United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SIXTEENTH SESSION
Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE, 1230th MEETING

Wednesday, 20 December 1961, at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Chairman: **Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

AGENDA ITEM 20

The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4900 and Add.1, A/C.1/858, A/C.1/859, A/C.1/860, A/C.1/861, A/C.1/862, A/C.1/863, A/C.1/864, A/C.1/865, A/C.1/L.302, A/C.1/L.303, A/C.1/L.305) (concluded)

1. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that by refusing to allow the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the debate, the majority in the Committee had once again acted in disregard of justice, logic and the necessities of the situation. In South Korea, there had been a succession of anti-democratic régimes bringing nothing but economic ruin and suffering to the people and preventing them from getting rid of foreign influence and from uniting with their brethren in North Korea. Yet the South Koreans had given a dramatic demonstration of their aspirations by ousting the Syngman Rhee clique and demanding internal reforms and the peaceful unification of Korea. On 16 May 1961, however, a fascist-type military dictatorship had seized power and had, at least for the time being, drowned the hopes of the population in a wave of terror and reprisals.

2. Despite the lamentable spirit in which they were written, the last two reports of UNCURK contained evidence of South Korea's critical economic and financial situation and of the anti-democratic nature of its present Government. They indicated, for example, that despite the substantial assistance provided by wealthy Western countries, particularly the United States, there had been 3 million unemployed in 1960, or 26 per cent of the population of working age. The economic situation was further aggravated by the reign of terror imposed by the régime of General Park Chung Hee, which had banned all political activities, the publication of the more liberal newspapers and periodicals, and demonstrations and public gatherings. During the first few months following the coup d'état, more than 100,000 persons had been arrested. Yet UNCURK stated (A/4900, para. 78) that a number of details concerning persons arrested and the charges against them had not been available at the time of the signature of its report. Instead of denouncing the acts of violence and terror, it had seen fit to conclude (ibid., para. 86) that the military Government had taken a number of definite steps to return conditions to normal. In other words, the Commission appeared to have done its utmost to whitewash the present régime in South Korea, as it had done in the case of the Syngman Rhee régime. Its efforts would, however, be as futile now as they had been then. So long as United States troops were in South Korea and the Government based its policies on their presence and on the support of the militant anti-communists, there could be no solution of the Korean question.

3. The charge made by the Western delegations in the First Committee that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was hindering the unification of the country by refusing to comply with the General Assembly resolutions had been echoed by UNCURK. Those resolutions, however, had been imposed by a pro-Western majority. Since their adoption, things had changed in the world and in the United Nations, where the new countries of Africa and Asia were showing an increasing interest in the successes achieved by the Democratic People's Republic, whose efforts towards the peaceful unification of Korea were gaining more and more international support. It was in the spirit of those changes that a new approach should be sought to the Korean question.

4. The Polish delegation whole-heartedly supported the draft resolutions submitted by Mongolia (A/C.1/L.302) and the USSR (A/C.1/L.303). The question of the unification of Korea must be solved by the Korean people without interference from outside. Proposals to that effect had been made in 1960 by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic and repeated in its memoranda of 6 March 1961 (A/C.1/833) and 6 December 1961 (A/C.1/861). It proposed, inter alia, the institution of a confederation of North and South Korea, the setting up of a supreme national committee composed of representatives of North and South Korea, and the holding of free general elections throughout Korea on a democratic basis and without outside interference. Those measures could be preceded by the establishment of joint organs to promote the development of economic, commercial and cultural relations between the two Korean States. The proposals had been favourably received by world public opinion.

5. The Polish delegation would vote against the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.305) because it would not enable the Korean people freely to solve their problems and to achieve unification as soon as possible on democratic principles.

Mr. Enckell (Finland), Rapporteur, took the Chair.

6. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) emphasized that the attitude of the North Koreans to the United Nations

was one of non-co-operation and obstruction. Whereas UNCURK had been able to move about freely in South Korea and to report regularly on conditions there, no United Nations representative had been able to visit North Korea and the authorities there still maintained a position of hostility towards the United Nations.

