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Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).

AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443, L.444 and Add.1, L.445)

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Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7189-DC/231)

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Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (*continued*) (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327)

1. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): In the slowly unfolding process of disarmament negotiations this debate may be said to take place in between acts. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been considered and commended by the General Assembly [resolution

2373 (XXII) and annex] and it has been signed by more than eighty nations. But the Treaty has not been brought into force. The signatures of several key nations are still missing and far too few States have proceeded to ratify it.

2. We in Finland remain convinced that first priority must be given to bringing the Treaty into force. In our view nothing that has happened since June has invalidated the compelling necessity of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. My Government has in fact initiated the process of ratification of the Treaty. A Bill to that effect was introduced in Parliament on 12 November and ratification can be expected in a matter of weeks. We hope that other States will follow and that above all the principal nuclear Powers themselves, the authors of the Treaty, will enact their ratification without further delay. Such action on their part would help a great deal to dispel some of the uncertainty now prevailing.

3. The uncertainty and the sense of insecurity revealed by the Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States calls for concerted efforts to rebuild international confidence. The success of such efforts clearly depends on the great Powers. They alone are able to take decisive action to improve the international climate. There seems to be general agreement that halting the further development of strategic nuclear missile systems is the most important and urgent task. This can be achieved only through bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States; yet it is an issue that affects the security of every nation and it is natural, therefore, that we here should urge the two Powers to enter into such negotiations without delay. Everyone recognizes the great complexity of the problems involved. But the beginning of bilateral talks in itself would improve the international situation. It would demonstrate the willingness of the two most powerful nations to work together for the maintenance of world peace.

4. A successful conclusion to such bilateral talks might well provide the key to real progress in nuclear disarmament. It would certainly enhance the possibilities of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty. But we should not passively await the outcome of the possibly protracted negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. My delegation welcomes the idea put forward by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report¹ to the effect that the testing and development of nuclear-weapon systems should be halted while talks on limitation and reduction of both offensive and defensive nuclear strategic missiles are being conducted. In the meantime

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 A*, para. 28.

work on preparing a generally acceptable comprehensive test-ban treaty should be carried on vigorously. The report of the experts who have met under the auspices of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on new developments in the field of seismic test-ban verification² encourages us to hope that this work can finally be brought to a successful conclusion. The cessation of the further development and refinement of nuclear weapons through underground testing would constitute an effective measure of disarmament. It would also provide convincing evidence of the willingness of the nuclear Powers to follow up the non-proliferation Treaty with meaningful steps to halt the nuclear arms race.

5. It is important in our view to maintain the momentum of disarmament negotiations. For that purpose we would welcome an early start, among the nuclear-weapon States as well as within the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, on work for a treaty reserving the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. Such a treaty, although it may have little immediate impact on international security, would have a considerable psychological significance, comparable to that of the outer space Treaty.³

6. Similarly, my delegation supports the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament⁴ that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and biological means of warfare. The expert report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons⁵ is a valuable precedent in this regard. We all know that new biological and chemical weapons are being developed and tested in laboratories. Such weapons may in some ways be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditures of financial and scientific resources that are needed for nuclear armaments. World public opinion should be alerted to recognize the frightening prospects of chemical and biological warfare.

7. While it is natural that we are preoccupied with the problems of controlling nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, we should not lose sight of other aspects of disarmament and arms control. The ever-increasing quantity and power of conventional armaments continue to have the most immediate and direct bearing on the national security of most States. In the shadow of the nuclear balance of terror, conventional armaments are in fact being used on an increasing scale for the attainment of political ends by the use of force.

8. A number of ideas for the limitation and regulation of conventional armaments, on a regional basis or generally,

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 6.

³ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

⁵ *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No: E.68.IX.1).

have been put forward in various connexions. They deserve serious and urgent consideration.

9. I have dealt only with some of the subjects confronting us. There are many other items of disarmament that continue to be on our agenda and on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In recent years Finland has followed, through observers, the work of that Committee which we consider a most useful expert body of both nuclear and non-nuclear countries in the field of disarmament. That organ performs an important function in a political as well as a technical sense.

10. I have not at this stage discussed the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which produced a great number of important and constructive recommendations and ideas. These must be fully considered in a spirit of co-operation between the nuclear Powers and non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. It is understandable that in a world in which the use or threat of force continues to prevail and international relations still are largely influenced by considerations of military power, the search for greater security remains the main preoccupation of nations. There can be of course no universally applicable formula that could solve the security problems of every State. In the last resort each nation will always judge for itself, in the light of its own circumstances, what its security requires. No treaty or declaration, no document, has ever by itself created real security for any nation unless it reflects the political realities governing international relations. In the case of my own country, as was pointed out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahti Karjalainen, in Parliament on 12 November 1968, Finland as a neutral country cannot accept any security guarantees from other Powers, apart from those provided by the Charter of the United Nations. But that should not be taken to imply any lack of interest in the strengthening of international peace and security as a whole. On the contrary, Finland is ready to join any constructive effort to improve international confidence, promote further measures of arms control and disarmament, and above all strengthen the peace-making and peace-keeping capacities of the United Nations. That we believe is the road to genuine security for all nations.

12. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker on my list I wish to inform members that Mongolia has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1, bringing the number of co-sponsors to twelve.

