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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 20

The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/4900 and Add.1, A/C.1/858, A/C.1/859, A/C.1/860, A/C.1/861, A/C.1/862, A/C.1/L.300, A/C.1/L.302, A/C.1/L.303, A/C.1/L.304, A/C.1/L.305) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the list of delegations wishing to speak in the preliminary phase of the debate should be closed at the end of the meeting.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. CAMPBELL (United Kingdom) noted that there had been a change since the previous session in the attitude of the Soviet Union and its allies on the preliminary question of the invitation: those delegations had then maintained that the question should not be subject to consideration in the General Assembly. He touched briefly on the background of the Korean question, and stressed the responsibility of the Soviet Union and North Korea for events in Korea and for its continuing partition. The United Nations would have to deal with that important problem until the causes of friction between North and South were eliminated. The presence of representatives of the Government of the Republic of Korea would facilitate its task considerably. That Government intended to re-establish civilian government within a reasonable time-limit and was making successful efforts to rehabilitate the country's economy. Every successive Government of the Republic of Korea, regardless of its political complexion, had been subjected to the same attacks by the representatives of the communist countries. Perhaps they hoped in so doing to divert attention from conditions in North Korea, which they had good grounds for wishing to conceal. In any event, it was the international aspect of the policies of those two Governments which mattered. The present Government of the Republic of Korea had from its earliest days reaffirmed its support for the Charter of the United Nations, and had undertaken to intensify its efforts to reunify the country by peaceful means in accordance with the United Nations proposals for unification through peninsula-wide elections under United Nations supervision.

3. The attitude of the North Korean authorities was entirely different. Although that régime represented less than one-third of the Korean people, it claimed to speak on behalf of the Korean people as a whole, and even went so far as to demand to be heard by the Assembly. It refused to co-operate with the United Nations and continued to display an intransigent attitude towards the Organization's decisions, which it criticized constantly in the most violent language. The past conduct of the North Korean authorities gave grounds for doubting their sincerity when they proclaimed their intention of organizing free elections on democratic principles. Unless the voters were assured of protection by the presence of the United Nations—which the North Korean authorities categorically refused—there would be no guarantee that those elections would indeed be free and democratic, in the sense of being secret and allowing real choice. Although the North Korean authorities had not so far shown the slightest wish to help the United Nations to find a positive solution for the Korean problem, the United Kingdom delegation would be prepared to agree that the Committee should hear their representatives provided they changed their position and accepted the competence of the United Nations in the Korean question. The United Kingdom delegation would therefore support the amendments to that effect submitted by Greece and Thailand (A/C.1/L.306) to the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.300). Only on that condition, in the opinion of the United Kingdom, could the representatives of a Government which had openly rejected the good offices of the United Nations, and adopted an abusive and defiant attitude towards it, take a seat at the Committee table.

4. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) said that his delegation supported the amendments of Greece and Thailand, which were designed to make the Mongolian draft resolution consistent with the Committee's decisions at the last session and with the position of the United Nations on the Korean question, which had been repeatedly reaffirmed by resolutions of the Assembly.

5. Mr. BUDO (Albania) thought that the Committee should concentrate on approaching the Korean problem with an open mind and on avoiding a pointless and disastrous repetition of the errors of the past. The aim of the United Nations should be to help the Korean people to solve the problems brought about by the present partition of the country, and to establish the necessary conditions for its reunification and rehabilitation.

6. The Korean people, who were the party chiefly concerned, were also in the best position to determine the most appropriate means of achieving those aims. The views of the representatives of both Korean States should therefore be taken into account, to enable a decision to be taken in full knowledge of the facts on measures according with the interests of the Korean people as a whole.

7. Such a procedure was essential on grounds of principle, for equity forbade the United Nations to disregard the right of the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be represented at the debates on the same footing as South Korea. It was no less necessary in practice, since any decision adopted in the absence of one of the two parties concerned would be ineffective. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not be expected to apply decisions emerging from a debate from which it had been deliberately excluded despite its urgent request. An invitation should therefore be extended to representatives of both parties. Any other course would be unjustifiable. Only those who were really in favour not of the unification but of the dismemberment of Korea could oppose it.

8. The United States was using South Korea as a military base for its plans of aggression in the Far East, and the dangerous situation there had been aggravated by the fascist "coup d'état" which had taken place during the year. The question of the rehabilitation and unification of Korea was therefore not only vital to the Korean people as a whole but also important for world peace. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had always struggled since it first came into being for the peaceful unification of the country. The Committee could not do without its collaboration.