7. In view of the allegations and charges made in the memorandum dated 6 December 1961 submitted by the North Korean authorities (A/C.1/861), it should be recalled that since the end of the Second World War, Korea had occupied a special international position. The task of the United Nations was to bring about, but not to impose, Korea's unification. Since its armed intervention had been undertaken precisely in order to prevent unification by force, the United Nations had naturally been deeply concerned ever since not to take any action which might again open the way for such a tragic development. It was therefore no wonder that the United Nations had on many occasions stated that its objectives in Korea were to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.

8. There was every reason why the sponsors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution should reaffirm those objectives and urge that efforts should be made to achieve them. The draft resolution was not controversial. Its wording was flexible enough to allow for negotiations concerning the more precise arrangements which would be required to achieve the broad objectives of the United Nations. In that connexion, New Zealand had never held the view that the reunification of Korea should depend, in particular, upon a single method of supervision of the necessary elections. An agreement on both the preliminary arrangements and the elections themselves should be sought through negotiation. The right of free choice, however, should in no way be infringed, for only through the exercise of that right could there be established a system of government responsive to the wishes of the Korean people as a whole. In order that the Koreans might be able to make their decision without interference, there should be effective and impartial international supervision at the various stages of the electoral process. The modalities of that process could not be determined in advance, but there should be nothing which would mean the abandonment of the fundamental objective, namely, a united, independent and democratic Korea, conforming to the wishes of the Koreans themselves.

9. It was to be hoped that the recent changes which had taken place in Korea, the facts concerning which had been set out in their proper context by the Australian representative after having been distorted by some delegations, would lead to a necessary cleansing of the body politic which, combined with new vigour in the economic and development spheres, would help to bring the general objectives of the United Nations much closer. His delegation had welcomed the statements made on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning the time-table for the transfer of power to civilian authorities and the recent statements of General Park reaffirming his Government's support for the principles established by the General Assembly for the unification of Korea. If those undertakings were not honoured, the world would be made well aware of it by UNCURK. Unfortunately, the same could not be said about any undertakings which might be entered into by the North Korean authorities.

10. New Zealand looked forward to a growing flexibility on the part of both North and South Korea with a view to overcoming the barriers now preventing them from carrying out the United Nations objectives in Korea. For its part, the United Nations could not abandon its moral obligation towards the Korean people. Nor could it accept any challenge to its competence in the matter. His delegation did not consider that the Mongolian and USSR draft resolutions would assist in the attainment of the United Nations objectives. They entirely ignored the reasons for the United Nations interest in Korea and for the presence in that country of United Nations forces, the great majority of which had in any case been withdrawn. New Zealand would vote in favour of the fifteen-Power draft resolution, of which it was a sponsor, in the hope that the North Korean authorities would reconsider their position and that the unnatural and tragic conditions of life of the Korean people would soon be brought to an end.

11. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) felt that it was obvious from the way in which the discussion had been forced on the Committee that no solution of the Korean problem was being sought. The fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.305) sponsored by the United States of America and other countries members of the NATO and SEATO military blocs, was a conglomeration of misstatements and served no constructive purpose, as could be seen from the third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble. Far from having withdrawn its troops from South Korea, the United States Government had added to its forces there; United States troops now in Korea under the United Nations flag numbered approximately 60,000 men armed with atomic weapons and rockets. The United States had denounced paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement[1/] and had transformed South Korea into a base for missiles and nuclear weapons directed against the continent. There was at present no threat of aggression in Korea other than that represented by the presence there of United States armed forces and of air and naval bases equipped with atomic weapons.

12. As far as operative paragraph 1 of the fifteen-Power draft resolution was concerned, there was reason to ask by what peaceful means it was intended to unify Korea inasmuch as the simplest means available to the United Nations, the hearing of the two parties, had been rejected owing to the manoeuvres of the United States and its allies.

13. Finally, operative paragraph 2 failed to say who should make the continuing efforts to achieve the objectives specified. The sponsors of the draft resolution had their reasons for wishing to keep matters vague.

