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Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443, A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-6, A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.446, A/C.1/L.448)

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Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (*continued*) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327, A/C.1/976)

1. Mr. EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic): The First Committee is considering in its current debate five agenda items connected with the question of disarmament. While the wide range of these items reveals the complexity of the subject of disarmament, it serves at the same time to

underline the urgent need for the intensification of efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, a goal adopted by the fourteenth session of the General Assembly in 1959 as one to be actively sought and to be agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

2. Whatever differences may exist on varying concepts, approaches and emphasis, whatever differences may exist on the timing and phasing of the different stages and steps involved in the inherently complex process of disarmament, whatever differences may exist on the priorities to be established among the various collateral measures of disarmament, little difference can exist among us on the urgent character of disarmament and the central position it occupies in contemporary international problems and present-day international institutions.

3. This central position of disarmament derives from its organic relationship with and reciprocal influence on the maintenance of international peace and security, which is the basic purpose and the primary function of the United Nations. For the continuation of the arms race confronts mankind with an incalculable peril and putting an end to such a race becomes, therefore, an urgent and overwhelming interest of the human race in sheer survival.

4. As efforts towards disarmament progress, these efforts generate a sense of security and trust among States which, in turn, become instrumental in the achievement of further progress in disarmament. The interaction between disarmament on the one hand, and the lessening of international tensions and the consolidation of confidence among States, on the other, was affirmed in the joint statement of agreed principles on disarmament,¹ and in the concept of collateral measures as elaborated by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Basic to this concept is the determination of the world Organization to prevent aggression, and once it is committed, to repel it, and eliminate its consequences. The strict enforcement of the guarantee of territorial integrity of all States as embodied in the Charter and the effective implementation of the collective security system as elaborated in the United Nations system, are essential for the prevention of aggression and for putting an end to violations of the basic norms of the Charter relating to the prohibition of the use of force and the inadmissibility of conquest by war.

5. The impact of disarmament on the shaping of international relations is by no means confined to the field of peace and security. For if the continuation of the arms race presents an incalculable peril, disarmament presents an incalculable promise.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

6. The unlimited resources—economic, technological and human—which are at present undertaken for the purpose of the arms race would, in a disarmed world, be released and re-channelled for the attainment of accelerated economic development and social progress, and for the pursuit of the art and institutions of peace and co-operation.

7. Since the First Committee last met and deliberated on disarmament matters, a number of significant developments and achievements in the field of disarmament have taken place. The successful conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] after ten years of efforts in the United Nations and in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must be regarded as a major positive event. As stated by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report, the treaty “has been acclaimed as ‘the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began’, and as ‘a major success for the cause of peace’”.²

8. The United Arab Republic was one of the first to sign the non-proliferation Treaty as evidence of the importance we attach to that Treaty. Bearing in mind the special character of the Treaty and the considerations of security which underlie it, a universal binding scope is essential for its effective implementation. It is therefore to be hoped that all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, will see their way to becoming parties to the Treaty and that it will enter into force without significant delay. Under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, parties to it bind themselves “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. That article has been rightly termed “crucial”. Nuclear disarmament is, and will continue to be, the most urgent and important undertaking in the field of disarmament. Of particular significance are the declarations of intentions by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States that they would provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used, and the adoption of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) on the question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

9. Another development of major significance in the field of disarmament is the convening of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States last August. The fact that the Conference was attended by ninety-two non-nuclear-weapon States and four nuclear-weapon States attests to the importance that the international community attached to the problems that were the main preoccupations of that Conference. The Conference addressed itself to the twin problems of the security of non-nuclear Powers and the question of international co-operation in harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. That Conference, the convening of which was supported by the United Arab Republic delegation through its vote in favour of resolution 2153 B (XXI), represented an achievement the results of which are set forth in its final document and in the fourteen resolutions it adopted. I shall not go into any

analysis of the conclusions and recommendations of that Conference. My delegation hopes to address itself to that important question at an appropriate opportunity in the future. What I do feel I ought to state, however, is that the Conference has made a most valuable contribution to the efforts that are being exerted to achieve progress in the field of disarmament and international co-operation for the harnessing of nuclear energy for peaceful use. The report of that Conference [*A/7277 and Corr.1*] is now before this Committee for consideration and it now remains for the General Assembly to ensure the continuity of the work undertaken by the Conference. My delegation is receptive to any proposal on this score and is actively considering proposals which have been brought to its attention. We shall at a later stage make our views known, after consultations on this subject have matured.

10. The two important developments I referred to, namely, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the non-proliferation Treaty, have stressed the significant role that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United Arab Republic has always acknowledged the importance of this international body and will continue to give it every support. We believe that IAEA has been called upon now and requested by the non-proliferation Treaty and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to intensify its efforts in the two most crucial fields of the atom in so far as the developing countries are concerned: firstly in promoting international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy and secondly in endeavouring to ensure the peaceful nature of the uses of the atom. We hope that all countries will continue to intensify their support for and co-operation with IAEA in its strengthened role and extended responsibilities.

11. Another welcome development to which I should like to refer is the agreement already reached between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions regarding the reduction in the deployment of both offensive and defensive missile systems. We join the appeal made by a number of representatives who preceded me to the leading nuclear-weapon Powers to begin these bilateral discussions at the earliest possible time.

12. I wish to turn now to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for the period 16 July to 28 August 1968.³ My delegation takes note of the statement contained in paragraph 19 of that report that

“Because of the comparative shortness of this session, the Committee reports that it has not been able to give comprehensive consideration to the matters before it”.

Since the United Arab Republic is a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it goes without saying that my delegation agrees with the priority delineated by that Committee. My delegation believes that special significance should be attached to the conclusion reached by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in paragraph 21 of its report that “first priority in its

² *Ibid.*, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 15.

³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

work should be given to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". This conclusion flows from the non-proliferation Treaty itself, which commits the nuclear countries to pursue negotiations in good faith to that end.

13. The next item of priority to be dealt with in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must be the completion of the Moscow Treaty of 1963⁴ with a ban on underground nuclear test explosions. As is evident from its report to the Assembly, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during its short summer session had a valuable discussion on the subject of a comprehensive test ban. The General Assembly has for many years recognized that a comprehensive test ban would constitute an effective measure of disarmament. It has, as a matter of fact, given this measure a special priority alongside the now concluded item of non-proliferation. The eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have this year again found it necessary to point out in a special joint memorandum,⁵ presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and attached to its report, the urgent need for renewed efforts to conclude such a treaty. The Assembly also must once again adopt a resolution to this effect.

14. It is now generally recognized that progress in the identification of seismic events has reduced to manageable proportions the issue of verification of a comprehensive test. The Secretary-General states in the introduction to his annual report:

"It is, indeed, to be hoped that improved instrumentation, international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, and the use of statistical methods can provide a control system sufficiently reliable to deter parties to an agreement from violating such an agreement."⁶

15. My delegation followed with deep interest the valuable information provided by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her statement on 18 November [1609th meeting], on the meetings of an unofficial character which took place in Sweden during the past year between leading members from several countries of the Scientific Community of Seismologists. My delegation wishes to pay tribute to the Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm which organized those meetings.

16. My delegation, along with nine other delegations, has proposed a resolution on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests contained in document A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1 and 2, which has already been placed before this Committee by the representative of Ethiopia, which, we hope, will be unanimously approved by this Committee.

⁴ Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 10.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 A*, para. 22.

17. Item 2 on the agenda adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament⁷ deals with chemical and bacteriological weapons. The United Arab Republic has consistently opposed all weapons of mass destruction and fully supports the idea of the total prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. My country was one of the first signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.⁸ My delegation believes in the continuing importance and validity of the Protocol. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the United Arab Republic voted for resolution 2162 B (XXI), which called for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol and urged those States which had not acceded to it to do so. My delegation supports the proposal made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament⁹ that the Secretary-General appoint a group of internationally known scientific experts in each of the two fields of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to report on the state of their present development and the effects of their possible use. As rightly pointed out by the representative of India, Mr. Husain, in his statement on 28 November:

"It is necessary that the international community be made aware of the nature and possible effects of the use of these weapons of mass destruction..." [1624th meeting, para. 66.]

