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(XXII) and annex/. On 1 July the two major nuclear Powers agreed on bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and anti-ballistic missile systems. Last summer at its Conference the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament held a series of meetings: as a result that Conference was able to recommend a provisional agenda for its future work, embodied in paragraph 17 of its report¹ which is now before us. Not only did the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament take into account the two major events I just mentioned, but it also had an opportunity to consider a number of important working papers submitted by its members. My delegation has taken note with great interest of the proposals, put forward both singly and in the form of a joint memorandum by the eight non-aligned members, which are attached to the Committee's report in annex I thereof.

Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament *(continued)* (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443, L.444 and Add.1-3, L.445 and Add.1, L.446)

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Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament *(continued)* (A/7189-DC/231)

Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament *(continued)* (A/7134, A/7223, A/C.1/974, A/C.1/L.443)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference *(continued)* (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327)

1. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): In matters of arms control and disarmament the year which is now drawing to its close has been a very busy one. The resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly culminated in the commendation of an agreed text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373

2. Geneva was also the scene for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, another important item on our agenda.

3. Such an important list could have been a herald of hopeful further developments. We should not delude ourselves by not recognizing that the rising tide of expectations receded at a most untimely moment. If we accept, as we all do, that progress in the field of arms control and disarmament has become a matter of life or death for mankind as a whole, this backward flow must be stopped by a determined and united effort. In my judgement, there is no reason for despair. Provided all Governments show a same singleness of purpose, the chances to continue building on the foundations that have already been laid are not lost. In practical terms, this means that nothing should be left undone to further the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty at an early date.

4. In order to ensure the implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the adherence of the greatest possible number of non-nuclear-weapon States, and in particular of the so-called "threshold countries", is essential. The conclusion of agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as provided for in Article III of the treaty will greatly contribute towards creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence which is equally indispensable for a smooth functioning of the treaty. It is therefore important to speed up negotiations on such agreements as much as feasible. The Netherlands Government will try its best to bring about a satisfactory agreement between Euratom and IAEA.

5. In the context of article V of the treaty, dealing with the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes,

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

my Government is of the opinion that the Vienna Agency is the “appropriate international body” to act as an intermediary and in a supervisory role. My delegation hopes that it will soon be possible to formulate the agreement or agreements envisaged in the same article of the non-proliferation Treaty.

6. I wish to revert briefly to the question of the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles. In our judgement, this is the key to halting the nuclear arms race and reducing the threat of nuclear war. By all appearances, time is slowly but inexorably running out. For a while, the destabilizing effect of the present game of “one-upmanship” in more sophisticated offensive weapons versus defensive systems may well remain hidden; nevertheless it does exist and is bound to make its influence felt increasingly. Then, some day, perhaps too late, it may become clear that we have got more terror but less balance. The continuation of the strategic arms race, which, in the last resort, does not enhance in any way the security of either party, will be more and more conducive to creating an atmosphere of pent-up psychological and political tensions.

7. My delegation, therefore, wholeheartedly supports resolution D adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para 17 (III)] calling for early bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the USSR and the United States. As President Johnson pointed out in his message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,² progress on limiting strategic delivery vehicles will also facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

8. In this connexion, I wish to remind this Committee that my delegation pleaded during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly in the First Committee [1454th meeting] for an examination by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of the so-called question of a “minimum deterrent”. At that time we suggested the establishment of a working group to examine the function of a “nuclear umbrella” in the context of disarmament and the composition, the phasing and other aspects of such a deterrent.

9. My delegation noted that the concept of an absolute minimum, compatible with a mutual deterrent, is touched upon, and for the first time outside the context of general and complete disarmament, in the memorandum of the USSR [A/7134] which forms part of the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament³ and has now been introduced as a separate item [94] on our agenda.

10. Incidentally, I should like to associate myself with the views of the representatives of Belgium and Italy, and other speakers, that the proposals contained in the Soviet memorandum have duly been taken into account by the Eighteen-Nation Committee in drawing up its provisional agenda. My delegation is therefore not convinced of the utility of referring, as a kind of “feed-back”, the same proposals once more to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Moreover, paragraph 18 of the report of that Committee recognizes the right of all its members to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time.

11. An agreement on the limitation of nuclear delivery vehicles would make it more likely that a complete test ban could be achieved. The halting of underground tests by the nuclear Powers remains a top priority.

12. Moreover, it would be a logical step on the part of the nuclear Powers to give proof of their earnest determination to live up in good faith to the stipulations of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States, by becoming parties to the treaty *ipso facto*, renounce underground nuclear tests. A real prospect that the nuclear Powers are about to accept the same renunciation would undoubtedly be a powerful incentive for a world-wide adherence to the treaty.

13. At this juncture my delegation deems it appropriate to reiterate once again its earnest hope that all nuclear Powers soon will become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and be prepared to participate in international negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

14. One of the stumbling blocks to achieve an underground test ban remains the problem of verification. In essence, “adequate verification” should aim at achieving such a degree of probability of detecting an evasion as to make clandestine underground tests unattractive for any potential transgressor. In other words, it is a question of adequate deterrence of violation rather than a guarantee of non-violation. My delegation continues to support the Swedish proposal for the formation of a “detection club” by international co-operation. The possibilities of reaching agreement on the basis of “verification by challenge or by consent” should also be further explored. I also wish to pay a tribute to the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm for its important initiative in regard to international co-operation in the field of test ban verification by seismic means.

