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**1449<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 10 SEPTEMBER 1968

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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## FOURTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 10 September 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

*President:* Mr. G. IGNATIEFF (Canada).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1449)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 2 September 1968 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8794);

Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8805);

Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8806).

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in the Middle East

**Letter dated 2 September 1968 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8794);**

**Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8805);**

**Letter dated 8 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8806)**

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision previously taken by the Council, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. M. A. El Kony (United Arab Republic) took places at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council will now continue its examination of the question before it. I would draw the attention of the Council to the supplemental information received from General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as contained in document S/7930/Add.79 of 9 September 1968, which has been circulated.

3. I have also been informed that the Secretary-General has a comment to make before I call on the first speaker on my list.

4. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: At the 1448th meeting of the Security Council on the night of 8 September 1968, the representative of the Soviet Union questioned the use in UNTSO's report on the 8 September incident of the expression "Israel Defence Forces". It may be useful at this stage for me to give a clarification on this point.

5. The expression "Israel Defence Forces"—or its abbreviated form "IDF"—has been used by UNTSO simply because this is the official title of the Israel armed forces. This practice has been followed by UNTSO for many years. There is no intention whatsoever, in using this expression, to describe or intimate the nature or purpose of the Israel armed forces.

6. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker on my list is the representative of Israel to whom I now give the floor.

7. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): Since 4 September the Security Council has been seized of the Israel complaint regarding the aggressive Egyptian raid on 26 August 1968 and the situation resulting from it. This situation has in the meantime been seriously aggravated by the large-scale attack carried out by the United Arab Republic against Israel on 8 September 1968.

8. From the very first moment, the United Arab Republic and its unquestioning supporters have done everything possible to thwart Security Council action on Israel's requests to deal effectively and equitably with Egyptian aggression. These delegations have even objected to today's meeting despite the fact that the situation created by the United Arab Republic attacks remains at least as threatening as it was when this discussion first started.

9. In the course of our recent meetings, and in particular in consultations connected with them, these delegations have gone as far as to adopt an attitude of disapproval at my Government's recourse to the Security Council. Let me, therefore, recall that time and again in the past we have heard from these representatives that Israel should show

more confidence in and reliance upon the ability of the Security Council to maintain the cease-fire.

10. Indeed, in the last few months we have been repeatedly advised that Israel should always resort to the Security Council rather than defend itself against armed and violent attacks in violation of the cease-fire by Arab regular and irregular forces. Israel has come before the Security Council on 4 September with a complaint so simple, in a situation for which responsibility is so obvious, that the Government of the United Arab Republic, against which our complaint was directed, did not even find it appropriate to submit a counter-complaint, but contented itself with vague, qualified and entirely unconvincing denials and generalities designed to fog the issue.

11. Yet, what has been the reaction of the exponents and supporters of Egypt's aggression? Those who in the past extolled the virtues of Security Council action now suddenly frown on Israel's recourse to it and strive to end the present deliberations without any meaningful outcome. Those who used to suggest that Israel should not confine itself to lodging counter-complaints with the Council but must also itself initiate Council actions when the circumstances warrant, now purport to find fault with Israel's appeal. Those whose fiery outrage at Israel's defence actions in the past never fell back on justification in United Nations inquiries, feel now that the Security Council must withhold decision because of a flaw which they say appears in one or another point of a report by the United Nations military observers. Those whose venom knew no bounds when Israel acted in self-defence are now short of words to pronounce themselves on the Egyptian military attack of 26 August, to which Israel did not reply. Those who feel for the sorrow and grief of Arab casualties now mock and blaspheme the Israeli dead. This posture is a spurious one and no casuistic decorum can hide the double standards of those who, in denying justice to Israel in the Security Council, are even ready to trample upon the sacred sentiments and the faith of its people. In their view, to establish the death of Israelis in Arab attacks, it is not enough that the names of the dead and the details of their funerals are a matter of public knowledge. For them an Israeli soldier captured in the attack can be forgotten by the Security Council, because the statement of his Government, his photographs published in the press, the marks of his body being dragged to the Canal, are not sufficient evidence in the callous game of inhumanity that is being played by their Governments. Let us remember their guile and malevolence, for tomorrow they might come here to preach smugly of morality, of respect for human values, of gallantry and of the proper attitude towards the United Nations.

12. Juxtaposed to Israel's complaint about the 26 August attack, there are before the Council only the United Arab Republic's qualified denials. Those denials come from the same Government that for years in the fifties denied knowledge of the raider attacks it conducted against Israel from Gaza and Sinai. These denials come from the same representative who, on 6 June 1967, stated before the Council:

"Today we have decisive, irrefutable proof at our disposal that the air forces of Great Britain and the

United States have actively participated with Israel in its aggression. The United States and United Kingdom air forces have been participating in two ways: first, by joining the Israeli air force in its attacks against the Arab cities and civilians and, second, by providing air cover for the Israeli armed forces. This they have done from the first moment of the Israeli attack on Cairo, Damascus and Amman." [1348th meeting, para. 209.]

13. These denials come from a representative who declared in this very debate on 4 September 1968: "Innocent civilians should not be the target of any fighting. This rule we believe in and strictly adhere to" [1446th meeting, para. 40]. And then, in the very same statement, he went on to proclaim his Government's continued support for terror warfare against the people of Israel--innocent men, women and children.

14. The United Arab Republic attitude cannot but call to mind the words of the Prophet:

"None calleth for justice, nor any pleadeth for truth:  
They trust in vanity, and speak lies:  
They conceive mischief and bring forth iniquity."

However, traditional United Arab Republic denials of responsibility for aggression have been invariably disproved by facts. This is so also in the present case. The facts of the 26 August attack have never been in doubt in the minds of objective observers. They are now further buttressed by an interesting new development.

15. On the morning of 7 September, an Egyptian soldier, Private Abdul Hadi Abdul Halim Muhammad Suedi, Personal No. 627633, twenty-four years of age, and a man of secondary education, deserted to the Israeli forces. His home town is Sambalion, in the DeKhilia district. He was scripted into the Egyptian army on 18 December 1965. Private Suedi gave as the reason for his desertion the offensive attitude of officers in the Egyptian army towards the soldiers.

16. Yesterday he made the following statement to the press about the Timsah attack on 26 August. He served in the Suez Canal sector near Ismailia in the 340th Infantry Battalion of the 114th Brigade. On the day of the incident, at 2000 hours Cairo time, his battalion was placed on a state of alert. In accordance with his duties, he went up to an observation post and saw his unit take positions along the Canal. He was connected with the communication network of the battalion. At approximately 2200 hours he saw three flares fired on the west bank in a northerly direction. Half an hour later the state of alert was relaxed. He then heard his battalion commander inform the company commanders, through the telephone network to which he was connected, that a special force of the 118th Brigade had crossed the Canal and ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing two Israeli soldiers and capturing a third one, who was wounded. The 118th Brigade is stationed near the 114th Brigade and to the north of the latter.

17. The next morning, on 27 August, a soldier from the 118th Brigade arrived in the unit in which the deserter served and reported that a special commando force from his

unit had carried out the aforementioned operation and that the captured Israeli soldier had died on the way to the hospital. Private Sueidi heard that the special force of the 118th Brigade which had executed the ambush crossed the Canal in rubber boats. He also stated that in recent months soldiers had been transferred from his battalion and from other units for special training in commando activities, mine laying, water crossings, attacks on vehicles and the capture of prisoners.

18. The attack of 26 August is, unfortunately, no longer an isolated incident. Egyptian mine-laying incursions have continued, and before yesterday tension in the area had reached the highest pitch when the United Arab Republic army positions on a 100-kilometre-long front launched a concerted and heavy assault against the Israeli forces on the east bank. The Security Council has before it the reports of 8 and 9 September 1968 submitted by General Bull [S/7930/Add.78 and 79]. A careful analysis of the reports confirms the gravity of Egyptian responsibility.

19. General Bull opens his report of 8 September [S/7930/Add.78] by making it clear in paragraph 1 that the first explosions were on the east side of the Canal. The United Nations military observers indicate that the first hits on the east side were at 1306 hours Z (GMT). This was the initial violation of the cease-fire. General Bull goes on to state that fire was initiated by the United Arab Republic seven more times.

