Question considered by the Security Council at its 906th meeting on 16 September 1960 (concluded)

1. Mr. GRYAZNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): Owing to the attitude which the United States and its partners have adopted over the Congo, the Security Council resolutions of 14 July [S/4387] and 22 July [S/4405] and of 9 August 1960 [S/4426], designed to deal with the difficulties in the Congo and to provide assistance for the young African Republic, are not being implemented. Action fundamentally conflicting with these decisions is even being taken in the Congo, under cover of the United Nations flag.

2. As a result of this action, the situation in that Republic has so deteriorated that it has begun to constitute a mortal threat to the country's territorial integrity and political independence, a threat to peace and international security.

3. Through the fault of the United States and its NATO allies, the Security Council, at its last meeting [905th meeting], was unable to take any concrete decisions calculated to promote a return to normality in the Congo. The United States, whose representatives talk so much about assistance to the Congolese people and about the struggle for independence, at first did not want the Security Council to meet at all, obviously counting on the emergence in the Congo of a state of affair that would be to United States advantage. After many countries had insistently demanded immediate action by the Council, the United States and its partners did their best to prevent the representatives of the Congolese Government from participating in the Council's work.

4. Now, we may well ask, can we discuss the situation in the Congo without the lawful Government of the country, which in a very brief space of time was repeatedly confirmed in power by Parliament and the Senate, being a party to the discussion? How can we proceed in this way, seeing that all the Council's decisions on the Congo have been taken in connexion with a request from that very Government?

5. Having prevented the Council from taking constructive decisions which might contribute to a return to normality in the Congo, the United States put forward the demagogic proposal that the General Assembly should meet in emergency special session. We may well ask why they need this emergency special session and why they are in such a hurry. We think that everyone understands the United States' hidden aims. The United States does not want a comprehensive and detailed discussion of this question at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, in which the Heads of State and Heads of Government of a number of countries, including many African ones, will take part.

6. May I turn next to the way in which the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 have been carried out? In these resolutions the tasks and duties of the United Nations and its forces in the Congo are set out with perfect clarity and accuracy. But it must regretfully be pointed out that the actions of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations Command in the Congo have often been in conflict with the Council's decisions.

7. Recently the United Nations Command and the responsible officials of the Secretariat have, in essence, become accomplices in the colonialist conspiracy against the Congolese people and its lawful Government, elected in accordance with the country's constitution and enjoying the population's full confidence.

8. Let us see how the Security Council resolutions on the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from the Congo have been carried out.

9. In its resolution of 14 July [S/4387], the Security Council called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo. It would seem that the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command in the Congo should have taken all the necessary steps to ensure that that decision was carried out as soon as possible. In actual fact, the armed intervention against the Congo continued even after the Security Council had adopted that decision.

10. What were the United Nations forces in the Congo doing in the meantime? What were they engaged in? They were deploying and taking up positions—to put it that way—and, in the process, were often being sent to areas and towns where no Belgian troops existed and where there was no need for the forces' presence.

11. The Belgian Government, relying on the support of the United States and the other Western countries interested in the maintenance of the colonial régime in the Congo, continued daily to send additional army units into the country. Everyone knows this, and the Belgian representative who has denied the fact will be unable to mislead the Assembly. It is moreover charac-
acteristic that these reinforcements were coming in simultaneously with the arrival of United Nations units in the Congo.

12. After the Security Council had adopted its resolution on the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, Belgium seized a number of Congolese towns and important strategic points. The cities of Leopoldville, Coquilhatville, Kindu and others were occupied. The Belgian military bases at Kamina and Kitona became the focal points for the subversive activity directed against the Republic of the Congo. Simultaneously the Belgians, acting in accordance with the colonialist principle of "divide and rule", embarked upon an active policy of undermining the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

13. It was perfectly clear that in these circumstances the Security Council had to occupy itself once more with the situation in the Congo. In its resolution of 22 July [S/4405], it called upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the resolution of 14 July 1960 on the withdrawal of the Belgian troops, and it authorized the Secretary-General "to take all necessary action to this effect". These words "all necessary action" need emphasizing.

14. It was therefore useless for Mr. Hammarskjold to try, as he has done here, to show that he did not have sufficient powers to fulfil this task. He did, in point of fact, have such powers.

15. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested all States "to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo".

16. But these decisions of the Council were not carried either.

17. To camouflage its aggressive actions in the Congo, Belgium withdrew some of its troops from the Congolese stations; they seized all the airfields and made it impossible for the United Nations forces to enter the province. The United Nations forces did enter Katanga but, in spite of that, the withdrawal of the Belgian troops continued to be delayed. One deadline after another was set, but to no effect, there are still Belgian troops in the Congo; they remain at the Kamina and Kitona bases. In Katanga the henchmen of the Belgian aggressors were given a free hand to carry out subversive actions against the Republic of the Congo. Even after the arrival of the United Nations forces in Katanga, the Belgians continued, and are continuing, to bring weapons into the province; and this, of course, is not a technical error as the Belgian representative has asserted, but premeditated action by the colonialists.

