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GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
Forty-fourth session  
Items 50, 52, 58, 62, 63, 64, 79,  
and 83 of the preliminary list\*  
CESSATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-TEST EXPLOSIONS  
URGENT NEED FOR A **COMPREHENSIVE**  
NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY  
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE  
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL)  
WEAPONS  
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT  
REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE TWELFTH  
SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION  
OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL  
THEIR ASPECTS  
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC  
CO-OPERATION

SECURITY COUNCIL  
Forty-fourth year

Letter dated 22 May 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden  
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the Final **Statement** of the **Palme** Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, issued in Stockholm on 14 April 1989.

I would like to request that the text of the Statement be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under **items 50, 52, 58, 62, 63, 64, 79** and 83 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(**Signed**) Jan ELIASSON  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative of Sweden  
to the United Nations

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ANNEX

Final Statement of the Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, issued in Stockholm on 14 April 1989

1. The **Palme** Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues concludes its work at a time when reason and common sense seem at last to be taking hold in the world. Long and bloody conflicts in several regions are ending. The prospects for halting the arms race have rarely appeared so promising. There seems to be a greater spirit of co-operation among countries. The United Nations is again being used as an important instrument for peace.

2. The current situation stands in striking contrast to the state of the world in 1980, when the Commission was established under the leadership of the late Olof **Palme** of Sweden. At that time, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were deteriorating rapidly, heading toward a struggle reminiscent of the darkest moments of the Cold War. As the major Powers froze negotiation and exchanged insults, conflicts raged in East and South Asia, in the Persian Gulf, in several parts of Africa, and in Central America. Arms negotiation were stalled, as nations in all areas of the world accelerated their military programmes. As arms races heated up, the danger of nuclear war seemed less and less an abstract idea, and more and more a possibility.

3. Deeply concerned about the world situation, we came together to see if, in spite of our differences in national background and political convictions, we could identify common interests and objectives and agree on a promising course of action. Agreement, indeed, proved possible, and resulted in our report, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, published in 1982.

4. At this, our last meeting, we have both looked behind us to assess the changes in the international situation since Common Security was issued, and, more importantly, we have looked ahead to consider appropriate courses of action for the future. In our opinion, humanity has an historic opportunity in the final decade of the twentieth century to create a radically more peaceful and more humane world. This opportunity must not be missed; it may not reappear.

Common security

5. In 1982 we called for new approaches to issues of international security and disarmament. "There will be no winner in a nuclear war", we pointed out, an observation now accepted officially by the two leading military Powers. As a result, we concluded, "a doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction."

6. The development of nuclear weapons, along with the aircraft and missiles capable of delivering them to any point in the world within minutes, shows clearly that war should not be considered a rational instrument of statecraft. All nations

would be threatened **should** a military conflict directly involving the leading military Powers ever **take** place. All nations - rich and poor, powerful *and* weak, peaceful and bellicose, socialist and capitalist - **are united** in their vulnerability to nuclear attack and to the effects of nuclear war.

7. Technology **is** also making it possible for more nations to build nuclear weapons, and for other countries, and even sub-national groups, to build additional types of weapons of mass destruction, introducing new horrors in world affairs. It **is** feared that as **many** as 20 nations either possess or **may now** be building lethal chemical weapons, while advances in biological **sciences** could raise previously unknown threats to **human existence**.

8. **Even** on the so-called "**conventional**" level, the human and material destruction of modern warfare can be **horrendous**. Given current and prospective military technologies, war is losing its meaning as an instrument of national policy, becoming instead an engine of senseless destruction that leaves the root **causes** of conflict unresolved. **As** weapons advance technologically, **moreover**, the costs of preparing *for* war are becoming increasingly burdensome, even for the **most** wealthy nations.

9. These facts have made traditional concepts of national security obsolete. In the nuclear age, nations can no longer hope to protect their citizens through unilateral **military** measures. All States, **even** the **most** powerful, **are** dependent in the end upon the good sense and restraint of other nations. **Even** ideological and political opponents have a shared interest in survival. In the long run, no nation can base its security on the insecurity of others. True security requires a co-operative effort, **a** partnership in the struggle against war which can only be established through dialogue *and* reconciliation.

10. All nations of course have the right of self-defence, as guaranteed in the Charter of the United Nations, and hence *to* maintain military *forces* adequate for that task. **But** the pursuit of military superiority is a futile endeavour that can only lead to less security for all. It is evident that most nations have become **more** powerful militarily over the years, yet it is equally clear that this has not led to a greater **sense** of security. Common security requires an end to arms competitions through negotiations, national restraint, and a spirit of collective responsibility and mutual confidence.

11. **But** security is a broader and **more** complex **concept** than protection from *arms and war*. The roots of conflicts and insecurity include poverty, economic disparities within nations and between them, oppression, and the denial of **fundamental** freedoms. Unless problems of social and economic **underdevelopment** are addressed, common security can never be truly attained. New threats to security also are emerging from environmental problems and the degradation of certain ecosystems. Against these threats to humanity's survival, the adversaries in the East-West conflict no longer stand on opposite sides; they often confront the same dangers - dangers they share as well in North/South relations. In this respect, common security could evolve from a concept intended to protect against war to a **comprehensive** approach to world peace, social justice, economic development, **and** environmental protection.