13. Mr. VAKIL (Iran): This has been a busy year for those concerned with disarmament what with two sessions of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and two discussions of non-proliferation, one here in the spring and another, just concluded, at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. After all the brave words spoken in so many forums, the question remains: what will come of them?

14. I must confess that this renewed discussion finds my delegation in a mood of discontent. Disarmament is the first concern of the United Nations. But though it figures on our agenda each year, we do not so much take decisions

about it as react, more or less involuntarily, almost automatically, to decisions taken or not taken outside the United Nations. We exhort and we urge: elsewhere, what are called "useful and valuable discussions" are held. Time passes without result in the field of disarmament proper, while the matter becomes more urgent. The question to which at this time we ought to respond is how the United Nations can improve its methods and machinery for meeting its responsibilities in this domain.

15. The report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is too narrow a document to serve as the basis for a fundamental review of the disarmament problem. It is a mixture of technical suggestions on which there has been no agreement and general programmatic declarations which have grown stale through ineffective repetition.

16. The report takes no account of the mood of the world or of the changes taking place in the political and psychological context of the problems we face. If those in whose hands the major power of decision lies had ever felt the pangs of hunger or known in their own countries the horizons of hopelessness that bound the view of much of the world, their sense of responsibility and accountability would surely have burst the limits of this meagre and bloodless document.

17. Technology has shortened the military time scale between the life and death of nations; events in Europe, the Middle East and South-East Asia may be reducing the psychological time scale between them equally, diminishing the immunity which somehow we had developed against the fearsome risks that military advances had created.

18. Will the forbearance of the two super-Powers and their mutual will to desist from challenging each other endure? Is it consistent with our responsibilities as Members of this Organization to continue so passively to rest our peace and security on their equilibrium of mind and strength, about which so many doubts have newly arisen?

19. Only last spring, on the insistence of many here present, the draft non-proliferation treaty was strengthened, as we all believed, by inserting in it an emphatic renewal of the Charter interdiction of the use of force. Yet force has again been used; the use of force requires arms and men; it involves challenges to others which, if they deem them provocative enough, they will accept. And then what?

20. Will all this have a propitious influence on the fulfilment of the treaty promise to discuss means to end the nuclear arms race, to stop the competition in development of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, offensive and defensive, and to proceed to their elimination?

21. Most of the Members of this Organization are strangers to these decisions and discussions; they have no real voice in or influence on them; their fates are helplessly dependent on them.

22. The aspirations of this voiceless and unrepresented majority of States are recorded in innumerable resolutions adopted by this body. They form a kind of uncodified programme, which has now been supplemented by the

conclusions reached in Geneva in September 1968 at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, with which we shall have to deal at a later stage of this debate.

23. The question which arises now is how to make more telling the influence all this has on those who have the power to take decisions. So far that influence has been small.

24. I do not wish to trace the many organizational changes in the handling of disarmament that have followed each other from the time when the Security Council first failed in its Charter duty to formulate plans for disarmament. In its present form the system has two major features.

25. First, it is organized outside the United Nations, although the United Nations Secretariat provides it with services.

26. Second, the principle of representation purports to be tripartite: two parts being the two major Powers attended by their close friends. France, unhappily, has not taken part. The interest and labours of France in the cause of peace need no praise from me. I cannot forbear to say, however, how sorely her voice and influence are missed in the disarmament negotiations. In this connexion, I dare raise the question whether modalities for the accommodation of the French point of view with existing arrangements for the examination of the disarmament question cannot be sought and found, given goodwill on all sides.

27. The third part of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is composed of eight States usually referred to as non-aligned Powers and presumably unconnected with either side. Upon this third group of participants falls the heavy burden of speaking for the vast remaining number of United Nations Members.

28. Great changes have taken place inside and outside the United Nations since that Committee was established. The United Nations has 126 Members now. The Security Council numbers fifteen instead of eleven, the Economic and Social Council twenty-seven instead of eighteen. Membership changes, offices rotate, the Eighteen-Nation Committee remains unaffected.

29. Two aspects of that Committee ought, in my view, to be examined. The first is its distance from the United Nations, organizationally; the second is its composition.

30. Between the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Assembly stands the Disarmament Commission—in effect, a committee of the whole which acts as a postal drop for the reports of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. No one pretends that it is a suitable forum for the consideration of the hard questions of fact and policy involved in dealing with problems of arms control and general or collateral measures of disarmament. An over-crowded body which meets infrequently, it is not even organized for much work. It has no fixed schedule—indeed for five years it did not meet at all; it has no subordinate committees, expert services or means of study, and is not even a useful sounding board for the expression of the points of view of its members. Nothing is expected of it. The General Assembly itself through the

First Committee performs the Commission's presumable functions far more effectively. But the General Assembly is not the place for the protracted and continued study of the difficult and fateful questions involved in disarmament.

31. It is suggested sometimes that participation in the negotiation, as opposed to the rhetoric of disarmament, demands expertise. Was the criterion for membership in the Eighteen-Nation Committee at the time of its establishment the experience and wisdom in disarmament already possessed by those who were picked to sit there?

32. To be sure, much of what that Committee has accomplished it owes to the critical prodding of those members who were not particularly expert to begin with. In matters increasingly central to the problems of the great Powers they have contributed elucidation and suggestions for possibilities of management in increasing measure. This is proof that expertise is acquired in this, as in other matters, by study and exposure to the problems involved.