14. With regard to the request that the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should continue its work, it was painful to see that matter pressed, for UNCURK was one of the parasitic organs created by a certain majority in the United Nations. It used United Nations funds to serve as a cover for the corrupt régimes which had succeeded one another during the preceding ten years. Quoting as an example paragraph 77 of the

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

UNCURK report (A/4900), he asked how a Government interested in improving the economic atmosphere could release from prison persons who had amassed fortunes through illicit means. It was useless to try to praise, as the representative of Australia had done at the 1228th meeting, the efforts of UNCURK and of the successive dictatorial régimes of South Korea, which had collapsed in disgrace. None of them could have survived for twenty-four hours without the support of United States armed forces.

15. The Romanian delegation would vote against the fifteen-Power draft resolution, which was a direct encouragement to aggression. It would vote in favour of the Mongolian draft resolution, because one of the essential conditions for the restoration of peace in that area was the withdrawal of United States forces from South Korea. Moreover, it would seem that the time had come to do away with the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, whose activities had only contradicted its title. The task of Korean reunification should be left to those who alone were competent and able to bring it about, namely the Koreans themselves.

Mr. Amadeo (Argentina) resumed the Chair.

16. Mr. YOST (United States of America) stressed how bitter the struggle for independence was for the Korean people, who for 1,500 years had shared a common history, tradition, government and language. The desire of the Koreans for national independence had been recognized in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and in the Moscow Agreement of 1945, which had provided machinery for re-establishing that independence.

17. The Korean question had been brought to the United Nations in order to end a temporary military occupation of that country and to provide for self-determination by the Korean people. By military necessity, the United States of America and the Soviet Union had occupied the South and the North respectively in order to receive the surrender of the Japanese forces. That situation, which had been expected to last only a few weeks or months, had resulted in a division of the country which had now lasted for sixteen years. The United States had from the very beginning endeavoured to reach agreement with the Soviet Union with a view to the prompt establishment of a Korean Government, as provided for in the Moscow Agreement. Two years of negotiations had produced no results, because the USSR had refused to allow consultation with any Korean group which did not accept the principle of four-Power trusteeship. That principle had proved repugnant to the Korean people, who considered that they should recover their full independence immediately. The United States had supported the Koreans' right to express that view. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had gradually closed the border to commerce and communication between the north and the south of Korea and had imported Soviet citizens of Korean ancestry to administer the northern area and to cut it off more and more completely from the South.

18. The division of Korea had had tragic results in the economic, political and social spheres. United, over 35 million Koreans would place their country among the fourteen largest nations in the world by population and Korea could be a stable and prosperous country. Instead, brother had been set against brother and in 1950 the North Korean régime had made a unilateral attempt to solve the problem by force.

19. From the very beginning, the United Nations had played a major role in the birth, development and preservation of the Republic of Korea. In 1947, when all efforts towards an agreement between the occupying Powers for Korean unification had failed, the United States had brought the problem to the General Assembly.[2] The Assembly had adopted resolution 112 (II) on 14 November 1947, providing for free elections throughout Korea to establish a national government, under the observation of a nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. The United Nations authorities, however, had been barred from the northern part by the Soviet Union, which had denied the competence of the United Nations. The Interim Committee of the General Assembly had then decided[3] that elections should be held in the parts of Korea accessible to the Commission. Those elections had been held on 10 May 1948 and had resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Korea on 15 August of the same year. On 12 December 1948 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 195 (III).

20. From the day of its establishment, the Republic of Korea had striven to achieve democratic stability and economic independence, but no sooner had such progress become evident than it had been wiped out by the North Korean invasion of 1950. The United Nations had immediately rallied to repel that aggression. Troops of sixteen nations—from Africa, Asia, Europe and North and South America—had fought side by side with the gallant Korean forces. After more than three years of hostilities, an Armistice Agreement had been signed in July 1953, re-establishing a demarcation line between north and south. Once again, the United States and other countries whose troops had fought under the United Nations flag had tried to negotiate a basis for the unification of Korea. Once again, such efforts had failed. The United Nations had repeatedly demonstrated its continued concern for the unification of that country in freedom, but it had always been repudiated by the North Koreans, who had never ceased to denounce the Republic of Korea and every country and United Nations agency which had assisted the Republic.

