



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR

**1478<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 18 JUNE 1969

NEW YORK

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## NOTE

*Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.*

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 18 June 1969, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. M. SOLANO LOPEZ (Paraguay).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Algeria, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Zambia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1478)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia

Letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper

Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (S/9237 and Add.1-2)

### Reports of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/8954 and S/9252)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): In a letter dated 17 June 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council and reproduced in document S/9261, the Permanent Representative of India has requested to be invited to take part in this debate. Just before the beginning of this meeting I received a similar request from the Permanent Representative of Sudan. If there is no objection, I propose to invite the representatives of India and Sudan to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

*It was so decided.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions already taken by the Council, I shall also invite the representatives of Mauritania, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea and Somalia to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

3. Since the space at the Council table is limited, in accordance with the practice followed in the past in similar cases I shall invite the representatives of Mauritania, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea, Somalia, India and Sudan to take the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council table.

4. I have just received a request from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to be allowed to participate in this debate. In accordance with past practice, and if there are no objections, I propose to invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

*It was so decided.*

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. A. Ould Daddah (Mauritania), Mr. A. B. C. Danieli (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. A. Touré (Guinea), Mr. A. A. Farah (Somalia), Mr. S. Sen (India), Mr. M. Fakhreddine (Sudan) and Mr. J. M. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.*

5. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

6. The first speaker on my list is the representative of India, on whom I call.

7. Mr. SEN (India): Permit me to thank you, Mr. President, and through you the members of the Council, for letting me avail myself of the usual procedure of the Council to allow non-members to participate without vote in the debate—in this particular instance, on the question of Rhodesia. If I have asked for this indulgence of the Council, it is not because my country, India, has any special wisdom to contribute to the solution of this difficult problem, but mainly because of our interest—I almost said special interest—and experience in this ominous subject of *apartheid*. This is my only justification for delaying the Council by a few minutes.

8. Facts and figures have already been given by various speakers who have preceded me. I shall try to avoid repetition of those facts; they speak for themselves. I shall, on the other hand, to be a little more analytical with regard to the problem facing us.

9. India was the first country in the United Nations to have achieved independence through a long, bitter and, at times, bloody struggle. India was the first country to bring the problem of *apartheid* to the attention of the General Assembly. So many speakers have emphasized the potential and inherent danger of this evil of *apartheid* that it should be clear to all who wish to see that unless we can remove this evil, in time it will affect us all, big or small. It is also evident that India, being the most populous country represented in the United Nations cannot but be concerned most seriously if the present race relations turn into a universal conflict. And that conflict cannot be avoided if we do not or will not take effective preventive action now.

10. To turn to the main features of the problem before us, the most outstanding one among them is that while the British Government continues to claim responsibility for restoring legality in Zimbabwe and continues also to declare that the Smith régime is in a state of rebellion against the British Crown, that Government is unable to bring down that régime, far less to crush it or to punish those persons who are guilty of rebellion. For years now and in different forums, the British Government has explained that it is against the use of force in Zimbabwe on the ground that it would involve much human misery—in fact, there is already a great deal of suffering there—that its consequences cannot be calculated, and that force frequently fails to bring about the desired result. For years we have been persuaded, however reluctantly, by that argument. Yet what is the result?

11. The sanctions have proved a dismal failure and the long list of “actions” which the delegation of the United Kingdom has told the Council that its Government has taken to bring about the fall of the Smith régime have had no effect on it. Other speakers have told us at length and in detail how the sanctions have failed and some countries have not even removed their consular representatives from Zimbabwe. In fact, by publicly and repeatedly declaring that force would not be used, the British Government has laid itself open to the charge or criticism that it has encouraged the illegal régime of Ian Smith in its intransigence and foul racist doctrine and its police state methods.

12. In these circumstances we are entitled to ask what action the British Government now contemplates to avert

the acute “dangers to peace and stability in the whole region of central and southern Africa. . . . Even outside Africa stresses are being created between nations by this issue” [1331st meeting, para. 23]. These words are not mine, but are the words of Mr. George Brown, former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, before the Security Council on 8 December 1966.

13. Since all the British theories about how to bring about Mr. Smith’s downfall have failed, the Council is understandably sceptical about further British advice as to what should be done. We can and we should, of course, condemn the proposed constitution, but we shall have to supplement such a measure with others more substantial and more effective.

14. The time has come to stop shadow-boxing and come to grips with the real problems. Reality demands that we accept the hard fact that we are not dealing with the Smith régime, but with a collusive and offensive pact and philosophy forged by Mr. Smith and his merry men, together with South Africa and Portugal.

15. The second real problem is that although many noble statements have been made condemning *apartheid*, South Africa and Portugal, many States have not matched their statements by their actions. Indeed, we have had a feeling over the years that many delegations do not yet take seriously the inherent danger in the policy of *apartheid* and Portuguese colonialism; perhaps they think that there is no imminent danger, that problems will resolve themselves, or that it is too difficult, politically or financially, to take the right type of action. My delegation disagrees with this line of thinking and considers that racial tension today constitutes a genuine threat to international peace and security, and that the time has come when we must impose harsh and effective sanctions against the illegal Rhodesian régime and against South Africa and Portugal, until they behave in a more civilized way and talk less about Western civilization, of which they know next to nothing. This is the second feature of our problem.

