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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 9 December 1965 to 10 March 1966)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 9 December 1965 to 10 March 1966 and brings up to date the record of United Nations activities in the Island pursuant to the mandate laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. During the period under review, the military situation has remained quiet and the cease-fire, by and large, has continued to be observed.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, 9 December 1965, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 5,591 military personnel and 175 Civilian Police (S/7001, para. 3). On 7 March 1966, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>
Austria	- Field Hospital . . . . .	54
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . .	65
	Battalion plus reconnaissance squadron . . . . .	808
	Contingent HQ and administrative support group . . . . .	<u>110</u>
		983
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . .	30
	Battalion . . . . .	<u>650</u>
		680
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . .	24
	Battalion . . . . .	<u>783</u>
		807
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . .	17
	Battalion . . . . .	<u>504</u>
		521
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . .	13
	Battalion . . . . .	<u>750</u>
		763
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . .	154
	Battalion plus reconnaissance squadron . . . . .	663
	Light aircraft and helicopter support . . . . .	57
	UNFICYP logistic support units . .	<u>171</u>
		<u>1,045</u>
	<u>Total military personnel:</u>	4,853

<u>Civilian Police</u>		<u>Total</u>
Australia . . . . .	40	
Austria . . . . .	34	
Denmark . . . . .	40	
New Zealand . . . . .	20	
Sweden . . . . .	<u>39</u>	
	<u>Total Civilian Police:</u>	<u>173</u>
	TOTAL UNFICYP:	<u>5,026</u>

4. The following changes in contingent strength took place during the period:
- (a) Denmark: There was a reduction in strength between 15 and 18 January 1966 of 337 all ranks. The present strength of DANCON IV is 680.
  - (b) Finland: There was a reduction in strength between 28 December 1965 and 11 January 1966 of 187 all ranks. The present strength of YKSP 4 is 807.
  - (c) Sweden: There was a reduction in strength on 15 and 16 January 1966 of 177 all ranks. The present strength of the 32nd Swedish Battalion is 763.
  - (d) United Kingdom: "A" Squadron, 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (strength 117) relieved "A" Squadron, 14th/20th King's Hussars (strength 127) between 13 December 1965 and 26 January 1966. The present strength of the United Kingdom contingent is 1,045.

5. The Force continues to be deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP (international) including HQ UNCIVPOL

Nicosia West District

- Danish Contingent
- Danish Civilian Police

Nicosia East District

- Finnish Contingent
- Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

- Swedish Contingent
- Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

- British Contingent
- New Zealand Civilian Police
- Australian Civilian Police

/...

Lefka District

Irish Contingent  
Australian Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Canadian Contingent  
Danish Civilian Police

6. On 17 December 1965, the Force suffered a tragic loss in the death of its Commander, General K.S. Thimayya. General Thimayya's professional skill, determination and wisdom had been a dominant factor in the effectiveness of UNFICYP. He had been an inspiring leader ever since his arrival in Cyprus in the difficult days of July 1964. The progress achieved since then owes much to his energy, patience and unswerving devotion to the United Nations and its cause of peace.

7. Since the death of General Thimayya, the Force has been under the Acting Command of its Chief of Staff, Brigadier A.J. Wilson. Mr. C.A. Bernardes has continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus.

B. Function and guiding principles

8. The function of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council, in its resolution of 4 March 1964, in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964, and 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965.<sup>1/</sup>

9. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of the civilian police element of the Force are described in my reports of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4), 11 March 1965 (S/6228, paras. 112-113) and 10 December 1965 (S/7001, para. 91) and in the present report (see para. 78 below).

<sup>1/</sup> Documents S/5575, S/5603, S/5778, S/5868, S/5987, S/6121, S/RES/201, S/RES/206, S/RES/207 and S/RES/219.

10. The Political Liaison Committee has continued to meet regularly to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relations between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. The Deputy Chief of Staff, the UNFICYP Senior Political and Legal Adviser and the Police Adviser have continued to meet in the Committee separately with liaison officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Between 9 December 1965 and 10 March 1966, the Committee held twenty-four meetings; twelve with the Government Political Liaison Officer and twelve with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

#### Casualties and discipline

11. During the period of this report, UNFICYP suffered no casualties as a result of inter-communal fighting. One UNFICYP soldier was killed and fifteen were seriously injured in accidents.

12. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of all contingents of the United Nations Force have continued to be of a high order, reflecting great credit on the Contingent Commanders and their staffs and on the armed forces of the contributing countries.

#### C. Relations with the Government and with the communities

13. Throughout the period of this report, UNFICYP has maintained close liaison at every level with the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

14. While some cases have occurred in which precipitate action, generally at local levels, has been taken by one side or the other, without consulting UNFICYP, or in disregard of its advice, timely negotiations have nearly always averted serious consequences.

15. Understanding between UNFICYP and the Command of the National Guard, and relations with the Turkish Cypriot fighter elements, particularly at the lower levels, have improved greatly and this has facilitated the prevention or containment of incidents. The marked improvement in relations is exemplified by the smooth departure from Xeros of 512 Turkish Cypriot students on 28 January 1966, in which UNFICYP, the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership co-operated fully and successfully in executing a delicate operation demanding a high degree of mutual confidence (see paras. 48-52 below).

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

16. During the period covered by this report there were four incidents involving a denial of freedom of movement to UNFICYP elements. Two may be attributed to members of the National Guard and two to Turkish Cypriot fighters. In one case, the National Guard incorrectly asserted that an UNFICYP patrol had entered an agreed restricted area (see S/6426, para. 19). There was, however, one occasion on which an UNFICYP patrol did enter an agreed restricted area by mistake.
17. The limited number of these incidents can be attributed to the fact that up-to-date records of the agreed restricted areas on "master" maps are held by both HQ UNFICYP and HQ National Guard (see S/7001, para. 16).
18. All four cases were the result of local actions by subordinate commanders and did not reflect decisions taken by National Guard Headquarters or the Turkish Cypriot military leadership, both of whom have demonstrated a general desire to co-operate with UNFICYP smoothly and effectively.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING  
AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF  
LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

19. On 10 January 1966, the remainder of the 1947 age-group reported for military training. It will be recalled that those of the age-group wishing to join the National Guard earlier had done so in August last year (S/7001, para. 20). The 1940 age-group was called up on 1 March 1966. This age-group constitutes the oldest so far enlisted under the conscription law. For reasons of age and the adverse effects on the national economy of keeping these men under arms for the full term of eighteen months, it was decided that the 1940 age-group would do only six months' active military service.

20. According to official sources, the Council of Ministers at its meeting on 20 January also decided to call up the 1948 age-group, but no reporting date has been announced so far.

21. Notwithstanding the call-up of these new age-groups, there has been a significant reduction in the regular strength of the National Guard during the period covered by this report. Men of the 1942, 1944 and 1945 age-groups who had had prior service in the special forces during 1964 were formally released from the ranks on 15 December 1965. However, they have continued to stay on under a reservists' call-up for a further limited period of one to three months. This means that by 15 March 1966 the vast majority of these three age-groups will have been demobilized.