18. My delegation is gratified to note the welcome given by the Secretary-General to the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament regarding the appointment of a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. The arguments in favour of such a study were cogently marshalled by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report:

"The question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question of nuclear weapons, which have a destructive power several orders of magnitude greater than that of chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons."¹⁰

19. With a view to carrying out the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament concerning a thorough study of the problems connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons, my delegation, along with eighteen other delegations, has proposed a resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-6 which was introduced by the representative of Poland and which we hope will receive the favourable consideration and approval of the Committee.

⁷ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

⁸ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

⁹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 A*, para. 30.

20. Due to the short time at its disposal during its last session, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament could not discuss substantively the item concerning the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. At the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, my delegation was one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2344 (XXII). This resolution requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament "to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America". It further requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament "to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the progress achieved on the question".

21. The position of the United Arab Republic on foreign military bases has been clearly and repeatedly defined before this Committee. We are opposed to the establishment of foreign military bases because they belong to the pre-Charter era of colonial domination and spheres of influence; they violate the principle of sovereign equality and constitute a source of friction among nations and contribute to the aggravation of international tension. These concepts have been consistently reflected in the resolutions and declarations of the Organization of African Unity and of the conferences of non-aligned States in which the United Arab Republic participated and to whose principles it firmly adheres.

22. The United Arab Republic has also consistently opposed the use of nuclear weapons and has advocated their total prohibition. It should be recalled that as early as 1961 the General Assembly of the United Nations at its sixteenth session, on the initiative of Ethiopia, adopted a declaration that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons was a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and that any State using such weapons was to be considered as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization [*see General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI)*].

23. At the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, and upon the initiative of the Soviet Union, resolution 2289 (XXII) was adopted, expressing the need to make new efforts aimed at continuing "urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention". The resolution also contained an appeal to all States "to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention . . . proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . and to undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States".

24. My delegation has supported those resolutions and will continue to lend its active support to all efforts aimed at expediting the attainment of the objective set out in them.

25. My delegation notes that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons figures as the first of the nine points

contained in the memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [*A/7134*] on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament. This memorandum projects the different problems relating to disarmament in such a comprehensive and interrelated manner so as to render it a greatly valuable document in the consideration of the problem of disarmament. We wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the initiative which the Soviet delegation has consistently taken and for the efforts it has tirelessly made in the field of disarmament.

26. Having defined the position of my delegation on the different items related to disarmament which are on the agenda, I wish now to indicate our position on draft resolution A/C.1/L.446 submitted by the delegations of Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Norway. It will be recalled that a similar proposal¹¹ was made in 1965 in the First Committee by one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, which was rejected by 19 votes to 18, with 39 abstentions. The result of that vote is self-explanatory. It reveals clearly that an overwhelming majority of the members of the Committee entertain serious doubts as to the advisability of the introduction of such a proposal.

27. My task in presenting the case of those who oppose draft resolution A/C.1/L.446 is much easier today, since the arguments were marshalled, with greater cogency than I could do, by the representative of India, Mr. Husain, in his statement before the Committee on 28 November [*1624th meeting*]. In this statement, Mr. Husain set forth in masterly fashion with scholarly analysis a history of the question of the registration of arms trading and related matters, in the light of the experience of the League of Nations, as well as the efforts of the United Nations in the first year of its existence in relation to information about armaments.

28. The partial and discriminatory character of draft resolution A/C.1/L.446 and the adverse effects it may have on a certain group of States, and in particular small States, has been established in the analogies presented by the representative of India. I would therefore centre my remarks on the partial and mechanical approach which the draft resolution pursues in relation to the problem of local wars.

29. The draft resolution injects the complex problem of local wars in such a manner that it does not take full account of the different aspects of local wars and the respective positions of the parties thereto. Any adequate consideration of such a problem must take into full account the following facts.

30. First, the causes of local wars lie in the facts that a number of peoples are still denied their inherent right of self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and that certain States still violate the territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States, in violation of the basic norms of international law.

31. Second, there is the fact that a mechanical approach to the question of the provision of arms to States in local

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 28, document A/C.1/L.347.

wars, which would result in the equating of peoples struggling for their independence and self-determination and States defending their territorial integrity with those who oppose peoples struggling for their independence, is not in accordance with the principles of the Charter. A mechanical approach to this question would result in an inequality in favour of the culprit party and in imposing restrictions to the detriment of the wronged party.

32. I should be less than candid if I did not indicate to the co-sponsors of this draft resolution that their draft, sharply controversial as it is, divides the house and is not of such a nature as to expedite our work at a time when we need to mobilize all our energies to review the situation of disarmament and take up with firmness of purpose those questions which are more urgent and more susceptible of early agreement. The draft resolution creates more problems than it seeks to solve. I therefore join in the earnest appeal addressed by the representatives of Saudi Arabia and India to the co-sponsors, that they withdraw their draft resolution.

33. In conclusion, I wish to sum up the position of my delegation. The successful conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty was an event of major importance. We must take full advantage of the momentum generated by that major event. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has now the duty, and the possibility, of completing the Moscow test ban Treaty. We hope that the Committee will also review its work and review the proposals that have been submitted, and those that may be submitted, in order to define its programme, in particular its programme on nuclear disarmament.

34. Never in the history of mankind has the world been so filled with tensions as it is today. We recognize that in those tensions lies a force which can, if uncontrolled, move the world towards utter disaster, or which can, on the other hand, if challenged constructively, speed progress towards even a better world than we had before and, perhaps, a better world than we have dared to dream of.

35. Mr. BUSNIAK (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from French*): The general discussion of disarmament problems in our Committee has clearly confirmed that it is not merely desirable but necessary to begin forthwith constructive negotiations on problems whose solution would have a positive effect on the present international situation and bring us a little closer to our final objective—general and complete disarmament.

36. Now that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which should be implemented as soon as possible, has been concluded, other urgent questions remain to be settled. My delegation believes that priority should be given to those whose solution depends essentially on a political decision by the interested parties. We should solve the least complicated problems first, and then take up more complex questions, which are related to other problems. In any case, we should continue without delay the process begun by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and earlier agreements. Otherwise, we might be too late to take advantage of the favourable psychological conditions created by that Treaty; moreover, that instrument, drafted

with so much difficulty, might remain alone in its field and thereby lose some of its value.

37. We have an appropriate mechanism for studying and discussing disarmament problems in all their complexity—the Geneva Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, on which the different groups of countries are represented. Despite the criticism levelled against it for various reasons and despite some shortcomings in its work—but what organ can be said to have none?—the Committee's activities and its results are such, in my opinion, as to offer sufficient guarantee that it will study and deal with disarmament problems in a responsible and competent manner. Its agenda for next year, adopted unanimously and referred to us for examination,¹² is ample proof that the Committee's efforts are directed towards the most important questions requiring a rapid solution.

38. In this connexion, I should like to associate myself with the view expressed in our debate that it would be unwise to establish new organs to deal with the same problems as existing organs which they would replace or whose work they would duplicate. These existing organs have acquired a certain experience and yielded significant results. It would therefore be more reasonable to create the necessary conditions to enable the existing organs to do their work still better and to lend them all necessary aid in their activities. In my view, that is the proper way to remedy the situation, rather than through a proliferation of organs, especially as those now in existence are not being used to their full potential.

39. My delegation takes a similar position on the proposals to set up, without regard to the ten years' existence of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its considerable achievements, other bodies which would deal with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, conceivably, with co-operation and co-ordination of different projects in that field. The arguments in favour of these plans advanced in our Committee were not convincing.