9. Accordingly, the delegation of the People's Republic of Albania would oppose the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.304), and give its unreversed support to the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.300). It regarded the amendments in document A/C.1/L.306 as unacceptable and would vote against them because they would create unjustifiable obstacles to the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Committee's work.

10. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the only possible doubt about inviting representatives of the two Korean States was whether the spokesmen of the military or fascist clique which had usurped power in South Korea could be considered to represent the Government of that country. The Czechoslovak delegation still believed that, since there were two Korean States, the Korean question could not be settled without the participation of their representatives. That view had been fully confirmed by the course of debate on the question in the United Nations. The main reason why no progress towards a satisfactory settlement of the question had yet been made was to be found in the attitude of the United States and its allies, which had prevented the Committee from making a serious study of the question with the assistance of representatives of both Korean States. In the current year the United States Government was again trying to force through the adoption, by the usual automatic majority, of a purely formal resolution which would serve its purpose of keeping the question one of routine. In order to prevent an invitation from being extended to representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States had alleged that that country would not accept the competence and authority of the United Nations in the Korean question. That far-fetched argument was contradicted by the telegram of 17 April 1961 (A/C.1/838) from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which showed that that country had always respected and supported the Charter of the United Nations. It was true that the Minister had added that

his Government would "not recognize any unjust resolution adopted in the United Nations without the participation and approval of its representative". But, as a number of representatives had rightly pointed out, such a position was a perfectly proper one for any sovereign State to hold. It was thus incorrect to say that North Korea did not recognize the competence of the United Nations because it refused to recognize resolutions which the General Assembly adopted every year without its participation. It was rather those who at every session sponsored draft resolutions which they knew beforehand were doomed to failure who should be criticized.

11. The question of reunification could only be settled through direct negotiations between the Koreans themselves without any outside interference. Whereas the military régime of South Korea was trying to perpetuate the division of the country, the Government of the People's Republic was sincerely endeavouring to create the conditions which would enable such negotiations to be started. The attempts made by the United States and its allies to prevent the delegation of North Korea from participating in the work of the Committee—contrary to the usual practice in such cases—were designed to poison the atmosphere and prevent the adoption at the current session of a positive solution that would be in the real interests of the Korean people. The arguments used by the representative of the United States to try to explain his negative attitude were in fact merely a fruitless effort to camouflage the real designs of the new Government of that country, which no more wanted a peaceful settlement of the Korean question than had its predecessor.

12. For all those reasons the Czechoslovak delegation would vote for the Mongolian draft resolution; it would vote against both the United States draft resolution and the amendments submitted by Greece and Thailand, which would attach unacceptable conditions to the invitation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

13. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that a new approach to the Korean question was essential if Korea was to be reunified with the full agreement of the inhabitants of both its parts and in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Korean people themselves. To take only one aspect of the new attitude that was needed—the others concerned the substance of the question—the representatives of both Koreas should participate in the United Nations debate, as proposed by the delegation of Mongolia. If the question was to be settled peacefully, the United Nations must not adopt a rigid attitude. Whatever the chances of success might be, an invitation to both Koreas would in no way harm the United Nations. He would have preferred the preamble to the Mongolian draft resolution to be worded positively rather than negatively. That, however, was merely a question of form, and the delegation of Afghanistan would vote for the draft resolution, which would open up new possibilities. Its adoption would encourage the North Koreans to recognize the competence of the United Nations. That recognition was already implied in their statement of willingness to participate in the deliberations of the United Nations, a mark of good will that must be appreciated.

14. His delegation recognized the importance of the amendments submitted by Greece and Thailand (A/C.1/L.306), particularly in regard to acceptance of the competence of the United Nations. However, taken as

a whole they changed the substance of the Mongolian proposal, while the third amendment spoke of United Nations "authority" and "action" in a matter which had not been closely studied, particularly in the light of the new developments in Korea. In a way the conditional nature of the amendments imposed an unconditional attitude on one of the parties, whose agreement was in fact indispensable for a peaceful solution of the question. The delegation of Afghanistan would therefore be unable to support the first and third of those amendments, and would abstain from voting on the second.

15. On the Mongolian draft resolution, his delegation would, in the light of the voting on the amendments, take a position consistent with the views he had just expressed, which would also guide its action on the United States draft resolution.

