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**Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

AGENDA ITEM 19

**Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2) (continued)**

1. Mr. POPPER (United States of America) noted that many delegations had spoken favourably of the disarmament programme submitted to the General Assembly by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy (A/4891). That programme was intended not as a detailed plan but only as a realistic basis for the negotiation of a disarmament agreement or agreements. It was presumptuous for one country to submit a complete plan for disarmament, because it could not claim to think for all other countries or to bind them to one set of views; and a disarmament plan with specific obligations, arrangements and provisions for verification and control remained to be worked out in future negotiations.

2. The United States programme was a balanced one designed to protect every nation's security. It provided for a step-by-step approach to an extremely complex task, one which could not be completed overnight, because no agreement could be reached until all parties had confidence that its provisions would be honoured, and such confidence could come only if they could be certain that there were no secret stores of weapons in existence or preparations being made for surprise attack. Yet the programme was very flexible, recognizing that some steps could be taken more easily than others, and providing that those steps should be taken as soon as they could be agreed upon.

3. It was true that the United States programme did not provide in the first stage for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction or of the means for their delivery. The programme was balanced, phased and safeguarded throughout, and the reason why it did not provide for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the first stage was that there was not yet any technical method of detecting the secret storage or manufacture of chemical biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. The programme provided for the establishment of committees of experts to examine and report on the feasibility of verifying the reduction and eventual elimination of those weapons and the means for doing so. The Soviet Union was aware that it was not at present feasible to eliminate those weapons in a way that would ensure the security of all countries. The second stage of the programme pro-

vided that nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons should be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which could be agreed upon as a result of the experts' findings, while the third stage provided that no nuclear weapons would remain in the national arsenals of States and that States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments and establishments needed for maintaining internal order. At that stage, the United Nations peace force would be fully functioning.

4. However, the first stages of the programme provided for stopping the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons and for transferring agreed quantities of such materials already produced to non-weapons purposes. In the first stage, moreover, restrictions on the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not possessing them were provided for.

5. It had been asserted that the programme did not provide for the elimination of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction; however, it was provided, in section D of stage I, that strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles should be reduced and that the production and testing of such vehicles should be limited or discontinued. Stage II provided for further reduction of delivery vehicles, which would be eliminated by stage III. Those provisions were realistically designed so that no State or group of States could obtain a military advantage at any stage.

6. The Soviet representative had stated at the 1195th meeting that the first stage of the United States programme provided for specific measures in regard to strategic means for the delivery of nuclear weapons to target, but said nothing about military bases on foreign territories; and he had drawn the conclusion that the United States programme was conceived so as to destroy a presumed Soviet advantage in regard to long-range military rockets without impairing the system of United States bases maintained on foreign territories by consent of those concerned. Members could draw their own conclusions regarding the Soviet claim to superiority in the field of military rocketry. However, that statement was inconsistent with another Soviet statement, in which the United States programme had been criticized for not adequately moving towards the elimination of the means for delivering weapons of mass destruction. Surely there could be no objection to including measures dealing with delivery vehicles in the programme. In any event, the first stage of the United States programme was not designed to weaken the Soviet Union with regard to long-range rockets, but to avoid giving an advantage to any State; and one reason why it did not provide for the elimination of all means of delivery in the first stage was so that all parties might be sure that such means of delivery were being reduced equally by the other parties. Nor

was it true that the first stage contained no provision with regard to bases on foreign territories. Section B of stage I, which provided for reductions of armed forces and armaments, would affect the operation of bases both at home and abroad; and by the end of stage II agreed military bases and facilities everywhere would be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

7. He categorically denied allegations that the United States was seeking to carry out certain measures proposed in stage I outside the context of a programme for general and complete disarmament, in order to achieve not disarmament but the establishment of control over armaments. The United States believed that progress in disarmament would be furthered if certain measures were implemented as soon as they were agreed, but it had no intention of stopping on the road towards general and complete disarmament, and the principle that disarmament should take place as rapidly as possible until it was completed was affirmed in its programme. The programme also provided for immediate measures, measures which could contribute to the common security of nations, could be implemented as soon as they were agreed upon, and could facilitate and form a part of the over-all disarmament programme. That idea was embodied in the eighth principle of the joint statement of agreed principles (A/4879).

