



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 26th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GUTIERREZ (Costa Rica) (Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire) (Chairman)

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Mr. McDonagh (Ireland)
Mr. Inako (Austria;
Mr. Gutierrez (Costa Rica)
Mr. Fischer (Federal Republic of Germany)
Mr. Al-Kotol (Iraq)
Mr. Haidor (Pakistan)

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In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Gutierrez (Costa Rica), Vice-Chairman, opened the meeting.

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE, AS NECESSARY

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Today the United States delegation is introducing a draft resolution under agenda item 62, "General and complete disarmament", entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreement agreements", in document A/C.1/42/L.59, dated 27 October.

The United States is very pleased to have, as of this date, the following nations as co-sponsors: Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain and Zaire.

My Government was most gratified that last year's resolution on this subject was adopted by consensus, and hopes that this body will again signify its recognition of the crucial role that compliance plays in the disarmament process by adopting this year's resolution by consensus. The 1987 resolution on compliance is virtually identical to its predecessor except that the last operative paragraph seeks to underscore the importance of the subject by recommending it to the attention of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The United States, as we well known, has for many years stressed, on the positive side, the vital role that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements plays in the preservation and strengthening of international security

(... Fr iedersdorf, United States)

and, on the negative side, warned of the corrosive effect that non-compliance with such agreements can have in undermining the foundations of international security.

It is with some degree of satisfaction that my Government welcomes the widespread acceptance of the tenet of compliance in arms limitation and disarmament agreements. To be sure, adopting a resolution such as this, even by consensus, does not mean that the international community can rest on its laurels. Each nation must put into practice the principles to which it subscribes, that is, adhere to agreements to which it is party, and co-operate in resolving doubts about its non-compliance. It must also take steps to resolve doubts about the non-compliance of other States. Ignoring these doubts or turning a blind eye to actual violations permits a poison to spread in the international arena. We need only look at the history of international affairs in the 1930s to realize the damage done to the fabric of world order not only by States that failed to comply but also by States that shirked their duties in addressing such non-compliance.

It is encouraging that mechanisms are being developed to investigate and resolve questions about non-compliance. That some doubts are not justified by facts is to be expected. Far better to raise the doubt and have it resolved than brood in silence and fear.

It appears that the international community has these last years made a good beginning by recognizing that the problems of compliance and non-compliance exist. We need to continue this work. Ultimately we must grapple with defining the role of the international community in cases in which arms control and disarmament agreements are being unequivocally violated.

(Mr. Friederich, United States)

We believe that this draft resolution is one step in the process of strengthening confidence in the viability of arms limitations and disarmament agreements, agreements which can play an important role in preserving peace. We are grateful to its co-sponsors and we encourage all members of the First Committee to join in adopting it by consensus.

Mr. GRUNDMANN (German Democratic Republic) : The United Nations General Assembly at its forty-second session faces the important task of making the necessary decisions for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With the draft agenda it has submitted, the Preparatory Committee has outlined the framework for the next steps to be taken. We expect from the special session a comprehensive dialogue on the key issues of disarmament, the safeguarding of peace, and concrete measures to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war and to secure peace through disarmament.

In the communiqué published a few hours ago on the Prague meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States, the following, inter alia, is stated:

"The allied States favour a complex approach to the questions of disarmament. They regard it as extremely important that the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament give positive impulses to all negotiations on the various disarmament problems and to the agreement of concrete measures. That session should contribute to a nuclear-weapon-free and secure world and to the emergence of a climate of trust, openness and predictability in international affairs."

On the basis of a realistic assessment of the international situation and in the light of positive trends in its development, it is necessary to decide upon ways and means of implementing the disarmament strategy contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That document has retained its vital importance and topicality to date; it shows a sense of reality and great vision. There is, for instance, no doubt that the agreement in principle between the USSR and the United States of America on the conclusion of an accord on the complete elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons constitutes the political implementation of at least two key

(Mr. Grundmann, German
Democratic Republic)

principles of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, namely, the priority of disarmament and arms limitation in the nuclear field and the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States which have the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons at their disposal.

My delegation believes that the 1978 consensus has lost nothing of its trend-setting role; it must remain a basis for action-oriented efforts.

The comprehensive peace programme reaffirmed and specified in detail by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty at their Berlin Summit at the end of last May meets the requirements of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and virtually offers practical solutions to all questions of arms limitation and disarmament.

The document adopted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Six-State Initiative constitute a considerable part of the international platform for world-wide disarmament efforts.

In the Reykjavik document (of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) we find elements for practical measures as they should be adopted by the special session. The general debate in the First Committee has shown that international agreement is emerging on those disarmament questions which in their different forms must be tackled with priority in the near future. That is, in our view, encouraging.

Unlike 1982 when the global international situation was not conducive to the course and results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, today there are signs of a growing readiness to approach in a new way the questions of war and peace, disarmament and security.

(MC. Grundmann, German Democratic Republic)

As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, • teted during his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany from 7 to 11 September 1987:

"Today the world is at a crossroads calling for new thinking and action by all those vested with political responsibility. Ideological and social differences must not be transferred to State-to-State relations, let alone be settled by military means."

The idea of a comprehensive system of international peace and security is gaining ever more support. It is a matter of complex solutions. The course and results of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development have shown, for instance, how close the relationship is between the strengthening of independence, security, the elimination of hunger and backwardness, ensuring economic and social development, and environment protection, on the one hand, and disarmament, on the other. The forthcoming special session should duly take into account that relationship.

The German Democratic Republic would welcome it if the third special session Of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in keeping with a relevant Soviet proposal, declared the 1990s a decade of action for a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, that would be an important guideline for continuing the world Disarmament Campaign.

The special session is to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament. At its summer session, the Genvs Conference on Disarmament agreed on certain parts of the programme. However, we note with concern that as the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament draws nearer a few States question

(Mr. Gtundmann , German
Democra tic Republic)

important parts of already agreed texts that are explicitly based on the Final Document of the first special session of the **General Assembly** devoted to disarmament. **We** take the view that key questions of disarmament, must be reflected in the programme.

The special session will also receive and **discuss** reports of the **Geneva** Conference on Disarmament and of other disarmament forums. It would **help** considerably to bring about a **successful outcome** of the session if the **Geneva** Conference on Disarmament could, at its 1988 spring session, make progress in dealing with nuclear and space issues, in particular a test ban on nuclear **weapons**, accelerate the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical **weapons**, and submit the draft of a comprehensive programme *on* disarmament.