15. Lastly, a complete test ban should contain or be coupled with appropriate provisions allowing the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in article V of the non-proliferation treaty.

16. I should now like to turn to item 2 of the provisional agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: non-nuclear measures of disarmament. Both the memorandum of the USSR and the message of the President of the United States of America deal with regional disarmament and the question of how to contain a conventional armaments race in certain areas of the world.

17. My delegation is prepared seriously to consider any proposal concerning those problems. In our judgement, the risks of an unbridled traffic in non-nuclear weapons could be countered most effectively by restrictive arrangements between supplier States and/or arrangements between the receiving countries in particular areas. It seems that this approach, difficult as it may be, may prove to be a promising one. Registration by the United Nations of international transfers of armaments could serve as a first, introductory step.

² *Ibid.*, annex I, sect. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, sect. 3.

18. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament also examined the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons [*C and B weapons*]. In spite of its deficiencies it must be recognized that to date the Geneva Protocol of 1925⁴ remains the most authoritative international instrument proscribing chemical and bacteriological warfare. The Protocol has been signed and ratified by many countries, including my own, and the number of signatories is increasing. In the light of new scientific discoveries and breakthroughs in the post-war era, in particular in the biological field, the need for a review of the Protocol is clear.

19. The best procedure would probably be to refrain from changing the Protocol itself. The norms and principles embodied therein have not lost their value; on the contrary, my delegation hopes that they will be strictly observed by all States. The Protocol should, in our opinion, be supplemented by an additional agreement or agreements reflecting the realities of the present and also anticipating future developments.

20. As a preliminary step, my delegation supports the recommendation made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament⁵ that the Secretary-General of the United Nations appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of C and B weapons. In our view, however, the term "bacteriological weapons" is too restrictive and the study should cover "biological weapons" in the broadest sense, as proposed in part II of the Secretary-General's introduction to his annual report.⁶

21. My delegation took note of the statement by the representative of Poland [*1615th meeting, para. 19*] to the effect that the report of the group of experts should, firstly, be based on all accessible material relevant to the subject and, secondly, take into account the documents, opinions and suggestions presented both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee. It would therefore have the broadest possible basis to formulate authoritative conclusions. It is on this understanding that we have co-sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3.

22. I now wish to make a few observations with regard to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. It is a tribute to the patience and perseverance and the spirit of co-operation of the participants that, in spite of inauspicious political events and the limitations imposed on the Conference by its special character, they were able to reach a number of positive and useful conclusions. Predictably, most recommendations adopted by the Conference pertain to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, safeguards and certain aspects of disarmament. It is a matter of regret that no progress could be achieved on the question of security assurances. The four weeks of intensive discussions and consultations on this intractable subject, however, were not

entirely fruitless; undoubtedly, the debate added to a better understanding of the problem and a deeper insight into its many complexities. At the same time, I think it became clear that real progress, in particular in regard to security assurances, depends on the active co-operation of the nuclear Powers.

23. The question of the best ways and means to implement the decisions taken by the Conference should be examined in a rational and practical manner. Since most of those decisions are directly related to problems falling within the competence of the International Atomic Energy Agency, certain specialized organizations and other bodies, we ought to consider what has been or can be undertaken within the framework of the existing United Nations system. In our view, we should pause to think and be cautious not to assume, *a priori*, that the need for any new machinery is evident.

24. My delegation wishes to reiterate its conviction that the Vienna agency is the competent body to further the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular with a view to the needs of the developing countries, both in the context of article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty and otherwise. It should be noted that the supplement to the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1967-1968, annexed to document A/7175/Add.1,⁷ contains the texts of two important resolutions adopted by the twelfth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 30 September 1968. These resolutions constitute a positive response to resolution H (IV) and to resolutions H (V) and K [*see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (IV)*] contained in the Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

25. Furthermore, a draft resolution identical with resolution I adopted by the Geneva Conference [*ibid.*] was referred to the Board of Governors by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency for early examination. This speedy action was taken even before the final document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States became available. I am confident that the Vienna Agency will also initiate appropriate action on other recommendations within its purview—for instance, concerning ways and means to secure finances from outside sources for its activities. It may reasonably be expected that other agencies will react in a similar way. So less than two months after the closing date of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States there is already ample proof that its recommendations have not remained unnoticed and are being given serious consideration.

26. This leads my delegation to the conclusion that the implementation of the Conference's recommendations can indeed be effectively followed, promoted and, when necessary, discussed by the organizations which form the United Nations family without resorting to the creation of any new institutional machinery.

27. As the representative of Nigeria put it so well [*1612th meeting, para. 51*] it is important to concentrate on increased action and the attainment of results rather than complicate the procedures for achieving progress.

⁴ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 A*, para. 32.

⁷ Mimeographed.

28. In this connexion, I venture to suggest that more active participation by Member States in the decision-making process of the organs of the IAEA could contribute considerably to achieving some of the major objectives in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and related problems.

29. Finally, as regards security problems, the General Assembly remains the broadest forum in which a meaningful discussion of either a procedural nature or a substantive character could be resumed.