33. With the changes that have taken place in the organization and the disposition of power in the world, the time has come to conform the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the principles of the Charter.

34. We have the help of expert groups like the one that produced the recent report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.⁶ In this connexion, I should remark that we favour initiating a study by a similar body of the problems of chemical and biological warfare.

35. The Secretariat can be of great help, too. Much valuable information on disarmament and arms control is already in the public domain, either in Government publications or in the many books and articles privately produced by individuals and research organizations. It seems appropriate to suggest that the epitomization of all this information and analysis should be one of the major tasks of the Secretariat in our behalf. Does not something of the kind already occur in the Eighteen-Nation Committee? If not, why not? And, if it does, why should not a wider group profit from our work? I should like to suggest also that there should be a wider and prompter distribution of the records of the proceedings of the Committee. No one should believe that none of us outside the sacred circle of that Committee has done his homework. What is lacking is the experience which only exchanges of ideas can provide, and for such exchanges we lack a forum.

36. The contention that agreement between the super-Powers on the major problems on which they are divided would automatically provide answers to our own arms dilemmas has also lost much of its force.

37. Changes have taken place in power relations in too many parts of the world to permit continued reliance on that argument. Disarmament is now not one all-embracing monolithic matter; it has regional aspects which must find a high place on the agenda of disarmament negotiations. For the consideration and solution of these newly urgent problems the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

needs an infusion of fresh blood and new ideas, to make it more nearly representative of the growing concern and involvement of States in various parts of the world with particular aspects of disarmament.

38. The fact that formulation of the agenda of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament falls within the province of the co-Chairmen perhaps explains why that body is not responsive in the desired degree to urgent requests of the General Assembly that it give high priority to matters to which the Assembly has attributed special importance. The force of such recommendations and indeed the regard of the Eighteen-Nation Committee for the views and concerns of those outside its perimeter would be strengthened by its enlargement and the establishment of a closer connexion with the United Nations.

39. The need for change in this respect became plainly visible with the holding of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which constituted a kind of turning point. Because the great majority of United Nations Members had been left out of the negotiations in the exclusive club of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, they sought to establish a forum of their own in which to consider the advantages and disadvantages of non-proliferation from the point of view of their development and security.

40. There is beginning to be perceptible the structure of a disarmament system which is likely to halt where it is unless the main architects can be pushed to complete plans for building it by engaging them in continuous dialogue not only with each other but with the rest of us.

41. We have a test-ban only partially built for lack of a cellar, though I am heartened by the news out of Sweden that scientific means of detecting from a distance have been developed which may at last pave the way for a complete ban on tests. Non-proliferation still has only a horizontal and no vertical dimension. There is ground still to be cleared in the promised dismantling of strategic delivery vehicles, offensive and defensive; the shift to be made from war to peace uses of fissile materials involves not only a halt in the building of nuclear stockpiles but the drawing down of supplies presently destined to war uses in order to permit their transfer to meet the multiplying energy needs of the world's population. Finally, the construction of an edifice invulnerable to the security shocks of political earthquakes, is the last and most difficult task still before us.

42. To my mind, the disarmament foundations which we are laying will have to serve also as the base for the building of peace in the widest sense of the word. I would remind you that we are committed to diverting to the needs of peaceful development the resources now dedicated to arms. We have a beginning of this in the changes anticipated in the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency, where safeguards against abusive diversions of the world's atomic resources are to be married to measures giving it an increased role in the peaceful exploitation of those atomic resources.

43. Similar developments are to be anticipated in ensuring that the development of the resources of the sea-bed and

⁶ *Ibid.*

ocean floor is restricted to peaceful ends. When the discussion of the limitation and elimination of vehicles for the delivery of strategic weapons bears fruit, a similar union with the work on the peaceful uses of outer space may be expected. Progress in the solution of all these problems is interrelated. We need to find means of moving ahead in a co-ordinated way in all these areas.

44. All this impinges on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, where problems of co-ordination and keeping pace with the tasks of peaceful development are bound to emerge and grow in consequence of these transformations. It seems evident to me that reinforcement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is necessary to take account of all this, with due regard for the need for improved effectiveness. Now that the developing countries are becoming more closely involved it is appropriate to consider how to apply the well-established principle of geographical distribution and rotation in this domain.

45. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): In approaching the problems of disarmament in the First Committee the Hungarian delegation keeps the fundamental objective always in mind—that is, the plan of general and complete disarmament—and judges every disarmament proposal by its aptness to promote the achievement of that aim.

46. Hungarian foreign policy has a primary interest in thwarting the threat of an atomic war, especially in the conditions of the still existing and varying international tensions. That is precisely why we think it important to put into effect disarmament proposals which lead in the direction of *détente*. The Hungarian delegation has had occasion in the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies to point to the causes of international tension in various regions of the world. As a small country of Europe, Hungary of course looks with particular attention at the problems prevailing in Europe.

