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SPECIAL REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS

1. I must draw the Security Council's attention to a very serious incident which occurred in the Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou area of Larraca District on 15 November 1967. This incident, together with the events leading up to and immediately following it, is described below.
2. Tension had risen sharply in this area in recent weeks owing to the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the resumption of patrolling by the Cyprus Police to the mixed village of Ayios Theodoros along the main access road from Skarinou bridge on the Nicosia-Limassol highway. This road enters the village from the north, passing through the Turkish Cypriot quarter. Patrols there had been conducted regularly since the beginning of the emergency in 1963-1964, but after some shooting incidents on 20-21 and 29-30 July 1967, the Cyprus Police decided on its own initiative to refrain from using the main road from Skarinou until calm was restored and tension lowered. Instead, the Cyprus Police would enter the village from the south (where the Greek Cypriot quarter is situated) and would inform UNFICYP in advance about such patrols, so that UNFICYP could observe their peaceful progress.
3. The Cyprus Police sought to resume its regular patrols from the north on 7 September, at which time UNFICYP felt that a reasonable period had elapsed for the situation to settle down and for the normal practice to be resumed. A Cyprus Police patrol on 7 September travelled along the main access road and into Ayios Theodoros without incident, but was not allowed by the local Turkish Cypriot fighters to return by the same route. On 16 September, the Cyprus Government decided to send another police patrol to the village along the main road, and requested UNFICYP to escort it. UNFICYP did so, and the patrol reached the village without serious incident, although the local Turkish Cypriot fighters again refused to allow it to return along that road and it was only after the UNFICYP escort had

been threatened and manhandled by the fighters that the latter bowed to instructions from their leaders in Nicosia and allowed the patrol and its escort to pass.

4. After 16 September a number of representations were made by UNFICYP to the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Turkish Government regarding the resumption of Cyprus Police patrols. UNFICYP took the view that the status quo ante 30 July 1967 should be restored and that the Cyprus Police should be in a position to patrol to Ayios Theodoros via the main access road, as it had done in the past, approximately twice a week. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership remained adamant and took the view that such patrolling could only be resumed when the National Guard withdrew from the positions it had taken up along Artemis Avenue at Larnaca on 12/13 May 1967 (see S/7969, para. 69). UNFICYP argued repeatedly that these situations, not being analogous, should not be linked, as in the case of Ayios Theodoros the main problem was the restoration of the freedom of movement of the Cyprus Police whereas at Artemis Avenue it was not a question of freedom of movement, which had never been hindered, but of a new confrontation area which had arisen from the building of fortifications by the National Guard and partial reciprocation of this by Turkish Cypriot fighters opposite.

5. While these negotiations were going on, the Cyprus Government became increasingly impatient and pressed for the resumption of patrols at an early date. After careful consideration UNFICYP proposed to the Cyprus Government on 18 October and to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires and the Turkish Cypriot leadership on 19 October, a time-table for the gradual resumption of Cyprus Police patrols as from 2 November. The Cyprus Government accepted the proposed time-table. The Turkish side had reservations about it, but agreed to review the matter once again.

6. I fully endorsed the efforts of UNFICYP to settle the situation at Ayios Theodoros and made repeated representations to the Turkish Permanent Representative at Headquarters in support of these efforts. On 27 October I addressed an urgent personal appeal to the Turkish Government, requesting its co-operation with UNFICYP and its acceptance of the proposed time-table for the resumption of patrols. The reply of the Turkish Government received on 3 November was that Turkey would be prepared to accept the time-table provided that the Artemis Avenue situation was resolved simultaneously.

7. At a meeting held on 13 November under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, and in the presence of General Grivas and the

Minister of the Interior, the Cyprus Government expressed to my Special Representative and the Force Commander its deep concern at the delay in having the Cyprus Police patrolling to Ayios Theodoros resumed, and it indicated that it might not be in a position to wait any longer. My Special Representative and the Force Commander strongly recommended that the resumption of patrolling be postponed so as to give more time for reaching an acceptable solution. On the evening of that day my Special Representative again saw the Minister of the Interior and repeated his request that the resumption of patrolling should be postponed, emphasizing that after the return without trial to Turkey on 12 November of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktash, President of the Cyprus Turkish Communal Chamber - who had come to the Island secretly on 31 October and had been apprehended by Government security forces - there were indications that the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were prepared to reconsider their stand on the question of Cyprus Police patrolling to Ayios Theodoros and appeared to be on the point of agreeing to the time-table put forward by UNFICYP for the gradual restoration of Cyprus Police patrols. This reported change in the Turkish attitude was reiterated to the Cyprus Government during the morning of 14 November. Despite this, the Cyprus Government decided to go ahead with the resumption of police patrolling, and it sent two patrols to Ayios Theodoros in the afternoon of 14 November.

