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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1615)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent	1

(16 p.)

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 15 December 1971, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1615)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent.

The meeting was called to order at 7.20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent

1. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council will recall that at a previous meeting [1606th meeting] the Council decided to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to participate in the debate of the problem currently under discussion by the Council, without the right to vote. In accordance with that decision, and with the consent of the Council, I shall invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take their places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Swaran Singh (India) and Mr. A. Shahi (Pakistan) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: The Council has also decided [1607th meeting] to extend invitations to the representatives of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia to take the seats reserved for them in the Council chamber, with the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) and Mr. J.M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT: I have just received a letter from the Permanent Representative of Ceylon [S/10454], requesting that he be permitted to participate in our discussion on this item. In accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of

procedure of the Security Council and with the consent of the Council, I shall proceed to invite the Permanent Representative of Ceylon to participate in our debate, without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe (Ceylon) took the place reserved for him in the Council chamber.

4. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): At the meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Chinese delegation has repeatedly stated the views of the Chinese Government on the current situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan is in essence the struggle of interference and counter-interference, subversion and counter-subversion, aggression and counter-aggression between the Indian expansionists and the Pakistan Government and people.

5. With the support of the Soviet Government the Indian Government has openly committed aggression against Pakistan and thus seriously wrecked the peace on the India-Pakistan subcontinent. In order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the issue between India and Pakistan the essential prerequisite is an immediate cease-fire by India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of their respective armed forces to their own territories. This is common sense. At the meetings of the Security Council the Soviet representatives went so far as unreasonably to veto two draft resolutions which contained such provisions. The problem was then referred from the Security Council to the General Assembly and 104 countries were in favour of the resolution calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal [2793 (XXVI)]. However, at the Security Council meeting of 13 December [1613th meeting], the Soviet representative again unreasonably vetoed the draft resolution, the contents of which conform to the will of 104 countries.

6. This is the first time that the Chinese delegation takes part in the work of the United Nations. The Soviet representative has three times flagrantly abused the veto power in disregard of all consequences, with the obvious aim of marking time so as to shield India in its occupation of East Pakistan. We are deeply shocked by such things, which we did not expect when we first took part in the work of the United Nations. This cannot but make people think. How can a super-Power defy the opinion of well over 100 countries and behave so arrogantly and truculently? This cannot but make people think. How can a super-Power, which has given such undisguised support to Indian aggression against Pakistan, truly and really help the Arab

people in the Middle East in opposing the aggression committed by the Israeli Zionists with the support of United States imperialism? This cannot but make people think; since if a super-Power can give such undisguised abetment and support to a country in interfering in the internal affairs of another country and violating its territorial integrity, then how many countries in the world can possibly be exempt from the present sufferings of Pakistan?

7. In a speech of 13 December, the Soviet representative attacked the leaders of China with slanderous language, accusing China of attempting to exploit the India-Pakistan situation for expansion. This indeed is not worth refuting. The facts speak louder than words. China has no military bases and not a single soldier on foreign soil. Who committed armed invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia? Who has stationed large numbers of armed forces on foreign soil? Who is establishing military bases everywhere? Who is controlling its own allies? Who has been subverting the legal Governments of Afro-Asian countries? Is it not the Soviet revisionist renegade clique which has betrayed Marxism-Leninism, betrayed the Soviet people and the people of the whole world?

8. Here I deem it necessary to mention the Polish draft resolution [S/10453/Rev.1]. This is a draft resolution to dismember Pakistan and legalize the dismemberment. This is a draft resolution to involve the Security Council directly in the dismemberment of Pakistan. China firmly opposes this draft resolution. This draft resolution certainly cannot represent the Polish people, because they cannot possibly forget the sad history of their own motherland which was partitioned on many occasions, nor can they forget the unpleasantness of Poland today. To put it bluntly, this is not a Polish draft resolution but a Soviet draft resolution.

9. During the debate, Britain and France assumed an attitude which is seemingly impartial, but fails to distinguish between right and wrong on the major question concerning the Soviet Government's support for Indian aggression and the dismemberment of Pakistan. This has inflated the aggressive arrogance of the Soviet Union and India. This reminds us of the League of Nations during the thirties. The United Nations is now standing at the crossroads of history. Whither the United Nations? This is a question which gives much food for deep thought by all the countries and peoples who love peace and uphold justice.

10. In defiance of world opinion and in disregard of all the consequences, the Soviet leading clique is abetting, encouraging and supporting India in its aggression against Pakistan. Its purpose is to make use of the wild ambitions of the Indian expansionists to control the India-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean and to gain superiority on the subcontinent as a flanking movement to affect the situation in the Middle East, to strengthen its position in its confrontation with another super-Power in the Middle East and other parts of the world and to wage an even fiercer struggle for world hegemony with another super-Power.

11. But the Soviet revisionist social imperialists and the Indian expansionists should not become overjoyed too early. The question is far from being finished. The Indian

ruling clique has let a wolf into its own house, and the Indian people will be the first to suffer. It will not be too long before India itself will suffer the grave consequences of dismembering another country. In acting so truculently, the Soviet leading clique will only enable the Afro-Asian people and the people of the whole world to see ever more clearly its true features of social imperialism and further raise their political consciousness and thus it will only accelerate the doom of the new tsars who stop at nothing in doing evil.

12. China is following with deep and great concern the development of the India-Pakistan situation. No matter what happens in the India-Pakistan subcontinent, the Chinese Government and people will firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle against foreign aggression and in defence of national independence and unity. We are deeply convinced that no matter how many difficulties and twists and turns may still occur, the Pakistan people, persevering in the struggle, will surely win final victory.

13. The Chinese delegation has consistently held that the United Nations and the Security Council must respect the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan. In order to put a quick end to Indian aggression, the Chinese delegation will not oppose a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire by India and Pakistan followed by the withdrawal of their troops from the territory of the other side, but the draft resolutions now under consultation have failed to reflect the just will of the 104 countries in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. On the contrary, they contain provisions which seriously contravene the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and which are partial to the aggressors. The Chinese delegation is most dissatisfied with all this. The Chinese delegation declares that, should any draft resolution contain provisions which interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, disrupt the national unity of Pakistan and support the puppet régime, the so-called "Bangla Desh", China will have no part in it.

14. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Ceylon to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

15. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon): I must express my sincere thanks to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the Security Council, for extending to me the courtesy of participation without the right of vote in the discussion of the item that is now before the Council, namely, the situation in the India-Pakistan subcontinent.

16. We are witnessing one of the most fearful and poignant tragedies in the history of the United Nations, the imminent disintegration of a country, a Member of the United Nations since its foundation. Born of partition, its geographical division into two widely separated constituent elements was in itself a formidable obstacle to unification. It is now experiencing a greater agony. At this moment of appalling destiny, one final effort is required to salvage something from the wreckage, something for the future, even if it is something as insubstantial as hope and as evanescent as a dream.

17. Ceylon has watched with increasing concern, distress and despondency the deepening crisis that has enveloped

the India-Pakistan subcontinent. The situation has steadily worsened despite the best efforts of members of the international community, the Security Council and the General Assembly, clearly made in good faith and from the highest of motives, namely the preservation of the principles of the Charter and the search for the slightest element that could provide some hope of a satisfactory settlement.

18. It is not the fate of Pakistan alone that is being settled today, it is not her destiny alone that is being determined by the events of the day; it is for peace and harmony in our part of the world that the bell will now toll unless we act with vision, courage and faith.