18. The traitors to the Congolese people—the separatists of the Tshomboé type and others—threw all restraint aside, having received massive support from the foreign States whose economic interests in Katanga are at the bottom of the attempts to split the country.

19. As for the United Nations Command, on the pretext of non-interference in the Congo's internal affairs, and in violation of the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 July, it not only failed to give the necessary assistance to the lawful Government of the Congo in its efforts to safeguard the territorial integrity and political independence of the country, but indeed took every measure to impede it in this task.

20. It is common knowledge that the Secretary-General's representative, without consulting the Government, proceeded to Katanga for talks with Tshomboé. The Secretary-General and other United Nations officers in the Congo began dealing with Tshomboé, the Belgian puppet, as with an equal. Tshomboé was making one demand after another and, strangely enough, the representatives of the United Nations met these brazen demands with compliance. For example, the Secretary-General refused to allow the lawful representatives of the Republic of the Congo to proceed to Katanga, and on a subsequent occasion he postponed—following objections by Tshomboé—the implementation of an earlier order for the dispatch of United Nations forces into Katanga.

21. All these facts show that the actions of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations Command in the Congo have been in conflict with the Security Council resolution of 14 July, which stipulates that the Secretary-General must "take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary".

22. In his statement of yesterday, 18 September [S/4448], the Secretary-General tried to prove that both he and his representatives in the Congo had in constant consultation and co-operation with the Central Government. However, he omitted to name the persons in the Congolese Government whom he consulted and with whom he maintained contact. The only clear facts that have emerged from his statement is that he did not deem it necessary to consult with the Prime Minister and Head of that Government, Mr. Lumumba, and that he obviously ignored him.

23. Spokesmen for the Central Government of the Congo have repeatedly made official statements to that effect, both at press conferences and in letters to the United Nations. In this context I could quote, in particular, the letter [S/4448] dated 20 August 1960 from the Prime Minister of the Congo to the Secretary-General.

24. On 9 August the Security Council adopted a decision calling for the immediate withdrawal of the Belgian forces from Katanga so that United Nations forces could enter the province. The United Nations forces did enter Katanga but, in spite of that, the withdrawal of the Belgian troops continued to be delayed. One deadline after another was set, but to no effect, there are still Belgian troops in the Congo; they remain at the Kamina and Kitona bases. In Katanga the henchmen of the Belgian aggressors were given a free hand to carry out subversive actions against the Republic of the Congo. Even after the arrival of the United Nations forces in Katanga, the Belgians continued, and are continuing, to bring weapons into the province; and this, of course, is not a technical error as the Belgian representative has asserted, but premeditated action by the colonialists.

25. The United Nations Command followed a totally different line in its dealings with the lawful Government of the Congo. The United Nations forces deprived Mr. Lumumba's government of access to the radio station; they seized all the airfields and made it impossible for the Prime Minister and other officials of the Government to move freely about the country. They went so far as to threaten to use their weapons against the Head of the Government of the Republic if he tried to board an aircraft or broadcast an appeal to the people. All this was done under the cloak of non-interference in the Congo's internal affairs.

26. The Secretary-General has told the Assembly [S/439th meeting] that the United Nations forces could not and should not interfere with the Congolese National Army which, according to him, was free to side with the Government or against it. But in this context it is legitimate to ask why the Secretary-General tried to disarm the Congolese Army without considering the interests of the lawful Government and the people of the Congo, and why the United Nations Command is taking no action against Congolese Army units which have refused to obey orders, are not allowing Parliament to meet and are impeding the activity of the lawful Government of the country. Bearing in mind that the United Nations forces have, in essence, been
assisting traitors like Tshombé and his kind in their acts of subversion, it becomes obvious that the actions of the United Nations Command in the Congo can be regarded only as tantamount to the establishment of an occupation régime in the country.

27. A conspiracy was organized to overthrow the legitimate Government of the Congo. It is beyond doubt that the organizers of this odious affair were Belgium and the Western countries behind it. It should be pointed out that the United States representative had clearly admitted, in the course of near-polities in the Security Council, that the colonialists were plotting something against the lawful Government of the Congo.

28. At the 899th meeting of the Security Council, the United States representative made unambiguous use of expressions such as: "It is neither necessary nor appropriate in the present circumstances—by that I mean today, at this moment— [S/PV.899, para. 10] in reference to the question of inviting the representatives of the Congo to attend the Council meeting. Referring to the delegation nominated by the Prime Minister of the Congo to take part in the Council meetings, he remarked: "if he (i.e., the Prime Minister) still be the Prime Minister..." [ibid., para. 12].