12. The early years of the next century could see a world which is **greatly** different, but perhaps not greatly better than the world of today. East-West tensions could sharply decline, but conflict would not thus necessarily vanish from international life. As economic development continues to diffuse power more broadly around the globe, both ancient and newly discovered differences could become acute. The problem of wars, local or regional, could become as **fraught** with disastrous consequences as those which were brought on humanity by the two World Wars.

13. This need not happen. The inadequacy of "military solutions" has been illustrated so vividly in our recent past that **one** can reasonably hope that the lesson has been widely learned. A world in which there are many more centres of political and economic activity will require different approaches to ensure the peaceful solution of problems, their "demilitarisation", and the harmonisation of apparently conflicting interests. Humanity can succeed in this vital task if it is resolved to succeed and if it provides itself with the institutions it will need to put that resolve into effect,

#### Common security through the rule of law

14. There are now more than 160 independent nation-States. A handful of them have large populations and cover vast areas, but most are small in territory and citizenry. Some are advanced technologically and prosperous many more are poor and struggling to develop their economies. All nations are sovereign. But never before have common problems and challenges transcending the borders of individual States been so evident. The forces shaping our future are less and less under the control of individual Governments. No one country can solve these problems alone. No one State can organise global security, dominate the global economy, or determine the course of political affairs. In order to deal with the problems of the world, nations will have to co-operate and establish stronger forms of international order.

15. The evolution of an effective and stable international legal and political framework is essential for the achievement of international peace and security, for substantial progress towards disarmament, and for sustainable economic and social development. Over time, anarchy and power politics must yield to the rule of law among States. National sovereignty must always be respected, but in their own self-interest, States must learn to exercise collective responsibility and self-restraint, to co-operate with one another, and to follow patterns of behaviour that support the emergence of the rule of law.

16. Co-operation will not replace rivalry as the hallmark of international behaviour overnight. It will take time before nations habitually follow peaceful patterns, conform strictly to the dictates of international law, and act through international institutions to achieve their common interests. Trust among nations can develop only slowly, particularly among States who have been enemies in the past. But concerted efforts can provide surprising results, as we have seen during the past few years, and any pauses in the progress towards a more just and lawful

international society can be **utilized** effectively to consolidate the gains which already have been made.

17. Transforming the current international **system** to one grounded more firmly on the rule of law requires three **simultaneous** and mutually **reinforcing** developments.

18. First, **nations** must develop patterns of behaviour *in* which disputes are resolved peacefully, as they undertook in the Charter of the United Nations. In their own self-interest, States must recognize that recourse to peaceful means of resolving conflicts is far **more** effective than recourse to war, **armaments**, or coercion. A variety of such peaceful means are already **available**: mediation, arbitration, diplomatic negotiations, and others. They can be carried out bilaterally, with the assistance of third parties, through **regional organizations**, or through multilateral global organizations. The specific means and forum for resolving a conflict need to be fitted to the substance of the issue. What is important is not the choice of venue, but the prerequisite decision to turn away from instruments based on military strength. When nations habitually use peaceful means to resolve disputes, the **rule** of law will be strengthened,

19. **Second**, international institutions must be strengthened. Again, many of the necessary organizations already exist, including the International Court of Justice, various arbitration and mediation agencies, **regional** political and economic organizations, and of course the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies. It is a question of providing these institutions with greater **resources**, of improving their procedures and methods of operation, and - most importantly - of developing national patterns of behaviour that turn first to these **organisations** for assistance. There could be a synergy here. As international institutions become **stronger**, nations can be expected to become **more** willing to rely on international instruments rather than on unilateral ones. **As** such changes occur in national patterns of behaviour, the international institutions will themselves gain confidence and become more effective.

20. Third, public opinion must be **mobilized**. In that respect, private organizations have a vital role to play. Such associations can reflect the concerns of people throughout the world about emerging **threats** to **security** even before Governments can take action. Working together with **Governments** and international institutions, they can help to **ensure** the timely address of the world's problems.

### Strengthening the United Nations

21. In this context, no more important task exists than to **strengthen** the United Nations. Until an international security **régime** based on the Charter of the United Nations is implemented effectively and reliably, nations will **see** no alternative but to arm themselves, even at great sacrifice in **terms** of economic development. **Events** in recent years provide hope that it may be possible to reaffirm and develop the security **régime** of the United Nations. For the first time since 1945 there **seems** to be agreement among the major Powers to act to prevent and contain conflicts, and to put their weight behind the methods and techniques **employed** by the

United Nations. It will take more than rhetoric to make the United Nations effective. It will require **leadership** and restraint by the leading Powers, co-operation from other nations, and the allocation of tangible resources by all States.

22. In our 1982 report, we put forward practical steps to strengthen the United Nations security system. Our approach was ambitious, covering means of anticipating and preventing conflicts, improved methods for peace-keeping operations, and even means of utilizing the Charter's enforcement mechanisms - long impractical because of the East-West division - in certain well-defined types of conflict situations. Not all were ready for our proposals for preventive peace-keeping, but the international situation now appears propitious to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to anticipate and prevent conflict, as well as to keep the peace in various situations.