40. Since we have a suitable organ in which any useful proposals regarding disarmament can be taken up, may I add that there is also no lack of subjects for it to take up. We have before us a series of specific suggestions whose adoption would slow up, and eventually end, the arms race, thereby greatly reducing the risks of a nuclear conflict. These proposals, *inter alia*, appear in the Memorandum of the USSR Government of 1 July 1968 [A/7134]. This Memorandum stresses in particular measures relating to nuclear disarmament—the key, in my opinion, to the entire vast problem of disarmament. This is in full accord with the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee which also, and quite rightly, accords priority to this group of questions. At the same time, the Memorandum neither omits nor relegates to the background measures relating to conventional disarmament, including such important measures as prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, regional disarmament, and the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

41. For Czechoslovakia, which is situated in the centre of Europe, where the two mightiest military blocs of our day

¹² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

meet face to face, the question of regional disarmament is of especial importance, as are measures to exclude nuclear weapons from this zone. That is why we were unreservedly in favour of banning the spread of nuclear weapons of any kind to States which do not have them. We are alarmed by the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany has not yet signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, one of the measures that would result in keeping nuclear weapons out of central Europe. Decision by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to add its signature to those of over eighty Governments already affixed to that important instrument would be a considerable contribution to the common effort. Moreover, I am certain that such a decision would have a favourable effect on the process of ratification and greatly hasten the Treaty's entry into force.

42. Now that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been signed, it should be possible, I believe, to agree on a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and underground testing. In both cases, what is needed, in the main, is a political decision by the great nuclear Powers. By taking such a decision, these Powers would simultaneously offer another important safeguard to the non-nuclear-weapon States and conclusive evidence of their determination to implement the provisions of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty that have been cited here on so many occasions. There is no need to add that these measures would have a most salutary effect throughout the world and would make it easier for non-nuclear-weapon States to sign other disarmament agreements. My delegation is, however, perfectly aware that only complete destruction of all nuclear stockpiles and cessation of their manufacture could really free mankind of the threat of nuclear war. That is precisely the end objective of the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons¹³ and of the other measures proposed. One of these measures is to be discussed at the forthcoming bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and reduction of means of delivery of offensive strategic nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic-missile systems. It would be well if these talks were held soon, as the development of means of delivery has a direct bearing on that of nuclear warheads and, at the same time, on the continuation of underground testing. Unless these problems are settled, it would be difficult to proceed to a systematic reduction and ultimate destruction of the nuclear stockpiles.

43. For all these reasons, my delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/L.443 submitted on 12 November last by the USSR delegation.

44. At this stage in the debate, I have no intention of analysing in detail the problems which I have mentioned and which, no doubt, will be carefully examined by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on which my country has the honour of being represented. My delegation will, as in the past, take active part in that Committee's work, expound at length my Government's position on the problems examined and co-operate with the other members in a spirit of initiative.

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 96, document A/6834.

45. May I, nevertheless, before concluding, say a few words on the question which today is foremost among the problems of non-nuclear disarmament; namely, the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. I am not raising a new point. Others have given well-merited praise to the various delegations that took the initiative of submitting draft resolution A/C.1/L.444, which in the end had twenty sponsors. My delegation strongly supports that draft resolution. I would emphasize in this connexion that some years ago, as part of the Pugwash movement, a working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Ivan Malek, member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, was set up on the initiative of Czechoslovak representatives. This group's mandate was to study the problems relating to chemical and bacteriological weapons and to propose measures to prevent the manufacture and use of such weapons. Use should certainly be made of the findings of that group of scientists in studying the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons—surely a problem in urgent need of attention. In dealing with it, my delegation believes that the 1925 Geneva Protocol¹⁴ should be taken as a basis and as a starting point for any necessary improvements. It therefore feels that the Protocol, to which Czechoslovakia acceded at the time of its adoption, should be signed by all States.

46. These are the brief remarks my delegation wished to make with regard to the complex problem of disarmament.

47. Mr. HAYMERLE (Austria): This is the third time that we have had the opportunity, this year, to address ourselves to the major aspects of the disarmament question.

48. In May and June we had such an opportunity during the long discussions leading to the elaboration and finally the endorsement of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In August and September the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in Geneva provided a most useful opportunity to reappraise the situation. The present debate in the General Assembly will now permit, on the basis of the non-proliferation Treaty, and in the light of the discussions of the Geneva Conference, a new dialogue between all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear, and on all aspects of the disarmament problem.

49. I believe that the basic attitude which my country adopted in respect of the wide field of disarmament, an attitude which it has constantly maintained over the years, is well known to the members of this Committee. We advocated from the beginning a cessation of the arms race to be followed by concrete measures of disarmament, nuclear as well as non-nuclear, leading then to an over-all system of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

50. It is our firm belief that we must do everything in our power to achieve those goals and support all initiatives and measures conducive to this end. In the past years we have already been able to achieve some encouraging results in this respect. Let me refer to the Moscow Treaty,¹⁵ the

¹⁴ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

¹⁵ See foot-note 4.

Antarctic Treaty,¹⁶ the Treaty of Tlatelolco¹⁷ and the outer space Treaty.¹⁸ This year we have been able to make another important step forward which can be credited to the joint efforts undertaken under the United Nations auspices—I am speaking of the non-proliferation Treaty.

51. Austria has always advocated a treaty preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We welcomed the non-proliferation Treaty at the special session in June. Austria has signed it. Ratification, in accordance with Austria's constitutional procedures, is now under way. We hope it will enter into force as soon as possible. However, the non-proliferation Treaty is indeed one of the most complex political instruments ever drafted within the United Nations. It is perhaps due to this complexity that the Treaty has so far not become effective. It appears that some Governments are of the opinion that a sufficient number of States must have ratified the Treaty and that it must have entered into force before any steps to implement it can be taken. Other Governments obviously hesitate to ratify the non-proliferation Treaty, or to accede to it, unless they are given assurances that certain other States will also ratify it. Others, again, are striving for concrete indications assuring them that the obligations of the non-proliferation Treaty will, indeed, be carried out by all parties, including nuclear Powers in particular. This situation however might easily lead to a deadlock.

52. When the non-proliferation Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature, we all were of the opinion that this Treaty would soon become effective and would constitute a great stimulus for other disarmament measures as well as for the immediate strengthening of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

53. It seems to my delegation that at this moment we risk, due to manifold reasons, losing this momentum. The non-proliferation Treaty constitutes by itself an act of faith. Non-proliferation will only become a reality when the States which are to renounce the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons will have confidence that they will not be exposed to a threat or use of force in the settlement of international disputes. The problem of security, as this discussion has again revealed, is indeed to many nations a source of very real preoccupation.

54. If the non-proliferation Treaty is to become a reality we shall have to join our efforts—nuclear Powers and non-nuclear States alike—to re-establish a climate of mutual confidence. In order to create that climate, steps outside of the non-proliferation Treaty, but in its concept, will be of great influence and importance. This will be true in respect of measures of disarmament taken in the same spirit in which article VI was conceived. It would equally be true in respect of measures in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy as envisaged in articles IV and V. Such measures, both in the field of disarmament and in the field of

peaceful uses of nuclear energy, can be carried out even before the actual entry into force of the Treaty. It is the nuclear Powers in particular which we believe could take effective steps in this respect.