19. Ceylon has been impelled to seek a hearing before the Security Council for two reasons. First, and it goes without saying, we enjoy the friendliest and most fraternal relations with all parties to the conflict—and there are three, the Government of Pakistan, the people of East Pakistan and the Government of India. These feelings and that relationship are the product of a common origin, a common heritage, a common culture, the most priceless part of a heritage, a common experience and common problems and aspirations. The second and equally cogent reason is our own national self-interest which lies in the speedy restoration of conditions of peace and harmony in the area. This should not be placed in jeopardy by any act of omission or commission at this crucial juncture.

20. That mistakes—incredible and avoidable mistakes—have been committed by the Government of Pakistan in its handling of the East Pakistan question has been admitted with courage and candour by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan. We recognize that unspeakable sufferings have resulted from those mistakes; we recognize the crushing burden imposed on India's resources, and the deadly threat to economic, political and social stability posed by the refugee problem. We recognize equally the heavy strain imposed on the patience of India's leaders and on the forbearance of its people by the events of the last eight months, whose unhappy climax now confronts the world.

21. But it is just such a seemingly hopeless situation that calls for the display of a spirit of chivalry and magnanimity on the part of those who alone are in a position to do so.

22. We want a settlement that will prevent victory from being an embarrassment, defeat from being a humiliation, and peace from being an illusion. My Government's approach to the problem is based on a policy of strict and scrupulous neutrality—not the neutrality of indifference to facts, but the neutrality that is the mark of the genuine friend and conciliator. My Prime Minister has at all times been ready to associate Ceylon with initiatives accepted by the United Nations towards achieving a settlement, and has always been ready to use her own good offices in any way possible, if and when necessary. We have considered a political settlement in East Pakistan to be central to any solution, and negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and the acknowledged leaders of the people of East Pakistan to be the only effective and legitimate means of achieving that settlement. We have also held that any

such settlement must be in accordance with the wishes of the people of East Pakistan.

23. A cease-fire and the cessation of all hostilities constitute the first and indispensable requirement. Simultaneous with it, negotiations must commence between the Government and the acknowledged leaders of East Pakistan. The withdrawal of the armed forces of the two countries to their respective territories would be a subsequent step.

24. If the imperious and inexorable logic of fact and circumstance dictates the withdrawal of the Government of Pakistan from East Pakistan in deference to the will of the people of East Pakistan, let it be given the opportunity of doing so—with honour and dignity, and in response to the international community's request for a political settlement.

25. In other situations, we have asked for a political settlement—not a military solution. That is the quintessence of the Charter. I ask you not to deny to the Government of Pakistan what we—every one of us—would wish if a similar fate overtook us: and that is the opportunity of making peace with honour.

26. Rarely has a situation demanded the exercise of greater statesmanship. We are confident that the leaders of all parties concerned are capable of rising to those heights. Military problems must now be subordinated to political exigencies—political exigencies that are not merely of parochial and provincial import. The only settlement worth achieving is one that would not merely bring the hostilities to an end and settle the future of East Pakistan, but one that would at the same time heal the wounds that have been inflicted, without leaving them to fester—one that would help repair the economies ravaged by war, one that would substitute economic growth for moral and material decay, and one that would, above all, provide a sure and stable foundation for lasting peace and harmony between those who are brothers and must always remain so.

27. As important as a settlement itself are the means by which it is achieved. No one would profit by a Pyrrhic victory. We had hoped to suggest the terms of a draft resolution to be sponsored by any interested member or members of the Security Council, but we were not prepared to do so without the concurrence of both India and Pakistan. If any other draft resolution secures their approval, we would be happy to see this consummation of the untiring efforts of the Security Council.

28. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The situation in the Hindustan peninsula has become extremely acute, and as a result immediate measures are essential.

29. On instructions from the Soviet Government, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has, during the discussion of this question in the Security Council and the General Assembly, made every effort to achieve a break-through from the armed conflict between two States in that region to a just and lasting settlement. A complex situation arose in the Hindustan peninsula, and in the course of attempts to achieve a settlement, many

further complications have arisen. The beginning, the development and the causes of the conflict are of an unprecedented nature; this fact is generally recognized. Only the Chinese representative, in his efforts to mislead both the United Nations and the Security Council, refuses to recognize the unprecedented nature of these events and closes his eyes to reality. This replacement of reality with fabrications and with slander against the Soviet Union is no doubt an inherent characteristic of the Maoist clique. He has claimed that the Soviet representative used words which he finds displeasing. It was not the representative of the USSR who started using these words. Let the Chinese representative stop using such words and he will not hear them from me.

30. An unprecedentedly acute crisis has arisen in East Pakistan. Instead of taking swift and positive measures for a peaceful political settlement, the authorities used methods of terror and violence to stifle the will of the population of East Pakistan. As has been pointed out more than once during the discussions in the Security Council and the Assembly, this led to unprecedentedly tragic consequences. Hundreds of thousands of people perished, more than 10 million were forced to flee to save themselves, to abandon their native land and their houses, and to flee to another country.

31. However, neither the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, when speaking in the Security Council, nor the Chinese representative has said a word about this. It is of no interest to them. The death of several hundred thousand people means nothing to the Chinese representative. The flight of 10 million people from their native land to a foreign country to save their lives is to him a trifle which is not even worth mentioning. There you have the typical Maoist approach to such important, unprecedented events. Here you see both the Chinese representative and Chinese policy in their true colours.

32. The very unprecedentedness of these events, and their specific character, call for the adoption of something other than the usual decisions. The essence and nature of these events require us to take all the circumstances into account and make the right decisions. We must take all aspects of the problem into account, especially its primary cause, and not close our eyes to the real situation. In the quest for a solution, we must show a sober, calm and firm approach.

33. It has become obvious to all of us that this problem cannot be settled by a one-sided approach. Many delegations have informed either me personally, or members of the Soviet delegation, that the Soviet approach to solving the problem, which links the cessation of hostilities to a political solution, is perfectly correct. Even the bourgeois United States press, which no one could ever suspect of sympathy for the Soviet Union, recognizes the correctness of the Soviet position, of the Soviet Union's approach to solving the problem. For example, today's issue of the leading Boston newspaper, *The Boston Globe*, states:

"This is substantially the Russian position too, and it is difficult to quarrel with it. Russian Ambassador Yacob Malik has asked only that the United Nations take no decision 'without ensuring the interests of the people of

Bangla Desh'. This is the sort of thing upon which it is traditional for American diplomats to insist. It galls a bit to hear the idea of self-determinism spoken in Russian while Washington, insisting upon the right of its forces to bend Viet-Nam to its will, also insists upon an Indian withdrawal from Bangla Desh, which at this time would jeopardize Bangla Desh independence. What Washington seems to be saying is that it is under no compulsion to heed the rules it lays down for other nations."¹

Only Washington is mentioned here; there is no mention of Peking. Yet Peking is following exactly the same course as Washington. In this respect, too, in this area, too, as has already been noted, a Chinese-United States duet is being played.

34. Peking is not interested in the fate of 10 million people who are undergoing unheard-of suffering. It is interested in only one thing, in exploiting the situation in order to strengthen its position in South-East Asia and in the Hindustan subcontinent. This is what Peking says the Soviet Union is doing, but the Soviet Union has no such intentions; it never has had, and it never will have. A solution to the problem we are discussing can be found only on the basis of recognizing the need for a cease-fire between India and Pakistan and combining it with a simultaneous decision on a political settlement in East Pakistan.