22. As a result, and until the 1948 age-group reports for duty, the regular strength of the National Guard will consist mainly of the conscripted elements of the four age-groups of 1940, 1941, 1946 and 1947.

23. It should, however, be borne in mind that while the active strength of the National Guard is thus being reduced, the strength of its trained reservists, who can be quickly mobilized, is steadily increasing (see S/7001, para. 22).

24. To the effective total strength of Government armed forces must also be added a substantial number of Greek officers and other categories of military personnel from Greece - apart from the Greek National Contingent - who are believed to be integrated into the National Guard.

25. There have been further complaints by the Turkish Cypriot leadership about clandestine entries of Greek national military personnel into Cyprus. These entries have allegedly taken place mainly through the port of Limassol, and may relate in part to the periodic movement of Cyprus National Guardsmen to and from Greece for specialist training.

26. Instruction and training, which is still mainly the responsibility of Greek national officers, has continued normally during the period of this report. No large-scale exercises similar to those which were staged during the summer months of 1965 have taken place (S/7001, para. 23). Field exercises have been carried out with a limited number of troops and the principal aim seems to have been to test coastal defences. Much effort is still being devoted by the National Guard to improving fortifications and coastal defence systems in sensitive areas (S/7001, para. 24).

27. Shipments of military goods have continued to arrive in the Island, and as in the past, the port of Limassol has been the principal port of entry. These imports seem to have consisted of maintenance supplies of various items. UNFICYP has been unable to verify allegations by the Turkish Cypriots that the shipments may have also included light anti-aircraft weapons.

28. The strength of the regular Cyprus Police is approximately 2,000 all ranks, including a para-military Police tactical reserve of about 500 men distributed among the principal police headquarters throughout the Island.

29. On 25 February the Government announced regulations governing compulsory service in civil defence by all Cypriot males aged sixteen to fifty-five and females aged twenty to forty, with the usual exemptions.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

30. UNFICYP has observed no substantial changes in the organization, standard and conditions of the Turkish Cypriot fighters since my last report, apart from the military implications of the departure of some 500 Turkish Cypriot student-fighters from Kokkina and other places on 28 January 1966 (see paras. 48-52 below).

31. The most important part of the Island under the control of the fighters remains the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia and the enclave north of that city. Training here has been carried out as a daily routine under competent leaders and from time to time has included field exercises and night alerts within the city.

32. In confrontation areas throughout the Island efforts are continuously made to retain and improve the standard of training and the readiness of the fighters.

33. At Limnitis, the situation has been less influenced than at Kokkina by the departure of the student-fighters, which, however, may have affected the quality of the local leadership.

34. Precise figures for the total strength of the Turkish Cypriot armed elements are hard to obtain. As previously pointed out, the number of Turkish Cypriot fighters under arms at a given time varies according to local conditions and changes in the political climate (S/7001, para. 28). The estimate of 12,000 arrived at by UNFICYP in the past may well be on the conservative side since, in an emergency, almost every able-bodied male Turkish Cypriot would become a fighter.

35. However, only a part of the total fighting potential of Turkish Cypriot armed elements is being exploited in the present situation, and it would appear that the existing strength constantly under arms or employed on a permanent basis for special duties within the various organizations does not exceed 6,000.

36. UNFICYP has no evidence that weapons or other categories of military equipment have been received by the Turkish Cypriots from outside the Island during the period under review.

(c) The Greek and Turkish National Contingents

37. No apparent change in the total strengths or the locations of the two national contingents has occurred during the period under review.

38. The relief of approximately half of the Greek National Contingent was carried out on 19-20 December 1965 through the port of Famagusta. UNFICYP had been informed in advance.

39. By a note verbale dated 24 February 1966, the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Cyprus that Turkey intended to replace part of its contingent in Cyprus towards the end of March 1966. UNFICYP was informed, and was asked to extend its good offices and its facilities in the operation, as in the past.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

40. In general, the situation on the Island since December 1965 has been quiet. There have been, however, a series of minor incidents, many of which were potentially explosive.

41. At the beginning of the period under review, the main problem was implementation of the arrangements for the defortification of areas of direct confrontation in Famagusta. Work was commenced on the dismantling of fortifications on 10 December and, in the main, completed by 15 December (see paras. 55-57 below).

42. An example of the distrust that still exists between the two communities was the reaction of Turkish Cypriots to a decision by Greek Cypriots to hold, for the first time since the inter-communal disturbances, a service at a Greek Orthodox Church in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol on 17 January. On being informed of the intention to hold the service, the local Turkish Cypriot committee advised UNFICYP that the safety of those attending could not be guaranteed. However, following the personal intervention of my Special Representative and the Acting Force Commander, it was agreed that the service could take place and arrangements were made for a strong UNFICYP presence in the area of the Church. During the ceremony, which was attended by an estimated 800 Greek Cypriots, feeling among the local inhabitants rose to a dangerous pitch and only the fact that great restraint was exercised by responsible persons on both sides prevented a serious incident from taking place.

43. Throughout the period a series of minor incidents occurred in the northern part of the Nicosia enclave. A cause of concern was the continual attempts by the Turkish Cypriots to improve the Temblos track (see paras. 65-67 below). This work, which the Turkish Cypriot leadership stated was only repairs, eventually resulted in UNFICYP's having to close the track. An agreement acceptable to all parties was negotiated at the end of January and the track was then reopened. Another indication of the feeling in the area was the wounding by the National Guard of three Turkish Cypriots who were cutting wood in the Karmi forest on 22 January. A further factor aggravating the situation has been the continued occupation of a position at Pileri by the Turkish Cypriots, which UNFICYP regards as provocative. On 7 February, two fighters from this position stabbed and wounded a Greek Cypriot shepherd in the area (see paras. 61-64 below).

44. During early February there was some increased activity by the Turkish Cypriots which reached a peak on 10-13 February with a series of night exercises close to and along the "green line" in Nicosia. The tension caused by these exercises was further increased when the Turkish Cypriot fighters shouted insults and threw stones at National Guardsmen in nearby positions. No major incident resulted thanks to the restraint and discipline shown by the National Guard.

(iii) Developments towards reducing areas of tension

45. UNFICYP has continued its efforts to persuade the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take steps to eliminate lines of armed confrontation in the Island. Since the successful defortification of Famagusta (S/7001, para. 56), there has been no further progress in this respect.

46. As a result of that defortification, the lines of armed confrontation in Famagusta have been shortened and consequently the area and degree of tension reduced. However, the possibility of a serious incident still exists in Famagusta, since the Turkish Cypriots are not prepared to relax their state of readiness and have maintained their precautions against possible armed action by the Government.