30. Mr. BELOKOLOS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): In this nuclear century of ours, the problem of disarmament is beyond doubt the most important of all the problems of world politics which engage the attention of men all over the world. Because the race to produce nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and means of their delivery has reached unprecedented proportions and the already tremendous stockpiles of such weapons are increasing, the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war is more acute than it has ever been. A radical solution lies in general and complete disarmament. Being aware of this fact, the peace-loving countries have been advocating the realization of a broad programme of measures to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament—i.e., to put into effect a plan for general and complete disarmament.

31. The first steps along this arduous path have already been taken. They include the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three media,⁸ the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space [*resolution 2222 (XXI)*], which closed outer space to nuclear weapons and, lastly, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII)*], which has created favourable conditions for further efforts to stop the arms race and take measures to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons. What matters most and is most urgently needed today is that this last Treaty should be signed and ratified, for any delay would only play into the hands of aggressive and reckless elements and hinder the taking of further practical steps towards disarmament. It is on the basis of this important international instrument that we can and must strive for the conclusion of other disarmament agreements.

32. In examining the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, my delegation noted with satisfaction that in its future work programme, on which the Committee agreed at its last session, priority is given to nuclear disarmament problems. Those are the very problems to which priority has been assigned in the USSR Government's Memorandum concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament [*A/7134*].

33. A favourable opportunity is thus offered for creative work by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, particularly as the USSR Memorandum supplies a broad basis for such work.

34. This important document indicates the main lines of what has to be done in those areas which constitute the

greatest danger to the cause of peace. Quite rightly, the Memorandum gives pride of place to measures for the further limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race. These include prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and cessation of manufacture of strategic means of delivery. These are major proposals and bear witness to the scrupulous and conscientious manner in which the Soviet Union has been complying both with the resolution adopted at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, which contains an appeal "urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", and with the analogous obligations imposed by article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

35. During the current session, both in the general debate and in our Committee, many delegations noted with satisfaction that the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to hold an exchange of views on the reciprocal limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons—both offensive and defensive, including anti-missile missiles. That the USSR Government is prepared to begin forthwith a serious exchange of views on the subject was reaffirmed in the statement made by the USSR delegation in this Committee on 12 November 1968 [*1606th meeting*]. My delegation, like many other delegations, strongly supports the USSR Government's initiative and trusts that this exchange of views will yield tangible results.

36. There is therefore good reason to hope that, given goodwill and co-operation, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be followed by other disarmament measures, which in their turn will help to safeguard the external security of States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.

37. That all States are deeply concerned with security questions is amply demonstrated, *inter alia*, by the present debate. While we fully understand and share the legitimate desires of States for a high degree of security from nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack, I would nevertheless say frankly that we do not agree with those who minimize the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty as a security factor. Both the Treaty and the well-known Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 undoubtedly open up new possibilities for enhancing the security of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

38. Naturally, the Treaty cannot guarantee full and absolute security. It could hardly do so, for it was intended as a partial measure. But, although it is a partial measure, the Treaty as such constitutes a valid guarantee of greater general security. To ask of it more than it can give is tantamount to sabotaging the Treaty and offering a pretext to those who would like to postpone its entry into force. Such a development would lessen the chances of agreement on other partial measures and would consequently run counter to the interests of ensuring State security.

39. As has been repeatedly noted, this important international instrument also offers tremendous opportunities for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

⁸ *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

40. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has always upheld the principle that benefits deriving from the peaceful uses of atomic energy must be equally available to all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. We fully understand that States whose peoples have recently thrown off the yoke of colonialism and, for reasons outside their control, have not yet caught up with the highly developed countries in the field of science and technology should be anxious to place atomic energy at the service of their developing societies at an early date.

41. The best scientists and experts of many countries are working today on the problems of making use of atomic energy in different areas of science and technology, agriculture and health. Since the Soviets came to power, scientific research institutes and laboratories concerned specifically with such problems have been created in the Ukraine. The discoveries of Ukrainian scientists in the sphere of the peaceful uses of atomic energy are being widely used in the national economy. These achievements, on which our scientists have reported at international conferences, are well known. The contacts maintained by Ukrainian scientists with young specialists in developing countries are increasing in number and closeness from year to year. A great deal has already been done in this respect, but still more remains to be done.

42. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is bound to play a major role in allowing the developing countries to use the latest achievements of nuclear technology to promote their economic development. It will be of particular advantage to those developing countries which as yet do not have either the personnel or the technical capability for large independent projects using nuclear energy for the development of their economy, science and technology.

43. Articles IV and V of the Treaty impose on the nuclear States a contractual obligation to help the non-nuclear countries, under international agreements, to make use of the knowledge and experience accumulated by the nuclear States; to make available to them nuclear devices and materials; to allow all States to benefit from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, etc. It is obvious that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will help to accelerate the economic, scientific and technological progress of non-nuclear countries. Once it has come into effect, the non-proliferation Treaty, as has rightly been noted, will become a treaty on the proliferation of the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

44. Naturally, States parties to the Treaty will be in a more favourable position than those which, for one reason or another, decide not to accede to it.

45. The point is that parties to the Treaty assume the obligation to submit to certain control procedures, ensuring that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes. Countries which are not parties to the Treaty, on the other hand, assume no such obligation and consequently making available to them certain types of assistance in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy entails the risk that such assistance might be diverted to other than peaceful uses.