8. Certain delegations, in order to misrepresent the United States position on controls, had asserted that the United States was seeking to obtain a minimum of disarmament with a maximum of control. All the United States wanted was that all parties should have adequate assurance that all obligations undertaken by other parties to a disarmament agreement were fulfilled. Unless each party had confidence that its security was not in jeopardy as a result of possible violations by others, suspicions would arise and the whole process of disarmament might be upset or delayed. The implementation of all obligations undertaken must be subject to verification. Yet it was now alleged that such verification would represent control over armaments and would legalize espionage. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union had stated in the General Assembly (1016th plenary meeting) that no one now knew what armaments and armed forces States possessed. That was particularly true of countries which withheld such information even from their peoples. No State would be able to be sure that the agreed levels had been reached after the elimination of certain numbers of armed forces or armaments unless it knew the original level of armaments and unless a method of verifying the level reached were developed. Moreover, methods of ensuring that the agreed levels were maintained and not exceeded by unauthorized, clandestine operations must be developed by joint effort. That was a matter of simple prudence, not of espionage. The nature and extent of controls must depend strictly on the objective requirements for the verification of each disarmament measure, but no consideration other than that of ensuring the full and timely implementation of each measure should enter into the requirements for verification; the security of States should not be adversely affected by controls.

9. A detailed disarmament plan could be worked out only in a smaller body, and his delegation hoped that agreement would soon be reached on the composition of such a body.

10. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the Committee's discussion revealed that there was general agreement among all States that negotiations to prepare a treaty on general and complete disarmament must be resumed as soon as possible. That view had been expressed not only by the socialist countries, but also by States members of Western military blocs and by non-aligned countries. It was shared by the Soviet Union, as the Soviet representative had made clear in his statement on 15 November 1961 (1195th meeting). Almost all delegations agreed with the Soviet Union that the armaments problem could be solved only by general and complete disarmament. That solution had been advocated by the Soviet Union at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. At the fifteenth session and at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Western Powers had tried to discredit it and divert attention to partial measures restricted to arms control. At the current session, however, many delegations had stressed that general and complete disarmament was the only solution, and even the Western Powers had not denied it. Similarly, all delegations who had spoken had welcomed the joint statement of agreed principles issued by the Soviet Union and the United States. As early as 15 November 1961, the Soviet delegation had proposed that the General Assembly should approve those principles as a basis for agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. As the Bulgarian representative had pointed out (1204th meeting), the socialist States had proposed similar principles in the Ten-Nation Committee on 8 April 1960. But for the obstinacy of the Western Powers, such principles could have been agreed on eighteen months previously; nevertheless, they still provided a good basis for the forthcoming negotiations.

11. His delegation understood the concern of countries which felt that there was little chance of reaching agreement when confidence was lacking. Appeals for mutual trust in international relations had been made, not only by neutral countries, but also by allies of the United States and the other Western Powers, such as Iceland, Venezuela and Italy. The concern of those delegations was quite justified, but the situation to which they referred was the fault of the Western Powers, and particularly of their policy on the question of a Germany peace treaty. When one side put forward peaceful proposals on the German question and the other side responded by launching a furious arms race, success in disarmament negotiations could hardly be expected. The Soviet Union, for its part, was doing everything in its power to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and reduce tension. Everyone knew that, in pursuance of the decisions of the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government had taken a number of important steps to achieve those ends and to promote peaceful co-existence between States with different social systems. It had taken appropriate measures with respect to the Germany question and it had agreed to the resumption of negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, putting forward constructive proposals. The Soviet Government's statement of 27 November 1961 (A/4990), which contained its new proposals on the nuclear tests problem, emphasized that the solution of that problem would be a real advance towards general and complete disarmament. If those proposals were accepted by the Western Powers, the problem would, in fact, be solved.

An important contribution to the creation of the atmosphere of trust necessary for general and complete disarmament had been the General Assembly's adoption of resolutions declaring Africa a nuclear-free continent (resolution 1652 (XVI)) and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons (resolution 1653 (XVI)). The Soviet Union and other socialist States had supported both resolutions; thus, it could be seen that those countries had not limited themselves to appealing for an improvement in international relations, but had taken practical steps to achieve it.