55. In the light of these considerations I should like to turn now to the problems of disarmament proper, as they appear in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty and, in particular, of article VI. Here of course our attention is focused on the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

56. We have taken note with satisfaction that the Eighteen-Nation Committee drew up a list of priorities for its future deliberations, and that among the various items to be discussed first priority will be given to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

57. We have also taken note, with much hope, of the agreement reached between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States earlier this year to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. We sincerely regret that events which have taken place since this agreement have so far prevented these discussions from taking place. We appeal to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter into the proposed bilateral discussions at an early date. Progress on this issue would not only constitute a step of major importance in efforts to halt the nuclear arms race, but would also be evidence of the intentions of the two great Powers to implement the provisions of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, an evidence urgently needed in the sense I have already indicated. May I, in this context, also recall resolution D of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [*see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III)*], urging that negotiations take place at an early date.

58. We also welcome the further efforts which the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament gave to the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. Austria has always given its support to the efforts calling for a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests. We welcomed the Moscow Treaty, to which we are a party, as a decisive step forward, and we hope that further efforts will lead to an agreement on halting underground nuclear-weapon tests also.

59. We are, of course, fully aware of the fact that the main difficulty in this field is how to find an appropriate solution for the problem of verification. We would, however, believe that there should be no insurmountable obstacles, particularly as we are told that there are new technical and scientific means recently developed for the verification of seismic events. We listened most carefully to the statements of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and others who commented favourably on the results of the seismic study group of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research. The technical details concerning it which are set forth in the summary of the report of that group¹⁹

¹⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

¹⁷ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 91, document A/C.1/946.

¹⁸ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 6.

are indeed encouraging. Moreover, the United Kingdom delegation has advanced, during the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, noteworthy proposals²⁰ which should also be carefully studied.

60. While urging the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests we cannot, however, but recall with regret that there are still nuclear tests conducted in the atmosphere. Further tests of this nature have taken place during the past year. It is only appropriate, we believe, that when we urge a halt in the underground testing of nuclear weapons, we should also urge a cessation of all further tests in the atmosphere or in other environments.

61. Another field where disarmament efforts would produce fruitful results appears to lie in the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In our statement in this Committee last year we called attention to this problem which, during the past two decades, had been overshadowed by the problem of nuclear weapons. We welcome the renewed interest which this question has now received both at the Geneva negotiations and from the Secretary-General.

62. Guided by these considerations we have joined, therefore, with other delegations in presenting to the Committee a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-6 which would urge a study by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, of all aspects of that question. We hope that this proposal will receive the unanimous support of the Committee which we feel it deserves. We recall the impressive report²¹ which the Secretary-General, with the help of experts, was able to present to us some time ago on the consequences of the possible use of nuclear weapons. We feel that a concise and factual report on chemical and biological weapons would be of equal interest and impact.

63. We attach equal importance to other problems in the wide field of disarmament. I refer in particular to the comprehensive memorandum [A/7134] which the Government of the Soviet Union presented in July of this year and which is now a separate item on our agenda. This memorandum has also been inserted by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament into its report to the General Assembly.²² We are convinced that the proposals contained in the memorandum deserve special attention. We are confident that our deliberations here will create a realistic basis for further concrete consideration of these proposals by the Eighteen Nation Committee at its next series of negotiations in Geneva.

64. I should now like to turn to the second main aspect of the items now under consideration, namely the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Evidently this question is intimately linked with the outcome of the Conference of

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which was held in Geneva during the month of September.

65. Let me begin, by saying that we have found the deliberations of the Geneva Conference of considerable value. The Conference has not only led to a number of resolutions which can now serve as guidelines for Member States and international organizations in their future work. The Conference has also brought clarification on several issues, and a number of new and interesting ideas were presented in its context. Furthermore, it has led in many aspects to a common thinking on the problems involved.

66. Certain doubts have been expressed as to the usefulness of that Conference. We feel that it was a useful conference and we should like to pay a tribute in this connexion to all those responsible for its organization, and in particular to the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Arshad Husain, who served with such distinction as President of the Conference.

67. The Conference adopted a number of resolutions and a declaration [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17]. While the declaration sets forth general principles, the resolutions deal with specific questions, are addressed to specific addressees, namely States or intergovernmental bodies, and call for specific action. Swift action in conformity with these resolutions is now necessary, in order not to lose the momentum created by the Conference. And we do feel that this momentum must be maintained.

68. This, I believe is a wish common to all States which participated in the Geneva Conference. Where a difference of opinion seems to exist is the question of how we should best proceed and what course of action would be most conducive to a speedy implementation of the resolutions adopted in Geneva.

69. We, for our part, feel—and we know that in this respect we are not alone—that these resolutions should now be transmitted, as soon as possible, to the Governments and to the international bodies to which they are addressed. Those concerned will then act in accordance with these resolutions, and will report on their action to the General Assembly, in time for consideration at its next session. We think we should also ask the Secretary-General to submit to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly a comprehensive report on the implementation of the resolutions of the Geneva Conference.

70. Such a report, we believe, would enable us at the twenty-fourth session to have a clear picture of how the resolutions adopted in Geneva were implemented, and to decide what further action might appear warranted. Before we have these reports, before we know what concrete measures have been taken on our recommendations, we believe it would be premature to entrust other bodies of the General Assembly with functions in this field. This, in our opinion, might easily duplicate and complicate the work of those organizations and bodies which, in accordance with the Geneva resolutions, are now called upon to act. In the light of their action we shall be able to decide whether it is necessary to entrust other organs with specific tasks which the organizations and bodies now engaged in the implementation might not have discharged.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, sect. 8.

²¹ *Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).

²² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 3.

71. In conclusion, let me express our hope that agreement will be reached in this Committee as to the continuation of the work begun in Geneva. It appears imperative to us that all action in this field should be based on joint and united efforts of all countries, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. This, we are confident, would ensure that in this crucial question we will find together the road which will lead us into a common and secure future.

72. Mr. TURBAY-AYALA (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): In this debate practically nothing has been left unsaid, and I am sure my approach is no different from that of those who as human beings have an understandable feeling of insecurity in the face of the headlong arms race. I too am a prey to the terror engendered by the fact that it takes far more time to produce any international instrument than to manufacture hundreds of thousands of weapons of mass destruction. However, I believe that we cannot afford to hesitate in the continued search for collective security measures.

73. There are subjects that seem to be jaded by constant repetition, though many of them are as topical and significant as ever they were. One of these subjects is disarmament, which has always been of concern to mankind and will continue to be discussed until the world succeeds in attaining the remote goal of general and complete disarmament under international control.

74. A widespread sense of insecurity can be detected in all the peoples of the world, for with the sole exception of the super-Powers, there is no people in a position to face alone the risk of aggression perpetrated with weapons of mass destruction. For want of universal safeguards, States bind themselves in defensive military pacts whose very existence highlights the danger and the real possibility of war.

75. My delegation realizes, of course, that it is not easy to replace the prevailing sense of fear overnight by one of absolute confidence and security. We recognize that there are vast contradictions among the great Powers and that despite their strength they cannot move with absolute freedom. They are prisoners of the very circumstances they have tried to overcome. The finest fruits of their efforts are the Moscow Test Ban Treaty²³ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. Both instruments could afford to be rounded off, the Moscow Treaty by extending the prohibition to underground tests, and the non-proliferation Treaty by implementing the pledges on the drafting of new disarmament measures.

76. There is no justification for misgivings regarding the non-proliferation Treaty, except as to whether it will be implemented. We believe that its implementation offers ample opportunity to ease international tension and to open the sluice-gates of progress to all nations through the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

77. In a world as swift-moving as it is today, we have to act promptly if people are not to be the victims of events,

with all their foreseeable and dramatic consequences. Delay in devising new disarmament measures will inevitably give a fillip to the infernal arms race which has turned our planet into the most gruesome arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. The great Powers possess more weapons today than they could possibly use in the undesirable event of a confrontation of their destructive power. It is a sad state of affairs where there are too many weapons in the arsenals while multitudes of poor people lack food and shelter.

78. My delegation considers that the function of the small countries in regard to a topic as broad as that of disarmament must be focused on mobilizing public opinion so as to create a universal awareness that will goad the great Powers on to draw up agreements leading to general and complete disarmament.

