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MEETING**

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**Chairman:** Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

**AGENDA ITEM 80**

**Question of Algeria (A/4842 and Add.1)**

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that it had decided at its 1208th meeting to begin consideration of the question of Algeria on 14 December. Consideration of the Korean question was consequently suspended in order to enable the Committee to discuss the question of Algeria.
2. Mr. YOST (United States of America), invoking rule 117 of the rules of procedure, moved that the debate on the question of Algeria should be adjourned for thirty minutes in order to permit the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea to make a statement. After hearing him, the Committee could temporarily postpone further discussion on the Korean question and return immediately to the question of Algeria, thus giving the North Korean authorities the opportunity to prepare their reply to the invitation addressed to them by the Committee.
3. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) supported the United States representative's motion. He recalled moreover that it had been agreed that the report on the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests would be submitted to the Committee on or about 14 December, and requested that a date should be fixed for consideration of that report.
4. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) expressed his disagreement with the United States representative's motion. The Committee should not have invited the South Korean representative to be present until it had received an answer from the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; in any event, he should not be given the floor while the other Korean State was not represented in the Committee. It was generally recognized that the Korean question could not be solved without the participation of both Korean States, and the United States delegation itself could be under no illusion as to the value of any contribution that might be made by the representative of the military and fascist dictatorship in South Korea.

That being so, it was clear that the United States could have only one intention: to revive the cold war over the question of Korea, even though such a policy might well jeopardize peace and security in the Far East. He appealed to the United States representative to withdraw his motion.

5. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said that he could not support the procedure proposed by the United States representative; the Committee should first hear the representatives who wished to speak on the question of Algeria, and then consider the United States motion.

6. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) supported the United States representative's motion.

*The motion was adopted by 37 votes to 19, with 21 abstentions.*

7. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) pointed out that the motion just adopted entailed the simple adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion, and not a change in the agenda, which would require a new decision of the Committee taken by a two-thirds majority.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that he did not share that view, and pointed out that when it had been decided that the debate on Algeria would begin on 14 December, no hour had been set. Since the motion just adopted did not entail any alteration of that date, it did not affect the agenda of the Committee.

9. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said there was absolutely no doubt that in deciding to discuss the question of Algeria on 14 December, the Committee had intended the discussion to begin at 10.30 a.m. What was being proposed was therefore in fact a change in the agenda—a decision which could be taken only by a two-thirds majority.

10. After a short exchange of views in which Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria), who referred to the Journal of the United Nations for 14 December, and Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) took part, the CHAIRMAN said that he would stand by his interpretation of the rules. That decision was entirely impartial, his sole concern being to execute faithfully the wishes of the Committee as a whole. As the ruling of the Chair had not been challenged, he would call on the representative of the Republic of Korea.

**AGENDA ITEM 20**

**The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4900 and Add.1, A/C.1/858, A/C.1/859, A/C.1/860, A/C.1/861, A/C.1/862, A/C.1/L.302, A/C.1/L.303, A/C.1/L.304, A/C.1/L.305) (*continued*)**

11. The CHAIRMAN called on the representative of the Republic of Korea to make a statement.

12. Mr. CHOI Duk-Shin (Republic of Korea) said that no one could be more anxious than the people of Korea to see the efforts of the United Nations to enhance peace and security in the Far East through a just solution of the problem of the enforced division of the Korean nation crowned with success. Two facts emerged from the history of the Korean question during the past fifteen years. First, the United Nations had always been firmly determined to secure a solution which would be just to the people of Korea; secondly, some States were pursuing policies which had so far thwarted the efforts of the United Nations.

13. Like its predecessors, the report of UNCURK (A/4900 and Add.1) dealt solely with developments in South Korea, since in the North the Commission was still prevented by communist force from fulfilling its mission of observing the situation in the whole of the country.

14. The first Government of the Republic of Korea had fallen after a series of demonstrations launched by university students in April 1960 to protest against election rigging. A new Government had been established through elections which had been observed by the United Nations Commission. On 16 May 1961, without bloodshed or disorder, control of the Government had been assumed by a group of patriotic military leaders. President Yoon Bo Sun, recognizing the necessity of that revolution and its support by the people, had pledged his support to it. Prime Minister Chang Myun and his cabinet had met on 19 May and had resigned, turning over the power to the Military Revolutionary Committee. On 12 August, General Park Chung Hee, Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, had issued a public statement promising that a new election, again to be held under United Nations observation, would be held in May 1963, following which the Government would be completely turned over to civilian control in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

15. As the experience of many nations indicated, revolution was never pleasant; but it was one of the legitimate means by which a people might sometimes protect its liberties, its basic rights, its security and its legitimate aspirations. The Government of Prime Minister Chang Myun had had to be replaced by the present Government of the Republic of Korea because it had proved to be too weak to deal with the needs of the nation, and especially because that weakness had opened wide the door to communist infiltration and subversion, which had threatened the complete destruction of the national freedom and welfare of the South Korean people.