The **items** on the agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission are also of direct importance for the further preparation and holding of the third **special session** of the General Assembly **devoted** to **disarmament**. Regrettably, it has not been possible so far to work **ou t** recommendations **for the special session**. There, too, a few delegations dissociated *themselves* from formulations that had been **agreed** upon several year **s** ago, in particular with regard to questions of nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Certain **progress** has been made in the discussion of issues regarding the limitation of the naval arms race, verification and the strengthening of the **role** of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Meanwhile, the United Nations Disarmament Commission has **become** an inalienable part of the multilateral **disarmament** process. It should **however** carry on the discussion up to practical conclusions - for instance, pertaining to the role of the united Nations **in** verifying compliance with disarmament treaties.

(Mr. Grundmann, German
Democratic Republic)

The further democratization and **internationalization** of the disarmament process, including the strengthening of the multilateral disarmament process and full use of its potential, will be a central issue at the **special** session. That is a substantive problem but also an **organizational** one.

The German Democratic Republic supports proposals aimed at transforming the Geneva Conference on Disarmament into a permanent organ for negotiations on **disarmament** and simplifying its procedures. The indisputable substantive relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations must find its expression in more concrete forms of co-operation.*

We welcome the **regular information** from the USSR on its bilateral negotiations with the United States as a practical step towards that goal and a contribution to more openness in the disarmament process. The question of how the United Nations can become even more effective in the disarmament field, in the **sense** of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is particularly crucial. All **possibilities** must be considered to that end. In this connection, document A/CN.10/96 of the 1st session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission contains a number of interesting ideas. There have been further valuable suggestions in recent times, including the debate so far in the **First** Committee.

The German Democratic Republic **welcomes** reflections seeking to activate the United Nations Security Council in the disarmament field. The Council could, for instance, hold one or several series of meetings on nuclear disarmament at the

*The Chairman returned to the Chair.

(Mr. Grundmann, German
Democratic Republic)

foreign-minister level, for which, of course, thorough preparations would have to be made.

We also advocate that ~~the~~ United Nations Secretary-General submit annual reports on the implementation of consensus resolutions on disarmament, on the basis of information provided by ~~Member~~ States. My delegation shares ~~the~~ view that it is necessary to reach consensus not only with regard to the adoption of resolutions but also with regard to their implementation.

Another question is whether the potential of *the Advisory Board* is fully used. In the perception of the *German Democratic Republic*, ~~the~~ Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies can play a more important part in the co-ordination of study activities on disarmament. In ~~this~~ context, my delegation ~~support~~ ts the principles for disarmament studies that have been agreed upon by ~~the Advisory Board~~. It would be highly satisfactory if the Board discussed proposals for *new* studies with due regard for ~~those principles~~, before the General Assembly reached a decision on their elaboration. Furthermore, it could assist in *more* effective **organization** of the elaboration process by submitting recommendations for the direction and scope of the studies, for **priorities** in their drafting, and for the **general** approach. In its dual function as ~~an~~ **advisory** body to the **Secretary-General** and as a board of trustees ~~of~~ the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *the Advisory Board* is specially suited to make politically and financially **responsible** allocations for study activities between United Nations groups of experts and **UNIDIR**.

In addition, it is worthwhile to think about the following. It should be possible to ensure that the regional conferences **organized** within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign by the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the

(Mr. Grundmann, German Democratic Republic)

United Nations Secretariat in co-operation with various countries have an even greater impact on the other respective regions - that is, to study possibilities of participation by representatives from other regions and to ensure even swifter publication of the results. Thus, regional activities would be **more** integrated than before in the comprehensive world Disarmament Campaign. In this **connection**, the regional centres for disarmament and the co-ordination of their activities could still play a greater role.

The First Committee should enhance its **support** for the United Nations Secretariat by proposing topics for meetings **of** experts or symposiums that are of special interest to the world public. It would be helpful if possibilities were found within the framework of the regular budget - for instance, in the Department **for** Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat - to store, in the form of a file of data and facts, all disarmament initiatives, whether undertaken by individual States or on a regional, global, bilateral or multilateral basis. The information gathered could then **be** regularly made available to Member States on the eve Of sessions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the First **Commi t tee**. Such information would allow new developments to be taken **fully** into **account**.

The German Democratic Republic is ready to participate actively in the in-depth discussion of **various** initiatives and proposals within the framework Of the next session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at the next preparatory session for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and at the third special session itself.

(Mr. Grundmann, German Democratic Republic)

We are certain that during the present session we shall reach agreement on the date and duration of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Reykjavik was a turning-point in the bilateral disarmament efforts of the USSR and the United States of America. The **third** special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should **become** a turning-point in **the** multilateral disarmament process.

Mr. McDONAGH (Ireland) : On behalf of my delegation, I congratulate you, Sir, on **your** election as Chairman of the Committee. We are fully confident that your experience and abilities and the skill and dedication of your efforts will chart an efficient and successful course through our work. The Irish delegation Pledges you its full support in this task.

The Permanent Representative of **Denmark** has spoken already in this debate on behalf of the 12 States members of the European Community, including Ireland. I should **like** in addition **today** to offer the following views on a number of issues before this Committee to which my Government attaches particular importance.

The past year has seen **developments** in the areas of arms control and disarmament which are of great importance in their own right and which, **moreover**, hold **out** the hope that further significant progress **may** be attainable in the relatively near future.

