

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly
FORTY-SIXTH SESSION
Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
Third meeting
held on
Monday, 14 October 1991
at 10 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD **OF THE** 3rd MEETING

Chairman:

Mr. MROZIEWICZ

(Poland)

CONTENTS

TRIBUTE TO **THE MEMORY OF ALFONSO** GARCIA ROBLES, AMBASSADOR OF MEXICO

OPENING STATEMENT BY **THE** CHAIRMAN

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL **DISARMAMENT** ITEMS [47 to 65]

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/46/PV.3
18 October 1991

ENGLISH

91-61445 6536V (E)

62

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF ALFONSO GARCIA ROBLES, AMBASSADOR OF MEXICO

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the memory of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico and, on behalf of the members of the First Committee as well as on my own behalf, to express to the delegation of Mexico and to his family our heartfelt condolences on his passing.

Ambassador Robles, who was known to many of us as the "father of disarmament", was the architect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region of the world. As members are all aware, he was also the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982, which was awarded to him for his outstanding service in the cause of disarmament and peace.

Ambassador Robles was the main initiator of the World Disarmament Campaign, was a member of the Palme Commission on Common Security, the planning group of the Six-Nation Peace Initiative and served with distinction on the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.

Although most members of the Committee know of Ambassador Robles' contributions to disarmament, it is worth noting that he was also a member of the Mexican delegation to the 1945 Conference in San Francisco, which was instrumental in drafting the Charter of the United Nations. Subsequently, he became Director of the Political Division of the United Nations Secretariat, Principal Secretary of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly on the Question of Palestine. In 1957 he resumed his services with the Government of Mexico. He was appointed Ambassador to Brazil and, subsequently, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(The Chairman)

Alfonso Garcia Robles was indefatigable in his struggle for disarmament. Those who worked with him here in the First Committee, in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere will certainly always remember his **energy, his** steadfast determination and his devotion. The First Committee has immensely benefited from Ambassador **Garcia Robles'** wisdom, great knowledge and expertise in the field of disarmament in the past several years. His death is certainly a great loss *not* only to his country, but also to the international community, especially to the First Committee.

I now call on the **representative** of Ethiopia, who will speak on behalf of the Group of African States.

Mr. MAHMOUD (Ethiopia) : I would like, on behalf of the African Group in the First **Committee**, and on my own behalf, to pay a **tribute to the** memory of Ambassador **Alfonso Garcia** Robles, who passed away on 2 September.

Those who are familiar with the work achieved by the Committee, particularly from 1971 to 1975, will miss **Mr. Garcia Robles**, who was **Mexico's** Permanent Representative here, and can vouch **for** the invaluable contribution he made to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear **weapons**. As is widely **recognized**, the Treaty **for** the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - the Treaty of Tlatelolco - could not have been signed in 1967 without his painstaking and courageous efforts. That Treaty **was**, without doubt, an encouragement for the creation of other nuclear-free areas. And, **as** the Chairman has just stated, it was in recognition **of** his contribution to the promotion **of** peace and disarmament that **Mr. Garcia Robles was** awarded the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize. jointly with Mrs. Alva **Myrdal** of Sweden.

Speaking in the First Committee on 23 November 1973, **Mr. Garcia Robles** **said:**

(Mr. Mahmoud, Ethiopia)

The crossroads at which the world finds itself, therefore, is this: to go either towards the destruction of nuclear weapons or towards resignation to our own disappearance.* (A/C.1/PV.1968, p. 8-10)

I am sure that he would have been quite gratified by the recent indications given by the President of the United States and the President of the Soviet Union to reduce certain tactical nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, I should like to express the sincere condolences of the African Group in the First Committee to the bereaved family of Ambassador Alfoaso Garcia Robles and to the delegation of Mexico.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Japan, who will speak on behalf **of** the Group of Asian **States**.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): I deem it a great honour on this occasion to pay a tribute, on behalf of the Asian Group, to the life and **memory** of Ambassador Garcia Rohles.

Diplomat, world **statesman** and Nobel laureate, Ambassador Garcia Robles dedicated his life to world peace and security. In a career spanning five decades, Ambassador Garcia Robles impressed all who had the privilege **of** working with him as a man of great vision, profound wisdom and unerring integrity. As Mexico's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its Minister for Foreign Affairs and as its representative to the Conference on **Disarmament** from 1977 until his retirement in 1989, Ambassador Garcia Robles was an exemplary servant of his country. His achievements have benefited not only Mexico, but also the international community as a whole.

Ambassador Garcia Robles, who was present at the signing of the Charter of the United Nations in San **Francisco** in 1945, remained deeply **committed** to the goals and purposes of the United Nations throughout his **career**; he left an

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

indelible imprint on the work and accomplishments of the **Organization**, particularly in the field of disarmament. Indeed, he was at the forefront of **major** international efforts to promote disarmament, serving as President of the Conference on Disarmament several times and participating in the drafting of important international agreements on disarmament, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978.

Although we are all diminished by the death of this great man, **his** contributions to world peace and security constitute a legacy that will endure for generations to come.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who will speak on behalf of the Eastern **European** Group of States.

Mr. KRASULIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): On behalf of the Eastern Europe Group of States, I would like to pay a tribute to an outstanding individual and diplomat, **Alfonso** Garcia Robles. Throughout all of his professional life, Ambassador Garcia Robles was devoted to trying to resolve international problems by non-violent **means**.

Many of us associate his name with disarmament alone, but in fact the range **of** his activities was much wider than that. **One recalls** that he was present at the very birth of the United Nations, participating in the San Francisco Conference **of** 1945, when the Charter **of** the **Organization** was **ratified**. From the **very** beginning **of** the **Organization's** existence, **he** worked in the General Political Division of the United Nations, and many of us are aware that when he was working in the Secretariat Ambassador Garcia Robles was the first person under whom Under-Secretary-General Akashi worked.

Ambassador Garcia Robles made an enormous contribution to the **activities** of our Organisation in the area **of** peace keeping. Indeed, the body which we **now** call the Committee of 34 was founded essentially on his initiative. More than anything else, however, Ambassador Garcia Robles will go down in the history of disarmament as the father of the Treaty **of** Tlatelolco. Even if that were all he had done, he would indeed deserve our tribute. We will all remember **him**.

We remember him in different ways. **Some** remember him as Ambassador **Garcia** Robles while others among us called him Alfonso. But I believe that we all agree that **this** man could rightly **be** called Mr. Disarmament. That is how we will remember him.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Honduras, who will *speak on behalf of* the Latin American and Caribbean Group.

Mr. FLORES BERMUDEZ (Honduras) (interpretation from Spanish):
Today, **we** are beginning our *work* on agenda items relating to disarmament and **international** security. During this latter part of October, we shall be hearing the considered thoughts **of** many representatives who, with a deep **sense of** responsibility, will be analysing the recent past with a view to proposing measures and actions to be taken now for a better and more secure future.

One might feel that there is a voice missing here, that there **is** a void among **us**, that we are no longer benefiting from the lucid thinking which, throughout so **many** years, contributed to forging the world's **awareness** of the delicate matters of disarmament and international **security**. The *death on* 2 September **of** Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles leaves us with the feeling that not all of us are present. **None** the less, his ideas and concepts will remain part of our **work**. His contribution to **the** items **before** us will remain as effective and important in future years as they are today.

It could not be otherwise, **for** we have benefited from his contributions over more than a quarter of a century. In 1967, *Ambassador* Garcia Robles **came** here to present the Treaty of Tlatelolco. **He** contributed significantly to the preparation **of** the Final **Document** of the first special session **of** the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 1978. **His** role and ideas have been fundamental to the world **campaign for** disarmament undertaken by our Organisation.

Don Alfonso was educated in Europe **and** had completed his legal training at the **University of Paris** by 1936. He later obtained the diploma *of the* Academy of International Law at The **Hague**. His **professional** work and lengthy diplomatic *experience in* the **service of the Mexican Government enabled him to**

(Mr. Flores Bermudez, Honduras)

contribute his brilliant skills as one of the very **first** international civil servants in the Organisation. **He** occupied the position **of** Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of **Mexico** from 1964 to 1970. At that time, he resumed his work on disarmament in the United Nations and headed his **country's** delegation **to the Conference Of the Committee** on Disarmament.

In his capacity as Under-Secretary, Alfonso Garcia **Robles** presided over all meetings on the military denuclearisation **of** Latin America that were held in **Mexico** City from 1964 onwards. As has been said, these meetings culminated in the ratification, on 14 February 1967, of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin **America**, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The representative **of** Mexico in Geneva, Ambassador **Marin** Bosch, in his **book Alfonso Garcia Robles. Nobel de la Paz**, says:

"It could be said that the professional career of Ambassador Garcia Robles is intimately **linked** to the United **Nations. His training** took place within the Organisation that he himself helped to strengthen. He personally contributed to the preparatory work leading to the establishment **of** the United Nations and, since then, has vigorously defended the principles **of** the Charter. Indeed, it could be said in paraphrase of Alfonso the Wise that Garcia Robles not only was present at the creation **of** the United Nations but indeed had occasion to contribute ideas to its better structuring and greater **effectiveness.**"

The quotation **continues:**

"Alfonso Garcia Robles belongs to a generation of internationalists who witnessed the successive crises of the 1930s, the toppling **of** the League **of** Nations and **the** tragedy **of** the **Second** World War. They were **aware** of the need **to** create a more just **and** lasting international **order**

(Mr. Flores Bermudez, Honduras)

and devoted themselves to that noble cause from 1945 onwards. **His** enthusiasm was shared by representatives **of** the founding countries of the United Nations and by international civil servants who, like Garcia Robles himself, joined the Secretariat of **the** Organisation. The professional level of the first civil servants was very high and was in conformity with their human **qualities."**

In expressing our deepest condolences to the bereaved family, and the people and present delegation **of** Mexico, ~~the~~ Latin American and Caribbean Group wishes in this way to pay a tribute to the illustrious Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, Nobel Laureate of 1982, a Mexican by birth, a **Latin** American by conviction, and a man of universal dimensions through his struggle for international peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Norway, Ambassador **Martin Huslid**, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Western European and other States.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway) : For all of us who knew Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles - and I was glad to be one of them - the news of his passing away was received with sadness and emotion. In Alfonso Garcia Robles, the world lost one of its most **dedicated** and indefatigable **spokesmen** for peace, **disarmament** and security.

Ambassador Garcia Robles had clear goals and great visions regarding **disarmament**, reflected in, among other things, his comprehensive programme for **disarmament**. He worked untiringly **for** his goals and his visions in spite of, it must be admitted, frequent lack of progress in a difficult environment. But this quality was part of the greatness of the man: **to** work steadfastly towards the goals that he knew to be right, notwithstanding opposition and difficulties.

I shall not say any more about Ambassador Garcia Robles' professional achievements. You, Mr. Chairman, and others have already **enumerated** them. They will stand for posterity. I shall just add one thing, and all of us who had the privilege of knowing him and being his friends can testify to it: Alfonso Garcia Robles was a kind, gentle man with whom it was always pleasant and, I would say, enriching to talk. Personally I am convinced that there **was** a clear link between the kindness and gentleness in the character of **Ambassador Garcia** Robles and the causes to which he chose to dedicate his life.