35. As a result of the prolonged and many-sided discussion of the problem in the Security Council and the General Assembly, it is becoming more and more obvious that a political settlement can be found only on the basis of recognition of the expressed will of the people of East Pakistan. The real situation dictates the necessity for a cease-fire and a simultaneous political settlement in East Pakistan. The question of the withdrawal of troops has been raised; however, we may be sure that the Indian side could cease-fire and withdraw its troops if the Pakistan Government withdrew its troops from East Pakistan and if a political settlement was achieved there by peaceful means, with the lawful representatives of the people of East Pakistan. To achieve this, power must be transferred to those elected by the people, to the representatives of the party that won a majority at the elections in December 1970.

36. Another important, and indeed essential, requirement is the creation of conditions in which all the East Pakistan refugees can return from India. Who can create and guarantee these conditions? Surely no one, in the light of the nine months' experience of the bloody events in East Pakistan, can assert that the Pakistan military authorities are capable of creating or ensuring conditions in which all the East Pakistan refugees, numbering more than 10 million, can return from India. This can be done and guaranteed only by new authorities consisting of, and appointed by, the lawful representatives of the East Pakistan people and elected by that people.

37. The Chinese representative is not interested in this aspect of the matter, either. While passing himself off as a

¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

supporter of a cease-fire and an end to military action, he at the same time remains silent about the fate of 10 million people, and talks as if these 10 million should return to those from whom they fled. This is Chinese logic; this is the Chinese approach to rectifying such an important situation which is unprecedented in the history of the post-war period.

38. The East Pakistan people themselves will decide what they want and determine their own fate. The Security Council has heard a statement by the Minister for External Affairs of India, Mr. Singh [1611th meeting], which made it perfectly clear that India has no intention of imposing its will on the people of East Pakistan, and that they themselves will determine their own destiny.

39. This and nothing else must be the essential basis for immediately putting an end to the conflict and simultaneously setting about reaching a peaceful political settlement.

40. A constructive and peaceful settlement of this complex problem, which has already more than once been termed unprecedented, also requires that neither side should undertake unilateral action or engage in any ostentatious moves. There remains one more thing which is important to a solution of this problem: the Government of Pakistan must also enter upon a real path of political settlement in East Pakistan, on the basis of a peaceful settlement with the lawfully elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. It may be objected that such a solution to the problem would be unusual. However, no one can deny that the events in East Pakistan themselves, which were the main and decisive cause of the conflict in the Hindustan peninsula, were unprecedented, and consequently unusual. Ten million people left their country, left their native land, in order to save their lives. As has already been pointed out, this is equivalent to the population of a whole State. It is larger than the population of 88 States Members of the United Nations.

41. Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Huang Hua, however, have not given us an analysis of this terrible event. They have made no effort to look this startling fact in the face. They have proposed no way out of the situation. They protest and object to concrete proposals for a political settlement, and this attitude was reflected in the Chinese representative's vote against the Soviet draft resolution [S/10418]. He referred here to the Soviet veto, but said nothing about his own very real veto. He voted against the Soviet draft resolution, which contained an appeal for a political settlement in East Pakistan, as a result of which there would inevitably have been a cessation of hostilities. He voted against a Soviet proposal to call upon the Government of Pakistan to take measures to put an end to all acts of violence by Pakistani forces in East Pakistan which have led to the deterioration of the situation. In objecting to and voting against those proposals he took the course of approving and covering up the bloody terror in East Pakistan. There is the true face of the Chinese representative, and the essence of Chinese policy. For this reason, none of his slanders against the policy of the Soviet Union can be taken seriously. They are far-fetched, and have been repeated every day for many years.

42. Because of the unprecedented nature of these events, the Soviet delegation proposed concrete and practical measures to settle the situation. The unprecedented nature of the events calls for the adoption of unusual, unprecedented, measures to achieve a settlement.

43. After studying the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Poland [S/10453/Rev.1], the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has concluded that that draft outlines the right approach both to a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in the Indian subcontinent and to the methods and means of achieving a peaceful political settlement with the lawfully elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. Power must be handed over to them, since they alone are capable of creating normal conditions for the return of all East Pakistan refugees from India to their homes. Those who forced the refugees to flee can neither assure them normal conditions nor provide a guarantee of safety.

44. The adoption of such a resolution by the Security Council would open the way for a solution to the problem, and would ensure a peaceful political settlement in East Pakistan and an end to the serious military conflict between India and Pakistan. If this draft does not receive support, then the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reserves the right to submit its own proposals.

45. In the course of consultations, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed amendments to one of the drafts prepared by other delegations. The essence of our proposals is that all parties to the conflict in the Indian subcontinent should be invited to take steps towards an immediate cease-fire and a cessation of all hostilities on both the eastern and the western fronts. This is the first point, the basic and important point.

46. The second point, equally basic and important, is inseparably linked with the first; it is that the Council should recognize that simultaneously with the cease-fire, power in East Pakistan must be handed over to the representatives of the majority party who were elected in December 1970.

47. We submitted these amendments to one of the drafts proposed during the previous discussion of this question by the Security Council. We are firmly convinced that if the sponsors of that draft had accepted our amendments at that time, the problem would already have been solved. We introduced our own draft [S/10428], although after the Chinese representative had voted against the Soviet draft calling for a political settlement and a simultaneous cessation of hostilities, it became obvious that he would also vote against our second draft.

48. This is the reality. This is the essence of the matter. The Chinese representative prevented the adoption of a resolution which might have facilitated a settlement in the Hindustan subcontinent. In doing so, he destroyed that possibility. In his statement, he referred in his usual impertinent and slanderous manner to the Middle East.

49. I will confine myself to just one comment. It would be a good thing if China gave the peoples of the Middle East,

the peoples of the Arab countries who are waging noble and just struggle for their rights, and for their territory which has been seized by an imperialist aggressor, the same assistance as those peoples have received in the past, are receiving now and will continue to receive from the Soviet Union.

50. In our statement in the General Assembly during the discussion of the Middle East question,² we quoted statements by distinguished Arab figures thanking the Soviet Union, its people and its Government for the great help given by the Soviet Union and for the efforts which the Soviet Union is making, together with them, to ensure the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries. The appearance of China in the United Nations gave the Arab countries, and those who are their friends and who support their just struggle, grounds for hoping that China would take an active part in the work of giving the Arab countries assistance and co-operation in the United Nations in their noble and just struggle to eliminate the consequences of imperialist aggression. However, China has refused to share in the assistance given to the Arab peoples. The Chinese representative has refused to take part in consultations among the five permanent members of the Security Council with a view to co-operating with and assisting the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, in his noble efforts to solve the problem of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied by them and to achieve a peaceful settlement.

51. Thus, China is helping not the Arabs, but Israel and the United States. Consequently, to slander the Soviet Union's position in regard to the Middle East and to the provision of assistance to the Arab peoples and Governments is easier than to give them practical assistance in their noble and just struggle to eliminate imperialist aggression. The Chinese delegation prefers to substitute anti-Soviet tittle-tattle in United Nations organs for assistance to the Arabs.

52. This is the second time we have heard the Chinese representative refer to Czechoslovakia. The Chinese representative has thus given the whole world, and the United Nations, notice of China's real intentions with regard to Czechoslovakia, which are to give that socialist country over into the hands of imperialism and reaction. Now, after the Chinese representative's statement in the Security Council and his reference to Czechoslovakia, this is perfectly clear. And herein lies the essence of what we call social treachery.