21. In spite of all the criticisms heard during the debates on the Korean question and in spite of all the difficulties encountered, great progress had been made in the Republic of Korea. Illiteracy had almost disappeared, elementary education was virtually universal, the ravages of war had been repaired, the level of living ranked high among the countries of Asia, impressive strides had been made in industrial development, and the gross national product was increasing by more than 5 per cent annually. Industrial output had risen by 25 per cent since 1959 and agricultural production was at the highest level in the country's history.

22. Although President Rhee's administration had made considerable progress, its last years had been marred by serious set-backs to the cause of democracy which had culminated in the popular revolution of April 1960. The successor Government, which had come to power through free elections held in July 1960 on the basis of an amended Constitution, had been sincerely devoted to democratic progress but

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[2] See Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, General Committee, annex 1 b.

[3] Ibid., Third Session, Supplement No. 10, document A/583, sect. III, pp. 20-21.

had been unable to provide the leadership necessary to solve Korea's economic and social problems, that were being aggravated by the division of the country and by the hostile régime in the north. The present Government had come to power precisely in order to carry out the social and national tasks confronting the country. It had called for free elections in 1963 and had given itself a two-year period within which to set the nation firmly on the road of democratic progress and to ensure the re-establishment of civilian government through free general elections.

23. Even more was at stake, however, than the fate of 35 million Koreans. The United Nations action in Korea had been the first example of collective action under the Charter to repel aggression. It had prevented a small nation from being overrun by a powerful enemy. It had demonstrated that in united action there was strength. It might prove to have been the beginning of an international security system which would give all small nations the peace and security they so ardently desired. Nothing would be more pleasing to the United States than to see inaugurated in Korea the spirit of co-operation for which the representative of the Soviet Union had appealed at an earlier meeting. But how was it possible to have confidence in appeals for co-operation and for the reduction of international tension when they were accompanied by such vituperation as that which had characterized so many of the statements in the First Committee on the Korean question and as had been particularly notable in the communication of 19 December 1961 (A/C.1/864) addressed to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Minister of the North Korean régime?

24. With regard to the Mongolian draft resolution, he wished solemnly to assure the Committee that United States forces in South Korea were there solely on a defensive United Nations mission and that they would never be used for aggressive purposes against North Korea or against anyone else. The United Nations forces were in South Korea at the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea, since there was no assurance that the aggression of which South Korea had been the victim in 1950 would not occur again. To withdraw those forces before the Korean problem was at least on the way to solution would be to invite another "war of liberation" from the north, supported again by the Chinese communists. In other words, the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea would not contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. The United States delegation would therefore vote against the Mongolian draft resolution. It would also vote against the USSR draft resolution, which proposed the dissolution of UNCURK. All that had been said during the debate had clearly demonstrated the importance of the tasks still facing UNCURK. The Republic of Korea obviously still desired the help of the United Nations. It was to be hoped that some day UNCURK would be permitted by the North Korean régime to penetrate behind its iron curtain and to bring the message of the United Nations to the Korean people. The dissolution of UNCURK would be a grievous blow to the hopes of the Korean people, in both the south and the north, and would be interpreted by them as their abandonment by the United Nations.

25. The United States of America, together with fourteen other countries, had submitted a draft resolution which reaffirmed, as clearly and simply as possible, United Nations principles for Korean security and unification. The two basic principles for a Korean settlement which underlay the draft resolution had been repeatedly affirmed by the General Assembly. He trusted that it would be adopted by the Committee as similar resolutions had been adopted over the years.

26. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) recalled that his delegation had always urged that the representatives of the two parts of Korea should be invited to participate in the discussion of the Korean question. The decision the First Committee had taken both the previous year and at the current session, making the invitation of representatives of North Korea subject to certain conditions, hampered the search for a peaceful settlement, which was impossible without the co-operation of the two existing Governments. If it was desired to break the present deadlock, there would have to be a less rigid approach. The only realistic way of making any progress towards a practical and positive solution of the problem was through direct negotiations between North and South Korea, which could be facilitated by the participation of UNCURK or if, as seemed likely, UNCURK was unable to secure the co-operation of one of the parties, of a new body composed of countries acceptable to both parties.