In Alfonso Garcia Robles, we have lost a fine man, a good friend and colleague and an outstanding defender of peace in **the** world. His memory will remain with us and it should be an inspiration for us all.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the **family** of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles and the Mexican Government, I **am** very deeply grateful for this tribute. This room, **Conference** Room 4, had a very special **meaning** to *Mr.* Garcia Robles and **for** that reason we are most **grateful for** all that has just been said in this forum.

As has been said here, the professional life of Ambassador Garcia Robles encompassed a turbulent and contradictory half-century. There were dark years **and** hopeful years. When he completed his post-graduate studies in Paris and The Hague, Ambassador Garcia Robles was **invited** to give a series **of** lectures in **Europe** on a **very** controversial subject: the reason **for** the nationalisation of the **Mexican** oil industry in 1938.

On the **eve** of the outbreak of the **Second** World War, he joined the diplomatic service. After the storm there ensued the promise **of** a better world, and Alfonso Garcia Bobles was present at its creation: first, at the Latin American level, at the Conference **of** Chapultepec, and later at that of San Francisco.

After a decade as Director of the Department **of** Political *Affairs* for the United **Nations**, **he** rejoined our **foreign** service. **He** was a delegate to the first conferences on the Law of **the** **Sea**, Ambassador to **Brazil** and - as Under-Secretary for Multilateral Affairs - the architect of the **Treaty** of **Tlatelolco**.

During the complex negotiations **on** that Treaty, there was an incident that reveals his stature. At the Mexican Ministry there were those who wished to **leave** aside the **negotiations**, and at one particularly difficult stage **it** **was** suggested to him that perhaps when the President **of** the Republic shared **that** **idea**. **Under-Secretary** Garcia Robles requested an **appointment** with **the**

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

President **and** persuaded him not to abandon the endeavour. The Treaty was signed in 1967.

He was my country's representative here in New York from 1970 to 1975, when he was named Secretary for Foreign Relations. From 1977 onwards he devoted himself completely to his work. His contribution to disarmament was **recognized** in 1982, when, together with Mrs. Alva Myrdal, he received the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, he participated actively in the negotiation of the various multilateral instruments at the Eight-Nation Conference in Geneva, later the Conference **of** the Committee on **Disarmament**, and in the restructuring **of** that body.

As has already been pointed out here, he played a decisive role in the preparation of the Final Document of the first special session of the General **Assembly** devoted to disarmament. He was the most enthusiastic promoter of the World **Disarmament** Campaign and the Comprehensive **Programme** of Disarmament. Certainly, he was not always the favourite representative of the great military Powers; but everyone respected him, especially his colleagues in Geneva at what was at first the Group **of** Eight and is now the Group of 21.

I was lucky enough to work with Ambassador Garcia Robles from the day I entered the Foreign Service and **I** had the good fortune to be honoured with his **friendship**. His personal style can be summed up in a phrase that he often used: suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.

He was a teacher for several generations of Mexican diplomats and a point **of** reference and a counsellor for many political leaders in my country. **His** opinions were well founded, which is why people listened to him. More than **anything** else, he was a faithful interpreter **of** the *foreign-policy* principles of my country **and** was therefore a good **friend** to the United Nations and a

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

tireless defender of its noble aims **and** ideals. An internationalist par excellence, he faithfully served universal causes.

The **CHAIRMAN**: A memorial **service** for Ambassador Alfonso Garcia **Robles** will be held in the Dag **Hammar**skjöld Library auditorium at United Nations Headquarters on **Monday**, 28 October, at 1.30 p.m.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker on the list for this meeting, allow **me** to make a short **statement as the** presiding officer of this body **of** the General Assembly.

Over the years, our deliberations in this Committee have proceeded in a broad context encompassing a wide range of issues related to **arms** control and disarmament. **Among** the aspects discussed, **major** focus has been placed on substantial and sustained reductions in the global level of nuclear weapons, leading eventually to their elimination. In this spirit, we welcome the dramatic and far-reaching announcements in the last three weeks by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev calling for the destruction, elimination or withdrawal of the **land-** and sea-based short-range nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States. In this connection, I fully associate myself with the statement of the Secretary-General in reaction to the 27 September initiative of President Bush and the 5 October response of President Gorbachev in which he expressed his hope that:

"these two important and dramatic initiatives will provide **a new momentum** to the efforts to achieve further significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals, contribute to greater stability **and** lead to the adoption of additional steps towards the objective of a comprehensive test **ban...**"

and urged

"the other nuclear-weapon States to consider responding to President Gorbachev's invitation that they join in this bilateral effort."

We are also encouraged by the decision of both aides to **remove** several of their weapons systems from battle alert status. Such measures to eliminate, reduce, or **"stand** down" nuclear weapons **systems** will certainly decrease the likelihood of **any** nuclear incident between the two largest nuclear Powers.

(The Chairman)

The recent announcements **from** Washington and Moscow are indeed momentous, for they underscore the belief of many that mutual stability can be enhanced through the reduction of nuclear weapons. It is a **sign** of the historic times in which we live that two former rivals could issue statements **in** the space of eight days announcing the destruction, elimination or withdrawal of land- and sea-based short-range weapons, when only last July, the international **community** praised the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which stretched over nine years of negotiations. The first arms control agreement mandating the actual reduction of strategic or long-range nuclear arms, START, cuts these weapons by one third and establishes strict monitoring and verification provisions. As a number of Member States pointed out during the general debate in plenary session, speedy ratification **of** START by the United States and the Soviet Union would be a propitious way to lock in the reductions which have been negotiated.

It will, however, surprise no one that even in a post-START world, there are still sufficient stockpiles of nuclear weapons to eradicate life and civilisation from this **planet**. Nevertheless, START has underlined the prospect that the process **of** seeking mutual stability at lower levels of nuclear armaments is realistic and attainable. To become universal, such a process should eventually incorporate the nuclear arms **of** the other nuclear-weapon **States** and address the question of conventional arms and the problem of the proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction. In this connection the recent initiatives of President Bush and President Mitterrand are to be applauded.

(The Chairman)

On the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the **recent** declarations of intent of China **and** France concerning their accession to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation **of** Nuclear Weapons are practical signs of the strengthening **of** the Treaty **and** augur well **for** its universalisation. Despite reports of non-compliance in certain instances with its nuclear **safeguards** system, the **Treaty** continues to **command** respect as the most widely adhered-to **arms** limitation instrument and the **cornerstone of** an effective non-proliferation **regime**.

On the issue **of** nuclear-weapon testing, the **recent** unilateral announcement by the Soviet Union concerning A one-year **moratorium** on **testing**, represents an encouraging development. **At** the multilateral level, **it** will **be recalled that** informal, open-ended consultations **were** recently held **at** Headquarters by the Minister for Foreign Affairs **of** Indonesia, who, **as** President **of** the **Amendment** Conference of States Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer **Space** and Under Water, **had** been mandated in January to conduct consultations with a view to achieving **progress** on outstanding issues and to resuming the **work of** the **Conference** at an appropriate **time**. A broad agreement was **informally** reached concerning the modality for continuing the consultations of the President.

Events in the Middle East over the course **of** the **year** have once again underscored the urgency of a global and verifiable **ban** on chemical weapons. In Geneva, the **Conference** on Disarmament decided to further **mandate its** Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to intensify, **as** a priority **task**, the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, **with** a view to achieving a final agreement on the

(The Chairman)

convention by 1992. Several outstanding elements of the **Convention**, such as **verification** and legal and institutional issues, **are** receiving further consideration,

On the subject of biological weapons, and, in particular, endeavours to strengthen the 1932 biological weapons Convention, further confidence-building **measures were** elaborated in September at the Third Review Conference **of** the Convention held in Geneva. On the question of verification, an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts was established at the **Review** Conference to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. It was **decided** that the Group of Experts would be **convened in** Geneva early next year to work on a verification study using **a set of** criteria agreed upon at the Review Conference.

As the Committee is aware, increasing attention has been given recently to the question of conventional weapons. Last November in Paris three historic agreements were reached in this area: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (**CFE**) **was** signed, and at the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures was endorsed, and the **Charter of Paris for** a New Europe - a document formally ending the cold war - was adopted. **A few** months later, the Warsaw Pact **was** formally disbanded **and** conventional armaments in Europe were ready to be destroyed, reduced or limited, while the CFE Treaty is being ratified and until it enters into force.

(The Chairman)

In a number of countries foreign military forces have begun to be reduced in number or withdrawn. Encouraging developments have been witnessed in other areas of the world also. It is my sincere hope that the question will receive fresh impetus following the recent accession by South Africa to the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. In this context, the Committee will recall that Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have acceded to the Treaty,

In Latin America, a number of countries, through the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu and the Declaration of Mendocaa, have forsworn the use of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The Central American Security Commission continues to carry out its programme of work, while the Rio Group of countries prepares for a special meeting on regional disarmament in Latin America.

As events in several regions of the world have shown, increasing pressure to expand weapons sales abroad as a means of cushioning the shock of cuts in military spending at home may have the effect of facilitating the transfer of arms to areas of strife. Surplus arms from areas of former tension could thus deepen the conflagration in strife-torn areas. In his latest annual report, the Secretary-General expressed grave concern about the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of conventional armaments. The needs of both the suppliers and the recipients of arms should be taken into account with a view to establishing fair criteria for the multilateral control of arms transfers, without prejudice to the legitimate security needs of States.

In this context, it is possible that the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms" - a report prepared with the assistance of qualified experts - which is being submitted to the General Assembly, may

(The Chairman)

stimulate a constructive Committee debate on this subject. Taking into consideration the views of Member States, the report, inter alia, recommends the establishment of a universal and non-discriminatory arms-transfers register under the auspices of the United Nations. As was indicated in the General Assembly's general debate, the 12 States members of the European Community, Japan and some other States are contemplating **the** introduction of a specific draft resolution on the subject.

It is important, at this juncture, to note that disarmament agreements - whether regional, bilateral or multilateral - should incorporate measures making it obligatory for **the** contracting parties to exercise restraint in the transfer, to other regions and countries, of armaments made redundant by agreements. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is a case in point.

While increasing attention **has** been focused **on** the question of international arms transfers, **there** is also growing *consensus* on the need to extend disarmament efforts beyond the nuclear and conventional **arsenals** of the great Powers and their **allies**. **As** the Foreign Minister of my country said a few weeks ago, during the General Assembly's general debate, the developing world is spending \$200 billion annually on armaments. **As** a proportion of *gross* national product, this is much higher than in the case of the developed States. It must be equally understood, however, that all States have the right to meet their own legitimate defence needs, with **a** view to maintaining internal order and protecting their national **territory** from armed **attack**.

As we move closer to the dawn of a new world order, events in the Persian Gulf and in Europe remind **us** that a newly emerging system of collective security does not automatically guarantee the maintenance of international peace and stability, Sources of conflict and **strife** - whether in the

(The Chairman)

political, the economic or the social sphere - remain. We must continue to give attention to the need to find agreed solutions to both military and non-military threats to security and to global challenges of a social, humanitarian, economic or ecological nature.

As the Committee is aware, the United Nations has a central role and a primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. The dramatic improvement, in the last two years, in the international climate has provided the Organization with a renewed opportunity to fulfil *the* principles set forth in the Charter.

