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**Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

AGENDA ITEM 19

**Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297)  
(continued)**

1. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) said that the peoples of the world judged the great Powers by their deeds, not their words. Their confidence in the sincerity of those Powers had been shaken by the recent series of nuclear tests and by the arms race now in progress. While admitting that war was no longer a practical means of settling disputes, the great Powers persisted in pursuing an illusory military and political supremacy, claiming that their purpose was to safeguard national and international security. That situation and the policies which had caused it had evoked general concern, which had been clearly reflected in the United Nations. The various draft resolutions adopted by the Committee at the current session showed the true feelings of Member States and of the world at large. It was to be hoped that their adoption would lead the Powers most concerned to realize that the security of all countries depended on the immediate cessation of the arms race and the rapid implementation of general and complete disarmament. It was generally recognized that a nuclear war would mean the end of life on the earth, so that the old conceptions of national interest and self-defence were not only no longer valid but positively dangerous. National security and world peace were now identical. It was sometimes said that the present international situation was not conducive to progress in disarmament; but it was precisely because the situation was so acute that a solution must be found. The armaments race was both the cause and the effect of international tension, and any progress towards disarmament would help to improve international relations.

2. The view that general and complete disarmament was the only answer to the present international situation had recently won support in various quarters; it sufficed in that connexion to recall the Soviet plan put forward at the fifteenth session by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev (A/4505), General Assembly resolution 1378 (XV), the statement issued by the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries in March 1961 (A/4868 and Corr.1), the appeal for the renewal of the moratorium on nuclear tests issued by the five Scandinavian countries on 7 September 1961 and

the decisions taken at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961. To stress the importance of general and complete disarmament, however, was not to deny the possibility of taking partial measures in that field. Such measures could not be considered as alternatives to general and complete disarmament, but they would create more propitious circumstances for progress towards that goal and would in themselves be a step towards it. The General Assembly, by adopting the resolutions on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (resolution 1653 (XVI)), the denuclearization of Africa (resolution 1652 (XVI)) and the cessation of nuclear tests (resolution 1648 (XVI)), had already shown that it believed intermediate steps to be both possible and necessary. Furthermore, the adoption by the United States and the USSR of the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879) indicated that some obstacles to disarmament had already been removed. The practical importance of the agreed principles would depend on how they were followed up. As they stood, they offered an adequate basis for disarmament negotiations; but whether they would lead to real progress would depend on the attitude taken by Member States, and particularly by the two leading Powers. His delegation, for its part, fully supported the agreed principles and considered that the Assembly should give them its approval by embodying them in a resolution.

3. His delegation did not feel that the Committee ought for the moment to consider the various substantive proposals on disarmament in detail, but he could not help expressing surprise at the statements made in the Committee by the two major Powers on the subject of control. They had seemed to imply that there was no solution to the problem. But there was no doubt that the problem could be solved within the general framework of disarmament and of improved relations between States. Admittedly, disarmament would entail certain risks, but as the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, had said in the General Assembly (1013th plenary meeting), they were insignificant in comparison with the risks of an unlimited arms race.

4. The immediate practical problem was to find some procedure by which disarmament negotiations could be begun and to set up the appropriate forum for those negotiations. Previous efforts in that direction had not been very successful. His delegation supported the views put forward in the Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at Belgrade, namely, that the non-aligned countries should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament, that all discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations, and that an effective system of inspection and control should be estab-

lished with the participation of nationals of non-aligned countries. The non-aligned countries' insistence that they should take part in any disarmament negotiations was justified by the fact that the current war preparations directly threatened the lives, health and economic well-being of all peoples. Although militarily of small importance, the non-aligned countries were in a position to play a constructive role, because they did not belong to any bloc and supported the principles of peaceful coexistence. As the United States representative had said, there was no neutral bloc: the uncommitted countries considered that to form a third bloc would merely increase the threat to peace already resulting from the conflict of the two existing blocs. Thanks to that policy, they were able to view the world's problems with objectivity. Furthermore, there could be no question of the majority's imposing its will as regards disarmament on the great Powers. Thus there was no reason to fear, and every reason to support, the participation of non-aligned countries in disarmament negotiations.

5. If such negotiations were to be successful, they must begin without delay and take place under the most favourable conditions possible. The idea of a world disarmament conference, which had been recommended by the Belgrade Conference, deserved close attention. A world conference would represent a change of forum, which would in itself be an advantage. More important than that, however, it would enable all countries to participate, and would allow committees, working parties and so on to be set up to examine the many different aspects of the problem. That would provide an answer to the question whether the various aspects should be taken separately or together. Proposals had already been made in the Committee for conferences on such aspects of disarmament as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a "non-nuclear club" which suggested that the proposal for a general conference was a useful one. His delegation would be prepared to consider any other proposal, such as that submitted by the Soviet Union (1195th meeting). But it could not accept that the current session should come to an end without any assurance that effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament would be begun forthwith.

6. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom, long a determined advocate of disarmament, supported President Kennedy's recent call to the Soviet Union to engage in a peace race, and the Indian Prime Minister's appeal to the General Assembly to tackle speedily the questions of war and peace and of disarmament. He had been glad to hear the representative of Yugoslavia declare that the right moment to achieve disarmament was now: the United Kingdom delegation believed that the chances of progress towards the resumption of effective disarmament negotiations were now better than at any time since the break-down of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. It had therefore hoped that the Soviet Union would make a positive new approach in the present debate. Yet the representative of the Soviet Union, in his statement at the 1195th meeting, had made a bitter attack on the West, and had given a most distorted picture of the Berlin situation, almost suggesting that it was the West which had raised tension in the area in question, denied freedom to the people of Berlin and built a wall to prevent West Berliners from fleeing to the East. He had also attacked NATO,

a purely defensive alliance which had come into being when the nations of Western Europe had seen their Eastern neighbours being engulfed by the military power of the Soviet Union.

7. However difficult progress towards disarmament had been in the past, nations must not relax their efforts to achieve real disarmament. The joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations approved by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879) was a useful first step, to which he hoped the Committee would give its unanimous approval. In many important respects that statement resembled the principles for disarmament agreed upon earlier in the year by the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth (A/4868 and Corr.1); it was encouraging to see such a wide measure of agreement on the principles which must underlie any lasting agreement on disarmament.

8. The United Kingdom fully supported President Kennedy's plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (A/4891), the purpose of which was the destruction of all the means of making war. The meaning of the words "general and complete disarmament" was clear. However, as the United States representative had shown, disarmament was not the only essential condition for a peaceful world and could not dissipate all strife between nations. Some means must be found of settling disputes which was not subject to the veto of any Power or group of Powers, and plans must be made for the progressive strengthening of international institutions and for the creation of a United Nations peace force able effectively to protect States from threats to or breaches of the peace.

9. He had been glad to hear the representative of the Soviet Union welcome the United States proposal relating to the provision of time-limits, both for individual stages and for the implementation of the whole programme of disarmament. The United States plan would require Governments to commit themselves not only to the idea of general and complete disarmament, but also to the general lines of achieving it. There would be a treaty covering the whole process, and pauses in the process should be only long enough for Governments to check on the work already done and to ensure that machinery for the next stage was in order. Disarmament would thus be a continuous process.

10. One of the tasks of the international disarmament organization provided for in the United States plan, in which all parties would have a voice, would be to look ahead from each stage to the next, in order to ensure that when one stage in the process had been completed, there was no interruption while preparations for the next were being worked out.

11. The problem of control had two aspects. It was agreed that reductions in armed forces and the destruction of weapons should be verified by an international team. But there must also be some check on the remaining forces and weapons and some assurance that the reductions made were permanent. Yet the representative of the Soviet Union had said that control over weapons or forces remaining in the possession of States at any given stage would give unilateral advantages to aggressive States. Since neither side would take the other's word as to the levels existing before and after reduction, the United Kingdom strongly supported the principle contained in the United States plan that verification arrange-

ments should be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions took place but also that retained armed forces and armaments did not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

12. The United Kingdom and the United States were not proposing any inequality in the control system; they were proposing that all parties should be subject to the same control, and they were ready to accept any measures of international supervision which might be necessary. Controls would give no advantage to a would-be aggressor, but would prevent aggression, since only the lack of adequate verification machinery could enable the would-be aggressor to build up his striking power with impunity.

13. Mr. Khrushchev had told the General Assembly (900th plenary meeting) that the Soviet Union would be ready to accept any proposals of the Western Powers on controls if the latter would accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament. The United Kingdom accepted the goal of general and complete disarmament, but it could not accept Mr. Khrushchev's plan out of hand, since it appeared to place the West at a serious military disadvantage at certain stages. The Western Powers had pressed for an explanation of the Soviet plan at the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but the Soviet Union and its allies had broken up the Conference at the very moment when they had known that the United States was on the point of making new proposals. It was completely untrue, therefore, that the Western Powers had sabotaged the solution of the disarmament problem, as the representative of the Soviet Union had alleged. However, the Western Powers hoped that disarmament negotiations would soon be resumed, quietly and in an atmosphere free from publicity and propaganda.

14. The representative of the Soviet Union had also condemned what he termed the resistance of the NATO countries to a draft resolution calling for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. However, it had been sheer hypocrisy for the Soviet delegation to vote for that draft resolution, when Mr. Khrushchev had said that the losing side in a war would certainly use nuclear weapons, and the Soviet representative had said equally clearly in the Committee that the Soviet Union would act in that way. The United Kingdom had voted against the draft resolution in question because it agreed with Mr. Khrushchev himself that world peace could not be ensured by undertakings to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons, but only by disarmament.