27. Although nothing in the UNCURK report indicated that any progress had been made, the Indian delegation saw certain encouraging signs in the positions of the two sides, both of whom desired peaceful unification of the country through free elections. Such elections should be held under international supervision, in a form acceptable to both sides. Another hopeful element was that the Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn from North Korea and the United Nations forces in South Korea had been reduced. The evacuation of the remainder of those forces would facilitate a political solution of the problem. It would not be advisable, at the present stage, to dissolve UNCURK unless it were replaced by a more acceptable and more effective body or until a solution of the Korean question had been reached. He did not think that the fifteen-Power draft resolution, which was like the previous resolutions of the General Assembly, could be very useful. He would vote on the various draft resolutions in the light of what he had just said.

28. In conclusion, he informed the Committee that all the former prisoners of war who had been taken to India had been resettled in the countries they had chosen. Eleven of them had opted for India.

29. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that the discussion of the Korean question had been fruitless owing to the attitude of the United States, which intended to perpetuate the division of the country and to go on occupying South Korea so that it could more easily implement its aggressive plans in the Far East. It was because of United States pressure that the United Nations had so far followed an unsound and unjustifiable procedure which, by excluding the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic from the discussions, precluded any possibility of resolving the problem. Yet the Minister for Foreign Affairs of North Korea, in his telegram of 19 December 1961 (A/C.1/864), signified his willingness to take part in the Committee's discussion; he had made it quite clear that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic respected the Charter of the United Nations. The decision which the Committee had taken under

United States pressure was a violation of the Charter that was all the more inadmissible in view of the situation prevailing in South Korea and of the danger which it created for world peace and security.

30. The reign of misery and terror imposed upon South Korea by the fascists was a result of the colonialist policy of the United States in the Far East. Living conditions were quite different in the Democratic People's Republic, which had achieved great success in all fields. The people of South Korea longed for the reunification of the country and were actively fighting against the American occupation, as shown by the popular uprising in April 1961 which had overthrown the Syngman Rhee clique. Unfortunately the latter's successors, who were also in the pay of the United States, had pursued the same policy and had always rejected North Korea's concrete and constructive proposals for the country's progressive reunification. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic was still ready to negotiate with the South Korean authorities on the basis of those proposals.

31. As the Albanian and many other delegations had pointed out on numerous occasions, no solution was possible without the evacuation of the United States armed forces from South Korea. Since 1958 the People's Republic of China had withdrawn the Chinese volunteers from North Korea, whereas the United States was transforming the southern part of the peninsula into a powerful military base equipped for atomic warfare. If the United Nations really wanted to see the Korean question settled, it should take decisive steps to ensure that the United States and all other foreign troops stationed in South Korea were withdrawn. It should also dissolve UNCURK forthwith, as it was implementing the aggressive policy of the United States and was merely aggravating the situation.

32. For those reasons the Albanian delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolutions submitted by Mongolia (A/C.1/L.302) and the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.303) and would vote against the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.305).

33. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) observed that, in deciding not to invite the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the debate, the Committee, far from promoting a settlement of the question, had injected partiality into the discussion and had still further aggravated the dispute between the Democratic People's Republic, an independent and prosperous State with a stable Government, and South Korea, which was subjected to a succession of military dictatorships and whose economic situation was all the more deplorable because of the continued occupation of the country by foreign troops. The United States, not content with interfering, on the American continent, in the affairs of countries whose political systems displeased it, was applying its thesis of extra-continental intervention by maintaining troops in such distant countries as South Korea. In so doing, it claimed to be contributing to the maintenance of peace. The Cuban Government considered that, on the contrary, the only real contribution to that end would be to withdraw those forces immediately. The unification of Korea was a question for the Korean people alone to settle and the efforts in that direction made by the Koreans could only be hampered by the regrettable decision which the Committee had just taken in preventing North Korea from being heard. The Cuban delegation also considered that there was no justification for the continued existence of UNCURK, which had in no way helped to establish peace in the area. It would therefore vote in favour of the Mongolian draft resolution and the Soviet draft resolution and would vote against the fifteen-Power draft resolution.

34. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the artificial division of Korea, which had lasted for fifteen years, was perpetuating a situation that was as grave as it was abnormal for both that country and the region as a whole. Reunification of the country could be achieved only by the Koreans themselves, without outside interference, and it would not be possible while the United Nations, under United States pressure, continued to adopt resolutions preventing the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic from participating in the Committee's discussions. The main criterion for any evaluation of the situation was the attitude of the two Korean States in regard to the peaceful reunification of the country. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic had given many proofs of its willingness to attain that objective. It had taken many positive steps towards that end, had put forward constructive proposals, among other things, for the creation of a confederation of the two countries, and had drawn up programmes for economic and cultural co-operation with a view to creating the requisite conditions for the peaceful reunification of the country through free and democratic elections without outside control. In the event of confederation not being acceptable to the Government of South Korea, the Democratic People's Republic had proposed the establishment of a joint economic committee to organize an economic collaboration that would gradually eliminate the disastrous consequences of a military occupation lasting for sixteen years. However, those proposals, together with North Korea's offers of economic assistance, had been rejected or disregarded by South Korea and the United States, which had consistently opposed the peaceful steps advocated by the Democratic People's Republic. The continued occupation of South Korea by United States troops and the frenzied militarization of that country could not be justified on any score. That was the main obstacle to the reunification of Korea.

35. As a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Czechoslovakia could affirm that it had become impossible for an international body to supervise the implementation of the armistice terms, and it strongly protested against the systematic violations of the Armistice Agreement by United States troops and by the South Korean army. Rejection of the realistic proposals of the Democratic People's Republic had had disastrous consequences for South Korea, where more than 50 per cent of the economically active population was either unemployed or partially employed and where nearly two-thirds of the budget was devoted to military expenditure. There had been a catastrophic deterioration in the economic situation leading to extreme poverty and a chronic state of famine. As to United States assistance, three-quarters of the funds provided had been absorbed by military expenditure. A striking contrast was presented by North Korea which, in fifteen years, had become an advanced socialist State whose prestige was constantly growing throughout the world. That fact was convincingly demonstrated by the return of more than 64,000 Koreans from Japan to North Korea.

36. After describing the tragic experience of the South Korean people after the overthrow of the Syng-

man Rhee régime and the circumstances in which the military coup d'état of May 1961 had taken place, he emphasized that the régime of South Korea was repressive and anti-constitutional, and that its leaders were openly opposed to the peaceful reunification of the country, despite the clearly expressed will of the people. The coup d'état had in fact been staged in order to stamp out the increasingly powerful movement for unification. The publication entitled The Military Revolution in Korea issued in July 1961 by the so-called Ministry for Foreign Affairs of South Korea recognized the anti-democratic nature of the present Government and painted a revealing picture of the corruption and terror of the Syngman Rhee régime, which the United States representatives had held up as an example of democracy in the Far East. The events in South Korea showed that it was the United States which, through its manoeuvrings, had prevented the reunification of the country. The statements by the United States delegation at the time of the coup d'état would deceive no one; the facts—above all, the presence of leading United States military and political figures during the days immediately preceding the seizure of power by the military clique—were irrefutable proof of the close ties between the United States and the present South Korean régime. The recent visit of one of the leaders of that régime to the United States confirmed that the latter was supporting the fascist dictatorship in South Korea in order to preserve an important strategic and military base directed against the socialist and neutralist countries of Asia.

37. It was, therefore, not surprising that the report of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should omit all reference to the deplorable situation and the increasingly fascist nature of the country. Czechoslovakia unreservedly supported the request of the Democratic People's Republic for immediate reunification, a prerequisite for which was the withdrawal of the United States troops. It was also necessary to disband UNCURK, whose activities merely perpetuated a situation that served United States interests.

38. The Czechoslovak delegation would vote for the draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet Union and Mongolia. It would vote against the fifteen-Power draft resolution, the sponsors of which wished to continue misusing the United Nations and covering up United States intervention in Korea.

39. Mr. QUINTERO (Philippines) said that the fifteen-Power draft resolution, of which the Philippines was a sponsor, reaffirmed the objectives of the United Nations in Korea and recommended measures which his delegation believed would facilitate the reunification of the country and the maintenance of peace in the area.

40. The Philippine delegation could not, however, support the Mongolian draft resolution, which called for the withdrawal of the forces stationed in South Korea. The events of June 1950, which had marked the opening of the Korean war, were still fresh in the memory of the Philippines, whose soldiers had died in Korea in the service of the United Nations. It was only the presence of United Nations forces in Korea that prevented the North Koreans from re-occupying the southern part of the country.