For the First Committee there is a considerable amount of difficult work ahead, but I am confident of the support and cooperation of all members. I am also counting on the high level of competence of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

AGENDA ITEMS 47 TO 65

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now begin the general debate on all disarmament items.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Please accept the congratulations of the delegation of Mexico, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee of the General Assembly. **The** world is changing rapidly, and the political, military, ideological and economic transformations will have their impact on disarmament negotiations in this and other multilateral forums. You, Sir, will therefore have an opportunity to contribute to the tracing of new and, we hope, better paths. In the discharge of your important task you can count on the full cooperation of my delegation.

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

The breezes of change that began blowing some five years ago were followed by ever-stronger winds, which last **August became** truly historic hurricanes. The First World War signalled the collapse of a century-old political order, and after the Second World War a new **kind** of order emerged. It was based on ideological rivalry, which translated into history's greatest arms race. It is difficult to **foresee** the type of world in which we shall be living in 20 years' time, **but** what is already an inescapable reality is that it will be very different from the world of the cold war. With the United Nations Charter as **our** point of departure, all of us - and I underline "**all**" - must ensure that the new world order is more just. Disarmament - in each and every one of its **most** relevant aspects - should appear among the priorities of that new **order**.

For almost five decades the world **was** held hostage by the ideological and military competition between the **super-Powers and** their allies. The nuclear and conventional **arms** build-up, **we** were told, **was based** on military doctrines of deterrence. **Over** the years these were defended as if they were divine revelations. They **were** always difficult to justify - but **today** more than **ever**. We must ensure that reason will be our guide in the twenty-first century.

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

Today new **paths** towards disarmament have been opened. There is an **increasing number of initiatives** - initiatives of all kinds, Those who sell **the most** conventional weapons now **want** to put order - and some transparency - into **the transfer** of those weapons. Those who sold the most **missiles** now **want** to **control** their proliferation. Those who have spent the most for military **purposes now wish** or are constrained to cut those expenses. **Those who** built **the most** tanks now **want** to convert them into **tractors**.

However, one thing **has** not changed: the stagnation of the work of the Conference on Disarmament on seven of its eight agenda items. **The Conference on Disarmament** - the only multilateral negotiating organ for **disarmament** - is **only negotiating** a draft convention for a complete ban on chemical weapons. **There is no** movement at all on the other priority items: a comprehensive **nuclear-test ban**, nuclear disarmament, the prevention **of an** arms race in outer **space, nuclear security assurances**, and the **programme of** comprehensive **disarmament**.

Every year the General Assembly urges the Conference on **Disarmament** to **negotiate in Geneva** agreements on those items, and, except **for** chemical **weapons**, each autumn the Conference on **Disarmament** arrives empty-handed in **New York, as shown** in its annual report (A/46/27). We are told what an **important** role the United **Nations** has in regard to international security, but little is done **within** the United Nations on **disarmament**. The emerging new **world** order will **make** sense only if the United Nations plays the central role **that all** its Member States have assigned to it for the achievement **of** **disarmament measures**.

What • □□ **the main** challenges and **threats facing** us in the field of **armament? In** the first place, **nuclear** weapons are still being produced,

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

stockpiled and tested. Then there are the other weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical weapons; **and there** are signs that soon we shall have a multilateral agreement on their elimination. Another challenge is the environmental impact of toxic waste - chemical agents and so on - and nuclear waste. What are we going to do with military waste when we still do not know what to do about toxic waste from civilian industries? **A** fourth subject is the militarisation of outer space. A fifth is the naval arms race. A **sixth** is the proliferation of ballistic missiles. **A** seventh is the arms trade and conventional weapons in general.

On almost all of the aforementioned questions it **is** still unclear how we should proceed in order to find an appropriate solution. **Even** with regard to the convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons certain problems persist. It is true that the **negotiations** in Geneva have intensified this year as a result of the change in the United States **position** on the **prohibition** of the use of such weapons and on their unconditional **destruction**; but there are still some outstanding problems.

The first problem **is** that of the system for the verification of the future convention on chemical weapons. **Twenty** years ago we were told that it was not possible to **verify** compliance with a total ban on chemical weapons. **Now** we all recognise that the future **convention's** verification system must be universally acceptable, non-discriminatory and cost-effective.

It should be noted that several types of verification measures are being considered. **One** is the rather routine system of verifying non-production by the chemical industry of certain substances for civilian purposes. **Here** care will have to be taken to **ensure** that the provisions agreed upon do not turn into a mechanism for controlling the chemical industry. **The other type** of

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

verification measures is rather exceptional - a kind of last resort in the **swat** that one party has serious doubts **about the** compliance of another party **with** its obligations under the convention. I *refer* to the challenge **inspections**. The principles that should guide this **kind of** action are those of "**anywhere, anytime, and** without the **right** of refusal". It will **therefore be important** that in conducting those inspections **and** in assessing their results one remain within a strictly multilateral **framework**. Even then, as the recent experience **of** the United Nations in Iraq demonstrates, there is the **risk of** divided loyalties among the inspectors.

With regard to the executive council of the organisation for the prohibition **of** chemical weapons, the basic criteria for determining its membership should be that of equitable geographical distribution. When **considering** other criteria, such as chemical industrial capacity, *we must* envisage a mechanism that will allow those criteria to be examined periodically.

Another unresolved question is the way in which the organisation's costs will be distributed. We do not think that **it** should be based on the United **Nations** scale of assessments. Verification costs, especially during the 10-year **destruction** period, will **be very high** and should not **be** borne by States **that** have never had chemical weapons. In March this year the manager **of the programme** for chemical demilitarisation of the **United** States informed the **Conference on Disarmament** that his country *had* estimated the life-cycle cost **for** the chemical stockpile disposal **programme** to be approximately \$6.5 billion,

Has the time not come to include in the production cost of certain environment-threatening weapons the cost of **their** eventual destruction? Many

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

automobile manufacturers are now required to equip each car with a catalytic converter. Why not apply **"the principle of catalytic converters"** to armaments? **Moreover**, we should **seek** the establishment of an international mechanism to act as a clearing-house **for** the exchange of information on national experiences of the environmental effects of military activities, including development, production and destruction of weapons **and** weapon systems.

In this statement the delegation **of** Mexico would like to identify some of the most relevant aspects of the present situation in the disarmament field. The transition from a militarily bipolar and thus confrontational world to one **of** greater cooperation and understanding will not be very easy. This is borne out **by** the Persian Gulf war, the rise of nationalism in Europe and the persistent penury and political instability **of** some developing countries. Furthermore, some **of** the current trends in disarmament will certainly not make that transition any easier. **A** handful of countries cannot proclaim themselves the guardians **of** an international security that they themselves have defined according to their particular interests.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - and **of** their ballistic missiles is a subject that has acquired increasing importance in light of the Gulf war. **At the** same time, the **indiscriminate** trade in **conventional** arms - intensified **by** the voracity **of** the sellers **and/or** the mindlessness of the buyers - has become a general concern. **Examples** are the proposals made by the Group of 7 in London on 16 July last, and others such as that of France **of** 3 June, as well as the **meetings in** Paris **of** the five permanent members **of** the Security Council.

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

The foregoing **is** part **of** a trend - **one** that is very evident - to increase **the** number **of** the so-called suppliers' cartels such as the "**nuclear** suppliers club", the "missile technology control regime" and the "Australia group" - chemical and biological materials - all of which **are** aimed at imposing export restrictions **on equipment** and technology. The same is occurring in the negotiations on the convention for the elimination **of** chemical weapons. **This** trend was also evident in September during the Third Review Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons.

The main feature **of** the initiatives taken so far with regard to non-proliferation relates to the preservation **of** a monopoly over such weapons and ballistic technology and "putting order" into the conventional arms trade. Some other way should be sought, **one** in which all States, especially those that have been participating actively in multilateral disarmament **forums**, can contribute to finding a lasting solution to this problem. To that end, it might be appropriate **for** the General Assembly to indicate the most useful mechanism for carrying out those discussions.

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

The proliferation of weapons and military technologies has been a constant in history. **From** the dawn of the atomic age scientists and political leaders have been concerned about the dangers that the eventual proliferation of those **weapons** could entail. Only a **few** nations had the material resources and the scientific knowledge necessary to produce atomic bombs, Canada's unilateral decision and that of other European countries, together with constitutional bans imposed by the Allies on Germany and Japan, reduced even further **the** number of potential nuclear Powers.

With the 1963 Moscow Treaty the door to horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons was partially closed when testing was banned in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. But underground nuclear testing continues. Hence **the** importance that a vast majority of States **Parties** to the 1963 Treaty attach to the Amendment Conference aimed at converting it into a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (**NPT**) was the first international instrument aimed at preventing the horizontal proliferation of a specific type of weapon. To achieve this, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had to make certain concessions and commit themselves to negotiating agreements on vertical non-proliferation of those weapons. Since then the principle, proclaimed by the General Assembly, has been accepted that there should be a balance between undertakings by States not possessing certain **wapona** and States possessing them. This principle was **reiterated** in 1972 when the biological weapons Convention was concluded **and** it has also been invoked in ongoing negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. The General **Assembly**

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

should, therefore, reiterate that principle when it deals with the question of what mechanism is to be established to consider non-proliferation in its broadest sense.

All States Parties to the NPT should encourage other countries to accede to it. But its universalisation will not solve two **key** problems on nuclear-weapons proliferation: first, the verification system whose shortcomings became evident recently when it was **revealed** that Iraq - a Party to the Treaty - had been violating it; and, secondly, the lack of fulfilment **of** its provisions on nuclear disarmament.

The **NPT** contains certain provisions that had not been included previously in multilateral disarmament instruments. One is the five-year review conferences so that the Parties **can** assure themselves that all the Treaty's provisions are being implemented. The other is the provision that:

"Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether **the** Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended **for** an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a **majority** of the Parties to the Treaty". (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex, Article X.2)

Those provisions were included so that the non-nuclear-weapon States - which had committed themselves not to acquire them - would have the opportunity to assess the fulfilment of the balance of obligations between them and the nuclear-weapon countries. In other words, during the NPT negotiations in 1967 and 1968 a link was established between the **NPT's** limited duration and the fulfilment of its provisions regarding nuclear disarmament, that is, a comprehensive test ban and the reduction **of** the then existing

(Mr. Maria Bosch, Mexico)

nuclear arsenals. That link was proposed specifically by **some** of those countries at which the NPT was aimed: Germany, Italy, Japan and **Switzerland, among others.**

In 1995 the NPT will have to be extended. In other words, it will not expire: but rather agreement will have to be reached as to how long it will be extended and that decision will be **taken by a majority of the** States Parties. To ensure the 1995 conference's success, its preparatory phase should begin as soon as possible, preferably during early 1992.

Proper preparation for the conference is fundamental. It is equally necessary to *begin* at once a multilateral discussion regarding the subject of the non-proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction and their ballistic-missile **systems.** All nuclear-weapon States and a **good** number of non-nuclear-weapon States, including the so-called threshold countries, should participate in that discussion. **Almost** all are members of or observers at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It might therefore be a good idea to suggest that the multilateral discussion be held in Geneva within the Conference on Disarmament or outside its framework. We would prefer that it be held within the Conference on Disarmament.