#### Anticipating conflict

23. Strengthening the United Nations must begin with the Security Council, and particularly with its permanent members. Given the better understanding and closer collaboration which now seems to characterise these five States, there is an opportunity to build on this spirit to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to resolve conflicts peacefully and co-operatively.

24. Early warning is essential to anticipate and forestall conflicts. The Secretary-General is authorised under Article 99 of the Charter to bring to the attention of the Security Council, "any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". In order to monitor the world situation, however, the Secretary-General must have available the necessary personnel and technology, such as military observers, fact-finders, and experts.

25. Consideration also should be given to making available to the Secretariat information derived from space-based and other technical surveillance systems. Access to such information would enable the Secretariat to monitor world troublespots and to seek timely authority from the Security Council to resolve prospective military conflicts. The United Nations could have its own surveillance capabilities and a small cadre of experts to interpret the data. Before this option can become a reality, Member States might undertake to provide national data to United Nations experts. There is likely also to be an increasing flow of data available on a commercial basis. These options need to be evaluated, but there should be no debate on the need to enhance the access of the United Nations to the basic facts wherever a troublespot may develop.

26. The Secretary-General should prepare a report on the world security situation each year and deliver it to a public session of the Security Council attended by the foreign ministers of the members. A subsequent private session of the Council should identify and direct any specific measures which might be required. The international community has too often been late to act in conflict situations and has not shown sufficient determination to unite behind recognized principles of international law and justice. This not only gives aggressors time to consolidate

their gains, but weakens the authority of the Council, undermining the confidence of **small** and weak States in the collective security **system**.

27. We believe it is essential for the Security Council to agree on certain procedures to be set in motion when a conflict is emerging. Each crisis is of course a unique case, but previously agreed procedures for certain classes of contingencies can expedite action. These procedures can include the use of fact-finding missions and military observer teams to avoid the emergence of a conflict. It would be **most** helpful if the permanent members of the Council would commit themselves to consider the dispatch by the Secretary-General of special **representatives**, observers or fact-finders as a procedural matter, not subject to the veto. All Members of the United Nations should also commit themselves to receiving such emissaries of the Secretary-General and co-operating fully with them in the fulfilment of their task. If armed conflict occurs, the Council **must** be prepared to act to bring about a cease-fire, making use, if necessary, of the means of enforcement described in Chapter VII of the Charter.

#### Improved capabilities for **peace-keeping**

28. The tremendous contributions of United Nations peace-keeping forces were **recognized** in 1988 by their receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize. With a greater emphasis on the role of the United Nations in international security, and with the strengthening of the rule of international law, peace-keeping will become even more important. We believe that the role of these operations should be expanded, that the resources available to the Secretary-General in support of peace-keeping should be enhanced, and that the financing of peace-keeping operations should be placed on a sounder basis.

#### **Role**

29. In the past peace-keeping operations have been used primarily to observe and monitor cease-fires and other means of ending and containing armed conflicts. We believe that the role of peace-keeping operations can be expanded and the concept and methods be applied to areas beyond those of classical peace-keeping. These are essentially political, rather than military, operations. According to the specific needs of the situation, they usually include a civilian component like medical units, civilian police forces, transport equipment, various experts, and so on. They **have** often been required to render humanitarian assistance to the populations in addition to peace-keeping functions.

30. In peace-keeping operations, personnel and equipment are drawn together and put under a unified command for a specific purpose, not **necessarily** limited to monitoring a cease-fire. It could be to oversee elections, a task which is given explicitly in the mandate for the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia. In other roles, peace-keeping forces could ensure that countries are not destabilized across frontiers.

31. Other types of peace-keeping operations could include:

(a) Maritime peace-keeping in situations such as the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf, or against piracy or other criminal activity in troubled regions such as South-East Asia. Combined naval exercises should embrace and prepare for a United Nations peace-keeping role.

(b) International reactions to some forms of terrorist incidents should be anticipated and prepared for.

(c) Another role arises from the increasing risk of environmental catastrophes. Many countries in the developing world do not have the expertise or the resources to cope with such accidents. When they occur, quick action is needed. Containing the damage and restoring the environment is in the interest not only of the country directly affected, but of the international community as a whole.

(d) The question of how the international community can in the future play a role in prolonged conflicts within a State also needs to be considered, particularly when it has a bearing on the efficacy of international relief efforts.

32. A significant portion of the United Nations membership consists of small States - no less than 34 of the Members of the United Nations have a population of 1 million or less. They are especially vulnerable to outside intervention. If these small countries are to put their trust in the United Nations security system, it is important to make arrangements so that defensive operations can be carried out through the United Nations on behalf of the entire international community. The weakest members of the family of nations should not be denied the protection of international law in a practical form.

### Resources

33. The Secretary-General is charged with all aspects of the management of peace-keeping operations. Beyond a small complement of military personnel on the Secretary-General's staff to co-ordinate preparations for, and the implementation of, peace-keeping operations, it is not necessary to expand the United Nations own resources for peace-keeping. Military units in the armed forces of all nations, including all permanent members of the Security Council, which potentially could be made available for peace-keeping should be earmarked, along with the airlift and sealift assets that would be used to transport them to troublespots in emergencies. Specialized logistical and medical units also should be earmarked throughout the world. Developing nations might be given assistance to train designated military units for peace-keeping roles.