The basis for the prevailing optimism is clear: it is, in particular, due to the continuing dialogue **between** the two super-Powers which, for the first time offers prospects of an early net reduction in nuclear weapons through the global elimination **of** intermediate-range nuclear missiles,

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

My delegation whole-heartedly welcomes the United States-Soviet dialogue and the prospect which is now offered of a significant nuclear-arms control agreement, which we hope will be but a first step towards the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. This is an objective to which we note the super-Powers have in principle given renewed support. It is also an objective which is shared by the vast majority of delegations here, including my own,

In welcoming these planned reductions we none the less remain deeply conscious of the vast quantities of nuclear weapons which will continue to be part of the arsenals of the super-Powers and the other nuclear-weapon States. At the strategic level there will still exist an awesome capability to annihilate the world many times over, and below that level thousands of nuclear weapons will remain unaffected by the agreement currently foreseen. The challenge of eradicating this frightening threat will still remain.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

It is our profound hope **that** the decision to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) is *not merely an isolated event*. We trust that it reflects a deeper and more far-reaching change of attitude **towards** nuclear weapons. My delegation has long held the view that whatever degree of stability exists at present cannot be maintained indefinitely against the background of an **ever-increasing** arms race. We *were* not alone in believing that **any reasonable** defence needs had long since been met and surpassed and, indeed, surpassed to the **point where further so-called improvements** in nuclear-weapon systems were themselves a major source of tension. We **continue** to believe that **the** existence of these **weapons** arouses a deep sense of unease, **additional to** that caused by **political** and ideological differences. We also believe that the refinement of these weapons does not serve the stated **aim** of enhancing deterrence, but has instead a militarily destabilizing effect.

We would like, therefore, to think that an agreement to eliminate one particular category of weapons reflects a greater willingness to reduce dependence on nuclear arms and to **seek** improved security through a lessening of military **confrontation**. We believe that the prospects have been greatly improved by this agreement. It is vital that the impetus should be maintained and that it should be carried over into the negotiations on strategic nuclear and space weapons. The agreement in principle reached last year on a **50-per-cent** reduction in strategic nuclear weapons of both the United States of America and the Soviet Union is an **objective** which must be vigorously and **urgently** pursued, as is the goal of a world **completely** free from **the** threat of nuclear weapons. The achievement of this latter objective clearly must involve not only the **super-Powers** but all nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

Perhaps the single, most depressing aspect of the history of arms control negotiations to date has been their failure to match and overcome the impetus of the arms race. Agreements on arms control have been very **slow** to come about. 'BY contrast, one generation of nuclear weapons has succeeded **another** at a pace which makes the original weapons and their delivery systems appear primitive. This race has been fuelled both by illusions of attaining **military** superiority and by heavily funded research. One area where we **believe** progress has been delayed far too long is that **of** nuclear testing. Over 1,000 nuclear-test explosions have been carried out since the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty was concluded. **A comprehensive** test-ban treaty is urgently needed if a qualitative improvement of **nuclear** weapons with all its destabilizing effects is to be halted.

We have gained **some** hope from **the** joint statement in Washington on nuclear testing by the United States of America and the Soviet Union on 17 **September**. That statement envisages full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations before 1 December with the immediate aim of reaching agreement on effective verification measures. The willingness to engage in joint on-site verification experiments at each other **'s** nuclear-test sites, as part of this agreement, is, in our view, an important development. We would hope that the issue of verification can be dealt with in a realistic way and can be removed as the major element of contention that it has **been** in the past several years. We believe that questions of verification can be solved if there is a political will to do so and that this issue should not **represent** an insuperable barrier to the **conclusion** of a **comprehensive** test-ban treaty (**CTBT**). At the same time, we have to register our disappointment that **agreement** on the complete cessation of nuclear testing has once again been deferred to an indefinite future.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

In view of the advances made in the bilateral dialogue, and given the stated ultimate objective of the two super-Powers, we hope that the difficulties that continue to be encountered at the Conference on Disarmament on the elaboration of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a CTBT can now be overcome. We recognize the valuable work that continues to be done by the group of seismic experts in considering the various problems concerning verification, including the work of seismic data exchange. We consider that the time has arrived to agree on a mandate. This would be consistent with the wishes of the vast majority of the Member States of the United Nations.

Progress in these areas has, of course, a major bearing on the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. This is a question which Ireland introduced into the General Assembly some 30 years ago and which led to the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 10 years later. The NPT remains one of the most important arms control agreements reached to date and is a significant contribution to world stability. The commitment undertaken by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT has undoubtedly had the effect of limiting horizontal proliferation and avoiding an even more serious escalation of the problem of nuclear weapons. The problems we would face today, had the proliferation of nuclear weapons not been effectively halted, are unthinkable.

For their part, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith leading to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament. As we approach the twentieth anniversary next July of the signing of the NPT, it has to be said, unfortunately, that none of these objectives is as yet in sight. Instead, the period since the signing of the NPT has been one of continuous expansion

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and development of nuclear weapons both quantitatively and qualitatively. We hope that the reduction in nuclear weapons now agreed in principle between the super-Powers represents but the first sign of a willingness to fulfil the commitment entered into in the **NPT** to pursue a path leading to nuclear disarmament.

A further important dimension of the **Non-Proliferation** Treaty is the right of States to complete agreements in order to assure the **denuclearized** status of their respective territories. The first special session of the *General* Assembly devoted to disarmament confirmed that the creation in certain parts of the world of such zones could contribute to stability in the areas concerned, to non-proliferation and to the disarmament process in general. The entry into force last December of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, is a significant arms control agreement in its own right. It is also a welcome statement of determination to establish a limit to the development and spread of nuclear weapons which may also have applications in other regions.

We see the twentieth anniversary this month of another important treaty. This is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the **Exploration** and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. This Treaty is part of an important body of bilateral and multilateral instruments which make up the present legal **régime** applicable to outer space. It has long been **recognized** that this legal **régime** is not in itself sufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is important, however, that there should be strict compliance *with* all existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, including, in particular, the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty, and that the **régime** be consolidated and reinforced to **enhance** its effectiveness,

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

My delegation does not believe that the route to security and self-preservation requires the addition of new and more advanced tiers of weaponry. In particular, we do not wish to see the exploitation of outer space in a way which engenders instability and adds a further dimension to the arms race. In so far as the development of military strategy based on the use of outer space in the context of nuclear war is concerned, it is my delegation's belief that the only way to avoid the consequences of a nuclear war is to ensure that such a war never takes place in the first instance.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space or the Conference on Disarmament has on the basis of its mandate usefully examined and identified relevant issues in the area of prevention of the arms race to outer space. It should now be enabled to begin the task of actual multilateral negotiations to complement the existing legal régime in outer space. We hope that this Ad Hoc Committee will be reconstituted next year with a sufficient mandate to proceed on this basis.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