To sum up: first, the cold war and the ideological conflicts served to justify an unbridled arms race and fuelled the horizontal and vertical proliferation **of** certain types **of armaments,** including weapons **of** mass destruction and their missiles.

Second, agreements **signed to date** in order to prevent the proliferation of certain weapons have not achieved their goal. The partial test-ban Treaty should be **converted** into a **comprehensive ban** and the **NPT** should be strengthened through its full implementation.

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

Third, the trade in military technologies and conventional weapons **continues** to grow **even** after the tragic experience of the Gulf war.

Fourth, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world should have in place a genuine and universal regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction and their ballistic missiles.

Fifth, the recent initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction should be examined in a multilateral forum of the United Nations by all States directly interested. The United Nations General Assembly should address that question.

Sixth, the preparatory work of the 1995 NPT conference should begin early in 1992 in order to ensure its success. **At** the same time a multilateral mechanism should be established to encourage discussion on the various aspects of the proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction and their respective ballistic missiles, as well as on the conventional arms trade. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which is about to conclude a draft convention on the elimination of chemical weapons, would perhaps be the proper forum for that discussion.

The statements made in recent weeks by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear disarmament are very encouraging. **Some years ago** as a result of a Mexican initiative a Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General prepared a study entitled "Unilateral nuclear **disarmament** measures" (A/39/516). That Group of Experts, which I had the honour to chair, noted that for decades **the arms race** had intensified as a result of unilateral decisions of States, taken in the name of national security. Those decisions were then reciprocated by the other side and an "action/reaction*" process was

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

set in **motion** that led to the over-accumulation of weapons and weapons **systems**. The Group added - and I quote from the report:

“Conversely, the process of de-escalation **and** reversal of the **arms race** and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race, could be **promoted by unilateral initiatives of States.**” (A/39/516, para. 65)

In addition to the unilateral measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, the 1984 study identified **four** other priority **areas**: a nuclear-test **ban**; prevention of nuclear war, including the question of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and a nuclear freeze; security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States) and prevention of an **arms race in outer space**.

Therein lies the key to understanding fully the significance of **what has** been happening in recent days in the nuclear disarmament field. Even before ratifying the long-negotiated Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed last July, the United **States** and the USSR indicated their willingness to carry **out** unilateral reductions of various types of nuclear weapons and their missiles.

(Mr. Maria Bosch, Mexico)

When announcing his important unilateral initiative on 27 September last, the President of the United States pointed out that the nuclear disarmament steps that his country would be taking should be reciprocated **by** the other side. And the Soviet Union's positive response was not long in coming. In effect, on **5** October the President of the Soviet Union announced that his country would not only reciprocate the steps to be taken by the United States, but would go even further, including the unilateral suspension for one year of its nuclear tests.

We are thus witnessing what **may** perhaps be the beginning **of** the de-escalation of the nuclear-arms race. There **are**, of course, **some** aspects which are still difficult to reconcile. One is the intention to go on with the production **of** some new nuclear armaments - such as the B-2 bomber. Another is the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative programme. Another example is the **asymmetry** in the proposed reductions of land-based **MIRVs, on** the one hand, and the sea-launched ones, on the other. Moreover, some observers have pointed out that, if the rationale for eliminating certain nuclear weapons is the diminution of the Soviet threat, why not reduce radically the rest of the nuclear weapons, beginning with the strategic ones? **Others** have noted that the proposals could be in part the result of a decision merely to rearrange the various components **of** the nuclear arsenals in the light of the concern regarding the danger that would entail the horizontal proliferation in Central Europe, and even **within the** Soviet Union itself, **of** certain types **of** nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones.

What is important, **however**, is that the initiative could set in motion the process of dismantling nuclear-weapon systems. And that process could lead very soon - and we hope it will - to **further** measures aimed at ending the

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

actual production **of** nuclear weapons **and** all tests. We urge the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their bilateral consultations on this question and we urge the other nuclear-weapon States to follow their example.

All of this should serve to spur the work of the Conference **on** Disarmament in Geneva on three priority items of its agenda, all of them relating to nuclear disarmament. We also hope that it will have a **positive** effect on the efforts which, under the guidance of Minister **Ali** Alataa of Indonesia, are being carried out in order to **amend** the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Amendment Conference began its **work** in New **York** last January and decided to request its President to conduct a series of consultations with the aim **of** furthering the consideration of various aspects relating to a **comprehensive** test ban, in particular with regard to the verification **of** compliance and possible sanctions in case **of** non-compliance. We hope that the Conference will continue its work in 1992 and that, pending a comprehensive test ban, all nuclear-weapon States will suspend their tests through unilateral **or** agreed moratoriums. In this regard, the recent announcement by the Soviet Union **is** especially heartening.

In conclusion, I should like **to** say that on 14 February 1992, the Treaty **for** the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons **in** Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, will mark **its** silver anniversary. Once again we call on France to ratify its Additional Protocol I, and on the countries **of** the region that are not yet parties to the Treaty to adhere to it. That will **be proof** that all countries, all of us, are **ready** to strengthen the international instruments regarding nuclear disarmament. All **of** us should also **take**

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

advantage of **the** present international situation in order to move decisively towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands) : Sir, on behalf of the European Community and its member States, I wish to **congratulate** you on your election as **Chairman** of the First Committee of the General Assembly. I should also like to **extend my best wishes** and congratulations to the other officers of the **Committee**. I am sure that under your able leadership the First Committee can **look forward to a fruitful session**. Let me assure you of the wholehearted support of the European Community and its member States in the accomplishment of the important task with which you have been entrusted.

Our work in the **First** Committee of the General Assembly comes at an important time in the field of international peace and security. **Many new developments** have taken place *since* our last session, and more will undoubtedly be forthcoming in **the** near future. While the spectacular decline of East-West tensions has been clearing the way *for* new, cooperative security **structures**, some long-standing *concerns* as well as new challenges remind us of **the** amount of work that remains on our agenda.

Looking at the vastly changed international security environment, the recent war **in** the Gulf and its aftermath cannot but figure prominently in our minds. The Twelve pay a tribute to the resolute collective efforts which have led to the **restoration** of Kuwait's *sovereign independence* and have thus **demonstrated** that aggression does not pay and can be reversed. Beyond its immediate effects, the Gulf conflict has illustrated the effectiveness of a truly collective security **system** which the United Nations has been expounding down **the** years. The breakdown of the paralyzing division of much of the world into two antagonistic camps was a **major** factor **enabling** the Security Council

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

to assert the authority vested in it by the United **Nations** Charter and thus to respond to the challenge posed by the invasion of Kuwait. The Twelve **warmly** welcome the increased weight of the United Nations in matters of international peace and security as a result of the Gulf conflict. They believe that **there** is now a need and opportunities **for** a **more** active and assertive role for the United Nations in international peace and security. One such opportunity may be the expansion **of** the United **Nations** role in disarmament and **arms** control, where the Twelve will lend their support to the United **Nations efforts** to build upon the **momentum** which has now been generated.

The experience of the United Nations Special **Commission (UNSCOM)** in implementing Security Council resolution 683 (1991) **holds** important lessons for the implementation of arms control **agreements**. By ordering the mandatory elimination **of** Iraq's weapons of **mass** destruction, the United Nations has broken new ground. The **Twelve** wish to emphasize that the Special **Commission** deserves every measure of support, as does the work **of** the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in fulfilment **of** resolution 687 (1991).

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

The pioneering work of the Special Commission and the IAEA in Iraq underscores the urgency of curbing at the global level the rising tide of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of missiles. If we are to eradicate the proliferation threat, we must resolve its **underlying** causes. I refer of course to the many political divisions, both old and new, which continue to burden the reality of international relations. At ~~the~~ same time, ~~the~~ Twelve attach the utmost importance to the early establishment of a system of effective and interlocking arms control and disarmament measures designed to root out the threat that proliferation poses to global security. In ~~the~~ view of the Twelve, these disarmament measures must be complemented by new action ~~to~~ prevent the build-up of conventional-weapon arsenals well beyond the levels warranted by the legitimate right to self-defence **enshrined in** Article 51 of the Charter.

Having dwelt on the Gulf war and its impact on the international **security environment**, I should like to review briefly the recent progress made in the field of arms control and disarmament. The European Community **and** its member States **welcome the new** climate of confidence prevailing in Europe, which has already benefited our work during the last two **sessions** of the First Committee. **The revolutionary** political changes in Central and Eastern Europe, now leading to the gradual consolidation of free and **democratic** societies in that part of the **world**, have imparted a new quality to security relations on the European continent.

The Treaty on Conventional **Forces** in Europe (CFE), concluded in **November** last year, will be a cornerstone of **future** European **security**. The reduction in **conventional** forces and **the far-reaching** verification regime provided for in the Treaty reflect the desire on the part of the **contracting parties for a**

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

significantly greater degree of political and military stability and cooperation in Europe. The solution of the problems that had arisen concerning the CFB Treaty can now lead to its early ratification and entry into force.

The Twelve welcome the significant progress made in the field of confidence- and security-building measures, as reflected in the Vienna document. The new instrument of evaluation of information on military force⁵ and on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems by visits which must be announced five days in advance became effective on 1 July 1991. The first evaluation visits have taken place over the past few months and have clearly indicated that these visits are a valuable tool in promoting confidence among participating States.

The ongoing negotiations on manpower levels in Europe as well as the continuing negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures represent a further step towards strengthening stability and security within our continent. The Twelve wish to emphasise that the further development of a security dialogue and of arms-control measures will be embedded in the wider framework of the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In this respect the CSCB participating State⁵ have recently started informal preparatory consultations aimed at initiating new negotiations in 1992, after the conclusion of the Helsinki follow-up meeting.

The Twelve welcome the encouraging outcome of the recent exploratory round on an open skies agreement, to which they attach the utmost priority. As an open skies regime will introduce a new dimension of transparency and confidence-building and will further advance the arms control process, the Twelve are in principle in favour of full participation by all CSCE

(Mr. Wagenaar, Netherlands)

participating **States** that **might** wish to join the negotiations. The Twelve express the hope that rapid progress will be **made** towards the earliest **possible** establishment of an open skies regime.

The European Community and its member States wish to emphasise that the further development of this new European security order **must** remain firmly embedded in the wider **framework** of the CSCE **process** that, now **more** than ever before, represents an important factor of stability in the face of changes between and within the nations of Europe which **at times entail** conflict.

Recent events in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are dramatic testimony to the **many** unresolved and historically rooted sources of conflict that now demand our urgent attention. It cannot be stressed enough that structural solutions conducive to the creation of new and stable constitutional orders in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, including full respect for human rights and democratic freedoms, can **be** found only through negotiations and dialogue.

There have been **dramatic** initiatives in nuclear-arms control since the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Twelve none the less warmly **welcome** that Treaty and look forward to its early ratification. The START Treaty, leading to increased stability through **substantial** reductions in the **most** destabilising strategic nuclear **arms** in particular, is a milestone in the nuclear-arms-control process and the basis for further measures outlined recently by the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the view of the Twelve, nuclear disarmament must be supported and strengthened by an effective international nuclear-non-proliferation regime. The recent accessions of **more** States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and more specifically the prospect of accession to the Treaty

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

by all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, will buttress the existing nuclear-non-proliferation regime.

