



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 22nd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE, AS NECESSARY

Mr. AL SAIDI (Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): As this is my first statement before the First Committee, I should like to convey to you, Sir, the congratulations of the delegation of the Yemen Arab Republic on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of the Committee. It constitutes recognition of your well known diplomatic skill. I wish also to convey my delegation's congratulations to the other Committee officers.

The forty-second session of the General Assembly is taking place at a time when tension is easing in the bilateral relations between the two super-Powers. This has been especially true since the September agreement in principle between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe. My delegation welcomes that agreement. We hope that it will be the first step towards the complete elimination of nuclear terror, and that this détente will be extended to other parts of the world.

In that connection, my delegation welcomes also the agreement between the two super-Powers on beginning full-scale phased negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We urge the super-Powers to implement the Reykjavik agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in their offensive nuclear weapons. My delegation is grateful for the Soviet call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century.

My delegation believes that the militarization of outer space would jeopardize international peace and security. Therefore, the United Nations must give priority attention to the threat that the launching of military objects into space would pose to the security of non-space Powers. The Organization should focus also on the

ecological and environmental **threat** which thr **militarization** of **outer space** poses to our planet. We hope the two **super-Powers** will not monopolixr the future of outer • pacrj their **space programmer** should be aonzidered as an **aspect of** multilateral **disarmament** negotiatior.

Military expenditures are increasing daily, thus **thrratrnng** future economic and **social** devrlopment **world wide**. Statistics zhov uz that annual military budgetz now total \$1 trillion. Thin spiral could be **broken** by a total prohibition on nuclear weaponz and their **poliferation**, and by proven ting the spread of the arms race to outer **space**.

In the **same vein**, we believe that the **money and effort** now **employed to** **increase** the effectiveness of conventional weapons could usefully be **diverted to** thu el tmination of poverty , ignorance and **disease** in the wor ld - man's main enemies. There is no logic in the **argument** of **the major Powers**, which demand that **other countr** iea comply wj th the provisiona of the **Treaty** on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear **Weapons** and place **thei** nuclear reactors under international safeguards, while the two **super-Powers** continue **their relentless** efforts through nuclear tests to improve their nuclear **arsenale** qualitatively and quantitatively, and deploy nuclear **missiles** in regions distant from **their own** territory. That is a **cause of** insecurity for many States, which must therefore try to possess the **weapons of** destruction and thia **depletes** their **resources**. Some countries imagine they will find **security** in thia **vicious** circle.

My delegation maintains **that** the only one way to break that vicious circle is as follow8 : First, all States, including Israel and **South Africa**, must become **parties** to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of **Nuclear Weapons** and must **place** all their nuclear reactors under International **Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** safeguards. Secondly, non-nuclear **States** must **have** full **quarantees** that **force**, including nuclear force, will not he used in the settlement of disputes. **Thirdly**, nuclear-weapon-free zones must **be established**.

(Mr. Al-Jabiri, Yemen)

My delegation welcomes the Treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatolco and supports the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Africa and South-East Asia.

The Middle East region is fraught with danger. That is why my delegation supported resolution 41/48 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. We believe in that lofty principle and wish to save our region from the scourge of destructive war.

But these efforts are obstructed by Israel, which continues its nuclear programme and refuses to subject it to international safeguards. Each year, Israel joins the consensus on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; it declares that it will not be the first State to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. If that is true, why does Israel not subject its nuclear reactors to international safeguards? Why does it not end its nuclear collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa?

A report of the Secretary-General makes it clear, beyond any doubt, that Israel has crossed the nuclear-weapon threshold. That report goes on to say that "Israel appears to have a posture of deliberate ambiguity on this subject, which has contributed considerably to the alarm in the region and to the concern of the world community". (A/36/431, annex, para. 80)

(Mr. Al Shidi, Yemen)

With regard to transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace free of nuclear weapons, the Deputy Premier of my country stated our position in the General Assembly on 8 October, as follows:

“The Yemen Arab Republic reiterates its rejection of any military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea and again expresses its support for transforming the Indian Ocean region into a zone of permanent peace and security, free from nuclear weapons.” (A/42/PV.30, p. 51-55)

Therefore my delegation supports holding the Conference on the Indian Ocean as soon as possible, so that the Indian Ocean States and others concerned can agree on the creation of a zone of peace and security there.

My delegation looks forward to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament early next year. On this occasion it wishes to express the hope that at that session the General Assembly will focus its attention on the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

My country also welcomes the international efforts being made in the context of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva to agree on a treaty to end the development and proliferation of chemical weapons. It has been proved that chemical weapons are no less dangerous than nuclear weapons.

Mr. BALACHEV (Bulgaria): Today the Bulgarian delegation wishes to dwell on the work of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly on the questions of a nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. My country attaches major importance to the Conference on Disarmament owing above all to the mandate entrusted to that unique multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations.