47. We continue to be concerned about the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany pursues a policy of *revanchisme*, advocates the changing of the *status quo* in Europe and of existing frontiers and claims the right to represent the people of the two German States. Furthermore, in spite of its declarations concerning the renunciation of nuclear armaments, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supports every effort to counteract the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Another alarming fact is that recently, in certain quarters in the United States, a position has been adopted against banning the National Democratic Party, thus violating the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. In sharp contrast to that attitude, the other German State, the German Democratic Republic, follows an entirely different policy by supporting all positive initiatives for disarmament. This is clearly manifested by, among other things, its prompt signing of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the statement sent to the President of the General Assembly by Minister of Foreign Affairs Otto Winzer, from which I wish to quote the following important part:

“The Government of the German Democratic Republic anew declares to the forum of the United Nations its readiness to effectively co-operate also in the future in the implementation of measures for disarmament and *détente*.” [See A/C.1/974.]

48. We cannot let it pass unnoticed that international tension is being increased also by the communiqués issued recently on “demonstrative nuclear explosions”, which are proposed in order to strengthen NATO, in the territories of European NATO Powers.

49. We have no intention of adopting this cold-war tone. We are sure that the defence system of the socialist countries is working well, but we think it timely and proper to point out that the tendencies I have just mentioned are apt to step up the arms race. On the other hand, my delegation wishes to stress at this stage of the debate what the Prime Minister of the Hungarian People’s Republic said in his address to the National Assembly this autumn. He said:

“In spite of the increasing international tension the basic line our Government has followed in its foreign policy remains unchanged and our international activities are aimed at the same goals we have been trying to achieve all the time. We carry on our efforts to ease international tension and to improve the world atmosphere. We are ready at any time to co-operate in an examination and to achieve a settlement of the major international problems.”

50. The Soviet draft resolution [A/C.1/L.443] submitted to the Committee reflects the sense of responsibility with which the Soviet Union wishes to save mankind from the disaster of a thermonuclear holocaust. The arms race, which the Soviet Union stands up against and because of which the majority of United Nations Member States are in favour of the non-proliferation Treaty, is today fraught with dangers which, unless they are checked and if additional countries join the nuclear arms race, may have a catastrophic effect not only on the security but also on the whole economy of the world. This race, even without a thermonuclear war, could ruin the lives of the peoples. That is why my delegation welcomes the initiative of the Soviet Union as regards starting negotiations and is confident that the memorandum of the Soviet Government [A/7134] will meet with a sensible response from the other great Powers concerned.

51. The Secretary-General states in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the United Nations:

“The past year has been a year of achievement in the field of disarmament.”⁷

It was indeed a signal achievement that the United Nations General Assembly on 12 June 1968 commended the non-proliferation Treaty by an overwhelming vote. The Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic was among the first to sign it, and we are very pleased to see the practicability of the Treaty verified by the signatures of more than eighty Governments. We are convinced that this avenue of progress must be broadened. The implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty is the actual key problem in the efforts at disarmament.

52. We have been confirmed in this conviction by the general debate of this twenty-third session of the General Assembly as well. The majority of Member States regard

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 A*, para. 14.

the non-proliferation Treaty as an important factor in halting and reversing the arms race. The view has come to prevail that without the non-proliferation Treaty it is difficult, if not outright impossible, to make any progress towards further considerable disarmament measures.

53. As to the matters of detail concerning the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, my delegation intends to speak separately at another stage of this debate. Now I wish only to point out that this is the first time in history that the signatory Powers have undertaken the legal obligation, under the provisions of article VI,

“ . . . to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” [*see General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*].

54. Hungary, as one of the small States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, accepts that it is mandatory for all signatories to meet this obligation with a view to promoting further disarmament measures. In our view, the Soviet memorandum, by stressing the outstanding aspects of the problem of disarmament, shows the practical course to be followed by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

55. Our immediate task must be to create the conditions which ensure that, no matter how contradictory and serious the international situation may be, the weapons of mass destruction are not used and the life of mankind is not extinguished.

56. Hungary is not a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In examining its report to the General Assembly we can see that it has given preference to the discussion of issues which go in the direction of eliminating the weapons of mass destruction. In this respect the Hungarian delegation deems it necessary to stress the timeliness of some of the questions included in the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

57. In operative paragraph 1 of its resolution 2289 (XXII) the General Assembly has already expressed the conviction that it is essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. The Soviet memorandum of 1 July [A/7134] again called attention to this question and thus stimulated the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue examining it during its relatively short session.

58. The Hungarian delegation fully supports the idea of concluding a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons for the following reasons:

(a) The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is essentially a political matter. Such an obligation could be put into effect without any complicated measures. At the same time, as an initial step, it would promote and facilitate the physical elimination of nuclear weapons, which requires technically more complicated decisions. It is well therefore to seek the solution by starting with the easier way and proceeding towards the more complicated.

(b) An appropriate convention as a practical measure to move forward can be concluded promptly.

(c) According to the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union the parties would undertake to make every effort to arrive as soon as possible at agreement on the cessation of production and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons. States, first of all the nuclear Powers, would thereby assume a new legal obligation working towards general and complete disarmament.

(d) The adoption of a convention would stimulate nuclear disarmament; it would add an essential measure to the existing controls; it would enhance the effectiveness of international obligations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it could become a major means of consolidating international law and order; it would stop atomic blackmail.

59. The General Assembly in 1967 adopted resolution 2289 (XXII) with not a single vote against it. This is added proof that a very considerable number of States are interested in the adoption of such a convention.