34. Equipment useful for peace-keeping operations might be stockpiled in several locations so that it can be readily available when necessary. Advanced technologies, such as seismic and acoustic sensors, mobile radars, advanced communications, and even overhead surveillance systems, could be useful in a variety of ways to monitor cease-fires and disengagement zones. The application of such advanced technologies could reduce both the manpower requirement of peace-keeping operations and potential losses of life. Means should be found to



develop these technologies for peace-keeping purposes and to make the systems available to the United Nations. Such proposals may appear futuristic and costly, but they could prove cost-effective. It would be regrettable if the best technologies were available for war-making purposes, but denied to peace-keepers.

### **Financing**

35. All aspects of the United Nations operations have faced financial difficulties in recent years, but perhaps none so severe as its peace-keeping missions. A world that spends the equivalent of nearly 1 trillion United States dollars each year to prepare for war should be able to afford the comparatively small sums required for peace-keeping. But the current arrangements for financing these operations are inadequate and unreliable. They place the heaviest burden on the countries that contribute the troops, thus discouraging participation and harming the principle of collective security. Financial constraints place severe limits on the capabilities of the United Nations to prevent and contain violence, and to resolve conflicts successfully. Just this year, for example, the initial scope of the operation of the United Nations in Namibia had to be scaled back substantially. Due to financial limitations imposed by the five permanent members of the Security Council, the size of the planned force was cut from 7,500 to 4,600. These constraints and the ensuing delays have already seriously hampered the Namibian operation, hamstringing the peace-keeping forces and threatening the peace settlement that had been negotiated.

36. A special reserve fund earmarked for peace-keeping operations should be built up over a few years to a minimum total of 2 billion United States dollars. Money for this fund should be raised through mandatory contributions assessed to all Member States on the basis of a formula established by the General Assembly.

37. Negotiations to set up peace-keeping operations are often drawn out because of disagreement on their financing. The proposed "Peacekeeping Fund" would serve as a financial buffer and thus facilitate the initiation of new operations on a timely basis. The fund would be used to pay only for missions mandated by the Security Council. It would be replenished each year, as needed, on the direction of the General Assembly.

38. In addition to mandatory contributions, voluntary contributions to the Peace-keeping Fund should be encouraged, especially from States that as a matter of principle do not participate in peace-keeping operations. It should be possible for organizations and individuals to contribute to the Fund as well, especially those who benefit financially from peace-keeping operations. Finally, possible independent sources of revenue for peace-keeping operations with built-in automaticity should be considered. One such source would be a levy on arms exports, which would require the establishment of a United Nations register of private and governmental international arms sales. The costs of keeping the peace are much lower than the costs of war.

Common security through negotiations

39. Emergence of the international rule of law would encourage progress towards arms control and disarmament. For the most part, nations arm because they are involved in conflicts or fear that they would be vulnerable to attack if they were not strong militarily. Persuading States to disarm requires that they gain confidence in the capabilities of international institutions and international law to protect their security.

40. The United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies, which together account for more than three fourths of the world's military expenditures, have the greatest responsibility for progress towards arms control and disarmament. Not only must the leading military Powers make progress in their bilateral talks, but their leadership is essential if separate negotiations on global aspects of the arms competition, and on regional issues, are to be concluded successfully.

41. There has been considerable progress in arms negotiations since our report was issued in 1982. The United States and the Soviet Union have concluded a treaty eliminating all intermediate-range missiles from their arsenals, the first time a whole class of nuclear weapons has been abolished through International negotiations. They have also made considerable progress in the bilateral START talks on central strategic nuclear forces, and are discussing a draft agreement which would roughly halve the two States' strategic arsenals. The talks in Geneva on abolishing lethal chemical weapons, carried out under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament, also have made substantial progress, as have several other negotiations. A new negotiation on conventional forces in Europe, with much better prospects than its predecessor, and a further negotiation on confidence- and security-building measures, opened in Vienna last month.

42. Important issues still cloud each of these negotiations, however, and a concerted effort will be required to bring each of them to a successful conclusion and to move on to even more far-reaching talks. In the mean time, the world's military forces remain large and costly, and are being modernised at a rapid rate. New technologies are being introduced, moreover, which threaten to create dangerous instabilities in several aspects of the military competition, while inhibition against the use of particularly dangerous kinds of weapons, such as lethal chemical agents, appear to be breaking down. It is essential that the leading military Powers act decisively to conclude the current round of negotiations and to move on to more ambitious agreements.

43. The need for progress in arms negotiations extends to other regions. In the past several years, political dialogues have been initiated concerning regional conflicts in Central America, in the Persian Gulf, in South and East Asia, and in Africa. There have been positive developments in Sino-Soviet relations, in Kampuchea, between India and Pakistan, and between China and India, among other troubled relationships. Such a political dialogue is needed urgently for the Northern Pacific, as well, involving all regional States, including the leading military Powers. Negotiated limits on the size and structure of military forces, including naval forces, and on their operations, could contribute meaningfully to

the resolution of each of these conflicts. Diplomacy *and* arms control must go hand-in-hand in the effort to bring peace 'throughout the world.

