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**Chairman:** Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (*continued*)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, in order to avoid a lengthy discussion of the Indian motion to submit the draft resolution that had been adopted at the previous meeting to the General Assembly immediately, the Committee should transmit to the General Assembly forthwith the section of its report containing that draft resolution, with a request that it should be considered as soon as possible.

2. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) withdrew his motion for adjournment of the debate on the Indian procedural motion and endorsed the Chairman's suggestion.

3. The CHAIRMAN said that in the absence of objections he would take it that the Committee approved his suggestion.

*It was so decided.*

4. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Committee now had before it a United States motion to adjourn the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 and to give priority to consideration of the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280). In accordance with rule 117 of the rules of procedure, two speakers might speak in favour of, and two against, the motion.

5. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) found it logical that the Committee, having first adopted an emergency resolution on the explosion of the 50-megaton bomb (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1) and then a resolution calling upon the Powers concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of a more binding agreement (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), should now go on to discuss the implications of such an agreement. He therefore supported the United States motion.

6. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) also thought that, in view of the Committee's earlier decisions, it was logical to give priority to consideration of the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution. It was not only the Committee's right but its duty to study the ethical and legal principles on which negotiations for a treaty on nuclear tests should be based. All matters which had a bearing on that question should therefore be given urgent consideration.

7. The CHAIRMAN said that, as there were no speakers against the United States motion, he would put it to the vote.

*The motion was adopted by 50 votes to none, with 25 abstentions.*

8. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.280).

9. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), introducing the draft resolution, said that the purpose of the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty was to establish a system of control which could ensure compliance with the terms of the treaty. To be effective, the treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all tests in all environments. It was also essential that the control system should be concerned exclusively with observance of the treaty and that the control operations should be carefully defined so that the Administrator responsible for the direction of the control system would be required to act impartially. All the parties to the treaty should be represented in the control organization in order to ensure the international character of the treaty and to avoid self-inspection. Lastly, the decisions of the policy-making control commission should be taken in such a way as not to favour one party at the expense of the others. Those considerations, which underlay the draft treaty (A/4772) submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, were also embodied in their draft resolution.

10. In order to keep the United Nations informed of the progress made in the negotiations, the parties should report to the Disarmament Commission not later than 1 March 1962. The United States and the United Kingdom were prepared to resume negotiations immediately and they called upon the USSR to adopt the same position.

11. Very wide participation in a nuclear test ban treaty was essential and, once a treaty had been concluded, it should be ratified by all States in order to guarantee its effective and impartial application and to ensure that nuclear weapons testing ceased forever in all environments.

12. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) thought that the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution was entirely in keeping with Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations. The General Assembly should not concern itself with the detailed provisions of the treaty, but

Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal.

*Abstaining:* Spain, Syria, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Somalia.

*The amendment was rejected by 59 votes to 14, with 28 abstentions.*

41. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Afghan amendment as orally revised by the sponsor.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Italy, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq.

*Against:* Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel.

*Abstaining:* Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana.

*The amendment was rejected by 61 votes to 19, with 21 abstentions.*

42. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294).

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Ceylon, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia,

Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic.

*Against:* Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

*Abstaining:* Cuba, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Yugoslavia.

*The amendment was adopted by 86 votes to 10, with 5 abstentions.*

43. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the preamble of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1).

*The preamble was adopted by 72 votes to none, with 25 abstentions.*

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 1 of the six-Power draft resolution.

*The paragraph was adopted by 83 votes to none, with 17 abstentions.*

45. In connexion with the vote on operative paragraph 2, the CHAIRMAN noted that a separate vote had been requested on the words "or general and complete disarmament". Accordingly, he called for a vote on those words.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*The Dominican Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia.

*Against:* Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark.

*Abstaining:* Ecuador, Finland, France, Haiti, Hungary, Ivory Coast, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Togo, Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey.

*The words "or general and complete disarmament" were rejected by 43 votes to 36, with 22 abstentions.*

46. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote operative paragraph 2, as amended.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Guatemala, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana.

*Against:* Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece.

*Abstaining:* Haiti, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Portugal,<sup>1/</sup> Thailand, Afghanistan, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cuba.

*The paragraph, as amended, was adopted by 69 votes to 21, with 11 abstentions.<sup>1/</sup>*

47. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked for some explanation of the use of the plural in the word "agreements" in operative paragraph 3. It was his understanding that as a result of the deletion of the words "or general and complete disarmament" in operative paragraph 2, the only agreement contemplated in operative paragraph 3 was an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. If so, he would vote against the paragraph.