29. Is it not clear from these remarks that the colonialists had then already set in motion plans for overthrowing the lawful Government of the Republic of the Congo? As for the United Nations forces, they continued to ignore the lawful Government and to assist all kinds of subversive and separatist elements outside and inside the country.

30. This attitude on the part of the Secretary-General and other United Nations officials in the Congo has led to a most grave situation in the country, which has been plunged into total disorder and lawlessness. Responsibility for this state of affairs in the Congo falls squarely on Belgium and its NATO allies, and on leading officials of the United Nations, whose actions have furthered and sometimes directly promoted the designs of the colonialists and their henchmen.

31. As a result of the prolonged rule of the Belgian colonialists, the Republic of the Congo has remained economically backward. Side by side with the Belgians, the monopolists of the United States, the United Kingdom and other capitalist countries are taking part in the exploitation of the Congolese people and its wealth. The following, for example, will show who owns the wealth of the Congo.

32. The economy of the Congo is dominated by a powerful company, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, a cartel belonging to the monopolists of Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom. This company accounts for 20 per cent of the cobalt produced in the world (excluding the socialist countries), 10 per cent of the uranium and 8 per cent of the copper produced. Last year the shareholders received a dividend of 34 per cent, i.e., more than three times the usual profits of the capitalists.

33. According to press reports the Rockefellers, the American millionaire family, in 1950 acquired 600,000 shares in the major Belgian company working the mineral wealth of the Congo. The London Observer stated on 10 July 1960 that Rockefeller's operations in Katanga brought him considerable profit. "For the Rockefellers"—the newspaper pointed out—"participation in the Belgian enterprises in Katanga provides a brilliant opportunity for profitable speculation"; the ore is magnificent and so is the organization; the only doubt is political.

34. This explains why the United States shows such an interest in the Congo and why it is opposed to Mr. Lumumba's government, which has set itself the goal of consolidating the independence of the country and of liberating it from the yoke of all the colonialists, including the Americans, and not only the Belgians.

35. The colonialists have pursued the course of disorganizing the Congo's economy. Under the protection of the United Nations forces, the Belgians have removed the Congo gold, valuables, money and specialists in an attempt to bring the Republic of the Congo to economic collapse, cause famine and even more widespread unemployment, and provoke unrest throughout the country. They needed this in order to create the impression that the Central Government of the Congo is incapable of getting the country's economic life going.

36. In these circumstances the Government was forced to turn for economic assistance to other peace-loving States, and this request met with timely response.

37. The objections raised here to assistance for the Republic of the Congo being provided outside the United Nations merely prove that the objectors wish to deprive the Congo of the rights enjoyed by every independent State. These objections are not dictated by any desire to give real assistance to the Congolese people; their purpose is the use of assistance through the United Nations in order to consolidate the positions of the United States and of the other colonialists.

38. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR takes the view that the General Assembly, at its present emergency special session must condemn Belgium's armed aggression against the Republic of the Congo and must demand from the Belgian Government the immediate and complete withdrawal of all its troops and military personnel from the territory of the Congo, whatever the pretext for their presence there.

39. The General Assembly must ensure absolute compliance with the Security Council's resolutions of 14 and 22 July and 9 August 1960 regarding the withdrawal of the Belgian forces from Congolese territory and the maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of this Republic, without permitting any interference in the country's internal affairs.

40. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR fully supports the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union [A/L.293], because it is in line with the interests of peace and the maintenance of the Congo's territorial integrity and political independence.

41. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that, taking into account the situation—the new situation—now obtaining in the Republic of the Congo, it is absolutely necessary to discuss this question thoroughly at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, at which the Heads of many Governments will be present.

42. Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): Throughout the recent months of the crisis in the Congo the Canadian Government has been guided by a desire to see that country emerge as a stable, prosperous and independent State fully able to take its place among the other States of Africa and in the United Nations family. Canadians have the greatest sympathy for the Congolese people in these hours of trial. We have watched with close and warm interest the emergence of in-
dependent nations, first in Asia and more recently in Africa. We have been glad to offer whatever assistance we could to facilitate this very important and promising development.

43. The Canadian Government has been fully alive to the dangers and difficulties which have prevailed in the Congo. Essentially we believe that in the long run the situation there can only be remedied by the people of the Congo themselves. In their own way they must meet the challenge thrust upon them by this sudden emergence into statehood. They must solve the problem of separatism, which may be largely the result of traditional forces, but which has political causes of more recent origin. This separatism, however, must be overcome if the Congo is to survive as a nation and if the dangers of the present situation are to be avoided.