As is known, however, the present situation is unsatisfactory in so far as the Conference has become another deliberative organ where no substantive consideration

(Mr. Halachev, Bulgaria)

is given to a number of priority disarmament issues. The strengthening of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Conference on Disarmament is a matter of interest, not only to the members of the Conference, but to all States Members of the United Nations as well. At its forthcoming third special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly should pay particular attention to this problem. Bulgaria is ready to join the efforts to identify ways and means of intensifying the work of the Conference and particularly to strengthen its efficiency on all agenda items.

We endorse the proposal that the Conference should work throughout the year, with several intermissions, with a view to becoming a permanent universal organ for disarmament negotiations. That would be a practical reaffirmation of the democratic principle that all States have the right and responsibility to contribute to making progress in the disarmament process.

I should like now to turn to the specific disarmament issues that are the subject of my statement. It is the view of the People's Republic of Bulgaria that the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be an extremely important disarmament measure in its own right. This is a matter of the highest priority in the context of efforts to prohibit the development, production and improvement of nuclear weapons, to achieve their reduction and ultimate elimination, and to prevent the deployment of space-strike weapons.

Along with other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, Bulgaria looks upon the readiness for an early conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as proof of the defensive character of any military doctrine, and it calls for the immediate initiation of comprehensive talks with a view to reaching concrete agreements to that end. We also fully share the opinion of the Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, as underlined in his

(Mr. Halachev, Bulgaria)

message addressed to the Conference on **Disarmament**, that all efforts should be made to draft a **treaty** on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and that new and innovative proposals **will be necessary to provide the** crucial momentum for efforts to that end.

Guided by their **desire to facilitate the opening of** comprehensive substantive negotiations, the socialist countries have submitted to the **Conference on Disarmament** a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". The document offers **radically** new approaches to the key **issues** of prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, as is evidenced also by the **envisaged** comprehensive **verification measures** which range in scope from announcing the location of testing **sites** to establishing an institution of international inspectors who will carry out on-site **inspections**.

Bulgaria welcomes **the** agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States of **America** to start comprehensive negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing. We expect early positive results **from** those talks.

However, this should **not** doom the **Conference on Disarmament** to inaction. Bilateral negotiations and multilateral efforts to draft a comprehensive international treaty should **go** hand in hand and complement each **other**. Therefore, it is **essential** that an ad hoc committee within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should start functioning **without** delay with the mandate of ensuring practical **progress** in the elaboration of a **multilateral** treaty on the **complete** prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The prevention of an arms race in **outer space** is one of the paramount **tasks** of our age. The deliberations in the General **Assembly**, as well as in this **Committee**, have shown most **convincingly** that **the urgency** of this question is increasing. The overwhelming majority of Member States is categorically opposed to the deployment of weapons in **outer space** in any form or **under any pretext** whatsoever. It is well

(Mr. Halachev, Bulgaria)

known that space weapons cannot eliminate nuclear arms; on the contrary, their introduction would intensify the nuclear arms race, particularly in strategic weapons. The deployment of space-strike weapons would not strengthen security and stability but would sharply destabilize the international situation and increase the risk of nuclear war. Therefore efforts to revise the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM Treaty) and adopt its so-called broad interpretation are of particular concern to us. Such a step would have the same destructive effect and unpredictable negative consequences as the outright denunciation of the ABM Treaty.

Of particular concern also is the reported redirection of the strategic defence initiative programme towards intensified preparations for the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defence in the near future. As reported in the June issue of Arms Control Today, there have been drastic budgetary reassignments within the strategic defence initiative programme in favour of off-the-shelf technologies, particularly kinetic weapons.

The threat of early deployment of space-strike weapons, which would precipitate a new and even more dangerous round of the arms race, is growing more real. There can be only one conclusion: fresh efforts, statesmanship and common sense are needed to eliminate this threat.

(Mr. Halachev, Bulgaria)

The deliberations on this issue indicate that the existing international legal régime concerning outer space is a practical and effective one, providing a relatively broad and effective basis for arms control in outer space. As the vast majority of Member States have pointed out, that régime cannot, however, fully ensure the effective prevention of an arms race in outer space. The adoption of a strict universal ban on the deployment of any weapons in outer space would be the most realistic and pragmatic way of providing such a guarantee. Any such agreement could be further strengthened by a reliable verification system.

Of particular interest in this respect is the Soviet proposal to establish an international system to verify the non-deployment of any weapons in outer space, including the establishment of an international inspectorate. The permanent presence of inspection teams at all launching sites, as well as other organizational structures which could be created within the framework of the proposed verification system, would ensure the full confidence of States parties that all channels for the deployment of weapons in outer space have been reliably closed,

A number of partial measures could be undertaken with a view to paving the way for a comprehensive treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, such as the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons, the non-use of force against objects in outer space, and so on.

The Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament under its agenda item 5 entitled, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", has been functioning for three years now. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee clearly demonstrate that its mandate has already been exhausted and no longer corresponds to the responsibilities entrusted to the Conference. It is necessary for the Ad Hoc Committee, from its next session on, to focus its efforts on existing proposals and future initiatives relating to the scope of prohibition and verification, as

(Mr. Balachev, Bulgaria)

well as on the definition of some basic terms. It is essential that the negotiations on such an important issue should be **conducted** on a practical basis. In our view, **the** adequate structuring of the working programme of the Ad Hoc Committee would facilitate the early achievement of concrete positive results.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria has consistently supported the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. Reviewing the **work** of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament under that agenda item, **my** delegation wishes to emphasize that it has **made** headway in its work this year. **At the same time** I should like to convey our regret that it has not been possible to elaborate a convention before the end of 1987.

The plans **to** begin the production of binary chemical **weapons**, particularly at a time when we **seem to be** close to a solution of the **most** complicated problems concerning the convention, are fraught with the danger of hampering and **slowing** down the negotiations.

Equally contradictory is the proposal that States parties have the right to **retain** and, if necessary, replenish their so-called national-security stockpiles during the 10-year period allowed for the destruction of existing stocks. **As** a number of delegations have already **emphasized**, that idea is not only contrary to the essence of the Convention under consideration but, if adopted, could encourage the proliferation of **chemical** weapons.

We also call for the resolution without delay of the problems concerning the order in which chemical weapons should be destroyed during the 10-year period. We are convinced, however, that absolutely equal security for States during that period in any particular region or throughout the world cannot **be** achieved by the production of additional chemical weapons or by delaying their destruction. Stocks of chemical weapons, once declared and placed under international control as

(Mr. Halachev, Bulgaria)

prescribed by the convention, will be completely different in status from stockpiles of any other weapon not subject to destruction under any international instrument. In a way, those stocks will be inoperative. Therefore, it is our view that there is no objective necessity for any State party to maintain or produce any stocks of chemical weapons if, after declaration of its inventory of chemical weapons 30 days after the convention enters into force, it finds itself with no or insufficient arsenals of chemical weapons.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria supports the Soviet concept of on-site challenge inspections in its entirety, that is, the inspections shall apply to any and all objects and locations on the territory of a State party or under its jurisdiction or control, including those belonging to a physical or loyal subject of a State party, regardless of its location,

We view the proposal to codify the principle of challenge inspections which cannot be refused as a contribution to real and effective verification,

There have been other achievements in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, in particular its unanimity concerning the need to establish a preparatory commission, the additional texts of the draft convention that have been agreed upon, and so on. Visits to facilities relating to the destruction of chemical weapons will also contribute to building mutual confidence and trust. In this connection I would like to mention the visit to the military facility at Shikhany at the invitation of the Soviet Union.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria calls for the intensification of negotiations and for conferring upon the Ad Hoc Committee a mandate that would provide for the elaboration of the final draft of the convention. In our view the achievement of that ultimate goal is a matter of months, provided that there exists political will on the part of all interested States.

(Mr. Halachev, Bulgaria)

In conclusion I would like to recall that, on the way towards a global
 • ottlomont of the problem of prohibition of chemical weapons, Bulgaria has
 undertaken **certain additional** steps. Along with the Socialist **Republic of Romania**,
 my **country** is **the** co-rponror of the initiative to • stabliah ☉ ochemical-weapon-free
zone in the Balkans.

Late last year the Council of **Ministers** of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
 adopted a **decree** imposing **certain restrictions** on the export of chemicals for
peaceful purposes which could **also be** used for the production of chemical **weapons**.

My **country** will continue to **exert** unflagging **efforts** to bring about the
 construotivr settlement of all problems **related** to the complete prohibition and
 destruction of chemical weapons.

Mr. TANAS IE (Romania): Our earlier statement was devoted to an **urgent**
issue of crucial importance, namely, the **elimination of medium- and shorter-range**
nuclear missiles in Europe **and** in other regions of the world.

The extremely positive influence **ruah a measure would have on the whole**
process of disarmament and on the international political climate cannot be ignored
 or **questioned**.

We welcome the fact that both the USSR and the **United States** of America **are**,
as one of their representatives **has stated**, "almost there" **as Car** as a **final** text
 of the treaty eliminating **such missiles is** concerned, **and** we hope that the two
 ooun tr **ies w** ill soon proceed dur inq this year, **as was** stated earlier, with the
 actual **conclusion** of a treaty on that matter.

(Mr. Tanae ie, Roman ia)

My delegation therefore regards as more relevant, than over the decision adopted last week by the General Assembly urging the two sides to spare no efforts in achieving this year the objectives set forth in their statement of September and reaffirmed at the recent Moscow meeting,

It has been stated in the Committee that it would be a serious error to allow the sense of optimism to cloud a realistic, sober assessment of the global security situation. Indeed, the world situation is particularly serious and complex. The arms race has assumed disturbing proportions. Nuclear tests aimed at the steady development of weapons of mass destruction are still going on. Far from diminishing, the conflicts, crises and hotbeds of tension in various parts of the world have even worsened. The policy of force or threat of force and gross interference in the internal affairs of other States goes on unabated. The persisting world economic crisis affects all States, but its adverse effects are being felt primarily by the developing countries, whose situation is already dramatic. In the view of Romania and of President Nicolae Ceausescu, the sole compelling alternative at present is to reverse the dangerous course of events and to bar the road that leads to a nuclear catastrophe. A new world war is inconceivable, for it would mean practically the annihilation of life on our planet, hence the need to denounce once and for all the false concept held by some nuclear-weapon States, that nuclear weapons strengthen security and contribute to the maintenance of peace.