In the field **of** conventional-arms control further measures **must** be given our increasing attention. This is an area where all States can make a significant contribution to the ultimate goal **of** global arms control and disarmament. The recent Gulf war has sharply reminded us of the grave dangers that the excessive build-up **of** conventional arsenals poses to international peace and security. The Twelve are ready to start tackling this problem during the present session of the First **Committee.**

To complete this brief review **of** the main outstanding issues on our agenda, we welcome the ongoing negotiating efforts in Geneva to overcome the remaining obstacles in the way of a global, effectively verifiable and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Similarly, the recent Third Review *Conference* of the parties to the biological and toxin weapons Convention has just outlined a **programme** of action designed to uphold, and where possible strengthen, the existing ban on biological weapons.

Nuclear disarmament continues to be one of the Twelve's highest priorities **in** the field **of** arms control and disarmament. The Twelve consider that making further progress in nuclear-arms control remains one of the most **serious** challenges facing the world today. They therefore note with satisfaction that the process leading to genuine arms reductions, which the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF Treaty) inaugurated, has visibly accelerated now that President Bush and President Gorbachev have appended their signatures to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). By agreeing for the first time actually to reduce the number **of** their deployed strategic nuclear **weapons**, the United States and the Soviet Union have demonstrated their special responsibility in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. The Twelve warmly welcome the Treaty as an important milestone along the road to substantial and balanced nuclear arms reductions, a process to which they continue to attach the utmost importance.

The **Twelve** therefore strongly support the initiative of the United States concerning the unilateral reduction **of** its nuclear arsenal, as announced by President **Bush** on 27 September. The implementation of this initiative will result in a substantial reduction *of* the nuclear arsenal. The Twelve hope that this initiative will be conducive to further far-reaching steps in order to bring about greater stability at substantially lower **levels**. The Twelve welcome with pleasure the positive response **of** the Soviet Union announcing its intention also to reduce its nuclear stockpile. They look forward with

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

confidence to the outcome of the **forthcoming** consultations on these **matters**, including strategic defences. The Twelve strongly **support** early follow-on talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues, as well as the continuation without delay of negotiations on defence and space **issues**, including the relationship between means of strategic offence and **defence**.

With **the** removal of the last intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear **forces**, which **eliminates a whole class of nuclear weapons**, has been successfully implemented. Mindful of **the improved** political and military conditions prevailing on the European continent, **the** Twelve welcome the prospect of far-reaching reductions by the **United States and the Soviet Union** in short-range nuclear arms.

We cannot, however, close our eyes to some **less** encouraging developments. The European Community **and its Member States** are **gravely concerned** about **reports** from the Special **Commission** set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the International Atomic **Energy Agency** to the Security Council that the Government of Iraq **so** blatantly violated its obligations under the safeguards agreement pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty (**NPT**) and resolution 687 (1991).

The Twelve reaffirm their commitment to the principle of nuclear non-proliferation in general, and the NPT in particular, **as a cornerstone** of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation. They welcome the accession of more States to the NPT. In **this respect** they commend **Mozambique**, **South Africa**, **Tanzania**, Zambia and Zimbabwe for having recently become parties. With **the** announced intended accessions of France and China, all the **permanent** members of the Security Council will have underwritten the **NPT**, thus further strengthening the Treaty's universality. The Twelve are confident

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

that, in parallel with wider adherence to the NPT, a better functioning of the present nuclear non-proliferation regime can be **brought** about. Thus, in view of recent events, **we look forward** to a reinforcement of the various elements of that regime and, in particular, to a further strengthening and improvement **of safeguard** implementation. We expect that discussions being held at present within IAEA will soon reach positive conclusions to this end.

A conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty was held in New York in January ~~of~~ this year. No consensus **was reached**, a fact which reflects the diverging views on the degree of priority to be given to the conclusion **of** a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. There exists, nevertheless, **a clear trend towards** limiting nuclear testing, as exemplified by a decreasing number of actual **explosions** and by the Protocols to the threshold **test-ban Treaty and** the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet **Union** in June 1990, and ratified by both countries. The prospects for **further** limitations, as foreseen by the United States and the **Soviet Union**, should be discussed bilaterally.

The Twelve note the re-establishment this year by the **Conference** on Disarmament of its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, They believe **that** the issue of nuclear testing should continue to be addressed in that multilateral context.

Before turning to global disarmament issues proper, I would like to signal the increasing importance of the institutional aspects of the arms-control **and** disarmament process. As our agendas and our forums grow **in size**, so **does** the **centrality** of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. In this connection, the Twelve wish to stress the unique character **of** the Geneva Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

forum within the United Nations system. We welcome the growing number of States which, although not members of the Conference, are participating in its work. We trust that the new **working** methods *and* additional improvements in the functioning *of the Conference* on Disarmament will further enhance the important role which it already plays within the global arms control and disarmament process.

The Gulf war has imparted a new sense of urgency to reaching the long-sought goal of a global, effectively verifiable and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. After many years of multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention has clearly **become** imperative. Much *of the* groundwork has already *been done*. The favourable outcome *of* the Gulf war *now* provides the negotiators with a political **window** of opportunity, which **we** cannot afford to ignore. With determination **and** imagination we can bring the negotiations to their final and decisive phase.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

In this connection, the Twelve warmly welcome the timely and substantial revision of the positions of the United States, as **set** out by President **Bush's** initiative, which should facilitate the completion of the negotiations by the middle of 1992. In view of the amount of progress already made in Geneva, this timetable seems by all means achievable. The Twelve welcome President **Bush's** important announcement that the United States formally forswears the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any State and unconditionally **commits** itself to the destruction of all its stocks within 10 years after the entry into force of the convention. This should clear the way for the resolution of the remaining issues, among which verification stands out. Confidence in compliance is the crucial yardstick by which the credibility of the future chemical weapons convention will be **measured**. The Twelve therefore call on all negotiating parties to muster the creativity and political will necessary to break the deadlock over this seemingly intractable issue. They are confident that this and other remaining obstacles can be overcome during the next few months, and they reaffirm their intention to be among the first signatories of the convention. The Twelve invite other States to do likewise, either on a national or on a regional basis. So efforts should be spared to help deliver the promise of a chemical weapons convention, including the full and timely implementation of last year's breakthrough agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the destruction of their respective chemical weapons stockpiles.

While a global, effectively verifiable and comprehensive chemical weapons convention is the ultimate response to the scourge of chemical warfare, the ongoing diversion from their legitimate uses of materials and technology needed for the manufacture of chemical weapons requires immediate and decisive

(Mr. Wagenvoort, Netherlands)

action, at both the national and the international level. In conjunction with **other States, the Twelve are working to strengthen and expand existing arrangements aimed at preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.**

Halting the spread **of** chemical weapons and **other weapons of mass destruction is** a practical **objective** for the period following the Gulf war, and this should be initiated in Iraq. The European Community and its member States wish to stress that Iraq **must** fully abide **by** the relevant terms of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) concerning the **elimination of its** nuclear, chemical and biological warfare and missile capabilities.

Last but not least, the Twelve recall the importance **of** upholding the authority given to the Secretary-General to investigate cases **of** alleged **use** of chemical weapons.

On several occasions during the past **years** the Twelve **have warned against** the proliferation of biological weapons. The first biological **weapons** inspection carried out by the United Nations Special **Commission** in Iraq **has** shown that our concerns **were justified**. Unlike the case **of** chemical weapons, the international instrument banning biological **and** toxin **weapons** already exists. I am referring to the biological and **toxin** weapons Convention **of** 1972. The Twelve consider the strengthening of this Convention to **be of the** utmost importance.

The Twelve therefore welcome the outcome of the Third Review Conference of States Parties to this Convention, which **took** place in Geneva from 9 to 27 September 1991. Significant progress was made, **inter alia**, in the field of confidence-building **measures**. In this regard, the Twelve call **on** all States parties to participate in the improved **and** expanded confidence-building measures that were agreed upon.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

The Twelve particularly welcome the important decision of ~~the~~ Conference to **establish** an ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and **examine** potential verification measures from a **scientific** and technical standpoint. The **Twelve stress** the **importance of** the **recognition** by the Conference that **effective verification** could reinforce the Convention. They consider highly encouraging **the** great interest in verification expressed by a considerable number of delegations **present** at the Conference. This corresponds at the same **time** to a growing awareness by the international community **of** the risks of proliferation **and** to progress in openness to multilateral controls. The Twelve hope that **this interest** will be reflected in a broad participation in **the work of the expert** group. They are of ~~the~~ opinion that the proceedings of the Third Review Conference and the Final Declaration adopted by the **Conference** have underlined the importance of this international instrument as the authoritative norm against biological and toxin weapons, a norm which **fully deserves** our support, now and in the future. The Twelve sincerely hope that States which are not yet parties to the Convention will be encouraged by the decision~~s~~ of the Review Conference to **accede** to the Convention without **delay**.

The European Community and its member States reaffirm the importance they **attach to regional** arms control and disarmament measures. Arms control and **disarmament** achievements on a regional level will, alongside bilateral and multilateral negotiations, facilitate global arms control and disarmament **efforts**. While initiatives in this field should **take** into account the **specific** characteristics of each region, some general principles can be drawn **from** the **experience** gathered so far. The successful conclusion of ~~the~~ Treaty **on** Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in November of last year and the

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

simultaneous adoption **of** a substantial new set of confidence- and security-building measures by the participating States **of** the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (**CSCE**) deserve mention in this context. One of our partners has taken an initiative aimed at regional disarmament in a Balkan area.

As the European experience **suggests**, such confidence-building measures as the **exchange of** information on military structures and force deployments, the advance notification **of** large-scale military movements, the mandatory invitation **of** observers and on-site inspections, will lead to greater openness, transparency and predictability **of** military activities.

Secondly, regional arms control and disarmament measures should focus, initially and as a matter of priority, on the most destabilising military capabilities and imbalances, such as the capacity to launch surprise attacks and to conduct large-scale offensive operations.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Thirdly, the process of adoption by **all countries of defensive force** structures should result in a stable military balance at the lowest possible level **of armed** forces and armaments and in conditions **of equal and undiminished security for** all participants.

Fourthly, regional **arms control and disarmament measures** must be buttressed by adequate verification **provisions**. Last but **not least**, arms control and disarmament measures in one region should not lead to **increased arms** transfers to other regions.

While measures such as those I have just outlined should come from and be developed by the region **itself**, initiatives from outside can be called for to act as a catalyst. This is certainly the case with respect to the Middle East, where regional arms-control and disarmament **measures must** be instituted as a matter of priority. In this connection, the European Community and its member States give their unequivocal support to the objective of instituting **arms limitation** and disarmament arrangements in the Middle East, including the establishment **of a zone free** of weapons **of mass** destruction and the possible consideration of measures **for** conventional-arms reductions. They recall the various proposals to this end put forward by President Mubarak, and welcome the timely arms-control initiative which President Bush proposed for that region, as well as the global disarmament initiative presented by President Mitterrand and the related proposal on conventional arms made by Prime Minister **Major**. The Twelve call on all States in the region to join the international efforts now under way aimed at ridding the Middle East of the **scourge of war**.