15. The United Kingdom delegation had no fixed ideas about the composition of the body in which disarmament negotiations would be held. It was not opposed to some participation by the non-aligned countries, but it was anxious, for practical reasons, that the negotiating body should not be too large. As the Committee knew, the Soviet delegation had handed the United States delegation a draft resolution including provisions for the constitution of a disarmament committee, and the United States delegation had responded by making proposals for a draft resolution to the Soviet delegation. He hoped that the Soviet delegation's response to those proposals would show an earnest desire to solve that question quickly and to enter into genuine negotiations.

16. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said that since the adoption in 1959 of General Assembly resolution 1378

(XIV), which described general and complete disarmament as the most important question facing the world today, virtually no progress had been made towards a solution of the problem. Yet a solution was more urgently needed than ever. The Western Powers had responded to the socialist countries' proposal for the conclusion of a German peace treaty by pursuing a more and more aggressive policy and constantly increasing their arms production. During the previous year, the members of NATO had spent more than \$62,000 million on armaments, and the United States alone planned to spend more than \$55,500 million during the 1961-1962 financial year. Preparations had been under way for some time to supply other NATO States, particularly West Germany, with nuclear weapons, and West German leaders were demanding that the United States should relinquish the right to decide on the use of any nuclear weapons which were given to West Germany. The threat to world peace inherent in that situation was obvious, for West German leaders made no attempt to conceal their revanchist aims.

17. The urgency of the problem of general and complete disarmament had been emphasized in the Declaration of the Belgrade Conference, and again by most of the participants in the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly. It was therefore regrettable that the First Committee was taking up the item on disarmament somewhat belatedly, even though the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations drawn up by the Soviet Union and the United States (A/4879) had been before it since the beginning of the session. It was gratifying to note that the joint statement contained a number of points on which the socialist States had insisted in the past. The agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States marked some progress, for previously the United States and its allies had refused to undertake serious negotiations of any kind on general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the fact that owing to the position taken by the United States Government no agreed and clearly defined principles had been formulated on certain points might enable the opponents of disarmament to complicate the course of future negotiations. The experience of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had shown that the Western Powers had interpreted certain provisions of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) in such a way as to evade negotiations on general and complete disarmament. It was evident from the position taken by the United States Government on certain basic questions, as indicated in the documents it had submitted, particularly document A/4880, that that situation might arise again.

18. Statements by leading figures in the United States, as well as document A/4880 and the "Declaration on disarmament" presented to the General Assembly by President Kennedy (A/4891), showed that although the United States spoke of general and complete disarmament, its real aim continued to be control over armaments, in other words, legalized espionage. The socialist countries had always espoused the principle that every agreed measure of disarmament must be carried out under effective international control, but they could not agree to the conclusion of a treaty which would permit the gathering of information on existing armed forces and armaments and on the location of strategic objectives. That position was in keeping with paragraph 6 of the principles agreed on by the United States and the

Soviet Union (A/4879), under which the nature and extent of control would be dependent at each stage on the nature and extent of the disarmament measures being carried out. On the other hand, the United States had contended in a letter dated 20 September 1961 (A/4880, III), and its representative had reiterated at the 1195th meeting of the Committee, that, from the very beginning of the disarmament process, verification should ensure not only that agreed reductions took place but also that retained armed forces and armaments did not exceed agreed levels at any stage. Thus, while document A/4891 provided for such relatively unimportant measures in the first stage of disarmament as the reduction of "strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles" and the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, it called for far-reaching control measures which would make it possible to collect vital information on nuclear delivery vehicles. He recalled in that connexion that General White, the former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, had testified in Congressional hearings in February 1959 that the problem of locating Soviet missile sites would be a very difficult one for the United States.

19. At the 1195th meeting, the United States representative had stated that under the Soviet concept of disarmament inspection it would be possible for the arms race to continue, since there would be no way of knowing whether two new weapons were being produced to take the place of every weapon that was destroyed. In reality, however, the USSR proposal (A/C.1/856) laid down that all means of delivering nuclear weapons should be destroyed in the first stage of disarmament, following which the control organization would have the right to inspect without hindrance all enterprises, plants, factories and shipyards previously engaged in the production of rockets, aircraft, surface warships, submarines and any other means of delivering nuclear weapons. Continued United States insistence on the necessity of control over retained armed forces and armaments from the very beginning of disarmament would be a serious obstacle to future disarmament negotiations.