16. Practically all religions teach us that nothing good can be achieved in this life unless we are prepared to make the effort or pay the price. Curiously, this also seems to be the philosophy underlying a free and competitive economy. If the sanctions that I have suggested do not produce results, for whatever reasons, we should consider using force, not in an irresponsible or callous manner but to the extent that it becomes absolutely necessary. It is conceivable that even the threat of force could bring cowards and bullies to their senses. We have had some experience of this. If we fail to protect the Africans from the indignities, exploitation and miseries to which they have been subjected in the hands of the racists, who will blame them if they make their own arrangements to assert their legitimate rights by such means as are or may become available to them? I for one shall not. If we fail them now, should we not, in considering whether or not force should be used, keep in mind the price which we shall have to pay eventually in blood and treasure? It is the failure of the United Nations in numerous ways to bring about changes in race relations in Africa and the frequent complacency about this subject in many prosperous but racially different parts of the world

that account for the bitterness that is sweeping Africa and many other continents besides. This is the third feature of our problem.

17. Briefly, therefore we would recommend for the consideration of the Council that apart from condemning the proposed constitution, we should extend most stringent and extensive sanctions against the régime of Mr. Smith, South Africa and Portugal. Let us not in this context waste time and idle tears on the effect such sanctions will have on the Africans themselves, for the fact is that they will put up with it for a better future, but it is far from certain if the rich and powerful will apply them, for fear of immediate losses. Our action could well be covered by Article 41 of the Charter.

18. Secondly, we should make it clear that if Mr. Smith and the white minority in Zimbabwe do not accept a civilized coexistence with the Africans, the Council will take action to use force to the extent necessary in terms of Article 42 of the Charter. These measures will not inhibit the British Government from taking such other steps it may consider necessary to carry out its pledge of NIBMAR—no independence before majority African rule—and to bring an end to the rebellion. The British Government may be assured of very widespread support within and without the Council in taking such supplementary action. I have in mind, for instance, that it may want to bring Mr. Smith and the men who support him to actual trial for rebellion—one of the many actions which the British Government could take even if force were to be used as the only solution.

19. On the other hand, if we do not act swiftly and effectively, Mr. Smith will simply ignore once again the country he and his settlers owe so much to, and will continue in a scandalous manner to flout the authority of this Council and so reduce its effectiveness. No one would wish for dissension or division in the United Nations, but surely the way to achieve unanimity in the Council is for the minority to abide by the wishes of the majority and not the other way round. We do not wish to be in the position of the British matron who, watching her son in a parade, exclaimed, "Everyone is out of step except our little Johnnie". Personally, I do not believe that any unanimous action or lack of action or even division in the Council will have the slightest effect on Mr. Smith unless he realizes that we mean to have our way and it is he who will have to pay a greater price if he challenges the conscience of mankind and all decent human values.

20. The Government of the United Kingdom is a fully sovereign entity and it can take any action it wishes. However, when it brought this subject to the Security Council [1257th meeting] it explained that it did so because it wished to have the support of the Member States in order to secure maximum application of all measures, short of the use of force, for removing the illegal régime of Mr. Smith. It also felt that a "situation the continuance of which could be a menace to international peace and security" had arisen [1263rd meeting, para. 8]. The United Nations and the Council have given ample support to the measures suggested by the Government of the United Kingdom, but the total effect of such measures has been so negligible that Mr. Smith now feels bold enough to take the

final plunge. In these circumstances, could we not expect that the United Kingdom would take account of our goodwill and support and decide to respect the views of the Africans, so ably voiced by so many speakers from that continent?

21. Finally, those with a philosophical or anthropological trend of mind might argue that solutions of complicated and long-standing social problems of race relations and adjustments cannot be brought about by legislation or force or quickly, even through such an august body as the Security Council. According to them these changes can come about only slowly, through education and evolution. Unfortunately this comfortable doctrine does not take into account that millions of Africans are not prepared to wait and to be systematically booted and hooted by a small racial minority. Nor do these pundits always realize that human efforts can and should direct evolution in the right direction. We should be men and act according to our best lights, rather than let nature take its own course with all its dangers and pitfalls, indeed with its threat to international peace and security.

22. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The next speaker on my list is the representative of Sudan, on whom I call.

23. Mr. FAKHREDDINE (Sudan): I am grateful to you, Mr. President, and to the members of the Council for allowing my delegation to participate without vote in this debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

24. As the Council meets to discuss the question of Southern Rhodesia, its deliberations are overshadowed by the virtual certainty that in two days the white colonialist settlers of Southern Rhodesia will sanctify their oppression of the rightful inhabitants of the country by approving their new constitution.

25. The endorsement of that constitution by the selected electorate does not seem in any doubt. And while it is viewed in some quarters with approval and in others with resignation, the people of the African continent see it in another light. To them it represents yet another step in the inexorable progress towards confrontation between the white colonialist settlers in southern Africa and the oppressed indigenous African population; and inasmuch as the oppressors have joined their forces, the African people have gained a new sense of solidarity and a new determination to wrest their freedom. The passage of this constitution will inevitably lead the people of Africa to the realization that, ultimately, their freedom will not be handed over to them—that they will have to show that they deserve to gain it by demonstrating their will and ability to undergo any sacrifice. "The door of our freedom", the poet says, "is red, red with the blood of the martyrs whose stained hands are for ever pounding on it to gain admittance". The door will yield to the force of those desperate and determined hands.