8. All along, it had been made known to the Cyprus Government that UNFICYP would be prepared, if necessary, to take appropriate measures to restore the status quo ante in Ayios Theodoros and enable the Cyprus Police to resume patrolling, and in particular it had been made clear that UNFICYP was ready to escort the patrol again as it had done on 16 September. But at no point during the high level discussions on Monday and Tuesday, 13 and 14 November, had UNFICYP's participation or support been requested. On the other hand, it was out of the question for UNFICYP to offer such assistance in the absence of an official request. It was only at 1250 hours^{1/} on 14 November that the United Nations Commander at Kophinou was informed by way of the Commander of the National Guard troops there that at 1315 hours that same afternoon, i.e. twenty-five minutes later, two Cyprus Police patrols would move into Ayios Theodoros, one along the main access road and one from the south. The National Guard local Commander asked to be told what protection

^{1/} All times local except when otherwise indicated.

UNFICYP was going to afford to the patrols, and pointed out that if UNFICYP did not provide protection they, the National Guard, would escort the patrols and "would be prepared to meet whatever consequences resulted". By the time this important request - which it may be noted was made to the UNFICYP Local Commander and not, as might have been expected, by the Government of UNFICYP headquarters - was made, UNFICYP had already observed large-scale military movements and deployment by the National Guard in the Ayios Theodoros area; there could therefore be no question for UNFICYP, in view of the short notice given and the strong deployment of Government forces observed, of joining the National Guard in action directed against the Turkish Cypriot fighters guarding the entrance to Ayios Theodoros, as it had always been made very clear that once the National Guard took it upon itself to make a show of force in the village, UNFICYP could not participate in any joint action. This position of UNFICYP was communicated to the Cyprus authorities at both the local level and the Government level in Nicosia.

9. At 1330 hours on 14 November two Cyprus Police patrols proceeded without incident to Ayios Theodoros, which shortly afterwards was visited by General Grivas, Supreme Commander of the Cyprus armed forces. At 1000 hours the following day, 15 November, another patrol, escorted by the National Guard, proceeded to the village without difficulty; indeed a tractor which was barring the road at the entrance to Ayios Theodoros was removed by the Turkish Cypriots without any coercion by the police or the National Guard.

10. At 1340 hours on 15 November the UNFICYP Commander at Kophinou was informed by the local National Guard Commander that the Cyprus police would patrol again to Ayios Theodoros at 1400 hours from both directions (i.e. from Skarinou and from the Greek Cypriot sector of the village) and that the composition of the patrols would be the same as in the morning. A little later, when the patrol from Skarinou reached the entrance to the village, it found a tractor and plough drawn across the road. Although there were no Turkish Cypriots around the tractor, some were seen in the area of a nearby school. At about 1400 hours the patrol from the Greek Cypriot sector arrived on the scene. This patrol was much stronger than that of the morning and included a platoon of infantry. When it reached

the obstruction, the soldiers debussed, removed the road block and deployed in the vicinity of the road junction at the north end of the village. Almost immediately there were about three shots and a burst of automatic fire; the evidence on hand points to these shots having been fired by the Turkish Cypriots. The National Guard and Cyprus Police immediately opened fire, and this was the signal for firing to spread throughout the village, involving not only small arms but also the heavy machine guns and 2-pounder guns of the National Guard armoured cars. During the next hour or so the fighting became intense as the National Guard engaged the village with both artillery and mortars and launched a ground attack on it at approximately company strength. At about the same time some armoured cars and infantry moved against Turkish Cypriot fighter positions covering Kophinou, a village some two and a half miles away and unrelated to the patrol issue, but where tension has been high for some time. Towards the evening firing died down at Ayios Theodoros and only sporadic firing was reported, although at no time did it cease for any appreciable period. By this time most of the Turkish Cypriot positions around the village had been overrun, and the National Guard were in the village and virtually in control of it. At Kophinou the firing lasted longer and it was not until about 2030 hours that the last real exchange of shots took place. By this time the National Guard had cleared nearly all the positions on the features overlooking the village and were in the village itself, though not in complete control of it.

11. From the beginning of the exchange of fire UNFICYP made incessant attempts to effect a cease-fire and the Force Commander was in constant touch with the Cyprus Government at all levels and with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as well as with the Turkish Embassy. The Cyprus Government replied that the matter was under consideration; the Turkish Cypriot leadership let it be known before 1800 hours that the Turkish Cypriot fighters were ready to effect a cease-fire.