47. In other areas of armed confrontation around the Turkish Cypriot enclaves of Nicosia, Lefka, Limnitis, Kokkina, Scala and Ktima, the situation has remained unchanged. Any activity in these areas by one side near the agreed cease-fire line is observed and regarded with suspicion and hostility by the other. Crossing of the cease-fire line by armed elements, improvement of existing forward positions and construction of new ones is not tolerated by either side. Typical incidents reflecting this situation arose in early December 1965 at Pileri and Temblos and in January 1966 in the Karmi Forest (see paras. 61-67 below).

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

(i) Departure of Turkish Cypriot students for Turkey

48. After negotiations with the Government in mid-January conducted by my Special Representative at the request of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, agreement was reached for the departure of approximately 500 Turkish Cypriot students from the Island. The evacuation was arranged so that these young men, who had joined the Turkish Cypriot fighters during the early days of fighting, could return to Turkey to continue their studies.

49. The operation was executed without incident during the night of 27-28 January 1966.

50. The students came from three main centres: Nicosia (46), the Limnitis area (41) and Kokkina (425). Arrangements were made to move the students by road in UNFICYP vehicles to Xeros, where they were embarked on a Turkish ship through port facilities kindly provided by the Cyprus Mines Corporation.

51. The operation started at 2240 hours, local time, with the first move by road from Nicosia, and the last student boarded the ship at approximately 0310 hours, the ship weighing anchor at 0330 hours.

52. The whole operation went extremely well and UNFICYP received full co-operation from all parties. Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership paid a tribute to UNFICYP for its assistance in this matter. The military implications of the operation, with special reference to Kokkina, are discussed in paragraphs 68-70 below.

(ii) National Guard coastal defences

53. The only significant construction of coastal defences that has occurred since my last report (S/7001, paras. 48-54) was at Scala at position S 29284033. The site was inspected by UNFICYP on 12 February 1966. Although the position overlooks a portion of the Turkish quarter of Scala, there are sufficient Greek buildings interposed to conclude that it is designed purely for coastal defence and is not provocative.

54. In order to ensure that no incidents will occur because of the new position, the United Nations is negotiating for it to remain unmanned once construction is completed.

(iii) Defortification of Famagusta

55. The implementation of the arrangements to defortify Famagusta (S/7001, para. 56) began on 10 December 1965. Both sides demonstrated great eagerness and sincerity in carrying out their obligations. On 13 December, the late Force Commander inspected the demilitarized area and, finding the demolition of fortified positions and defensive works nearly completed, expressed satisfaction with the progress made. The removal of sandbags from the main police-station was delayed for a few days but, after negotiations conducted by the Acting Force Commander and the Special Representative, they were finally removed on 3 January 1966.

56. The defortification was carried out under close UNFICYP supervision, and United Nations troops helped to dismantle a considerable number of positions.

57. On 9 February it was agreed that Turkish Cypriot civilians could use the top of the northern section of the wall of the old city for social and recreational purposes only. Negotiations are being conducted at the present time with a view to obtaining agreement from both sides on the extent of the defortified area.

(iv) The Kyrenia Road

58. The convoy system continues to operate smoothly, and because of the infrequency of incidents involving the convoys, it has been decided to withdraw the night-time posts manned by military personnel. This leaves only UNFICYP Civilian Police manning the two checkpoints on the road during daylight hours (S/7001, para. 59).

59. In December 1965, the Turkish Cypriot leadership pointed out that Greek Cypriot firms using the convoy were transporting cement, gravel, iron rods and other items which, if they were regarded as "warlike stores", were prohibited under the Kyrenia Road arrangements (S/6102, annex I). It also pointed out that, in preventing the import of such supplies into Turkish Cypriot controlled areas, the Government had itself catalogued them as "warlike stores". These representations have been brought to the notice of Government authorities, who are taking steps to ensure that shipments of such supplies to Kyrenia should go via the long route through Myrtou, thus avoiding the Turkish Cypriot enclave.

60. For a time during the period under review, relations between UNFICYP and the Turkish Cypriot fighters in the vicinity of the Road were not altogether easy. On one occasion a serious incident was narrowly averted. On 30 December 1965, a score of armed Turkish Cypriot fighters were seen deployed near the Kyrenia Pass (GR 974830). During the course of a discussion aimed at inducing them to withdraw, the Turkish Cypriot fighters threatened to shoot a Canadian officer of the Force and pointed a loaded rifle at his head. The officer, exercising extreme patience and self-control, stood his ground until the fighters finally withdrew.

(v) Pileri

61. During the period under review, a serious exchange of fire between the National Guard and Turkish Cypriot fighters, directly involving a disputed position occupied by the Turkish Cypriots at Pileri, occurred on 28 December 1965. Another serious incident took place on 22 January 1966, when the National Guard fired on a group of Turkish Cypriots cutting wood forward of their lines in the Karmi Forest area of the Kyrenia Range, wounding three.

62. Again, on 7 February 1966, a Greek Cypriot shepherd was ambushed and stabbed, fortunately not fatally, near the Pileri position by two Turkish Cypriots. Later on the same day, Turkish Cypriots fired nine rounds over the heads of an UNFICYP patrol sent to investigate the incident.

63. While negotiations conducted by the local UNFICYP Commander have been successful in halting the construction of more bunkers in the area, no reply has been received from the Vice-President's Office to a series of requests by UNFICYP asking for Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the Pileri position. On 11 February, the Acting Force Commander made a further written request to the Vice-President's Office, recommending the Turkish Cypriots to withdraw from the position and permit its occupation by UNFICYP troops. In reply, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, citing past cases in which evacuated positions were subsequently occupied by the National Guard, declined to follow the recommendations but gave an undertaking that Turkish Cypriots would refrain from any action that might lead to incidents. On 22 February, the Turkish Cypriots began to use mechanical equipment to improve a trail leading from a secondary road to the disputed position. After a new strong protest by the Acting Force Commander, the work on the trail was halted.

64. Although full-scale fighting in the Pileri area has been prevented during the period, the situation continues to be dangerous and can only be resolved by Turkish Cypriot acceptance of UNFICYP's advice, tendered repeatedly since October 1965. United Nations Headquarters has asked the Permanent Representative of Turkey to seek his Government's good offices to this end.

(vi) Temblos

65. The agreed conditions governing repairs to the Temblos-St. Hilarion track described in my report of 10 June 1965 (S/6246, para. 75) were observed by the Turkish Cypriots throughout the summer of 1965. However, with the advent of the rainy season in December, and contrary to the agreement, work on the track was resumed without prior notice to, or authority from, UNFICYP Headquarters.

66. Following inspection of the track by the UNFICYP Force Engineer in January 1966, it was agreed that certain specified repairs could be made. However, the work subsequently done exceeded that which had been authorized, and there was an increase in tension in the area. The track was immediately closed by UNFICYP to all vehicular traffic. Subsequent negotiations at the local level resulted in a reduction in tension and the reopening of the track. Since then, no mechanical equipment has been used on the track and it remains in virtually the same state as on 10 May 1965, when the conditions concerning the use of the track were agreed upon.

67. The Temblos track is still only suitable for light vehicles in good weather and, in UNFICYP's opinion, does not pose a serious threat to the National Guard's coastal defences in the Kyrenia area.