46. The Treaty also specifies the channels through which the States parties to it would receive aid for the peaceful

applications of atomic energy; namely, special international agreements, bilateral agreements and an appropriate international body. As has already been proposed, this body should be the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is a broadly representative international organization and has the necessary technical and administrative staff.

47. It will be remembered that the Agency was set up in order (I am quoting from its Statute):

“To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world”.

and also:

“To make provision . . . for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world”.

48. May I also cite the message of Mr. Eklund, the Director-General of the Agency, to the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, dated 12 June 1968, in which he said:

“Since the Agency’s first purpose is to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy, it is also equipped by statute, experience and programme to play a central role in achieving the objectives of the treaty and especially of article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy with due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world.”⁹

49. In this statement the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the intermediary of its Director-General, has given assurance of its intention to make an effort to assist States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy.

50. In the light of these considerations, my delegation cannot agree to the establishment of a new body—a committee on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

51. We believe that such a step would be unwise, in view of the existence of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been concerned with these very questions for eleven years and which has accumulated valuable experience in assisting States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The existence of two international centres with identical functions would result in a duplication of work, as a number of delegations have quite rightly pointed out.

52. It has, of course, been argued here that this new committee would not interfere with the work of any existing agency or institution, but would merely be an important co-ordinating instrument. The word “co-ordinate”, however, means nothing less than determine the direction of work or, to put it bluntly, direct the work, of the existing agencies and institutions.

53. It should be noted that, generally speaking, the practice of setting up new committees on various unimpor-

⁹ See document A/7106 (mimeographed edition).

tant questions has become very widespread, and proposals to set them up are frequently advanced without a full assessment of the real need. We believe that permanent organs should not be created without careful consideration and, especially, without an assessment of their usefulness.

54. Today, as many delegations have remarked, mankind is threatened not only by the possible use of nuclear weapons, but by the use of such other means of mass destruction as chemical and bacteriological weapons.

55. Moreover, whereas manufacture of nuclear weapons requires tremendous expenditure, an advanced state of science and technology and highly qualified experts—which only a few countries possess—the manufacture of chemical and bacteriological weapons can be easily started in many countries today at no great cost. One can readily imagine the threat that would hang over mankind unless we achieve recognition by all countries of the principles of international law prohibiting the use of such weapons of mass destruction.

56. The basic international treaty on the question is the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June 1925.

57. The United Nations has reaffirmed the validity of the Geneva Protocol. As we all remember, at its twenty-first session the General Assembly adopted unanimously resolution 2162 B (XXI) calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, condemning all actions contrary to those objectives and inviting all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol.

58. It may also not be amiss to recall that the International Conference on Human Rights held at Teheran in the spring of 1968 adopted a special resolution entitled "Human rights in armed conflicts" [XXIII] calling on all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.¹⁰

59. A number of States responded to these appeals and acceded to the Geneva Protocol. Nevertheless, many countries, including the United States of America, have not yet done so.

60. My delegation repudiates all attempts to cast doubt on the validity and significance of the Geneva Protocol, on any pretext whatever. It has been said that since the drafting of the Protocol, new types of deadly chemical and bacteriological weapons have appeared. That is very true. Unfortunately, great scientific discoveries have led to the invention of new and lethal means of mass destruction, including chemical and biological means. But that does not in the least signify that the Geneva Protocol is obsolete. That instrument specifically prohibits the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and also of all analogous liquids, substances and processes, as well as of bacteriological means of warfare. What we need now is not to review the

Protocol, but to have all States which have not yet done so accede to it, and comply with it rigorously.

61. This is called for in the General Assembly resolution of the twenty-first session, and my delegation fully agrees that at its present session the Assembly should request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to consider ways and means of ensuring observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by all States.

62. My delegation also supports the draft resolution submitted by Poland and a number of other countries [A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3].

63. This proposal is valuable because, first, it would enable all peoples to learn about the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons, data on which would be compiled in a special high-level report prepared by outstanding scientists from different countries. Secondly, under this draft resolution the General Assembly

"Reiterates its call for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 and invites all States to accede to that Protocol."

64. It will be remembered that a similar report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons was prepared in 1967¹¹ and was highly appreciated by world opinion. The proposed new report would help to draw the peoples' attention to the need to prohibit chemical and bacteriological weapons and induce more States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

65. In conclusion, I would emphasize that there is only one way to solve the problems of disarmament and security—through general collaboration and mutual understanding. We have reached a stage where we have reaped the first fruits of our labours, where we have a well-considered programme for further work—the USSR Memorandum—and where we also have at our disposal an effective and reliable machinery to deal with disarmament problems—the General Assembly and its First Committee, the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, and the Eighteen-Nation Committee. What we need now is not a formal organization of non-nuclear States in some sort of opposition to the nuclear Powers, not a search for new and continued bodies and organs, but the continuation, with greater efficiency, of the work of existing machinery, on the basis of the constructive results already obtained, and with a view to developing and strengthening collaboration among all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, developing and developed, great and small. Steep and winding is the path which the United Nations has to travel in order to achieve its principal goal—"To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". But this path must be climbed. And to that end we must strengthen the system of international co-operation that already exists in the framework of the United Nations.

66. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): It is the common practice, in this and in other committees, first of all to dispose of the general debate on any item, including that of disarmament. It seems, however, that there is a dearth of

¹⁰ See *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights*, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968 (United Nations Publications, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2).

¹¹ United Nations Publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1.

speakers. This has been true not only in this Committee but in other committees as well. It has also been the practice that when there are no speakers, one may address himself, in the meantime, to any draft resolution or draft resolutions that may have been submitted. I believe we have several draft resolutions, and I thought I would profit by the time still remaining—because it is now only half past four—to address myself to one of those draft resolutions which is of great concern not only to my delegation but to a good number of other delegations with which I have consulted. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I shall explain the position of my delegation on that particular draft resolution. I am prompted all the more to do so because we had the privilege, this morning, of listening to our colleague from Denmark, who spoke at length about that draft resolution. Furthermore, it fell to me about three years ago, if my memory does not falter, to address myself to the same principles he enunciated in that draft resolution, to which I shall come a little later.

67. I believe my good friend and colleague from Malta was the author of that other draft resolution, and either he withdrew it or it failed to receive the necessary votes. I tried to find the record but could not, and I am speaking now from memory. Now I shall be more specific and start with my comments.

68. As I said, the intervention of our colleague from Denmark, in which he explained at full length one of the draft resolutions before us, namely, A/C.1/L.446, in connexion with the registration by the United Nations of deliveries of arms at the regional level, made it possible for me to speak this afternoon and address myself fully to the said draft resolution. If we look at the co-sponsors of that draft resolution, we find—besides Denmark—Iceland, Malta and Norway. Now, at the very outset I must say that they have submitted that draft resolution with the best of intentions. I am sure they must have felt frustrated that no headway—no appreciable headway—is being made on the various questions involved in disarmament—not to mention general disarmament. In my opinion, the slowness with which disarmament is proceeding is most probably the reason that drove them to start with something modest, to start with the smaller countries and see if something can be done that will achieve some success or at least start a chain-reaction in the field of disarmament. I must say this because I do not want to be misunderstood, I do not want it thought that I am opposing outright the provisions of their draft resolution.

69. Again, let us look to see who are the co-sponsors of that draft resolution, besides Denmark. They are Iceland, Malta and Norway. Denmark is a member of NATO, and so is Norway. Their security is safeguarded by one of the super-Powers in that regional organization. Iceland is, I submit, what I would call a sort of sleeping partner in NATO. It is in a favoured position. Iceland lies near the North Pole. We are also in a favoured position in Saudi Arabia. They are covered with ice, we are covered with sand. We both have a forbidding climate. In a way we are very similar, inasmuch as they shiver and we perspire. This is what kept the Arabian Peninsula insulated for thousands of years from outside aggression. Of course, the tribes warred against one another. I do not know about our Icelandic friends—they may have had their family quarrels,

their petty quarrels, too. But we are no longer as immune as we were because of the fact that the air can now be filled with instruments of war. So Iceland, of course, was also motivated by the best of intentions, like Denmark and Norway.

70. Now I come to my good friend, the representative of Malta. What a beautiful island Malta is—far-removed, a peaceful island in the centre of the Mediterranean. But it is not a member of NATO. NATO is trying to induce Malta to agree to some arrangement, but my information is that so far nothing has happened—as yet.

71. The representative of Malta, like many of us, felt frustrated and thought of setting the ball rolling by being the first one, about three years ago, to give us the idea which is embodied in the draft resolution.

72. Malta, in so far as I know, does not belong to any regional defence system. I am sure we would all be with Malta if anyone wanted to encroach on it.

73. Norway and Denmark are in a favoured position, aside from their being members of NATO. I think we envy them for being part of a peaceful region of their own, although they did not escape the scourge of the Second World War. But along with Sweden and Finland, they have tried, and will try, I am sure, to insulate themselves from trouble, and rightly so. They, like Malta, are not beset by problems which can be seen in other regions of our globe.

74. We speak of regional defence, and many of us belong to certain systems of defence. With respect to Europe, I need hardly draw attention to the fact that most European States belong either to the Warsaw Pact or to NATO. In the Far East, without naming the countries, there is a certain regional defence system. The same is true of the Middle East. There are also regional defence systems in the new hemisphere.

75. The small Powers that belong to any one of those regional defence systems are dependent on the States that wield world power, not to speak of world influence. Therefore, they are all under some type of defence umbrella.

76. The question of registering or not registering arms becomes irrelevant. Most of those regions contain a Power which is strongly industrialized and which can afford either to register or not register the sending of arms to another State which may be in danger. But what about those small Powers that are not industrialized and that depend on arms for their self-defence? What about those peoples—and I am speaking of peoples in the plural—who are still struggling to liberate themselves from the colonial yoke or from incursions from outside? Some of those peoples have no government because they have been aggressed against. How would the arms registration envisaged in the draft resolution apply to them? I would say that it would put those peoples at the mercy of any other State. Those peoples would be unable to liberate themselves.

77. The primitive Biblical instrument of war consisted of the sling and the stone. Wars were sometimes fought with the sling and the stone. I refer concretely to the legendary

story in the Bible of David killing Goliath with the sling and the stone. But now we are not living in the Biblical age. We are living in the age of missiles and of electronics, of highly sophisticated weapons, so complicated and so secret in many aspects that no one can even imagine what havoc they may play, without even being visible.