60. The debates so far have brought forth only one counter-argument, which is that the proposed convention would contain only unqualified obligations—that is, obligations without guarantees, sanctions and control.

61. We fully agree that it would be better to have a convention providing for obligations supported by appropriate guarantees. But the political proposal for the conclusion of a convention is based on realities. It aims at putting into writing what is feasible and useful today. It does not rule out at all—rather it outlines—the conditions under which the convention might be supported also by guarantees. As concerns the guarantees, I have to point out that the most effective guarantee is precisely the fact that all countries have a vital interest in assuming reciprocal obligations in order to free themselves from the nuclear threat.

62. To refuse to sign an international convention on the ground that it would not be respected is untenable. It would mean denying in general the instruments and norms of international law.

63. A certain measure of optimism—which is not baseless—is justified by the fact that on the issue of a comprehensive test ban, that is, the prohibition of underground explosions, agreement has prevailed among members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, including the nuclear Powers. There have been differences of opinion only on the methods devised to prevent clandestine explosions.

64. The Hungarian People's Republic identifies itself with the countries whose sound and well-considered judgement it is that the national means of detection are sufficient for control, and that their effectiveness is beyond question. We hope that the differences over the methods of control can be reconciled and that meaningful negotiations will start soon.

65. A comprehensive test ban is of major importance also for the slowing down of the arms race. It would prevent the

establishment and development of new and more sophisticated nuclear-weapon systems. We think that at the present juncture, which is marked by agreement on a comprehensive ban, Governments should give up forcing various ideas of verification systems and quotas and should make policy decisions which, together with other measures, would be conducive to the physical scrapping of nuclear weapons. We are fully in favour of including the subject as a high priority item in the agenda of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

66. What I have said thus far is also evidence that the Hungarian delegation is consistently against the use of all weapons of mass destruction, and stands for their prohibition. That is why we are glad to see the question of chemical and bacteriological warfare on the agenda of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and have sponsored the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1, initiated by the delegation of the Polish People's Republic.

67. Chemical and bacteriological warfare is a very dangerous means of mass destruction which several decades ago was subjected to prohibitive measures under the provisions of a widely accepted international instrument. The Hungarian People's Republic, in the very first few years of its existence, ratified the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare⁸—commonly called the Geneva Protocol. It was on the initiative of the Hungarian delegation that the General Assembly adopted resolution 2162 B (XXI), inviting all States to accede to the Protocol. Being concerned for the future of mankind, the great majority of Member States endorsed that appeal. Ever since the twenty-first session of the General Assembly we have done all we could to make that position of ours prevail, and we have been fighting to prevent the issue of the Geneva Protocol from being shelved or confused. We strive to keep the issue alive and not to allow certain imperialist circles to have a free hand, by depreciating the Geneva Protocol, to use weapons of mass destruction.

68. The effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons are not known widely enough. That is an especially timely justification for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1. In operative paragraph 1 the draft requests the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report. Its purpose is quite clear: the attention of public opinion must be drawn to the danger of a possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

69. Regarding the use of another means of mass destruction, the nuclear weapon, the Secretary-General made a very useful report⁹ to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session. We have every reason to hope that he will prepare a similarly satisfactory report on our present issue as well.

70. In connexion with the question of chemical and bacteriological warfare, the Hungarian delegation wishes to call attention to two essential points.

71. The first is that we have an effective, lasting and satisfactory instrument of international law in operation against chemical and bacteriological warfare. That is the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which has been ratified by over sixty States. By their ratification those States have undertaken also to persuade all States to accede to the Protocol, with a view to giving it universal effect.

72. The twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2162 (XXI) recognized the universal international validity of the Geneva Protocol. It was in no small degree due to that fact that a number of States acceded to the Protocol after the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. The latest accession, to our knowledge, was by Nigeria, early this month. Further confirmation, which is also very important from the point of view of international law, was given to the Geneva Protocol by the International Conference on Human Rights organized by the United Nations in Teheran in the spring of 1968. The lawyers participating in that Conference arrived at two essential conclusions: (a) that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is validly included in the present law of warfare; and (b) that all States which have not yet done so should become parties to the Geneva Protocol.¹⁰

73. What makes the Geneva Protocol so powerful an instrument? Why do international jurists still consider it an instrument of universal validity?

74. The lasting value of the Geneva Protocol lies in the fact that the Committee set up to formulate it, having drawn the lesson from the horrors of the First World War, laid down a political decision. It formulated a comprehensive and universal prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare. The authors rightly understood that the aim was to extend the prohibition to as large categories as possible without closing the circle. They did not wish to get lost in technicalities. A list of technical details would inevitably have had a restrictive effect upon the political decision aimed at a universal prohibition, not to mention that such a list could not have been exhaustive, because of the jealously guarded secrets of that time and, I might add, of our time. That is a very strong argument against the amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.445, which implies a more detailed specification of the subject. That should, in our view, be the task of the consultant experts.

75. There is nothing the proponents of chemical and bacteriological warfare would accept more willingly than a specification of the various weapons "to improve" the Geneva Protocol. That would make things easier for them, since the weapons kept secret would not be included in the list and they would have a free hand to use them. It is precisely the fact of the prohibitions being formulated in the Geneva Protocol in such a comprehensive way, permitting an interpretation *per analogiam*, that makes every attempt to "improve" that international instrument suspicious.