44. No independent nation would be prepared, in our opinion, to submit to outside dictation or to interference as to the kind of constitutional arrangements which should be made. The evolution of a national constitution, with the governmental form and processes which it should embrace, is of the very essence of independent statehood. Any attempt to impose a solution from outside would not only be improper but would be likely to fail because it fell short of the national aspiration. In the Congo, however, there has been a recognition that help is needed from the outside to assist in settling the new State on a stable course. Shortly after independence, as we know, the country was plunged into serious disorders which have disrupted political and economic life. Assistance was urgently needed, first to restore order, but over a somewhat longer period to organize the administrative services needed to give political and economic reality to the new national independence.

45. Very wisely, the Congolese Government turned to the United Nations for that help and the Security Council responded with its resolutions of 14 July [S/4387] and 22 July [S/4405], and later of 9 August [S/4420]. As a result, the resources of the United Nations and its specialized agencies have been mobilized on a growing scale.

46. At the focal point of this complex effort by the United Nations, and indeed its mainspring, has been the Secretary-General. I am honoured to pay the highest tribute to the unstinting and unhesitating way in which he has served us all and the cause of peace in carrying out this most difficult mandate which has been given to him. Drawing on his limitless patience and diplomatic skill, the Secretary-General has effectively led the United Nations team in the Congo, whose loyalty and devotion we also acknowledge. Without this guidance and devotion to duty, these United Nations operations would have foundered long ago and the people of the Congo, and the members of this Assembly and the world at large would have faced a disaster of major proportions in this important part of Africa.

47. At the same time, I should like to pay warm tribute to the independent African States, whose contribution to and support of the United Nations in this formidable effort have been really decisive. Without the highly efficient contingents from the African States, without the wise counsel of African representatives in the Security Council and in consultations with the Secretary-General, the United Nations role in the Congo would not have been possible. The leaders of independent African States deserve our praise for the responsible statesmanship and the political wisdom which they have shown, if I may say so, throughout this troubled period.

48. Non-African Members too have responded quickly and generously to the requests of the Secretary-General for assistance in carrying out the heavy task. The extent and significance of the United Nations operation in the Congo really qualify it as the most important challenge, I think, ever faced by this Organization. The combined effort on the part of so many Members has been a really impressive demonstration of international co-operation under the United Nations. It must not be allowed, in the Canadian view, to fail of its purpose.

49. The most pressing requirement of this emergency special session is to ensure that sufficient support is forthcoming to sustain the United Nations effort in the Congo.

50. In this debate and in the earlier proceedings in the Security Council, we have heard sharp and very unjust criticism of the Secretary-General. This kind of activity has been counter to the real interests of the United Nations in the Congo, and indeed counter to the interests of the Congolese people themselves, whose main hope for future independence must lie in close co-operation within the United Nations. We believe that this emergency special session should act to ensure that all Member States refrain from political interference and military assistance outside the framework of the United Nations mandate in the Congo.

51. I have already referred to the heartening response from Member States to meet the needs of this emergency situation. There is surely no doubt that our efforts must be sustained in the months to come if the United Nations assistance to the Congo is to be truly effective. A serious and sizable problem will be the financing of the United Nations operations there. It must be fully recognized, however, that the dangers in the Congo situation are sufficiently great and the political consequence for Africa sufficiently important to make it imperative that the political decisions of the United Nations be backed with material means. It is essential, moreover, that the broadest possible measure of support be provided in furtherance of the United Nations efforts in the Congo to bring about stability and peace.

52. Turning to the draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1] before us, submitted in the names of Ceylon, Ghana and fifteen other nations, I should like to say that it is the assumption of our delegation that this draft resolution is designed to serve the very aims I have already mentioned. Among other things, it requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action to carry out the mandate given to him by the Security Council; it appeals to the Congolese people to seek a peaceful solution of all their internal conflicts. It requests all States to refrain from action which might impede the restoration of law and order, and especially through the provision of arms, military personnel and other assistance for military purposes outside the framework of the United Nations mandate. Therefore, for the reasons which I have stated, the Canadian delegation will support this draft resolution.

53. In view of the Canadian attitude on the seventeen-Power draft resolution, I need hardly comment on the draft resolution [A/L.293] submitted by the Soviet Union. I would only place on record, however, that in conformity with its own past record of support for the United Nations, the Government of Canada responded to the urgent request of the Secretary-General for assistance by providing a contingent of army specialists
who were selected specifically for their technical competence and their linguistic qualifications. It is utterly absurd to suggest that this response to an emergency requirement can in any way be regarded as a sign of aggressive intent, just as it is absurd to argue that membership in the NATO alliance is in any way incompatible with rendering support and assistance to the United Nations. The Canadian Government firmly rejects both these suggestions.