41. The Philippine delegation was also opposed to the Soviet draft resolution, which called for the dissolution of UNCURK. The Commission was a body which had done creditable work and should be retained. It was to be regretted that, because of North Korea's failure to co-operate, it had been prevented from visiting that part of the peninsula to report on the situation there, and it was to be hoped that there would be a change of heart by the North Korean authorities in that respect. Such a development would hasten the unification of Korea.

42. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) said it was unfortunate that the Korean question could not be fully discussed and that the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not been permitted to take part in the debate. He wished, however, to make some brief comments clarifying the Korean situation.

43. It was not surprising that the report of UNCURK was tendentious, since the Commission itself was made up solely of military allies of the United States. It was, in fact, endeavouring to achieve the objectives of the aggressive policy of the United States in the Far East by concealing the military build-up instead of working for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea; that was why it was difficult to see any justification for the Commission's existence.

44. There were no grounds for denying the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the right to participate in the debate. Those delegations which claimed that that country was not respecting the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations had been unable to give any facts in support of their assertion and had confined themselves to quoting previous Assembly resolutions which were themselves a violation of the Charter. It was clear from the telegram sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/864) that the Government of that country had always respected the Charter, and it was not surprising that it should have reservations with regard to United Nations actions in view of the fact that the evident purpose of the United States motion introduced at the 1228th meeting was to induce the First Committee to act on the Korean question without taking the provisions of the Charter into account.

45. Several representatives had called for the organization in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of elections similar to those which had taken place in South Korea under the so-called auspices of the United Nations. But the whole world knew that elections were only free in appearance under the régime of terror of Syngman Rhee, who could not have seized and retained power without the support of the United Nations. UNCURK had deliberately omitted those facts from its report, while criticizing the elected Government for having permitted the workers to stage demonstrations calling for an improvement in their economic situation and the unification of Korea and for having tolerated a certain degree of freedom of the Press, which was strange to say the least on the part of a United Nations commission. It was thus not surprising that the report should make no comment on the steps taken by the present Government of South Korea in violation of human rights. It was well known that General Park had had tens of thousands of people arrested for political or other reasons and that civil liberties had almost completely disappeared, as had been reported in an article in the New York Herald Tribune of 21 November 1961. In the circumstances, it was easy to understand why the Government and people of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea refused to accept such electoral methods and such a rule of terror.

46. The present Government of South Korea was quite as corrupt as its predecessor, although the United States had engaged its political prestige in supporting that Government. The United States had taken that decision regardless of the general interests of the Korean people. Despite the favourable picture of the situation in South Korea which UNCURK attempted to give, the country was in a state of economic stagnation and there were 5 to 6 million unemployed, despite the assistance given by the United States, which was principally of a military nature. The economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the contrary, was developing rapidly, as he himself had observed when visiting that country; during his journey he had been impressed by the scope of the reconstruction work carried out, the volume of industrial and agricultural production and the absence of unemployment. Even in the capitalist countries people were aware of the true situation. Thus, over 90,000 Koreans living in Japan had come to settle in North Korea, although 90 per cent of them were originally from South Korea.

47. For historical, geographical, economic and cultural reasons, Korea must be unified. It would be for the Korean people, however, to decide how the country should be unified and what social system should be adopted. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had made a number of proposals in an attempt to overcome the difficulties, but the South Korean authorities and the United States Army and Government were opposed to unification—as was even the United Nations, to judge by such actions as the adoption by the First Committee at the 1228th meeting of the United States motion. If Korea was to be unified, all foreign military forces must first be withdrawn from the country. The armed forces of the United States, stationed in Korea under the banner of the United Nations, were supporting a fascist dictatorship and, in co-operation with the army of South Korea, were persistently violating the Armistice Agreement. He referred to a number of violations which had been committed during the first half of 1961. Those facts were ignored in the report of UNCURK, which failed to mention that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, South Korea was importing modern weapons, which would evidently increase the danger of war.