(vii) Kokkina and Limnitis

68. The Kokkina and Limnitis enclaves continue to be danger areas although the departure for Turkey of 425 Turkish Cypriot students from Kokkina has contributed greatly to a reduction in tension. The evacuation has considerably decreased not only the existing Turkish-Cypriot fighter strength at Kokkina but also its military potential.

69. The departing students have undoubtedly left behind a large quantity of weapons, especially in the Kokkina area. The Government is concerned about the future of these weapons, particularly the machine-guns, recoilless rifles, bazookas and mortars, and has so far not reduced the strength of the National Guard surrounding the area.

70. The present situation would seem propitious for the demilitarization of the Kokkina sector, as previously proposed (S/6102, para. 172), and for the resettlement of the refugees now in Kokkina in their home villages. UNFICYP is now making renewed efforts in this direction.

71. The departure of forty-one Turkish Cypriots from Limnitis did not materially affect the Turkish Cypriot fighter strength in the enclave. Up to March 1966 a precarious quiet had reigned in the area since the outbreak of firing in October 1965, resulting from the alternate "creeping forward" that had greatly narrowed the neutral zone between the lines of confrontation (S/7001, paras. 62-68). On the morning of 5 March, intensive rifle and automatic weapons fire suddenly broke out at the south-east corner of the enclave and continued until about noon, when UNFICYP negotiated a cease-fire. Altogether, several thousand rounds had been fired and some of them had struck an UNFICYP post, apparently inadvertently. After the firing had stopped, an UNFICYP patrol explored the neutral zone and discovered a Turkish Cypriot woman and her two-year-old baby crouching in a ravine. When questioned through an UNFICYP interpreter, she stated that she wished to join her husband, a former Turkish Cypriot fighter who had defected, for a second time, a few days previously. She and her child were escorted to the National Guard lines.

(viii) Incidents arising from refugee problems

72. In the period under review, there were no incidents of a serious nature directly attributable to the refugee problem.

73. It must be borne in mind, however, that in very many of the refugee centres, notably Polis, Kokkina and Louroujina, living conditions are such that grievances are readily aggravated and it requires constant alertness by UNFICYP personnel to ensure that minor frictions do not develop into serious incidents.

74. Conditions at Kokkina have given rise to an increased number of evacuations of aged and sick Turkish Cypriots, but the situation there has been considerably alleviated by the departure of the student fighters.

(ix) Observance of the cease-fire

75. Shooting incidents during the period concerned are summarized below. The figures from previous periods are also given for purposes of comparison. It will be seen that there has been a further significant decline in the number of shooting incidents.

Zone or district	2 December 1965 to 7 March 1966	11 June to 1 December 1965	8 March to 10 June 1965	9 December 1964 to 7 March 1965	9 September to 8 December 1964	9 June to 8 September 1964
Nicosia Zone	Not operative	17	89	97	124	191
Nicosia West District	0	3	Not operative during these periods			
Nicosia East District	1	3	Not operative during these periods			
Famagusta Zone	0	14	10	44	16	10
Limassol Zone	4	9	5	7	6	5
Paphos District	Not operative	6	2	7	4	53
Morphou District	Not operative	4	153	67	10	
Lefka District	1	3	Not operative during these periods			
Kyrenia District	11	10	Not operative during these periods			
TOTAL	17	69	259	222	160	259

76. In the opinion of UNFICYP, only seven of the seventeen shooting incidents constituted deliberate breaches of the cease-fire. One occurred in Nicosia East District, two in Limassol Zone, one in Lefka District and three in Kyrenia District. Three were attributed to the National Guard and four to Turkish Cypriot fighters. The figure for deliberate breaches, covering a period of three months, is about one fourth of the number that occurred during the previous period of approximately six months.

77. The shooting incidents in Limassol Zone are reminders that, even where no direct confrontation exists, a serious incident can easily occur because of the continuing strong emotions of the two communities.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order

(i) The work of the UNFICYP Civilian Police

78. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) continues to carry out the duties described in my previous reports. Generally, these are functions which can be performed more effectively by policemen than by soldiers. They include: the manning of posts in sensitive areas which had shown a relatively high incidence of inter-communal offences, such as Chatos, Gouphes and Ayios Theodoros (Famagusta Zone), Mallia (Limassol Zone), and Kazaphani (Kyrenia District); observation at Cyprus Police stationary checkpoints in Nicosia City, Famagusta City, and Lefka District, and mobile checkpoints in Lefka, Limassol and Paphos Districts; liaison with Cyprus Police and Turkish Cypriot Police; Kyrenia road convoy duties, with the exception of armed escort; investigation of incidents having inter-communal implications; inquiries concerning missing persons; joint patrols with Cyprus Police in Nicosia and Ktima, and village patrols supplementing those by UNFICYP troops.

79. Between 8 December 1965 and 7 March 1966, UNCIVPOL investigated forty-five cases having aspects of inter-communal strife, including two of attempted homicide, three of assault, nine of shooting from vehicles either while passing through villages or at persons working in fields, fifteen of larceny, and sixteen of damage to property - eleven at the expense of Turkish Cypriots and five of Greek Cypriots.

80. Observations were made in connexion with arrests of sixteen Turkish Cypriots, the temporary detention by Cyprus Police of a number of others and eighty-three seizures of items belonging to Turkish Cypriots at Cyprus Police checkpoints. In addition, UNCIVPOL has co-operated with the Cyprus Police in investigations of major incidents of interest to UNFICYP.

81. In connexion with all these duties, the activities and often the mere presence of UNCIVPOL continued to have a noticeably salutary effect in reducing crime and preventing minor incidents from escalating into serious breaches of the peace.

82. UNCIVPOL has continued its efforts to trace missing persons. Of the Turkish Cypriots reported missing since the beginning of the troubles in December 1963,

212 are still unfound, including one reported by the Cyprus Police. This is an increase of two since my previous report (S/7001, para. 93). There are also forty-one Greek Cypriots, three British nationals and one German national reported missing. In addition, one Greek soldier is reported missing in Nicosia City.

(ii) Investigation of crime and inter-communal strife

83. The persons responsible for the murders of two trade-union leaders, Greek Cypriot Costas Mishaolis and Turkish Cypriot Dervish Gavazoglou (S/7001, para. 94); Greek Cypriot Kyriakos Savva Tsaiattos (S/7001, para. 96); Turkish Cypriot Mehmet Kadir (S/7001, para. 98) and Greek Cypriot Kyriakos Solomou (S/7001, para. 99) have still not been brought to justice.

(iii) Bomb explosions

84. Since August 1964, there have been a number of bomb explosions in the Government-controlled areas of the larger towns of the Island, which the Cyprus Police had not indicated to UNCIVPOL as having any inter-communal implications. On 2 March 1966, however, the Minister of the Interior stated at a press conference that most of the explosions had been the work of a group of three French nationals who had operated partly from the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia under instructions of a member of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia and the director of the "Turkish Information Service". This question has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Cyprus (S/7182 and S/7189).