Another area in which the Conference on Disarmament has been actively engaged and where clear progress now seems possible is on a convention banning world-wide production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Such a convention would be a major achievement. This year again we have been reminded of the urgent need for a global ban on chemical weapons. The unanimous conclusions reached by the group of experts sent to Iran and Iraq by the Secretary-General on the use of chemical weapons in the conflict in that region are deeply disturbing. Violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol are taking place and these weapons are being used against the civilian population. There is the greatest possible need to halt these breaches of the Geneva Protocol now. A total world-wide elimination of such weapons must continue to be an urgent objective. We are glad that, in this area, the Conference on Disarmament appears to have made considerable headway. A convergence of views, for example, on on-site inspection on challenge, when circumstances so require, and on securing adequate verification of non-production of chemical weapons, now appears to be emerging. We welcome the new openness that is present in those negotiations in the more recent past. The visits undertaken and planned to chemical-weapons installations in the United States and the USSR should have the effect of enhancing mutual trust, help promote efforts at securing adequate verification and advance the conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on the Convention regarding biological weapons held a meeting at Geneva earlier this year. This was a welcome demonstration of the continuing commitment of the international community to enhancement of the effectiveness of this important element in arms control. The exchange of information, which is a central part of the measures to improve confidence and trust, will strengthen the Convention and help ensure its continued relevance.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

We are well aware that the arms race is not confined to weapons of mass destruction. The rivalry in conventional weapons has also been vigorously pursued. That rivalry does not take place only between competing military alliances. Regrettably, it extends to almost every corner of the globe. Just as in the case of nuclear weapons, the conventional arms race serves only to sharpen tensions and undermine security. The pace of technology has greatly increased the destructiveness of conventional weapons, and this is vividly demonstrated by the tragic results of the many conflicts which have taken place over the last four decades. There is a very real need to control and reduce conventional armaments and to do so urgently.

The Greatest concentration of conventional weapons and forces in the world is located in Europe. Existing efforts to bring about reductions have produced no concrete results to date. However, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) currently meeting at Vienna offers an opportunity for a fresh start. The CSCE has already accomplished very useful work in confidence- and security-building. A series of measures has been devised to lessen the apprehensions caused by military exercises and manoeuvres. We look forward to a successful conclusion of the Vienna meeting which, among other things, would embark upon a new phase by mandating negotiations upon actual reduction of weapons and forces.

The primary responsibility for dealing with many of the problems besetting disarmament lies with the largest military Powers. However, all nations individually, and the international community as a whole, also have responsibilities in the disarmament field. This underline: the importance of the role which the United Nations has to play, a role to which my delegation is deeply committed. For its part, the Conference on Disarmament has a unique responsibility for pursuing multilateral disarmament negotiations. We can point to the

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

achievements of the **Conference** on Disarmament. However, our deliberations would be lacking in seriousness if we did not also point to a lack of progress. The danger of stagnation represents a threat to the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament as a disarmament negotiating body. There is a compelling need for its efforts and its work to be marked with success and for concrete progress to be recorded on the issues which have been on its agenda for many years now and on which it has not been possible to reach consensus on a way forward.

An encouraging example of the role played by the United Nations is the successful conclusion of the recent International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We recognize, of course, that for many countries the outcome of that Conference fell short of expectations. However, we believe that the Conference did achieve valuable results, and largely for the reason that these were agreed by consensus. As my Foreign Minister noted in its address to the Conference:

"The problems connected with the relationship between disarmament and development are important to all countries. They are not likely to go away or to solve themselves over time without collective, immediate and sustained intervention."

The Final Document of the Conference and its action programme represent a framework for further activity which we warmly support. We also welcome the renewed international commitment to allocate a proportion of the resources released through disarmament for the purposes of development with a view to bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries. We further welcome the role that the United Nations will play in undertaking analysis of the impact of global military expenditure on the world economy. We believe that the idea included in the action programme of establishing a mechanism within the existing

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framework of the United Nations to monitor the trends in military expenditure will strengthen the United Nations role.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled to be held next year, will be an occasion for the United Nations to conduct a comprehensive examination of the entire spectrum of disarmament questions. The international community should seize this opportunity to reaffirm the objective of general and complete disarmament and to draw up a List of practical and realistic measures and actions designed to achieve this goal. In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament drew up a consensus document, which was a broad-ranging and substantial statement on disarmament issues. Ireland fully supported the outcome of that first special session, and our commitment to its results remains undiminished today. With that document as a firm and reasonable foundation, we look forward to the exploration of ways and means of developing and strengthening the commitments it contains during the third special session.

There are many areas to which the third special session must devote its attention. However, the question of nuclear disarmament and the threat of nuclear warfare must, in our view, remain central to its deliberations so that an ordered and focused debate in this area may identify points on which concrete and practical measures can be agreed. We believe that the several factors which together contributed to the failure of the second special session can and must be overcome. My delegation particularly regretted the failure to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament has since engaged in a substantial amount of effort in this area. We look forward to its session in 1988 to resolve outstanding issues in time for submission to the third special session. With a positive international environment and with flexibility and commitment to ensuring the overall success of the session, we believe that a

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

final document can be agreed by consensus, which will be a significant contribution to the disarmament debate and represent a landmark global statement on some of the most important issues besetting the world today.

A number of delegations have expressed concern about the manner in which the work of this Committee is organized. My delegation also believes that our modus operandi is in need of substantial improvement. The existing degree of consensus in the Committee must be broadened if its authority is to be restored and strengthened.

We have felt obliged in the past to underline the fact that the ever-increasing number of draft resolutions coming before us tends to obscure rather than clarify the very stern reality of our concerns about disarmament problems. The net effect has been to diminish the authority that the Committee can and should command. A number of practical proposals have been advanced which would facilitate the work of our Committee. several of the ideas put forward are eminently reasonable, in particular, the proposed elimination of the distinction drawn between the Committee's general debate and the exchanges that take place subsequently on specific agenda items. This distinction seems artificial and largely irrelevant. If the Committee could combine both those stages of its proceedings, more time could be devoted to consultations on the many complex and contentious issues under consideration.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

The suggestion that the Committee might bring forward the date on which it begins its work has particular appeal to my delegation. The consensus approach would be helped considerably by a decision to commence our proceedings at the same **time** that other Committees commence theirs. Failing that, we should try to advance the beginning of our substantive work, at least by one week. Any step in that direction would provide more time **for necessary** negotiations on texts and would contribute to increasing the number of draft resolutions adopted by **consensus**.

The relatively late deadline set for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament items should be advanced. Such a change would also help us make the **best possible use** of the time at our disposal. This year the deadline did not arrive until we had reached the stage at which fully one third **of the** 66 meetings scheduled for the session had already taken place.