20. Another source of disagreement was the question of the relationship between general and complete disarmament and various measures of partial disarmament. In the Ten-Nation Committee, the Western Powers had avoided any discussion of general and complete disarmament on the pretext that priority should be given to certain "initial" measures which were "easy" to carry out. The statement in the United States memorandum of 14 September 1961 (A/4880, II) that "while the complete programme with its admittedly complex provisions is being worked out ... any beginning, even the most limited, will represent progress" could be used in a similar manner as a pretext for refusing to discuss general and complete disarmament and insisting instead on partial measures involving far-reaching controls. Czechoslovakia and the other socialist countries had consistently taken the position that negotiations on general and complete disarmament did not preclude the application of specific measures which would ease international tension, strengthen confidence between States and thus promote the cause of general and complete disarmament; and a number of such measures were enumerated in the memorandum submitted to the General Assembly on 26 September by the Soviet Union (A/4892). His delegation had also supported the proposals introduced by African and

Asian countries calling for a ban on the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and for the recognition of Africa as a denuclearized neutral zone. The Western Powers' opposition to those proposals showed that their emphasis on partial measures was not designed to facilitate disarmament negotiations and that their thinking continued to be based on the use of nuclear weapons.

21. Another unsolved problem in connexion with disarmament was the composition of the future negotiating body. In view of the active part played by the neutral countries in efforts to achieve disarmament, the socialist countries contended that representatives of neutral countries should be permitted to participate in future negotiations on an equal basis with representatives of the socialist countries and of those countries belonging to Western military and political groupings. His delegation could not support the proposal made by the United States in its memorandum of 29 July 1961 (A/4880, I) that the participants in disarmament negotiations should be selected on the basis of equitable representation for the different regions of the world and of such factors as population and military capabilities; that system of representation would weight the composition of the negotiating body in favour of the Western Powers and against the socialist and neutral countries. The General Assembly should do everything possible to promote agreement on that issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. His delegation fully supported the Soviet proposal that the new negotiating body should complete the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament by 1 June 1962 and submit it for consideration by a special session of the General Assembly.

22. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.297, which was directed against the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

23. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that the unparliamentary language used by the United Kingdom representative would not help to create an atmosphere in which a useful discussion could take place. As regards the substance of his remarks, there was no justification for his claim that there was a contradiction between the Soviet Union's support for draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3 and a certain statement made by Mr. Khrushchev. As his delegation had already explained in the Committee, Mr. Khrushchev had been replying to a quite different question, put by a United States correspondent, namely, whether the Soviet Union would declare that it would never be the first nation to employ nuclear weapons in a war. In his answer, Mr. Khrushchev had explained exactly why the Soviet Union was not prepared to undertake a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3, on the other hand, referred not to unilateral renunciation, but to a multilateral convention, which the Soviet Union was quite ready to conclude; in that connexion, he drew attention to section 2 of the USSR Government's memorandum of 26 September 1961 (A/4892). It should be noted, moreover, that the Soviet Union did not expect any of the other nuclear Powers unilaterally to renounce nuclear weapons. But it was clear from the United Kingdom representative's statement that his Government, like some other NATO Governments, did not want a multilateral convention. Fortunately that was not true of all members of

NATO; but if such a convention was not concluded the world would know where to lay the blame.

24. The United Kingdom representative had also claimed to answer Mr. Khrushchev's statement that the Soviet Union was ready to accept any proposals on disarmament control if the Western Powers would accept the Soviet proposals on disarmament. But all his answer came to was that, although his Government agreed that general and complete disarmament was the ultimate aim, it would not accept Mr. Khrushchev's proposals. It was to be hoped that that was not the United Kingdom Government's last word, since otherwise any forthcoming negotiations would be very difficult. The representative of Cyprus had shown that the problem of control could be solved on the basis of the Soviet plan and had put forward some very interesting ideas, although the Soviet delegation could not accept all of them. He hoped that in the light of the Cypriot representative's statement the United Kingdom representative would reconsider his position.

25. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom), replying to the Soviet representative, said that the quotation from Mr. Khrushchev's reply to a newspaper correspondent was relevant in the present context; he would be

glad to let the members of the Committee decide who was right in the matter. He was sorry that the Soviet representative had taken exception to the language he had used; he could not withdraw it, because it had been suited to the Soviet actions to which he had been referring.

26. With regard to Mr. Khrushchev's statement regarding controls, his delegation could not, as he had already stated, accept it out of hand, but was prepared to discuss the matter around the negotiating table.

27. Mr. MATSCH (Austria) said that his delegation had joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 in the conviction that the countries not in possession of nuclear weapons could play an important part in the preparation and implementation of measures to prevent further nuclear weapons tests and the further spread of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution had no connexion whatever with the question of the right of States to take measures of self-defence in the event of armed attack. It proposed specific action which would lessen the threats to world peace and facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.