12. In the afternoon of 15 November, I met with the Permanent Representatives of Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. The Permanent Representative of Turkey, Ambassador O. Eralp, had asked to see me in order to convey the appreciation of his

Government for the help which the United Nations had provided in settling the Denktash matter and also to communicate to me that the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot community agreed in principle to the UNFICYP time-table for resumption of the Cyprus Police patrols in Ayios Theodoros, provided UNFICYP returned the Kophinou police compound to the Turkish Cypriot police element and efforts would be redoubled by UNFICYP to settle the Artemis Avenue situation. By the time Ambassador Eralp arrived for his appointment early in the afternoon of 15 November, he had additional instructions from Ankara concerning the fighting in Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou. According to the Turkish Government, the fighting was the result of an attack planned and premeditated by General Grivas on a wide front, utilizing heavy weapons and armoured cars. Ambassador Eralp conveyed to me the grave concern of the Turkish Government in regard to these developments and stated that unless UNFICYP interposed itself between the hostile factions and brought the attack to a halt, there was a risk of hostilities breaking out on an Island-wide basis. After having stated to Ambassador Eralp that it was my intention immediately to request the Cyprus Government to agree to the cease-fire proposed by UNFICYP and to withdraw the National Guard from the positions they had occupied during the fighting, I requested the Turkish Permanent Representative to convey to his Government my request to exercise the utmost restraint in the present circumstances.

13. Immediately after seeing the Turkish Permanent Representative, I met with the Permanent Representative of Cyprus, Ambassador Z. Rossides, and requested him to convey to his Government my very grave concern regarding the fighting in Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou and my shock at the treatment meted out by the National Guard to UNFICYP elements in the area. I impressed upon Ambassador Rossides the urgent need to bring the fighting to a stop and requested his Government to order the National Guard to withdraw from the positions occupied during the fighting and to co-operate fully with UNFICYP in the restoration of peace and quiet. On 16 November, I addressed a note of protest to the Government of Cyprus, through its Permanent Representative, on the abusive treatment of UNFICYP personnel by the National Guard.

14. I next met with the Permanent Representative of Greece, Ambassador D.S. Bitsios, and through him requested the Greek Government to use all its influence in bringing

about an effective cease-fire in the Ayios Theodoros/Kophinou area and the withdrawal of the National Guard from the positions occupied during the fighting. I also expressed to him my shock and dismay at the conduct shown by the National Guard towards UNFICYP elements in the area of the disturbances. Ambassador Bitsios said he had just received information that a cease-fire had come into effect at about 2000 hours GMT. Very shortly after our meeting, Ambassador Bitsios called my office to inform me that he had already contacted his Government which had asked him to give me the most categorical assurance that the Greek Government would do everything in its power to assist in the restoration of peace and quiet in the area of the incidents in Cyprus.

15. At 1840 hours on 15 November the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Nicosia transmitted orally to my Special Representative and to the Force Commander a message from the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chaglayangil. Translating from Turkish, the Chargé d'Affaires gave the following text:

"The attack launched against the Ayios Theodoros area has introduced an element of complication such as has not been seen since 1964. Such action, while there was still a possibility of reaching a negotiated solution of the Ayios Theodoros problem (meaning patrolling by the Cyprus Police), constitutes a flagrant provocation by the Cyprus Government. UNFICYP is requested to stop the fighting immediately and clear the Turkish Cypriot areas of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou of both Greek Cypriot and Greek armed forces. If this cannot be done, a crisis which will go beyond the borders of the Island will be unavoidable. We therefore request immediate action by UNFICYP."

The substance of this message was immediately transmitted to the Cyprus Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kyprianou. At 2145 hours Mr. Kyprianou informed my Special Representative that a cease-fire had been ordered effective immediately. This cease-fire, though mainly effective, was not complete, and even late in the night of 15 November and early morning of 16 November sporadic firing continued. This was largely due to the National Guard carrying out house clearance operations in Ayios Theodoros after the cease-fire, and it did not stop until they received orders to withdraw to their original positions.

16. Before these mopping-up operations took place the National Guard cleared the village of civilians - men, women and children. UNFICYP was informed that these civilians were moved to places outside the village with the object of protecting them from any further danger. Later the villagers, who were grouped in various

areas, were visited by UNFICYP officers and were reported to have been well looked after.

17. At 0300 hours on 16 November my Special Representative learned that orders had been given to the Supreme Commander of the National Guard forces in Cyprus (General Grivas) that all such forces were to be withdrawn from all the areas occupied during the fighting before daybreak, so that the situation would be restored to what it had been before 1400 hours on 15 November. This information was immediately transmitted to the Turkish Embassy by my Special Representative. It was also transmitted to the UNFICYP Chief of Staff, who had gone to Kophinou on behalf of the Force Commander. On receipt of this information, the Chief of Staff, the UNFICYP zone Commander and the UNFICYP Commander of Kophinou District visited the local National Guard Commander and discussed with him his plans for withdrawal. These were for the National Guard to start withdrawing at 0445 hours. It was arranged that at 0500 hours the villagers who had been moved out would be released to UNFICYP. This was done and UNFICYP transported them back to their villages.