There are of course other suggestions that commend themselves to our attention. For example, last year we witnessed several successful attempts to merge draft resolutions-which addressed the same **issue**. We welcomed this. The practice of clustering draft resolutions might be developed even further, and a serious attempt ought to be made to take up some of the perennial draft **resolutions** at intervals of two or **more** years rather than annually, as is now the case.

Earlier this week Cameroon submitted a draft resolution (**A/C.1/42/L.76**) on rationalisation of the work of the First Committee. My delegation warmly welcomes that initiative, which will have our full **support**.

Necessary reforms such as these should help us proceed with our work in a more orderly and efficient manner and should facilitate our consideration of the complex and vital issues which are the concern **of our** Committee.

Mr. INZKO (Austria): I am speaking on agenda item 61, on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and I should like to address three points: first, Austria's position on chemical weapons; **secondly**, the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological-Weapons Convention, as well as the follow-up action taken by Austria in that regard; and thirdly, **draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.41**, concerning the Second Review Conference.

Chemical weapons were widely used for the first time during the First World War. During that war, according to official reports, gas casualties **numbered** about 1.3 **million**; of these, 100,000 were fatalities*. The suffering of hundreds of thousands of people due to the **use** of such weapons created public **outrage and led** to negotiations **and**, seven years after the First World War was **over**, to the adoption of the 1925 **Geneva** Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases - and of all analogous liquids, **materials or devices - and** of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Austria's commitment against chemical weapons is of long standing. As early as 1900 Austria ratified the Hague Protocol on asphyxiating gases. In 1925 Austria became a party to the Geneva **Protocol**. And finally, in 1955, Austria reaffirmed **its** commitment in the Austrian State Treaty.

In view of that position, Austria, together with other countries, requested the **Secretary-General** in 1968 to prepare a report on chemical and bacteriological weapons. That report, entitled "Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use", qualified this species of arms as a class of its own, and as armaments that **exercise** their effect solely on living matter. **In** his report, the Secretary-General also warns that their large-scale use could have an irreversible effect on the balance of nature. Subsequently, the General Assembly discussed chemical and bacteriological weapons for the first time as a separate item in 1969.

(Mr. Inzko, Austria)

Two years later, in 1971, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, agreement was reached on separating the two items; **bi**ological weapons have since been viewed as distinct from chemical weapons. Since then, chemical weapons have been considered independently at Geneva. A number of highly complicated issues were addressed thereafter, such as **the** question of the scope of the prohibition; the question of whether implementation should **be** immediate or spread over a period of **time**; the sensitive question of verification procedures and whether they should **be** systematic, **by** challenge or a combination of the two, and so on.

In recent years the General Assembly has regularly **urged** the Conference on Disarmament to intensify negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. **My** delegation therefore noted with particular satisfaction the progress achieved in 1987 in the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on chemical weapons. The fact that the necessity for on-site inspections was commonly **recognized**, the fact that the formulation of lists of certain lethal and super-toxic chemicals succeeded and the fact that confidence-building measures outside the framework of the negotiations were initiated give rise to the hope that the year 1988 **may** finally bring **about** the conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention. In that respect, Austria welcomed the recent invitation the USSR extended to international representatives and experts on chemical weapons, including those from my own country, to visit the military facility at Shikhany. Accordingly, Austria welcomes also the forthcoming visit by Soviet experts to the United States facility at **Toole**, Utah, next month.

In that context, I wish to refer to a statement by the Austrian Foreign Minister in April this year, in which he underlined Austria's willingness to participate in an international verification **system set up** by the convention.

(Mr. Inzko, Austria)

Following the 1971 agreement to separate the chemical and biological weapons issues, a number of draft proposals were introduced, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was opened for **signature** in April 1972. By the end of 1986, 107 countries had ratified that Convention.

The Second Review Conference on that Convention, held in September 1986, represented a particular privilege and challenge for Austria. Presiding **over** that Conference, Austria found itself for the first time at the helm of a disarmament conference. Sixty-three States parties participated, and substantial progress was achieved in defining the scope of the prohibitions, including the definition of all biological agents and toxins covered by the Convention. Another significant agreement concerned the exchange of various data in order to prevent or reduce ambiguities, doubts and suspicion. The Conference finally succeeded in approving a provisional agenda for the next review conference, to be held in 1991 at the latest.

Pursuant to the Final Declaration of the Review Conference, an ad hoc meeting Of scientific and technical experts from States parties was held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987.

(Mc. Inzko, Austria)

The experts' report finalising the modalities for the exchange of data and information agreed to in the Final Declaration was distributed by the President of the Conference to all States parties on 5 May. According to the experts' report, the first exchange of data and information was agreed to take place not later than 15 October 1987 and the President circulated a second note **verbale** at the beginning of this month to ensure that that target date was met by the States parties to the Convention. In this connection, my delegation has noted with satisfaction that an encouraging number of States parties have so far provided the United Nations Secretariat with substantive data, as agreed in the Final Declaration.

The relevant draft resolution prepared by Sweden and Austria follows in consensus language basically the contents of last year's resolution **41/58 A** of 3 December 1986. It takes note with appreciation of the work of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts, noting furthermore with satisfaction that the first **exchange** of information and data, as foreseen in the relevant documents, has commenced.

Allow me finally, on behalf of the President of the Second Review Conference, Ambassador Lang, to express thanks to those States parties to the Convention on bacteriological weapons which have so far participated in the exchange of data and information and all those that intend to do so in the future, thus fulfilling their obligations and helping to build confidence - an element which is one of the cornerstones of international peace and security.

Mr. GUTIERREZ (Costa Rica) (interpretation from Spanish): Since this is the first time my delegation has intervened in the debate in the First Committee, I have great pleasure in extending my warmest congratulations to you, sir, on your work in discharging with efficiency the functions of Chairman of the Committee. I take pleasure in sharing with you and the other officers of the Committee the

(Mr. Gutierrez, Costa Rica)

task of guiding the Committee's work, and we are greatly honoured to have been elected a Vice-Chairman of the Committee at the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

Also, I should like to take this opportunity to express our sincerest thanks to all the delegations which have expressed to us their pleasure, affection, support and congratulations at the honour conferred on the President of Costa Rica on his having been awarded the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize. On behalf of the Costa Rican Head of State, we convey our deepest gratitude.