Now that the world has irreversibly moved beyond the East-West divide and its attendant **arms** race into an era **of** greater international cooperation, the

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

excessive levels **of** conventional armaments held by many States stand out as a dangerous anomaly. The Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf war exemplify the permanent threat which the indiscriminate acquisition of massive arsenals by certain States poses to regional peace and stability and, indeed, to international security as a whole. If it is to prevent the repetition **of** tragedies similar to the one which afflicted the Gulf, the international community must develop ways to deny States the instruments which enable them to sow war and devastation. Missiles capable of delivering weapons **of** mass destruction are a particularly notorious example in this respect, which is why the Twelve reaffirm their support for the guidelines **of** the missile technology control regime.

We are aware of the conceptual and practical difficulties which greater control over the burgeoning international arms trade entails. The **Twelve** acknowledge the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and accept that to be able to exercise that right many States **depend** on arms imports. But while every State should enjoy the means to ensure its security in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Charter, its **armaments** holdings should not exceed its legitimate self-defence needs to the point of becoming a threat in themselves to neighbouring countries. Achieving wide acceptance of this concept of **reasonable** sufficiency is one of the many practical challenges we **face** in the post-Gulf-war period.

Since in this field no international **agreements** are in place **or in** the process of negotiation, we shall have to innovate and break new ground where necessary. **The** European **Community** and its member States, **for their part**, are determined to come to grips with this problem and to contribute to its

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

resolution, as they made clear in the Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports issued by the European Council at its most recent meeting, in Luxembourg in June.

In the perspective of political union and in the framework of their internal consultations, the Twelve wish to elaborate on the basis of a common set of criteria a common approach to the harmonization of their internal policies. At the international level, the Twelve believe that far-reaching action is needed immediately to promote restraint and transparency in the transfers of conventional weapons and of technologies for military use, in particular towards areas of tension.

First and foremost, the Twelve stress that openness and transparency, which by now are well-established principles of arms control and confidence building, must be extended to the international trade in conventional arms and military technology. Several initiatives are already being taken in this respect.

At the regional level proposals are being considered in the context of the negotiations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on confidence- and security-building measures for the annual exchange of information on production and exports of military equipment.

At the global level the Twelve are giving the greatest priority to the early establishment of a universal and non-discriminatory United Nations register of conventional arms transfers. They note with appreciation that this initiative has already attracted wide support from recipient and supplier countries, including the seven most industrialised countries and the five permanent members of the Security Council. In this context, they welcome the

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

stated readiness of those States, which account *for* the overwhelming bulk of conventional **arms transfers, to start** tackling this worrying problem.

The timely and excellent report by the Group of Governmental **Experts** on ways and **means** of promoting transparency in international transfers of **conventional** arms, established under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General, gives added weight to the proposal for a register. In our view, such a register would promote several objectives: it responds to the need for greater openness and transparency; it could give early warning of attempted arms build-ups beyond the level *of* reasonable sufficiency. Finally, the establishment of a register would constitute a first practical step in a wider process designed to curb irresponsible and destabilising arms transfers.

The **Twelve are** therefore among the original sponsors of a draft resolution on the establishment of a register which will be submitted during the present session of the First Committee. As to the practical modalities of the register, the Twelve will aim for **a system that** is unambiguous, easy to **administer** and ready for immediate adoption. Later, improvements can of course be envisaged in the light of the **experience** gained. We trust that these various elements will commend themselves to the First Committee, and we solicit the cooperation and support of all States in achieving substantive results in this field.

In addition to the **establishment** of a universal register of **arms transfers**, the Twelve call on suppliers as well as recipients of conventional arms to observe responsibility and restraint in an area where restraint has on some occasions **been** so manifestly absent, to **the** detriment of regional and global security.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Restraint is particularly called for where destabilising weapons, *such as ballistic* missiles, are concerned. **This** in itself already can contribute to a more reasonable pattern of arms transfers. The provisions in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) which **aim** at preventing the transfer of surplus weaponry to countries outside the area covered *by* the Treaty are a **commendable** development in this context.

Third, the Twelve would welcome a dialogue between recipient and supplier countries, with a view to evolving an agreed code of conduct governing arms transfers. We remain open to the further consideration of the arms-trade issue in all its aspects by the United Nations and other appropriate multilateral forums.

The transparency of international arms transfers is just one aspect, albeit an important one, of greater openness in, and objective information on, military **matters** in general. The Twelve have consistently spoken out in favour of such openness, which they see as a means to strengthen mutual confidence and overall security. The Twelve will therefore continue to support the annual reporting of military budgets and call for wider participation in this exercise.

The growing importance of objective information on military **matters was** well reflected in this **year's** session of the United Nations Disarmament **Commission (UNDC)**, as next year's report will undoubtedly show. In this context the Twelve note with appreciation the renewed sense *of* purpose which the implementation *of UNDC reform* has imparted to the *Commission's* deliberations *this year*.

More generally, the vigorous activities undertaken by the United Nations disarmament machinery, especially in the field of verification, *testify* to the

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

present vitality **of** the arms-control and disarmament process. The Twelve **commend** the Department for Disarmament Affairs (**DDA**) for its dynamic **efforts** aimed at promoting the multilateral dimensions **of** the arms-control and disarmament process. Similarly, the various research papers published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (**UNIDIR**) during the ten years of its existence, as well as the useful activities undertaken by the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, have given greater visibility to the United Nations role in arms control and disarmament.

In the wake of recent arms-control and disarmament achievements, significant reductions in military expenditures can be observed in many States. While such reductions will undoubtedly be beneficial in the longer term, they can entail painful economic adjustments in the short term. The European Community and its **Member** States acknowledge that the transition **from** military-dominated to civilian *economies* has become a dominant concern in a growing number of States.

There is, however, no single blueprint for the conversion **of defence** resources into civilian industries. Differences between the existing economic and political systems impose limits on the possibility of evolving a general approach to the **conversion** issue. In our view, the conversion process **can** therefore **best** be managed along balanced and pragmatic lines in accordance with the specific conditions prevailing in each country. **Thus**, in a free-market **economy**, conversion will essentially **take** the form **of** a natural economic response to the problem of adjusting supply to changing demands in the civilian industry. Technical and economic feasibility, rather than political desirability, will then be the key factors determining the **scope** and the pace of the conversion process,

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

This also means that we cannot see conversion as a prerequisite for developing international peace and security. At the same time the Twelve feel that governments should avail themselves of existing collaborative structures, both at the national and international level, which could assist national conversion processes.

Now is the time to preserve and build upon the spirit of international cooperation which we have been able to establish. As I said before, we cannot afford to let precious opportunities slip away, and least so in the area of arms control and disarmament which, as we all know, is so susceptible to the cross-currents of international relations.

The Twelve trust that the First Committee will fully play its part in the quest for cooperative solutions to our **common** security challenges. In recent years the First **Committee** has demonstrated its growing ability to put effectiveness before rhetoric and flexibility before dogmatism. Further rationalisation **of** its procedures and streamlining of its agenda should enable our Committee to deal decisively with the real problems of today.

As in previous **years, the** European Community and its member States will again promote wider consensus on a well-contained overall number of **resolutions**. In a continued effort towards setting priorities, the Twelve will also encourage a more frequent biannualisation or multiannualisation **of** items on our agenda. They appeal to **other** States to join in these practical efforts aimed at maximising **the** contribution of the First Committee to **the** cause **of** disarmament.

Mr. SOMAVIA (Chile) (interpretation *from* Spanish): On behalf **of** the **Chilean delegation**, allow me to congratulate you on your election *as* Chairman **of** the *First* Committee. We know that your diplomatic abilities will have a

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

decisive impact on the attainment *of positive* results at this **session**. In addition, as a Chilean, **I** take special satisfaction in seeing a **former** activist *of* the historic Solidarity Union leading **us** in **our** endeavours. You are a living symbol of recent world-wide changes.

I should also like to congratulate the Vice-Chairman, from Turkey, Ambassador **Ordoñez** of the Philippines and our very good friend and colleague Mr. Pablo Sader, who represents Latin America at the table. I also congratulate our dear friend Mr. Akaahi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, because during this year *of* great change he has carried on with great vision, great energy and sensitivity in promoting reflection on complex matters, which is one of the main tasks of the United Nations; and finally Ambassador Komatina for his work as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, which at this moment in international relations will perhaps move ahead on subjects that have been, up to now, limited.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

Finally, although we have already heard the tributes to **Ambassador Garcia Robles, I** cannot fail to add a brief personal note. Let me refer to a different kind *of* solidarity and **emphasize** his ongoing solidarity with the **struggle of** the Chilean people to restore their democracy. This adds a new **dimension to those** with which all **members of the Committee** are familiar, and reflects *in* him a solidarity of which I personally became aware during a period of political exile in Mexico. He **was** a symbol of great universal values - **not** only in disarmament spheres.

This session begins with **good news** in the field of disarmament: we **are** witnessing the first practical results *of* the end of the cold war and of the **uncompromising** ideological confrontation that brought mankind so much suffering. We **welcome** the decisions of the United States and the Soviet Union **on** the reduction and elimination of short-range nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles and the moratoriums on nuclear tests. We welcome, too, the **significant** reductions that have been announced in overall defence expenditure **for coming years**.

However, in **the new era** on which we are embarking it would **have** been more meaningful had some of these decisions been announced **for the first time in** the United Nations. Such a gesture would have strengthened the Organisation and given a symbolic indication that in the sphere *of* **disarmament** the United Nations **is** able to play a more relevant role.

Unfortunately, we note that the **major Powers** still retain attitudes which hinder multilateral forums **from** completely fulfilling the tasks for which they were created, namely, the General Assembly, as the highest **forum of** dialogue and political guidance *of* the international **community as** a whole; the **Disarmament Commission, as** the principal technical **forum** with a broad

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

representation of **countries**; and the **Conference** on Disarmament, as the negotiating organ, albeit restricted **in** its membership.

In this regard, **I** appeal to the General Assembly at this session to urge the members of the Conference on **Disarmament** to complete **during** 1992 **consultations** on its expansion and to decide on the applications submitted by a number of countries, including Chile, to become members of that organ.

We must reiterate our concern over the lack of agreement within the **Conference** on Disarmament on matters as sensitive as nuclear disarmament and the increasing detriment to the ecological balance. Since **there** is also no negotiating mandate in the respective committees, we cannot but criticise the lack of political will to achieve substantive **progress** in the multilateral disarmament **sphere**. None the less, we consider initiatives such as the treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear testing submitted by Sweden as positive **steps**, and we shall look into them thoroughly.

The draft resolutions adopted yearly by the First Committee should evolve towards more legally binding instruments that strengthen international peace and security. Aware of this vexing situation, my **Government**, together with those of Argentina and **Brazil**, at the beginning of last month signed the **Mendoza Accord** on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons, **an** instrument to which Uruguay has now subscribed and which is open to participation by the other Latin American countries.

This regional **confidence-building measure**, which confirms previous unilateral declarations on the **non-possession** of biological and chemical weapons, contains mechanisms which are contemplated in the future convention on chemical weapons being negotiated by the Conference **on** Disarmament and which promote that Convention's prompt conclusion and entry into **force**.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

Similarly, President Aylwin, aware of the importance of giving full effect to the Tlatelolco Treaty, has taken the necessary steps, together with other Latin American countries in the same situation as Chile, to negotiate the implementation in practice of the provisions of that fundamental disarmament instrument.