The fundamental problem of our time is to halt the arms race and to proceed resolutely to disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, because defending the right of peoples and individuals alike to a better life or to the pursuit of happiness necessarily implies, as a basic prerequisite, defending their right to life and to a free and dignified existence.

(Mr. Tanarie, Romania)

TO make real advancement on the road to nuclear disarmament and to promote the ultimate objective of complete disarmament under international control is a very complex process, and no one should minimize the difficulties such an exercise may encounter. Far from inspiring resignation, the situation rather suggests an increased participation by all States in the disarmament process. Since nuclear weapons threaten the whole world and since the problem of peace affects all peoples, all States must take a clear stand and contribute to seeking effective action to promote disarmament. We believe that it is high time to move on from words to deeds. It is high time to translate good intentions into real and lasting agreements capable of halting the arms race on Earth and in outer space.

That is the spirit in which I wish to express my delegation's views on some of the items under consideration. My first remark is of a more general nature and concerns the current approach to the disarmament process. We may regard as a positive asset the fact that, within the framework of the recent disarmament deliberations, a prevailing consensus seems to be emerging around some basic conceptual elements,

First, there is a general recognition that in a future world war - which would inevitably be a nuclear war - there would be neither winners nor losers. Nuclear weapons would pay no heed to differing social régimes, and such a conflict would virtually annihilate our planet.

Secondly, it appears that a similar recognition exists as to the need to deal with conventional weapons, which continue to be the main tools for waging wars and military intervention in various parts of the world. In addition, progress in nuclear disarmament, which is the priority concern, appears to require concrete action to cut conventional forces and armaments.

Thirdly, there is a growing willingness to direct the main disarmament effort towards regions where the greatest arsenals do exist and where the nerve of

(Mr. Tanaa la, Roman la)

confrontation. Liar. The relaxation of tension in Europe by implement in confidence-building and disarmament measures would not necessarily result in disseminating confrontation and arm4 accumulation in other regions of the world.

Lastly, disarmament is by its nature a global major issue of today's international life, and its solution could not be viewed outside the efforts to get to a resolution of such other equally global and major issues as development and the maintenance of international security.

Basing our position on the new realities, of which I have mentioned just a few elements, we believe that a new approach to disarmament problems is necessary and possible. Such an approach is to find its expression in a complex programme of disarmament along the lines of the programme being considered by the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

In our view, the complex feature of that programme would permit better co-ordination and correlation between various global and partial spheres of disarmament by subordinating them to the single goal of general and complete disarmament. The formulation of such a complex programme on the basis of proposals from all States would make it possible to take into account the interests of all countries, thus ensuring their right to equal security. The programme should include and stimulate the disarmament efforts of States at the global, regional, bilateral and unilateral levels. Negotiations based on the principles contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be so ordered as to develop simultaneously on several levels, influencing one another with a view to identifying new disarmament measures.

Because it would include measures for the reduction of military expenditures and armed forces, the programme would also stress the interdependence between disarmament and development. It is obvious that any reduction in the burden of

(Mr. Tanasie, Romania)

military expenditures can lead to an increase in the human and material **resources** available to carry out economic and **social development programmes** for the benefit of all **countries**, in particular the developing **countries**.

The formulation of such a programme can be accomplished only with the participation of all **states**. That is why we favour **intensified negotiations** at the **Conference** on Disarmament at Geneva on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament and still believe that the third **special session** of the **General Assembly** devoted to disarmament would call for a **sustained process** for its **finalization**.

My second **remark** relates to the **urgent** need to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race. While **discussions** and negotiations are going on concerning the actual reduction of nuclear weapons, the **prohibition** of chemical **weapons** and a **possible** cut in conventional forces and armaments, we should not **lose** sight of the equally urgent need to **engage** in negotiations on measures meant to **neutralize** the self-propelling engine that keeps the arms race in a **spiral**. For it would be a deep delusion, and indeed a historic error, to applaud and encourage the reduction or elimination of certain classes of weapons while other systems, even **more** sophisticated and dangerous in their destabilizing effects, are to be developed and deployed.

In this context, my **delegation** welcomes the agreement reached by the USSR and the United States to begin full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on the nuclear-arms issue **before** 1 December 1987.

(Mr. Tanaa Ie, Romania)

Never **theless**, bearing in mind the crucial importance a test ban would have for inhibiting the **arms race**, we believe that **measures** are needed immediately. That is why **the President of Romania**, in formulating the **recommendations and proposals concerning the major issues before the General Assembly at its forty-second session, stressed** the need for the **Assembly to urge nuclear-weapon States, primarily** the United States and the Soviet Union, to halt nuclear testing and any other activities designed to develop and improve nuclear **weaponry**.