The award conferred on the President of Costa Rica is interpreted by our Government not only as an honour but also an enormous responsibility. Our country has always wanted to play a role in building a stable and lasting peace in our region. That role is in complete harmony with its expressed will many years ago, which took on a more tangible form in 1948 when our country unilaterally decided to disarm. That event 39 years ago dictates our position with regard to war, peace, disarmament, security and the relationship between disarmament and development, not only with regard to Central America but also to the general subject of disarmament at the world, regional and sub-regional levels.

Our views are especially well defined with regard to the need to achieve general and complete disarmament at the regional level. We do not wish to detract from the importance of nuclear disarmament, which we consider essential for the survival of the human species. The fact is that disarmament for the underdeveloped areas would have a greater social significance, and a larger impact on the possible development of the States of those areas than they could achieve themselves. Disarmament of the large nations, for all its importance for world peace and security, is of major significance for the developing world only to the extent the long-standing desires of the underdeveloped countries can materialise so that a

(Mr. Gutierrez, Costa Rica)

significant part of resources is no longer used to acquire weapons and maintain and deploy armed forces but to promote international development. If that is not achieved, the disarmament of developed nations would be of little significance for us.

Nevertheless, the problems of nuclear disarmament, banning chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction, and even the manufacture or development of weapons to extend war to outer space, should not deter us from our efforts to see conventional disarmament effected at the regional level. While efforts to avoid war are making laborious progress towards attaining agreements to eliminate or limit the production of this type of weapon, it is necessary to make a generalized effective effort to attain conventional disarmament among less developed countries. This could have the same effect of releasing large amounts of resources, but their use would not be governed by the kindness or altruism of developed countries but by the countries achieving such savings.

In the light of those circumstances, it is strange that countries in a region or sub-region of the underdeveloped world are so little inclined to come to the negotiating table to discuss the difficulties of their own disarmament. In comparison, there are many more meetings or negotiations to speak of no disarmament of powerful countries. We expend much energy and resources in words but use few of them to take specific measures that would effectively eliminate the dangers of a weapons build-up in the world.

We should not forget even for a moment that all wars waged in the world thus far have been waged with conventional weapons. Despite information to the effect that in some recent armed conflicts chemical and bacteriological weapons have been used, as have certain devices derived from the development of high technology, the truth of the matter is that this non-conventional war of which we speak so much has not occurred and that, therefore, our efforts have served to avoid it.

(Mr. Gutierrez, Costa Rica)

In our country, we are especially concerned with regional disarmament, because so-called **localized war** has been at the point of being unleashed very near our own **borders**. The international policy defined by our President is based on recognition of the fact that the security of an **unarmed** country like **Costa Rica** is based on an internal policy oriented to the development of a fair social and economic system within an **effective** democracy as much as on an external **regional** policy designed to attain a climate for disarmament, development and security that will avoid a **Conflict** among nations of the Central American isthmus.

In so far as all the nations of that region develop their democratic institutions and create the basis to solve internal **conflicts** through such a **rational** system, we shall then avert for ever the danger of war and establish the basis for a system of international security in which the spectre of mass destruction of men and women will disappear. I believe that this formula is not Only valid for Central America but is also applicable to the whole underdeveloped world. It is for this reason that we believe that it should inspire our efforts for disarmament and enable us to make really effective contributions in this matter.

MK. FISCHER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation wishes to speak on agenda item 66 and more specifically on some points concerning the question of the rationalization of the work of the First Committee.

Yesterday the representative of Denmark, in his statement on the same agenda item, made some comments on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community on improvement of the work of the First Committee, comments which my delegation fully shares. However, since this issue is of special importance to the Federal Republic of Germany, my delegation would like to add some further remarks.

As we said in this Committee at the outset of our debate, the First Committee, in order to fulfil its function of being the appropriate forum for generating new ideas, approaches and initiatives in the field of disarmament, must be enabled to perform this function more effectively than has hitherto been the case.

For us the most important aspect in redressing this situation is the reduction of the number of resolutions. This can be done by concentrating on resolutions that are concrete and can be implemented. Naturally this means that we have to try, whenever possible, to adopt consensus resolutions, which I think offers the greatest possibility for implementation.

The first step in this direction is the reduction of the number of items with which this Committee has to deal. In this context we are convinced that the recommendations made by the Group of 18 on the improvement of the United Nations system indicate the direction in which we should be heading. I quote from recommendation 3 (b), on page 6 of document A/41/49:

"The agenda of the General Assembly should be rationalized by grouping or merging, to the extent possible, related items and by setting an interval of two or more years for the discussion of certain items".

(Mr. Fischer, Federal
Republic of Germany)

We think that what has **been** said of the **United Nations** as a whole **by** the **Group** of **18** applies also to the First Committee since it has proved successful when adopted **by** other Committees of the General Assembly.

Even if it is **not possible** to take one or another item off the agenda of the First Committee, the **number** of resolutions could still be reduced in the **course** of the deliberations **themselves**. We are of the opinion that in the future every draft resolution **should** be thoroughly reviewed in the light of the **following question: is** it necessary for the sake of **progress** in the disarmament field to submit it **this year**, or could it be postponed one or more years, and, if it is submitted, should provisions be made in the operative part for the relevant **agenda item** to be dealt with after a lapse of more than one year?

My delegation is ready to approach from this angle any draft resolution projected or **submitted**.

My Government **is encouraged** that it **does not stand alone** in its wish to remedy the situation. My delegation especially welcomes the lead taken **by** Cameroon - a country with a well-established record of taking initiatives in the field of **improving** the working methods of the United Nations in disarmament affairs - in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.76, on the rationalization of the work of the First Committee. We regard this draft as an excellent basis for solving the problems before us.

We also welcome the fact that the informal group of friends of last year's Chairman of the First Committee, consisting of some previous Chairmen of the committee as well as **representatives** of regional groups, has addressed the problem and considered a number of **interesting proposals**. My delegation notes, **by the way**, that some of these proposals are reflected in Cameroon's draft resolution; it also

(Mr. Fischer, **Federal**
Republic of Germany)

notes that last year's Chairman of the First Committee, Mr. Zachmann, **s**poke at the **beginning** of this session of an emerging convergence of views on certain **aspects**.

