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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Agenda items 73 and 72:</i>	
<i>Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (continued)</i>	145
<i>The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (continued)</i>	145

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/849, A/C.1/850, A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2) (continued)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/849, A/C.1/850, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2) (continued)

1. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 represented an attempt to reduce the geographical scope of the cold war. The appeal for the denuclearization of Africa carried particular weight in that the nuclear weapons in question had been neither created nor tested by the peoples of Africa but had been brought in from outside, in pursuit of policies alien to the interests of that continent. His Government had always supported the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world; the transformation of Africa into such a zone would be a significant contribution to the cause of peace and might encourage the creation of denuclearized zones elsewhere. His delegation therefore fully supported the draft resolution.

2. His delegation also supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2, which, while singling out for special consideration the terrible weapon which threatened the very existence of mankind, also expressed the desire of its sponsors for a step in the direction of general and complete disarmament.

3. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) said that while his delegation appreciated the desire of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 to isolate Africa from the threat of nuclear war, it had reservations about the manner in which they sought to achieve that end. With regard to the appeal for Africa to be regarded as a denuclearized neutral zone, it was not for the United Nations, or any group of States, to direct States to follow any particular policy. Nor was there anything in geographical contiguity which gave one group, or

even a majority, of Governments authority to seek to impose a given policy upon their neighbours. Independent States had the right to pursue a policy of neutrality if they wished, but they were also free to take whatever position they chose on international issues and to make whatever arrangements they thought necessary for their defence. In view of the Polish representative's statement at the previous meeting, he wondered whether the Polish Government wished to be regarded in future as neutral on all occasions.

4. Moreover, there could be no guarantee of Africa's effective "de-nuclearization" in the absence of procedures for international verification, which would be possible only within the framework of a general agreement on disarmament. In any event, since any nuclear conflict would inevitably become world-wide, it would be unrealistic to believe that arrangements such as those proposed in the draft resolution would be enough to isolate a particular area of the world from a nuclear war.

5. With regard to the question of halting nuclear tests, which was touched on in sub-paragraph (a) of the operative paragraph, his delegation had already expressed its view that the only way to deal with the problem was to conclude an agreement halting tests everywhere under effective international control.

6. Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2, he said that an uncontrolled ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be no more effective than the previous uncontrolled moratorium on nuclear testing, which had been cynically disregarded by the Soviet Union. As recently as 5 September, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had said in an interview in Moscow that a pledge to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons would be meaningless since a nuclear Power which felt it was losing a war would unquestionably make use of such weapons; he had gone on to say that only disarmament could ensure world peace. The objectives sought by the sponsors of the draft resolution could be achieved only within the framework of general and complete disarmament carried out in balanced stages and under effective international control, as provided in the joint statement of principles for disarmament negotiations agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879). He was gratified that the President of Senegal had supported that approach to the problem in his statement to the General Assembly on 31 October (1045th plenary meeting).

7. With regard to the statement in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2 that the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a direct violation of the United Nations Charter, he wished to point out that the Charter recognized the right of individual and collective self-defence, which, in the view of his delegation, implied the right to use

whatever degree of force was necessary in order to repel aggression.

8. His delegation would vote against the draft resolution, since it felt that the course of action proposed in it would serve no useful purpose.

9. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that his delegation would vote in favour of both draft resolutions before the Committee. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative that the danger of war could be eliminated only within the context of general and complete disarmament. That, however, was no argument against adopting measures calculated to improve the political climate and facilitate the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament; indeed, in view of the deterioration of the international situation and the increased risk of nuclear war, such measures were essential. Although the goal of prohibiting nuclear weapons and eliminating them from the arsenals of States—a goal to which all nations should strive—could be attained only through the implementation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2, which was essentially a condemnation of nuclear aggression, could help to promote future negotiations with a view to achieving it. The Romanian delegation could not agree with the United Kingdom representative that the draft resolution could serve no useful purpose—though Sir Michael Wright was doubtless reflecting the general NATO view when he assumed a position which amounted to rejecting all measures by the General Assembly likely to reduce international tension and to suggesting that the Assembly should take no steps to improve the international atmosphere, but should merely seek to exacerbate the cold war. The Romanian delegation did not regard the two draft resolutions as a panacea for all the world's ills; it was convinced, however, that they could exert a positive influence on the development of international relations.

10. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 deserved the Assembly's most particular attention. On 1 December 1959, twelve nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, had signed the Antarctic Treaty, under which the continent of Antarctica had been declared a de-nuclearized and demilitarized zone. That agreement had been regarded as a vital contribution to the cause of peace. Twelve African States were now proposing that the continent of Africa, which was not a barren land like Antarctica, should be made a neutral and nuclear-free area. Such a step would be a major political advance; it would help to eliminate possible sources of conflict and thus reduce the risk of nuclear war. Without prejudice to any other legal means which the African States might wish to employ in the matter, the nuclear Powers should solemnly declare their intention to respect the desire of the African peoples that their continent should not be used in testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons.

11. However, Africa could not become a genuinely neutral and de-nuclearized zone unless steps were taken at the same time to liquidate the foreign bases still operating there. So long as those bases were maintained, it would still be possible to introduce weapons of mass destruction into Africa and keep them there without the knowledge of the African peoples. The Romanian Government attached great importance to the establishment of zones free of foreign military bases, nuclear weapons and vehicles

for the transport of such weapons. In 1957, it had proposed that the Balkan and Adriatic areas should be made into a nuclear-free zone in which no nation could construct rocket-launching sites or establish bases. It continued to support that proposal, which was in the interests of the people of the areas in question. Similarly, it believed that the establishment of Africa as a neutral nuclear-free zone would alleviate regional tensions and contribute to the consolidation of world peace.

12. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) said that his Government had always supported proposals for practical measures aimed at lessening international tension, improving relations between States and creating favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament. The socialist countries, desiring as they did to achieve positive results in disarmament negotiations and reduce the danger of nuclear war, had constantly stressed their willingness to carry out such measures immediately; the Soviet Government, for example, had put forward constructive proposals in its memorandum of 26 September 1961 (A/4892).

13. There could be no doubt that adoption of the two draft resolutions before the Committee would help to achieve the aims he had mentioned. To prohibit the use of nuclear weapons would be a step towards prohibiting their manufacture and towards their final elimination from the arsenals of States, which should be carried out within the framework of general and complete disarmament. The fact that the United Kingdom representative had spoken against draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2 showed that there was still a contradiction between the words and the deeds of the Western Powers in matters of disarmament. The argument that the draft resolution in question would be of no practical value because it made no provision for control could not be accepted. Although general and complete disarmament under effective international control was undoubtedly the most reliable means of eliminating the danger of nuclear war, a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons would certainly help to avert that danger. A comparable agreement, the Protocol prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925,^{1/} had proved effective in the Second World War. In any case, a convention of the kind envisaged would not oblige countries to undertake any specific measures, so that the question of control was irrelevant. His delegation would support that draft resolution.

14. As regards draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, his Government had always regarded the establishment of nuclear-free zones as a means of lessening tension and improving relations between States. That was why it supported the proposals for nuclear-free zones in Central Europe and in the Far East and the Pacific put forward by Poland and the People's Republic of China respectively. The establishment of such a zone in Africa would help to strengthen peace not only in that continent but throughout the world. It would increase the security of the African countries and reduce the danger of their being drawn into a nuclear war. The draft resolution was not aimed at imposing obligations on any State: it was merely an appeal, to which each Government could respond as it saw fit. His delegation considered the appeal justified, and would vote for that draft resolution.

^{1/} League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

15. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that the comprehensive plan of general and complete disarmament placed before the General Assembly early in the session (1013th plenary meeting) by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, provided that disarmament should be carried out in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be completed in an agreed period of time. That plan provided, in the first stage—in other words, at an earlier stage than in any other plan so far submitted—that States which had not acceded to an effective test-ban treaty should do so, that the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons should be stopped and that agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production should be transferred to non-weapons purposes. The plan further provided that when armaments reached prescribed levels, the armaments in depots should be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. That was the basic position of the United States Government with respect to nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms and to the eventual elimination, pursuant to the United States plan of general and complete disarmament, of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Moreover, the United States stood ready to sign immediately an effective treaty banning nuclear weapons tests not only in Africa but all over the world.

16. The United States was in full sympathy with the motives of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and, in particular, appreciated the need of the African States to proceed with their economic and social development in an atmosphere of peace. The United States Government had already stated that it was prepared to help those States in a very material way in carrying out their development plans according to their own ideas. However, having put forward a plan for the destruction of all armaments everywhere on a comprehensive and staged basis, it feared that the African proposal might interfere with that general disarmament programme. Moreover, the right of self-defence by whatever means might be appropriate was established in the United Nations Charter, and there was nothing in the Charter defining the circumstances in which particular types of weapons could or could not be used. If, as sub-paragraph (b) of the operative paragraph of the draft resolution provided, nuclear weapons could not be stored or transported in Africa, an African State subjected to attack by a non-African State possessing nuclear weapons would be placed at an unfair disadvantage, for it would be deprived of the right to defend itself by the use of nuclear weapons. The subject of the draft resolution should be related to all the problems involved in general and complete disarmament, and its purpose should be carried out within that context.