The production of *ever more advanced weaponry* has, unfortunately, been a constant **characteristic of the arms race**. **But at the present stage an extremely dangerous fact** is that the application of the **most recent developments** in science and technology to military purposes is increasing the scope of **the arms race** and its harmful **effects** on society as a whole. All this **casts doubt on the very** relevance of the entire concept of **disarmament and even arms control** as instruments for enhancing the peace and security of States.

The **arguments** adduced to **justify** the programme of placing new **strategic-weapon** systems in **outer space** are no longer convincing, for in the nuclear era the security of all States, including **the nuclear States**, is not a problem of technological supremacy **but** is rather a political problem. **From its inception**, the decision to **move** towards the development of **space-based strategic** systems has been **seen as a source** of **mistrust, tension and animosity**.

In ever growing numbers, **politicians and** experts are coming to believe that the development of **weapon systems** for **outer space** would destabilise international relations. In fact, even the intention of **placing** such systems in **outer space** **increases the danger** of the use of nuclear **weapons** either because of a superiority or inferiority complex, or by **accident**.

(Mr. Tanata ie, Romania)

ALSO, the militarisation of outer space is a factor that stimulates the technological improvement of conventional weapons; it is no accident that in the context of the development of space weapons there is increasing talk about the need to strengthen and modernise conventional stockpiles. We should like to take this opportunity to reaffirm Romania's firm position against any measure aimed at the militarisation of outer space, and to state that all nations should be allowed to make use of outer space solely for peaceful purposes.

In that connection, we support the convening under United Nations auspices of an international conference on the question of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. That conference should be entrusted with drawing up a programme for the use of outer space and space technology for the benefit of the economic and social development of all countries, first and foremost the developing countries. It should also adopt a treaty in that field and create a special body within the United Nations to deal with questions relating to outer space.

In a broader context, we are of the opinion that the time is ripe for the United Nations to deal seriously with the deep implications of progress in modern science and technology for international relations as a whole in the coming decades, and to adopt appropriate measures to ensure that scientific research will be used solely in the interest of the peace and development of all peoples.

We believe also that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament cannot escape addressing this subject and that it must devise measures to restrain research and technological development for military purposes.

My third remark concerns the enormous resources squandered each year to produce deadly weapons. The recent International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was as clear as possible on that subject. In one of the consensus conclusions contained in its Final Document it is stated that

(Mr. Tanar ie , Roman ia)

"The continuing arm8 race is ● b8orbing far too great a proportion of the world'8 human, financial, natural and technological resources, placing a heavy burden on the economies of all countrie8 and affecting the international flow of trade, f inance and technology, in addition to hindering the process of confidence-building among S ta tes. The global military expenditure8 are in dramatic contrast to ● conomio and social underdevelopment and to the misery and poverty afflicting more than two third8 of mankind". (A/CONF.130/39, section II, para. 3)

The Conternnoe further found that

"The relationship between disarmament and development in part derives from the fact that the continuing global arm8 race and development compete for the same finite resources at both the nation81 and international Levels. The allocation of massive resources for armament8 impede8 the pursuit of development to it8 optimal level.

"Considering the present resource constraint8 of both developed and developing countries, reduced world military spending could contribute significantly to development . . . , promoting equitable economic and technological co-operation and . . . pursuing the objective6 of a new international economic order". (paras 10-11)

I have quoted the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development with the intention of expressing, in words agreed upon by consensus, the basic concern8 which over the years have sustained the initiatives, proposals and unilateral measures undertaken by Romania on the subject of freezing and reducing military budgets. It is wi th a sense of urgency that we again call on all countries, and in particular on those States with the Largest military arsenals, to devoke increased attention to this matter.

(Mr. Tanase, Romania)

A8 is well known, Romania, together with Sweden, has taken the initiative within the United Nations of identifying the principles governing the activities of States in negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures. These principles are intended to harmonise the views of States and promote the commencement of negotiations on concrete measures to freeze and reduce military spending.

Although the Disarmament Commission tried again this year to find an acceptable formulation for the remaining principle, which relate to transparency and the communication of data, it was not successful in adopting the entire set of principles as a whole. We hope to finalize our work soon, bearing in mind the positive developments in the positions of some States, which now recognise transparency as a relevant principle.

The Commission will probably have to take up this subject again, given the expectation that the developments to which I have alluded will consolidate themselves and the greater readiness in various quarters to face the evident need to end military spending. At this session, my delegation will submit a draft resolution to that effect as well.

Meanwhile, we cannot but emphasize the importance of the appeal the General Assembly addresses year after year to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

(Mr. TANGU, Romania)

The final remark I should like to make relates to the multilateral disarmament machinery. As I said at the beginning of my statement, the lack of concrete results in the dialogue between the two great Powers must not lead to resignation. On the contrary, such a state of affairs demands that all the world's States, where Europe is concerned, all European States - not and • DUW their direct responsibilities in order to promote disarmament and peace.

Participation by all States in the disarmament process calls for maximum use of the multilateral democratic mechanism of debate and negotiation in the field of disarmament, based on the principle of the equality of all States, as • rtabR)Lrh@d by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Tanasie, Romania)

In this context, we firmly believe that the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should solemnly reaffirm the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and set forth measures to involve the multilateral forums even further in a meaningful debate on disarmament.