79. Without wishing to try to examine the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with the depth and mastery with which they were analysed by the representative of Pakistan [*1610th meeting*] and the representative of Italy [*1609th meeting*] in particular, I feel I should make one or two comments on that extremely important Conference. Let me say that, in the opinion of my delegation, many of the aspirations and worries that exercise the vast majority of States were crystallized at Geneva. A glance at the resolutions of the Conference [*A/7277, para. 17*] indicates that all of them tend to strengthen the co-operation and understanding between the non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear Powers. At no time was there any attempt at a confrontation between the two worlds; their interests are after all not mutually exclusive, they are complementary. The great Powers need the backing and the co-operation of the medium-sized and small nations in seeking peace, and these in their turn cannot hope without help from the great Powers to make headway towards achieving the social and economic objectives of a modern society in which technology in the service of the community can guarantee for everybody standards of well-being in keeping with the dignity of the human person.

80. The non-nuclear-weapon States placed special emphasis on two fundamental points: (a) security measures and (b) the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Both can be considered as the natural evolution of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

81. My delegation is convinced that as the great Powers implement the policy of co-operation with the medium-sized and small nations envisaged in the non-proliferation Treaty and designed to allow all countries free access to the sources of nuclear technology, sound and indestructible bonds of solidarity will be formed between the two worlds. Obviously international co-operation in this field cannot be limited to mere technical assistance; it must be of an all-round nature. A policy of liberal credits to promote and extend the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes becomes more and more urgent each day, for the States left behind in world nuclear technology will be struck a tremendous scientific and economic blow. At the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States my country contended that the stage of nuclear planning as an essential and complementary part of economic planning has now been reached at the world level.

²³ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

82. As stated at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, we consider that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Vienna can satisfactorily handle the new commitments and obligations arising for those States from the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. The strengthening of IAEA is a goal of all States interested in the development or acquisition of nuclear technology. Naturally the Agency at Vienna could be improved by a healthy reform of its internal structure. In my delegation's view it would be a grave error to waste the vast potentialities and the valuable experience of IAEA.

83. The aims as expressed at the Conference and in the non-proliferation Treaty in regard to encouragement of the policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes can be achieved in large measure if the States able to do so give the Agency their full economic co-operation. Instead of dispersing efforts over a number of organs, we might make up our minds to strengthen those that have proved their technical effectiveness and shown that they are capable of providing new and improved services. Naturally we do not rule out other forms of co-operation, for which the non-proliferation Treaty itself provides.

84. With regard to questions of security, quite clearly the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States served as a thermometer for gauging the degree of fear felt by the majority of nations because of the inadequacy of collective security measures. They all expressed their concern to see peace built on bases other than the very fragile ones that support it today. The "balance of terror" does not constitute a sufficient safeguard, and it can collapse at any moment and give way to an unwanted confrontation that would reduce the world to a heap of rubble.

85. The Colombian delegation considers it of the utmost importance for the United Nations Assembly to endorse the decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, since every decision was the outcome of careful reflection and was inspired by the most sincere desire to strengthen the bonds between the nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear-weapon countries. Obviously the latter will in due course have to give further thought to the best way of combining their own thinking and co-ordinating their action with that of the great Powers. My delegation does not rule out the possibility that after a certain period another meeting of the non-nuclear-weapon States may be desirable.

86. It is only by concluding the agreements and the treaty on disarmament envisaged in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty that the world will be able to acquire the sense of security it must have if it is to enjoy in peace the inestimable benefits life has to offer. My delegation attaches tremendous importance to the new discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and trusts that at the new stage in its activities it will achieve the agreements we all hope to see crystallize in tangible and promising realities. Let us hope that at the next session of the Assembly we shall be faced with the good news from the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva that the provisions of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty have been firmly and decisively endorsed by the great Powers.

87. We should like at the earliest possible moment to see it established, once and for all, as in the case of outer space,

that the sea-bed and the ocean floor will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Similarly we believe, as one of the signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, that that instrument should be strengthened and applied by all States.

88. One thing is certain: the diabolical nature of war recognizes no frontiers and it therefore constitutes a deadly and continuing threat to mankind. For that reason all nations have the inescapable obligation to exercise strict vigilance over the international situation so as to prevent the world from once again being plunged into the horrors of a new hecatomb.

89. If man has managed, over millenia of patient endeavour, to create the monumental achievement of modern civilization, he must make himself the guarantor of his own prodigious feat. Yet we see that in a moment of blind passion he is capable of precipitating the world into the abyss of self-destruction. This imperfect society of ours has an inexplicable propensity for flouting all dangers. As a famous thinker said, if the Creator had wanted man to be better, he would not have made him of clay but of marble. Let us then vindicate the virtues of peace, of culture and of civilization against the risks inherent in the lowly material of which we are fashioned.

90. Mr. GHAUS (Afghanistan): During the current year two significant events occurred in the field of disarmament and arms control. The General Assembly at its resumed twenty-second session commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which after painstaking efforts had been agreed upon earlier by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held in Geneva made a useful attempt at harmonizing the views of the participants on matters that, in this nuclear era, impinge so directly on their security and their vital interests.

91. Although the Treaty on non-proliferation could be considered a non-armament arrangement rather than a real measure of disarmament, it nevertheless constitutes an important step towards halting the spread of nuclear weapons and freeing the world from the dangers of a nuclear conflagration.

92. The universal acceptance of the Treaty on non-proliferation being the essential element of its effectiveness, the Government of Afghanistan decided to lend it its support. We are still of the opinion that the widest possible adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty will make up, to some extent, for its imperfections and shortcomings.

93. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States did not intend to minimize the usefulness of the Treaty on non-proliferation. Its aim was to improve the present non-proliferation régime and try to seek ways and means of strengthening the security of all nations without depriving the developing countries of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

94. The concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the inadequacy of the present system of security

assurances is clearly reflected in the relevant resolutions and the declaration of the Conference [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17]. Likewise, the countries gathered in Geneva expressed their common aspirations concerning the necessity of strengthening international co-operation in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The non-nuclear-weapon States are profoundly aware of the fact that nuclear energy has not only changed the classical concepts of war and peace, but has triggered an extraordinary technological revolution, which, based on the potentiality of the atom, could provide the answer to some of the baffling problems of development facing the developing countries.

95. The Conference has recommended to the General Assembly the continuation of the efforts to deal with the extremely important problems raised and examined in Geneva. It is now up to the General Assembly to act on the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to translate them into tangible measures for the benefit of all concerned. We hope that the recommendations of the Conference will not go unheeded.

96. Article VI of the Treaty on non-proliferation created an obligation for the nuclear-weapon States to embark on negotiations with a view to agreeing on further constructive measures leading towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. It is disappointing to note that since the conclusion of the Treaty on non-proliferation no concrete steps have been taken in that direction and that paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) has remained unimplemented.

97. In spite of the agreement reached in July 1968 by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to enter at an early date into bilateral talks on the limitation of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, it seems that the two super-Powers are not yet ready to start any meaningful discussions in order to carry on their avowed intention. This important step of disarmament which seemed at that time within reach did not become a reality.

98. It is hard not to agree with the representative of Sweden when she said the other day, "The credibility of the super-Powers in regard to disarmament is now at stake" [1609th meeting, para. 87]. We, for our part, hope to be confirmed in our belief that the two super-Powers are not waiting for the non-proliferation Treaty to enter into force or to be signed at least by the threshold Powers before agreeing on measures of vertical non-proliferation. In order to establish a better balance of rights and obligations among the States that possess the weapons of mass destruction and continuously develop and improve them, and those which have renounced willingly the atomic option, the super-Powers should start negotiations on effective measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and at the speedy achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

99. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in its resolution C has requested the present session of the General Assembly to recommend that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should

begin, not later than March 1969, to undertake negotiations for:

"(a) The prevention of the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles;

"(b) The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as an important step in the field of nuclear disarmament, and as a matter of high priority;

"(c) Reaching agreement on the immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

"(d) The reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems." [See A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III).]