76. The text of the Geneva Protocol is still timely and clear when it speaks of "poisonous or other gases, and . . .

⁸ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

⁹ See foot-note 5.

¹⁰ See *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights*, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2), chap. III, res. XXIII.

all analogous liquids, materials or devices” which result in the destruction of human life and the conditions of existence. The arguments advanced on the pretext of “updating” and “improving” are indications of dubious motives. An “updating” attempt without knowledge of the latest scientific developments, which are kept strictly secret, could hardly succeed. The prohibitive provisions of the Geneva Protocol apply today to chemical and bacteriological weapons, as means of mass destruction, just as they did in 1925.

77. Strictly speaking, the Charter of the United Nations prohibits every kind of war and thus the measures and agreements imposing restrictions on armaments and warfare would seem to be needless. However, despite the opinion of many to the contrary, the Charter is not obsolete. It is a progressive international instrument, for the implementation of which we still have a great deal to do, including making efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control and to implement the Geneva Protocol. Nor is the Geneva Protocol obsolete in that respect. It is still, today, a progressive international instrument which we have to use for the strengthening of the peace and security of the peoples.

78. Secondly, world public opinion must be continuously made aware of the dangers inherent in chemical and bacteriological weapons.

79. Like nuclear weapons, chemical and bacteriological weapons are terrible means of indiscriminate mass destruction. They are blind weapons, which do not aim at destroying military objectives, but which bring death and devastation to unlimited areas and turn war into a massacre of the civil populations. These weapons do not distinguish between the military and the civil population; they kill all life, human, animal or plant, without discrimination.

80. It is no negligible circumstance either that, while the military are well prepared and protected in some way or other against the means of chemical and bacteriological warfare, the civil population is defenceless in the face of these death-dealing weapons. We can state as a fact that the weapons of chemical and bacteriological warfare are means of terror and intimidation, and their use leads to genocide.

81. Special mention should be made of the real experience gained from the actual use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Indicative of the vitality of the Geneva Protocol is the fact that no chemical or bacteriological weapons were used in Europe during the Second World War. Unfortunately, however, there have been a few exceptions since the coming into force of the Geneva Protocol. It is known that the Fascist régime of Italy in 1936 used blister gas against the Ethiopians. We also know that Japan used chemical and bacteriological weapons against China on several occasions and, according to Brigadier General Charles E. Louchs, head of the United States chemical warfare operations in the Pacific theatre, even against American troops in a “few” instances. Documentary evidence has been presented before the United Nations that the United States also resorted to the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in Korea. The facts about operation “Ranch Hand” in Viet-Nam are known to the whole world.

82. Never before at any time or place has there been such intensive spraying of chemicals, defoliants and so forth. The entire American production of one leaf killer, 2,4,5-T—in 1966 the figure for this chemical alone was as high as 7.5 million pounds—was diverted to Viet-Nam. Apart from the fact that defoliation and crop destruction have the peculiar property of inflicting suffering on civilians while doing little damage to the military, the ecological effects of this warfare will last much longer, for generations to come.

83. We do not want to repeat the well-known facts already presented before this Committee during previous sessions. From the numerous examples of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons we can draw a lesson that is very instructive today. In every instance it was a highly industrialized country that used such formidable weapons against the developing countries and the liberation movements.

84. The proliferation of these terrible weapons still goes on clandestinely. Their allegedly low cost leads many to claim that even the developing countries can afford to engage in chemical and bacteriological armament. They make it appear as if the conditions were equal for all countries.

85. It is a serious political deception to emphasize the low costs of production. The truth is that the developing countries are neither economically nor technologically prepared for chemical and bacteriological warfare. Especially they are not prepared for defence against such weapons. In addition to the density of population—which in itself is an optimum for chemical and bacteriological attack—it must be taken into account that the “simple” measure of crop destruction alone may spell a national disaster to the developing countries. And one ought not to forget the degree of development of health services, since the provision of immunization, assistance and medical treatment is the primary condition of defence. Consequently, the chemical and bacteriological weapons serve the purpose of terror and blackmail, the conduct of warfare mainly against the freedom movements and the peoples of Asia and Africa.

86. In giving its support to a comprehensive study of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Hungarian delegation is motivated by the conviction that the results will induce an additional number of States—and possibly all—which have not so far done so to become parties to the Geneva Protocol. Apart from this, the First Committee, whose main task is to make political decisions, has to do everything possible to ensure respect for the Geneva Protocol and accession to it by as large a number of States as possible. Accession to the Geneva Protocol today is a political act which would exert a really great influence on the halting of the arms race. And the arms race must be stopped; it must be changed into a disarmament race.

87. The United States has built an enormous network of laboratories for chemical and bacteriological research and death factories extending even to a number of universities. The United States manufactures chemical and bacteriological weapons in the largest quantity and on a world scale. At the same time, the United States is the only great Power that has not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol. The draft

resolution in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1 is aimed at making world public opinion conscious of the danger inherent in chemical and bacteriological armament and enforcing the universal validity of the Geneva Protocol. We hope that, even in the absence of a report from the Secretary-General, the United States will in future feel bound by the Geneva Protocol and ratify it at an early date.