17. His delegation would request a separate vote on each sub-paragraph of the operative part of draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1. It would vote against sub-paragraph (a) in its present form because it called for an uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium; if, as the United States sincerely hoped, a test-ban treaty could be concluded, the result would be the cessation of all tests, in Africa as well as the rest of the world. The United States would also vote against sub-paragraph (b), because the undertaking which it proposed could be implemented only within the framework of general disarmament arrangements and under appropriate treaty controls. It would abstain in the vote on sub-paragraph (c) because it

did not consider it appropriate for the United Nations to initiate recommendations to particular countries or areas for disarmament measures limited to only one region of the world, particularly by means of uncontrolled declarations. In that connexion, he reminded the Committee that in the statement he had made to the General Assembly at its fifteenth session (868th plenary meeting), Mr. Eisenhower, then President of the United States, had urged the United Nations to be prepared to help the African countries to maintain their security, but expressed the hope that those countries would use regional machinery in order to avert an arms race in the area. Once the African States themselves had concluded appropriate regional agreements, Member States could properly be asked to co-operate in their implementation.

18. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) said that although he sympathized with the objective of draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, he considered it unnecessary, in view of the resolutions already adopted on the two items under discussion. If, however, the African States felt that the adoption of the proposal would add to their sense of security, the Pakistan delegation would be prepared to support it.

19. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2, the aim of which was to eliminate the use of nuclear weapons in case of war, his delegation considered that it could more appropriately be discussed against the background of the question of general and complete disarmament. However, if the Committee should decide that it was relevant to the two items on nuclear tests and should vote on it, Pakistan would support operative paragraph 1, although the drafting of sub-paragraph (a) of that paragraph could be improved on. His delegation found greater difficulty in supporting operative paragraph 2. The paragraph related to one aspect of general and complete disarmament, which should be discussed in its proper context. Yet several representatives—including the representative of the Soviet Union, who had only recently declared that his country would discuss the question of nuclear weapons tests only in the context of general and complete disarmament—were prepared to support the proposal to convene a conference for the purpose of signing a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in case of war. The best course would be to defer the draft resolution for consideration under the general heading of disarmament; the position might then be clarified. If that course was not followed, Pakistan would abstain on operative paragraph 2.

20. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco), replying to the observations made by the United Kingdom representative, said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 was not in any sense intended to deny the right of States to pursue whatever foreign policy and to conclude whatever alliances they wished. It was to be noted that the African States which were not sponsoring the draft resolution had so far expressed no opposition to the appeal for the de-nuclearization of Africa. Since the United Kingdom had at various times in the past advocated the de-nuclearization or neutralization of certain areas, he was surprised at the stand it was now taking.

21. The United States representative had asserted that the problem of disarmament should be considered in its entirety, whereas the African draft resolution dealt with only one aspect of the question. Yet it was the United States which had argued at the beginning of the present session that in view of the complexity of

the over-all problem of disarmament, the Committee should first take up the urgent question of nuclear testing.

22. The African States had always declared their opposition to the nuclear arms race. They had proposed special measures for the protection of the African continent only after France had announced that it intended to carry out nuclear tests in Africa. Such proposals had always been accompanied by appeals for the cessation of nuclear testing by all States and linked with the larger problem of general disarmament. His delegation's prediction at the fourteenth session^{2/} that France's nuclear tests would eventually be used by one of the major nuclear Powers as a pretext for breaking the moratorium had now been borne out. Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had supported the African position at that time, and it was deplorable that they were now unwilling to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1.

23. France had carried out its tests in 1959 in defiance of a General Assembly resolution and of the appeals made to it by African Governments. Although the present draft resolution did not mention France, it was tacitly directed at that country, for no other nuclear Power had indicated its intention of carrying out tests in Africa.

24. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom), replying to the representative of Morocco, explained that his earlier remarks had been addressed not to the question whether Africa should be denuclearized or to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons testing, but specifically to the word "neutral" used in sub-paragraph (c) of the operative paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1. Neutrality was an element in national foreign policy, and all independent States or groups of States had the right to decide their own foreign policy. His point had been to question whether it was proper for the General Assembly to take upon itself the responsibility of urging Member States to adopt a particular form of foreign policy—that of neutrality. That was one of the reasons why the United Kingdom had serious doubts about the draft resolution and would abstain in the vote on it.

25. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland), replying to the United Kingdom representative's remarks, said that the desire of the colonial Powers to maintain nuclear or other military bases in African countries was understandable, but had nothing to do with those countries' interests. His delegation, for its part, respected the wish of the African States, whether independent or still under colonial domination, not to be involved in the cold war and to declare their continent a nuclear-free zone.

26. As regards the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, the United Kingdom should already be familiar with all the details of the Rapacki plan. The plan did not contemplate the withdrawal of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic from the Warsaw Pact; but neither did it contemplate the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO.

27. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq) said that his delegation whole-heartedly supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, which represented the wishes of the peoples of Africa. Those peoples had

suffered much from imperialism and colonial exploitation, and they were entitled to demand that their continent should no longer be regarded as a field for competition between other Powers, and in particular that it should be free from nuclear weapons. If any African country wished to remain outside the proposed nuclear-free zone, it had only to say so. France's action in disregarding the appeals made to it both in and outside the Assembly not to conduct tests in the Sahara was much to be regretted. Its responsibility for the recent resumption of testing could not be overestimated; moreover, it was reported that France intended to carry out further tests on African territory. The peoples of Africa therefore had every reason to be concerned about nuclear tests. The underdeveloped regions of the world were particularly vulnerable, since they were not equipped to deal with the effects of radiation. The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Africa, by reducing international tension, would benefit the whole world. The prospects for peace would also be improved if such zones were set up in Central Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.

28. His delegation would also support draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2. The valid drafting criticism of operative paragraph 1 (a) made by the representative of Pakistan might be met by removing the word "letter" or by adding the word "Charter" after the words "United Nations". The deterioration in the international situation was clearly reflected in the resumption of the arms race, and particularly in the renewed competition in nuclear weapons. Yet both sides already possessed enough nuclear weapons to destroy not only each other but most of the rest of the world. The target of such weapons was not armies, but peoples themselves, who were now hostages at the mercy of any potential enemy. The prospect that faced the world was self-annihilation; little progress had been made towards averting that catastrophe since the first atomic bombs had been dropped in 1945. The least that the Assembly could do, therefore, was to adopt a declaration stating that any country which used nuclear weapons was committing a crime against mankind and civilization.

29. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) said that the word "neutral" in sub-paragraph (c) of the operative paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 did not refer to foreign policy, and was not intended to prevent any African country from pursuing whatever foreign policy it chose. The word should be read in conjunction with the fourth preambular paragraph, which referred to the need to prevent Africa from becoming involved in any ideological or nuclear competition between the Powers, and should be directly related to the term "denuclearized zone". He hoped his explanation would make it possible for the United Kingdom to reconsider its intention to abstain in the vote on sub-paragraph (c), and appealed to all the nuclear Powers to support the draft resolution unreservedly.

30. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) said that to de-nuclearize Africa would be to decolonize it. Once colonialism disappeared from Africa, no African State would consent to the testing or storing of nuclear weapons on its territory. The colonial Powers had taken to using their colonies for testing in preference to their own territory; his delegation would therefore support draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1. It was not enough to put an end to tests, however, since the nuclear Powers already kept vast

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 803rd meeting, para. 88.

stockpiles of weapons at their various military bases, many of which were maintained in foreign countries against the wishes of their peoples and Governments. His delegation would accordingly also support draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2.

31. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) said that although draft resolution A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 might seem to reflect the views of the uncommitted and non-aligned countries of Africa, his delegation would be unable to support it. It recognized the importance of the proposal made in the draft resolution, but considered that the proper procedure would have been for the Heads of State of all African countries to sign a convention covering disarmament and military bases as well as nuclear weapons and tests, and providing for international control. The General Assembly should then have been asked to guarantee that convention and thus guarantee the neutrality of Africa. While it was true that the African continent ought to be a nuclear-free zone, a mere resolution to that effect would not bind the great Powers never to drop nuclear bombs on African territory. Nevertheless, the fact that many delegations supported the draft resolution, including those from the socialist coun-

tries, was a good omen. If the concept of nuclear-free zones could be applied to Europe and Asia as well as Africa, the problems with which the Committee was concerned would be solved.

32. His delegation had voted in favour of the suspension of nuclear tests; but it also believed that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited, since that would certainly do much more harm than tests alone. It would therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-2. He was glad to note that the proposal had the support of many delegations, and in particular that of the socialist countries, since at one time it had seemed from the statements made by the Powers most concerned that the Committee's labours would be in vain. Operative paragraph 2 was particularly important; if a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons was signed, tests of such weapons would automatically be rendered unnecessary. Thus the draft resolution provided a solution to the problem of tests without linking it to general and complete disarmament. It only remained for the Western Powers to support it.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.