85. On 3 March, the Cyprus Turkish information centre denounced the allegations of the Minister of the Interior and said, inter alia, that they were designed "to isolate still further the Turkish Cypriot sectors and to bring greater pressure to bear on foreigners who visit these sectors".

### III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

#### A. General assessment

86. As I have pointed out in previous reports (S/6426, paras. 106-107), there is little likelihood that a return to normal conditions can be brought much closer short of substantial progress towards a political settlement. Thus, while UNFICYP continues to carry out its day-to-day task of mitigating the difficulties inherent in the present situation, e.g. in the economic and agriculture fields (see paras. 98-108 below) and extend its good offices in search of practical solutions in matters such as postal services, land records and social security (see paras. 115-132 below), the main issues remain unresolved. This state of affairs will continue as long as fundamental positions taken in the past are not significantly modified: the Turkish Cypriot leadership has maintained its rigid stand against any steps that might place more Turkish Cypriots in situations which would expose them to the authority of a Government it regards as unconstitutional, whereas the Government insists on its right to extend its sovereign authority over the whole territory of the Republic.

87. The advances towards normalization, therefore, remain modest; nevertheless, a measure of success has been achieved, e.g. there has been some improvement in regard to freedom of movement (see paras. 88-97 below), and as already reported in S/7001, paragraph 101, the Island's economy, taken as a whole, is back to its 1963 level.

#### B. Freedom of movement of the population

88. In my report of 10 June 1965 (S/6426, para. 108), I said with reference to freedom of movement of the Cypriot civilian population that it provided a convenient yardstick of political conditions in the Island. By that token, political conditions have improved only slightly since my last report in December, inasmuch as all of the restrictions on freedom of movement mentioned in paragraphs 109-112 of my report of 10 December 1965 (S/7001) are still being applied, with, perhaps, a certain degree of relaxation. This, when taken in conjunction with the measures of relaxation described in my previous reports on Cyprus, means that there has been a definite improvement as regards freedom of movement since September 1964, although progress has been painfully slow.

89. Taking this improvement into account, UNFICYP decided in January 1966 that conditions no longer justified the substantial cost of the monthly helicopter service it had been providing for certain local Turkish Cypriot leaders in order to facilitate their contacts with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Nicosia. UNFICYP discontinued the service after being assured by the competent Government authorities that the persons concerned would have freedom of movement by road.

90. The Government continues to maintain that, with the exception of the area around Kokkina, there is complete freedom of movement wherever it exercises control, and that the identification and search procedures to which persons are subjected when entering or leaving Turkish Cypriot controlled areas are only normal precautions in view of what it considers a continuing rebellion.

91. While more Turkish Cypriots are now moving safely on the roads between their enclaves than ever before since December 1963, it is UNFICYP's view that there are still too many cases of close bodily searches and lengthy interrogations which do not appear to be justified by the need to look for arms and strategic materials. It is sometimes explained by the Cyprus Police that they have been strict in certain cases because they were suspicious of the reasons given by an individual for his presence in a particular area, or they thought he was illegally carrying sealed correspondence or committing some other offence. The fact remains, however, that such practices tend to discourage greater freedom of movement.

92. This also applies to the recent introduction of "mobile" checkpoints in Limassol and Paphos districts, in which the Police establish a temporary roadblock, check the credentials of all who pass, and then move on to a new position. These checks have been the source of numerous complaints of unreasonably intensive searches or prolonged interrogations at nearby police stations. UNFICYP Civilian Police, which has observers posted at most Cyprus Police stationary checkpoints, has tried to keep track of these mobile checkpoints with a view to being present at as many searches as possible. In the past, their presence has usually led to a sharp reduction in complaints.

93. Under the arrangements for the defortification of Famagusta (S/7001, para. 56), Turkish Cypriot residents leaving or re-entering the walled city are no longer subjected to search. It would appear that a similar policy might well be tried out in other places in the Island; the Government might find that the beneficial

repercussions of such a policy on relations between the two communities outweigh considerations of internal security.

94. On the other hand, UNFICYP feels that, in line with the gradual improvement in security conditions over the past eighteen months, some steps should be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards relaxing its policy of discouraging Turkish Cypriots from circulating freely in places outside its control, especially if Government police measures should be further reduced. It could also profitably modify the general prohibition against the entry of Greek Cypriots into the Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

95. There have been no serious difficulties in the execution of the arrangement of 10 May 1965 with respect to free passage through Limnitis (S/6426, para. 114). Turkish Cypriots continue to exercise their right under that arrangement of searching some Greek Cypriot vehicles once weekly in the presence of UNFICYP Civilian Police.

96. Greek Cypriots wishing to travel through the Turkish Cypriot enclave between Nicosia and Kyrenia are still obliged to use the UNFICYP convoys. At times more than 200 Greek Cypriot vehicles have been counted in a single convoy.

97. During the period under review there has been no significant interference with the movement of Turkish Cypriots to and from Nicosia airport in connexion with foreign travel. The Government has continued to prohibit the return from Turkey of Turkish Cypriot male students of fighting age (S/7001, para. 114).

#### C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities

98. Official statistics indicate that the economic recovery referred to in paragraph 119 of my last report (S/7001) continued into the first months of 1966. In all probability, the gross national product in 1965 attained the level of 1963. This is a creditable result in view of the negative effects on the economy of the diversion of relatively large resources into military channels, the economic restrictions which contribute to the low level of economic activity in the areas under Turkish Cypriot control, and the continued loss of earnings in the sphere of tourism. On the other hand, the economy has been bolstered by foreign exchange earnings from "invisible" exports, in particular to the United Kingdom bases.

99. There has been no significant change in the Government's policy of imposing economic restrictions on the import into Turkish Cypriot controlled areas of goods that could be used to improve the fighting capacity of the armed elements in those areas. In general, the situation remains as described in my last report (S/7001, paras. 123-125): in addition to the thirty-one items that continue on the official list of restricted goods, nearly all building materials and some of the raw materials needed by industrial enterprises are not allowed to enter areas which are not under the Government's control. The Government has so far failed to take any action on the estimates of building materials submitted at its request by the Turkish Cypriot leadership on 25 October 1965 (S/7001, para. 125). Although it has permitted, in individual cases, the import into Turkish Cypriot controlled areas of restricted items provided that their distribution was supervised by UNFICYP, these cases have so far been concerned mostly with agriculture and enterprises of public necessity. Thus cement, mortar and bricks were allowed into Kokkina for the construction of a communal bakery under UNFICYP's supervision. Similarly, approval was given for the quantities of cement needed for the repair of a Turkish Cypriot hospital in Kophinou and of a water-pumping station in Limnitis.

100. An improvement has been noted by UNFICYP Civilian Police in the search procedures at Cyprus Police checkpoints so that the movement of supplies which are not restricted has been facilitated. In particular, relief supplies are now subjected to casual search only, complaints of damage to goods during search have declined, and some of the goods detained have been released after UNFICYP's representations more promptly than in the past.