16. The communist memorandum reproduced in document A/C.1/861 harshly attacked the revolution of 16 May in terms which clearly demonstrated the reasons why that revolution had been necessary—namely, because the weakness of the former administration would have permitted South Korean society to sink into disorder. It was for those reasons that the Korean people had enthusiastically supported the remedial measures taken by their sons and brothers in the armed forces.

17. It was noteworthy that Kim Il Sung had held the position of Premier in North Korea for over a decade. He had previously been a Soviet citizen, a major in the Soviet armed forces, and his real name was Kim Sung Ju. He had actually been installed in office by the Soviet forces. According to the communist masters of North Korea, two elections to the so-called Supreme People's Assembly had been held in the territory

dominated by them, one on 25 August 1948 and a second on 27 August 1957. Thus, the term of office of the first members of the Assembly had been nine years—perhaps the longest such term in history. In the 1948 balloting, the North Korean communists claimed that 99.97 per cent of the voters had gone to the polls and 98.49 per cent had voted for Communist Party candidates. Of 227 communist candidates, 212 had been elected. It should be noted that there had been no opposition candidates, and that the balloting had taken place not in secret, but in front of Party inspectors, the voters casting affirmative ballots in a white box, and negative ballots in a black box. The indictment against the 1957 election was even more damning; 99.99 per cent of the voters were said to have gone to the polls and 99.92 per cent of them to have voted in favour of Communist Party candidates, again under the scrutiny of communist inspectors; 212 candidates out of 212 had been elected.

18. For Kim Il Sung (or Kim Sung Ju) and his kind, democracy meant a lifelong tenure of office, unless there were further purges which resulted in their being sent off to Siberia. It was understandable that the communist masters should decline to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations.

19. The existing Government in South Korea was an interim Government which was striving under difficult circumstances to lay the foundations of a genuine and workable democracy in Korea. It had given a solemn pledge to that effect, which it was implementing by cordially co-operating with the United Nations in order to achieve the basic objective of reunifying the nation in democracy and independence.

20. In order to achieve in unity a just and final solution, it was important to identify the nature of the difficulties existing in Korea. The main difficulty lay in the fact that the ancient nation of Korea had been unjustly and forcibly divided against the will and interests of the whole Korean people. The solution sought by the United Nations, one which had always been supported by the Government of the Republic of Korea and by all the people of Korea, northern as well as southern, was to hold fair and honest elections, supervised by the United Nations, to enable the will of the whole people to be known.

21. As it was, the northern part of the Korean nation was forced to endure a foreign communist tyranny which constantly threatened the southern part with its enormous armed forces. That division had been imposed on the Korean people, not as a punishment for any crime it might have committed, but as a by-product of a self-confessed conspiracy to achieve world domination.

22. His Government was still doing what it could to assist the United Nations to achieve an equitable solution for the Korean problem; he hoped that the forces of aggression in northern Korea would come to see the advantage to themselves of co-operating in order to carry out the principles of justice and collective security represented by the United Nations. His Government sincerely hoped for close co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields with all the freedom-loving nations of the world. With that in mind, it had dispatched goodwill missions to eighty-three countries to inform them of its problems and of what it was doing in its endeavours to solve them.

23. During the six months it had been in office, the Government of the Republic of Korea had put into

effect a national reconstruction programme in order to provide work for the unemployed. A new bank, founded in August 1961, had already granted loans amounting in all to 27,000 million hwan to small businesses which were in difficulties; 20,000 million hwan had been lent to farmers and fishermen to free them from the usurious rates of interest which they had previously been forced to pay. An economic planning board had been established, and a five-year plan was to be instituted at the beginning of 1962. Nevertheless, his Government was confronted with numerous difficulties, caused in part by the artificial division of the nation, which prevented the effective utilization of the various resources of the north and south, and in part by the almost total destruction of key industries during the communist invasion.