20. Not only is the initiation of the attack by Egypt clear but also its extension on a wide front. As confirmed in the first five paragraphs of the report, the attack during the first twenty-three minutes was confined to the sector between observation post Pink and observation post Red, situated immediately to the north of Port Tawfiq, at the southern end of the Canal.

21. Firing was then extended by the United Arab Republic forces at 1332 hours Z to the area of observation post Mike, situated at Port Tawfiq itself. This is brought out in paragraph 6 of the report. The same paragraph confirms that the Israeli forces under attack in this area refrained from immediately returning fire.

22. The United Arab Republic forces extended the attack further to an additional sector by opening fire without provocation on the area of observation post Copper situated in the vicinity of Kantara, more than 100 kilometres north of Port Tawfiq. This is reported in paragraph 7. Israeli forces again showed restraint and did not return fire till later, as indicated in paragraph 9 of General Bull's report. At the same time, as confirmed in the same paragraph, the United Arab Republic forces initiated an attack in a third sector, removed from both the Kantara and the Port Tawfiq areas. The target of this attack was Israeli positions in the area of observation post Silver, approximately fifty kilometres north of Port Tawfiq. The United Nations observation post itself was not spared, however, and Egyptian fire destroyed it.

23. The initiation of the attack and its immediate extension along a wide front, with the co-ordinated use of artillery, mortars, tanks and machine-guns, leaves no doubt

about the premeditated and well prepared character of the operation.

24. Egyptian responsibility is further demonstrated by the attitude towards the United Nations cease-fire proposals. Though the report confines itself in paragraph 10 to the observation that the first cease-fire proposed for 1450 hours Z—1650 hours local time—was not effective, the official Egyptian communiqués have announced unequivocally that Egypt was the one to ignore the cease-fire. I have quoted one of these communiqués in the course of the 1448th meeting and I shall refer to it again at a later stage.

25. The same fate befell the second cease-fire proposal by the United Nations. Paragraph 15 of the report points out that the Israel Defence Forces ceased fire as agreed upon at or soon after 1630 hours Z. The United Arab Republic forces, however, continued firing along the entire front and finally ceased fire only a little more than half an hour later.

26. As I said at the 1448th meeting, the United Arab Republic was the first to attack, the first to extend the front of the attack, and the last to cease fire.

27. At this point I should like to correct the impression that might have been created that Israeli forces employed ground-to-ground missiles. No such weapons were used, though conjectures on the basis of sound may have been unavoidable in the heat of battle.

28. Even the representative of the Soviet Union could not help realizing the flimsiness of Egypt's denial of responsibility for the attack. He tried, at the last meeting of the Security Council, to find an alibi for the Egyptian action, but the hollowness of his argument was such that even the United Arab Republic representative himself shunned it. How can the noise of a detonated mine be reason for a well-trained army's opening up with an artillery barrage along a 100-kilometre front? Surely this is not a serious contention. In any event the problem before the Council is not an analysis of the Egyptian Army's psychology but the termination of its aggression. While the Egyptian representative continues to play on the gullibility of Security Council members, his Government is by no means reluctant to take credit for the 8 September act of aggression.

29. The military commentator of *El Ahram* gave yesterday the following official analysis of the attack:

"The powerful artillery action carried out along the entire cease-fire line constitutes an important point in the military confrontation with Israel . . . The enemy agreed, according to his military spokesman, to a cease-fire at 1650 hours. The Egyptian Command, however, accepted this request only after more than an hour had elapsed, and when the Command signified its agreement, it put forward for the first time conditions for acceptance of the cease-fire."

30. A further admission of the United Arab Republic's responsibility for Sunday's aggression and the premeditated nature of the attack came yesterday from the Egyptian Governor of Suez. According to the Egyptian Middle East News Agency, the Governor revealed that he had had half

an hour's notice—I repeat, half an hour's notice—about the impending attack and that the inhabitants of the area were instructed to take refuge in shelters. This fact is further confirmed in this morning's *New York Times* which in a report from Suez quotes Farouk Zaid, an official of the Governor's office, saying that casualties in Ismailia were light because "citizens had half an hour's warning and took to shelters".

31. It is clear that the Egyptian authorities knew of the plan to attack the east bank and were instructed to take precautionary measures, moving the civilian population into shelters half an hour before the attack was launched as a normal preparatory measure for a large-scale military operation.

32. Yesterday, *The New York Times* reported:

"The Military Command of the Egyptian armed forces announced tonight (8 September) that it would launch, beginning today, 'preventive defence operations' against Israeli military positions along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

"An Egyptian spokesman, who was quoted by the Cairo radio monitored here, said: '... the General Command of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic will, as of today, initiate preventive defence operations against the aggressive Israeli forces.'

"Informed sources here believe that this means that Egyptian forces will use Soviet-made ground-to-ground rockets to destroy Israeli positions along the Canal."

33. Radio Cairo announced yesterday at 1345 hours that the Government of Egypt had decided to undertake preventive military operations against Israel.

34. A week ago, following an Egyptian act of aggression in which two Israeli soldiers were killed and one captured, Israel turned to the Security Council. It emphasized the ominous nature of this attack. This was the first time since the cease-fire that United Arab Republic armed forces violated it by crossing the Suez Canal. The attack had all the characteristics of a well-co-ordinated military operation, and the circumstances surrounding it indicated the danger of further Egyptian attacks. We asked the Security Council for immediate and effective action to condemn this attack and prevent the recurrence of further acts of aggression.

35. The world watched and waited for Security Council action. The people of Israel watched and waited for Security Council action. The Government of the United Arab Republic watched and waited to see whether the Security Council could overcome its disabilities on Middle East questions and act. The Government of the United Arab Republic watched and drew its conclusions. There was no call to stop crossings of the Canal for mine-laying operations. There was no condemnation of Egyptian aggression. There was no warning that Egyptian military attacks were to terminate. The signal seemed to be clear and the United Arab Republic translated it into action. The over-all military onslaught on 8 September along the entire cease-fire line was violent in scale and indiscriminate in

character. Ten Israeli soldiers were killed; fourteen were wounded. In Kantara, the only town on the east bank, two Arab inhabitants were wounded; a church, two mosques and numerous houses were damaged or destroyed. The United Nations control centre in Kantara and a number of United Nations observation posts were damaged. One United Nations observer was injured.

36. The hour is late. Egyptian aggression has now assumed most menacing proportions and has been openly pronounced by Cairo to be the start of a new policy of preventive action. We all know what that means.

37. Israel appeals again to the Security Council not to delay its action, to condemn the Egyptian military attacks on 26 August and 8 September, to call on Egypt to prevent such acts of aggression in the future, to ascertain the fate of the captured Israeli soldier and return him to Israel. Such immediate action is not only essential to put an end to Egyptian violations of the cease-fire, but also the least that is required and the least that would be commensurate with the gravity of the situation and the threat to peace that comes from Egypt.

38. Lij Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): Mr. President, may I first of all join your other colleagues in the Council in extending to you my personal congratulations and best wishes, coupled with the renewed assurances of my delegation's full co-operation in the fulfilment of the high and responsible task that you have come to assume as President of the Security Council for the present month.

39. Here we are once again faced with grave incidents seriously affecting the cease-fire, this time incidents relating to serious events in the Suez Canal sector. For the last ten months or so, the Security Council has been repeatedly faced with interminable recurrences of incidents and violations in one or other sector of the cease-fire, and yet it has by some miracle managed to avoid a breakdown in the delicate peace mission that it has undertaken in this area. But it is well for the Council to ask how long this can go on without jeopardizing the peace-keeping and the peace-making effort on which we have by unanimous resolve embarked.

40. How long will it indeed be before the cumulative effect of these seemingly isolated incidents in the different sectors of the cease-fire rouse emotions to such a height of tension as to convert this area once again into a battleground for large-scale conflict and warfare? This is a very frightening question to ask and a very difficult one to answer; yet it is the very question which the Security Council is facing, and on the right answer to it will depend the future of peace in the Middle East.