26. Yet the Security Council, while it may realize the inevitability of the coming confrontation in southern Africa, has a clear duty as a guardian of peace and security to try to prevent that confrontation. It is indeed regrettable that the record of the Council in this regard has not been

encouraging; it has been a record of doing too little too late. But we do not consider that this is a reason to lose hope. The Council is now faced with an opportunity and a challenge.

27. Now since this proposed constitution in Southern Rhodesia will represent the final break of its tenuous political tie with the United Kingdom, Britain's claim for any sort of jurisdiction over Southern Rhodesia will become even less credible. Britain must now prepare for the inevitable and final break and renounce the claim for any special privilege in dealing with this question. Britain must now face the situation not merely as an administering Power, but as a responsible Member of the United Nations and must seek and find with other Members of the United Nations and with members of this Council an adequate remedy.

28. It must now be obvious to Britain, as it is indeed obvious to most of us, that they have now come to the end of the road in the application of economic sanctions. There is no doubt now that economic sanctions, as they have been applied to Southern Rhodesia, have failed. The reasons for this failure have been enumerated by many speakers in this debate. In fact they have been anticipated by many of us, yet Britain would not be warned. One would hope that they will now face this situation with a new awareness and demonstrate their desire for justice and their support for righteousness.

29. Now indeed is the time for action, but such action must provide adequate remedy for the injustice that is about to be compounded by the promulgation of the *apartheid* constitution in Southern Rhodesia. Such action cannot be a reiteration of condemnation. The United Nations has condemned the policy and practice of *apartheid*. The United Nations has acted before in imposing economic sanctions on the Government of Ian Smith in the hope that economic sanctions would bring about the downfall of that régime. But, because those sanctions were at first selective, they allowed the régime to make certain adjustments in the economy and to continue to function, if not to prosper. When this failure was realized, economic sanctions were made mandatory. These again, as we all know, have failed. We cannot now take the retrograde step of voicing condemnation of the Smith régime when confronted with the failure of our action to bring about its downfall by the imposition of sanctions.

30. It is clear, at least to us, that we should not take that course of action; we should not merely resort to condemnation. It is not logical, when action has palpably failed, to fall back on mere words. The United Nations would have to bear a heavy responsibility if it were to decide to fall back on condemnation, which offers no solace to the oppressed people of Africa.

31. One wonders why a system like that of Ian Smith should seek to legalize its oppression by enacting a constitution. We should realize that we cannot be all things to all people. How can we condemn injustice and yet continue to take the oppressor unto our bosom, as the United Nations has been doing with South Africa? There has not been any condemnation more vehement or more

unanimous than our condemnation of South Africa and its policies of *apartheid*. Yet, South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, persists in the single-minded pursuit of its fascist and repressive policies. South Africa has demonstrated beyond any doubt that the censure of world public opinion is no deterrent. South Africa stands condemned by the world, and yet continues to prosper economically. It is not isolated; it does not suffer in any way, even from the fact that many Member States do not recognize its Government or maintain diplomatic representation with it. Nor, for that matter, will the new Rhodesia, its close ally, unless the United Nations decides really to act in fulfilment of its Charter and the very reason for its being.

32. The Security Council has found that this situation in Southern Rhodesia bears in it a threat to peace. It has, in order to prevent the aggravation of the situation, decided to take measures, short of the use of armed force, designed to curb the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. Those measures have proved inadequate. It can now either pursue the remedies provided for in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter or acknowledge its failure, since it is deceptive and immoral to pretend that it can achieve a reversal of the course that the Smith régime has been pursuing by any means short of force. The history of mankind has repeatedly demonstrated the illusory and vain nature of the hope that both peace and justice can be maintained in the same place at the same time.

33. When the United Nations has failed, the white colonialist minorities in Southern Rhodesia and in the rest of southern Africa will have to bend before the onslaught of the African masses. By that time it will be too late for compassion; the time for compassion will have passed. The claims for pity and humaneness will have been forfeited as the vengeance of the oppressed will be terrible and unsparing.

34. Yet, one dares to hope that the United Nations will not by its negligence be a party to this turn of events; one hopes that the United Nations—and this Council—will act while there is still time for meaningful and adequate action.

35. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Saudi Arabia.

36. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Thank you, Mr. President, and members of the Council, for allowing me to address myself to the item under consideration.

37. In view of what I would call the cavalier manner in which this question of Southern Rhodesia has been handled in the United Nations, including the Security Council, and taking into account that for the last three years or so the tendency in the Council has been to engage in quiet consultations, arriving at a consensus of platitudes based on fond hopes and pious declarations, it is high time that someone like myself should raise his voice and, with your permission, warn the United Nations that, should we continue the style that we have adopted in our debates, we will once more accentuate the misgivings of peoples all over the world who think that, after all, we are no better than an academic society dealing in abstracts that cannot be translated into palpable results. What we need here is less

consensus, and more resolve to act. The League of Nations failed and ultimately foundered because the stress was placed on the publicity of its deliberations rather than on resolute action.

