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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292) (continued)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280) (continued)

1. Mr. MATSCH (Austria) said that since, even in the most favourable circumstances, the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament would require at least two years and its implementation would take five years, a voluntary moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons, along the lines envisaged in the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), should be established in the meantime as a matter of urgency. The moratorium should be followed by a second interim undertaking, namely, a treaty banning tests under international control.

2. Although the Soviet Union argued that the question of halting nuclear tests must be resolved within the framework of general and complete disarmament, it had indicated in a recent memorandum (A/4892) that it was prepared to consider the possibility of reaching agreement in the meantime on measures to ease international tension and contribute to general and complete disarmament. His delegation felt that the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests could be one of the measures referred to. After three years of negotiation, the early completion of such a treaty should be possible. It should also be recalled that, in his statement before the General Assembly on 18 September 1959,^{1/} the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had said that the elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament should not delay the solution of the problem of discontinuing nuclear tests.

3. For the reasons he had set forth, his delegation supported the six-Power draft resolution and would support any draft resolution recommending the resumption of negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear tests under effective international control in order to bridge the unavoidable gap until the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the cessation of production of such weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament became a fact.

4. Mr. PAVICEVIC (Yugoslavia) said that the nuclear tests by France, the USSR and the United States were but one aspect of the general international situation, which was characterized by "brink of war" policies. Attempts had been made to justify nuclear testing on various grounds, such as national security, the defence of peace and the fact that the other side had already resumed testing. However, there could be no justification for nuclear testing, which was not a means of defending peace and security. The nuclear Powers were not entitled to disregard the rights and interests of other countries which were directly affected by their tests. His Government had always condemned all nuclear tests, irrespective of the country by which they were carried out.

5. The discontinuance of nuclear testing would be particularly effective as a partial disarmament measure, since it would have a limiting effect on the arms race without upsetting the present balance of power, could be readily implemented and would provide experience in regard to controls. In view of the menace of radio-active fall-out, it should be approached as a matter of great urgency.

6. He wished to emphasize that his Government regarded the cessation of nuclear testing as only a first step towards general and complete disarmament, not as an end in itself. It could be implemented either as a separate measure or in conjunction with other disarmament measures. To treat it as an end in itself, or to make it dependent on a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, would merely render it more difficult to achieve. The only really effective means of halting the present dangerous trend of world events was, of course, general and complete disarmament. His delegation was also fully aware that a treaty banning tests was superior to a voluntary moratorium. The problem of halting tests, however, was of particular gravity at the present time.

7. Although their motives were different, all the nuclear Powers were basically opposed to a moratorium on testing. An attempt was being made in some quarters to create the impression that a choice was being offered between the immediate conclusion of a formal test-ban treaty, on the one hand, and a test ban within a more comprehensive treaty, on the other. In reality, however, the nuclear Powers were offering the world nothing but a continuation of testing. The excessively protracted Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 799th meeting.

of Nuclear Weapons Tests had been constantly faced with obstacles and difficulties, including France's refusal to observe the moratorium; such insistence on testing while ostensibly negotiating had clearly impeded the great results that had been expected.

8. It could not be argued that the concept of a moratorium had been discredited simply because the original moratorium had been violated. The fault did not lie in the moratorium as such but rather in the countries which had failed to abide by it. Unless goodwill existed, even a formal treaty would meet with a similar fate and, in fact, could not be concluded in the first place. It was also untrue that the absence of controls had doomed the moratorium to failure. The moratorium had been violated openly; there had been no question of secret tests.

9. A new moratorium would facilitate negotiations both for a test-ban treaty and for an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The fundamental immediate issue, therefore, was whether or not nuclear testing was to be halted. It was immaterial whether a country used the question of a formal test-ban treaty or that of an agreement on general and complete disarmament as a pretext for opposing a new moratorium.

10. In the view of his delegation, the six-Power draft resolution, of which Yugoslavia was a sponsor, fully met the requirements of the present moment and the urgings of world opinion. The Committee's action in appealing to the Soviet Union not to explode a 50-megaton bomb was further evidence of the universal desire for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests.

11. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia), speaking on a point of order, moved under rule 117 of the rules of procedure that the Committee should temporarily adjourn the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 so as to undertake immediate discussion of draft resolution A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1. His delegation had voted for the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1) in the conviction that it had been an emergency resolution. However, it was essential that the Committee should extend its humanitarian appeal by calling on all the nuclear Powers to halt nuclear testing of every kind. The world stood on the brink of disaster and, as the Peruvian representative had observed (1176th meeting), it would lose confidence in the United Nations if it failed to act in the present emergency situation.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with the ruling he had made in a similar case two days earlier (1176th meeting), which had been upheld by the Committee, he would deal with the Ethiopian motion under rule 117, which provided that a motion should be immediately put to the vote after two representatives had spoken in its favour and two against it. In view of the fact that the question of voting procedure under rule 117 had been extensively debated on the earlier occasion and that the Committee had taken a decision on the matter, he hoped that the present motion would be considered in an orderly manner and in a spirit of mutual understanding.

13. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India), speaking in favour of the Ethiopian motion, noted that the support given by the United States and the United Kingdom to the eight-Power draft resolution, which appealed to the Soviet Union not to explode its 50-megaton bomb, appeared to indicate that they no longer considered that the possibility of an appeal going unheeded made it

useless. He hoped that they would maintain that view with respect to the more comprehensive appeal against nuclear testing contained in the six-Power draft resolution introduced by India (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1). For there was no reason to believe that other nuclear Powers would be more insensitive to the six-Power appeal than the Soviet Union to that of the eight Powers, which the Committee had endorsed; and it could not be suggested that the conscience of the world was roused only by the harmful effects of a 50-megaton test and not by the effects of tests of lesser magnitude.

14. The six-Power draft resolution was not directed merely against the 50-kiloton underground test by the United States; it was also directed against the continuing series of tests being conducted by the Soviet Union. Indeed, if its consideration had not been delayed by the effort to link it with the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280) in a joint debate, it could have been adopted some weeks earlier. Had it been adopted at that early date, it would—provided, of course, that the Soviet Union had responded to world pressure—have prevented the Soviet Union from conducting the remaining tests in its scheduled series, including one explosion believed to have been in the 30-megaton range, and it would only have prevented the United States from proceeding with the 50-kiloton underground tests. It would thus hardly have shown partiality for the Soviet Union. In fact, if the draft resolution had been adopted several weeks previously, it would have been more embarrassing for the USSR. If the USSR had disregarded the appeal and gone ahead with its test series, the United States and the United Kingdom might have been on stronger ground in justifying the resumption of tests, although India would have continued to plead with them to discontinue testing. Instead, those two great Powers had exerted every effort to prevent or delay adoption of the draft resolution. While India could understand the Soviet Union's opposition to an appeal which embarrassed it, it could not understand why the United States and the United Kingdom had been so vigorously opposed to its adoption. Their opposition could only mean that they regarded their own tests as immaterial, even though the cumulative effect of so many tests might be even more serious than that of a 50-megaton explosion.

15. The Norwegian Parliament had been more consistent: in its statement of 23 October 1961 (A/C.1/849) it had expressed shock at the resumption of Soviet testing, but it had condemned all nuclear tests and warned against further violations of "universal ethics".

16. The draft resolution which India had sponsored was unobjectionable and required no further discussion. To oppose its immediate adoption might lend some credence to the charge made by certain representatives that the appeal sponsored by eight States (A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1) and adopted by the Committee on 25 October had been only a political move.

17. Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria), speaking in favour of the Ethiopian motion, pointed out that his delegation's vote in favour of the eight-Power draft resolution was to be interpreted as an appeal not only against the explosion of a 50-megaton bomb but against all nuclear explosions. Nigeria was opposed to the testing of nuclear weapons of any size, by any State, in any environment. It was aware of the urgent need to save humanity from the suicidal nuclear arms race and, therefore, gave full support to the Ethiopian motion.

18. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) recalled that, after a lengthy debate, the Committee had decided to discuss agenda items 73 and 72 together. The reason for that decision had been that, whatever differences of approach there might be, the main purpose of both items was to stop nuclear tests. It was therefore logical to discuss the two items jointly and consider which of the two proposed solutions would be most effective. The Committee was now in the middle of its debate on those items and a number of delegations had not yet spoken. His delegation was therefore opposed to taking a vote on a draft resolution which related to only one of the possible solutions before the debate had been concluded. The draft resolution in question (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) called for a moratorium without making any mention of control. A decision on it at the present stage would prejudice the issue of whether an uncontrolled moratorium would be more effective than a treaty under international control.

19. The representative of Ethiopia had argued that a decision must be taken on the six-Power draft resolution immediately, because the problem was urgent. It was indeed true that a solution to the problem brooked no delay, but the question was to find the right solution. The representative of India himself had noted, at the 1175th meeting, that an immediate moratorium was unacceptable to the Powers most directly concerned. It would therefore be unprofitable and misleading for the Committee to vote at once on the six-Power draft resolution while postponing a decision on the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.280). There was no comparison between the six-Power draft resolution and the eight-Power draft resolution, which the Committee had already adopted, since the latter was concerned with a specific and immediate danger to world health.