16. He stressed the need for the United Nations to act in the interests of the Korean people themselves by keeping away from the pressures of the cold war and avoiding any rigid attitude, which would only delay or compromise a peaceful settlement of the question.

17. Mr. QUINTERO (Philippines) thought that it would be useful if the North Koreans could, like the representatives of the Republic of Korea, participate in the debate. As, however, the solution was to be sought within the framework of the United Nations, the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should first unequivocally accept the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the question of Korea, as the representatives of the Republic of Korea had already done. The presence of the North Koreans would be most welcome if they really intended to co-operate with the United Nations and to facilitate the reunification and rehabilitation of Korea, but not if they wished simply to challenge the authority of the United Nations or to criticize UNCURK. If what they wanted was to submit complaints and criticisms, that purpose could be accomplished by having letters, memoranda and even newspaper articles circulated as United Nations documents. In fact, the Committee had received such material from North Korea, not only at the current session but also at previous sessions. If the desire expressed by the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the United Nations debate was sincere, they could hardly refuse to accept the very reasonable condition set by the First Committee in the resolution which it had adopted at the fifteenth session (A/C.1/837). He therefore hoped that the Committee would approve the United States draft resolution, so that the representatives of the Republic of Korea could participate in the debate and the Committee could, since so little time remained, begin its consideration of the item without further delay. If the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea really wished to take part in the Committee's debate, the Mongolian draft resolution invited them to do so. His delegation felt, however, that that invitation should be extended only on the condition that its recipient recognized in advance the competence and authority of the United Nations to act on the question of Korea. He would therefore vote for the Mongolian draft resolution if the amendments submitted by Greece and Thailand were adopted.

18. Mr. NORRISH (New Zealand) recalled that at the fifteenth session the Committee had decided to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea, and also

a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided that the latter first unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations, within the terms of the Charter, to take action on the Korean question.

19. Neither of the two draft resolutions on that subject took that decision fully into account. The United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.304), for example, did not contemplate extending a further invitation to the Government of North Korea.

20. Although his delegation did not object to the United States draft resolution, it nevertheless felt that it would be reflecting the view of a majority in the Committee if it stated that the North Korean authorities should be accorded one more opportunity to accept unequivocally the authority and competence of the United Nations in respect of the item. It was true that the Government of North Korea had stated, in its reply (A/C.1/838) to the invitation sent to it during the previous April, that it had always respected and supported the United Nations Charter. His delegation did not, however, think that that statement was sufficient and he thought that the great majority in the Committee would agree. While the Republic of Korea had recognized without reservation the authority and competence of the United Nations, North Korea was seeking the Assembly's endorsement for a particular solution of the question of Korea which would in all probability be unacceptable to a majority in the Committee and which would consist of leaving the question to the Korean people without the intervention of the United Nations. In those circumstances it was reasonable to expect North Korea at least to acknowledge the competence and authority of the United Nations in the question.

21. His delegation would therefore vote against the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.300) in its existing form, but would vote for the amendments to it submitted by Greece and Thailand (A/C.1/L.306) and, if they were adopted, would vote for the Mongolian draft resolution as amended.

22. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) recalled that since 1947 the General Assembly had been studying the question of the reunification of Korea without reaching any solution. Until now, at the instance of the United States and its principal allies, the question had always been considered and decisions taken in the absence of one of the parties directly concerned, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Yet it was obvious that the question of the reunification of a divided country could not be settled in the absence of one of the parties. Despite past failures, the United States and the other countries which were members of UNCURK persisted in their attitude. Nevertheless, all the peoples represented in the United Nations desired to do away with a hotbed of tension and conflict in the Far East. Moreover, the people of Korea, as the party most directly concerned, had made it clear that the division of the country must be ended and that conditions must be established in which the two existing Korean States could find an early solution of the question of the reunification and rehabilitation of the country. To that end the presence and active participation of the delegations of both parts of Korea should be facilitated.