53. The Chinese representative talked about Soviet bases on foreign soil. There are no such bases. There were in the past, and even on Chinese soil at Port Arthur, but the Soviet Union has eliminated them. Reference to any such non-existent Soviet bases on foreign soil completely un-masks the essence of the slanderous position of the Maoist clique with regard to the USSR and their pathological anti-Sovietism. The Chinese representative's talk of the "subversion" of Governments by the Soviet Union is such a

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2009th meeting.

monstrous lie that I see no need to waste time replying to it.

54. As for his reference to Marxism-Leninism, I cannot agree with the Chinese representative that this problem, and the crux of the ideological differences between us and the Chinese, should be brought up as a subject for discussion in the Security Council. Here again we disagree with the Chinese representative. There are other opportunities and other places for that, and I think that to refer here in the Security Council to our differences with regard to Marxism-Leninism, as to who is a real Marxist-Leninist and who is a traitor to the idea of Marxism-Leninism, is quite inappropriate. This is not the place for discussing this problem, or for ideological disputes between us. To us, the social treachery of the Maoists is perfectly obvious.

55. The Chinese representative referred to faces, to persons. However, I think all Missions to the United Nations and all representatives to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly and members of the Security Council have discovered the true face of that anti-Soviet slanderer, the Chinese representative. By his uninterrupted slanderous statements, he has fully confirmed that face in its true colours as the face of an anti-Soviet slanderer.

56. And now a few comments on the statements by the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto [1611th and 1613th meetings]. The Soviet delegation feels compelled to express its regret that Mr. Bhutto, in his two lengthy statements in the Security Council, was almost completely silent on the real crux of the problem from which the conflict in the Hindustan subcontinent arose, the spark which set the whole forest on fire. It was obviously not to his advantage to go into the essence of the problem. It was precisely in this connexion that I recalled that the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan had spoken about everything, including the Roman Empire, but had said nothing about the unprecedented events in East Pakistan, except for one word, that there had been "mistakes".

57. I would imagine that both contemporary and future historians will not be in error if, in describing the events in East Pakistan, they rephrase the famous comment of Talleyrand and say, "This was not a mistake; it was more than that, it was a crime."

58. Mr. Bhutto used here in the Security Council the term "a handful of secessionists and rebels", but surely this is not a convincing argument. More than 10 million people fled for their lives from the bloody terror and violence in East Pakistan, and for Mr. Bhutto this is a "small handful of secessionists and rebels". Moreover, unless my memory deceives me, the term "rebels" was also used by Mr. Huang Hua. The terminology used by Mr. Bhutto and by Mr. Huang Hua is identical. More than 10 million people saved themselves by fleeing from the threat of death which was hanging over them, and in Mr. Bhutto's and Mr. Huang Hua's eyes this is "a handful of rebels". It is sufficient to reflect on this to understand what both Mr. Bhutto and Mr. Huang Hua are trying to lead the Security Council into. What that is is something which we would call, in the first place, a departure from reality and, in the second place, adherence to what I might term the Pakistan-Chinese

methods which have been used in East Pakistan since March.

59. Mr. Bhutto expressed his delight at the policy and adherence to principle of certain great Powers, including the United States. But here again he is closing his eyes to reality. This approach leads in essence to closing one's eyes to what is going on in Indo-China, as well as to treaties of military aggression and their purposes, and to trying at the same time to discredit the Soviet-Indian treaty. Mr. Bhutto went so far as to attempt to compare the noble contents of that treaty on friendship and co-operation, concluded in the interests of strengthening peace between two great peoples—the peoples of India and the Soviet Union—with the aggressive military pacts, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of which Pakistan is a member and to which it is a party. However, we must give Mr. Bhutto his due in that, in an outburst of emotional self-pity, he revealed the essence of these two pacts of military aggression. He stated that the Soviet-Indian treaty speaks of peace and a joint consultation. "But", he said, "we know the value of such words. We are members of two treaties and we therefore know the difference between what is written down and the real purpose of these treaties." Thus Mr. Bhutto drew back the veil on the essence of the two military aggressive pacts, CENTO and SEATO. The words say one thing, but the reality is something else. The point of these treaties is aimed against other countries, and, of course, above all against the Soviet Union. I do not know how it is now, but when these pacts were concluded and signed they were equally directed against China, although China is apparently now inclined to defend them. This is the useful conclusion which we draw from the admission Mr. Bhutto made in his outburst of emotional self-pity during his statement in the Security Council. We shall take note of it. We have a Russian proverb: "If the mother-in-law is a lady of doubtful virtue, she will not trust her daughter-in-law either." Mr. Bhutto, who knows a lady of doubtful virtue, or rather two ladies of doubtful virtue, CENTO and SEATO, is attempting to cast doubt on the Indian-Soviet treaty.

60. I would request Ambassador Shahi to assure Mr. Bhutto that the Indian-Soviet treaty has nothing in common with the two aggressive military pacts, CENTO and SEATO, to which Pakistan is a party; Mr. Bhutto's attempt to draw such a parallel is artificial and unfounded, and its only purpose is to divert the Security Council and the United Nations from the true essence of the question under discussion.

61. I shall conclude on this note. I should like to state once again that the Soviet delegation reserves its right to introduce its own proposals at the appropriate stage, if the proposals which it supports are not adopted.

62. Mr. KULAGA (Poland): I did not intend to speak at this meeting. I was going to heed the President's appeal that, in view of the consultations which were going on, he wanted to suspend the meeting. But in view of the comments which were made on the Polish draft resolution [S/10453/Rev.1] by the Chinese delegation, I think I should speak briefly on the real aims of this draft resolution in order to give the Council a true picture of it, and not the

peculiar picture which the representative of China suggested.

63. My delegation, as perhaps all delegations in the Council—I say perhaps all—has given much thought to the problem. We have already explained our position on the substance of the problem many times. We recognize the urgency of the problem. We recognize the complexity of what I would call the practicalities of the possible solutions. We have studied the diverging points of view expressed during this debate. We have also studied in particular the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan.

64. In this light, we have submitted a draft resolution, which is now before the Council. In doing so we have taken into account both the essential needs for a political solution which, as I understand it, are not questioned by anybody—correction once more—are not questioned by anybody except perhaps one member of the Council. We thought and continue to think that this is the core of the problem we are facing.

65. We have also taken into consideration the question of a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops in a way which could ensure the elimination of the threat to peace and security of the region.

66. Finally, we have taken into account a very important element, the humanitarian one, to which several speakers referred in the debate, that is, the need to ensure that no acts of repression against any group of the population will take place.

67. Our draft resolution, therefore, covers all these three elements and suggests ways for a joint and interrelated solution of the problems. In elaborating this draft resolution, we were guided by three basic considerations: first, the urgency of the situation; secondly, political realism; and thirdly, the need for concretely formulated steps which could give effect to the first two considerations. We have also drawn on whatever experience we may have acquired from our participation in international commissions, bodies or missions.

68. This, very briefly stated—and I do not want to enter into a further elaboration of my explanation, reserving my right to do so at some other time—is the aim which we are trying to achieve through our draft resolution. I repeat, this is our aim, and since this is a Polish resolution, I consider myself best qualified to enlighten the Chinese delegation as to these aims.

69. I regret that it is necessary to refer to some other comments which were made. One comment was that this draft resolution does not represent the Polish people. That is indeed a curious attitude, a strange attitude, an unacceptable attitude. Does Mr. Huang Hua presume to dictate who represents whom, to dictate who represents Poland? China, it is true, claims to be the spokesman for smaller and medium-sized countries. It seems that it means that very literally. Indeed, that is not serious, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, it may be a warning to all those small and medium-sized countries for which China claims to be a spokesman.