12. The Committee had given much attention to the question of disarmament control. That was a question of great importance, and the Soviet delegation did not intend to create obstacles to its solution. The Soviet Union had put forward its own proposals on the matter, but it had also indicated its willingness to accept any proposals by the Western Powers on control if they would accept the Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, it would never accept the establishment of control not over disarmament but over existing armaments, which would be no more than legalized espionage designed to reveal the secrets of the Soviet defence system. Many representatives had taken a realistic attitude to the problem; in particular, the Swedish delegation had rightly said that it could not be solved by the application of a single formula and that it was impossible to create a completely watertight control system. A considerable number of speakers, including the representative of Cyprus, had recognized that the Soviet proposals did in fact offer good prospects for a solution of the problem of controls such that no country would be able to escape its obligations as regards disarmament or to use the control system for spying. Even Pakistan, an ally of the United States, had conceded at the 1205th meeting that a would-be aggressor might gain some advantage by inspection of that which was retained by the other side.

13. The Soviet proposals were outlined in the document "Basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament" (A/C.1/856). Under the Soviet plan, one of the most important steps in the first stage would be the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. There would first of all be control over the destruction of existing means of delivery of such weapons. But that would not be sufficient. It would then be necessary to make sure that no installations were maintained for the purpose of concealing or actually using means of delivery which might be clandestinely retained by any State. Finally, the control organization would have to ensure that the production of such means of delivery was not resumed; it would therefore have the right to inspect all establishments concerned in their production. Indeed, the plan suggested that at some plants permanent control groups might be set up. Those control measures would be fully adequate, and the Soviet Government was ready to accept them. The Soviet plan also provided that in the first stage all military bases on foreign territory should be liquidated. That process, again, would be subject to effective international control. Those proposals showed the absurdity of the allegations that the Soviet Union would agree to control only after general and complete disarmament had been achieved. The Soviet Union was definitely in favour of a realistic and constructive solution to the question, but any such solution must be reached within the context of general and complete disarmament.

14. The Soviet Government shared the views of the many delegations who had spoken in favour of a world conference on disarmament. It also agreed with the view that the execution of a disarmament programme must be subject to strict time limits. Without such time limits, any State would be able to sabotage the programme by dragging it out for years. The Soviet Government was ready to accept the period of four years which had been suggested, or a shorter period, if the Western Powers would agree; the important thing, however, was the principle of setting time limits.

15. All speakers in the debate had rightly said that negotiations on general and complete disarmament could not begin until a suitable negotiating body was established. It would be difficult to reach agreement on all the details of a disarmament programme in a body so large as the General Assembly or its First Committee; some kind of working body was thus necessary. It had been recognized by the majority of speakers that any such body must include representatives of the non-aligned countries on an equal footing with those of the socialist States and of the Western States. Some had preferred to speak in terms of geographical areas rather than blocs. That approach was acceptable on the understanding that it meant no more than that the neutral countries should not be taken from only one geographical area. But the Soviet Union could not agree to the admission of any more States who were members of Western military blocs, whatever the regions to which they belonged. Preliminary negotiations on the question of exactly which States should participate were at present in progress between the Soviet Union and the United States; their results would be made known to the Committee.

16. His delegation wished to express its gratitude to all delegations which had made a contribution to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. But it must be realized that disarmament negotiations would be successful only if all those concerned sincerely worked to that end and did not use them as a screen for an arms race, as the Western Powers had done at the conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. He noted that the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States had spoken in favour of the resumption of negotiations and had stressed the need to create an atmosphere of confidence and reduce international tension. Yet at the same time they had adopted positions which could only make negotiations more difficult. Thus, the United States statement at the 1195th meeting and the United Kingdom statement at the 1197th meeting showed that the countries in question were still proposing the establishment of control over armaments, which the Soviet Union would never accept. Similarly, they had voted against the draft resolution prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3), which seemed to indicate that they were in favour of their use. In the General Assembly (1063rd plenary meeting), the United States delegation had even voted against the last preambular paragraph of that resolution, which said that the use of weapons of mass destruction was a direct negation of the objectives for which the United Nations had been established; and the Western Powers had gone so far as to abstain in the vote on the first preambular paragraph, which merely stated that the United Nations had a responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security and to consider the principles governing disarmament. Did they really

doubt such simple truths? It was clear that the Soviet Union had grounds for concern about the outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. It would, however, spare no effort to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament, which it, like all socialist States, regarded not as a propaganda slogan, but as the most important means of ensuring universal peace.

17. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) expressed regret that the representative of the Soviet Union should have seen fit to engage in polemics at a time when the prospects for resuming negotiations on disarmament were better than they had been for some time past. The United Kingdom, as the record would show, was as anxious as the USSR to reach early agreement on a workable disarmament programme.

18. The USSR representative's remarks showed that there was still considerable disagreement on the subject of controls. He continued to insist that verification and inspection should not apply to remaining armaments. But surely a disarmament plan could have no meaning unless all parties had assurance at all times that weapons destroyed were not being replaced by others. That view was apparently widely shared in the Committee. However, it would be difficult to bridge the gap by continuing to argue the point in the abstract; what was now needed was to get down to the process of detailed examination of the verification and inspection arrangements which would be required for the various specific disarmament measures; and the right place for that detailed examination was the disarmament negotiating body. He trusted that agreement would soon be reached by the United States and the Soviet Union on the composition of that body, and he appealed to the Committee—and in particular to the USSR delegation—to refrain from polemics and to address itself to the task before it in a spirit of good will and determination to achieve results.

19. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that, although the Committee had now reached the end of the list of speakers in the general debate on agenda item 19, it should not take final action on the item until it had received the report on the negotiations at present in progress between the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the composition of a disarmament negotiating body. By leaving the general debate and the item open, it would be able to revert to the whole question of disarmament at a later stage in the current session. Accordingly he moved, under rule 117, that the debate on the item under discussion should be temporarily adjourned and that the Committee should proceed to consider draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2.

20. After a procedural discussion in which Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia), Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) and Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) took part, the CHAIRMAN, noting that there was no disagreement on the substance of the Canadian motion, said that in the absence of any objection there would be a ten-minute recess to enable the Committee to reach agreement on the terms in which it should be endorsed.

*The meeting was suspended at 4.55 p.m. and resumed at 5.5 p.m.*

21. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should decide to retain agenda item 19 on its agenda pending receipt of the report referred to in General Assembly resolution 1660 (XVI) of 28 November 1961 on the composition of a disarmament negotiating body, and that it should proceed to consider and vote on the

eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2). The Committee could resume consideration of item 19 as soon as the report was received.

22. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that the Chairman's suggestion was entirely in harmony with his original motion, which he therefore withdrew.

*In the absence of objection, the procedure suggested by the Chairman was approved.*

23. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2).

24. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the intention of the sponsors of the draft resolution—to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—would be viewed with general sympathy. However, he noted that the reference in the first preambular paragraph to the cessation of nuclear tests was not accompanied by any mention of its logical corollary, international control. A large number of Member States felt that international control was essential to guarantee the effectiveness of a test ban, and had endorsed that opinion in resolutions previously adopted on the items of the agenda dealing with nuclear tests. Ideally, such control should be provided for in a comprehensive and detailed treaty; but there was no reason why it should not be based on an instrument of a less formal character. In any event, it was generally agreed that control was necessary if the test ban was to be made a reality. For all those reasons, he proposed that the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution should be amended by inserting, after the words "all measures", the phrase "including, primarily, measures of effective international control". If the sponsors accepted his amendment, he would vote in favour of the draft resolution, on the understanding that it merely called for an inquiry designed to ascertain the position of various States with respect to the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Such an inquiry might pave the way for the eventual accession of States to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If his amendment was not accepted, he would be compelled to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. It might be advisable, incidentally, for the sponsors to ensure that there was no incompatibility between their draft resolution and the one submitted by Ireland under agenda item 81 (A/C.1/L.298).

25. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia), speaking as a sponsor of the eight-Power draft resolution, said that its purpose was to make clear the responsibilities of the non-nuclear Powers in preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. It would not commit any nation for the time being. He hoped that delegations which had been unable to vote for the draft resolution on the banning of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3) would find it possible to support the eight-Power draft.

26. His preliminary comment on the oral amendment introduced by Peru was that, although he had no objection to effective international control over a test ban and, indeed, had voted in favour of previous resolutions calling for such control, he saw no reason why the controversy on that subject should be injected into a resolution designed to prevent countries which did not possess nuclear weapons from acquiring them.