54. Mr. AVEROFF TOSI3ZA (Greece) (translated from French): A grave hour has again struck for the United Nations. In this ball, and in neighbouring rooms, during the last few years, we have lived through many a difficult hour. We have dealt with problems of the utmost gravity, which threatened us and the entire world with the direct fate. We have managed to survive these various crises, and the credit must go to the United Nations, to its wise decisions and the faithful execution of those decisions by our eminent Secretary-General, who earned the appreciation of all at the time.

55. The crises which we have avoided, and which might have brought disaster, were very grave and frequently raised complex problems. The problem we are dealing with today is likewise grave, both for the peoples directly concerned and because of its more general long-term consequences, which it would be naive to ignore. However, the problem is even more complicated in this instance because it has two aspects which are entirely fundamental to it. One of these concerns the attitude of third parties, particularly third parties who, rightly or wrongly, wish to be more directly concerned in it. This aspect is difficult and complex enough, but it can at any rate be discussed and disposed of, and with a little goodwill, agreement might even be reached. But, the other fundamental aspect we cannot discuss; it is entirely beyond us. Would it be an excess of scepticism to inquire what precisely the situation in the Congo was last night? And whether it is the same today and will be the same tomorrow? Who represents the new Republic in a manner which reflects the true situation?

56. I know there are arguments in support of answers all pointing in the same direction, but I am equally sure that there are arguments in favour of answers all pointing in the opposite direction. Thus one of the most basic factors of the problem is unknown. Indeed, it is highly likely that one of the basic factors of the problem is as yet non-existent. On a question which is so serious because it is so ill-defined, it is extremely easy to indulge in polemics. It is also useless, and perhaps even harmful.

57. My country is concerned about the fate of the Congo, not only on principle and for reasons of a general nature, but also for very special reasons. Thousands of my fellow-countrymen live in the Congo, have settled there and wish to continue, with the permission of the Congolese people, to live and to work in the country, in a fraternal spirit and with a constructive purpose. Consequently, my Government is particularly eager to see peace restored in that vast country which was offered its independence with dignity and without delay.

58. We are convinced that there is only one means of achieving the peace which the Congo must have before it can enjoy independence, dignity or well-being; that means is the United Nations. If one State intervenes in any manner, and if its intervention appears to be inoffensive or actually is so, there is absolutely no doubt that another State will intervene tomorrow and a third the next day. That is in the nature of things; it cannot be avoided.

59. However, to abandon the Congo to its fate today would be to deliver it over to famine, disease and perhaps civil war. Consequently the United Nations must clearly take a hand and make decisions in accordance with the Charter.

60. May I be allowed, in conclusion, to express the view that the best proof of concern for the fate of the peoples of the Congo that can at this time be given is complete abstention from any direct intervention—I repeat, any such intervention—or offer of direct assistance otherwise than through the United Nations. I believe that this would truly demonstrate concern for the welfare of the new Republic.

61. The United Nations has proved its worth in cases where world peace was threatened and when the situation was more serious than it is today. It now has a further opportunity to prove its worth in the case of the Congo, in the interests of the continent, of the world as a whole, and indeed of the United Nations itself. This point in regard to the future of the United Nations must be emphasized. The conflict of views is such, the United Nations has become involved to such an extent and the situation has developed in such a manner, that failure by the United Nations in this instance would undoubtedly do harm and might even prove fatal to this Organization, though it grew out of the bloodshed, the sorrows and the hopes of humanity. It would be all the more deplorable since, I repeat, the United Nations has proved its worth in even graver hours and, on this occasion too, it can rapidly and effectively bring true independence and true dignity to the people of the Congo.

62. The United Nations is ready to act. It has appropriate organs—organs to take decisions and organs to implement those decisions. They too have proved their worth, and I should like to take this opportunity to state, on behalf of the Greek Government, that we have complete faith in the principal executive organ, the Secretary-General and his staff, whom we have seen at work in times of stress in the plains of the Nile Valley, and of the valley of the Euphrates, on the shores of Lebanon and elsewhere. Why are they alleged to have failed only in the present instance? In our view, the abilities and the efforts of the Secretary-General have been among the most important factors contributing to the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. Those of us who have been here longest know that the Secretary-General has had plenty of experience. Considering the difficulties of the situation in the Congo, we are convinced that he has once again acted with great wisdom, courage and objectivity. My country, involved without intent or desire in one of the delicate aspects of this major upheaval in the Congo, has also had direct and concrete proof of the Secretary-General's objectivity.

63. As a result of its geographical position and the large-scale emigration of its nationals, Greece is particularly interested in the fate of this vast continent where so many young and vigorous peoples are now emerging. It hopes whole-heartedly that the dignity and welfare of the African peoples will be preserved and it is prepared to make its own modest contribution to that task. For that reason, at the conclusion of this debate my delegation will vote in accordance with the general position which I have had the honour to outline.

64. Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): The Swedish Government and the Swedish people have followed with
great interest and sympathy the process by which an increasing number of countries in Africa and Asia have attained full national independence. It is fitting that the United Nations should shoulder an important part of the responsibility for carrying forward this process in peace and in a way which contributes to stability in the geographical regions concerned.

65. We consider it to be of special importance that the new sovereign States should be allowed freely to choose their own line in foreign policy without undue influence or pressure from any quarter. Furthermore, the United Nations should try to meet the requests of these countries for such material aid as can create an economic foundation for their political independence.

66. Against this background, we found it natural and proper that the United Nations should take action, after the tragic events in the Congo, to render assistance for the maintenance of law and order, as well as to furnish material aid. In accordance with this attitude, the Swedish Government has willingly made certain contributions to the realization of this programme, at the request of the Secretary-General. We have noted with particular satisfaction that all the great Powers, while dealing with the Congo question in the Security Council, gave active support to the same basic concept of the role of the United Nations which I just mentioned.

67. We have heard serious criticism from certain quarters against the manner in which the resolutions of the Security Council have been implemented in the Congo. The criticism, of course, has not been directed against the United Nations action as such. It has been motivated by allegations that the measures taken in accordance with the mandate given to the Secretary-General by a unanimous Security Council decision were in fact to the advantage of certain great Power interests and aimed at replacing one form of colonialism by another. Furthermore, the attitude has been taken in the same quarter that single Member States should have the right to furnish direct aid to the Congo outside the framework of the United Nations action.

68. In the opinion of the Swedish Government, the resolutions of the Security Council on the Congo have been carried out by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command in the Congo correctly, effectively and impartially. It is evident that the criticism lacks foundation. However, some remarks of a more general character may be advanced in this context.

69. When the United Nations, as in the case of the Congo, gives a mandate to the Secretary-General to carry out such measures as he may deem necessary in his own judgement it may well happen that he may differ on the manner in which he discharges his task. This is in no way surprising. However, it is imperative that once the Secretary-General has received a certain mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly, he should be able to count on the confidence necessary for the fulfilment of his task. His motives should under no circumstances be questioned by anybody. Furthermore, the situation may easily arise in which a given United Nations action, however faithfully it is carried out according to the mandate and the stipulations of the Charter, is looked upon by some country as improperly furthering the interests of some other country. Nevertheless, the country concerned should be required to show solidarity in relation to the United Nations action. Only if such loyalty and the will to co-operate is shown by all Member States can collective measures of this kind be decided upon and carried out. If there is justification for expecting solidarity toward the United Nations on the part of all Member States, this applies especially to the authorities of the country in whose interest and at whose request the action was initiated. All groups in that country must make loyal and whole-hearted attempts to settle their internal conflicts for the good of the whole country and to refrain from all measures that would favour, or be to the detriment of, the special interests of another country. We have a right to assume that no group in the Congo takes it upon itself to act against these principles.

70. It is the earnest hope of the Swedish Government that all parties concerned, and in particular the great Powers, will be able to agree to carry on the United Nations action in the Congo. The draft resolution presented by a number of African and Asian States [A/L.292/Rev.1] seems to us to offer the necessary basis for such an understanding, and the Swedish delegation is therefore prepared to support this draft resolution.

71. Mr. HAKIM (Lebanon): The delegation of Lebanon has joined sixteen other Asian and African delegations in sponsoring a draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1]. I should like briefly to state the position of the Lebanese Government on the question of the Congo and the reasons which prompted my delegation to propose this joint draft resolution.

72. First of all, I should like to express in the strongest possible terms my Government's support for the United Nations effort in the Congo. The United Nations is in the Congo at the request of the Congolese Government, for the purpose of assisting that Government in the restoration of law and order and in the normalization of economic and social life in such a way as to help in preserving the unity, the territorial integrity and the political independence of the sovereign Republic of the Congo.

73. Lebanon is firmly determined to co-operate with other Member States in ensuring the success of United Nations action in the Congo. We wish to urge all Member States not to let this United Nations operation fail. Such a failure would result in serious consequences harmful to the prestige and authority of our Organization. My Government firmly upholds the authority of the United Nations and would be prepared to do its part to strengthen it as an agency for peace. The United Nations constitutes a bulwark for the independence and the peaceful development of small countries, and in particular the independence of the newly-emerging countries of Africa. Without it, the cold war is bound to produce conditions in Africa that will be detrimental to the interests of the emergent nations of that continent and dangerous to the peace of the world. The United Nations effort in the Congo should not be allowed to fail. We should all cooperate in preserving the United Nations from all prejudice, and, on the contrary, strengthening it as an instrument for peace and economic and social development in the world.