23. The United States draft resolution, which would invite to the discussion only the representatives of the military régime of South Korea, showed that its sponsor was trying once again to prolong the division

of Korea and to maintain a focus of war in the Far East. Through the extravagant conditions it sought to impose on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States was trying to prevent a delegation representing the Korean people from taking part in the debate. For that purpose it had asked—and compelled—the representative of the military régime of South Korea formally to declare that he accepted all the conditions precedent which the United States wished to impose on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was obviously easy to obtain such a declaration from a military régime which, like all those which had preceded it, was kept in power only by the bayonets of the United States Army. That régime was ready to make any declarations asked of it, even if it did not carry them out. If every delegation which did not agree with a United Nations resolution because they considered it, rightly or wrongly, contrary to their countries' interests had to refrain from taking part in the debate on a particular question, a large number of delegations would have disappeared for good long ago. It was sufficient to remember that, at the time of the vote on the six-Power draft resolution concerning the cessation of nuclear tests, the representative of the United States had himself declared (1183rd meeting) that, despite its profound respect for the United Nations, his country reserved the right to exercise all rights which it deemed necessary and appropriate to protect its own security and that of the world community. The United States was thus hardly qualified to impose on the representatives of another country conditions it would not itself accept, and thus to prevent them expressing their views on the unification of their own country. In fact, it was in the interests of the United States to keep Korea divided because that enabled it to keep armed forces there under the United Nations flag and to maintain in South Korea a military base for aggression against the countries of the Far East, against North Korea, and against the People's Republic of China. That was not a secret but had been officially recognized by UNCURK. In paragraph 22 of its report (A/4900) it was stated that "the Governments concerned were prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly had been fulfilled". The United States declared that it was ready to withdraw its troops from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement of the Korean problem had been met, but opposed all efforts made, both inside and outside the United Nations, to reach such a settlement.

24. Nevertheless, despite all the manoeuvres of the United States and its allies, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had expressly declared that it was prepared to send representatives to the First Committee to take part in the debate on the Korean question, and that it was anxious that decisions should be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter with a view to creating conditions favourable to the peaceful solution of the Korean problem. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had stressed that his Government had always respected and supported the United Nations Charter, and that the United Nations "must, on the basis of the principles of its Charter, take measures for the withdrawal of the United States forces and all other foreign troops from South Korea" (A/C.1/838). Thus the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not only ready to observe the principles of the Charter and to find a solution in accordance with those principles, but itself proposed the best peaceful solution,

the withdrawal of United States troops. Such proposals were clearly not to the liking of all members of the Committee, but those who really wanted a peaceful solution were bound to be in favour of an invitation, without prior conditions, to the two parties to participate in a debate which concerned them directly—in other words, of the reversal of the policy followed up to the present.

25. The Bulgarian delegation would accordingly vote for the Mongolian draft resolution but against the United States draft resolution and against the amendments of Greece and Thailand to the Mongolian draft resolution.

26. Mr. ANUMAN RAJADHON (Thailand) stressed that an artificial division of a country into two antagonistic parts, such as had occurred in Germany, Viet-Nam, and Korea, was an ever-present threat of conflict. While there was relative tranquillity in Korea because of the presence of United Nations forces, that uneasy peace could vanish at any time because the country was still divided and because the Government of North Korea had apparently not abandoned its design of unifying Korea by force and was steadfastly refusing to accept the competence and authority of the United Nations in the matter.

27. Briefly outlining the background of the Korean question, he said that, at the outset, North Korea had prevented the organization of elections throughout Korea for the purpose of establishing a unified, democratic, free and independent Government; it had attacked the Republic of Korea in an attempt to settle by force a problem that was under the direct jurisdiction of the United Nations; and, after the armistice, it had categorically refused to accept the United Nations plan for a peaceable reunification of Korea. Ever since, it had persistently rejected the competence and authority of the United Nations in the question.

28. In the circumstances, the Government of North Korea could not be treated as being on an equal footing with the Government of the Republic of Korea, as was done in the Mongolian draft resolution. That text clearly attempted to seek recognition for a régime that had been condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor, had persistently refused to co-operate with the United Nations and had never shown any sign of repentance. That draft resolution was therefore unacceptable to his delegation. He did not deny that the participation of representatives of both parties could be helpful to the discussion of the Korean question. Before it could take place, however, the North Korean Government must accept the competence and authority of the United Nations in the matter. That was the purpose of the amendments to the Mongolian draft resolution submitted by Thailand and Greece. They were a compromise between the Mongolian draft resolution and that of the United States, and his delegation hoped that they would receive the support of the Committee.

29. Mr. SUGAIR (Saudi Arabia) wondered whether the fact that the Government of North Korea had refused to recognize the competence and authority of the United Nations, whereas that of South Korea had accepted them, was a sufficient reason to refuse a hearing to the representatives of one party to the dispute, as was implicitly proposed in the United States draft resolution. His delegation believed that it would be wiser and fairer to extend an invitation to the representatives of all of Korea without distinction, regardless of their political and military involvement with one Power or another.