These are encouraging signs which show that **this** Committee finally has **recognized** the urgency of the matter, which is **very** well illustrated **by** the number of draft **resolutions** submitted by **Committee** members this year. We have again **been** **able** to set another **record**, with **78** draft resolutions **including** the draft on the Indian Ocean.

In conclusion let me appeal to the members of the Committee to combine our efforts so that the current **very promising** review of the **work** of this **Committee** will lead to true **rationalization** of its work. Let **us** all make this the last year of a record number of draft resolutions.

Mr. AL-KKTAL (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I shall speak in regard to item 68, "Israeli nuclear armament".

Israel's **long-standing** nuclear policy has consistently aimed at developing Israel's nuclear **capabilities** and the use of **such capabilities** for **military** purposes. **This** Israel has sought, sometimes **single-handedly**, sometimes in collaboration with racist South Africa and other countries, to acquire all the nuclear components **required** for the manufacture of materials essential for the production and possession of nuclear **devices** and the **vehicles** needed to launch them **against** specific targets; such vehicles include warplanes and rockets.

There is consensus in the body of **published** literature on the **subject** that Israel does indeed possess the capability to produce nuclear weapons. **Israel**, in fact, has an **arsenal** of nuclear weapons that is shrouded with a mantle of **secrecy** and **ambiguity** created with the help of its friends and **allies**. Thus there has **been** a **successive** series of vague statements and leaks of **ambiguous**, **even** contradictory,

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

information with the aim of creating an atmosphere of fear and terror as part of Israel's scheme to achieve its aggressive and expansionist ambitions in the Arab world.

Israel has long been endeavouring to produce nuclear armaments, beginning in the 1950s, when, during the Administration of the late President Eisenhower, the United States expressed concern over Israeli movements in the nuclear field. Most recently, in 1986, there were reports in The Times of London concerning information supplied by the Israeli technician Mordechai Vanunu after he stopped working on the Dimona reactor and on the testing of the Jericho II rocket. The implications of this information went beyond the Middle East region to affect the Soviet Union, which expressed its concern over those most recent developments. The information on Israel's nuclear capability and its possession of a nuclear arsenal of 100 to 200 nuclear warheads is available from different sources that I shall not cite. There is no need to give all or to quote all our sources.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

Suffice it to refer here to the two reports of the Secretary-General (A/36/431 and A/40/520), and the report submitted to this session (A/42/581), which states:

"While there is wide speculation, Israel itself has neither confirmed nor denied its nuclear capability. As noted in the 1981 study, Israel's nuclear activities, the ambiguity of its statements about its nuclear policy, its refusal either to deny or to confirm reports about its nuclear potential and its unwillingness to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or otherwise accept safeguards on all its nuclear activities have together conveyed the strong impression that it does in fact have the potential to produce nuclear weapons. Although the United Nations does not have conclusive proof that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, circumstantial evidence, together with the factors just cited, would seem to indicate that Israel has developed the necessary technology and has the means to manufacture nuclear weapons, if it so chooses." (A/42/581, para. 50)

I also refer to 'the discussions in the General Assembly over the last few Years, records of the conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the reports leaked from the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and published in a number of mass circulation newspapers, such as the The New York Times and The Washington Post, the news stories carried by several newspapers and magazines, such as Der Spiegel and the Soviet New Times, as well as to publications issued by strategic studies institutes, such as the Centre for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In this connection, it may be useful to refer to the statements made by some Israelis, including Yuv al Ne'eman, world figures like Paul Warnke, the former United States Under-Secretary of State, and other American military experts, such as Tony Crossman, Richard Ziehl and many others.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

The consistent policy of successive Israeli Governments in the nuclear field has been not only to **acquire** nuclear weapons, but, above all, to **spare** no effort and stop at nothing in the drive to make the Israeli entity the **only nuclear** Power in the Middle East and thus making it capable of imposing its terroristic aggressive and expansionist policy on the **countries** of the region. Hence, the Israeli policy proclaimed **quite** openly by Israeli officials of attacking and destroying at will any peaceful nuclear facility Israel considers detrimental to its nuclear hegemony over the region. It was in the context of this malignant policy that the attack against the Iraai nuclear installations was planned and launched on 7 June 1981. It was in line with that policy that the Zionist leaders repeatedly declared their intention to attack time after time nuclear installations that, in their view, would threaten or impair Israel's status as the only nuclear Power in the region. The policy of armed aggression against peaceful **nuclear** installations continues to be an integral component of the overall Israeli nuclear armament policy.

Consequently, at its thirty-first session on 24 September 1987, the General Conference of the IAEA took up the **question** of Israeli nuclear capability and the danger it **poses** and adopted its resolution **GC (XXXI)/RES.470**, in which it called upon Israel, once again, to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the Agency in compliance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The Conference also **requested** the Director-General of IAEA to examine the implementation of General Assembly resolutions **41/93** and **41/12** in so far as they concern the Agency.

Israeli nuclear armament poses a grave threat to international peace and security and is likely to have an extremely negative impact on the international safeguards system and the peaceful uses of nuclear power in general.

(Mt. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

Given the available **information** and data, the United Nations and its **specialized** agencies should make it one of their top priorities to force Israel to **acquiesce** to the will of the international community and thus save the **Middle East region** from the scourge of nuclear proliferation. We also believe the United Nations should **take the necessary action to** enforce its resolutions with **regard to** the Israeli nuclear facilities which are the only major nuclear facilities in the region and Israeli nuclear activities and to subject them to international scrutiny. Those facilities are the only nuclear facilities in the region which have a major nuclear **potential** and are not subject **to international control**.

Iraq, in condemning Israel's nuclear armament policy, wishes to remind the **international** community that dealing with this agenda item is extremely **necessary** in **view** Of Israel's refusal **to** renounce the nuclear option and the continued and growing nuclear threat **Dosed by** Israel's nuclear policy. There is mounting evidence that that policy has become an established Israeli strategy regardless of the dire **consequences** it is sure to entail.