41. It is not in the habit of Ethiopian representatives to make themselves the self-appointed prophets of doom. On the contrary, those who have worked with us on many difficult international problems—and there are many such in this chamber—will surely testify that we rather tend to be incurable optimists even when faced with the most formidable of problems. Yet, in the case of the Middle East, we cannot hide our anxiety over the turn of events. Not only does there seem to be no progress in the main effort

aimed at just and lasting peace, but even the fragile cease-fire which we so painfully worked out seems threatened by the possibility of a slow but sure breakdown if things continue the way they are at the moment.

42. As I had occasion to say in my last statement before the Council on this subject, we have to realize, and I think the parties themselves too have to realize, that there is an inevitable vicious circle involved in the over-all effort of peace-keeping and peace-making. On the one hand, the cease-fire, which is a necessary though temporary arrangement for keeping the peace, must be preserved if conditions are to be created that can help facilitate and expedite the cause of peaceful settlement. On the other hand, the chance of progress, even of a limited nature, on the peace-making side could not fail to improve the general atmosphere and could undoubtedly have a favourable impact on the whole turn of events in the area.

43. In other words, it is obvious that the twin efforts of peace-keeping and peace-making in the Middle East are closely interrelated to such an extent that repeated incidents in violation of the cease-fire are bound to spoil the chances for peace, while lack of any progress in the peace-making effort will inevitably lead to frustration, anger and bitterness on the part of the peoples under military occupation, resulting, in turn, in the kind of unfortunate recurrences of violent actions and counteractions which have been the subject of our debates for so long.

44. It is only if the parties to the dispute co-operate genuinely and fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his efforts to advance the cause of a just and lasting peace based on the principles and requirements of the unanimous Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967, that we can hope to break the vicious circle in which we find ourselves at the moment and bring hope to an otherwise hopeless situation. I respectfully submit that it is with this thought in mind that we should continue our consideration of the present serious events in the Suez Canal sector.

45. Turning now specifically to our agenda and to the grave incidents under consideration, I must say that the Council cannot afford to ignore incidents of such a magnitude, and cannot and must not allow such incidents to take their own dangerous course especially when both parties to the dispute come to the Council with urgent requests for effective action.

46. As regards the specific causes for the present incidents, my delegation, like, I am sure, other delegations, will need more time both to study the evidence at hand and, we hope, to gain more information from United Nations representatives in the Suez Canal sector. Under what must be most difficult circumstances, General Odd Bull and his brave team of military observers have made preliminary investigations of the incidents on the spot and have submitted reports which point to physical evidence and circumstances relating to those incidents. We are grateful to General Bull and to all those who serve under him for the difficult task they are fulfilling on our behalf. In spite of their small numbers and limited resources, these loyal and

brave servants of the United Nations have done their level best to ensure the maintenance of a delicate arrangement which extends over a wide and difficult area of potential conflict. The Security Council is duty bound to give to the fruits of their untiring efforts all the consideration and attention that their dedicated service deserves. For its part, the Ethiopian delegation will study the reports with great care and will not hesitate, when the appropriate time comes, to indicate its judgement as to where the blame lies. In the absence of complete information, and pending verification, we shall refrain from any hasty attempt to pinpoint responsibility, to apportion blame or to pass judgement.

47. Of course, we fully deplore the suffering and damage that these latest incidents have caused. Our sincere sympathies and condolences go out to the families of those who have fallen victims of this conflict on both sides. The loss of life and the suffering of people are to be deplored under any circumstances, and, in the particular case of the successive incidents of the past week, we share the grief of those Israeli and United Arab Republic families who have lost their loved ones.

48. While thus continuing to pay attention to the incidents under consideration and deploring their consequences, the Council must be prepared to look beyond those incidents and focus its attention on the important question of the general maintenance of the cease-fire in all sectors. It was only right and proper that the President should have been urgently authorized, as a first step, to make the declaration he made at the 1448th meeting, in which the Council deeply regretted the loss of life and required the parties strictly to observe the cease-fire called for by the Security Council's resolutions.

49. It seems to my delegation that the Council must now take the President's declaration as a new point of departure in its endeavour to ensure the maintenance of that peace and calm which are the primary prerequisites for a just and lasting settlement. The Council is required to keep faith with itself by acting in a manner consistent with its primary responsibility under the Charter, and it has, in the spirit of its unanimous resolution of 22 November 1967, urgently to consider some appropriate action on the following general lines which could, in our view, serve as the basis for worthwhile consultations among members of the Council: first, call, in the strongest possible terms, on all parties to exercise the utmost restraint; second, a renewed call—I daresay an insistent call—for strict observance of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council; third, an urgent appeal to the parties to co-operate fully with the United Nations representative in the area and a call to them to utilize the United Nations good offices established for the purpose of the peaceful settlement of all disputes; fourth, a call upon United Nations representatives in the area to intensify their efforts in order to resolve outstanding differences and issues by peaceful means; and finally, a wholehearted backing of the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Jarring.

50. These, I submit, are some of the imperatives for any Council action that will help create a better climate for the Jarring mission, thereby advancing the ultimate cause of a

just and lasting settlement in the Middle East; and it is on these same imperatives that the position of my delegation will be based.

51. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for the kind remarks he has addressed to the Chair.

52. Mr. DE ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I wish to take this opportunity to express my warmest thanks to those representatives who have addressed kind and generous words to me with reference to my term of office as President of the Security Council during the month of August.

53. We meet again today under the impact of the grave events that took place on 8 September 1968 in the Suez Canal area. The Council was then seized of a complaint by Israel to the effect that on 26 August 1968 two jeeps of the Israeli Defence Forces were ambushed while on a patrol along the Suez Canal by United Arab Republic forces which allegedly had crossed the Canal, killing two soldiers and abducting a third. According to the concluding paragraph of the report on the inquiry carried out on 27 August by the UNTSO authorities: "The United Nations military observers' finding was that an Israel Defence Force patrol was mined at approximate map reference 7415-8705. Physical evidence indicated that the patrol was ambushed" [*see S/7930/Add.74, para. 8*]. The language of the report appears to be clear and plain enough, and it is the opinion of the Brazilian delegation that the Council should not let such an incident pass unnoticed.

54. However, last Sunday, the Security Council was suddenly confronted by much more grave and serious events. A prolonged exchange of artillery between Israel's forces and the United Arab Republic's forces across the canal confronted us with a new surge of violence, bloodshed and open warfare in that tormented land. The statement made by the President, on behalf of the Council, in the early hours of 9 September [*1448th meeting*], represented an immediate and positive step, aiming as it did to strengthen the cease-fire, to reaffirm the authority of the Security Council and to avoid a dangerous disruption of the whole structure of peace. But while we try to find a remedy for the present, we should ponder the future. The Council may face at this stage of the Middle East question the grave risk of missing the forest for the trees, as the saying goes. The Council cannot go on indefinitely limiting itself in this matter to a mere fact-finding task of registering complaints on offences committed, or even to a routine allotment of blame. In the meantime, the vital problems which plague the Middle East, such as the unchecked arms race, remain untackled. Quite recently, on two different occasions during the debates of August 1968, we had the opportunity to refer to this perilous arms race and to stress the need for the major Powers to reach an agreement and an understanding on this all-important question of the supply of armaments and implements of war to the contending parties. We can never over-emphasize this point.

55. While we sit at this Council table and stress the necessity for a complete cease-fire, both sides are receiving new and more sophisticated weapons. Weapons are not the

prerequisites of the cease-fire; they are the prerequisites of war, and we fail to understand how the Security Council can disregard and ignore this alarming, perhaps the most alarming, aspect of the whole problem.

56. On the other hand, the Council cannot evade its paramount political and diplomatic task in bringing about a fair and negotiated solution of the problem, along the lines established by resolution 242 (1967). It is high time to move beyond the fact-finding and blame-alloting level, to rise from the appraisal of isolated incidents to the implementation of a policy which has already been set forth by the Council. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to restate its full confidence in the delicate mission entrusted to the experience and ability of Mr. Gunnar Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

57. Let me add that in the view of the Brazilian delegation, the foremost condition for the attainment of an equitable solution of the question is for all the parties to show the indispensable political will to achieve it. The parties have already at their disposal the general lines of a satisfactory settlement, unanimously endorsed by the Council in November 1967.