38. One might ask: "Why should Baroody take the floor? This is not the Middle East." After all, we are all Members of the United Nations and are supposed to be bound by brotherhood, and if the Africans are not my brothers and sisters, I should like to ask, who are? I have considered the Europeans, even the British when I lived among them, as my brothers. Is it just to criticize without having anything constructive to offer as a way out of the impasse in which the Council finds itself on this item, and for that matter on other questions? No, sir. Criticism does not solve problems—even when it is constructive—in making plausible suggestions. It is creative thinking that we need most today, and there is no dearth of clear thinkers in this Council. I hope that the statesmen or politicians behind them will also engage in clear thinking rather than in platitudes by sending instructions spelled out in resolutions that cannot be implemented or a consensus that would beguile—though it no longer does—the oppressed people with the hope that salvation is not too far off. No, sir. As I said, criticism does not solve problems—even when it is constructive—in making plausible suggestions. By creative thinking, which we need today, I mean that type of thinking that can be translated into action. Otherwise we would be engaging in too much ado about nothing. I heard Shakespeare being quoted the other day by my colleague from Turkey, and then my colleague from the United Kingdom cited *Othello*. That is what we are engaged in here—much ado about nothing. Then what will happen is that we shall become the laughing-stock of the peoples of the world.

39. I am not concerned about the names that have been given to the Mandated Territory of South West Africa, "Namibia", or to Zimbabwe. I am concerned about the indigenous people of Africa who are still under the yoke of colonial Powers, whether those Powers seceded from the metropolitan States years ago through the instrumentality of being members of the Commonwealth, as in the case of the Republic of South Africa, or by the rebelliousness of the régime, such as that of Mr. Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia. As I said, it is high time that members of the Council did some creative thinking, especially that this question has been churning in our minds for the past few years.

40. I participated in the discussions in the Fourth Committee. I gave a blueprint for a solution at one time.<sup>1</sup> Some of my African brothers toyed with it, and nothing was done. I thought I could not be more African than the Africans. In this instance you will recall that two or three years ago I suggested in the General Assembly that we think seriously about a co-administrator for the Mandate over what was then known as South West Africa.<sup>2</sup> Again, a good number of my African brothers encouraged me to such an extent that I submitted a draft resolution and I went as far as to consult with certain States, two of them great Powers,

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Fourth Committee*, 1609th meeting, para. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 1449th meeting, paras. 172-178.

two States that wield world power, but they backed out, saying they did not want a confrontation. I am not going to name them; you know them. Then I contacted some of my Scandinavian colleagues, and one or two of them transmitted the idea to their Governments. I went as far as to discuss the question with the Foreign Minister of South Africa, to whom my good friend Ambassador Botha introduced me. I do not know whether the Government of South Africa heeded my warnings and discussed my suggestions but I finally formalized those suggestions in a draft resolution. At the last minute my African friends were beguiled by the promises of the representative of one of the great Powers, who said that they had better content themselves at that time with having a Council for South West Africa to deal with this subject. A "Council" sounds better than a committee. Being good-hearted, those African brothers thought: "Now let us forget about a co-administrator." I told them, not only in person but from the rostrum of the General Assembly, that Clemenceau once said, "If you want to kill any item, form a committee and transfer that item to it." They said, "That was in other days." I retorted that things have not changed in many respects since the Treaty of Versailles. I suspended my draft resolution. It is still on the books, and, should there be any need to revive it, I will do so one of these days, with God's help and the co-operation of Members of the General Assembly.

41. Why have I mentioned all this? Because if our African colleagues had not been so good-hearted and so beguiled by empty promises, I think something could have been done even with the Republic of South Africa to persuade it to accept a co-administrator from a small State to accelerate the independence of what is now known as Namibia—Namibia on paper only, in name but not in fact; let us be frank about these things.

42. But now we are seized of the question of Southern Rhodesia. I am very proud of the British Government and I am very proud of Lord Caradon that they have not yet yielded and said, "We now wash our hands of Southern Rhodesia." Technically, it is still a British colony, and I think legally also; so we have been assured. I think we are thankful to the British for being tenacious at least. But technicalities and legalities do not solve the problem. It is action that does. What line of creative action, then, should the Council take?

43. I have a plan. I called it a radical plan, but someone said, "You are a monarchist. Do not call it a radical plan. 'Radical' has something to do with communism." I prefer to call it "a novel plan". But radical or novel, it does not matter what you call it. It is not new; I gave an outline of it in the Fourth Committee and I will repeat it now.

44. The plan would be to create a United Nations fund, financed by those who are directly concerned, so that short-wave broadcast programmes might be instituted and carried on twenty-four hours a day, every hour on the hour, broadcasting not necessarily rebellion but the human rights that should be enjoyed by the indigenous people of Africa still remaining under the colonial yoke. The broadcasts would be directed not only to the indigenous peoples, but to the white population of South Africa as well, telling

them that they are doing wrong, telling them what is going on in the world and how they are alienating themselves from all the rest of the world by practising *apartheid*, by thinking of themselves as demigods stalking the earth, by arrogating to themselves superiority not only in demeanor but by their rule, as if they were the lords of that part of Africa. It would be an educative programme.