48. The Hungarian delegation therefore wholeheartedly supported the Mongolian draft resolution, since Korea could not be unified unless all foreign military forces were withdrawn from the country. It also supported the Soviet draft resolution, since UNCURK was endeavouring to prevent a settlement of the question and should therefore be dissolved. For the same reasons, the Hungarian delegation considered the fifteen-Power draft resolution to be completely unacceptable.

49. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, observed that the United States representative had spoken in favour of the fascist military dictatorship of South Korea. In that connexion, he recalled that the seeds of fascism had already been sown around 1930 and that the United States had contributed to its growth. It was from those seeds that the Second World War had sprung. It was therefore cause for the greatest concern that the United States should again be supporting fascism in South Korea and elsewhere. It was time for the United States to realize its responsibilities and understand the danger of supporting military cliques all over the world. The very future of humanity might be at stake.

50. The United States representative had spoken a great deal about the past, but it was principally the future that should now be considered. In that respect there were two ways in which the problem might be approached: the question of Korea might be tackled afresh on a basis of mutual understanding and of respect for the sovereignty of States and the principle of peaceful coexistence, which would obviously involve the withdrawal of United States armed forces from South Korea; the other alternative was to wage the cold war, as the United States had been doing during the debate. The Soviet delegation wished to emphasize that if the United States pursued cold-war tactics, peace might be seriously endangered and international tension would be increased. As that would be the atmosphere in which the forthcoming disarmament negotiations would take place, he appealed to the United States to put an end to the cold war.

51. Mr. CAMPBELL (United Kingdom) felt that all the arguments on both sides had been expounded in detail and that the draft resolutions should now be put to the vote. He therefore formally moved the closure of the debate in accordance with rule 118 of the rules of procedure.

52. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) opposed the motion for closure of the debate. The discussion of the Korean question had been carried out in abnormal circumstances because of the absence of a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Moreover, the Committee had had little time to examine the question and representatives had not been able to deal with its various aspects as they would have liked. To close the debate would make the situation even more abnormal and the delegations of the Western countries would bear the responsibility.

53. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) opposed the motion for closure of the debate, since all the speakers on the list had not been heard and it would be preferable to give them an opportunity to state their views. They would otherwise have to speak in plenary meeting so that, in the long run, no time would be saved on the discussion of the Korean question.

54. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion for closure of the debate.

The motion was adopted by 40 votes to 16, with 27 abstentions.

55. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that as a result of the abnormal situation created by the delegations of the Western countries, there was no further point in examining the question of Korea and a vote would be meaningless. The Soviet delegation would therefore withdraw its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.303) and appealed to the sponsors of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.305) to withdraw it.

56. Mr. TSEVEGMID (Mongolia) stated that the question of Korea had been examined in an abnormal atmosphere because no representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was present, and

because delegations had had insufficient time to examine the question in detail. That being so, there would be no point in putting the draft resolutions to the vote and the Mongolian delegation had decided to withdraw its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.302).

57. The CHAIRMAN put the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.305) to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey.

Against: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining: United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Senegal, Syria, Togo, Tunisia.

Present and not voting: Afghanistan.

The draft resolution was adopted by 55 votes to 11, with 20 abstentions.

58. Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria) expressed regret that the representative of North Korea had not been permitted to take part in the debate. The views of both parties should be taken into consideration. The United Nations should not impose conditions regarding negotiations with a view to the unification of Korea; on the contrary, it should encourage the North Koreans and the South Koreans to meet, since in the last analysis it would be the Koreans themselves who would have to decide the conditions under which their country should be reunified. The Nigerian delegation therefore hoped that at the next session the First Committee would address an unconditional invitation to the representative of North Korea.

Statement by the Chairman

59. The CHAIRMAN stated that with the conclusion of the examination of the Korean question, the only item remaining to be considered was agenda item 78, entitled "Complaint by Cuba of threats to international peace and security arising from new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba". Since the General Assembly had to conclude its work that day, he suggested that, for lack of time, the Committee should not now discuss the item, and that its decision to that effect should be recorded in its report.

It was so decided.

60. In conclusion, the CHAIRMAN thanked the representatives for their co-operation and expressed his gratitude to the Secretariat for its assistance in the work of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

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