18. It had been very difficult during the action and the subsequent darkness for UNFICYP to assess how many casualties there had been. When UNFICYP moved into both Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros they found, by 1000 hours on 16 November, seventeen unidentified dead and seven wounded. Arrangements were made for the wounded to be evacuated by UNFICYP to Nicosia. Permission had been obtained from the Government early in the night of 15/16 November to send medical teams into the villages to give immediate aid and to arrange evacuation of any wounded they might find. However, UNFICYP's ability to do this was somewhat hampered by the fact that National Guard clearance operations were continuing. There is as yet no final figure for casualties. According to the latest reports from UNFICYP there were twenty-four dead, including two Greek Cypriots. Nine Turkish Cypriot wounded had been evacuated by UNFICYP to the Turkish Cypriot hospital in Nicosia.

19. At 1550 hours on 16 November the UNFICYP local Commander at Kophinou was advised by the National Guard that at 1615 hours during the same afternoon a mixed Cyprus Police/National Guard patrol would travel from Skarinou to Ayios Theodoros along the main access road and back. This patrol fortunately took place without

incident and returned to Skarinou at 1718 hours, leaving three land rovers and ten to twelve policemen in the Greek Cypriot sector of Ayios Theodoros. The patrol consisted of Cyprus Police personnel except for one man who appeared to be a member of the National Guard.

20. In this connexion it should be noted that on 16 November my Special Representative had urged the Government of Cyprus that, in the tense atmosphere after the fighting on 15 November, it should not send new patrols to the area for the time being. He had suggested instead that as soon as practicable UNFICYP should reactivate its plan for gradual restoration of patrolling which had now also been accepted by the Turkish side.

21. Also on 16 November, the Turkish Permanent Representative conveyed an urgent message from his Government to me regarding the patrol of 16 November into Ayios Theodoros, which the Turkish Government regarded as a clear provocation which could lead to serious consequences.

22. During the incidents at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, two messages were received by headquarters UNFICYP, one from General Grivas addressed to the Force Commander and the other from a senior officer of General Grivas' staff. In the first message, General Grivas blamed UNFICYP for not having prevented what had happened. He declared that the Turkish Cypriots had fired on the National Guard and that all the latter was doing was to defend itself. In the second message the National Guard senior staff officer declared that the National Guard was not responsible for what happened, and repeated that it was UNFICYP which was responsible because it had not helped the Cyprus police to exercise their rights. He further warned that the operation then in progress would necessitate the National Guard's movement through certain areas, including UNFICYP positions. In his reply the Force Commander rejected any responsibility for the fighting that was going on at that time at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. Furthermore, he said, he failed to see the justification for what General Grivas had called defensive action by the National Guard. The Force Commander insisted that UNFICYP positions should not be used by the National Guard. He protested most strongly against the forcible and deliberate disarming of UNFICYP soldiers and the disabling of UNFICYP radio equipment. He demanded that immediate orders be given for the complete cessation of these excesses against UNFICYP. The Force Commander concluded by requesting once more that an order for an immediate cease-fire should be given to prevent any further loss of life. At my meetings with the representatives of Cyprus and Greece, referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14 above, I also rejected as not in accordance with the facts the contention of UNFICYP's responsibility advanced by General Grivas.

23. It is to be regretted that during the course of these incidents, despite the Force Commander's request that UNFICYP posts should be bypassed, the National Guard took up positions at or alongside UNFICYP observation posts, thus endangering UNFICYP personnel by drawing fire onto them. Furthermore, much of the UNFICYP forces in the area was also under fire by the National Guard for most of the afternoon of 15 November, and UNFICYP observation posts, buildings and tents were struck by bullets. In one case the cookhouse of a UNFICYP observation post was destroyed by mortar fire, and many mortar and artillery shells fell extremely close to the UNFICYP district headquarters in the Kophinou compound. Fortunately, there were no UNFICYP casualties. In addition there were incidents of deliberate damage by the National Guard to UNFICYP radio equipment so as to render it unserviceable, while at one post UNFICYP soldiers were forcibly disarmed by the National Guard and their weapons, which were removed by force of arms, have not been returned despite urgent requests.

24. The magnitude of the Ayios Theodoros operation and the speed with which it was carried out clearly indicate that the National Guard had planned in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any show of opposition by the Turkish Cypriots. The running of several patrols at short intervals was not customary and was no doubt an important factor in the developments that followed.

25. According to the latest reports from UNFICYP, the military action has now stopped, the National Guard has withdrawn to the positions it occupied before the incidents began at 1400 hours on 15 November and the Turkish Cypriot villagers have returned to their homes. It is incumbent on all parties to do their utmost to assist in the restoration of peace and calm in the disturbed area and to co-operate fully with UNFICYP in ensuring that there will be no repetition of such senseless and deplorable incidents, which can only have an adverse effect on the improved atmosphere created by some recent developments.