45. You all know very well that not a long time ago there was what was called the Voice of Free Europe. I do not know which part of Europe was free and which part of it was slave, but it was called the "Voice of Free Europe". I do not know either whether it is still in existence, but the Voice has run down to almost a whisper these days; you do not hear much of it. I was here in the Security Council in the 1950s when the Voice of Free Europe was operating. Well, why should there not be a "Voice of Namibia" or a "Voice of Zimbabwe"? Why not? And it should be financed by a fund derived not from one particular State but from the United Nations collectively—provided the finances are mostly paid by those that are directly concerned, because any further funds to be established by this Organization should go to the members of the Secretariat for a better living-wage. But this we will come to in the Fifth Committee in due time.

46. We hear of all kinds of spying devices—planes, ships, submarines. This is what appears in the press. There are many things we do not know about; we are small nations trying to develop ourselves economically. I once heard about a peculiar plane. You know about it too; you have heard about it. I do not want to embarrass members here; I do not want Baroody to appear as if he were trying to criticize one nation or another. However, I think all those big Powers have all kinds of spying devices. We cannot afford them, even if we wanted to have them. As I said, I heard about a plane that was detected flying above the ceiling that was regarded as being the highest attainable a few years ago. It was a spy plane flying over another country, and it was shot down. We do not know, but maybe spy submarines also go here and there.

47. Why do not those States that have planes capable of flying over every part of the world without being chased away, in the event that the radio broadcasts I suggested are jammed—and we know that nations jam certain programmes that their Governments regard as unsuitable for their peoples—why do those States not have their planes or other conveyances drop educational leaflets, in the respective dialects and in English, to the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, telling them of their rights as decent human beings entitled to political, economic and social rights like any other people in the world? Would it be very costly for a well-meaning, wealthy nation to undertake such an enterprise? What would it cost? Nowadays in modern conflicts thousands of planes are lost. You hear on the radio of the thousands of planes that are lost.

48. This stage of my creative plan, if I may call it so with modesty, would be a stage preparatory for something further. Let us assume that this stage would be one of broadcasting and of dropping leaflets and pamphlets to awaken both the indigenous peoples of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to their rights and the white population

to their duties and obligations towards their brothers, who, regardless of the colour of their skins, are also *homo sapiens*, descended from the same hominids—and sometimes I think the hominids would have been better than *homo sapiens*; I wonder.

49. What will be the second stage? There is a conglomerate of nations known as the Organization of African Unity. They have men who are sincere, who are sincere and dedicated. We do not have to adopt any resolution here to send a peace-keeping operation. Let there be a corps of the States of the Organization of African Unity, disciplined and trained by military emissaries of the United Nations. They should see to it that a cordon would be set up around Southern Rhodesia to make sure that no goods will be transported by surface carriers such as by rail, or by any other conveyance.

50. Of course, I am not suggesting that anyone should shoot down cargo planes, because we in the Security Council are trying to keep the peace. But this may not be enough. Why may this not be enough? Because of the cartels, the monopolies, the giant corporations. I know something about them; I have known something about them since the twenties. In the aftermath of the First World War, I was in Western Europe and I was assured by Germans and by Frenchmen that certain cartels sold arms to both sides during the First World War—to the French and to the Germans. I do not know if the British had need of them; they were a big industrial Power—but they probably bought some of those arms too.

51. What were these cartels? Were they Indian cartels, or Arabian cartels? They were European cartels and they were selling to both sides. The patriotism of these people resides in their pocket. Incidentally, I am sorry to say that the more materialistic the world becomes, the more one finds that the first refuge of patriotism is in the pocketbook or in the bank account. It is unfortunate, but it is so.

52. I was involved in an uprising in one of the Mandated Territories, but in a peaceful manner. When I was twenty I once smuggled in my socks lists of arms bought from a Mandatory Power, in order to be used against that same Mandatory Power. I did not buy the arms; I was only a nationalist trying to help, and almost got killed in the process. That was in 1925. I do not want to state the location or who was involved in that uprising.

53. Therefore, what can one expect from those States which have strong economic and financial relations with South Africa which produces much gold and diamonds? I do not mean diamonds to embellish the necks or the rings of ladies, but diamonds for industrial use.

54. We know what is happening to most of the world currencies today. These currencies are being eroded by inflation. Gold is a metal that does not tarnish, and it is suggested time and again that gold should become the base of currencies as it was of yore. Many a time none other than Mr. Jacques Rueff has suggested a reversion to gold. But, of course, certain countries want their own currencies to constitute a part of the reserve funds of other countries. And when they devalue their currencies, who pays the



difference? The people who have held reserves of those currencies in their national coffers. But nowadays one does not have to devalue currencies. Currencies are being eroded, because the index of the cost of living shows that it is always on the rise. And South Africa is necessary for those countries to bolster their reserves, because perhaps one day gold again may be used as the principal base for national currencies. Furthermore industrial complexes and combines need diamonds because diamonds are irreplaceable in industry, in spite of the laser beams that have been devised. They take the part of incising certain steel sheets and other material. Hence, diamonds are still very important for the development of modern industry. I am not talking out of my head; I have been told all this by technical people who know.