27. Mr. ENGEN (Norway) said that his delegation had doubts concerning the practical value of the draft resolution, on the ground that it attempted to achieve too much at a time when actual disarmament was still

a distant prospect. The real solution of the problems raised in the draft resolution could be found only in the context of world-wide controlled disarmament. As long as the present military-political situation existed, and in the light of the rapid technological development of armaments, many Governments would be unable to reconcile their need for security with the assumption of binding undertakings for the future in regard to a particular class of weapons.

28. Norway would have to reserve its position with respect to those parts of the draft resolution which might be interpreted as prejudicing the position of Governments by seeming to anticipate the replies they would give to the proposed inquiry. In its reply, Norway would formulate conditions which went substantially further than those suggested by the Swedish representative (1178th meeting). Moreover, the Norwegian delegation understood that the draft resolution was not to be interpreted as deviating from the principle of maintaining the existing balance and not giving any advantage to a State or group of States at any point in the process of disarmament. On that understanding, and subject to the reservations which it would specify in its reply to the inquiry, Norway would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

29. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy) said that Italy had constantly maintained that measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons should be included in the first stage of any plan for disarmament; and indeed, the United States programme (A/4891), in the drafting of which Italy had taken part, provided in its first stage for measures to contain and reduce the nuclear threat. All questions relating to disarmament should be studied, negotiated and solved in the same context; it was unlikely that nuclear weapons could ever be eliminated unless the major nuclear Powers agreed on a disarmament programme. His delegation would therefore vote for the Irish draft resolution submitted under agenda item 81 (A/C.1/L.298), the precise wording of which seemed more appropriate than that of the eight-Power draft resolution.

30. Italy did not object to the procedural aspect of the draft resolution, and was prepared to reply to the proposed inquiry by the Secretary-General. It was clear that the sponsors of the draft resolution did not wish to alter the present strategic balance; but an isolated solution, as envisaged in the draft resolution, would inevitably give an advantage to one side and would dangerously disturb the balance of power. Although Italy wished to free the non-nuclear Powers from the dangers of nuclear competition, it felt that no agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons could save a country from attack, and that any such agreement must be guaranteed and controlled and must not increase the danger of surprise attack. The non-nuclear Powers should bring specific problems to the attention of the negotiating body, which would deal with them according to the principles accepted by the United States, the Soviet Union and the First Committee. Since it was not advisable to separate the various elements of disarmament, the

Italian delegation could not support the eight-Power draft resolution.

31. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) supported the eight-Power draft resolution. More and more countries were now acquiring the technical and economic resources to manufacture nuclear weapons, and some might be tempted to do so as a matter of prestige. It would be still more difficult to achieve a nuclear ban when the possession of nuclear weapons was no longer limited to three or four countries, and the further dissemination of such weapons would complicate the problem of nuclear disarmament and add to the risk of accidents, since their use in local disputes might lead to a general holocaust.

32. In the view of his delegation, the draft resolution was complementary to General Assembly resolution 1576 (XV). Although it was true that there was no way of verifying compliance, because nuclear weapons or technical information could be passed surreptitiously from one country to another, the inquiry called for in the eight-Power draft resolution could be followed by a treaty or agreement providing for inspection or control. It would be a useful first step towards the complete outlawing of nuclear weapons, and eventually of war. His country had repeatedly stated that it would not use nuclear power except for peaceful purposes, and it would like all countries to do the same.

33. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) supported the eight-Power draft resolution. The representative of Peru had objected to the absence in the first preambular paragraph of any reference to international control. Although his delegation had no objection to the present wording, it felt that the draft resolution was not directly concerned with tests, and he accordingly suggested that the first preambular paragraph might be amended to read:

"Convinced that all measures should be taken that could prevent the spread of nuclear weapons".

34. The reference to tests in the third preambular paragraph could not be considered controversial.

35. His delegation was not happy about the words "in the future" in the fourth preambular paragraph, but it would not press the matter.

36. Mr. LEGENDRE (France) said that the draft resolutions designed to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, like the recent resolution on a moratorium on nuclear tests, on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and on the de-nuclearization of Africa, took little account of the present world situation. Such undertakings and declarations would not promote disarmament, avert national disputes or lessen world tension. They could only divert attention from the consideration of measures of general disarmament under effective international control and lead to new failures. His delegation would therefore be unable to vote for the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1-2).

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.