#### Reductions of strategic forces

44. In START, an agreement could be concluded within ~~the~~ year, but the negotiators ~~must~~ work hard to overcome the remaining major issues. Two questions are relatively technical, concerning how to verify limitations on mobile land-based missiles and sea-based cruise missiles. Without going into details here, it seems clear the possible solutions are understood by the two sides and within reach! we urge their rapid adoption.

45. ~~The~~ third issue is more a question of principle, concerning the relationship, if any, between the ~~prospective~~ START agreement on offensive forces ~~and~~ the existing Treaty Limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMs). Although no specific action is required to maintain the 1972 ABM Treaty, which has an indefinite term, as a legal obligation, questions have arisen about its duration as a result of research programmes in new ballistic missile defence technologies. ~~In~~ our view, ~~the~~ false promise of effective missile defences should not be permitted to disrupt either the ABM ~~Treaty~~ or the prospective START ~~agreement~~. The overwhelming weight of scientific opinion is that ~~there~~ are no effective means of defending populations from ballistic missile ~~attacks~~ and that ~~none~~ is in ~~prospect~~ at least through the end of the century. Given this scientific reality, a mutual reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty would seem to be costless. Such a commitment, ~~moreover~~, would help to ~~reassure~~ both the United States and the Soviet Union that the other would ~~not~~ suddenly abrogate the ~~agreement~~ ~~and~~ deploy extensive missile defences. The two might also discuss in specific terms the ~~types~~ of experiments in space that they each plan to undertake and their ~~relationship to the Treaty's~~ limitations. With such a formula governing research on ~~defence technologies~~, the talks in START on offensive weapons could go forward ~~rapidly and achieve~~ the 50 per cent reduction envisioned in the current draft Treaty.

46. The negotiations between the leading ~~militar~~ Powers cannot end with the current START Treaty, however, and the ~~residual~~ arsenals on the two sides would remain large. Future negotiators should seek even deeper reductions in nuclear ~~forces~~ and limitations on qualitative changes.

47. Another aspect of the strategic competition requiring attention concerns anti-satellite weapons. Through unilateral measures, the United States and the Soviet Union have stepped back from earlier efforts to deploy such ~~systems~~. ~~However~~, these arrangements are fragile. Outer space is one of the last commons of humanity. It should be protected from the arms race and utilised solely for peaceful purposes, including joint programmes. Weapons should be banned in their entirety, including the testing of weapons in ~~space~~.

#### Arms reductions in Europe

40. We have reached a historical watershed in the history of Europe. The possibility exists to ~~move~~ beyond the military confrontation that has cemented and

exacerbated the political **division** of Europe. The new Europe should be based on **diversity** and **tolerance**, an openness and a **sense** of cultural community, on economic co-operation and **peaceful** competition. Our approach to security in Europe should be enlightened by a broad **vision** of stability. The existing military confrontation should not be permitted to hamper the evolution of a more open and co-operative order in Europe. It is **necessary** to eliminate significant asymmetries, to reduce the levels of **forces**, to **restructure** forces to reduce the danger of surprise attack and offensive operations, and to reduce **reliance** on nuclear weapons. Furthermore, provisions should be **negotiated** to ensure the progress towards stability is not undermined by technical and scientific developments that can be used for some forms of arms modernisation. There is a need to institute a dialogue about force postures and doctrines relating to security in Europe, to prevent unilateral decisions from violating the idea of **common** security.

49. The **seven** years since our report was issued have **been** productive for gaining control of the military competition in Europe. In addition to the previously mentioned Treaty eliminating intermediate-range missiles, an agreement was concluded in Stockholm in 1966 to give prior notification of, and to exchange observers at, all military manoeuvres above a certain **size**, thus building confidence that such exercises were not **being** used to mask preparations for a surprise attack. The agreement permits inspections to be carried out on a **challenge** basis after short warning, a provision which contributes measurably to the agreement's **success**. Talks on additional confidence- and security-building measures involving 35 nations of Europe and North America are continuing.

50. New talks on conventional **forces** in Europe opened in Vienna in March. The 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are participating in **these** negotiations. The talks aim to establish a stable and **secure** balance of conventional **armed** forces at lower levels of armaments and equipment, and to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, especially the capability to launch surprise attacks or to initiate **any** large-scale offensive actions. Unlike their **predecessor**, the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which continued **unsuccessfully** in Vienna for 15 years, the new talks have the advantage of (i) including all members of the two military **blocks**, (ii) including all of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, as the territory for **agreed** limits, and (iii) starting with the stated willingness of the participants to eliminate threatening asymmetries.

51. The new talks also will benefit from the precedents for intrusive **verification** Procedures included in both the Stockholm agreement and the Treaty on **Intermediate-range** Missiles. Verification is no longer a political issue in any arms control negotiation; only technical questions about specific procedures remain to be resolved.

52. It is essential that the new Vienna talks not be permitted to become lost in a **technical** thicket, as befell their predecessor. The highest political authorities of each participant will have to pay continual attention and not permit the negotiations to drift. We believe that periodic meetings of the foreign and defence ministers of all the participants to review progress and set objectives would be useful to ensure that the negotiations continue to **move** forward.