Chile does not want nuclear weapons in the region, either its own or those of others. They are not needed; on the contrary, they constitute a source of mistrust and their mere existence produces friction and gives rise to political and environmental risks. The time has come when we must begin to think about the international legality of nuclear weapons, To what extent is their mere existence, rather than a source of collective security, actually a potential crime against mankind? Is there any real difference, from an ethical standpoint, between the massive suffering and devastation wrought by chemical weapons that we are prepared to ban and that resulting from nuclear weapons? From the legal and humanitarian viewpoint the reasons for banning the former are as valid as the reasons for banning the latter.

The various initiatives aimed at establishing a register of conventional weapons by the United Nations deserves our support, so much so that my country, at the last meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), together with Argentina, Brazil and Canada, sponsored an analogous proposal of regional scope. However, we must emphasise that Chile and other Latin American countries have comments with respect to these proposals. They relate to the compulsory nature sought to be given to the registry, the failure to include certain aspects such as internal production of weapons and their control and the problem of illicit arms-trafficking. In addition, we must

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

ensure that the register be universal, non-discriminatory and **respectful** of the principle of self-defence.

Moreover, my Government believes that, **while the initiative is perhaps** one of the **most** relevant we have seen in the **First** Committee in recent times, it constitutes but one step further in the disarmament **process, which** needs to be complemented with comprehensive **measures on** the elimination of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

The Government of Chile notes with dismay that an essentially political topic, such as that of enhancing the idea of security by way of non-military elements - one so often raised by Chile in various forums of the United Nations - is not gaining acceptance in the work of the First Committee. These new components of the concept of **security** - which encompass not only the military aspects of disarmament, but all present or future threats which may erode local, regional or world stability, economic development and human dignity - call for emphasis to be placed on negotiations aimed at **establishing** an appropriate relationship between disarmament and development, **thereby** enabling us effectively to release for economic and social development funds earmarked for the purchase of weapons that do not play a deterrent role and that cannot be justified for purposes of legitimate self-defence.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

Of particular relevance in this regard is the **Stockholm** Declaration of 22 April 1991. That Declaration, which was signed by my Government, refers to the peace dividend - a much-discussed but very elusive concept. The Declaration mentions the **use** of funds saved as a result of economies in the acquisition of weapons **for purposes of international cooperation and for the** creation of a global **emergency system** for conflict prevention. These **are** initiatives that my Government fully **supports**.

However, we are well aware of **the great** difficulties that are beginning to emerge in the **process** of turning the much discussed peace dividend into a material and **financial** reality. Budget deficit and balance-of-payment problems are mentioned, together with domestic needs, the cost of the destruction of weapons and of industrial conversion, the lack of economic growth **and** access to markets. These and many other **emerging** problems are cited to explain **the fact** that, once **again**, the needs of developing countries **remain unsatisfied**. This reminds us of the ease and **speed** with which nearly \$45 billion were raised **for** the purpose of prosecuting the Gulf war. It reminds us also of the impossibility of creative, innovative and resolute **action** in **the sphere** of financing development.

This **leads** me to think that, in the final analysis, the real peace dividend is not **just a matter** related to the **use of resources released** from military budgets, important though that **may** be. The real peace dividend **is** a political, intellectual **and** cultural one. The main benefit should be our own capacity to think with open minds, and on the basis of up-to-date criteria, about the problems of peace and security. We must begin by **recognizing** that the ideological division of the world eclipsed other security problems at least as important as the confrontation between the super-Powers. But, in

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

addition, the cold war intellectually distorted our identification of the problems by defining them in terms of a friend-enemy dichotomy rather than in terms of permanent values. A major example of this dichotomy is the way in which concepts as profound as human rights and democracy have been manipulated. The cold war was a source of deep personal and family insecurity for millions of people throughout the world - not primarily because of fear of a nuclear holocaust but, rather, because the struggle for human rights and democracy was a subordinate political factor. It was always secondary to the overriding objective of defeating the other super-Power and its allies. In the name of the fight for freedom, dictatorships of all kinds were promoted, protected and assisted. From an ethical and moral point of view, it is a sad story.

This lesson of the recent past makes us realize the need to ask ourselves how, today, we want to identify and define the problems of security in the post-cold war world. As I have said in various United Nations forums, the Government of Chile believes that we must ponder the main sources of contemporary insecurity and what might be the most appropriate instruments to deal with them. To that end, I should like to share a few thoughts with other members of the Committee.

First, since the end of the Second World War the State has been at the centre of our attention with regard to security. Thus, we have neglected the personal and social problems of the individual. Today, we must acknowledge that the security of the individual is at least as important as the security of the State and, above all, that one cannot be achieved at the expense of the other.

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

Secondly, in the contemporary world the main **sources of insecurity** for the individual **citizen** are economic, social and environmental. Social **insecurity is caused by** poverty, unemployment, criminal **and** political violence, **drugs, population** growth and environmental deterioration, among other things. This is especially so **in** the case of the countries of the third world, **and it should be** noted that insecurity **from** this source can be fought **not** with weapons but only with political and social instruments and by various **means** of international cooperation.

Thirdly, **we must** assume that, with the end of the cold war, security will **increasingly** become a **matter of** interdependence. There will be no security in the North **unless** there **is** security in the South there will be no security **for** those **who** enjoy well-being unless we can devise solutions to the problems of **those who** live in a state of social uncertainty. Neither societies nor the world will be stable unless we diminish simultaneously the various sources of insecurity **in** all countries.

Fourthly, as we all know, the receding danger of global conflict, **as well as political** movements towards democracy and the market, **are creating new points of tension or** have activated **some** latent ones. Regional situations will be **more** at the **focus of** international debate. This will create new **responsibilities** for the countries of a region - for instance, in the case of **Haiti**, responsibilities for Latin America and the Caribbean, where the **Organisation of American States** has acted decisively **and** firmly to **demand the restoration of** the legitimate Government.

But **these new** situations that we are living through **also** enable us to **take a fresh** look at concepts that, **in** the context of the cold war, were **given** ideological interpretations favourable to one side or the other. I refer, for

(Mr. Somavia, Chile)

example, to the concept of a **zone of peace**. It **is** clear that **this** could be of major usefulness in the regional setting. Latin America and the Caribbean **are** moving in that direction. Years ago **Brazil had** the vision to **propose the** establishment of a **zone of peace for** the Atlantic, and that **was** approved by the General Assembly. **A** similar suggestion **was made** by Peru **in** respect **of the** Pacific; the Central American Governments are discussing the creation **of** a zone of peace in Central America; and President **Borja of** Ecuador recently proposed to the General **Assembly** the creation of a South *American zone* of peace.

All **of this forms** part of a new dynamic **process of** enriching **some** concepts and **of** rehabilitating others that were discarded as a **result of** the mechanical workings of the cold war and the Ideological simplification that it meant **for** mankind. For instance, along these lines, it is possible, following *the* good example of *the Conference on security and Cooperation in Europe*, to consider the convening of regional or subregional conferences that would gradually address situations *in* the **framework** of these *new* realities.

(Mr. Somavia. (Chile))

As I have already indicated, it is an **obvious** fact that the problems of drugs, the environment and other **such matters** are also problems **of** security, but they are not the **same** kind of security problem as those that are discussed **in** the Security Council or even here **in** the First Committee. We are beginning to identify such security problems which, as has been said before, according to the modern view of the concept, point to the need to pay attention to the economic, social and environmental dimensions of the problems, dimensions which are dealt with in the Second and **Third Committees** of the General Assembly.

The interrelationship **of** disarmament and international security is clearer today than ever before. We cannot neglect **the sources of** insecurity that affect human beings, **families**, communities, States and mankind as a whole. The emergence **of** a *new* international order requires that attention be given to the legitimate aspirations of all the countries of the world. Disarmament must be a global process which, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, will mean a real improvement in the living conditions of the developing countries.

The United Nations is the appropriate forum for the realisation of a shared vision of what security should be in the decade **of** the 1990s. Let us not waste that opportunity, perhaps a unique opportunity in history, to achieve substantial advances in the development **of** ideas and **of** political practice to promote international peace and **security**.

Mr. ZLENKO (Ukraine) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to express my satisfaction at seeing **you, a representative** of a country that is **Ukraine's friendly neighbour, presiding** over the deliberations of the First Committee. I wish you and **all the officers of the Committee every success** in accomplishing the Committee's tasks **at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly.**

The turbulent developments **of the past few years have dramatically** changed the global political landscape. Structures of **a new world order are** taking shape on the basis of cooperation, interaction and trust. The Paris Charter for a New Europe, the Treaty on Conventional Forces **in Europe, the signing of the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)** and the recent bold United States and Soviet initiatives in nuclear disarmament: all these measures are cementing the foundation **of a fundamentally new security system** based on mutually beneficial cooperation and interaction. In other **words**, the world has become **a much safer place to live in**, and the threat of a super-Power clash has vanished from the political horizon.

The indivisible and integral nature of security is being made obvious through the intrinsic links between its military, political, environmental, economic and humanitarian dimensions. Yet the ending of military confrontation and the reductions in military capabilities, primarily through disarmament and **arms control** but also by downscaling and limiting military **activities**, remain central to any multidimensional concept of security. This process should undoubtedly be well-balanced and continuous and should extend to all nations and cover all types of arms. In this respect, every nation **must** shoulder its share of responsibility for **the situation in the world**, while the United Nations should awaken every nation to its duty. **Among the**

(Mr. **Zlenko**, Ukraine)

military aspects of security. nuclear arms and consequently nuclear disarmament **are** the fundamental issues in today's world.

Ukraine has consistently advocated the elimination of all nuclear arsenals. We are convinced that *an* effective, balanced and efficient international **security** system could prevent **or, if necessary, curb any aggression** through a joint international effort not involving the use **or threat** of use *of* nuclear weapons*

On 24 August this year, the Parliament of Ukraine proclaimed Ukrainian State independence, and implementation arrangements followed immediately. **Meanwhile** we are awaiting the endorsement of that decision in *a referendum on* 1 December this year.

The Parliament of the Republic has decreed that all armed forces within **the** territory of Ukraine fall under its jurisdiction. This has led to some concern. in world public opinion and official circles **in** many countries, that Ukrainian **independence** might lead to the emergence *of a new* nuclear Power. Please rest assured that that concern is groundless. **On** the contrary, I am **convinced** that Ukraine's consistent policy in *favour of* eliminating nuclear weapons has *been* instrumental in the far-reaching, coordinated nuclear **disarmament** measures announced **by** President Bush and President Gorbachev, and that that policy will be helpful in the implementation of those **measures**.

Our position means that all nuclear arms on *our* territory should *be* eliminated as soon as possible. I should like to quote what was said by **Leonid Kravchuk**, President of the Supreme **Rada**, the Ukrainian Parliament, in his statement on 30 **September** in the general debate at this session of the **General Assembly:**

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

"Ukraine does not seek to possess nuclear weapons. It intends to become a party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State. This intention is in line with international efforts to reduce and destroy nuclear stockpiles throughout the world. By adopting this stand, Ukraine wishes to promote disarmament and greater trust among nations."