100. It should be said in this regard that during the negotiations aimed at the realization of the above-mentioned objectives, the importance of preventing the development and the improvement of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and the necessity of their reduction and elimination should not be overlooked. The continuous sophistication and improvement of the delivery systems increases proportionately the danger inherent in nuclear weapons and gives it a world-wide dimension which is detrimental to the security of all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.

101. It is our hope that the General Assembly will endorse the provisions of resolution C of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, particularly its nuclear-weapon members which have great responsibility towards the community of nations on matters of disarmament, will entertain this request with all the seriousness that it deserves. We further hope that France will soon find it possible to contribute to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

102. It goes without saying that an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty will considerably reduce the reported leakages of radioactivity outside the territorial limits of testing States and will to a great extent hamper the improvement and development of new weapons.

103. The adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty will be an important step towards the limitation of nuclear armaments.

104. We are all aware that the differences among nuclear-weapon States on the question of verification of underground events and the type of system needed for monitoring underground explosions have been until now a major obstacle for extending the provisions of the partial test-ban Treaty²⁴ to all environments. Let us hope that the encouraging developments in the field of seismic methods of detection and identification to which the memorandum of eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament²⁵ draws our attention, will pave the way for an early solution of this important and vital question. In this connexion it should be said in passing that the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 10.

purposes is closely related to the test-ban treaty. It should, as an urgent matter, find an adequate solution in the context of a treaty banning nuclear explosions in all environments.

105. It is with these considerations in view that the delegation of Afghanistan welcomes the initiative of the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1 and 2, and will vote in favour of it.

106. As the representative of Afghanistan in Committee I of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, while speaking at the 10th meeting of that Committee on the advisability of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as a first measure of creating a system of negative security assurances which is presently non-existent, I said:

“In this period of uncertainty when each technological advance could threaten the concept of nuclear deterrence and upset the prevailing delicate equilibrium, would it not be in the best interest of peace and security if the nuclear weapon States explored the possibility of establishing a new balance which would derive from an obligation not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances?”

107. It has been argued here and elsewhere that owing to the prevailing situation in the world the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is not the best way to approach the question of nuclear disarmament. But it can be maintained with equal strength that the observance of such a convention could not depend so much on the capacity of States to do so but on their willingness to abide by its provisions.

108. The advent of the nuclear age and the development of nuclear energy for warlike purposes was not foreseen by the drafters of the Charter. Therefore, a new approach to the concept of non-use of force in general, and non-use of nuclear weapons in particular, becomes a necessity. The adoption of an internationally binding instrument in this respect will be in conformity with the obligations contained in Article 2 (4) of the Charter. It will strengthen further the declaratory nature of the thirteenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty. It will give force of law to the provisions of resolution 1653 (XVI) of the General Assembly. Let us reiterate, in this regard, what we have said on previous occasions concerning this matter: by its nature the use of nuclear weapons requires a preventive solution. It is obviously against their use that the people of the world seek protection.

109. We are happy that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was able to consider during its past session the problem of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. This category of weapons could pose a serious threat to mankind and to the human environment.

110. The delegation of Afghanistan is of the opinion that the strict adherence by all States to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare²⁶ done at Geneva, will constitute an effective measure for safeguarding the present and future generations from the dangers inherent in these

weapons of mass destruction. We hope that the General Assembly, in accordance with the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,²⁷ will request the Secretary-General to appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.

111. Another new matter of non-armament to which increased attention should be given is the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor. Undoubtedly, the question of demilitarizing the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction will be thoroughly examined by the new committee which is going to be established and by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. These two bodies will have to co-operate in formulating the legal norms preventing the use of the area mentioned above for military purposes.

112. We firmly believe that this area should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and its exploitation carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

113. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that the time has come for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give serious consideration to the various aspects of conventional disarmament and the implications of the conventional arms race. It should be realized that the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of conventional weapons has taken on enormous proportions.

114. The Chairman of the delegation of Afghanistan in his address to the General Assembly during the general debate of the twenty-third session stated:

“The arms race and the flow of arms is most alarming to us, as a small country. It is disturbing the balance of power in regions throughout the world and necessitates expenditures far beyond the means of all Governments. Resources stolen from high-priority economic and social needs are allocated to arms and to strengthening disproportionately municipal and police departments.” [1690th plenary meeting, para. 74.]

115. The safety and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States, which are mostly small developing countries, can primarily be endangered by the use or threat of use of conventional weapons.

116. The threat of conventional weapons to the security of small non-nuclear-weapon States can originate from different quarters: it can come from a nuclear-weapon State which, without resorting to its nuclear capability, can destroy several times over a non-nuclear-weapon State only by using its sophisticated means of conventional warfare. It can also emanate from a non-nuclear-weapon State which has acquired important stockpiles of conventional weapons by belonging to a military alliance or because of its financial strength or by virtue of its privileged geographical or political position. The spread and the development of conventional armaments has made it imperative that the security of non-nuclear-weapon States be safeguarded and guaranteed not only against the use or threat of use of

²⁶ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

²⁷ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

nuclear weapons but also against the use and threat of use of conventional armaments as well.

117. We are all aware that since the proposal for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control was put forward nine years ago no significant progress has been achieved in this respect. We believe that it is high time for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in its phased approach to general and complete disarmament, to speed up the consideration of the first stages of this process. Armaments, whether nuclear, conventional, biological or chemical, are all means of war and destruction. Their very existence constitutes a potential danger for mankind as a whole. It is in general and complete disarmament that lies the hope for a lasting peace and security for all.

118. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Taking stock of world developments in 1968, we would list the non-proliferation Treaty as a major achievement in the field of disarmament, for it restricts one aspect of the dangers of a nuclear war. We would also list as a noteworthy and significant event the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which produced a number of valuable resolutions, and also the encouraging manifestation of renewed concern over the dangers of chemical and microbiological warfare as appears in the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament²⁸ for a relevant study by the Secretary-General.

119. The non-proliferation Treaty, notwithstanding any reservations on its imperfections, has eased at least one great anxiety weighing upon the minds of all nations and peoples, that of the further spread of nuclear weapons. Recognition is due to the spirit of co-operation that prevailed on this subject between the super-Powers, and to the diligent and persistent efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Treaty has been subscribed to by eighty nations; yet the signatures that are particularly vital to it, namely those of States having nuclear potential, are still wanting. Ratification is also regrettably delayed, and particularly by sponsor nuclear Powers, thereby further jeopardizing acceptance of the Treaty by those States which appear hesitant to accede to it. We are gratified, however, by the recent announcement of ratification of the Treaty by the United Kingdom. We trust that existing differences on this Treaty will eventually be overcome by mutual accommodation so that the Treaty may be strengthened and subscribed to by all nations.