53. The mandate for the new talks specifically excludes nuclear weapons. With implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-range Missiles, the 7,000 to 8,000 nuclear weapons remaining in the combined arsenals of the two sides in Europe will consist primarily of tactical weapons, including ordnance that would be delivered by aircraft, warheads for short-range missiles, and nuclear-armed projectiles that would be fired by artillery. Both sides have modernized some of these weapons in recent years.

54. Short-range nuclear weapons cannot be omitted from arms control negotiations. We urge the two alliances to develop a framework and schedule to include them in negotiations. Such discussions could facilitate progress in both START and the Vienna talks on conventional forces, as well as benefit from progress in those negotiations. An agreement in Vienna, for example, could obviate the perceived military need for new types of short-range nuclear missiles,

55. Care must be taken, moreover, not to block progress in the talks already under way by decisions on modernising short-range weapons. Military force planning should be based on a comprehensive concept of security which encompasses not only an assessment of military threats, but also an understanding of international political change and the possible outcomes of negotiations for disarmament. We urge the two alliances in Europe to eliminate the asymmetries in conventional force levels which stimulate perceived needs for modernising short-range nuclear forces, and to move rapidly towards sharply reduced forces.

56. Since naval forces are not embraced by the existing negotiations, consideration should be given to constraints concerning naval forces in the Baltic in order to ensure that they do not undermine agreements about conventional stability on land in Europe.

57. In 1982, the Commission suggested that in the context of the establishment of parity and mutual reductions in conventional forces, it would be desirable to create a corridor free of nuclear weapons, starting in Central Europe and extending ultimately from the northern to the southern flanks of the two alliances. Nuclear munitions and their storage facilities would be prohibited within the corridor, perhaps 150 kilometres on each side of the border, as would operations and manoeuvres simulating the use of these weapons. We continue to support this proposal. As the Vienna negotiations progress, it may be advisable to expand the corridor concept to include not only nuclear weapons, but offensive types of conventional forces, such as armoured units, as well. Creation of areas along the East-West border, as an integrated part of a European agreement, in which only lightly armed forces could be stationed, could contribute significantly to stability and a structure of forces that would make an attack unlikely.

#### Ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction

58. Abolishing all weapons of mass destruction must be considered the eventual goal. Much has to be accomplished before such a goal will be embraced by the nations of the world as an operational objective. The emergence of a régime of international law would be an important part of this process. Sustained progress towards conventional disarmament must take place simultaneously.

59. It is not sufficient to negotiate agreements specifying that certain kinds of weapons should be abolished. In addition, procedures for verifying such agreements with great confidence must be developed and institutionalised. Much will be done by individual nations utilising national technical means. But multilateral institutions can play significant roles in verifying agreements, if they were provided with the resources to do so. Abolition régimes must also include national commitments to use all available sanctions against treaty violators and to make determined efforts to convince States that had been reluctant to ratify the agreement. Unless the international community demonstrates a willingness to ensure that disarmament agreements are accepted universally and scrupulously respected, resistance to the final abolition of weapons of mass destruction will prove overwhelming.

#### Maintaining the prohibition on biological weapons

60. More than 100 nations have already ratified the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention which, together with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibits the development, production stockpiling, possession and use of biological weapons. But neither the Convention nor the Protocol include verification procedures, depending on the then-perceived military disutility of such weapons and the common recognition of their extraordinary dangers to guarantee national restraint.

61. In recent years, developments in microbiology and biotechnology may have increased the potential military utility of biological weapons. Concerns have grown about possible violations of the existing agreements. There have been public reports during the past few months, for example, that one or more nations may already be manufacturing lethal biological agents for military uses. Whether these reports are accurate or not, a climate of mistrust is emerging with the potential to undermine the Convention.

62. The Convention provides that complaints about possible violations may be lodged with the Security Council; the parties are charged to co-operate with any investigation that may ensue. All parties should reaffirm their readiness to clarify any situation which raises official questions about compliance with the agreement, even before the question is taken before the Council. At the same time, thought should be given to means which could help to build further confidence in compliance. The next review conference must further elaborate such ideas as the exchange of information on laboratories and research centres that handle high-risk biological materials, means of allaying concerns arising from atypical outbreaks of disease and exchanges of visits to relevant facilities. Concerted efforts to induce additional States to ratify the Convention also should be organized.

63. The Biological Weapons Convention is the only existing concrete step towards the abolition of weapons of mass destruction. It, must not be permitted to erode.

#### Abolishing chemical weapons

64. In the seven years since our report was published there has been a proliferation of chemical arms and a breakdown in inhibitions against their use. Lethal chemical agents were used repeatedly during the recent war between Iran and

Iraq. The two leading military Powers maintain large stocks of lethal chemical agents. It is feared that as many as 20 nations may now either possess or be building lethal chemical weapons and some of these nations have or are developing a ballistic missiles which could be used to deliver such munitions to distant targets.

65. At the same time, the negotiations in Geneva for a treaty that would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and cause the destruction of existing stocks, have made considerable progress, with questions of how the agreement would be verified providing the most serious of the remaining stumbling blocks. Presidents George Bush of the United States and Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union have stated their commitment to completing the agreement on numerous occasions and, with continued high level attention, it may be possible to conclude the negotiations relatively quickly.