The United Nations should effectively direct its efforts towards promoting the political will of all States, first and foremost the nuclear-weapon and other strongly armed States, in order to arrive at concrete agreements for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament.

It is unacceptable that, on the pretext of financial difficulties, ideas or proposals are put forward to reduce the activities of the multilateral mechanism in the field of disarmament, especially at this crucial time which calls for the intensification of all such activities.

There is a compelling need to act in a constructive spirit at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament taking into account existing proposals, in order to reach a **successful** conclusion of negotiations on questions on the agenda of the Conference, in particular the drawing up of an international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

It is also necessary to keep increasing the role and usefulness of the Disarmament Commission's activities and to improve the organization of its work so as to reflect the pressing need for concrete action to promote negotiations on disarmament agreements.

The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs would, in the future, be called upon to play an increasing role in assisting the process of **disarmament**. We

(Mr. Tanasie, Romania)

take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. yasushi Akashi on his appointment as its head and express our confidence that, under his guidance, the Department will, within the limits of existing resources, find the ways and means to stimulate and **multiply** the efficiency of its staff.

The views put forward by my delegation in the context of our deliberations are based on the need to make a joint effort to **take** a qualitative turn in our activities and promote genuine negotiations on effective disarmament **measures** - first and foremost nuclear disarmament measures. Such an objective is realistic because it is at the very root of the will clearly expressed by the peoples of the world to live in peace and **devote** their efforts and resources to free and independent **development**, safe from the threat of war.

Mr. BATIOUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian) : My delegation wishes today to address the item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In 1985, in starting the Soviet-United States dialogue on nuclear and space armaments, both parties - at the highest **level** - undertook to speed up negotiations *on* preventing an arms race in outer space and ending it on Earth, limiting and reducing nuclear weapons and strengthening strategic stability. This agreed formula for negotiations was no accident. It was the accumulation of the experience of **many years** of negotiations and represented a mutually acceptable basis for ensuring progress in disarmament with neither side trying to achieve military super **ior** ity.

The genuine role *of* the negotiations for strengthening international security through disarmament is to prevent an arms race in **outer** space and end it on Earth. The role is not to substitute one kind of arms race for another but rather to keep

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outer space peaceful by not deploying weapons there and to reduce the number Of weapons while at the **same** time maintaining parity at the level of reasonable sufficiency .

Down through the **centuries**, from the very beginning of technical progress, more and more advanced weapons of destruction have been used to defend man and **to ensure the security** of **States**. As a result of the improvements in military technology, each time military actions have taken place, greater and greater **numbers** of the peaceful population hve per **ished**. Finally, in our time, military technology has reached a level where war **using** nuclear weapons will spare no one.

Today's weapons leave *no* State any hope of defending the lives of its population through military technology. This upsurge of new and ever-newer **weapons** in outer space, according to Star Wars plans, will significantly increase the probability of that destructive military technology will move from its present state **of** being on the brink of war to the state of being over the brink, and mankind would move from a situation of struggling for survival to a situation of non-existence. It would be illogical and useless to try with one hand to curb the arms race and with the other to open the door to some space Powers thus enabling them to break into outer space with weapons that would constantly hang over the heads of all States and would not add any feeling of security or inspire **any** gratitude towards the creators of such evil projects.

The fact that the arms race is being established in outer space under the title of strategic **"defense"** initiative cannot deceive anyone. Even on Earth this is being carried **out** under the heading of **"defense"**. The reality is that the establishment and the **development** of Star Wars weapons will inevitably crank up the arms race in every direction. **It** is therefore **necessary from** the outset **to** impose an effective international ban on space weapons.

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Why is the United States so insistent on working on the idea of building and deploying space weapon systems? Officials in Washington have stated repeatedly that they are not going to embark on any negotiations to limit their defense initiative, since they have the prospects for a defensive system which will make nuclear missiles practically obsolete. One may recall the statement of United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who said, referring to SDI, that if the United States were able to build such a system which would be effective and which would make Soviet weapons ineffective, the United States would be obliged to go back to a situation when the United States was the only country with the nuclear weapon. Thus, the real goal pursued by the advocates of transferring the arms race into outer space is the achievement of unilateral superiority.