55. Now, let us look into the importance of Southern Rhodesia to certain States. I shall read from a report given to me and I vouch for its authenticity. It reads: "The mining industry in Rhodesia continued to be wholly owned and controlled by foreign-based monopolies." But you would say that you do not know what monopolies they are. We shall come to that. There is an area there of 2,680 square miles south of Lake Kariba, an area likely to be rich in gold, copper and uranium. There again is gold; there is copper. I do not know where my Chilean friend is. Some companies are always renegotiating copper prices with Chile and other countries. But here they do not have to renegotiate prices. Southern Rhodesia will tell them: Well, we will have fixed prices, whereby you will eat a good slice of the cake and we will eat the rest of the cake thanks to cheap labour.

56. Uranium is also very important, although bacteriological warfare is getting more in the news these days. But still, uranium is not used only for war purposes. One can use uranium for generating electricity. There is so much pollution in the big cities and one day, perhaps, the utilities will turn to atomic energy. Uranium is a base for generating electricity.

57. We would not be unhappy, because we would still use our oil in Saudi Arabia for food. Do not think that we will be bankrupt. We will inhale good air, and not the polluted air of New York, if more uranium is used—not for bombs and atomic weapons but for industry and lighting cities.

58. And Southern Rhodesia has nickel. Who are the shareholders of those companies in Southern Rhodesia and in the Republic of South Africa? I was not going to read out names, but the information has been furnished. I have certain names here. I do not want to embarrass friends and others. Some of them are members of legislatures of countries which have interests in Rhodesia and in the Republic of South Africa.

59. I shall read the names of some of the companies—and some of them are very big companies: Unilever, Metal Box Company, African Explosives and Chemical Industries Ltd, De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd, the monopolists of diamonds, Nettlefolds, the chloride groups, British Insulated, Callenders Cables, Lancaster Steel, Stewart and Lloyds, Tate and Lyle—these are their Rhodesian sugar refineries—British Petroleum, Eveready Batteries, and

Vickers. In my early days it used to be Vickers-Armstrong, purveyors of arms. Now it is Vickers: I do not know what happened to Armstrong. Then we have Hawker-Siddeley Bush Ltd, Gallaghers and, of course, British American Tobacco. Some of my friends told me that tobacco stocks were piling up and spoiling. I said: "You are ignorant; although I am not a smoker, I know that if it is stored, tobacco gets better, like wine. The Rhodesians will get better prices for it." And do not think that Mr. Ian Smith is going to choke on a surplus of tobacco by smoking too much of it.

60. So we find that the economic situation does not pave the way to any settlement in the Council because of the financial and other interrelation between that part of the world and certain countries. And I am not going to name them; you know them, but we have to play the game of politeness.

61. What is the second stage of my plan? I said that the first stage should be broadcasting educational material, enlightening material, day in and day out; sending high-flying planes to distribute leaflets and booklets. We believe in education. Sooner or later I think that this method will have an impact both on the coloured people of Southern Rhodesia and on the white people who live there and have arrogated to themselves the responsibility for running the whole country—225,000 of them are trying to lord it over four and a quarter million coloured Africans. By what dint of logic, by what yardstick of justice can we allow these things to go on in the era of the United Nations? By rationalization?

62. I do not think that anybody should be hard on the United Kingdom for not taking a more drastic line of action that it has done. And I have the courage to explain why. I do not hold a brief for the United Kingdom; it is well represented by an illustrious gentleman who is the friend of all of us. But sometimes a stranger can say things that the representative of a given country may not find it appropriate to mention for various reasons which might confront any one of us if his own country were concerned. But I stand to be corrected and I apologize if I am wrong.

63. First, the United Kingdom has—and for that matter have others besides the United Kingdom, in fairness to the latter—vast interests in the Republic of South Africa and also in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom bore the brunt of the Second World War. It got rid of 95 per cent of its colonies in the wake of the Second World War, and we salute it for that. The British are a people which has struggled for freedom and democracy—the right type of democracy at one time—and everybody knows that the British Parliament is the Mother of all Parliaments in Europe. It is not in any way shameful if one does not wield world power; it is not shameful for a State if it does not wield world power as it had done before. On the contrary, I think that it is an advantage to be a small Power. Do not get me wrong—the United Kingdom is not such a small Power, but I speak in general because even if a small Power wanted to hurt another Power it could not do so, and that is a privilege. Power corrupts, as Lord Acton said.

64. Second, the United Kingdom had no experience in its homeland of mixing with coloured people. We hear voices

in the United Kingdom saying that the 600,000 coloured people now in that country are too many, although again we salute the present Government for having stood up to those critics who wish to banish the coloured people from the United Kingdom. We salute the present Government for taking such a courageous stand. But I submit that should the United Kingdom take any drastic measures—aside from the financial interests and economic ties which it has with that region of the world—no British Government would be able to survive the rebellion of the British white people against it for adopting a policy against the whites in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Let us face the facts. We ourselves could be beset in a different manner by similar problems. Therefore, as we say in Arabic—and this is a translation—God does not expect anyone to carry a heavier burden than he can bear. I think that, very politely and very ably, Lord Caradon, and other representatives of the United Kingdom in the Fourth Committee and in other organs of the United Nations, have made it clear that they were not prepared to use force. They do not tell you what I am saying, and if I were in their place I might take the same stand.