66. Such an accomplishment would only constitute a step towards the abolition of chemical weapons, however. A substantial period will be required during which existing stocks of lethal chemical weapons are destroyed and other nations induced to join the régime. During this period, an international institution will be established and specific procedures developed to verify compliance with the agreement. Concerted international efforts will be required to be certain that the agreement gains global acceptance. Some nations, for example, have taken the position that chemical disarmament should proceed only in tandem with nuclear disarmament) they will have to be persuaded otherwise lest the current opportunity to rid the earth of chemical arms be lost,

67. Establishment of a régime to abolish chemical weapons is important in its own right, of course. But it gains even greater significance when understood as a precedent for the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. The experience of negotiating and implementing the Chemical Weapon Treaty will have an important impact on the prospects for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

#### Abolishing nuclear weapons

68. Conclusion of a START treaty, along with reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, would be major steps towards the goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons. Further progress towards that goal will depend on movement in other negotiations, the talks on conventional forces in Europe being the most important.

69. A number of further steps could move the world towards nuclear disarmament.

#### Comprehensive test ban

70. Conclusion of a comprehensive test ban would indicate very clearly that the leading military Powers were sincere in their determination to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. It would strengthen the régime against the proliferation of nuclear arms and help curtail the development of advanced nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

71. The United States and the Soviet Union should declare an immediate moratorium on all nuclear tests above a very small yield, say, one kiloton, to last for at least two years. The nuclear Powers understand how to monitor such a moratorium with high confidence. During this period, negotiations should be held to complete formal agreement on a comprehensive and permanent end to nuclear testing. The verification issue no longer constitutes an obstacle to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty. It is now strictly a matter of political will.

#### Denuclearizing the navies of the world

72. It may be timely for the nations that deploy tactical nuclear weapons at sea to begin discussing means of abolishing them. These weapons may include certain kinds of anti-submarine devices, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles and ship-to-shore missiles. They necessitate extensive security arrangements and sometimes provoke adverse popular reactions with a possibility of restrictions on ports which will accept ship visits. In so far as the greater performance of modern sensors and command and control systems has overtaken the original justification for these weapons, the nations deploying them may find it in their own self-interest to consider means of prohibiting or curtailing their potential deployment. One way to approach the issue would be to prohibit all nuclear weapons on all ships and submarines other than classes specifically designated by agreement. Such an agreement could have the additional benefit of facilitating negotiations on sea-based cruise missiles in the START talks.

#### Stemming nuclear proliferation

73. Achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is linked inextricably to the problem of nuclear proliferation. A prohibition on nuclear tests would make it more difficult for additional nations to develop nuclear weapons and for those States already on the threshold of nuclear-weapon capabilities to develop more advanced designs suitable for military applications. A halt to nuclear testing also is at the heart of the mutual pledges between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1970 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1995, the parties to that agreement were required to decide whether that Treaty should be extended indefinitely, or continued in force for fixed periods of time. Unless tangible progress is made towards achievement of a comprehensive test ban and convincing progress made in reducing nuclear forces. The continued existence of the Treaty itself could be threatened.

74. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, there are three nations with declared nuclear-weapon stocks (Britain, China and France). As the leading military Powers' stockpiles are reduced in size, the three other declared nuclear Powers will have to be brought into negotiations. Each of these countries has indicated a willingness to take part in such talks following substantial reductions in the arsenals of the leading military Powers.

75. Six additional countries are believed to have nuclear weapons or to be on the threshold of such capabilities (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa). Arrangements also will have to be made concerning these near-nuclear Powers. Argentina and Brazil have initiated a bilateral process of



declarations and exchanges of visits to nuclear facilities *in* recent years. India and Pakistan recently signed an agreement to forebear from attacks on each other's nuclear facilities. Certain nuclear facilities in all four countries, however, as well as in Israel and South Africa, remain outside any nuclear non-proliferation régime. Efforts should be made to induce these countries (and others with nuclear industries who remain outside the existing non-proliferation régime) to help impede further nuclear weapons' proliferation.

76. As the world moves towards the abolition of nuclear weapons, the international community will have to co-operate to bring pressure to bear on all nations to submit all their nuclear facilities, without exception, to international inspection and safeguards. Nuclear disarmament will not be possible in the absence of an effective international régime, including the declaration of all nuclear-weapon stocks and nuclear facilities, the effective verification of such declarations, the comprehensive destruction of nuclear weapons in all countries under strict international controls and the creation of effective international institutions and procedures to ensure that nuclear weapons are never again built. The operational need for such institutions and procedures is no doubt far in the future. But the possibility of the abolition of nuclear weapons will not be taken seriously until effective means of verifying the destruction of nuclear stocks and production facilities and ensuring that they could not be quickly reintroduced, are designed and accepted on a global basis.

Common security through economic development, social justice and protection of the Planet

77. Common security cannot be achieved through military strength, or even through disarmament and the traditional concept of collective security.