58. The logical step forward would be for both parties to show the same degree of adherence to resolution 242 (1967), the same degree of willingness to co-operate with the efforts undertaken by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General towards implementation of that resolution and, what may be more important still, the same intent and purpose to forgo violence or retaliation.

59. Should both parties live up to their pledges under the Charter of the United Nations and should both parties accept and respect the decisions already adopted by the Security Council, on a fair and equitable basis, we would embark on a safe and speedy course towards peace and security in the Middle East. Otherwise, we shall be confined to an endless and rather unrewarding and frustrating consideration of isolated incidents and violations of the cease-fire, which, with the accelerating impact of the arms escalation, both in quantity and in quality, may lead again to a major conflagration in the area.

60. A whole series of acts of war can still be avoided by a single constructive act of peace. Now it is up to the parties and it is up to us to move forward in this direction.

61. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United Arab Republic.

62. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): The act of aggression committed on 8 September by the Israeli armed forces against the cities on the west side of the Suez Canal is viewed very seriously by my Government not only because it is a flagrant violation of the cease-fire arranged by the Council but also because it is ominous as to the future designs of Israel in the area.

63. In its previous meeting the Council did not deem it appropriate to discuss in depth the situation that has arisen as a result of this latest attack, since the information provided by General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO,



had not yet been fully studied by the members of the Council. Today, after having had ample time to examine in detail the report of General Bull, the Council should be in no doubt about who initiated the firing in the incident which took place on 8 September 1968. Paragraph 5 of his report, contained in document S/7930/Add.78, is explicit about the identity of the initiators, and for further clarity I shall read it to the Council: "At 1325 hours Z, OP Pink reported Israel Defence Forces initiated fire." Paragraph 6 of the same document is further proof that the United Arab Republic acted solely in self-defence, since both observation posts Mike and Gold recorded the time of the firing initiated by the United Arab Republic as 1332 hours—that is, seven minutes after the Israeli armed forces had opened fire.

64. We now have a report from General Bull, contained in document S/7930/Add.79. This report, in paragraph 2, adds further proof which emphatically belies the fabricated Israeli allegations about the detonation of mines; it states:

"It was noted that in the letter of 8 September [S/8805] from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council, reference was made to the discovery and demolition of an anti-vehicle mine by Israeli forces. Following the 1448th meeting of the Security Council on 8/9 September, the Chief of Staff was informed by the Secretary-General of the references in the debate to this statement in the Israeli letter and was asked for anything he might be able to add to clarify this matter. General Bull subsequently cabled that 'UNTSO was not informed on 8 September of a mine to be exploded by Israel Defence Forces' and that 'the United Nations military observers were unable to indicate what caused the initial explosions reported by observation posts Lima, Gold and Red' (see paragraphs 1 to 3 of document S/7930/Add.78)."

65. The situation, grave as it is, has in consequence been further aggravated by the human and material losses sustained by the cities of the west bank of the Canal and their inhabitants. The latest casualty figures show that seventeen persons were killed and ninety-three were injured in the cities of Suez, Ismailia and Kantara. In this human tragedy, the damage caused to the installations and the buildings in these cities is considerable. Among the targets of the Israeli shelling were: the Arabaie Mosque, the hospital in Adebia Port, the naval arsenal, the television tower, as well as eight apartment buildings in Suez, and several houses in Ismailia, three of them occupied by United Nations observers. The streets were flooded with water from burst mains. One can easily imagine the risks and the hazards to public health created by such conditions in these cities.

66. When, on 8 September 1968, we requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the latest developments in the area, it was certainly not with the intention of only informing the Council of yet another act of wanton aggression by the Israeli armed forces against the United Arab Republic; it was a request for prompt and effective action to be taken by the Council against an established aggressor. My Government expects the Council to live up to its responsibilities set forth in the Charter and

to take into account the seriousness of the offence, in whatever action that will be taken by the Council on this incident.

67. It was the understanding of my delegation that the Council would continue today its consideration of the complaint brought by the United Arab Republic concerning the Israeli attack on 8 September. But it appears that Mr. Tekoah, ashamed at the clarity of the evidence contained in General Bull's report, is attempting to divert the attention of the Council from the real issue to a fictitious one. The case of the allegedly abducted Israeli soldier has no sound basis, whatever amount of fabricated evidence is introduced.

68. I have, on behalf of my Government, in this very Council denied categorically any knowledge by my Government of this incident. This denial is unqualified, unlimited, and supported by the findings of General Odd Bull. On the other hand, I beg to submit that the evidence adduced by Mr. Tekoah is qualified, limited and unsupported. And, since certain members of the Council are fond of adjectives, let me add yet another one at this stage for their benefit: "fabricated".

69. Disturbed by the report of General Odd Bull, the Israeli authorities decided to fabricate new evidence, to which wide publicity has been given. But this latest figment of their imagination cannot add any weight to the previous allegations. By now, members of the Council are fully aware of Israel's tactics. The bombshell has boomeranged, maybe because of the lack of co-ordination and the timing of its disclosure between New York and Tel Aviv.

70. The statements made in the Council by certain of its members sometimes defy understanding. The representative of the United States, in his statement before the Council on 5 September [1447th meeting], expressed his Government's decision to espouse the Israeli cause. It is the prerogative of any Government to select its allies and to choose the cause it wishes to support. But for that Government, in pursuance of such support, to attempt to inject new elements of accusation in order to put life into a losing cause is definitely beyond our expectation—as if it were incumbent on the United States delegation to fill in the loop-holes that were apparent in the original Israeli complaint. For, when it became abundantly clear that the participation of the United Arab Republic's armed forces had not been substantiated by General Bull's report, it was necessary that an insinuation about the involvement of my Government be introduced into the debate.

71. Furthermore, it is regrettable that the United States representative should uphold the notion that the Arab Governments are responsible even for the acts of individual members of the Arab population living under Israeli occupation. On this point I have very little to add to what the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Malik, had to say on this point:

"All responsibility for those territories"—meaning the occupied territories—"lies with those countries which have occupied other peoples' territories. If we were to proceed along the line suggested for the Security Council

by the United States representative, we could go very far in that direction, and we would thereby be justifying further the constant acts of aggression on the part of Israel against the Arab countries." [1447th meeting, para. 63.]

72. It is to be regretted that the representative of the United States, in his endeavours to implicate my Government, has suggested that, the alleged incident having occurred in a sparsely-populated area, the perpetrators must have come from the other side of the Canal—as if the inhabitants of a sparsely-populated land are less patriotic than those of a densely-populated one. The news, only two days later, that an armed Israeli vehicle had been destroyed by a mine inside Sinai shows that it was an arbitrary and unfair American judgement.

73. The concern shown by the representative of the United States over the need for an even-handed approach is indeed surprising to my delegation. It seems hardly plausible that anyone should equate an unsubstantiated allegation by a party regarding the occurrence of an incident with the avowed and blatantly admitted acts of military aggression perpetrated by Israel against the Arab countries. The sheer attempt to put them on an equal footing is in itself an application, and the pursuance, of double standards. It seems even less plausible that while Israel undertakes a massive act of armed attack, the United States delegation always tries to alleviate its responsibility for that act by claiming provocation on the part of the Arab countries; but at the same time it intentionally forgets the provocation posed by the continued occupation by Israel of Arab territories.

74. There is a tendency among a few delegations to erect a halo around the resort of Israel to the Security Council, advocating that it should be rewarded for such an initiative, as if that were not the normal behaviour of Members of the United Nations. We were also told that the consideration by the Council of the Israeli complaint would encourage Israel in the future to resort more and more to the Council and desist from further acts of a military nature. Yet as we have seen, the Israeli forces struck again on 8 September against the civilian population, using missiles and thus inflicting loss of life and material damage.

75. In conclusion, I feel compelled to refer to a few of the many distortions proffered by the Israeli representative who in his statement of 5 September, said that "the cease-fire is the only basis for relations between the two countries" [1447th meeting, para. 89]. I submit that this is but another futile attempt to distort the facts. The cease-fire injunction of the Security Council was never envisaged as a framework within which to govern future relations.