70. The representative of China also made another statement. He said that this was not a Polish draft resolution, but a Soviet draft resolution. There most probably was an error in translation. That sometimes happens in the United Nations. As an old hand in the United Nations, I can testify to that. I think it would be best for the Chinese representative to correct the mistake in the Chinese translation of the Polish draft resolution.

71. Now, lastly, the Chinese representative made a comment about, I think, an unpleasant situation in Poland. Well, that is very thoughtful of him. But I would like to tell him that without him we are doing very well in Poland. We are forging ahead in Poland. We are forging ahead as a united nation, working in unison to develop our country, to develop economically, to raise our standards of living. We have had, during these last days, a congress of our Party which reaffirmed these aims, these lines of action and this unity of our people.

72. So, Mr. Huang Hua, please do not worry about us.

73. The PRESIDENT: I call now upon the representative of Pakistan.

74. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): It was not my intention to speak this evening, because the situation calls for action by the Council and not for statements at this critical juncture. Nevertheless, I deem it necessary to speak, because some of the speeches we heard this afternoon have distorted the perspective of the problem in the India-Pakistan subcontinent and have been lacking in any display of a true sense of fairness and proportion. In order to remove the confusion that has been created, I should like to make a few comments.

75. First, I shall refer to the statement of the Ambassador of Ceylon, for whom we have such high regard. Ceylon is a country whose impeccable policy of peaceful coexistence has earned our admiration. Therefore, anything that I may say by way of comment on his statement is prompted by the same spirit of friendship and goodwill towards him and his country that he has expressed towards mine. The representative of Ceylon spoke of the quintessence of the Charter. Yet I was pained to hear him advocate negotiations for a political settlement simultaneously with a cease-fire; that is, given the present situation in East Pakistan, he advocated negotiations for a political settlement when East Pakistan is under the occupation of Indian military forces. I was somewhat disturbed—perhaps I did not follow him very closely—that when he spoke about giving expression to the wishes of the people of East Pakistan, he even seemed to convey the impression that that part of the territory of Pakistan should be allowed to secede, whereas in a previous statement of great eloquence and brilliance³ he had maintained that those who had advocated secession must renounce such a position before they could qualify for political negotiations towards a settlement that would truly reflect the wishes of the people of East Pakistan in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, including the principle of the national unity of Pakistan and its territorial integrity.

³ *Ibid.*, 2003rd meeting.

76. I turn now to some comments made by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik. I have listened with great respect and admiration to him in past debates; I have heard how valiantly he upheld the sacred principles of the Charter. The role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East crisis earned our unstinted praise. And that is not a secret. I gave expression to that, I paid a tribute here to the representatives of the Soviet Union on innumerable occasions when they defended the principles of the Charter against the position taken by the United States. In those debates we were completely, one hundred per cent, with the Soviet Union and against the United States. But his statements in this debate, including the one today, I regret to say have been so one-sided and partisan as to cause deep dismay to countries like mine, which look to this great socialist State as the expression of certain profound principles translated into actuality, as a State which has defended the rights of peoples over so many years. I am sure my delegation is not alone in feeling this pain and regret at the position adopted by the representative of the Soviet Union in the present India-Pakistan crisis.

77. In regard to what particular newspapers may say about the India-Pakistan crisis, let me put the question: how many editorials, how many articles and columns show even an elementary knowledge of what the United Nations is about and what the principles are on which it is founded? Do the editorial writers take the norms of the Charter into consideration when they write editorials? I should have thought that the bourgeois press of the United States was not the best source of objective expression of opinion, because that same press took a quite different position, one that was not to the liking of the representatives of the Soviet Union, in other crises nearer to the Soviet Union.

78. I had occasion to comment on the Soviet draft resolution both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. I therefore would not like to repeat myself. The main defect, the main departure from a position of principle in the Soviet draft resolution is that it fails to call for a withdrawal of the Indian occupation forces from East Pakistan. Assuming that a political solution based on the wishes of the population of East Pakistan is imperative to resolve the crisis in what the Soviet representative calls the "Hindustan peninsula"—and I would like him to take note also of the existence of a State called Pakistan in the subcontinent; it is the India-Pakistan subcontinent—assuming, as I say, that a political solution of that nature is imperative, is not the withdrawal of the Indian occupation forces also imperative? How can we rest satisfied with the assurance that of course the Indian occupation forces will withdraw? If it is their intention to withdraw, why should any Soviet draft resolution not give expression to the Indian intention to withdraw? Therefore, I should think it would be eminently acceptable to both India and the Soviet Union that the sponsors of the various draft resolutions, including the representative of the Soviet Union, should add an unequivocal clause for the withdrawal of Indian occupation forces from East Pakistan, so that a genuine political settlement based on a true and free expression of the will of the people of East Pakistan could be achieved. But we are urged to achieve a solution before the withdrawal, under the duress of war and under the

occupation régime imposed by India. Is that consistent with the Charter?

79. Now I should like to point out that when the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan spoke so movingly and with such passion and eloquence, as a man of the people, about the traumatic experience of Pakistan, he did not in any way intend to pass over or to gloss over what the representative of the Soviet Union calls the appalling event that occurred in Pakistan. Mr. Malik stated that the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan did not offer an analysis of the crisis, nor did he propose a political solution. I should have thought that the Deputy Prime Minister, as a political leader who has assumed office, did speak at considerable length about the political crisis and the necessity for a political solution. He did not think it necessary that another analysis of the events of the last nine months should be placed before the Council. This has been done repeatedly, and on several occasions by the delegation of Pakistan, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, and if the Deputy Prime Minister did not wish to go over the same ground again it was because these debates are fresh in the memory of the members of the Council and of the General Assembly and all the others who are present here.

80. Therefore, thereafter, when the delegations of India and Pakistan had presented their cases, members of the Security Council and the General Assembly gave expression to their own views and, as a result, on three different occasions the Security Council adopted resolutions which commanded a majority of 11 votes and, in the General Assembly, a massive majority of 104 votes against 11. For any Power represented in this Council or in the United Nations, howsoever great, to reject the expression of majority will so clearly and decisively given is far from democratic. This United Nations is an attempt to establish a democratic international order, and we have seen that in this crisis the dedicated, untiring efforts of so many delegations in the Security Council were brought to naught and the will of the international community as expressed in the General Assembly was negated in this very Council.

81. Surely it is neither right nor just for a great Power to impose its own will on a country which is passing through such a traumatic crisis as mine, and to insist on a solution contrary to the expressed will of the international community on the basis of dismemberment of Pakistan because 10 million refugees—accepting the Indian figure, which we do not, but assuming that there were 10 million—fled from East Pakistan to India. Is the solution to be one of dismemberment? Consider the percentage of population represented by 10 million; the population of all Pakistan is 130 million, and of India, nearly 500 million. So, assuming that every one of those 10 million refugees wanted the dismemberment of Pakistan, what about the wishes of the 120 million people of Pakistan?