65. Then shall we wash our hands at the United Nations and say: The United Kingdom will not take action, does not want to use force, and violence may breed violence and we are here to preserve the peace? What is the solution?

66. There is a solution, again in line with some creative thinking. There are two world Powers that have emerged on the scene since the Second World War. When they spend billions of dollars for the exploration of outer space or for increasing their armaments; that is nothing. I think that they could allocate some of the money for a project which I shall take the liberty to unfold before the Council.

67. If the first stage of my plan of a free Africa programme, the distribution of literature by various means and the territorial cordon around Southern Rhodesia under the aegis of the United Nations fails, then, with the permission of the United Kingdom, which has never given up its political struggle against Southern Rhodesia—the United Kingdom insists that Southern Rhodesia is still a colony, it has manifested readiness to negotiate time and again and its Prime Minister even went out of his country to meet Mr. Ian Smith, but failed to reach any practical solution with him—the two great Powers and any other concerned Power that would like to join them, with the co-operation of certain African States, could arrange for a regiment of parachutists to pounce on the Government House in Southern Rhodesia and put Mr. Ian Smith and his cohorts in straitjackets, without hurting them. I think that they suffer from a psychosis, and we do not believe in hurting anyone bodily or otherwise. They could be taken to London because, after all, Southern Rhodesia is still a colony, and the United Kingdom could then take over, and the genius which the British have for democratic government would then not only come in handy but would provide a solution for the whole problem.

68. Of course, there would be some casualties, but there is nothing that can be achieved without paying a certain price. Remember that this plan can be modified in such a way as not to entail too many casualties. During the Second World

War Council members know very well that the Nazis abducted a chief of State. Were the Nazis more capable than are the two great Powers if they put their heads together?

69. Now if one State does not want the other State to co-operate with it for reasons of ideology, then the United Kingdom could carry out the operation with that other State. I say this advisedly, because a certain ideology is still anathema in certain parts of the world, although there are many political parties that have embraced that ideology. Again, I am speaking advisedly because we do not have that party. But I can understand others who might feel that there is an obstacle. Let therefore one of the two great Powers, in co-operation with the United Kingdom, carry out the operation, perhaps not to the letter but some type of operation along the lines I have suggested in order to put an end to the impasse in which the indigenous people of Zimbabwe and Namibia find themselves. It could also put an end to the very embarrassing situation in which we here in the United Nations find ourselves year in and year out, in not being able to do anything except talk. Somebody said, "Well, is not talk the stock and trade of diplomats at the United Nations?" I said, "No, we are supposed to act through the Security Council." It is understandable that the General Assembly makes recommendations, but it is the Security Council that should take action in hand.

70. I shall now read from a telegram that has been handed to me. This is from Rhodesia. It reads:

"At Salisbury movie theatre Smith"—meaning Mr. Ian Smith—"told luncheon crowd that a vote for the constitution would be a message to busybodies everywhere in the world"—busybodies meaning us, the United Nations—"that are wasting their time sticking their noses in our affairs."

We are sticking our noses in their affairs, we, the Security Council, an august body of the United Nations, the organ which is responsible for the maintenance of peace. Well, if we are used to swallowing such bitter pills, such news dispatches when they are published will constitute a challenge to us as to whether we are to remain with arms folded or whether we are to do something practical and, if I may say so, not only practical but also practicable, something that can be implemented instead of expressing pious hopes or trying to be sanctimonious about our work, as if we were the arbiters of justice when we cannot enforce the semblance of it.

71. That is my message to the United Nations on this question. Far be it from me to feel that my suggestions are sacrosanct and final. But I thought that they might start someone on another line of thought in the attempt to find a practical solution, one perhaps which might be very different from that contained in the suggestions that I have submitted. But we have to start thinking creatively in the Council, instead of sitting here wearing the straitjackets of instructions of many politicians who sit far away in our capitals. We have our dignity as diplomats. I venture to say that if many of the statesmen or politicians in our capitals—and some of them are not statesmen but politicians—would delegate more power to the representatives

sitting around this table, I think that our task would be much easier and that we could arrive at practical solutions.

72. Again, Mr. President, and honorable members of the Security Council, I thank you for having granted me permission to speak. I do apologize if my remarks have in any way hurt the feelings of any one representative sitting here, because they were not intended to hurt. My remarks were solely intended as a gadfly to the banal state of inactivity in which, unfortunately, the United Nations has found itself during the last few years.

73. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*translated from French*): In our previous statement we expressed the grave concern of the States members of the Organization of African Unity at the continuous worsening of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. We expressed doubts of the efficacy of the measures taken by our Organization. Today we have before us two reports of the Committee set up under Security Council resolution 253 [S/8954, S/9262] which definitely corroborate these doubts.

74. I do not wish to make a thorough analysis of these reports, as we are all aware of their contents. I should like, however, to stress certain aspects which show the extent to which the Smith régime has strengthened its position with the support of certain Member States, particularly Portugal and the Pretoria régime.