24. The Committee should keep in view the difference between the régime in the north and the Government of the Republic of Korea. Whereas the latter had always co-operated closely with the United Nations, in accordance with its purposes and principles, the communist régime had always barred the United Nations from its territory and had made war against the Republic of Korea and the United Nations, whose objectives in Korea it had denounced; it had been branded as an aggressor by the United Nations. The North Korean communists had described the First Committee's decision of April 1961 (A/C.1/837) as a shameful act and an unjust action which ran entirely counter to the principles of the United Nations. In an official memorandum dated 6 December 1961 (A/C.1/861) they had stated: "The unification of Korea is an internal affair of the Korean people that decides their own destiny. Accordingly, no outside force is allowed to interfere with it." It might be conjectured that what Kim Il Sung really feared in connexion with foreign interference was that North Korea might increasingly become a pawn in the power struggle between Communist China and the USSR; events in Albania were doubtless of particular interest to him.

25. The Government of the Republic of Korea was ready to accept the appeal of the United Nations for free elections in both North and South Korea. Since the communist régime in the north claimed to represent the people of Korea, it should accept that test; the Republic of Korea challenged it to do so.

26. The Republic of Korea, which had always adhered to the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, had been denied its rightful place in the Organization as a result of the exercise of the veto by a single permanent member of the Security Council. Despite that injustice, the Republic of Korea had joined most of the specialized agencies and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and was affiliated with non-governmental organizations in which the Soviet veto could not be exercised. To the extent of its meagre resources, his Government had contributed to the funds of those different organizations and was eager further to promote international co-operation. In its resolution 296 G (IV) of 22 November 1949 the General Assembly had determined that the Republic of Korea was, in its judgement, a peace-loving State within the meaning of the Charter, that it was able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter and that it should therefore be admitted to membership in the United Nations; and the Assembly had reaffirmed that determination in its resolution 1017 A (XI) of 28 February 1957. On behalf of the people and Government of the Republic of Korea, he appealed to the Members of the General Assembly and to the world community to

help them to realize their desire to take their rightful place in the United Nations and to participate in its work for peace and justice. Meanwhile, he expressed his profound gratitude to the United Nations for its efforts to unify the Korean nation in independence.

27. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the previous speaker had taken advantage of the Chairman's one-sided attitude to drag the Soviet Union through the mire.

28. The CHAIRMAN recalled his earlier statement. All that he had done had been to comply in complete impartiality with the Committee's decision.

*Mr. Choi Duk-Shin, representative of the Republic of Korea, withdrew.*

## AGENDA ITEM 80

### Question of Algeria (A/4842 and Add.1) (continued)

29. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) said that the question of Algeria was as delicate and complex as it was important and urgent. Without recounting the details of the heroic and tragic struggle that had been waged for so many years by and on behalf of the Algerian people, he would simply express the admiration that was due to those who were engaged in it. His Government also appreciated the skill, perseverance and steadfastness with which President de Gaulle was seeking to solve the problem.

30. It was certainly not easy to find a just solution. The tragic history of the Algerian conflict was still not completed, but there was every reason to hope that its end, and a happy one at that, was in sight. It appeared that the wise and heroic men who, on behalf of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on the one hand and the French Government on the other, were so earnestly seeking a solution, were about to attain their objective. The delegation of Pakistan hoped that the Committee would help them to achieve that objective speedily.

31. Although the progress accomplished so far had been slow, important results had been achieved. The right of the Algerian people to independence was no longer in dispute. The territorial integrity of the whole of Algeria seemed to have been conceded when, on 5 September 1961, President de Gaulle had unequivocally recognized the unanimous conviction of the Algerians that the Sahara formed an integral part of Algeria.

32. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and the French Government had twice entered into direct negotiations which, although they had been suspended, had nevertheless helped the two parties towards a better understanding of each other's points of view and an appreciation of the difficulties standing in the way of agreement. Since the suspension of the negotiations, further light had been thrown on certain facets of the problem. However, in the interests of the parties and of the maintenance of peace, that process—the initiation of negotiations, their progress and suspension—must not be permitted to become a rigid pattern. Those concerned must take the fullest advantage of the progress made, in order to enter into fresh negotiations with the determination to arrive at a just settlement of the conflict and deliver the Algerian people from their nightmare of terror and torture.

33. One obstacle still seemed to stand in the way: the problem posed by the situation of the French population

of Algeria. That question aroused deep emotions, which, however, justice and reason should be able to overcome so that an enduring settlement could be achieved. Every effort must be made to arrive at a clear understanding of the difficulties and fears besetting that population and to seek an equitable means of surmounting the former and allaying the latter. The best approach would be to exclude, by all requisite means, any possibility of coercion by either side, and to guarantee in all circumstances, whatever the choice of those affected in the matter of citizenship or nationality, that there would be complete security and a total lack of discrimination.