82. When the representative of the Soviet Union criticized the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan for passing over in silence what the representative of the Soviet Union called the crux of the problem in the Indian subcontinent—I should like to remind him that in all his statements he passed over in complete silence the military invasion

launched by India on 21 November against a part of East Pakistan. Not one word was said by the representative of the Soviet Union about the intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan, about the fomenting of civil strife, about the sanctuary given to anti-State elements, about arming, organizing and directing them to cross the border from India in order to prevent the return of normalcy and to prevent a political solution of the East Pakistan problem within the framework of what the Soviet representative sometimes refers to as the Pakistani State. We were saddened by this silence of the representative of the Soviet Union on crucial aspects of the situation, such as military invasion and the organization of subversion and intervention—unprecedented intervention—in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

83. The Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan made certain comments about the Indo-Soviet treaty. We are not concerned about the intention of the Soviet Union in concluding this military alliance. I have said on more than one occasion that this treaty will be judged not by its intent, but by its results, by its fruits. And we all know that it was that treaty which led to the unleashing of aggression by India against Pakistan. The representative of the Soviet Union referred to aggressive pacts such as CENTO and SEATO. I am glad that he also said he did not know what the present position was about these pacts. My country has not engaged in any hostile actions against the Soviet Union by virtue of our membership of CENTO, nor against the People's Republic of China because of our membership of SEATO. But in the wake of the Indo-Soviet treaty came a military invasion whose true aim, as is now being abundantly revealed, is not the return of refugees, but the dismemberment of Pakistan.

84. In regard to the question whether the Indo-Soviet treaty is a true treaty of friendship and co-operation or a military alliance, those representatives who may be interested in engaging in a degree of research will find that article 9 of the Indo-Soviet treaty is very similar to article 4 of the South-East Asia Treaty and to a similar article in the ANZUS Treaty, which is a military alliance between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. A military alliance does not cease to be a military alliance just because certain countries conclude a treaty which is similar to a military alliance. How can we argue that when instruments embody almost identical language of commitment in the event of threat to one party or the other, identical language in two respective instruments, one becomes a military treaty and one does not become a military treaty?

85. Finally, I should like to say a word or two about the Polish draft resolution [*S/10953/Rev.1*]. I shall preface my comments by saying that it is a matter of deep regret to us that a country with such a profoundly tragic history as Poland, which has been dismembered and partitioned, should now present a formula or prescription for the dismemberment of the Pakistan State. The Polish draft calls for the peaceful transfer of power to the representatives of the people, but while war is raging and while Indian troops occupy East Pakistan. It is only thereafter—after transfer of power in such conditions, under duress—that a cease-fire is to come into effect and the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan are called upon to withdraw from East Pakistan,

withdraw from their own territory, even before the people of East Pakistan have expressed themselves in regard to a political solution. This is determined in advance. The Polish draft resolution does not even wait to see what will be the result of this political settlement and what the people of East Pakistan have to say about the presence or withdrawal of the Pakistan armed forces from East Pakistan. Then, even more strange, in operative paragraph (e) the Polish draft resolution states that after the Pakistan troops have begun withdrawal, the Indian armed forces will withdraw. That is, first the Pakistan forces should withdraw from their own territory and then the foreign occupying forces will begin to withdraw. Then the draft resolution goes on to state that such withdrawal of troops will begin upon consultations with the newly established authorities organized as a result of the transfer of power to the lawfully elected representatives of the people. In other words, while the new Government is to take power and office under Indian military occupation, then the question of the withdrawal of Indian forces will be decided in consultation with the new Government, and that Government will be the Government established by Indian military occupation authorities; and we know very well that in such a situation even a government which reflects the popular will of East Pakistan will be under duress, will not be a free agent and will not be in a position to take a free decision without coercion in regard to the Indian occupation forces. Yet this is the draft resolution that the representative of the Soviet Union commends to the Security Council.

86. Mr. KUI/AGA (Poland): I do not want to prolong this meeting, but I think I should say a few words about one or two points which the representative of Pakistan has now raised. The representative of Pakistan returned to the thesis of dismemberment. This is not the aim of the Polish draft resolution, as I said when I explained the motives of my delegation in presenting that draft resolution. The representative of Pakistan will not see this word in our draft resolution.

87. The representative of Pakistan talked about the fact of Pakistani armed forces having to leave first. I said that one of our aims, one of our basic premises in the resolution, was the fact that we have to be realistic, we have to analyse the situation as it started and as it evolved until it became an international problem. This responsibility was that of the armed action of repression carried out by the Pakistan army.

88. As far as the Indian armed forces are concerned, there is a definite provision in paragraph (e) for the withdrawal of armed forces.

89. Finally, a very brief remark about the Government installed under duress, as the representative of Pakistan said. I should like to remind him that in operative paragraph (a) we provide for a transfer of power to the representatives of the people, lawfully elected in December 1970, that is, elected in conditions where there was—I suppose and I presume—no duress.

90. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): I am sorry I have to take the floor again, but I feel compelled to do so. The Polish draft resolution does not use the word "dismemberment", but

the effect of the implementation of this draft resolution is nothing but dismemberment. Secondly, while the Polish draft resolution contemplates an immediate transfer of power to the representatives of the people, we must all take into account the reality of the present situation in which the Indian occupation forces are present in East Pakistan. If the Indian occupation forces were to withdraw immediately, then the will of the elected representatives of the people would be manifested in a free and uncoerced manner.

91. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): When the representative of the Soviet Union spoke, he mentioned a draft resolution that had been brought to his attention and suggested certain amendments to that draft resolution. Unfortunately, my delegation is not in possession of that particular draft, so to enable us to have an idea of what it is all about, it would certainly help if the delegation sponsoring that draft resolution could bring it to our attention. Perhaps that delegation could also let us know why it found it impossible to accept the suggestions or proposals made by the Soviet Union.

92. Furthermore, yesterday we adjourned our meeting because the representatives of the United Kingdom and France said that they were actively involved in consultations in an attempt to reach a formula by which this Council would be able to proceed to a stage whereby we could at least find some measure of agreement in bringing this fighting to a stop. It would certainly help my delegation—and I am sure other members—to know exactly how far these consultations have gone: whether they have foundered or whether they are still continuing. If they have foundered, perhaps the representative of France or the representative of the United Kingdom could let us know why they have foundered so that we can know exactly what the imponderables are.

93. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): This is in reply to the representative of Somalia. May I say that our consultations have been intensive to a degree. We are now on what is called Anglo-French draft revision 5. I hope we are going to show it to the parties principally interested after this meeting. It would be nice if we were able to submit it this evening, if we are able to agree. Otherwise, we shall continue to press on as hard as we can. As you will see, Mr. President, it has been rather complicated—and this you will appreciate from the discussion in this chamber.

94. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I am speaking now with a profound feeling of frustration, as one who, after innumerable meetings of the Security Council, has heard the same arguments time and time again. I am speaking now with a feeling of frustration, seeing the Council completely immobilized while the confrontation between India and Pakistan continues with great intensity.

95. The representative of the United Kingdom, after 24 hours of very intense consultations, has just told us that his efforts are now at the stage of the fifth revision and that the parties still need to be consulted. I would also add that the non-permanent members of the Council might be consulted as well, because we, too, have a thing or two to

say in the crisis which we are trying to resolve, and our views might very well not coincide with the views of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

96. This morning we heard a very moving statement by the First Deputy Minister of Pakistan. Above and beyond any consideration which we might give to his arguments, one thing is definite: he is quite entitled to complain about the absolute paralysis of the Security Council. The Security Council has taken no decision. It continues to talk and this is in spite of or even contrary to the freely expressed will of the General Assembly. I believe that responsibility of the non-permanent members of the Security Council is intact because we have done everything that we can to find a settlement. What is there so unusual about what we have called for? What is so unacceptable? We have called for an immediate cease-fire so that there will not be any more victims on both sides. We have called for the withdrawal of troops to both sides of the border, because we think this is an indispensable prerequisite to avoid the kind of tragic errors which have been committed elsewhere in the world, and which now four years later are still a matter of regret. We have asked Pakistan to create the conditions necessary for the return of the refugees. We said that these are preliminary steps, because we believe that later the substance of the problem must be tackled—the so-called political settlement.