101. In the sphere of industry, discussions have continued with a view to reopening factories, situated mostly in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave, which have been idle since the inter-communal fighting of December 1963 (S/7001, paras. 141-142). On two occasions during the period of this report, representatives of both business communities met in the presence of UNFICYP officers.

102. In the context of these discussions, the Turkish Cypriot leadership authorized in January 1966 a Greek Cypriot owner, together with some mechanics, to visit his flour mill in the Turkish Cypriot sector, remove some equipment and make arrangements to employ Turkish Cypriot maintenance workers. Similarly, the Greek Cypriot owner of a textile plant in the Turkish Cypriot sector was also permitted

to visit his property together with an insurance assessor. The Turkish Cypriot leadership felt that the Government should reciprocate with a similar gesture, specifically with the release of steel wire and gas oil for two Turkish Cypriot enterprises.

103. The Greek Cypriot business representatives indicated, however, that it was the view of the Government that tangible results in this field could only be reached by a comprehensive solution and not by a step-by-step approach with matching concessions.

104. At a meeting on 2 February, the President of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry outlined such a comprehensive solution for the reactivation of industrial facilities. Among the measures envisaged by the Government were the reopening of a Turkish Cypriot owned tyre retreading plant, brick and tile factories and the Ambelikou lime-kilns (S/7001, para. 140), as well as the removal of restrictions on steel wire, gas oil and certain replacement parts. In return, the Turkish Cypriots were asked to agree to the reopening of the Greek Cypriot owned flour mill and textile factory, a lime-kiln and quarries, and a farm.

105. Subsequently, on 4 March, two Turkish Cypriot businessmen residing in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave were permitted to inspect their inactive factories situated outside the enclave.

106. UNFICYP representatives are continuing their consultations on this matter and it is expected that further meetings between the representatives of both business communities will take place under UNFICYP auspices.

107. In agriculture, conditions are generally as described in my last report (S/7001, paras. 129-132). During the period covered by this report, UNFICYP supervised the distribution of 500 tons of nitrate fertilizer in Turkish Cypriot areas to the satisfaction of both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community (S/7001, para. 132). UNFICYP has also made a special effort to reduce the incidence of illegal cultivation of land by bringing the interested Greek and Turkish Cypriot parties together. In many cases a solution has been found through agreement on leasing terms or a share-cropping arrangement.

108. UNFICYP has continued to send out special observation patrols whenever such assistance is requested by Greek or Turkish Cypriot farmers working in sensitive

areas. This procedure has proved to be as effective as the former system of escorts, which UNFICYP has abandoned.

D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons

109. While the number of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons - approximately 20,000 - has not declined since December 1965, there has been some improvement in their living conditions, owing mainly to the considerable assistance provided by the Red Crescent Society of Turkey before the beginning of the winter rainy season (S/7001, paras. 146-151). Other important factors have been a self-help programme of construction of mud-brick housing especially in Hamid Mandres, one of the largest refugee villages, and the relatively mild winter.

110. In December 1965, the International Committee of the Red Cross withdrew its permanent delegation after informing my Special Representative that it would send out a temporary mission to Cyprus whenever its assistance was needed.

111. There has been no new shipment of Red Crescent relief during the period under review. As indicated in my last report (S/7001, para. 151), the tenth shipment, which had arrived on 13 November 1965, was transported by UNFICYP to the various distribution centres in the Island. Distribution was completed by 13 December 1965 under UNFICYP's supervision. On 8 March 1966, the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus informed UNFICYP that the Red Crescent Society of Turkey was preparing an eleventh shipment of relief supplies for needy Turkish Cypriots, and that notification to this effect had been made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.

112. Regular relief shipments and commercial shipments of fruits and vegetables to Kokkina have continued under the conditions indicated in my last report (S/7001, para. 154). The serious overcrowding there has been greatly relieved by the departure of the 425 Turkish Cypriot students to Turkey (see paras. 48-52 above) and the people who had been living in caves have now been relocated in tents. During December 1965, the Government approved the shipment to Kokkina of twenty additional tents, 200 beds and mattresses, canvassing for the repair of camp-cots, and a considerable quantity of blankets and clothing. Using local resources, the Turkish Cypriots have constructed a community centre and some hard-surface streets in the tented area of the village. The construction of the second auxiliary water

system and the new communal bakery mentioned in my last report (S/7001, para. 155) has been completed under UNFICYP's supervision.

113. The Government's scheme for the resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees in their former homes (S/7001, para. 157) has not produced noticeable results. The movement of approximately fifty persons from the refugee centre of Paramali to their old homes in the village of Mallia during February has been noted, but it is too early to say whether this is a permanent move or simply a temporary visit connected with seasonal work in their fields. In support of its policy with regard to the refugees, the Government has continued to refuse the entry into areas under Turkish Cypriot control of supplies - especially building materials - that would help displaced Turkish Cypriots to establish themselves on a permanent basis in the areas where they now live.

114. Nevertheless, the living conditions of the refugees continue to show slow improvement in all areas with the exception of Polis. There, efforts by UNFICYP to relieve the serious overcrowding in the school-building have not been successful. After the Government's failure to release standard building materials, the Turkish Cypriots of Polis have not imitated the self-help measures of the refugees at Hamid Mandres, Kokkina, Limnitis and elsewhere.

#### E. Normalization of the public services

115. Efforts aimed at the restoration of postal services in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves of Lefka and Nicosia have continued during the period under review, but the difficulties that have bedevilled past efforts in this field have not been overcome.

116. In the course of recent consultations with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the latter drew attention to a provision of the Post Office Law (CAP. 303, section 6), whereby the Postmaster-General was empowered to enter into contracts for the conveyance of mail and appoint letter-carriers for the delivery of letters. It was suggested that under that section he would be free to enter into an arrangement with one or two Turkish Cypriot agents for the delivery of mail in the Turkish Cypriot sectors of Nicosia and Lefka.

117. Competent Government officials pointed out that the provision in question had been useful at the turn of the century before a modern postal system had been

developed in Cyprus, but that it was no longer applicable; the Government could not accept solutions which would tend to perpetuate the separation of the two communities. It favoured full restoration of postal services by reopening, if necessary under UNFICYP supervision, of post offices in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves of Lefka and Nicosia as long as it was clearly established that these offices would operate under Government control. UNFICYP is making renewed efforts to break the impasse in this sphere.

118. The problem of compliance with the on-the-spot inspection provisions of the Social Insurance Law continues to prevent full resumption of the payment of social insurance benefits to persons residing in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

119. In my last report (S/7001, para. 170), I mentioned that the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance had indicated that he was prepared to consider favourably the resumption of payments to old and infirm Turkish Cypriot beneficiaries without inspections, provided that such beneficiaries would apply in person to the competent Government offices and their continued eligibility could be fully established by reference to the Ministry's files and by interview with the applicants.