48. The CHAIRMAN said that he had no authority to interpret resolutions before the Committee. He put to the vote the original operative paragraph 3 of the six-Power text, which as a result of the adoption of the seven-Power amendment should now be re-numbered paragraph 4.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Saudi Arabia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nether-

lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal.

*Against:* Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania.

*Abstaining:* South Africa, Spain, United States of America, Afghanistan, Cuba, France, Greece, Haiti, Luxembourg, Philippines.

*The paragraph was adopted by 81 votes to 10, with 10 abstentions.*

49. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) as a whole, as amended.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Laos.

*Against:* Luxembourg, Mongolia, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy.

*Abstaining:* Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Turkey, Afghanistan, Belgium, Cuba, Haiti.

*The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 72 votes to 21, with 8 abstentions.*

50. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to resume the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72.

51. Mr. POPPER (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that he wished to reintroduce his delegation's motion, withdrawn at the Committee's 1180th meeting, to adjourn the general debate on those items temporarily and to take up the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280) immediately, with a view to reaching a decision on it as soon as possible. That motion was in keeping with the Committee's decision to discuss items 73 and 72 simultaneously, and most speakers in the debate on the six-Power draft resolution had necessarily and quite properly commented on the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution and stressed the urgent need for a test-ban treaty. He therefore hoped that the draft resolution would be put to the vote as soon as possible. Since it had in fact already been the subject of much discussion, he would support a motion for closure of debate on it at any time the Committee might deem appropriate.

<sup>1/</sup> The delegation of Portugal subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to be put on record as having cast its vote against operative paragraph 2, as amended.

52. The CHAIRMAN said that in accordance with precedents already established in previous cases, the United States representative's motion was in order, and would be put to the vote.

53. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) pointed out that the six-Power draft resolution which had just been adopted was still a matter of urgency, and moved that it should be transmitted to the Assembly for approval at the plenary meeting to be held next day.

54. The CHAIRMAN said that the Indian motion was in the nature of a previous question, being a direct corollary of the draft resolution adopted by the Committee. He pointed out, however, that the question whether or not that draft resolution could be taken up at the Assembly's next plenary meeting was one which only the President of the Assembly and the Assembly itself could decide.

55. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland), referring to the United States motion, observed that by adopting a succession of motions for separate debates on separate draft resolutions, the Committee was drastically changing the established procedure for debate in the main committees. If it once again suspended the general debate, in order to give priority consideration to the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution, it was not clear when the general debate would be held, if at all.

56. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) suggested that it would help the conduct of business both in the First Committee and in the General Assembly if the Committee could complete its discussion of the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution before the six-Power draft resolution went to the Assembly, so that the two items could be discussed in that body together. The close relationship between them had been made abundantly clear during the debate just completed. He was making his suggestion with no intention of impeding progress on the six-Power text, but merely to facilitate the work of the Assembly. Accordingly, he urged the Indian representative not to press his motion.

57. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) begged to differ: the effect of the voting just completed had in his understanding been to single out the six-Power draft resolution as a matter of urgency. Consequently, it should be considered separately in the plenary meeting without further delay, especially since there was no way of knowing how long the debate on the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution would last.

58. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tunisia) pointed out that the Committee had already established a precedent for transmitting the six-Power draft resolution to the Assembly as a separate question by its action on the eight-Power appeal (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1).

59. The CHAIRMAN felt that since differences had been voiced on the question of transmitting the six-

Power draft resolution to the Assembly, there was now a substantive issue involved. That being so, the matter should be decided by the Committee as a whole.

60. Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey) pointed out that since the Committee had decided to debate agenda items 73 and 72 together, the report of the Rapporteur would have to cover the draft resolutions relating to both items, and could thus not be completed and sent on to the Assembly until the Committee had completed the general debate on the two items. To decide to transmit the six-Power draft resolution to the Assembly separately would be to reverse the Committee's previous decision—which under rule 124 of the rules of procedure could be done only by a two-thirds majority vote.

61. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that by adopting the motion he had made at the 1179th meeting, under rule 117, the Committee had decided to act separately on the six-Power draft resolution alone, and on no other proposal. Indeed, the only purpose of his motion had been to ensure such separate action, both in the Committee and in the General Assembly. He therefore opposed the United Kingdom suggestion; but in any event, the Committee could change its decision only by a two-thirds majority vote.