I am pleased, on behalf of Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, **Mauritania, Morocco, Oman,** Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, **the Syrian Arab Republic,** Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, to submit draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.15**, the preamble to which recalls the most important resolutions adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Conferences of the **IAEA** that have a bearing on Israeli nuclear armament and calls upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under **IAEA** safeguards. The most recent of these was resolution **GC(XXXI)/RES.470** adopted by the General Conference of IAEA at its thirty-first session.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraa)

The preamble refers to different United Nations resolutions, the latest of which is resolution **41/93**, in which the General Assembly condemns **collaboration** between the two racist entities in Pretoria and Tel Aviv in **building** their respective nuclear capabilities and the grave threat posed to peace and security in Africa and the Middle East as a result of such collaboration. The last paragraph in the preamble expresses deep concern vis à vis the declared Israeli policy of attacking and destroying at will nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes and the fact that that policy is part and parcel of Israel's overall nuclear armament strategy.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

The most important operative paragraphs in draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.15** are the **following**. First, operative paragraph 1 reiterates the Assembly's condemnation of Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons. This is only natural inasmuch as Israel has failed to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and that **refusal** runs counter to the efforts being made to keep **the** region free **from nuclear weapons**.

Operative paragraph 2 reiterates the condemnation of the co-operation between the racist **régimes in Israel and Pretoria**, despite numerous international calls to discontinue such co-operation and despite the repeated statements by Israeli officials **about the status** of that co-operation. **However**, none of those officials have categorically denied such co-operation in the past, nor have they provided any convincing evidence that such co-operation has ceased.

In operative paragraph 3 the Security Council is requested once more to **take urgent** and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Security Council resolution 487 (1981), in which, inter alia, the Council called upon Israel to comply with Security Council resolutions and to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this connection we would stress that Israel was the only Power to be made the **subject** of such a resolution by the **Security Council**. It therefore **bears sole responsibility** for its implementation.

In operative paragraph 4 all States and organizations that have not yet done so are called upon to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field. **In** so doing they would contribute to saving the region from a nuclear holocaust.

Operative paragraph 5 reiterates the **request** to the International Atomic **Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could** contribute to its nuclear capabilities. That paragraph is in keeping with

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

resolution **470** adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in September 1987.

In operative paragraph 6 the International Atomic Energy Agency is requested to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel may undertake to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

In operative paragraph 7 the Secretary-General is requested further to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

Most of the paragraphs I have cited were contained in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the same item at the forty-first session. We hope that Member States will support **draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.15** this year, as they have done in earlier years.

Mr. HAIDER (Pakistan): In its statement today my delegation will be addressing agenda item 61 concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons, a subject that has been before the General Assembly since 1969. In recent years considerable progress has been made in the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The latest report of the Conference on Disarmament now contains a fairly well developed text of the draft convention on chemical weapons. At the same time it is evident from the rolling text that a number of difficult issues remain, the resolution of which will require compromises on the part of all the parties to the negotiations. If the necessary political will is mustered, the convention could, in our view, be finalized in a matter of one year.

The convention is no longer a distant goal. It is a real possibility. Pakistan is keenly interested in a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons and has been participating fully in *the* negotiations under way at Geneva. While we are gratified at the steady progress

(Mr. Haider, Pakistan)

being made at those negotiations, we also find it disquieting that chemical weapons* are being acquired today by an increasing number of countries. We deeply deplore the use of those weapons in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as reported by the United Nations Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council earlier this year (S/18852). Reports of the use of chemical weapons in other parts of the world have also persisted, but, in the absence of adequate verification machinery, their truth or otherwise cannot be determined. These developments serve to underscore the urgency of concluding an international ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, with effective verification provisions.

My delegation does not underestimate the complexity of some of the issues that remain outstanding, among them the questions of challenge inspection, non-production of nuclear weapons in civilian industry, or of destruction, and organizational matters. All those issues have been extensively discussed in the Conference on Disarmament and, while there has been some narrowing of differences, no solutions have yet been found. Besides those politically difficult problems, it will also be necessary to agree on the details of certain outstanding technical matters. In addition, a number of articles of the proposed convention have still to be considered by the Conference on Disarmament, among them articles X and XI, dealing respectively with assistance and with economic and technological co-operation.

Provisions on challenge inspection will have a central place in the proposed convention, both as a means of providing confidence in its implementation and in order to deter violation. To be effective, those procedures will have to be expeditious, non-discriminatory and mandatory. Although those principles now seem to be generally accepted, the task of translating them into agreed procedure has not been easy. Consultations carried out by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee have led to some convergence of views as regards the initiation of the process of

(Mr. Haider, Pakistan)

challenge inspection, but the crucial question - how to resolve a situation in which the challenging State and the challenged State are unable to agree on how the inspection is to be conducted - remains. In the view of my delegation this is a matter which could appropriately be entrusted to the executive council proposed to be established under the convention. As is generally agreed, time is of the essence in challenge inspection, and if doubts about compliance remain unresolved, confidence in the convention would be seriously undermined and its viability put at stake.

(Mr. Haider, Pakistan)

The organization to be set up under the convention will play a key role in its implementation. Its composition, structure and functions should be based on democratic principles and provide for the representation of States parties in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical and political balance. We are glad that there is today growing support for that approach.

Articles X and XI of the convention are of special importance to the developing countries. My delegation has taken particular interest in article X, dealing with assistance. In that regard, we have submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a detailed proposal envisaging collective measures of assistance to a State party faced with a chemical-weapons threat from another State, whether a party to the convention or not. We feel that credible assurances of assistance could add significantly to the effectiveness of the convention and to its universality and viability.

Equally important are the provisions of the proposed convention concerning economic and technological development. Article XI, which deals with that subject, should, in our view, incorporate the obligation of States parties not to impede international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemical science and technology and ensure that the benefits of research in that field are made freely available to all States without discrimination of any kind.

A lot of hard work remains to be done before we can conclude a chemical-weapons convention. We should therefore utilize every opportunity to carry forward our negotiations. My delegation is looking forward to the forthcoming inter-sessional work of the Conference on Disarmament on this subject. We hope that all other delegations will participate in those negotiations with a sense of urgency and in a spirit of compromise.

(Mr. Haider, Pakistan)

Before I conclude my statement, I should like also to place on record the **satisfaction** of the Pakistan delegation at the results achieved at the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from the States Parties to the Convention on biological weapons, held at Geneva earlier this year. **I t is** our hope that the modalities for the exchange of information **elaborated** at that meeting will **be** widely implemented, thus contributing to promoting confidence amongst States in this important area.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French) : The **following** delegations are scheduled to speak at the next meeting of the First Committee: Kenya, the Central African **Republic**, the **Observer** of the Holy See, **Comoro**, Qatar and Malaysia.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.