76. In fact, the Council's call upon the parties in resolution 233 (1967) was "to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area". Hence, the cease-fire is only a preliminary and inevitable step to precede the cessation of hostilities. Further steps should have followed promptly for the liquidation of all the traces and consequences of aggression, in particular of the military occupation.

77. To meet this end, the Council, on 22 November 1967, adopted resolution 242 (1967) unanimously. The responses of the parties are well known and I shall not tax the patience of the Council with all the details. Suffice it to mention, however, that the United Arab Republic has time and again declared its acceptance and its readiness fully to implement that resolution, while Israel continues to evade a direct and forward acceptance to carry out its implementation. Thus it should be perfectly clear that it has always been Israeli procrastination which has hindered the evolution of a just settlement in the Middle East.

78. The deliberate and persistent policy of the Israeli representatives to omit any reference to the General Armistice Agreements is a grave matter which deserves the attention of the Council. I have had occasion at previous meetings of the Council to state the views of my Government on this matter. We maintain, and rightly so, that the aforementioned Armistice Agreements are still valid and should be adhered to meticulously. The United Nations fully supports our views on the validity and applicability of the Agreements. This was fully manifested by the Secretary-General in his introduction to his annual report to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly when he clearly stated that:

"... there has been no indication either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council that the validity and applicability of the Armistice Agreements have been changed as a result of the recent hostilities or of the war of 1956; each Agreement, in fact, contains a provision that it will remain in force 'until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved'. Nor has the Security Council or the General Assembly taken any steps to change the pertinent resolutions of either organ relating to the Armistice Agreements or to the earlier cease-fire demands. The Agreements provide that by mutual consent the signatories can revise or suspend them. There is no provision in them for unilateral termination of their application. This has been the United Nations position all along and will continue to be the position until a competent organ decides otherwise."<sup>1</sup>

79. The Israeli representative has referred to the decision of my Government to undertake special defensive measures—and not preventive measures, as he alleged today—after each aggression and has attempted to raise doubts as to the real intent of my Government. The intentions are both clear and humane. The populations of the cities on the west bank of the Canal having been subjected to continuous and brutal shelling and firing from across the Canal, it is the duty of my Government to undertake all necessary steps to ensure the protection of the civilian populations of these cities.

80. The repeated violations of the cease-fire by Israel and the cruel and wanton attacks on the civilian population on the Suez Canal should receive the urgent consideration of the Security Council. The evidence of these violations is not controversial; it lies in the ruins of the shattered cities and in the dead and wounded inhabitants. These actions by

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/6701/Add.1), para. 43.

Israel should be severely condemned by the Council, and Israel should be warned that further violations will not be tolerated by the Council.

81. Mr. TARDOS (Hungary): The fact that the Security Council is again called upon to discuss the situation in the Middle East clearly demonstrates the lack of progress in the solution of the grave situation prevailing in that region.

82. For more than a year the world has had to witness new and newer incidents taking place between the resistance fighters of the occupied Arab lands and the armed forces of Israel stationed there. The Security Council was impelled more than once to deplore deeply, or condemn, the repeated aggressive actions to which the Israeli forces resorted.

83. It is Israel which this time has come to the Council to accuse the United Arab Republic of "a further serious act of aggression . . . on the east side of the Suez Canal" [*S/8788 of 28 August 1968*] and which asked for a meeting of the Council. A resumption of the discussion in the Council was requested by Israel on 8 September [*S/8805*]. Finally, the United Arab Republic on the same day requested an urgent meeting [*S/8806*], stating that "Israel has committed another premeditated act of aggression by opening fire today, about 1600 hours local time, against the cities of Port Tawfiq, Suez, Ismailia and Kantara".

84. As to the alleged incident on 26 August, the United Arab Republic Government categorically denied any involvement of its forces in the incident. The report of the United Nations military observers of 27 August [*see S/7930/Add.74 and 76*] does not confirm the Israeli accusation that United Arab Republic forces violated the cease-fire. Without going into the details of the issue, we feel bound to say that after reading the reports a number of questions remain unanswered. These questions, which were referred to earlier by the representative of the United Arab Republic, prove convincingly that there is simply no case against his country. Attempts to state the contrary are not substantiated by the reports of the United Nations military observers. Efforts to put the blame on the United Arab Republic are not supported by any impartial evidence, unless we accept Israeli statements as being impartial. These efforts, motivated by political considerations, are alien to the substance of the specific issue before us. Our doubts concerning the alleged incident are strengthened by the record of the Government of the United Arab Republic all through the Middle East crisis.

85. Everyone knows that the United Arab Republic Government, notwithstanding the long occupation of its territories, the misappropriation of its natural resources, the systematic destruction of its cities and industries in violation of the cease-fire, the Israeli blocking of the Suez Canal and the armed prevention of its clearing, despite all these grave facts, has rigorously adhered to the cease-fire and steadfastly worked in favour of a political solution of the Middle East crisis based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. All this and the record of Israel all through the period since the June 1967 aggression do not encourage us to accept at face value the Israeli version of the incident in question.

86. In this connexion, my delegation disagrees in the most categorical manner with attempts, in the name of even-handedness and impartiality, to have the Council adopt a stand totally unrelated to the facts of the issue before us. Statements to the effect that earlier Council censures of Israel's aggressive actions, proved and admitted by Israel, require similar actions against the United Arab Republic when there is absolutely no evidence against it, cannot be accepted. Nor can the Council be accused of promoting terror and destroying the alternative to reprisal, as one member put it in his statement during our last meeting, unless it bends to accusations without any foundation whatsoever. Statements like those show only one thing: support of Israel whatever the merits of the case may be.

87. The serious events of 8 September 1968, on which a report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO has been submitted to the Council in document *S/7930/Add.78* and later in document *S/7930/Add.79*, underlines that the misgivings shared by many about the intentions of Israel in coming to the Council with a spurious complaint have been justified. The report leaves no doubt about the fact that Israel has again resorted to naked force when it indiscriminately shelled several cities of the United Arab Republic along the Suez Canal.

88. In authorizing the President to make the declaration at the 1448th meeting on 8 September, the Security Council sought to lower the tension in the region. But the fact of the matter is, and continues to be, that we have an abnormal situation in the Middle East. We have a unanimous Security Council resolution laying down the basis for a political solution. That resolution, as we all know, has never been accepted, let alone implemented, by Israel. It is common knowledge that leading members of the Israeli Cabinet rejected and continue to reject resolution 242 (1967) for stipulating the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories. As a result of the pressure of those extremist circles, the Government of Israel continues to put forward as conditions demands not contained in the Security Council resolution, while refusing to implement the terms of the resolution. It is this policy of the Israeli Government which is responsible for the continued occupation of Arab territories and for the tension resulting therefrom.

89. My delegation is of the view that the Council could serve no useful purpose by engaging in the consideration of the symptoms of that tension. It is, rather, the underlying causes that remain to be solved. This solution cannot be anything but the acceptance and implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967) by all sides. Were Israel ready to follow the Arab lead in this matter, the Council would have no reason to deal again and again with the tragic situation of the Middle East.

90. Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) (*translated from French*): Mr. President, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your taking up the high position which you hold during the month of September. Your qualities are so well known that I need not dwell on them, and I am convinced that you will not fail to put them to good use for the benefit of the Council as a whole.

91. I should like to take this opportunity to convey my warmest congratulations to Ambassador de Araujo Castro of Brazil, to whom we should like to pay a particularly well-deserved tribute.

92. It was with some surprise that the Algerian delegation learnt of the request submitted by Israel for a meeting of the Security Council on the basis of document S/8794, a letter dated 2 September 1968. There is no need for me to revert to the flimsiness of the Israeli complaint, which is based solely on tracer bullets of uncertain origin and on the discovery of military equipment, which can easily be acquired in any military surplus store and from the bodies of soldiers who have been killed but who cannot always be traced. One might have wondered, only a few days ago, what was the real object of the complaint submitted to the Council.

93. After the recent statement by Mr. Abba Eban that the situation was particularly quiet in the occupation area adjacent to the rest of the United Arab Republic, we have witnessed today an operation of which the United Arab Republic has been a victim, an operation accompanied by an unequivocal ultimatum. Indeed, how else can we describe the words uttered by Mr. Tekoah in the Council when he said that the return of the so-called Israeli prisoner was a vital matter for Israel? In addition to the fact that there is no certainty about the detention of such a person, it seems to us particularly serious that peace in that area should be made dependent upon Israel's demands in regard to a claim the foundation of which is denied by the other side.