62. The CHAIRMAN said that the Indian motion was in order. The Committee had agreed to debate the two items together, but not to vote on them together. The Committee should decide by simple majority in favour of either the Indian motion or the United Kingdom suggestion.

63. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) formally moved the adjournment of the debate on the Indian procedural motion.

64. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) withdraw his suggestion, in the hope that the Committee would proceed rapidly to the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution.

65. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said that his original motion, introduced at the 1179th meeting, for separate action on the six-Power draft resolution would not have been fully complied with until the Assembly, in plenary meeting, had acted upon that draft resolution.

66. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Ethiopian motion had been fully carried out, and that the matter had been disposed of by the vote on the six-Power draft resolution. He called for two speakers for and two against the Afghan motion.

67. Mr. DELGADO (Philippines) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

*The motion was adopted by 50 votes to 18, with 17 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 7.5 p.m.

should nevertheless deal with the basic issues involved such as control, inspection, the status and qualifications of inspectors, the participation of third countries, the functions and composition of the control commission, its representative character and the absence of any veto over its decisions. Those points were embodied in the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution, and he felt they should meet with no objection.

13. It should be possible for the treaty to be signed not only by the nuclear Powers but by other States. Even if it were signed only by the nuclear Powers, however, it might be inferred from the draft resolution and from the explanations given during the debate that the control system's staff of inspectors and other personnel would include representatives of the small Powers, thus guaranteeing impartiality.

14. The most delicate aspect of control concerned the need to avoid self-inspection. That was a very old question. The objection to control had initially been based on a mistaken conception of sovereignty. It had been believed that the presence of any international official in a supervisory capacity in the territory of a country would undermine its national sovereignty. Today, however, sovereignty was regarded as the freedom of a State within the international system. There was no longer any reason for any State to feel that the presence on its soil of an international official with specific duties violated its sovereignty. Inspection and control of the application of a nuclear test suspension or disarmament treaty required the utmost objectivity, which could not be expected from nationals of the country in which the inspection and control took place. Obviously, however, the role of the control and inspection officials would have to be very clearly defined in order to avoid any misinterpretation which could lead to interference in the domestic affairs of the country concerned.

15. With regard to the veto, it should be recalled that at San Francisco it had been interpreted as an obligation to seek unanimity, but over the years it had become debased to such a point that some questions were now vetoed in advance, even before any effort had been made to find agreement. In no sphere, however, could the use of the veto be more serious than in that of disarmament. In fact, so long as the veto existed, there could never be disarmament. The veto condemned any organization to inactivity or to subservience. Logically speaking, the veto was an aberration, morally speaking it was a monstrosity and legally speaking it was an instrument of despotism, used to oppose the will of others as well as the dictates of intelligence and intellectual co-operation.

16. His delegation thought it was necessary to amend or delete the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, noting that negotiations had been recessed pending completion of General Assembly discussion of the matter, and operative paragraph 3, requesting the negotiating States to report to the Disarmament Commission by 1 March 1962 on the progress of their negotiations. The negotiations should begin at once and the negotiating States should submit their report by 15 December 1961 so that the General Assembly could make a decision at its current session.

17. His delegation appealed to the nuclear Powers to strive with goodwill and in a spirit of objectivity and mutual understanding to find a solution to the problem.

18. Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom delegation had already fully explained its reasons for believing that the only way to stop nuclear weapons tests was to conclude an international treaty incorporating satisfactory guarantees on observance. That was a first step towards restoring confidence—a step that was all the more needed now that the Soviet Union had shattered what confidence there had been in a voluntary uncontrolled moratorium. The Committee did not need to enter into a detailed consideration of the draft treaty that had been under study at Geneva. The greater part of that text had been agreed as early as the spring 1961 and the issues that had been left unsolved were clear and could be settled quickly, given the will to do so. The United Kingdom delegation had already set out the points at issue in full at the 1173rd meeting. At the same time, it had expressed disappointment that the Soviet Union had not responded favourably to the compromise proposals submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom, and had deplored the Soviet retraction of the agreement on a single Administrator, reached in principle two years previously. In the interests of speed, those points should be resolved directly between the negotiating parties. But the United Kingdom delegation held that the treaty, once agreed to between the major nuclear Powers, should become world-wide, and it appealed to all Governments, without exception, to subscribe to that "nuclear charter".

