenth International Conference of American States, held at Caracas in March 1954, had been to rally support for the aggressive intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of a popularly elected Government in Guatemala, the legal Government of President Arbenz Guzmán. The meeting recently concluded at Punta del Este had served merely to prepare the way for further United States aggression against the independent State of Cuba. The States involved in United States aggression, past or future, would be unable to evade their responsibility.

35. Mr. ORTIZ MARTIN (Costa Rica) objected to the Cuban representative's innuendo that the recent elections in Costa Rica had not been perfectly regular. Since Costa Rica had no army, moreover, his allusion to the seizure of power by military groups in Latin American countries could not possibly refer to Costa Rica. Moreover, it was the anti-oligarchy party, the party of José Figueres Ferrer, which had won the Costa Rican elections; the allegations made by the Cuban representative had obviously missed their target. For his part, Mr. Ortiz Martín was proud to defend representative democracy against communism.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.