94. There is no need to add that the threatening tone used by Mr. Tekoah in regard to the Council and the United Arab Republic in order to have his demands met, has not been lost on the Council.

95. The question remains: what are the real objectives of this entire operation? The first obvious objective in our eyes is that Israel would like to be credited with a peaceful attitude by bringing an alleged problem to the attention of the Council for settlement. But it would be naïve indeed to believe that having achieved its military objectives, Israel now intends to apply the rules of law. Perhaps Israel would also like, by reversing roles, to acquire a good conscience in the face of world public opinion and play down the warlike character which it is known to have.

96. We believe—and this is the most serious of all—that this sudden change in Israel's policy in having recourse to the Security Council's good offices was designed to prepare world public opinion for future military action in the area. According to a plan which has become traditional, Israel intended to legitimize in advance its acts of aggression. The serious Israeli act of aggression which took place the day before yesterday has amply justified our misgivings.

97. Finally, this operation was probably designed also to make the public forget the essential problem with which the Security Council must deal sooner or later, that is, the military occupation of Arab territories. It must not be forgotten that in working for denial of the right of resistance, Israel wishes thereby to justify the reality of the

repression harshly applied throughout the occupied territories.

98. However, as long as Arab territories remain occupied by enemy forces, the duty of the inhabitants is to fight by all the means available to them. The resistance of a people to its enemies cannot be confined solely to the inhabited areas but extends to the entire national territory, including desert regions. The armed resistance of the Arab peoples must be pursued on all fronts from Sinai to Gaza and from the west bank of the Jordan to the Golan heights. Whatever some may think, the right to resist colonial invaders is not the privilege of the peoples of Europe alone. The determined struggle waged by the peoples of the non-aligned world is only a continuation of their old tradition of resistance to all usurpers.

99. The act of aggression committed on 8 September by the Israeli occupying forces against Arab towns along the Suez Canal, as the report of General Odd Bull indicates, is a direct consequence of the tolerance, by this Council, of the occupation of territories of sovereign countries, Members of the United Nations. In a word, the Council must focus its attention on this point because the threats and dangers at present existing in the Middle East have their origin in military occupation.

100. In less than one year Israel has many times renewed its attacks against Arab towns in order to destroy the economic potential of the United Arab Republic. Yesterday the burning of crops and the destruction of development centres in Jordan and today the bombing of densely populated towns in the United Arab Republic are, in our view, glaring proof that Israel's primary objective is to weaken economically the Arab countries of the Middle East.

101. The aggression of 8 September is part and parcel of a general pattern of Israeli aggressions, which, although simple, is nevertheless effective.

102. The cunning of the Tel Aviv authorities, which consisted in having their aggressive plans preceded by a so-called complaint the grounds of which were non-existent cannot deceive us about Israel's real objectives. In any case, it must not lead the Council to refrain from assuming its proper responsibility in regard to this aggression, that is, to condemn Israel in no uncertain terms in order to emphasize the Council's disapproval with regard to the act of force itself and at the same time to make it impossible for civilian objectives to be the favourite targets of military operations, as has so frequently been the case, especially as this aggression took place at a time when the Council was still dealing with the complaint submitted to it by the Tel Aviv authorities.

103. We cannot fail to note that certain Western Powers which, only a few days ago, felt that they could not express an objective judgement on the accusations and counter-accusations, rushed to express final judgements in the haste of the moment. It is not by hastily advocating a semblance of unanimity on the basis of texts which place the parties on equal terms that we can act in conformity with the fundamental principles of the Charter. Nor is it by

advocating an arithmetical balance of condemnations, as these Western Powers are doing, that we can arrive at a satisfactory solution based on real justice. Israel has been condemned time and again simply because of its repeated and premeditated acts of aggression.

104. Temporary solutions which are perpetuated only aggravate the political situation. They maintain Israel's illusion that it will be possible some day for it to retain its territorial acquisitions; these maintain and increase poverty and despair among the numerous refugees of the region and also give the Security Council the illusion that it can postpone indefinitely the time to assume its own responsibilities in the settlement of this question, an illusion which, more than any other, contributes to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East.

105. The Council has so far been too much preoccupied with the inevitable consequences of Israel's military aggression in the Middle East and has for too long put off assuming its obligations in regard to the causes of this situation. These causes are well known. It is high time that the Security Council set about the task of putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab territories in the region and also helped to restore to the people of Palestine their legitimate national rights.

106. Mr. BERARD (France) (*translated from French*): Mr. President, a few words will suffice for me to congratulate your predecessor on the very skilful manner in which, during difficult and serious debates, he carried out his duties. Impartiality, composure, authority, political acumen and decisiveness are the rare qualities which Ambassador de Araujo Castro displayed in our Council.

107. A few words will also suffice for me to tell you, Mr. President, how pleased my delegation is to see you take up in your turn those highly-responsible duties. My delegation is not alone in its pleasure. All my compatriots share this feeling, particularly those of the Vaucluse, a part of France which you are fond of. I can assure you that my delegation will give you its full support in your duties. It is convinced that you will display in that respect the qualities which we have already appreciated in you over many months.

108. A few days ago we had to deliberate on the subject of an incident which had occurred on 26 August 1968 on the east bank of the Suez Canal, one and a half kilometres south of Lake Timsah. The French delegation which, like the majority of the Council, has in the past condemned reprisal operations, had noted with satisfaction that Israel had decided, on 2 September, to refer this incident to the Council. The French delegation had interpreted this as a sign of a favourable evolution which it hoped would be confirmed. It must acknowledge, however, that the releasing, by the Algerian authorities, of the crew and passengers of the El Al aircraft and the return of the aircraft had led it to hope that things would quiet down and that we would be spared further debates.

109. On 8 September we were urgently convened, the two parties having referred to us a new incident which had occurred between Israeli forces and United Arab Republic

forces, a particularly serious incident on account of its duration and scope and the losses which it entailed on both sides. Shelling, not only by small arms and machine-guns but also by tanks and artillery, took place on both sides for over four hours all along the Suez Canal. The proximity of large centres of population on the west bank makes the consequences of such shelling even graver. That this is indeed so was observed on 8 September. According to press reports, shells fell on the civilian quarters of Suez, Ismailia and Port-Tawfiq where it is to be feared that the casualties and damage have been very great.

110. The French delegation has studied with the greatest attention the various reports sent in to the Secretariat by General Bull. It wishes to express the confidence it places in the latter, the hopes which it bases on his action and the wish that the parties will give him their most active co-operation and keep in close touch with him.

111. We have noted in General Bull's report of 29 August that Ambassador Gohar had denied that any United Arab Republic forces were in any way involved in this incident and that he had stated that "an inquiry had been ordered and that the results of this inquiry showed that no United Arab Republic forces had taken part in any action on the Israeli side of the Suez Canal sector" [*S/7930/Add. 74, para. 7*]. We noted with interest that the Under-Secretary of State had added that he had further assured General Bull: "of the continued and unqualified adherence of the United Arab Republic to the cease-fire in the area, as required by the Security Council and accepted by the parties, and also to the practical arrangements of 27 July 1967, renewed on 27 August 1967, concerning the prohibition of movement of boats and military activities in the Suez Canal" [*ibid.*].

112. My delegation has taken due note of these statements which have been reiterated in this room by the representative of the United Arab Republic. If the Egyptian forces have not intervened on the east bank of the Canal, we must nevertheless take note of the fact that an ambush was laid there. My delegation has no doubt that the Egyptian authorities, as far as they are concerned, will make every effort to clear up the question of this ambush and the fate of the Israeli soldier who has disappeared.

113. Deploing all these incidents, the French Government is especially aggrieved at all the losses of human life which they have caused.