19. The purpose of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States was to seek the support of the Assembly for the broad principle that an agreement should be concluded urgently for the prohibition, under effective control, of all nuclear weapons tests "in all environments", as was specified in operative paragraph 2 (a). The proposals put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom in Geneva had precisely the same objective: the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. The Committee was not being asked, under operative paragraph 2, to approve the text drawn up at Geneva or to go into the details of a treaty; the paragraph merely set out the simple and broad principles that must govern any international control machinery if it was to enable observance of a treaty to be verified. Operative paragraph 2 (b) set out the principle that international control machinery should be organized so as to be representative of all parties to the treaty. That was an obvious point. In fact, the United States and the United Kingdom had gone further in the proposals made at Geneva, which envisaged that neutral nations should not only participate in the control machinery but should have a deciding voice in the event of East-West differences on significant points. It was stated in the same subparagraph that the international control machinery should be staffed and operated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness, avoiding self-inspection; which, again, was a self-evident principle. It meant, for example, that an inspection team operating in the United Kingdom should not be predominantly British nor be headed by a Briton. It was further specified in that sub-paragraph that the procedures to be followed by the international control machinery should be such as to ensure that its facilities would be used exclusively for purposes of effective control; that was in order that it should not be open to the charge of engaging in espionage—an eventuality the Soviet Union appeared to fear, although the United Kingdom Government could not conceive of a thoroughly international control organization being involved in spying or imagine on whose behalf it would be doing so.

20. In operative paragraph 2 (c), it was specified that day-to-day executive and administrative operations of the control system should not be susceptible to obstruction by the exercise of a veto and that administrative responsibility should be concentrated in the hands of a single Administrator. That provision should not give rise to any difficulty inasmuch as so vital an issue as the cessation of nuclear tests should not be open to obstruction and no country should be able to block the verification provided for in the treaty by a veto. Furthermore, he thought the Assembly would likewise recognize the need for a single Administrator under the treaty, since it had resolutely shown its opposition to replacing the Secretary-General by a tripartite group.

21. The principles incorporated in the draft resolution were obviously acceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom; they were indeed willing to go further and to accept any degree of international control in their territories that would ensure observance of the treaty. If the Soviet Government would do likewise and accept an effective system of control and verification, the conclusion of a treaty on the banning of nuclear tests or on full and general disarmament should present no difficulty. But since the Soviet Government had always put up obstacles to international verification, all that the United States and the United Kingdom were asking was acceptance of the minimum of essential principles.

22. The United States-United Kingdom draft resolution urged the States participating in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests to resume negotiations. Those negotiations had been suspended because of the attitude of the Soviet Government and because of its decision to resume the testing of nuclear weapons. The Conference had not, however, ended, which was why no report on its work had yet been issued. In that connexion, the United Kingdom Government deeply regretted that the Soviet Union was refusing to conclude an agreement on the cessation of tests until an agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament had been signed. It certainly continued to hope that agreement on general and complete disarmament would be reached, but ne-

gotiations to that end must inevitably be long. Furthermore, if it was not possible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the cessation of nuclear tests, the prospect for agreement on all aspects of disarmament must necessarily be regarded with less optimism. At any rate, the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests was a matter of urgency, although it could not be concluded if the Soviet Union refused to negotiate. Since, however, the Soviet Union had ignored direct appeals by the United States and The United Kingdom to resume negotiations, there was no alternative but to ask the General Assembly to take a stand in favour of the urgent resumption of negotiations in the hope that the Soviet Government would heed such an expression of world opinion.

23. In conclusion, he said that, in spite of the possible military advantage the Soviet Union had gained as a result of its latest series of tests, the United States and the United Kingdom were ready now to sign a treaty to put an end to all nuclear weapons tests or to resume negotiations on such a treaty and to consider any fair and reasonable compromise. With that end in view, he again appealed to the Soviet Government to agree to a resumption of negotiations and to the Committee to support that appeal.

24. The CHAIRMAN noted that no further speakers remained on the list; the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.280) might therefore be put to the vote.

25. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tunisia) thought that members of the Committee had not yet had enough time to study the text of the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution. The principles set out in that proposal required close study, more especially as some of them had given rise to difficulties during the Geneva negotiations. He therefore thought it would be premature to take a vote immediately and accordingly formally moved the adjournment of the meeting.

*The motion was adopted by 45 votes to 30, with 17 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.