88. The Hungarian delegation is resolutely and consistently set on the path of a definitive reversal of the cold-war note which was struck by some at the start of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. In the spirit of the obligation under article VI of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the First Committee still has much to do in designing further constructive disarmament measures, and I offer full support for such efforts on behalf of my delegation.

89. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker on my list I wish to inform the Committee that Finland has added its name to the list of co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444. The number of co-sponsors of that draft resolution is now thirteen.

90. The delegation of Trinidad and Tobago is now a co-sponsor of the amendment proposed by the delegation of Malta in document A/C.1/L.445. The number of co-sponsors of that amendment is now two.

91. Mr. KABANDA (Rwanda) (*translated from French*): Having heard the statements of the representatives who have spoken thus far on the item before us, and particularly in the light of the statements made by the representatives of the Soviet Union [1606th meeting], the United Kingdom [1609th meeting] and the United States of America [1611th meeting], we might be tempted to hope that the work of the current session with regard to disarmament is being directed towards long-awaited solutions.

92. As a matter of fact, some factors do seem to justify optimism: the signing and ratification by a number of countries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex], the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution on measures to be taken in case of nuclear threat or attack [resolution 255 (1968)], the resolutions and the final report of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277 and Corr.1] and the statements made by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States on the eventual reduction of their ballistic missile systems, are all factors that may hold out some hope.

93. Yet if, on the other hand, we glance at the world security situation, we unfortunately find dangerous hotbeds which, if not dealt with seriously and swiftly, may flare up and endanger the peace and security of our already troubled world.

94. For proof of this, we have only to look at the Middle East, where there is only a theoretical cease-fire, since the sound of weapons has unfortunately not given way to moderation and realism; we need only recall Viet-Nam, where battles are being waged near the 17th parallel. We need only think, too, of the situation prevailing in southern Africa, in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and South

Africa, where racism and racial segregation are rampant. And I am not forgetting the continent of Europe, where the situation brought about by recent events is made even darker by fears for the future. And I could go on. . . . If, to all that, we must add the frantic nuclear arms race and the race in all kinds of conventional weapons, and the resurgence of the cold war between East and West, we have to come to the conclusion that the situation is, to say the least, disturbing.

95. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which so much hope was placed, may be compromised if the promises made in articles IV and V of the Treaty to the small Powers that are Parties to it are not rapidly fulfilled and if, above all, these Powers are given no serious guarantee against any actual or threatened nuclear attack by one or another Power Party to the Treaty, however large that Power may be.

96. Is there any need for us to repeat what we said about the Treaty last May [1562nd meeting]? We considered it to be an important step towards the eventual control of atomic weapons. Our views have not changed since then, but as the treaty will not help to reduce the number of nuclear-weapon States, since it merely bars the entry of new States into the nuclear club, we still think that the danger which threatened the world before the Treaty was signed has in no way been dissipated. My delegation believes that the evil must now be attacked at its source, in other words, there must be a gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, or at the least a solemn assurance must be given forthwith that the nuclear countries are seriously considering freezing nuclear weapons at their present level. In short, we should be working on the preparation of a treaty on vertical non-proliferation.

97. Nuclear testing is still being carried out in the atmosphere and underground. This we read in the memorandum submitted by eight member countries of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.¹¹ Although it is regrettable that all nuclear countries are not bound by the Partial Test Ban Treaty,¹² it would be particularly regrettable if the States Parties to this Treaty were to take the initiative in violating it. We hope that this will not occur.

98. In the memorandum submitted by the eight Powers, we read that continued testing would impart

“... a renewed impetus to the arms race, bringing about unforeseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust in the relationship between States and causing immense and increasing diversion of human and material resources for purposes of war”.

Then, referring to reports by experts in this field, the eight Powers go on to say that underground tests

“... have led to leakages of radioactivity outside the territorial limits of testing States, thus causing infringements of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Even if these incidents have not been deliberate, they may eventually

¹¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 10.

¹² Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

lead to a weakening of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and even endanger its very existence”.

99. A number of delegations have quite rightly stressed that the most pressing problem to be solved at the present time is that of the total prohibition of nuclear testing in all environments. My delegation shares this opinion. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be followed immediately by a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear testing in all environments. The urgency of this matter would justify the priority which the Eighteen-Nation Committee should give it when it prepares its time-table at its resumed meetings.

100. It will be remembered that the Secretary-General, at the request of the General Assembly, had a study prepared on the effects of horizontal proliferation and the possible use of nuclear weapons. His report¹³ was most useful, especially for delegations like my own which do not have access to many other sources of information in the nuclear field.

101. My delegation believes the Secretary-General could also usefully undertake a study on the effects of underground nuclear explosions on plant and animal life in the explosion area and on mineral resources which might be buried under the surface. Such a study should also propose what steps should be taken to avert the effects of radioactivity produced by nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

102. This proposal—which I am introducing on behalf of the delegation of Rwanda—will probably meet with the objection that if the Secretary-General undertakes a study on the effects of underground testing, there will be no pressing need for the question to be considered by the Geneva Committee until this study is submitted. We hope that no delegation will make this objection, since it will be recalled that the Committee performed the work which led to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the same time as the study requested by the General Assembly was being carried out.

103. We feel that there is no point in minimizing the dangerous effects of nuclear explosions on, both the psychological and security levels, for mankind, which has felt the shock of war, is asking only to be protected from what would be an additional source of fear and anxiety.