120. Since then, the Government has begun to implement this policy and the payment of old-age benefits has been resumed to a number of Turkish Cypriots found eligible under the procedure described.

121. Apart from the resumption of payments of social insurance benefits in the above cases, the Government appears to be relaxing its stand with regard to settling certain individual claims of Turkish Cypriots. Payment has now been offered in a claim on which UNFICYP has made representations and the Government, while recognizing the merits of the claim, had previously decided to withhold payment (S/6426, para. 168).

122. Under article 19 of the Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Cyprus (S/5634), the latter is responsible for providing without cost such premises to UNFICYP as may be necessary for the fulfilment of its functions. Turkish Cypriot owners of property occupied by UNFICYP elements in connexion with operational tasks have frequently complained that so far they have received no rents from the Government for the use of their property.

123. While UNFICYP has no obligation to the owners in question, it is concerned that the United Nations presence in Cyprus should not be prejudicial to the rights and interests of individual citizens of the Republic and it has therefore offered its

good offices in connexion with the claims of Turkish Cypriot owners of UNFICYP-occupied property. In September 1965, the Government indicated that it was prepared to pay the rents in question, subject to normal assessment of a fair rental by the Department of Lands and Surveys and the deduction of any moneys due the Government on the property concerned. Direct talks between the Director-General of the Department of Communications and Works and a representative of the Turkish Cypriot owners were arranged in October 1965 and a relevant procedure was laid down. In December, the names of thirty-nine owners to whom the procedure was acceptable were submitted to the Government. UNFICYP has been informed that since then the competent Government agencies have been checking their files to determine what moneys were due the Government. It is hoped that payments on at least some of these cases will begin soon.

124. With respect to problems of public revenue there has been no further exchange of views between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership on the question of the annual grant of £C400,000 to the Turkish Communal Chamber envisaged by article 88 of the 1960 Constitution (see S/7001, para. 177).

125. As to the claims and counter-claims between the Government and Evkaf, the Turkish Cypriot religious trust, it will be recalled that on 1 November 1965 the Government had asserted that there was no valid reason for making any payments on the Government's obligations to Evkaf since the total amount of instalments due the Government on loans to Evkaf was far in excess of the total amount of payments due Evkaf (S/7001, para. 179).

126. This has been disputed by Evkaf in a communication dated 23 February 1966 pointing out that, whereas on 1 January 1966 Evkaf's arrears on obligations to the Government amounted to £C21,431, those of the Government on obligations to Evkaf amounted to £C12,488 in respect of rents, £C5,247, in respect of special allowances and compensation and £C60,000 in respect of water rates collected by the Government in Larnaca for the Bekir Pasha water-system of which Evkaf was the lawful administrator.

127. These observations have been communicated to the Government for its comments.

128. In my report of 10 December 1965 (S/7001, para. 185), I indicated that because of the great accumulation of pending transactions the Government was contemplating the enactment of new legislation aimed at overcoming the difficulties resulting

from the fact that the land records for Nicosia District were in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia. In December 1965, a Bill entitled "Nicosia District Lands Office (Temporary Provisions) Law" was presented to the House of Representatives and referred to committee. The proposed law provides inter alia that within a period of a few months all persons having a claim against any immovable property within Nicosia District must submit to the Director of the Department of Lands and Surveys a memorandum containing details of their interests or rights, that no dealings in respect of such immovable property would be allowed unless notice thereof was given to the creditors who had thus notified the Director, that the Director could require any person claiming ownership to any immovable property in Nicosia District to produce not only his certificate of registration but also further evidence of title, that new land registers would be created by a gradual process to replace the existing registers in the former District Office in the Turkish Cypriot quarter, and that any certificate of registration issued under the new registers would operate as a presumptive title for a period of one year, after which it would confer an unimpeachable title. The Bill would also authorize the Council of Ministers by publication to issue an order requiring the production of all certificates of registration to the Director within a specified period.

129. On 15 December, Vice-President Kuchuk strongly protested to my Special Representative in Cyprus against the proposed law which, he said, conferred excessive powers on the Director of Lands and Surveys and opened the way for possible abuses at the expense of members of the Turkish Cypriot community. He added that because of the political significance of land ownership to his community, Turkish Cypriots attached great importance to the safe-keeping of land registers and records of Nicosia District. He concluded by saying that if, instead of continuing negotiations, the Greek Cypriots adopted measures that could easily be abused to dispossess Turkish Cypriots of their property, such action would be likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus still further.

130. On 23 December, the Permanent Representative of Turkey addressed a similar communication to me. After pointing out the potential explosiveness of the new legislation, he requested my good offices in order to pave the way for the adoption of such provisional measures as would safeguard the rights and interests of both communities.

131. In my last report (S/7001, para. 182), I mentioned the positions on this vexed problem taken by the Government authorities and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as well as the efforts repeatedly made by UNFICYP to find a solution. During the period covered by this report, these efforts were greatly intensified and after many consultations by UNFICYP officers with Government officials and Turkish Cypriot leaders, during which the opposing views were brought closer and closer together, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Government indicated agreement to principles that are essentially very near to the temporary solution described in paragraph 182 of my report of 10 December 1965 (S/7001).

132. UNFICYP is now preparing the basic provisions of an arrangement which will take into account the main considerations put forward by both sides and which, it is hoped, will be acceptable.

F. The functioning of the law courts and the administration  
of justice

133. The situation with respect to the judiciary has remained as described in my last three reports to the Security Council (S/7001, para. 186, S/6426, paras. 171-174 and S/6228, paras. 192-202). The work of the courts continues to be confined to cases where the litigants are Greek Cypriots, although the judges of both communities have continued to attend the courts.

134. On 28 January 1966, in response to a request by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, conveyed through UNFICYP, the Government released from custody, and handed over to UNFICYP for evacuation to Turkey - along with the Turkish Cypriot students who were departing to resume their studies - nine Turkish Cypriots detained pending trial for offences alleged to have been committed by them in connexion with the inter-communal disturbances. They boarded the evacuation vessel at Xeros on the same day.

135. As at 1 March, there were no longer any persons being held without bail anywhere in Cyprus in connexion with the disturbances.

#### IV. MEDIATION EFFORT

136. By a letter which he addressed to me on 22 December 1965, from Quito, Ecuador, Mr. Galo Plaza submitted his resignation from the position of United Nations Mediator on Cyprus. Mr. Plaza's letter of resignation and my reply of 30 December 1965, in which I took note with great regret of his final decision on the matter, were circulated to the members of the Council of 31 December (S/7054).

137. My subsequent efforts towards achieving a resumption of the mediation function have thus far been unavailing, due primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned. I shall, however, persevere in these efforts.

138. At the same time, I have felt it incumbent upon me to take any other step possible and reasonable which might offer some hope for a fruitful approach to the solution of any of the divisive issues and problems of Cyprus. Consequently, following informal consultations with the parties directly concerned, and after informing them in advance, on 2 March 1966, I sent to my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. C.A. Bernardes, the instruction broadening his scope of activity, as the Council was informed by my note of 4 March (S/7180). I have received from the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey assurances of their co-operation with Mr. Bernardes in the exercise of his broadened responsibilities.