20. For those reasons, his delegation was opposed to the Ethiopian motion.

21. Mr. DEMETROPOULOS (Greece) said that it would be impossible to discuss the two draft resolutions and the questions to which they related separately; for if priority was given to either, a representative speaking against that proposal would necessarily argue in favour of the other. His delegation was therefore opposed to the motion for adjournment.

22. The CHAIRMAN said that in accordance with his ruling on a similar case at the 1176th meeting, which had been supported by a majority vote in the Committee, no explanations of vote would be given before the vote.

23. He therefore put to the vote the Ethiopian representative's motion that the Committee should temporarily adjourn the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 and immediately take up discussion of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Sierra Leone, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville),

Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Senegal.

Against: South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Australia, Belgium, China, Costa Rica, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Portugal.

Abstaining: Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania.

The motion was adopted by 44 votes to 22, with 29 abstentions.

24. The CHAIRMAN said he would now call on representatives who wished to explain their votes.

25. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) recalled that at the 1176th meeting his delegation had voted against the similar motion made by the Iranian representative. It had been unable to vote for the Ethiopian motion for the same reasons. Although it disagreed with the procedure adopted, however, it fully supported the purpose behind the Ethiopian motion, and had therefore abstained.

26. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) reminded the Committee that at the 1177th meeting, during the discussion on the eight-Power draft resolution, his delegation had tried to introduce an appeal to all the nuclear Powers into the text. Since that attempt had failed, he had been in favour of putting what was now the six-Power draft resolution to the vote immediately after the eight-Power draft resolution. He shared the views put forward by the Ethiopian representative at the present meeting and those put forward by the Iranian representative at the 1176th meeting. If there was urgent need for an appeal to the Soviet Union about the 50-megaton bomb, there was an even greater need for an appeal to all the nuclear Powers about nuclear tests of every kind. That was why his delegation had voted for the Ethiopian motion.

27. It was unfortunate that some delegations which had voted in favour of the Iranian motion at the 1176th meeting had voted against the Ethiopian motion, which was very similar. The United Kingdom representative, in particular, had argued that the Committee must choose between the six-Power draft resolution calling for a moratorium and his own draft resolution calling for a treaty. There was no such dilemma: his delegation was in favour of both a moratorium and a treaty.

28. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) recalled that in the discussion on the order of agenda items his delegation had favoured giving priority to agenda item 73, but had objected to the fact that the original Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283) did not call for the conclusion of a treaty. After some discussion, the Indian delegation had produced the first revised version of that draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.1), which called upon the Powers concerned to establish internationally binding obligations for the cessation and prohibition of nuclear tests. The substance of that

provision had been kept in the second revised version (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1); and the exact nature of the provisions the treaty should contain was not an urgent question. His delegation had therefore voted in favour of the Ethiopian motion.

29. There was, however, an important difference between the first and second revised versions, in that the latter referred to agreements on general and complete disarmament as an alternative to agreements on tests. If that reference were maintained, the proposal for suspension, and consequently the draft resolution, would lose its urgency.

30. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) said that the Sudan had welcomed the voluntary moratorium undertaken by the nuclear Powers. In resolutions 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV) the General Assembly had urged them to continue that moratorium and his country had hoped that the great Powers would at last recognize their responsibility for keeping peace. Those hopes had been shattered by the resumption of tests. The situation was much more serious than when the voluntary moratorium had been adopted because the power of nuclear weapons had greatly increased. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had threatened to continue tests.

31. His delegation had always advocated the conclusion of treaties on the prohibition of the production and testing of nuclear weapons and on general and complete disarmament. The Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, had supported that view. But in the present circumstances time was of the essence, and the suspension of tests must be given priority. Even if, as had been said, a treaty could be signed within thirty days, there should still be a moratorium for that period. The immediate suspension of testing would create a better atmosphere for the negotiations preparatory to a treaty and would facilitate the resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament. His delegation fully supported the six-Power draft resolution, which in no way minimized the importance of a treaty, and had therefore voted for the Ethiopian motion.

32. Mr. TURBAY AYALA (Colombia) said that if the purpose of the Ethiopian motion had been to separate the discussion on the six-Power draft resolution from that on the treaty proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States, that purpose would not be achieved. The six-Power draft resolution called upon the nuclear Powers to conclude the necessary agreements, and discussion of the draft resolution would therefore inevitably involve the question of a treaty. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, but felt that nothing would be gained by giving it priority. It had therefore abstained on the Ethiopian motion.

33. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) explained that he had voted against the Ethiopian motion because his delegation continued to believe that the two items dealing with a ban on nuclear tests should be considered simultaneously. His vote should not be interpreted to mean that Japan did not recognize the urgency of an immediate suspension of nuclear weapons tests. His delegation would take an active part in the debate on the six-Power draft resolution.

34. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, moved that the Committee should decide to act on the United States-United Kingdom

draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280) immediately after having taken action on the six-Power draft (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), at the same meeting.

35. The CHAIRMAN, after pointing out that the debate on the items dealing with nuclear tests had been adjourned under rule 117, said that there was no explicit provision in the rules of procedure prohibiting the Committee from deciding to take up any matter. Accordingly, the United States motion could be put to the vote and discussion on it was in order. The number of speakers on the motion would not be limited.

36. Mr. KALONJI (Congo, Leopoldville), observing that all the members of the Committee were agreed on the common objective, namely, to prevail upon the nuclear Powers to cease all tests, appealed to those who had abstained or voted against the Ethiopian motion to join the other members of the Committee in inviting the nuclear Powers to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. He felt that immediately after taking action on the six-Power draft resolution, the Committee might address a telegram to all the nuclear Powers urging them not to explode any more nuclear bombs.

37. His delegation was particularly concerned at the prospect of a 50-megaton explosion on 31 October, and hoped that the appeal in the eight-Power draft resolution, which had been adopted by the Committee, would be heeded.

38. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana), raising a point of order, moved the closure of the debate on the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) under rule 118, and requested that the draft resolution should be put to the vote immediately.

39. He justified his motion by pointing out that the proposal had been fully discussed during the debate on the order of agenda items, and that it was a matter of urgency to approve an appeal to all the nuclear Powers to refrain from exploding any more nuclear weapons. To refute the argument that such an appeal had no value because one voluntary moratorium had already been violated, he reiterated the view he had previously expressed (1175th meeting) that if the United Nations, which presumably reflected the conscience of the world, were to refrain from making an appeal on those grounds, its *raison d'être* would be cast into doubt.

40. The CHAIRMAN said that he would put to the vote the motion for the closure of the debate on the six-Power draft resolution after the Committee had decided the matter of the United States motion.

41. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru), speaking on a point of order, protested against the motion for the closure of the debate on the six-Power draft resolution. In point of fact, the debate on that proposal had not even begun and the Ethiopian motion just adopted called for its consideration before a vote was taken on it. Peru deemed a discussion thereon essential, and would be forced to vote against it if such discussion were not allowed.

42. The Peruvian delegation was particularly eager to discuss the six-Power text in the hope that the sponsors would agree to eliminate a fundamental defect in the second revised version (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2). Operative paragraph 2 of that version called for an indefinite moratorium on testing, because it urged the nuclear Powers to refrain from further test explosions "pending the conclusion of necessary

internationally binding agreements in regard to tests or general and complete disarmament". Peru, for one, favoured a limited moratorium, which would end as soon as a specific treaty banning tests was concluded. If the reference to general and complete disarmament were deleted from the second revised version, Peru would be in a position to vote for it.

43. The CHAIRMAN, seeking to clarify the procedural situation, suggested that the motion for the closure of the debate on the six-Power draft resolution could be discussed when the Committee had actually begun consideration of that text.

44. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba), speaking on a point of order, contended that the United States motion, to the effect that the Committee should act on the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280) immediately following action on the six-Power draft, was out of order because it came within the framework of the debate which had been adjourned by a decision of the Committee. The Committee should deal first with the motion by Ghana to close the debate on the six-Power draft resolution.

45. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) suggested that the Committee should deal with the United States motion after it had disposed of the six-Power draft resolution.

46. Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria), speaking on a point of order, supported the Peruvian position that the debate on the six-Power text could not properly be closed until it had effectively begun. Moreover, while he did not oppose the United States motion, he considered that it should be reintroduced after the Committee had completed action on the six-Power draft resolution and had resumed the general debate on the two items dealing with nuclear tests.

47. Mr. MARTINO (Italy) pointed out that the procedural situation in which the Committee found itself was rather complicated. By adopting the Ethiopian motion, it had adjourned the debate on the first two items of its agenda. Accordingly, the representative of Ghana could not validly move the closure of the debate on a draft resolution representing a conclusion of a debate which had been adjourned. In order to allow time to resolve the complexities of the procedural situation, he moved the adjournment of the meeting.

The motion for the adjournment of the meeting was adopted by 53 votes to 26, with 14 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.