114. The French delegation greeted with approval the statement which our President read out on behalf of the Council at the end of the 1448th meeting on 8 September, in which it is stated that the Security Council calls on both sides scrupulously to refrain from any breach or violation of the cease-fire. That is an obvious necessity, but that is not enough. The present state of affairs cannot go on without incurring the risk of most serious complications, a truly alarming risk. The grave events of 8 September, after the incident of 26 August, show clearly the urgent need to achieve the restoration of a peaceful situation in the Middle East. My delegation will never tire of proclaiming that only a political solution is likely to put an end to incidents whose repetition and increasing gravity threaten to rekindle the conflagration in that part of the world.

115. By opening the way to this solution, to this political solution of which it defined the elements, the resolution of 22 November 1967 [242 (1967)], unanimously adopted by our Council—by all of us here present—had given rise to great hopes. No country rejoiced at this more than my own. These hopes have so far not been realized. The resolution of 22 November 1967 nevertheless remains for France the foundation of its policy and the basis of the settlement that we seek. My country calls for and will continue firmly and constantly to call for the effective implementation of the whole of its provisions and, among others, the end of the occupation, which would reduce the possibilities of incidents and the causes of tension.

116. It is convinced that the implementation of these provisions is the true way to stop bloody clashes and to bring to the Middle East the just and lasting peace that all of us wish for.

117. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): I wish to thank the Ambassador of France for the very kind words he addressed to me.

*[The President continued in English.]*

118. I should now like to say a few words, speaking as the representative of CANADA. During this latest series of meetings on the situation in the Middle East, the dangers, instability, and uncertainty of that situation have again, forcibly and tragically, been brought home to us.

119. We began this set of meetings by considering the complaint which, quite rightly, was brought by Israel to the attention of the Council, the complaint relating to an attack on an Israeli patrol in the Suez Canal sector. When we took up that complaint it was suggested in this Council that, in fact, no such incident had occurred. This assumption, however, cut across information provided by General Bull, as given in document S/7930/Add.74, paragraph 5, to the effect that "an Israel Defence Force patrol was mined at approximate map reference 7415-8705", and that the "physical evidence indicated that the patrol was ambushed". It was thus clear from the report submitted to the Secretary-General by General Bull that a deplorable incident had occurred.

120. In being concerned about that particular incident we could not help but have in mind the possible repercussions that such an occurrence might have for the maintenance of the cease-fire throughout the Suez Canal sector. Our fears were only too substantially and quickly realized. On 8 September, the detonation of another mine in this area was followed, in the conditions of tension created by the preceding incident, by massive and prolonged firing along the whole Suez Canal. The details of this sequence of firing, which lasted some four hours, were given us in the information received from General Bull as outlined in document S/7930/Add.78.

121. The gravity of these incidents is to be measured not only in the increase of tension in the area, dangerous though this may be. These incidents also involve grievous loss of life and damage to property on both sides, and they raise concern about the fate of civilian populations in communities likely to be affected by the firing.

122. In considering the three complaints which form the present item on our agenda, the Canadian delegation proceeds from the premise that the Security Council must be firm and precise regarding the need for the prevention of any and all violations of the cease-fire. We believe that the Council has a special responsibility to demand that the cease-fire, which was established in the first place at the call of the Security Council, should be fully respected. This belief leads us to welcome the fact that on 8 September, shortly after the latest outbreak of violence had ceased, it was possible, after consultations, for the President of the Council to make a declaration requiring the parties strictly to observe the cease-fire called for by the Security Council's resolutions.

123. It is most important that there should be the strictest observance of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area, where infractions, as the representative of the United Arab Republic quite rightly reminded us in his statement on 4 September [1446th meeting], have already been paid for dearly in the loss of life and injury. Members of the Council will have noted the assurances given by both sides regarding their adherence to the cease-fire, assurances which we now trust, in the light of the latest incidents, will be fully reaffirmed and respected. We note in this connexion the statement of the representative of Israel last week that Israel: "turned to the Council with one purpose in mind: to find in it support for strengthening the fabric of the cease-fire established by the Security Council" [1447th meeting, para. 93].

124. There are, of course, many ways in which the maintenance of the cease-fire can be strengthened—through observance thereof by the parties, first and foremost. It is also perhaps opportune to recall that as long ago as 31 October 1967, our Secretary-General recommended the provision of water patrol-craft and helicopters to the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector so that they could carry out their responsibilities with greater effectiveness. The Secretary-General's observations were outlined in document S/8053/Add.3, of 31 October 1967.

125. On this occasion, as on others, my delegation would urge all those responsible to maintain the most scrupulous respect of the cease-fire in the area and to avoid all actions which might aggravate the situation and make more difficult the achievement of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It is that goal—"a peaceful and accepted settlement"—which we must always keep in mind, for it is, in the view of my delegation, the only way out of this vicious circle of violence, as the representative of Ethiopia has reminded us in his most constructive remarks today.

126. Speaking again as PRESIDENT, I wish to inform the Council that there are no other speakers on my list, and if no other representative wishes to speak at this stage, I would suggest that the Council now adjourn. First, however, I have a brief statement to make about tomorrow.

127. I recognize the representative of Israel in exercise of his right of reply.

128. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): I shall be very brief in exercising my right of reply to statements made by two representatives.

129. At a certain stage of the debate I entertained the notion that the representative of Algeria would prefer not to intervene in this debate concerned with peace, cease-fire and international obligations. Indeed, the Algerian Government's adherence to international law and behaviour has come very close to becoming proverbial. Yet Algeria, which still maintains troops along the Suez Canal, would do itself, I believe, so much more of a service if, instead of continuing to glorify violence and to deny the Jewish people the right to sovereignty and freedom, it were to come before the Security Council and announce at last that it too accepted the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council. More than a year has elapsed since the Security Council adopted the fundamental resolutions on the establishment of a cease-fire. Algeria has refused to accept them. One cannot but wonder, of course, whether Algeria was not encouraged in this attitude when it was rewarded for its defiance of United Nations tenets by being elected to the organ charged with ensuring international peace and security.

130. I will not react at any length to the desperate attempts made by the representative of the United Arab Republic to justify aggression by distortion of facts. Suffice it to make one comment. For him, General Bull's report [S/7930/Add.78] starts not with paragraph 1, but with paragraph 5. He read to us paragraph 5, which reports firing by Israeli forces in the area of observation post Pink, and then explained to us that when, in paragraph 6, the report speaks of the United Arab Republic's initiating fire in the area of observation post Gold, it was in self-defence that the Egyptian army acted. Now, observation post Gold happens to be at a distance of fifteen kilometres from observation post Pink; one is at the northern tip of the Gulf of Suez and the other is at the southern end of the Little Bitter Lake. Moreover, General Bull reports that the United Arab Republic forces initiated fire not once, but seven times—this in addition to Egypt's extension of the fighting from the southern end of the canal to the north of it along a 100-kilometre front.

131. The attitude of the United Arab Republic representative to the analysis of the evidence submitted by the United Nations is the best indication of the degree of reliability and veracity of the United Arab Republic's statements before the Council, and of the absence of any facts that could refute Egypt's responsibility for the attacks on 26 August and 8 September 1968.

132. Finally, I agree with the representative of the United Arab Republic that we should look for more than the cease-fire as the basis for our relations. First there is, of course, the Charter of the United Nations. But at this stage, when Egypt openly proclaims the continuation of warfare against Israel, compliance by Cairo with Charter provisions in Egypt's relations with Israel remains, unfortunately, in the realm of dreams and hopes. I also agree with him that the cease-fire should be only a first step towards a just and lasting peace, as provided for in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. However, as long as Egypt abides by the Khartoum decision, which says "No peace, no negotiations, no recognition of Israel", Egypt consciously, wilfully prevents progress towards a just and lasting peace.

133. I regret that I must conclude my remarks by bringing to the attention of the Council two further reports about Egyptian acts of aggression which took place today. Today, at 1415 hours, a half-track of the Israel Defence Forces was blown up by a new anti-vehicle mine laid on the east bank of the Canal in the same place where the mine was detonated by Israeli sappers last Sunday. One Israeli soldier was wounded.

134. Another report which has just reached me states that at 1705 hours, local time—that is, only an hour and a half ago—fire was opened again, from the west bank by the Egyptian army positions on Kantara. The report states that at the time of its dispatch, one Israeli soldier was gravely wounded.

135. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union in exercise of his right of reply.

136. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. President, in view of the late hour the Soviet delegation intends to state briefly its position and to answer some of the attacks made by the Israeli representative on the statement made by the Soviet delegation at the previous meeting.

137. Today I should like to limit myself merely to expressing gratitude to the Secretary-General for the explanations he gave concerning the expression used to designate the Israeli armed forces. It has, of course, long been known; it is the official title. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation holds the view that in the official documents of the United Nations military observers when mention is made of various operations of the so-called "Israel Defence Forces", which have seized other peoples' territory, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, mention is made merely of the name of the State—the United Arab Republic—then both when one listens to those documents being read out, as happened at the previous meeting and when one reads them, that sort of balancing cannot but arouse a corresponding feeling that there is an element of tendentiousness in it. For this reason I express the completely logical wish that in documents of that kind if it is stated that "the United Arab Republic opened fire", then it should also be stated that "Israel opened fire". On the one hand, it is stated that "the Israel Defence Forces", which have seized other peoples' territory, opened fire, while, on the other hand, it is stated that the United Arab Republic opened fire. This cannot fail to cause surprise among those who read or hear it. However, it is a technical and procedural matter; I do not particularly insist on it.

138. To my second question as to whether anything was mentioned in the report of General Bull about the explosion of a mine, which was referred to in the letter of the Israeli representative [S/8805] and in his statement here at the 1448th meeting, a complete, clear and, I would say, final answer has been given. It says, as was quoted here by the representative of the United Arab Republic, that the United Nations observers were not informed of a mine to be exploded. After this explosion carried out by the Israeli side there ensued a chain of lamentable events resulting in losses of human lives and material damage.

139. I note with satisfaction that this answer is not only an answer to a legitimate question asked by the Soviet delegation but also an answer to the United States representative who, with his usual partiality, at the previous meeting came out with all sorts of fabrications and cast doubt on the legitimate remark made by the Soviet delegation as to whether there was any mention of the explosion of that mine in General Bull's report. This question was legitimate, to the point and well-founded. Nevertheless, the United States representative found it necessary, as I have already said, to make biased remarks concerning this legitimate question and in regard to the Soviet delegation which asked this legitimate and logical question. Therefore, I am doubly satisfied with General Bull's answer which makes things perfectly clear both for me and for the United States representative, Mr. Ball.

140. I suppose that the Security Council will await further reports from General Bull, especially since nothing has so far been said in the available reports of General Bull about the victims caused by this new act of aggression by Israel against the United Arab Republic. In his first report [S/7930/Add.78] there is mention of victims on the Israeli side, on the basis of Israeli information, but nothing is said about the casualties and material damage caused to the Egyptian side by this new act of Israeli aggression. Yet even the American press today, in particular *The New York Times*, which the representative of Israel is so fond of quoting, reports that the number of casualties is very high and that enormous material damage has been caused to the United Arab Republic. I think that the Security Council is entitled to expect from the United Nations observers information on this subject also.

141. Concerning the arguments put forward today by the representative of Israel based on the testimony of a traitor, I do not think that arguments of that kind are likely to convince the Security Council or those who impartially and objectively approach the consideration of this matter. In this respect the Israeli side is not displaying any originality. Everyone knows what wide use is made in the country in which we find ourselves—in the United States—of testimonies, articles, statements and interviews of Judas-like traitors. This is a term that was first used here by Mr. Ball in one of his statements. But I suppose that the representative of Israel is a religious man and that he is well acquainted with the biblical legend about the role of Judas. Therefore, if the Israeli representative, because of lack of documents or realizing the weakness of his arguments, resorts to references to the testimonies of Judas-like traitors, then the Israeli side has a bad case; it cannot go any further.

142. Now for my final comment. Can the remarks which the representative of Israel has just made in regard to Algeria in connexion with the statement of the Algerian representative regarding the attitude of Algeria towards the Security Council's resolution of 22-November 1967, which, if I am not mistaken, he called for the first time in his statements "fundamental"—can, I repeat, those remarks of the representative of Israel be taken to mean that Israel itself recognizes and is ready immediately to carry out this fundamental resolution of the Security Council?

143. Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) (*translated from French*): I shall be very brief. I should merely like to reserve the right of my delegation to exercise its right of reply at the next meeting of the Security Council.

144. The PRESIDENT: The request of the representative of Algeria has been noted.

145. I call on the representative of Israel in exercise of his right of reply.

146. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): This is not the first time that the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has entertained the Council with original ideas. The suggestion to examine the propriety of referring to States and their organs by their official names is indeed interesting. I wonder whether the Soviet representative had in mind that we examine, for instance, the propriety of such names as U-A-R—the United Arab Republic. With whom is that State united at present? With Syria, or Yemen, or Libya? Or is it simply an indication of some future expansionist or liberation idea, shall we say? I do not know whether even the name the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" would not constitute an interesting object of academic examination and discussion.

147. As for the reference by the representative of the Soviet Union to the deserter from the Egyptian army, it is interesting that he did not observe the reason for the desertion. I think it would be of interest to him to know that this was the attitude of the officers to the lower classes, the soldiers. But what matters is not the source of information but its truth, exactitude and applicability to the present debate.

148. The representative of the Soviet Union insists again on creating artificial issues out of such questions as why Israel detonated a mine planted on the east bank by the Egyptian army, in violation of the cease-fire. He reiterated again today that this shocked and apparently frightened the Egyptian army to such a degree that it launched an artillery, tank and mortar attack along a 100-kilometre front.

149. I have already said earlier today that the Security Council is not dealing with the problem of the Egyptian army's psychology, but with the termination of its aggression. Unfortunately, the somewhat irresponsible character of these arguments was demonstrated again today, as I reported to the Security Council.

150. To the Soviet representative it seems that the laying of mines and the need to detonate them may be a matter for dialectical acrobatics at a debating table. To us in Israel it is a matter of life and death. And to those who are really concerned with peace in the area it is a question of how to prevent violations of the cease-fire.

151. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

152. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I note that the Israeli representative is resorting to his usual practice of verbal acrobatics.



But he did not answer my last question, and I note that also.

153. I asked the question: should his remark about the attitude of Algeria towards the resolution of 22 November 1967 which he called "fundamental"—and, if I am not mistaken, this was the first time he had done so in his statements, as I pointed out—be regarded as meaning that Israel itself recognizes and is ready to carry out that fundamental resolution, about which the representative of the United Arab Republic has spoken here, declaring officially on behalf of his Government that the United Arab Republic recognizes and is ready to carry out that resolution immediately?

154. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United Arab Republic to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

155. Mr. EL KONY (United Arab Republic): I know the hour is late, and I shall not waste the time of the Council in answering Mr. Tekoah's uncalled-for remarks. However, since the Israeli representative chose to refer to the 22 November resolution, I believe it is only in the interest of peace and out of respect for the will of the Council that he be called upon to state, here and now and in very clear and precise terms, the position of his authorities regarding their acceptance and implementation of that resolution.

156. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

157. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): As an old colleague of the representative of the Soviet Union, I should not like to leave him with a feeling that I ignored a question put to me

by him. I should like to make one small correction. In the exercise of my right of reply to the Algerian representative, in speaking of "fundamental" resolutions, I said, and I quote: "the fundamental resolutions on the establishment of a cease-fire". That was the reference—not to the resolution of 22 November 1967.

158. As for Israel's position on the resolution of 22 November 1967, which is of cardinal importance in the efforts that are now being pursued towards a just and lasting peace, the Government of Israel has made its position very clear, as a representative pointed out the other day, in a statement made by me on 1 May [1418th meeting] in the Security Council and included in the records of that meeting.

159. The PRESIDENT: There being no further names on my list, I should now like to make a brief statement, as President, about the arrangements for tomorrow. The Council will be meeting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, at 10 o'clock, on the subject of the application for admission to the United Nations of the newly independent country of Swaziland. If we meet and promptly conclude our consideration of Swaziland's application for membership—and I would urge all concerned to be here promptly—I believe we could then resume our discussion of the item on today's agenda tomorrow in the forenoon; and I understand from informal consultations carried out with all members of the Council that there is no objection to this proposed course of action.

160. As I hear no objection, I declare this meeting adjourned on that understanding.

*The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.*

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