30. Such an invitation would not be the first of its kind. At the current session the Special Political Committee had extended an invitation to a delegation of Oman when the question of Oman had been discussed^{1/} and to a delegation representing the Arabs of Palestine when the question of the Palestine refugees had been under discussion.^{2/} It would be unfair not to grant the same opportunity to the people of North Korea. His delegation would, therefore, be unable to support the United States draft resolution in its present form and would abstain from voting upon it. On the other hand, the Mongolian draft resolution, being based on the idea of sending an invitation to both parties to the dispute, represented a more constructive approach and his delegation would vote in favour of it.

31. Mr. KULESHOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) stressed that the question of the reunification of Korea was a purely domestic matter within the purview of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, it was paradoxical to attempt to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the discussion of the question, which was vital to the whole Korean people, while it was proposed to invite the spokesmen of a military dictatorship protected by United States occupation forces. The best way of reuniting Korea peacefully was to hold free elections with no external interference. But the systematic opposition of the United States to inviting a Government which was sparing no effort to achieve a peaceful reunification of Korea stemmed from a desire to maintain tension in the Korean peninsula and the adjacent areas. That discrimination by the United States was depriving the Korean people of its legitimate right to settle its own affairs as it thought fit. If the United Nations really wished to help the Korean people and to serve the cause of peace, it must take account of the realities of the situation and invite the representatives of both North Korea and South Korea to take part in its work on an equal footing. Hence, the Byelorussian delegation opposed the United States draft resolution but would support the Mongolian draft resolution.

32. Mr. BERARD (France) emphasized that the United Nations had intervened in Korea because of an act of aggression committed by North Korea and that the General Assembly had established a United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea for the purpose of setting up, through free elections, a National Assembly and a unified Korean Government. Thus, North Korea, which was asking to be heard by the Committee, was not justified in refusing to give a prior undertaking to accept unequivocally the competence and authority of the United Nations; there was nothing discreditable about such an undertaking and it had been given without difficulty by the Republic of Korea. It would also be in poor taste for North Korea to criticize the events which had recently occurred in South Korea while it was itself closing its frontiers to all observers.

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Special Political Committee, 299th meeting.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, 306th meeting.

33. In the circumstances, to give a hearing to the representatives of North Korea, as proposed in the Mongolian draft resolution, would be a real injustice. While purporting to provide equitable treatment, it would be granting a reward to a former aggressor.

34. Furthermore, to judge by the draft resolutions submitted on the substance of the question by Mongolia (A/C.1/L.302)—asking for the withdrawal of the armed forces in South Korea—and by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.303)—proposing that UNCURK should be dissolved—the USSR and its associates apparently still denied the competence and authority of the United Nations in the Korean question. It did not seem likely that a régime which was so clearly opposed to the United Nations could make any contribution to the settlement of the Korean problem under the auspices of the United Nations.

35. His delegation would, therefore, support the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.304), which took account of the positions adopted by the Republic of Korea and by North Korea. On the other hand, it would vote against the Mongolian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.300) if it was put to the vote in its present form, but would vote in favour of the amendments submitted by Greece and Thailand (A/C.1/L.306) which had the merit of reverting to the reasonable and conciliatory position adopted by the Committee in April 1961.

36. Mr. AKIMAN (Turkey) said that in principle every Member of the United Nations was assumed to recognize the authority of the United Nations by virtue of the terms of the Charter, and that when non-members took part in its debates, they were also assumed to accept that authority unless there was evidence to the contrary.

37. The representatives of the Republic of Korea had, therefore, been allowed to take part in previous debates, because the Government of that country had always accepted the authority of the United Nations and had consistently co-operated with UNCURK. But North Korea had refused to accept the authority of the Organization ever since 1947; it had denied official representatives of the United Nations access to its territory and had even openly fought against the authority of the United Nations. It was therefore natural that the United Nations, before hearing the representatives of North Korea, should first seek to clarify North Korea's attitude with regard to the Organization. The adoption of the Mongolian draft resolution would mean waiving for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the conditions which had been imposed on the Republic of Korea during the fifteenth session. His delegation would not, therefore, be able to support it. It would vote for the amendments proposed by Greece and Thailand, which would have the effect of redressing that inequality; if they were adopted, Turkey would vote for the Mongolian draft resolution thus amended.

The meeting rose at 11 p.m.