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On 22 October of this year, the very same day on which the representative of the United States, **Mr. David Emery**, assured us that the strategic defence initiative promises to strengthen international security and strategic stability, one could find in America completely opposite assessments of the efforts by the United States Administration to sow a minefield of near-earth space-strike Weapons at any cost. In explaining to its readers why an agreement to reduce strategic missiles is impossible when the implementation of the strategic defence initiative **is** under way, The New York Times, in an editorial, wrote:

"There is no way the Russians will agree to reductions if they fear their remaining offensive missiles will be negated by an imminent **American** defence system. Apprehensions will be acute if they judge that system too half-baked to **resist** an initial attack, but possibly effective against a ragged Soviet retaliation - in other words, as the shield to accompany an American first strike. Moscow may also fear the use of space-based weapons as part of a first strike." (The New York Times, 22 October 1987, p. A34)

As YOU can see, defence stabilization and the peaceful mask of the strategic defence initiative all fall away when these things are viewed in the light of common logic. For us it is quite clear that the strategic defence initiative is a new stage in the arms race. It is an attempt to achieve strategic superiority by **rejecting** the limitations required by the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. It is also totally clear to us that the road to true security is to be found not by adding new types of weapons, especially weapons accessible only to a few space Powers, but rather by limiting and reducing armaments under strict international verification allowing for no loopholes. The Soviet-American anti-ballistic-missile (**ABM**) Treaty of 1972, which was concluded for the purpose of limiting the strategic nuclear-arms race, is obviously a necessary component of the process of reducing strategic weapons as well.

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Along with many delegations who have stated the positions of their governments at this session, the Ukrainian SSR advocates strict observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty by both sides and calls for the adoption by both parties of mutual obligations not to break out of that Treaty for at least **10 years**. Paragraph 1 of Article V of the **ABM** Treaty binds the signatories not

“to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based .”

For more than 10 years no ambiguity has been found in that provision of the Treaty, and it was **only** after 1983, when the United States announced its plans to construct the strategic defence system, did there appear the so-called broad interpretation of the Treaty - an interpretation so broad that the provision neither to develop, test or **deploy** is **now** interpreted to mean the exact opposite.

At the Reykjavik summit meeting last year and during the past week in **MOSCOW**, we have once again had confirmation that the United States strategic defence initiative, along with the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, are the main obstacle to reducing all the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States of America. Such a reduction is essential to the ending of the nuclear-arms race and to taking meaningful and **substantial** steps to eliminate the nuclear threat. Without an agreement on strict observance of the ABM Treaty there can be no agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons,

At the same time, the Moscow meeting demonstrated that **this** year there **is** indeed a chance of concluding an agreement on **medium-** and short range missiles. Work is also going on with regard to the problems involved in the **strict verification** of the provisions of that agreement, and for that specific measures have been proposed by the Soviet side to find mutually **satisfactory** solutions on the whole complex of **interrelated** questions concerning a radical reduction in

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strategic weapons, linked to the observance of the ABM Treaty. A great contribution to the solution of the problem of the demilitarization of outer space could be made through multilateral negotiating machinery. The Conference on Disarmament could continue its fine tradition of preparing international agreements on outer space after giving the relevant negotiating mandate to its Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. There is a solid basis for business-like and purposeful work on a multilateral basis. The initiatives of the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty banning the deployment of any type of weapons in outer space continue to be timely, as does the conclusion of a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth. These have been submitted to the United Nations for consideration.

Other countries represented in the Conference on Disarmament have submitted interesting proposals, and suggestions have been made with regard to partial measures of disarmament as well. Such partial measures could lead to a ban on the deployment of weapons in outer space. The Conference on Disarmament could begin drafting an international agreement to ensure the immunity of artificial earth satellites, which carry no weapons of any kind.

Moreover, it is important to seek ways to prevent the introduction of new anti-satellite systems and to eliminate those that already exist. We hope the Conference will consider the proposals made by the USSR on verification measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. These proposals include the establishment of an international system of verification to maintain the peaceful status of outer space and provides for the permanent presence of inspectors at all facilities for launching objects into outer space, as well as for making available to them all pertinent data about launches and about objects being launched.

The Conference on Disarmament is a unique multilateral negotiating body that can draft the text of a multilateral treaty or agreements on all aspects of

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preventing An arms race in outer Space. The report of the Conference on Disarmament contains enough information to convince us that its Ad Hoc Committee on outer space could begin work on these items in 1988. A now upward spiral in the arms race, in outer space, is in our opinion inherent in the concept of Star Wars. There is A need for broad co-operation among all States in developing and researching outer space for peaceful purposes.

The proposals made last Aummrr by the Soviet Union pave the way for such co-operation. I am referring to its suggestion that the international community consider A Atop-by-stop programme for joint Action in the peaceful conquest of outer space. At the heart of that suggestion is the convening of An international conference or A special session of the General Assembly to consider the problem of space In all its aspects. The proposal also calls for the ● rthlirhmont of a world space organization and for the drafting of a plan of international co-operation for the 1990s and for 10 to 15 years beyond that.

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It is necessary to focus efforts on solving such social and economic development problems common to all countries as those relating to communications, navigation, rescue, remote sensing of the Earth, studying and protecting the environment, creating a world-wide meteorological service, and developing new materials and technologies.

The leading space Powers could help create an international centre for joint research on and production of various kinds of space technology at the request of developing countries; that idea would open vast possibilities for joint efforts by States in the peaceful conquest of outer space.

The major space Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union - have a special role to play in the peaceful conquest of outer space. Surely everyone remembers the handshake in space between Soviet and United States cosmonauts, on 17 July 1975, in Earth orbit. That handshake was a genuine symbol of the fact that with good will and an awareness of their responsibilities, the USSR and the United States can find areas of large-scale, mutually beneficial co-operation, with a view to going beyond the boundaries of purely bilateral interests.