104. My delegation is pleased at the progress which has been made in international co-operation with regard to information concerning detection and identification methods for seismic phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions. We are hopeful that further progress will soon be made in the question of on-site inspection.

105. I said earlier that the question of underground nuclear tests should be given priority in the time-table of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and should be examined with a sense of urgency. We feel that it might be useful now

to suggest an order of priority for the other disarmament questions. In this connexion, the plan put forward by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, seems to us complete, logical and realistic. We need only refer to the 1609th meeting.

106. I should like to comment on the statements of intention made by the United States and the Soviet Union. Since these countries appear to be prepared to enter into joint negotiations aimed at reducing their stockpiles of missiles and delivery vehicles, we must try to avoid anything that could create an obstacle to their intention, which we for our part view as sincere. We believe that in drawing up its agenda the Committee should omit the question or questions on which the United States and the Soviet Union have promised they would negotiate. With regard to these questions, we feel that the Committee's role should be a subsidiary one; that might be the best way for us to obtain more than we hope for.

107. I should like to quote the words of the representative of Sweden in this connexion:

“The most urgent disarmament measure is to obtain a cessation of the missile race, going upwards and ever upwards. The limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles is, obviously, a matter for negotiation directly between the two super-Powers, but one to be closely watched by all of us.” [1609th meeting, para. 109.]

108. The General Assembly should take note here and now of these present intentions manifested by the two great nuclear Powers and make recommendations. The delegation of Rwanda hopes that agreement will have been reached by the beginning of the next session.

109. I now come to the Soviet memorandum. We believe that it raises some highly pertinent questions, the most important being the question of a treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, for this is the goal of all the work being done in this Committee and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We believe that this document should be given all the attention it deserves. The memorandum states that:

“Such an agreement would constitute a serious deterrent to all those intending to employ such weapons. By allaying the suspicions of some Powers that others might intend to use nuclear weapons, such an agreement would lead to a more healthy international climate.” [A/7134, para. 5.]

110. We understand from this that the agreement would first of all be a political instrument designed to allay suspicion; this would contribute to an atmosphere of relaxation, especially were it to come now, when the atmosphere is more tense than ever. However, this aspect is not negligible, even though there are others to be considered, such as the security of the non-nuclear countries. It is one thing to prohibit the use of a weapon one possesses, but the fear inspired by the very fact that the weapon exists is something else. Thus, if a treaty on the non-utilization of nuclear weapons is desirable, it is perhaps even more desirable that at the same time formal guarantees should be given that the manufacture of nuclear weapons should be

¹³ *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).

prohibited forthwith, and that the nuclear countries should undertake at least to freeze their existing weapons stockpiles at their present levels pending the outcome of negotiations on the gradual elimination of these stockpiles. This would, in addition, be in keeping with articles IV and V of the Treaty on non-proliferation.

111. The advantages derived from the application of nuclear technology are numerous. However, it is regrettable that the developing countries have not so far been able to benefit from them under acceptable conditions. Nevertheless, we believe that it is not too late to act; this is a new area for international co-operation which should be open to everyone. I have reason to believe that here too the conditions laid down for developing countries are extremely heavy, and this is a pity.

112. There are some countries, however, which do not have sufficient knowledge of nuclear matters, and Rwanda can be considered as one of them. We believe that countries with a highly developed nuclear technology should now undertake to make a greater contribution to fostering knowledge in this field, by placing funds for study and development as well as for equipment at the disposal of the countries with fewer personnel. My delegation believes that some programming and co-ordination of international assistance on nuclear matters are essential. The International Atomic Energy Agency should play a large part in this field, in collaboration with interested countries and specialized agencies, not forgetting bodies affiliated with the United States such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

113. A system of multilateral guarantees regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy should also be worked out. However, even though the peaceful use of nuclear energy may be an important element in the economic future of our countries, I feel it would be premature to stress priority for programmes of economic development based on nuclear energy over programmes worked out along traditional lines, although the latter expression may not be too appropriate. Such priority would be justified only if all developing countries were sufficiently equipped in the nuclear field.

114. As concerns chemical and bacteriological weapons, or microbiological weapons, to use the expression of the United Kingdom, my delegation shares the concern expressed by the Secretary-General when he stated, in the introduction to his annual report:

“The question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question of nuclear weapons,

which have a destructive power several orders of magnitude greater than that of chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons. Almost all countries, including small ones and developing ones, may have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in small laboratories or factories. This fact in itself makes the problem of control and inspection much more difficult.”¹⁴

115. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should without delay include this question on its agenda, along with the question of the denuclearization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

116. My delegation supports the idea of appointing a group of experts to carry out a study on the effects of chemical and biological weapons.

117. The Geneva Protocol¹⁵ should be brought up to date by an additional protocol which would be conceived on a universal basis, as suggested by several representatives, including those of Italy [1606th meeting] and the United Kingdom [1609th meeting].

118. In conclusion, I should like to express my delegation's concern at the fact that the conventional arms race has become nearly overwhelming. We think that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should take up this question and make recommendations to the Committee as soon as possible. Of course, we are well aware of the problems that can arise out of a discussion of this question owing to the simple fact that the large suppliers of such weapons are also members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, but we believe that they, too, are concerned for the security of all countries.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1 A*, para. 30.

¹⁵ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).