97. We have heard once again that there must be a political settlement simultaneously. I think there is much merit in what the representative of Pakistan has said. I do not know how the Security Council is going to ask one country to find a political settlement while negotiating under the occupying forces of another foreign country. No Member State of the 131 Member States in the United Nations would accept such a settlement. It is obvious that a political settlement is needed. It is logical and indispensable that a political settlement be sought. But first things first; and first there must be a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops.

98. It can also be quite justly asserted that a short time ago some delegations laid great stress on the need for a political settlement. I realize that. But just because one side has fared better on the battlefield does not mean that a political settlement must now be sought with that side present in occupied territory.

99. My delegation continues to be most distressed over what has happened. We cannot remain passive. While we continue talking and conferring, convening the Council four hours after it was scheduled to meet, while consultations continue to meet with failure, as indeed we all know deep down that they must because the points of view of all sides remain irreconcilable, and because if one side does not veto a resolution, the other side will. Indians and Pakistanis are dying. And the entire world is thus made to realize the limitations of the Security Council and its inability to take action in this grave crisis confronting the world.

100. I believe that if this situation continues we will once again have to consider the possibility of going back to the General Assembly. The General Assembly adopted a resolution by 104 votes. In paragraph 6 of that resolution, it is

stated: "*Decides to follow the question closely and to meet again should the situation so demand.*" [Resolution 2793 (XXVI).]

101. I believe that if this Council does not reach a decision in just a few hours, paragraph 6 of this resolution, adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Assembly, will have to be implemented.

102. But let one thing be made quite clear: if the Assembly meets once again, it will not be once again to require what it called for more than a week ago: a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and the creation of certain conditions as a preliminary step. The debate in the General Assembly will go into depth, and then, unfortunately, responsibility in this affair will be fixed. The rights and wrongs will be established.

103. The PRESIDENT: There are no more speakers on my list. May I ask whether it is the wish of members to suspend this meeting or to adjourn it until tomorrow morning? It appears that a decision is necessary on whether a vote on the draft resolution before us is to be taken. I also understand there are draft resolutions in respect of which consultations have not yet ended.

104. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): The representative of the United Kingdom informed us that he was now on his fifth revision and that he hoped to be in a position to submit his draft this evening. Taking this into account and also the statement made by the representative of Argentina, my delegation would move that we should suspend this meeting until 10.30 this evening.

105. The PRESIDENT: Is there any objection? I shall proceed to take a vote.

106. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I should like to be quite clear as to what we are voting upon, for it is not clear to me. Could I have an explanation?

107. The PRESIDENT: May I ask the representative of Somalia whether he is making his motion under rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure?

108. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I am moving formally for a suspension and, since there is no objection, I take it that no vote is required.

109. The PRESIDENT: It appears from the statement by the representative of Somalia that he is moving for a suspension of this meeting until 10.30 tonight under rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure. Is there any objection? As there is no objection, it is so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 9.10 p.m. and resumed at 11.45 p.m.

110. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syrian Arab Republic): My delegation feels that at this critical hour it should make an effort to contribute to breaking a deadlock which not only endangers two great and brother States of the India-Pakistan subcontinent, but endangers international peace and security and almost annuls the role of the Security

Council as the highest organ for the maintenance of international peace. That is why we offer the following draft resolution, knowing in advance that it might not give complete satisfaction to any of the parties. But we feel that in the face of this overwhelming and tragic crisis we ought to shoulder our responsibility as members of the Security Council and discharge our obligations under the Charter regardless of blame or praise. The situation is too serious for blame or praise.

111. In this spirit we sincerely hope that the draft resolution will be viewed with sympathy by all members and that its motives and objectives will be rightly appreciated. There is no time for speeches. Perhaps I should do best to read the draft resolution:

[The speaker read out the text of a draft resolution which was subsequently circulated as document S/10456.]

112. We earnestly and ardently appeal to all to give their best consideration to this attempt at breaking the deadlock which is not an honour to the Security Council nor to the international community.

113. The PRESIDENT: The draft resolution which the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has just read out is being processed, along with another draft resolution, and I understand that it will be two hours before either of them is available, because they have to be translated into the various languages before being processed and distributed.

114. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): As I said earlier, my delegation and the delegation of France have been engaged in non-stop negotiations in an effort to achieve a text of a resolution which could be agreed by the parties concerned, or, at least, which would not raise insuperable difficulties. Our overriding aim is to bring fighting and bloodshed to an end, to prevent further human misery and to provide for peaceful and honourable solutions to outstanding problems. We have been persevering over these many hours in the hope of producing a draft that was already agreed. The draft resolution which I am now introducing on behalf of the delegations of France and the United Kingdom has not, at this stage, been fully agreed. I can, however, assure the Council that great efforts have been made by all concerned to achieve this. We feel that the time has now come to put before the Council the result of those efforts so far, and perhaps, since it is going to take so long to produce the text, I might read what our draft says:

[The speaker read out the text of a draft resolution which was subsequently circulated as document S/10455.]

115. There is not very much for me to say about the draft resolution except that in speaking in operative paragraph 2 of the "elected . . . representatives" we have had in mind those representatives elected in the 1970 elections.

116. Our purpose in presenting this draft resolution is, as I have said, to inform the Council of the position we have now reached. It is our hope that further progress will be possible, but we realize that delegations may need time to reflect and ask for instructions. We are therefore not asking the Council to take action on this draft resolution at the moment.

117. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): I can add very little to the explanation given by my colleague from the United Kingdom, who has introduced our joint draft to the Council. Our draft is not a response. The gesture we are making in presenting this draft is not in response to the repeated, moving, emotional, anxious and sometimes bitter statements of representatives who have successively taken the floor today, nor is it any kind of justification: we do not need one. We are not neutral, but we are trying to be objective and impartial; and surely everyone will agree that, as regards my country, in that area of the world we have no immediate material interests. We have only our friendship with those two countries, India and Pakistan, and cultural and trade relations, like most countries, but there is no question of any direct influence in those countries. Only one thing guides us: our desire for peace in that part of the world.

118. In submitting this draft resolution we felt that we had a triple duty to fulfil. First, we had a duty to the Council. The Council had to know exactly where we stood, what we had done, how we were working. We have been working in the same direction as have many other delegations which have also tried to prepare drafts and to put forward some valid solutions. So this duty has been one of providing information which we felt was necessary.

119. Secondly, I would say we felt it was almost our duty to defend the United Nations and the Security Council because Mr. Ortiz de Rozas was right a moment ago, as was Mr. Farah, when they said that we had to get out of this impasse, that we had to show we were capable of taking a decision and, as has been said before, we could never resign ourselves to a failure on the part of the Security Council, whose duty it is to maintain international peace and security.

120. Thirdly, we felt we had a duty to world public opinion, which needs to know that here we are doing our utmost for peace, that we are doing what should be done in an effort to put an end to the sufferings of peoples, to put an end to the hostilities which have caused death and destruction, and to put an end to a tragedy which does not benefit any country.

121. Also, we have a duty, above all, to our own consciences to show that we are attempting the impossible, that we are not thwarted by temporary failures, that we have to pursue our efforts until the path of peace opens before us.