In that context, we welcome the new Soviet-United States agreement on co-operation in the study and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, signed on 15 April this year. In our view, this is a serious contribution to strengthening the basis for the peaceful conquest of outer space.

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind, and all mankind must share common interests there. These are contrary to the interests only of those for whom the arms race is good business and who want to achieve military dominance by using outer space. We intend to defend this view of ours with all our strength.

Mr . MN STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany) : During the general debate in the First Committee this year , nearly all speakers have expressed their appreciation of the most encouraging developments in the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations. We whole-heartedly ~~welcome~~ the agreement in principle reached by the United States of America and the USSR on the conclusion of a treaty on the world-wide elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear forces, that is nuclear missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. We hope that treaty will. be signed in the near future. we have likewise noted with satisfaction the ~~commi tment~~ by both parties to ~~wor k~~ for an early agreement on drastic reductions in their strategic offensive arms.

Today I should like to draw attention to another area in which this year's developments give rise to optimism: the substantial progress made in the negotiations on a world-wide ban on chemical weapons justifies the hope that an early agreement is possible. My Government attaches the highest priority to achieving a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, ~~acqui si~~ tion, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. It is high time ~~the~~ human race were free from these inhumane, cruel and insidious weapons. We ~~are~~, furthermore, appalled by the recent violations of the 1925 Geneva ~~Protocol~~, which were unambiguously established by United Nations fact-f ~~inding~~ mission. ~~We~~ are also very concerned at the reported proliferation of chemical weapons. These developments make an early , effective and global ban on chemical weapons even more urgent.

The negotiations on chemical weapons that are being conducted in the Conference on Disarmament have, this year, under the ~~very~~ able chairmanship of Ambassador ~~Ekeus~~, brought us considerably closer to a convention. Cm a number of ~~impor~~ tant issues, in particular in the field of verification, a convergence of views has been brought about..

(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal
Republic of Germany)

We may be satisfied with what has been achieved so far this year. However, there is no reason for complacency. A lot of work remains to be done and a number of technical and very complex issues need to be resolved. We are called upon to intensify our efforts to work out effective and acceptable solutions, in particular with regard to the verification of a global ban on chemical weapons.

The important agreement in principle achieved this year on mandatory challenge inspections must be translated into reliable treaty provisions. A number of complex details and political decisions have to be tackled in doing so.

The monitoring of the chemical industry is another area which requires particular attention from the negotiators in Geneva. The possibility of use of a given chemical for military purposes should be the decisive criterion.

Non-production controls are to make sure that no chemical weapons are produced after the coming into force of a convention. The verification mechanism which has to be established to that end must be manageable and effective. It should not place any undue or unjustified burden on the chemical industry. The future development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes must not be interfered with.

Bearing in mind that verifiability is of paramount importance for the viability of a convention and for building the confidence necessary for entering into an agreement, we must ascertain that the verification system under consideration assures all parties to a convention of compliance and permits clarification of any situation which could be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about compliance.

(Mr. von Stulpnagel, Federal
Republic of Germany)

Apart from the problem of working out the detailed provisions of a chemical weapons verification system, some other important questions require careful consideration. I should like to draw attention only to the importance of establishing the necessary conditions to guarantee the effective and smooth implementation of the convention. Thus, we have to tackle, inter alia, difficult questions concerning the functions and interrelationship of the organs of the organization to be established by the convention. Also, concrete provisions on the preparatory commission, which will operate in the period between the signing and the entry into force of the convention, need to be worked out now.

Furthermore, the order of destruction of chemical weapons needs to be worked out in a way that ensures the undiminished security of all States parties to a convention.

As will have become clear from my brief remarks on these still-open questions, the negotiations have reached an advanced stage. We are now called upon to pursue vigorously our common goal of concluding at the earliest possible date a treaty which will free the world once and for all from the scourge of chemical weapons. We are thus looking forward to the inter-sessional work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons scheduled to begin in November.

My Government is prepared to contribute in every possible way to achieving further progress and tangible results as expeditiously as possible. Thus, we favour an intensified work schedule for the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament, and we hope to proceed to the final drafting of a convention as soon as possible,

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : I had announced earlier that draft resolutions to be submitted by delegations were to be deposited with the Secretariat by 6 p.m. today, as agreed by the Committee. So that all draft resolutions may be deposited by that hour, I propose to suspend this meeting for half an hour to permit consultations on this subject. I shall then inform the Committee of the results of those consultations, which will relate to the submission of draft resolutions on all disarmament items: agenda items 48 to 69.

The meeting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 5.50 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I can now give you the **results** of the **consultations** that have been held. They were useful and positive. We can agree that the deadline for the **submission** of draft resolutions should be today, 27 October 1987, **but** owing to certain technical problems that some delegations have encountered, we can allow an extension of an hour and a half. Draft resolutions that are in the process of being finalized will have to be submitted to the **Secretariat** **by 7.30 p.m.** I **take it that** there is no objection.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.