78. Nor are we in the era of the spear and the sabre, which decided differences in the Middle Ages when chivalry reigned and when the adversaries were the contestants. In those days nobody had to register the spear. The knight-at-arms came and battled with another knight-at-arms. And how wise were the leaders of States—they let the knight-at-arms settle the issue and they acted accordingly, instead of having the holocausts that became characteristic following the industrial revolution, when the machinery of war became highly developed and mass destruction became characteristic of conflicts even with conventional weapons.

79. Let us examine this draft resolution carefully, and not dismiss it off-hand—always on the understanding that it was motivated by the best of intentions. I want to show my good colleagues from Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Norway that they themselves are not confronted with the facts of life in their region—or, in the case of Malta, in its island. This draft resolution deals only with conventional arms. Now, what are conventional arms when compared with all the arms in the arsenals of the highly industrialized Powers and the nuclear Powers? We have not yet devised any machinery even for preventing underground nuclear tests. We have not yet been assured that every day new weapons are not being devised for the mass destruction of man. Well, I do not blame the super-Powers, in fairness to them, because they are still suspicious of each other—or, if there are more than two super-Powers, of one another, to use correct English.

80. We are starting to deal with the question of disarmament from the tail, leaving the head aside. What is the purpose of this draft resolution? The answer becomes self-evident in operative paragraph 1, which states:

“Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ascertain the position of Member Governments”

with regard to certain undertakings. Let us examine operative paragraph 1 (a), which states:

“(a) on undertaking an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all imports and exports of conventional arms, ammunition and implements of war,”.

81. That is a most ideal undertaking; but can it be put into practice? We do not have to go into the question of ammunition. Certain corporations do not publicize what they are selling, for reasons of their own. It need not be arms, it may be cars, it may be machinery for peaceful uses. Why? Because they want to protect their markets; they do not want everybody to know. Why should we expect arms to be publicized or registered? We are asking the impossible.

82. On the other hand, it would place any small Power or people struggling for its independence at a disadvantage if it was known by those who want to pounce on a small State or to maintain it under a foreign yoke how much arms it was receiving. And there is always a way to acquire arms

secretly without anybody knowing. Even the people who may be struggling for their independence—most of them—do not know. The enemy, or the adversary, will see to it that the State or the people which is struggling for its independence is at that enemy's mercy.

83. Operative paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), of the draft resolution states:

“(b) on authorizing the Secretary-General to collect, and publish at regular intervals, information on the transfer of conventional arms, ammunition and implements of war,”.

The Secretary-General will still be on the thirty-eighth floor; the paragraph means representatives of the Secretary-General, or a committee appointed by the Secretary-General. But who are they? They belong to certain States. Can we imagine that the representative, or representatives, of the Secretary-General will be allowed to probe, belonging as they do to various States, into what is going on inside an importing or exporting country? It is not logical. A firm dealing in industrial machinery or commodities sometimes does not find it to its advantage to disclose what it is doing, so how could we expect that those whom it is proposed to inspect would open the books to the representative or representatives of the Secretary-General? He would have to have many, many representatives. Such an arrangement would not be practicable. The subparagraph reads: “information on the transfer of conventional arms”. It is always conventional arms which the poor peoples and small Powers depend on, either to defend themselves or to fight those who are oppressing them.

84. Subparagraph (c) says: “on the practical measures to be taken to that end”. I have just dealt with that point: there can be no practical measures. After what I have said, how can any practical measures be taken? Nobody will heed the representatives of the Secretary-General if they go to any country, exporting or importing, and say to it: “Please tell us what you are doing.”

85. Then, paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution reads as follows:

“Requests the Secretary-General to report on the results of his enquiry to the twenty-fourth General Assembly for deliberation and reference, as appropriate, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.”

As if the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee had nothing to do but to deal with academic issues—and I consider this draft resolution to be of an academic nature. We should have to finance a project by which various Members would be appointed as representatives of the Secretary-General, and in the end their work would be abortive and we should have to pay their salaries and to spend much precious time on this question at the twenty-fourth session and other forthcoming sessions. With what result? No result whatsoever. Forget about the expense; what about the precious time which would be taken away from the discussion of the vital questions of general disarmament? That is the essence of the whole question.

86. General disarmament has to start from the head, not from the tail, by decreasing conventional weapons. Conventional weapons will still be essential. I am sure that my

colleagues around this table will agree with me that we have not attained Utopia inasmuch as the security forces inside a State must have weapons to maintain public order. Likewise, small States in particular, and peoples struggling for their independence, must resort to weapons in order to defend themselves. We cannot have a *status quo* while the big Powers are able to do as they wish. We plead with them. They have their excuses for not making more progress than they have attained—and, I submit, it is very slow progress. But what would emerge out of this draft resolution if it were adopted would be to maintain the *status quo* and to leave the peoples struggling for independence under the thumb of those who want to see that they do not attain their independence, and also to see whether the small States will perhaps change alignments and upset the balance of power which, unfortunately, still regulates the international community when it comes to preserving one's independence.

87. For this draft resolution to be effective, it should be adopted unanimously. But this is not enough; and I do not see that it may even get the necessary votes to ensure its adoption. But let us assume that it is unanimously adopted: will its provisions be put into effect? This is the question. I submit that it will remain ink on paper—nothing more, nothing less.