74. Second, the Lebanese Government upholds the Secretary-General in carrying out the difficult task entrusted to him by the Security Council. His task is a difficult one and needs our sympathetic support and encouragement for its successful accomplishment. No one is infallible and no one can be absolutely impartial in the present complex situation in the Congo. But we have full confidence in the good faith and the good judgement of Mr. Hammarskjold and his assistants.
75. Third, we consider that the United Nations action in the Congo is one of assistance to a sovereign State and not one of intervention in its internal affairs. The Republic of the Congo is one of the African nations which have recently acceded to independence and whose sovereignty has been internationally recognized. Its admission to the United Nations has already been recommended to the General Assembly by the Security Council. Faced with aggression and outside intervention, the newly-independent Republic of the Congo requested the assistance of the United Nations. We emphatically reject the view that United Nations action constitutes, or can develop into, an act of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Congo. It should not and does not in any way impair the sovereignty of the Congo. Voluntarily-requested assistance is not intervention. We regard this principle of non-intervention as fundamental, and we are opposed to any intervention, whether it is practised by the United Nations collectively or by any Power or group of Powers. But we are convinced that the United Nations, when requested, is the proper agency for assisting emergent nations and for preventing intervention in their affairs by foreign Powers.

76. In the fourth place, my delegation regards as one of the main purposes of United Nations action assistance to the Republic of the Congo in safeguarding its unity and territorial integrity. We have all recognized the Congo as one State, and would regard any attempt towards its Balkanization as dangerous and inconsistent with the very nature and purpose of United Nations action. Partition of the Congo, motivated by the desire of certain colonialist circles to maintain their interest and control so as to permit the exploitation of the rich natural resources of certain Congoese territories, is a perilous enterprise which runs counter to the movement of liberation from colonialism which is sweeping the continent of Africa with irresistible force. The leaders of free Africa will oppose any such attempt towards the division of the Congo, whatever form it may take.

77. Operative paragraph 2 of our draft resolution contains a specific request to the Secretary-General to assist the Central Government of the Congo in safeguarding the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

78. Finally, the problem of the Congo can best be solved by the Congolese leaders themselves, who, in a spirit of national harmony, eventually will agree to resolve their differences so as to build a united, stable and progressive nation. If they desire help in this matter from the leaders of their sister African and Asian nations, such help should be offered to them for the purpose of conciliation and in a spirit of solidarity among the nations of Africa and Asia. It is for this reason that my delegation has agreed with the other sponsoring delegations to include in the proposed draft resolution paragraph 3, the proper implementation of which would help to bring about a peaceful settlement of the internal conflicts that have arisen in the Congo.

79. It is the fervent hope of my delegation that our draft resolution will be approved by the General Assembly and that its provisions will be faithfully applied with a view to arriving at a peaceful solution of the problem of the Congo in the interests of the Congolese people themselves, of the peaceful development of the continent of Africa and of the maintenance of world peace.

80. Mr. COMAY (Israel): My delegation feels that even at this late stage it should comment briefly on some of the essential elements in the problem before us, which may have become obscured in our debate.

81. First, in our effort to understand what has produced the crisis in the Congo, we cannot accept the notion that it is the fruit of sinister plots and conspiracies. Moreover, we regret the slurs which have been cast on the integrity of the Secretary-General and his staff. It is quite legitimate for anyone to feel critical of this or that measure taken under the pressure of events, but there is no reason to doubt the vigour, the dedication and the honesty of purpose brought to bear by the Secretary-General and his aides on a gigantic task which is without parallel in the history of our Organization.

82. The basic cause of the difficulties lies, in our opinion, in the abrupt transition to independent status without an adequate opportunity to prepare for the burdens and responsibilities of governing so huge and complicated a country. All of us who are newly-emergent States have discovered in turn that the proclamation of independence is not an end but only a beginning. On the morrow of the independence celebrations, the leaders of each of us have had to face difficult internal problems and looming external dangers, and each of us has made mistakes and suffered failures. Unhappily, these normal pressures have been sharply accentuated in the Congo because of the circumstances to which I have referred. However, we have before us the reassuring example of other new African countries which have been making steady progress and whose leaders have been displaying a high level of statesmanship and internal responsibility with regard to the current crisis in the heart of their region.

83. Fundamentally, we must reject any concept of superior or inferior races and any belief that one country, nation or people has the right to rule another. This applies fully to the Congo. Moreover, it should not emerge from colonial tutelage in order to incur international tutelage instead.