78. Security cannot in any real sense be said to exist at a personal or national level in a condition of chronic underdevelopment. Poverty itself is insecurity. For the individual, poverty is insecurity because of the fear of hunger, disease and early death that afflicts the hundreds of millions who live on the margins of existence in subsistence agriculture and urban slums. For the nation State, Poverty is insecurity because of the lack of control over unstable and adverse external events in commodity and capital markets; the inability to afford basic public expenditures] the dependence on external financial flows with its attendant conditionalities; and the inequality of bargaining power which affects external economic relationships. Poverty itself can lead to internal and external conflict.

79. Peace and security as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations as primary international goals cannot therefore be fully realised unless people and nations are released from the trap of poverty through real development. In truth, far more people in the world today suffer from economic, than military, insecurity. Yet the resources devoted by the international community to development assistance are very small compared with military spending. Moreover, co-operation for common security is unlikely in a world where many poor countries face extremely onerous debt obligations, decreasing resources for economic development and widening disparities between rich and poor countries.

80. International economic insecurity is not solely a matter of concern to poor countries. Serious threats are posed to the whole global economy by such elements of instability as trade protectionism, exchange rate instability, large economic imbalances and lack of effective multilateral economic management. Poor countries are the main victims, but not the only victims, of an international economy characterised by such high levels of insecurity.

81. Similarly, growing poverty has implications for the global community as a whole as it spills over from the developing world through enforced migration, various forms of political and religious extremism and such manifestations as the drug trade. All countries have an interest in ensuring that the concept of collective security embraces effective actions to end global poverty.

82. Insecurity could originate too from environmental disturbances. Evidence is growing that certain kinds of development are undermining natural systems and threatening widespread social disruption. Poverty and environmental destruction interact to create a downward spiral of activity that can result in migrations of environmental refugees, the spread of deserts and deforested zones, and conflicts over water and watershed use. Pollution has an increasingly cross-border character - as with acid rain and nuclear contamination. Some of the global environmental commons which are the responsibility of the international community as a whole - the oceans, Antarctica, the atmosphere and space - face serious problems unless multilaterally agreed, equitable rules can be collectively applied. Some environmental challenges are world wide in scale, such as the threat to the ozone layer and the possibility of global warming. Climate change could have far-reaching effects on patterns of settlement and economic organization. The interaction of poverty, military conflict, and environmental destruction in parts of Africa illustrate in an extreme form the cumulative nature of the threats these problems could pose, if not addressed, and the multifaceted character of security. More effective international structures to deal with environmental problems are required, both at the regional and the global level. They should bolster and expand, but include the important efforts of the United Nations Environment Programme. New institutional authorities within the United Nations and the various regional and subregional organisations should be established in order to come to grips with the problem of environmental security.

83. Political oppression and the denial of human rights is a further source of international conflict. Fundamental human rights are guaranteed to all peoples by many international treaties and other documents. These solemn undertakings to protect individual freedoms and the rights of minorities and to treat all peoples humanely and decently, need to be implemented rigorously by all nations if the sources of international conflict are to be abolished. As a Commission, and as individuals, we particularly deplore the continued oppression and inhumane treatment of the majority of the population in South Africa. The international community must work tirelessly to correct this manifestly unjust situation.

84. The processes of political and military change we have described previously - the emergence of the rule of law and progress towards the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament - would in themselves provide considerable momentum for economic and social development and environmental

protection. But the relationship between disarmament and development will only be interactive **and** mutually reinforcing if nations have the political will to make it so. The present moment of international opportunity must be used to begin such an interactive process. There is, after all, considerable experience in the conversion of military to civilian production. The period immediately following the signing of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 was **one** of rapid and successful economic conversion in both the United States and the Soviet Union - a conversion which made possible rapid economic growth in both countries for a time, **even** though it was **not** transformed into a co-operative, reinforcing process.

85. Progress towards the resolution of international conflicts and towards arms control and disarmament in the 1990s should be exploited to divert scientific and technical resources from military to environmental and economic purposes. Weapon programmes utilise skills - in computer and communication technologies, in atmospheric and ocean research, in energy physics, to name just **a few** - which are urgently needed for economic development. New technologies could permit developing nations to "**leapfrog**" over entire stages of industrial technology which are highly **destructive** of the environment. Satellites and space technology *are* needed not only to verify arms control **agreements**, but for environmental monitoring. **Biological** research should be **utilized** not for military purposes, but to eradicate disease, to improve the environment and to **provide** the food so desperately needed in parts of the world.

86. Common security imposes global obligations to end economic insecurity no less than political conflict and war. The **Brandt Commission** on International Development Issues and the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development have pointed the way forward. We urge the international community to pursue the **paths** they have marked out.

87. Many obstacles must be surmounted **as** the current sense of international opportunity is turned into concrete achievements. International hostilities and suspicions derived from decades of conflict and warfare cannot be erased overnight. But as they fade into history, a far better world - one with far less violence and far greater security for all - can be created. Common security can be **transformed** from an idea, a concept, into the common **condition** of human beings **everywhere**. New forms of international co-operation, going beyond the present international structure, may well be needed. What is required to make this a reality is nothing more and nothing less, than continued, concerted efforts involving **the** entire community of nations. As we bring to a close our work as the Palme Commission, we look forward to this future, not only with hope but with confidence.