88. It is understandable, after what I have said, why our colleagues who are co-sponsors of that draft resolution submitted it. They did so with the best of intentions, but they seem to be far removed from the facts of life as they obtain in the state of affairs of the world of today. Such a draft resolution, although I think it will not get the necessary vote to be adopted, will sow the idea that perhaps if we start with the small nations to avoid local wars we may be able to persuade the great Powers to live at peace.

89. There is some merit in the intention because, after all, as I mentioned in various interventions in this and other committees, the great Powers do not have any territorial ambitions in so far as the territories of other great Powers are concerned. The whole conflict revolves around spheres of influence—and when we say “spheres of influence” those spheres are composed of the small Powers—to change the alignments. And once there is an imbalance—or at least an imagined imbalance, in the view or in the opinion of one Power—then we have trouble.

90. It was unintentional on the part of the co-sponsors of that draft resolution, I am sure, to maintain the *status quo* of people who are struggling for their liberation, but in effect these people would be stymied in their movements if the principles of this draft resolution were to be applied. On the other hand, certain big Powers may use such a resolution to their own advantage by telling a small Power “You cannot be safe now that all imports are to be registered, so you had better come under my umbrella”. So there will be a scramble on the part of the great Powers to court the small Powers and to deepen the differences that already exist between those great Powers. Those great Powers fight tooth and nail in order to control us, to wield power over us.

91. I am not going to give concrete examples; it is embarrassing—they are our colleagues and our brothers,

regardless of whether they belong to great Powers, super-Powers. The whole struggle is as to who will control us small nations; so the struggle will still be there in spite of the registration. The struggle between the great Powers will still be directed by each towards the end of winning this State or that State to its side because the State finds itself incapable of defending itself. This is the crux of the question. How can such a draft resolution be valid?

92. I appeal to the co-sponsors to withdraw that draft resolution. The idea reminds me of the hydra. I thought we “scotched” the idea in 1965 until we could get into a better world situation, until we could see what would happen amongst the great Powers. It reminds me of the hydra; the hydra had seven heads—this has four. So it is easy now to dive back again, not to rise like the hydra, and I would feel rather constrained to vote against this draft resolution because these co-sponsors are submitting it with the best of intention but they are far removed from the realities of life.

93. Denmark—who does not envy Denmark? Not jealous envy; envy for the good things. Who would not envy Norway—although I would like a little more sunlight during winter. Who would not envy Iceland? I would if I were living in Saudi Arabia in August. But they are far removed from the whole picture and I ask them, I appeal to them, to face the facts and to withdraw that draft resolution gracefully lest it become the pivot of interminable debate—in which I will again participate, because my ammunition of words is not yet spent. I have further arguments as to why this resolution should not be submitted. It is a good thing that my ammunition is of words; the military people always tell me, “Don't use your ammunition all at one time”. So we learn from them although they are destructive—though they say they are using the ammunition for self-defence.

94. I appeal to them to make our task easier, and to concentrate with us to prevail upon the great Powers, especially the nuclear Powers, to have a little more goodwill amongst themselves and not work surreptitiously under cover to refine the sophisticated arms for mass destruction. We should focus all our efforts on that, not on maintaining the *status quo* which would mean the domination of the strong over the weak, whether it be a State or a people struggling for self-determination or to retrieve its homeland as is the case in the Middle East. There is a people whose self-determination has been cast by the wayside by none other than the United Nations through pressure of certain great Powers of that era, 1947, at Lake Success, which was Lake Failure in so far as that people is concerned. That people was sold down the river. But there are peoples struggling for their liberation and for their independence in other regions of the world—I do not want to be selfish and just concentrate on the Middle East.

95. Again I must emphasize the danger—that there would be an option that would be a corrupting factor, an attempt to divorce certain weak countries from one camp so that they would join another camp and tip the balance. It will create more trouble for the United Nations than it already has.

96. Sir, I thank you for affording me the opportunity of addressing myself to the draft resolution in question and I assure you that had there been any speakers in the general

debate I would not have taxed the patience of my colleagues by presenting my views on the draft resolution. But since we should utilize the precious time of the United Nations in order to dispatch our work, I must say how grateful I am that you gave me the floor for this purpose.

97. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Hungary, who has asked to exercise his right of reply.

98. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): At the 1615th meeting, introducing his draft amendments [A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1] to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3 requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the effects of the possible uses of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the representative of Malta chose to refer to the Hungarian statements of last year and quoted them out of context to create the impression of a discrepancy between what my delegation had to say then and what it is saying now regarding this important problem of disarmament. I feel bound to reject any assertion that is intended to cast even a shadow of doubt on the integrity of the Hungarian delegation's position on the important problem of disarmament.

99. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly the Hungarian delegation was initiating¹² a reaffirmation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹³ forbidding chemical and bacteriological weapons, and we were striving to achieve the general validity and full implementation of that international instrument. By such a reaffirmation we wanted to strengthen the Protocol through calling on more States to accede to it. During the twenty-second session of the General Assembly two draft resolutions connected with this problem were submitted, one by Malta¹⁴ and, later, one by Hungary,¹⁵ together with a number of other delegations. On 15 December 1967 the representative of Malta stated that the two draft resolutions had different objectives [1553rd meeting, para. 144]. He stated that the one co-sponsored by Hungary contained a simplistic recommendation that all States adhere to the Geneva Protocol [ibid., para. 151]. In the view of my delegation, juridically and politically that is the crux of the problem: that all States should adhere to such an important document on the prohibition of certain types of armaments. If this position was different from the Maltese position, that means that the opinion of Malta was different and that it did not want to support an appeal to other States to adhere to the Geneva Protocol. In fact, on 12 December 1967 the representative of Malta said among other things that "reference to the Geneva Protocol . . . can have little more than a symbolic significance" [1547th meeting, para. 7]. He even used some other adjectives to describe the Geneva Protocol, calling it "marginally relevant" [ibid., para. 8] and in another part of the statement "largely irrelevant" [ibid., para. 10]. He suggested that "a sub-committee would facilitate the consideration of the question of the definition and use of chemical and biological weapons" [ibid., para. 66]. In the statement of the representative of

Malta we did not find any support for the Geneva Protocol; we did not find a demand for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Thus the difference in approach between the two positions is very clear.

100. At our 1615th meeting the representative of Malta hinted that the Hungarian delegation opposed the study of the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In this connexion, in order to complete the quotations which were taken out of context, I wish to call the attention of the representative of Malta to the statement made by the Hungarian representative on 14 December 1967. Though I am always very reluctant to quote myself, I have to do that in order to remind representatives of what I said then—namely, that the Hungarian delegation considered

"that the effects of the already known and existing chemical and bacteriological weapons could be usefully studied and the attention of world public opinion and of all Member States should be called to it. In this way we would certainly promote and strengthen the effect and the implementation of the Geneva Protocol . . . [1550th meeting, para. 61].

and I said that my delegation was ready to conduct consultations on those lines.

101. My delegation held and still holds that a study is useful but is not a substitute for the implementation of the Geneva Protocol. The position originally held by my delegation is still held by it. In that spirit we have found it possible to co-sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3. I must observe now that the representative of Malta has stated regarding this draft resolution that "it is certainly better than nothing". [1615th meeting, para. 25.]

102. Had he been a co-sponsor of that draft resolution I should have considered those words to be the understatement of the year. Since he is not a co-sponsor, I can only see in those words that he continues graciously to despise and depreciate the proposal of other delegations. On the other hand, his statement is very revealing because he could not find even a word to support the Geneva Protocol or to mention its merits. Instead, by concentrating on marginal issues he is confusing the problems a little and, as I indicated at our 1613th meeting, he is restricting the scope of the whole problem. Thus some discrepancy can be found in the way the representative of Malta speaks of the dangers of chemical and bacteriological weapons but does not support the existing international instrument prohibiting those weapons. That is a fact. It is almost as though someone who sees a house on fire shouts for help but refuses to help pull the fire engine.

103. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, a positive approach would be for Malta, following the example of numerous newly independent countries, to accede to the Geneva Protocol. As the representative of Hungary, a signatory of and party to the Geneva Protocol, I am in duty bound—or rather, treaty bound—to appeal to Malta to sign and ratify the Geneva Protocol and thus to co-operate with other States more effectively against the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

104. The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Malta in exercise of his right of reply.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, document A/6529, paras. 5 and 13.

¹³ See footnote 4.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30 and 31, document A/7017, para. 4 (a) and (c).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (d)

105. Mr. PARDO (Malta): I do not wish to engage in polemics with regard to the merits of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and I thank the representative of Hungary for his appeal to my country to sign that Protocol. I very much regret that the representative of Hungary believes that I quoted him out of context. I shall therefore quote the entire passage from the 1547th meeting of 12 December 1967. It reads:

“Furthermore, the draft resolution proposes that the Secretary-General’s report should examine the probable effects of the use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. To all intents and purposes, that might refer only to radiological weapons . . . since the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons are, unfortunately, already widely known. Let us take the example of the chemical anti-crop compounds used in Viet-Nam. . . .” [1547th meeting, para. 167.]

My statement was perfectly factual and I am sorry if the impression I gave was that I quoted the representative of Hungary out of context. I would invite all representatives, if they are interested, to read the verbatim record of the 1547th meeting in 1967 and make up their own minds as to whether or not my quotation was out of context.

106. The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Hungary, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

107. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): I still feel that the clarification given by the representative of Malta really did not add anything to what I had already said, and that it is

still a quotation out of context. I too recommend all representatives to read the records of the last General Assembly on this topic. They will find that the Hungarian delegation fought resolutely and took a firm stand in favour of the implementation of the Geneva Protocol, and explained that studies were no substitute for the implementation of that Protocol.

108. The CHAIRMAN: First of all, I would say to the representative of Saudi Arabia that I am grateful that he explained my reason for giving him the floor so that I do not have to explain that to the Committee. I would only confirm what he said, that there is nothing in the rules which prevents any representative speaking on draft resolutions which have already been circulated: there is only a practice. However, he quite rightly said that when there is time we should use the time available in the best possible way.

109. Secondly, there is also a practice of giving representatives the floor to exercise their right of reply on the same day as on which a statement has been made which has given rise to some objection on the part of other delegations. Again, however, there is no rule but only a practice. I say this just to explain why I called on the last speakers, who asked to exercise their right of reply. This is just to remind representatives of the usual practice. Of course, if cases of the same nature arise again and if we have time available, delegations will have the right to act in the same way.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.