75. Annex I to document S/9252 shows that during 1968 the value of exports from Southern Rhodesia appears to have fallen from \$264 million to \$256 million, while the value of its imports appears to have increased from \$262 million to \$290 million. According to these figures the decline in exports was barely 3 per cent, whereas imports rose by 12 per cent. I would point out that these figures are for 1968, the year in which resolution 253, imposing mandatory sanctions against the Smith régime, was adopted. Despite these measures, imports into Southern Rhodesia increased by nearly \$30 million whereas exports fell by only \$8 million. This situation has arisen because a number of States Members of the United Nations which have announced that they had implemented resolution 253 (1968) have in fact done very little to observe it. The value of the imports of these States, which are listed in annex I, was \$75 million and of their exports \$45 million according to Rhodesian statistics, and £45 million according to United Kingdom estimates. It has also arisen because the value of South Africa's imports amounted to approximately \$80 million in 1967 and apparently to \$100 million in 1968.

76. It should be noted that the Pretoria régime has not thus far seen fit to reply to the communications of the Secretary-General requesting it to provide information on the measures which it has taken to implement resolution 253 (1968).

77. The observations of the Committee set up pursuant to resolution 253 (1968) leave no doubt of the part South Africa and Portugal are playing in support of the Smith régime. Permit me in this connexion to quote a passage of the report:

"Certain States, however, are not complying or are not yet complying fully with the measures imposed by the

Security Council. On the basis of all the facts at its disposal, the Committee wishes to state that the Governments of South Africa and Portugal have not taken any measures to implement the provisions of resolution 253 (1968) and have continued to maintain close economic, trade and other relations with the illegal régime and to permit the free flow of goods from Southern Rhodesia through the territories of South Africa and the colony of Mozambique and their ports and transport facilities.

"The Committee also noted with regret that the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia has been carrying on trade with States other than South Africa and Portugal in contravention of the sanctions and that this illegal trade, according to one estimate, amounted to approximately £44 million in 1968." [S/9252, paras. 45 and 46.]

78. One year after the adoption of the resolution 253 (1968), South Africa and Portugal have taken no measures to implement the provisions of this resolution and are helping to strengthen Southern Rhodesia economically and politically. Lisbon and Pretoria are still deliberately defying the decisions of the Security Council in flagrant violation of resolution 253 (1968) and particularly of its paragraph 11, in which the Council

"Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and reminds them that failure or refusal by anyone of them to do so would constitute a violation of that Article".

79. The Security Council is bound to put an end to this provocative attitude today. Its authority and the prestige of the United Nations are at stake. Its action against the Smith régime will be diminished if this challenge is not taken up.

80. As the report [S/9252] shows, the measures taken against Southern Rhodesia have had only a very slight effect. One of the reasons for this failure is the attitude of Lisbon and Pretoria. Paragraph 48 states;

"As a result of the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to take measures and the failure of some other States to fully implement the provisions of resolution 253 (1968), as stated above, the Committee is compelled to observe that the sanctions established by that resolution against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia have not yet brought about the results desired by the Security Council."

81. These measures will have the desired results only if South Africa and Portugal respect the decisions of this Council. The Committee set up pursuant to resolution 253 (1968) shares this opinion when it states:

"... consideration should be given to more effective measures to ensure full implementation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)" [ibid., para. 49].

82. Measures have been resolved by the Security Council and, if fully implemented, might enable us to achieve our

purpose. States Members of the United Nations, and particularly Portugal and South Africa, are however refusing to implement them. It is therefore necessary to compel these States—Portugal and the Pretoria régime—to respect our decisions. The Charter provides for sanctions that could be applied against Lisbon and Pretoria, which are helping to perpetuate in Southern Rhodesia a situation which according to the Security Council constitutes a threat to international peace and security. This is our interpretation of the conclusion which the Security Council Committee sets out in paragraph 49 of its report [S/9252].

83. It is also necessary for the States Members of the United Nations which still have trade relations with Southern Rhodesia and are mentioned in annex I to the report to stop trading with Salisbury, as resolution 253 (1968) recommends. Similarly it would be useful if States which maintain consular and trade representatives in Southern Rhodesia withdrew them to give effect to paragraph 10 of resolution 253 (1968).

84. The report of the Committee set up under resolution 253 (1968) justifies us in stating that the policy of economic sanctions has not achieved the desired results. This report has the merit of drawing attention to the reasons why these results have not been achieved. The most important of these reasons is the attitude of Pretoria and Portugal. Thus in any proposal submitted to the Security

Council provision must be made for measures requiring Portugal and South Africa to comply with its decisions.

85. The Committee's report also shows that the main products exported from Southern Rhodesia are tobacco, asbestos and chrome. These three products are exported mainly through the ports of Mozambique and South Africa with the aid of false documents. The Security Council could decide to urge States Members of the United Nations to prevent the import into their territories of tobacco, asbestos and chrome from Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique or South Africa. This measure would have the merit of defeating the falsification of documents which the Smith régime uses to export its principal products. We are convinced that the Rhodesian economy would be seriously embarrassed if the Security Council adopted this measure, which would bring us nearer to our objective, the overthrow of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

86. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): As no other representative has indicated that he wishes to speak this afternoon, with the consent of the Council I propose to adjourn the meeting. In accordance with the private consultations which have taken place, the next meeting of the Council to continue consideration of this item will be held tomorrow, Thursday, 19 June at 3.30 p.m.

*The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.*