(A/46/PV.14, p. 27)

"As the Assembly knows, certain nuclear-weapon systems are at present deployed in Ukrainian territory. Our policy is that these nuclear weapons are only temporarily stationed in Ukraine. Eliminating them and the components of their deployment is just a matter of time." (ibid.)

Of course, Ukraine is not the only nation in the world to have opted for a non-nuclear status. Yet it is one thing to refrain from something one does not have, and it is quite another to make one's choice in favour of a non-nuclear future when one has to face the costs of eliminating hundreds of strategic and tactical weapons and their production and maintenance facilities.

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

Considering the vivid example of **some** super-Powers, a **few** Ukrainian politicians would sometimes argue: Why hurry, if other nuclear **Powers** have **rejected** the non-nuclear option while actively encouraging others to accept it? Why **do we NOT** do the **same**? Indeed, people are right when they say that nothing is as seductive as a bad example, but it **is even more** true that most people have enough **common** sense and moral strength **not** to be led astray by **questionable** precedents. This **we** feel **warrants an** optimistic **perception of** **human** progress.

It is **international** partnership on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations **and** not the possession of nuclear arms that will guarantee the future of **the** world **community**. **We** sincerely hope that Ukraine's *non-nuclear* option will **be** judged on its **merits** as a meaningful contribution to consolidating international security **and** strengthening the **non-proliferation** Treaty, which should be made a **treaty** of unlimited duration.

At **this** point **I** shall **quote** again *from* the statement made by the President of the Supreme **Rada** of **Ukraine**:

"The world **community** must not let the new opportunities presented today pass by. The non-proliferation *of* nuclear arms, other **weapons of** mass destruction and combat missiles and missile technology has **become** particularly relevant. Ukraine welcomes the **declarations** by France, **China and South Africa of their decision** to adhere to the **nuclear** non-proliferation Treaty. **A situation is developing** in which any State's intention not to adhere to the Treaty may **be** regarded as contrary to the **common** interests of **mankind**". (A/46/PV.14, p.26)

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

A frequent question raised in the context of recent **events**, including developments in Ukraine, is whether the nuclear forces are in fact **adequately** protected **from** accidental or unauthorised **use**. We have a very **clear** policy with regard to these weapons in Ukrainian **territory: command** and control of nuclear **arms**, as long as they still exist, **must** preclude any possibility of unauthorised use. **But, of course**, a **second question** quite naturally arises: **Is** it really conceivable, or morally admissible, or indeed reasonable to envisage **any kind of** authorised **use** of nuclear **systems of** mass destruction?

The world can live and must live without mass annihilation weapons. But so long as they are still there, there can **be** only one **conceivable** way to use them in an "authorised" *manner* - namely, *as* a nuclear response to a nuclear attack. Anything else *defies* all perceptions of reasonable **human** society.

Recent developments such *as* the current **and** proposed joint **measures** to guard against accidental or **unauthorized** launches and to provide for the **security** of weapons transit and storage, as well as promises by the United States and the **Soviet** Union to **eliminate** tactical nuclear weapons, make us **hopeful** that all nuclear Powers may once again consider following the **example** of the **USSR and** China, **by** declaring their intention **never** to use **nuclear weapons** first and substantiating that **statement** with joint confidence-building **measures** in the **area**. We think that much *of* the road towards **prohibiting** a first use of **nuclear** weapons has been travelled already. The bold yet carefully balanced nature of **the** latest nuclear-arms initiatives suggests that the nuclear **Powers concerned** are indeed **in** a good position to travel **down** the remaining part of the **road**,

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

There is another urgent **task** in this field, *and* I feel sure that representatives in the First **Committee** are not the only ones to be very well aware **of** this task. I am referring to the need to complete the noble endeavour **of** our distinguished predecessor⁸ who banned nuclear testing **in** outer space, in the atmosphere and under water as long ago as 1963.

Certain progress has been made in limiting nuclear testing: the 1974 **and** 1976 Treaties were ratified and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has moved to considering this issue more actively. However, the principal goal - namely, a complete and **comprehensive** ban on all nuclear testing - still, alas, remains a remote prospect.

Ukraine, having *suffered* the horrible results of a "**peaceful**" nuclear disaster in Chernobyl, joins those who have fallen victim to the **use** or testing of nuclear **weapons**, and **the** millions of People who have not yet been directly affected but who do not want to put up with the looming nuclear threat, in urging all the nuclear Powers to show good will and cease nuclear testing, thus making a gigantic stride towards nuclear disarmament.

It is high time that we **stopped** once and for all our continuous nuclear warfare against **the environment**, during which dozens and hundreds **of** nuclear charges have *been* set off. This warfare is called nuclear testing. **I** should like to **emphasize** that this issue is in a class by itself, to be considered separately from its linkage to progress in disarmament. **No** steps in other directions can replace the need to ban nuclear testing **completely** and as soon as possible. The Soviet one-year moratorium, **announced** earlier this month, **is another** invitation to others to follow suit and opt for a **definitive** cessation **of** nuclear explosions - **which indeed** tax the patience of the people and of nature **itself**,

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

Now that international relations are evolving and the United Nations peacemaking potential is being realised to a **fuller extent**, we in Ukraine regard as **rather** realistic and not just idealistic **the idea of having** step-by-step nuclear disarmament, marked by such milestones as the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, early cessation of nuclear testing, complete destruction of nuclear **stockpiles**, and guarantees that nuclear **arms** are not being produced anywhere in the world. And if the non-nuclear prospect **is** not to somebody's liking today, **we would not** rule out the possibility of preserving some agreed minimum nuclear deterrence capability.

It is also essential to achieve an early **cessation** of **fissionable** materials production for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear explosives are not used **for military purposes**; that **is, the nuclear** explosives released as a result of accelerating nuclear **disarmament**. **These issues** are indeed high on our agenda.

Iraq's aggression against Kuwait **and** the **possibility** that new nuclear States might **emerge** soon and that chemical **weapons and their delivery vehicles** might be spread around the globe, along with some other **destabilizing** arms **and** technologies, demonstrate once more how important it **is** to put a **secure** barrier in the way of proliferation of dangerous type8 of weapons.

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

Recent developments have shown how urgent it is to introduce a strict international regime to monitor missiles and missile technology proliferation. Urgent, concerted and, **first** and foremost, efficient measures are required to tackle this problem.

Ukraine has unfailingly supported the establishment of nuclear-free **zones**. If the preparatory work is well done and if the **zones** are created at the initiative and with the agreement of all the nations in the region, such *zones* can have an **effect of containment**; they can encourage the renunciation of nuclear arms and consolidate stability in the region and throughout the world. When nuclear weapons are eliminated, our national territory must become a **nuclear-free zone also**.

Ukraine welcome⁸ the result⁸ of the recently completed Third Review Conference **on the Convention prohibiting** bacteriological weapons. The results of the Conference show that **disarmament agreements** concluded in the past **continue today** to play an important role and may be adjusted to meet today's **requirements**.

We are indeed gratified to learn that there are good chances of completing, **next year**, the drafting of a most complex agreement, namely, a multilateral convention on the **complete** prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We realise that the finishing touches of any arms-control **negotiations** always turn out to be the most intractable. Therefore, the negotiators are hereby **urged** to do their utmost to remove the differences so **that** work on this major arms-control instrument can be completed by the next **session** of the General Assembly. Ukraine neither possesses nor produces

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

chemical weapons, and Ukraine will be one **of** the first to sign the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical means **of** warfare.

The signing of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (**CFE**) in Paris on 19 November 1990 was definitely a landmark event last **year**. It consolidated the ground **for** genuine disarmament. The significance of this Treaty, which has paved the way for a brand-new **kind** of security on the continent of Europe can hardly be overestimated. Yet I **wish** to **stress** the point that, even before the Treaty entered into **force**, member States had resumed the Vienna talks to cover a still wider range **of** military and political issues. This is a good indication of the continuity and consistency in this straightforward process. However, progress in the reduction of conventional forces in Europe has **not** been matched by similar moves in other parts of the world, notwithstanding the fact that in recent times armed conflicts have continued to flare up in places outside of Europe. We feel that the international community should give **more** priority to reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in regions other than Europe, above all in areas torn by conflict. Measures to build confidence, enhance stability and strengthen good-neighbourly relations might be taken as a first step **in** that direction.

The implementation of the CFE Treaty, which must also have an impact on the conventional **forces** in Ukraine, emphatically calls for **Ukraine's** direct participation in any further multilateral disarmament talks as well as in **the CSCE** process at large. In this connection, I **wish** to recall once more that Ukraine has expressed its desire to participate directly in the disarmament negotiating process and is willing to make a constructive contribution to

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

solving the issues at hand. After the referendum has been held, we intend to **address in practical** terms the question of full-fledged membership in the CSCE.

The need to close down all the main channels of the **arms race** means that we can hardly avoid the issue of naval forces. Ukraine, a coastal nation of the Black Sea and hence the Mediterranean basin, is quite naturally concerned by the fact that the major achievements in various disarmament **matters** and regional issues have until recently **had little or** no effect **whatsoever on** naval activities. **We feel that the** time has **come** for substantive negotiations on naval issues, starting with elementary confidence-building, openness and predictability measures at sea. These have already been defined to a considerable extent. and we would thus **move** steadily down the road of significant reductions in **naval activities with a view to limiting them to** purely defensive functions.

Increasing attention has lately been focused **on the issue of conversion** of military industries. The very first experience in large-scale conversion has proved this to be a complex and at times ambivalent problem. It has been particularly vital for us since we aim to make a formidable part of our defence industries serve civilian purposes. Clearly, this is a field that calls for international cooperation, the sharing of experience, expert studies and **recommendations, some** of which could be provided by the United Nations and, **of** course, through the Department **for** Disarmament Affairs. We consider that it would be **very** important to go step up international efforts for large-scale cooperation in the area of conversion with a view to building trust, improving mutual understanding, making arms control measures irreversible and raising the living standards of peoples. Joint conversion

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

activities in **and of** themselves **can**, of course, serve both as a major confidence-building measure and as an indispensable source of the peace dividend which is to be drawn from fundamentally new approaches to consolidating international security.

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

Furthermore, conversion is equally vital to our success in limiting the arms trade and reducing the supply of weapons to international markets. Indeed, an arms manufacturer, just like any other producer, is always intent on finding markets for his products in order to provide jobs and pay wages to his employees. So in our view this raises to a high political level the issue of converting enterprises of the defence industry and shifting them to civilian production, a level which takes the issue above and beyond the usual cooperation based on mutual benefit. This makes me want to believe that our Western partners will show much greater interest in the conversion of defence enterprises in Ukraine than they are showing today.

Those remarks conclude my statement on some of the issues of disarmament. Although I dwelt on what is regarded by us as some of the most essential issues of disarmament. I did not refer to many crucial aspects of providing security through disarmament.

In conclusion, let me wish the First Committee all success in making further progress towards resolving this major problem.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to remind members that, in accordance with the decision of the Committee and as reflected in its programme of work and time-table, the list of speakers for the general debate on all disarmament items will be closed tomorrow, Tuesday, 15 October 1991, at 6 p.m. I hope that those delegations that have not yet inscribed their names on the list will do so as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.