34. Naturally the main responsibility for finding a just and peaceful settlement of the Algerian question rested with those who had the right to speak on behalf of Algeria and France. Nevertheless, the United Nations also had a responsibility, which it had been seeking to discharge for six years. The Pakistan delegation hoped that the present occasion would be the last on which the Organization would be called upon to deal with that delicate problem. It also hoped that the parties would achieve the detachment necessary for arriving at a clear and just appreciation of the major elements in the conflict and for finding an equitable solution to them.

35. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and the French Government now seemed equally anxious to achieve such a solution. France might have greater difficulties to face than Algeria in the matter, but it nevertheless had the advantage conferred upon it by its history and its outstanding record in the field of statesmanship. It could also rely on its Head of State to steer clear of the shoals which might lie ahead. Those sections of the population of Algeria which feared that a settlement might jeopardize their interests should likewise place their faith in him; he would be sure to devise a just and honourable solution that they could accept.

36. In conclusion, he expressed the fervent hope that negotiations to that end would be resumed as soon as possible and that they would be crowned with early success.

37. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said that it had never been more urgent or more important for the United Nations to discharge its responsibilities and call earnestly for a peaceful and constructive solution of the Algerian problem. The General Assembly must take effective steps at the present session to bring about a final settlement of the Algerian war as quickly as possible.

38. The fact that encouraging new developments had taken place in regard to at least some aspects of the Algerian problem did not justify taking a less urgent approach to that problem. On the contrary, they constituted a further reason for doing everything possible to give Algeria the independence which all its people wanted. His delegation's position in that regard remained unchanged. Indeed, his delegation had become increasingly convinced, over the years, that in defending the cause of the Algerian people it was defending a just cause, a cause, moreover, whose validity even France no longer challenged. Afghanistan was more vigorously supporting the position of the Algerian Provisional Government, among other reasons, because that Government had always shown willingness to accept a peaceful solution of the problem, respect for the part taken by the United Nations, and appreciation of the latter's efforts.

39. Citing the statement made by the Prime Minister of Afghanistan during the discussion of the liquidation of colonialism and the right of peoples and nations to self-determination at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, he recalled that the Afghan Government had officially recognized the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. It also shared the view of all the Governments of the non-aligned countries which had taken part in the Belgrade Conference that the Algerian people's struggle for freedom, self-determination and independence, and for the integrity of its national territory, including the Sahara, was a just and necessary struggle which should be given all possible support and assistance.

40. Although no war could be justified, the one which for many years had been raging in Algeria had been forced upon the Algerian people. As Mr. Ben Khedda, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, had said, the Algerians were not a warlike people by inclination. They wanted to be independent, and they would unquestionably continue to fight for that objective if they had to; what they sought, however, was a peaceful settlement of the conflict in which they were ranged against France. Mr. Ben Khedda had pointed out at the same time that to delay Algeria's inevitable attainment of independence would be dangerous both for international peace and for future relations between the Algerian and French peoples. That twofold threat was also a matter of concern to Afghanistan, which attached great importance to the future relations between two peoples for which it cherished feelings of sincere friendship. At the same time, his country appreciated the proposals for peaceful measures which had been made by the responsible statesmen on behalf of France, and would support any action likely to encourage frank and honest negotiations which would enable Algeria to attain independence on the basis of its territorial integrity and which would open the way to fruitful co-operation in the interests of the Algerian and French peoples.

41. He regretted that there had been delay in implementing certain measures on which the two parties concerned had reached agreement. He was also disturbed by the attitude of the section of the population of Algeria which was of French origin. The latter, however, was a secondary problem which could be handled easily if the primary issues were dealt with in a satisfactory manner; that, in turn, depended on the attitude of the French and Algerian Governments.

42. The importance which the Provisional Government attached to the position of the French minority was a further reason for confidence in its sense of justice and its political maturity. He was glad to note, in that connexion, that the people of that minority had been assured that they would be able to live in complete security and without restrictions of any kind in an independent Algeria, even if they did not choose to become Algerian citizens. The only thing asked of them was that they should cease to regard themselves as something more than ordinary citizens.

43. His Government hoped that future events would further improve the outlook for a solution of the Algerian problem. At the same time, it felt that at the present stage the United Nations could provide constructive assistance of the greatest importance. The opening of direct, official negotiations between the French Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, which had been urged on 1

November 1961 by all the African and Asian Members of the United Nations, was more urgently necessary than ever. The United Nations bore a responsibility in that regard, which had received recognition in General Assembly resolution 1573 (XV), and his delegation

hoped that the action taken at the current session would fully meet the desires expressed on the subject by the majority of the Members of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.