120. In our view the Treaty does contain a commitment by the nuclear Powers for a fair sharing with all other States of nuclear materials and techniques for the peaceful use of atomic energy. Where the arrangements seem to us deficient is in respect of the assurances undertaken under Security Council resolution 255 (1968) to safeguard the security of non-nuclear States against aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression. We would hope that those assurances may be made more realistically meaningful, particularly in face of the growing instances over the world of the use of force and aggression. Incidentally, some clarification of the meaning of "the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons" is required. A threat is not usually

specific of the degree of armed force contemplated. When a threat of the use of force is made, it is not normal to expect from the threatening Power that it will specify the mode of attack or the weapons it intends to use. It is normally implied that there is nothing to prevent such a Power from using eventually any weapon in its possession, particularly having regard to the fact that there exists as yet no international restriction on the use of nuclear weapons as distinct from any other weapons. In face of these realities, should a threat of aggression by a nuclear Power against a non-nuclear State not be considered in effect a nuclear weapon threat, affording to the latter the protection under the aforesaid Security Council resolution? Such protection in any case would be in full conformity with the obligations under Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

121. Another point of uncertainty on which complaints were expressed by the representatives of many non-nuclear-weapon States was in regard to the use in the Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of the term "aggression or threat of aggression", in the absence of a definition of aggression. Presumably the term "aggression", as contained in Articles 1 (1) and 39 of the Charter, was chosen as being more specific of armed attack than the more general and all-inclusive term of "threat or use of force" as in Article 2 (4), which might imply also any kind of forcible coercion or pressure. The Charter in the aforesaid Articles 1 (1) and 39 makes a clear distinction between "the act of aggression", which has a specific meaning in the context of those Articles, and "other breaches of the peace".

122. The use now of the term "aggression" in the Security Council resolution makes it more pointedly necessary that there should be a definition of aggression. In this connexion we express the hope that the spirit of co-operation that prevailed between the nuclear Powers in the non-proliferation Treaty will make it possible for them to reach agreement on a definition of aggression in the coming session of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, thereby rendering the Security Council assurances more meaningfully acceptable to the non-nuclear States, and at the same time meeting essential requirements for the proper application of Chapter VII of the Charter.

123. Despite the reservations aforementioned, the Treaty is a positive achievement and must not be allowed to wither away. It must survive. To that end it should be promptly followed by the preparation of equally necessary and urgent measures to halt the ever-growing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation Treaty creates an obligation on the nuclear Powers to start without delay purposeful negotiations for other collateral measures to stop the arms race. These measures are: a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a cut-off in production of fissionable material, and a halt in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their delivery system. When the arms race is thus arrested first, efforts towards reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems will be more meaningful.

124. We welcome the decision of the two super-Powers to hold bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of delivery systems of ballistic missiles, both offensive and defensive. We hope that the date for these discussions will

²⁸ *Ibid.*

soon be fixed. We would regard, however, as essential that the discussions include a halt in the production of those delivery systems.

125. We attach prior and paramount importance to the halt of production of nuclear armaments. Their reduction and elimination can only follow in a natural sequence. For what would it profit to eliminate any weapons if there is freedom of action in replacing them by new and better ones? Furthermore, the financial implications through the releasing of resources for development in the promotion of peace is linked with the halt in the production of armaments and not with their reduction.

126. As to the next collateral measure, to follow up the non-proliferation Treaty, priority should be given to a treaty banning underground tests in order to put a stop to the incessant competition between the super-Powers in the search for more sophisticated and more deadly weapons of global destruction.

127. The Secretary-General's report on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons²⁹ points, with equal emphasis, to the grave dangers from any further increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States or any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals. In the resolution of the Disarmament Commission in 1965³⁰ and in General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI), the comprehensive test-ban treaty is specifically mentioned, together with a non-proliferation treaty, as the two collateral measures of equal priority on which negotiations should be pursued urgently with a view to reaching agreements.

128. After the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty, all efforts should normally be centred on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreement on which has now reached the stage of maturity as far as the aspect of seismic detection and identification is concerned.

129. This is particularly true in view of the report of the group of experts, including scientists from four nuclear-weapon Powers.³¹ They unanimously recognized that it is now possible to distinguish large and medium-sized underground explosions from earthquakes.

130. We are in this respect indebted to Sweden for organizing the meetings of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research and for its general contribution to the disarmament effort; and I would take this occasion to pay tribute to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, for her consistent and dedicated work in the field of disarmament.

131. In view of the fact that large and middle-sized explosions can now be nationally detected and identified at all thresholds, there is hardly any major technical impediment to a comprehensive treaty.

132. With regard to small-sized explosions of minor importance, provisional arrangements perhaps could be

agreed upon, so as not to stall further the conclusion of a treaty of such importance.

133. We have entered in some detail on this subject because we feel it will be generally more profitable if the attention of this Committee is more positively focused on the collateral measures next to be tackled in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament rather than if it is centred on lengthy discussions and dissensions over the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, a measure already concluded. Any divisions that might arise from this Treaty between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers should carefully be avoided. We look forward to unity in order to meet the dangers from nuclear weapons. Improvements in the assurances under the non-proliferation Treaty will, we hope, be facilitated by progress in disarmament through achievement of the collateral measures next in urgency. It appears that when discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament range over many subjects at the same time, however, they are hardly conducive to concrete results. This was evident in the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee when, as appears from its report, the discussions ran the whole gamut of collateral measures and related problems. Contrary to expectations, that session could not produce any substantive progress towards reaching agreement on the next collateral measure, as a follow-up to the non-proliferation Treaty.

134. The eight-Power draft resolution, document A/C.1/L.448, an otherwise well-drafted document, seems to us deficient in this respect. It urges no priority to be given to the consideration of any particular collateral measure. In the previous relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, such as the aforementioned resolution of the Disarmament Commission in 1965 and General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI) in 1966, priority was given to the non-proliferation Treaty and the comprehensive test ban Treaty. One successful result of such priority was the non-proliferation Treaty.

135. My delegation feels that in any draft resolution on disarmament to be adopted, a paragraph should be added urging the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give priority to one of the collateral measures and, in our submission, to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is the duty of the General Assembly to give directives to the Eighteen-Nation Committee where it considers it necessary and profitable. The aforesaid priority for a comprehensive test ban treaty appears all the more necessary when one observes that all collateral measures so far concluded, valuable and important as they are, fall short of stopping or even slowing down the arms race. The partial test ban Treaty³² leaves the door open for continued tests under the ground, while the non-proliferation Treaty leaves unrestricted the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

136. If we look back through all the years since the adoption in 1959 of the resolution [*General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV)*] proposed by the Soviet Union for general and complete disarmament, in that year, we see a not very encouraging development. At first, optimism was generated by the agreement,³³ in 1961, between the

²⁹ See foot-note 21.

³⁰ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/225.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 6.

³² See foot-note 4.

³³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

United States and the Soviet Union on the principles governing disarmament and by the hopeful setting-up of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This was followed, in 1962, by the presentation in that Committee, by both the Soviet Union and the United States, of full and detailed plans for general and complete disarmament. Discussion of those plans began and continued with determination, raising hopes and expectations among peoples everywhere that the dangers from the arms race and the threat of war were on the way to being averted. However, all the while discussion of those plans was going on, action—and rapid action—in the arms race was being intensified. Thus, on the United States side, despite the retirement of the Atlases and the Titan I's, the number of land-based ICBM's increased in the years between mid-1961 and mid-1967 from 28 to 1,054. Similarly, on the Soviet Union's side, the number of land-based ICBM's reached the figure of 900.

137. On the other hand, the hopeful discussion of the said disarmament plans in the Eighteen-Nation Committee over a number of years gradually withered away, and by 1964 nothing was said about those plans. Notwithstanding the assiduous efforts and the dedicated work of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, no agreement was reached between the nuclear Powers on even one of the many points and phases in those plans. Indeed, it often clearly appears that despite the convergence of national and international interests in the elimination of arms, mankind is continually losing, not gaining, ground in this effort. Even where some little progress is slowly made, it is more than countered and outbitten by an accelerating arms race and the rapid development of technology in weapons of destruction. The disarmament effort must, therefore, be resumed with renewed vigour and with broader vision, particularly with respect to its interdependence with other related problems.

138. We believe that, regardless of any technical difficulties or other differences, the one basic obstacle to progress towards disarmament proper, over the years, is the absence of national security. There is now a growing awareness in the world that, in this age of nuclear missiles, national security through armaments is becoming wholly unrealistic, and that the real security of the nation and its people can come only from common security.

Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

139. But unless some form of such security is in existence to replace national defence through armaments, no nation can be truly expected to take steps in disarming itself, with all the goodwill it may have in that direction. Before we demolish the machines of war we have to build the institutions of peace. As we said in the Disarmament Commission in 1965: We have probably still to realize that disarmament cannot be attained through mere discussions or negotiations on various plans for the elimination of armaments. Disarmament and peace can be reached only through the long and arduous way leading to world order and international security.³⁴ It is in this sense that the

establishment of permanent peace, is envisioned in the Charter—the Charter from which we have so much digressed.

140. My delegation welcomes the significant statement [1607th meeting, para. 42] by the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Bebler, in which he pertinently said that international security is closely linked to the question of disarmament and warrants as much of our attention as disarmament. This aspect is of vital importance, particularly to small countries which depend for their freedom and security on collective security through the United Nations.

141. We are well aware of the great difficulties—political, military and financial—in developing collective security through the United Nations. However, this seems to be the only positive road to peace. We believe that one way to begin is to strengthen the United Nations in the ability to maintain collective security and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. To that end the Organization must be provided with the necessary means to carry out this paramount task, which is its primary responsibility under the Charter.

142. We have reached the stage in the world situation when we must make a move out of a seeming ineffectiveness and meet the increasing dangers of a nuclear conflagration in a spirit of genuine co-operation and in a sense of urgency. We have to reach beyond our complacency and our stereotyped clichés on matters of war and peace. The time has come when the growing complexity in our world makes a reappraisal of world problems, which are so far insoluble, a compelling necessity. Efforts in various United Nations bodies to solve such problems as disarmament, collective security through the United Nations and the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as economic development of the developing countries have made little progress. It now seems clear that the purposes of the Charter and the specific problems that have arisen, are so closely interrelated that none of them can be tackled or solved in isolation from the rest.

143. On the eve of the completion of twenty-five years since the birth of the United Nations, the General Assembly, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary, could decide on the evaluation of the United Nations experience during its existence for a quarter of a century, in regard to the implementation of the primary purposes set out in the Charter, with particular reference to disarmament, collective security through the United Nations, the peaceful settlement of disputes and economic development of the developing countries, and also provide for a study of possible ways in which these purposes might be more satisfactorily fulfilled in the coming years of the Organization. The Secretary-General might be requested by the General Assembly to appoint a committee of experts to undertake a study in depth of the aforesaid interrelated problems and prepare a report, which the Secretary-General would submit with his comments to the Disarmament Commission, when that Commission reconvenes. We have thought for a moment of suggesting a special committee, but on the whole, we believe it is better that this matter should be dealt with by the Disarmament Commission. The report would be transmitted to all Member States for such comments or proposals as they might think it appropriate to make.

³⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 84th meeting, para. 82.

144. The Disarmament Commission, when reconvened for the purpose, would, after a general debate, appoint a special sub-committee or sub-committees to consider the report of the committee of experts and present to the Commission adequate proposals for a comprehensive solution of the said problems.

145. The mandate of the Disarmament Commission would in such a case have to be broadened so that it might be enabled to deal not only with general and complete disarmament under international control, but also with the aforesaid interrelated problems.

146. We believe that the measures we propose will substantially contribute to the endeavours towards general and complete disarmament and to the general improvement in the world situation in our troubled times.

147. My delegation has submitted a draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.449. In submitting this draft resolution we do so in the hope that it will help to move us out of a stagnant situation on the question of disarmament and other problems. This is our proposed draft resolution, but we are open to any suggestions and amendments that may be thought fit to make. We are flexible on every part of this draft resolution and we shall be happy to hear any suggestions on it.

148. Mr. BARNETT (Jamaica): My delegation wishes to address itself to one or two aspects of the items on our agenda. The justification for our modest participation in this debate is the crucial importance of disarmament and arms control to the peace and well-being of the world. However, we cannot help but share some of the scepticism and feeling of helplessness of the representative of Peru [1610th meeting]. We are reminded that the "Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away". Within this context the super-Powers are in the place of the Lord. There is no shortage of machinery for disarmament negotiations. The issue was one of the very first tackled by the United Nations when it was created, and since then our Organization has been involved in it, sometimes marginally, other times more directly. But always the great Powers decided the tenor and flow of discussions, as inevitably they must. For the most part the rest of us waited with patience and trepidation.

149. There are certain distinctions which conveniently can be made—the direct relation between the nuclear-weapon States, particularly between the giants among them, their relation with the non-nuclear-weapon States individually or collectively, and the relation among the non-nuclear-weapon States themselves. These categories of relationships intermingle, but in this particular period of world history disarmament negotiations have come to mean negotiation about nuclear disarmament or, more precisely, about the control of nuclear weapons.

150. But this might have been a mistake, for by so doing we tended to overlook the cheaper, but no less deadly, field of chemical and microbiological warfare. Most of us are unaware of the variety of poisons, gases and microbiological agents which have been developed since the last world war. Defence against them, particularly by developing countries with inadequate public health services, would be especially

difficult. We would therefore welcome a report on this whole question by the Secretary-General along the lines of the justly well-known report of the consequences of the possession of nuclear weapons, and hope that such a study will take into account the vulnerability of the less technically advanced countries.

151. Nuclear weapons engage our attention not only because of their own obvious and horrendous peculiarity as weapons but also because of the vast sums spent on them in the search of an ephemeral security. Now the super-Powers find themselves, as it were, on the threshold of another giddy upward spiral. One would be inclined to let them go their way in search of more and more sophisticated systems of defence, since they both give the appearance of being able to afford these vast expenditures, were it not for the simple conclusion that the less vulnerable become their respective anti-ballistic missile systems the greater is the threat to the rest of us. It is paradoxical but true that up to the present time the more secure the super-Powers have felt with respect to each other, the less secure has been the rest of the world. Development of anti-ballistic missile systems will undermine whatever little stability now exists between the major alliances. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics must realize that their defensive postures against each other can, but should not, imperil the other Members of the international community. Members of defensive alliances will come face to face with the ghastly realization that each successive increment of refinement yields diminishing returns of security.

152. To date, the two nuclear super-Powers have not begun the strategic arms limitation talks as they agreed to do in July 1968. Whatever the reasons for it, the delay has been most unfortunate. My delegation wishes to emphasize that the qualitative great leap forward in the arms race between the two super-Powers has grave implications for the rest of the world. This is another instance where technological and military restraint would increase the security of all. We therefore urge them to begin these discussions before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is reconvened. It is relevant to point out that the nuclear-weapon States signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty have undertaken "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date" and that we were persuaded that the Treaty was the necessary and indispensable prelude to agreement on further measures of arms control and disarmament.

153. In this regard we note the Memorandum [A/7134] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament, and the agenda³⁵ contained in the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

154. My delegation has always been sceptical of the efficacy of Security Council resolution 255 (1968). Nothing has taken place since that resolution was adopted to change our attitude towards it. We do not deny the political importance of the three nuclear Powers agreeing together to protect the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty from attack or threat of

³⁵ See foot-note 7.

attack from a nuclear-weapon State, but we doubt the probable execution of that fact. For the non-nuclear-weapon States the only full guarantee against an attack or threat of attack involving nuclear weapons is a complete ban on their production and stockpiling and the destruction of those weapons already in existence.

155. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held in Geneva in August and September of this year attempted to deal with three broad issues: security, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference was not as successful as it might have been. Apart from the fact that the nuclear-weapon States were most sparing in their

support, the issues with which it engaged itself could not and cannot be easily resolved. However, useful work was done there and a fruitful exchange of ideas and opinions took place. It is the opinion of my delegation that the work of the Conference should be continued, but the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is essential. We do not agree with some of their counter-arguments, because they seem designed to erase the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States from the records. Nevertheless, we hope that their reluctance will be overcome in the interests of the world community.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.