122. All these considerations have motivated us. As I said once in the Assembly, when situations are brought to us when they are in such an advanced stage of deterioration, it is difficult for us to remedy them. But we still think that if everyone lends his weight it can still be done. At any rate we should not be overly concerned here with the way the world is divided or the struggle for influence or hegemony. The Council has a duty to fulfil towards peace.

123. The Council had a difficult task before it, as we said from the outset, since in this conflict there were two equally essential aspects: an external conflict and an internal tragedy—an internal drama which had, however,

taken on certain international dimensions. This accounts for our earliest failures. Each and every one of us, with the best will in the world according to his own temperament, character and personal philosophy, has perhaps emphasized one side in this tragedy but left the other side, which is no less essential, in the shade and somewhat neglected. And that is why it was difficult for us to vote in favour of a text to which the other side objected, although we did not try to hamper any effort. That was the reason for our abstentions. If there was any chance at all for peace, however, we felt that we could not go along with the majority view if it was imperfect and hence unacceptable to all, particularly the parties concerned.

124. So it has been that for hours, days, even nights, we have tried to put together, in one single text, the three major elements which were singled out again today: the cease-fire, the withdrawal of armed forces, and the political settlement. This is what the Council will find in our text, not, perhaps, balanced in such a way as to be satisfactory to everyone, but in a way we believe to be an honest one, in keeping with the most urgent needs of the situation. Perhaps there will still be some eleventh hour requirements. We are fighting not about principles, but still about words. Valéry said that peace should be made with ulterior motives. We are not sure that ulterior motives have been absent from these deliberations, but this is natural; we criticize no one. We can, however, state that we have no ulterior motive: our text has been put forward in good faith. We think that it will be acceptable to everyone and that it does open the way to peace, and that is why we appeal to all members. Those who do not believe that they can give their complete support should not put obstacles in the way of its adoption but should be satisfied with an abstention; that is all we ask. It is, however, truly our conviction that, in the interest of the United Nations, in the interest of India and Pakistan, it is now time for the Security Council to produce results.

125. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation will, of course, study carefully all the draft resolutions which have just been introduced. However, its first impression from the interpretation is that they do not define sufficiently clearly the relationship between the two main problems, the cessation of hostilities and a political settlement in East Pakistan, which the Soviet delegation has already discussed in detail in its statements, explaining the necessity for a close organic relationship between these two aspects of the problem. Accordingly, the Soviet delegation wishes to introduce the following draft resolution:

[The speaker read out the text of a draft resolution which was subsequently circulated as document S/10457.]

126. The Soviet delegation has explained in sufficient detail its approach to a settlement of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent, which is so dangerous to the cause of peace, and has more than once stressed and introduced appropriate amendments to the draft resolutions of other delegations, as well as introducing its own draft, which provides for a cease-fire, a cessation of hostilities and, simultaneously, the adoption of concrete measures to bring about a political settlement.

127. We are deeply convinced that only a combination of these two inseparably and organically linked parts of the question under discussion and of the conflict which has arisen in the Indian subcontinent can constitute a positive contribution on the part of the Security Council to a settlement of the problem of stopping the bloodshed and taking measures to facilitate a political settlement in the area.

128. The PRESIDENT: I have no more speakers on my list. The position at present appears to be as follows. The representative of Poland is not pressing for a vote this evening and is allowing for further consultations and, if possible, revision of his draft. The United Kingdom and French draft resolution has in fact not yet been officially submitted. I heard it read out by the United Kingdom representative, but I do not even have a copy before me. In his statement, he clearly indicated that he is not yet ready, because it is not complete. The draft resolution of Syria has likewise not yet been processed. In fact I have no copies before me, although it has been read for representatives to hear. I understand that the processing will take no less than two hours because of the translation into the other languages.

129. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I should like to draw attention to the fact that a draft resolution submitted by Italy and Japan is also before the Council [S/10451]. We also are not pressing for a vote on this draft resolution at this stage. I might say that we are gratified to see that the initiative which the delegations of Italy and Japan took has led to a proliferation of draft resolutions, which seems at least to have kept the members of the Security Council very busy.

130. I believe that the draft resolutions which have been presented by the Syrian Arab Republic on the one hand and France and the United Kingdom on the other have great merit and certainly deserve careful consideration. The Council also has before it the draft resolutions submitted by Poland and the Soviet Union.

131. I should like to say that my delegation has tried very hard for the last 12 days to find some way in which the Council could take a decision that would bring about, at least as a first step, a cease-fire in order to stop the shooting, the fighting, the killing and the misery of millions of people. I understand from what the President said that it will require two hours to have some of these draft resolutions circulated in the various languages. I believe that all of us around this table understand at least one of the working languages. As far as my delegation is concerned, none of the working languages is our own national language. I think that it would not be very good if we were to be stopped because of some technicalities. I believe that we can start working on the basis of the original language of each text. Since the delegation of the Soviet Union has introduced a draft resolution which is based on a draft which some delegations around this table—and I think they are well known to all members—have taken the initiative of preparing and circulating informally to other delegations, we might perhaps start some consultations on that draft, since other delegations are not pressing for a vote on their drafts. Several representatives said so eloquently some hours ago that it is time that the Security Council should

take some decision. I believe that we should suspend this meeting again to hold consultations, and we still might be able to arrive at some decision in a few hours' time, or possibly less. That, of course, does not mean that we would leave aside the other draft resolutions which I mentioned and which require and deserve careful consideration.

132. I therefore suggest that we again suspend the meeting and resume our consultations.

133. The PRESIDENT: I deliberately did not mention the draft resolution of Italy and Japan because I understood yesterday that efforts were being made to consolidate that draft resolution with other draft resolutions. It appears that those efforts ended in complete failure. I thought, therefore, that that draft, like some others, had died a natural death. That is why I did not mention it. However, the representative of Italy has now stated that his draft is alive, and it is therefore still before the Council.

134. If there are no other speakers, perhaps we might regard the suggestion of the representative of Italy as a motion to be considered under rule 33 of our provisional rules of procedure, because he is asking for a further suspension of the meeting.

135. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, your first proposal was to suspend the meeting until the morning. Three new draft resolutions have been submitted. They had previously been discussed during consultations, but had not been introduced formally in their final form. They have now all been introduced, but, while the representative of the United Kingdom had declared at the previous meeting his intention to submit a draft resolution, the proposal and

the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Syria have come as rather a surprise.

136. Therefore, since there are now official texts, I assume that some delegations, although fortunately not all, will have to communicate these texts to their Governments with relevant comments, and obtain by tomorrow instructions on how to act. The hasty adoption of such a draft as that submitted by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France would in my view be premature until we have reported to our capitals and received appropriate instructions.

137. I therefore believe that your proposal to adjourn until the morning, in order to give delegations time, during the night and up to 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, to study the draft resolutions, report to their capitals and obtain instructions, would be sensible. Positive results can hardly be achieved in two hours, and we may find ourselves in the same position as we are now. Moreover, it will take two hours to prepare the text in the appropriate working languages, and only then will delegations be able to study the substance of these new proposals thoroughly.

138. It would therefore be desirable from every point of view not to insist on suspending the meeting for two hours, then begin to study the text at about two o'clock, and then return and start all over again.

139. The PRESIDENT: As there are no other names on the list of speakers, subject to what members may have to say, I propose to adjourn this meeting until 10.30 a.m. Since there is no objection, the meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose on Thursday, 16 December, at 12.20 a.m.