## V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

139. In my last report to the Council on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/7001), I indicated that the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force from its inception on 27 March 1964 until 26 December 1965 were estimated as totalling \$41.5 million. This estimate has since been revised and reduced to \$39,725,000. The reduction of \$1,775,000 has been achieved mainly by excluding from the revised estimate the cost for the repatriation of contingents, which did not materialize, since the mandate of UNFICYP was extended beyond 26 December 1965, and by recalculating on the basis of recent information the amounts due as reimbursements to Governments for their extra costs in respect of contingent-owned equipment and in the costs of rental of premises.

140. The estimated costs of maintaining the Force for the period from 27 December 1965 to 26 March 1966 totals \$5,100,000, excluding the cost of repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs which, together, are estimated at approximately \$750,000.

141. The total amount of voluntary contributions paid or pledged to date to finance the costs of the UNFICYP operation is \$40,678,000. The deficit between the present estimated costs of the operation from its inception through 26 March 1966 and the voluntary contributions paid or pledged to date, therefore, totals \$4,147,000.

142. If the Security Council should decide to extend the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus for an additional six-month period from 27 March to 26 September 1966, it is estimated that the additional costs to the Organization, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would be approximately \$10,400,000, as follows:

I. - Operating costs incurred by the United Nations

A. Movement of contingents	\$1,190,000
B. Operational expenses	805,000
C. Rental of premises	100,000
D. Rations	480,000
E. Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	535,000
F. Miscellaneous and contingencies	100,000
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Total, Part I	\$3,210,000

II. - Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments  
providing contingents

A. Pay and allowances	\$6,290,000
B. Contingent-owned equipment	800,000
C. Death and disability awards	100,000
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Total, Part II	\$7,190,000
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Grand Total	<u>\$10,400,000</u>

## VI. OBSERVATIONS

143. Nothing has occurred in the past three months in Cyprus or elsewhere to change significantly the views expressed in paragraphs 205-216 of my last report to the Council on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/7001). Of the observations made in that report, I may reiterate one especially since it is the core of the dilemma which the United Nations, as well as the parties concerned, face in Cyprus. "It needs to be said of Cyprus, in full frankness, I believe, that it remains still to be demonstrated that there is a genuine will to peace among the leaders of the two communities of sufficient earnestness and intensity to lead them toward those mutual accommodations in viewpoint and position which are essential to pacific settlement. The international community can only help and assist. The key to a settlement, however, lies in the last analysis with the parties. Unless they are prepared to move towards resolving their basic differences, the prospects of an early solution are dim indeed." I deeply regret to have to say that three months after the publication of my last report the basic problem remains unsolved and there is little sign that the parties have reduced the deep differences that separate them.

144. Nevertheless, the situation in the Island in the past three months, given the continued armed confrontation in the Island, has been gratifyingly quiet. Despite this calm, however, the possibility of renewed and even large-scale fighting is ever present if steps are not promptly taken to control the results of minor clashes. In the absence of UNFICYP there would be a very serious risk of such fighting. I have, therefore, reluctantly reached the conclusion that the continued presence of UNFICYP in the present circumstances is not only desirable but virtually indispensable if a relative degree of quiet is to be maintained in the Island. I am informed that the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey also wish its extension.

145. It has proved possible progressively to reduce the strength of UNFICYP. The original size of the Force was approximately 7,000; the latest reductions will bring it down to approximately 4,500. This steady reduction in numbers

reflects not only the improvement in the security situation which has taken place in Cyprus since UNFICYP came to the Island, but also the determination of the Force Commander and United Nations Headquarters to provide the services rendered by UNFICYP in the most economical way possible. The effort to reduce UNFICYP will be continued in so far as it does not compromise the effectiveness of the Force in carrying out its mandate.

146. In carrying out its duties, and especially in the assistance given in cases where administrative and economic activities are affected by inter-communal divisions, UNFICYP has also made a determined effort steadily to reduce its role both in the interest of economy and also with the aim of restoring normal conditions as far as possible.

147. It is clear that both the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership value and appreciate the presence of UNFICYP. During the period under review, UNFICYP has continued to enjoy the respect and co-operation of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in large measure. This spirit of respect and co-operation is very valuable for the effective performance of the duties of the Force.

148. There have been recently a number of indications that both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations of Cyprus are increasingly impatient for a return to normal conditions and for a solution of the Cyprus problem, and it is to be hoped that this factor may have a positive influence upon the efforts now being made to find a solution. In this context, I would refer to the message sent by me to my Special Representative on 2 March 1966 (S/7180). The Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have assured me that they will co-operate with my Special Representative in the task entrusted to him in this message. I hope that all concerned will assist him in his efforts to achieve discussions, at any level, of problems and issues which would appear to be ripe for settlement, as, for instance, some of the problems mentioned in chapter III of this report. Much work has already been done, for example, on such matters as the reactivation of factories, the restoration of postal services, and the availability of land records. I would hope that if progress can be made in these limited matters, it may provide a firmer basis for efforts to tackle more fundamental

problems. I would hope also that the success of the defortification arrangements in Famagusta, after the serious incident there in November 1965, may be followed by the application of defortification arrangements to other areas in the Island.

149. As I have stated elsewhere in this report, the financial situation affecting the United Nations Operation in Cyprus continues to be acute, and the deficit between the estimated costs and the voluntary contributions pledged remains important. In this situation I have felt obliged again to notify the Governments providing contingents to the Force that I am not now in a position to honour commitments previously made to reimburse them in full for any extra costs they may have incurred and claim in respect of their contingents in UNFICYP. I am also reluctant in these circumstances to urge Governments providing contingents to continue to do so unless they are prepared to run the risk of providing them entirely at their own expense.

150. Despite the reservations which I must inevitably make as a result of the financial situation of UNFICYP, it is my considered view that the Force in Cyprus should be again extended. My strong preference, in the interest of planning, economy and the efficient management of the Force, is an extension for a period of six months after 26 March 1966. But this should be on the necessary condition that there is assurance of adequate financial support to sustain it in advance of the decision to extend the Force.

151. To my Special Representative, to the Acting Commander of the Force in Cyprus, and to all members of the Force and civilian personnel engaged in the Mission, I wish once again to pay tribute for the skilled, effective and devoted way in which they have continued to carry out their duties. I wish also once again to pay tribute to the memory of the late General K.S. Thimayya, who served, until his sudden death in December 1965, with great brilliance and distinction as Commander of the Force and whose passing has deprived his country, the United Nations and the cause of peace in the world, of a dedicated and exceptional leader.

152. The United Nations owes a debt of gratitude to the countries providing contingents to UNFICYP and to those who have contributed financially to the United Nations peace-keeping effort in Cyprus. For their faith and continued support I wish to place on record my deep appreciation to their Governments.