84. The task of the United Nations is that of furnishing temporary assistance to the Congolese Government until it has gained internal stability and a functioning administration, which we hope will be soon. Above all, the Congolese people must be masters in their own house. It is our sincere hope that the present unfortunate differences amongst the Congolese leaders will soon be overcome, so that there will be a Government in Leopoldville with sufficient authority and cohesion to implement the sovereignty of its country. In the meantime, it would be only just and fair for all of us, and, first and foremost, for the Congolese themselves, to recognize that however confused the picture may still be, the United Nations forestalled a worse situation which would have brought far more chaos, bloodshed and suffering to that country.

85. I should like particularly to stress the quiet work which has gone on behind the political conflict in order to keep essential services going. This has been possible because of the wholly disinterested and willing aid of many countries. For instance, with the collapse of health and sanitary services, the population was threatened with widespread disease and epidemics. It is a matter of some satisfaction to us that in this humanitarian field Israel was able to make its own modest contribution by rushing a medical team to the Congo.

86. Second, the seventeen-Power draft resolution [A/ L.292/Rev.1] before us rightly stresses the unity and the territorial integrity of the Congo, and my Gover-
ment fully endorses these principles. It is easy to point out that the boundaries of the African countries were artificial to start with, drawn a long time ago by outside Powers without due regard to ethnic distribution, geography or economics. But once countries have emerged to independent nationhood within certain boundaries, we deem it essential that the territorial integrity of those countries within those boundaries should be respected. This is in our considered view a principle which must be accepted and safeguarded by all, otherwise there can be no prospect of stability and peace in Africa or in any other region in which new countries have been born.

87. It is also easy to show that within the Congo, as in other African States, there are a variety of tribal groups and allegiances, allegiances which have not as yet merged into a full sense of national solidarity and allegiance, but there is nothing unusual about that. In fact, most of the countries represented in this hall took their present form after a process, sometimes a long and painful process, of unification. So, too, let us have faith in the process of building a united Congolese nation out of many diverse components. The fact that this must be a process and not ab initio an established fact is hardly surprising, and it should not in the long run make us doubt the viability of the Congo as a single State.

88. To what extent the internal structure and powers within that State should be centralized or decentralized is entirely a matter for the people of that country to decide for themselves.

89. Third, my Government accepts without reservation the guiding principle that at this stage States should channel all forms of military assistance through the United Nations. We have no personal interest in this matter since no form of military assistance from Israel to the Congo has at any time been offered or requested. We adhere to the principle because we believe that it is in the best interests of the Congolese people themselves and offers them the best prospects of non-involvement in global conflicts. We fully agree with what was said by the representative of Ghana and by others, that it would be a major tragedy for the new African States to be dragged into such conflicts instead of being given a full and free opportunity to organize their statehood and to promote the welfare of their own people.

90. Israel has many friends in Africa. This friendship is based on the deep conviction that we who are young countries should seek each other out, should share each other’s experiences in nation building, should in fruitful co-operation with each other attack our common enemies, which are poverty, ignorance and disease, the under-developed state of our countries and the under-privileged state of our people. It is a friendship offered and accepted in a spirit of complete equality, mutual respect, brotherhood and human dignity. And it is in this spirit that we are anxious to do whatever we can as a small country to help the Congo overcome its present troubles and move towards a better future.

91. Mr. CHAMPASSAK (Laos) (translated from French): At this stage of the debate on the question of the Congo, I should like to express the appreciation, confidence and sympathy felt by the Government and people of Laos regarding the Secretary-General personally and his wise action in the Congo crisis.

92. My delegation has listened with indignation to the personal attacks made on the Secretary-General. The strong utterances of the representatives of certain Powers are evidence of this offensive and the repetition of their attacks on the United Nations action in the Congo serves only to aggravate the situation and to undermine the authority of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations itself.

93. We cannot subscribe to such views, which call in question the highest authority of the Organization. For this reason, my delegation wishes formally, here in the Assembly, to follow the example of previous speakers and express to the Secretary-General the gratitude, esteem and confidence of my country. This is a very simple tribute from a small country and from a people which, at a time when the Kingdom of Laos is experiencing foreign encroachment and assault upon its independence and authority, is not unmindful of the efforts of the United Nations and, in particular, those of the Secretary-General, to seek a solution in keeping with their ideals and the principles of the Charter. Those efforts, calculated to assist my country in improving its economic and social position, are still being pursued.

94. I have mentioned these aspects of my country’s peculiar problem because we have faith in the United Nations and because the problems facing the young nations which have achieved independence are the same, whether they occur in Africa or in Asia.

95. With regard to the problem now under consideration, my Government hopes that the United Nations action in the Congo will be pursued until, in the interest of the Congolese people themselves, calm and order are restored in the country. The situation in the Congo is changing with such disconcerting rapidity that yesterday’s opinion is no longer valid today. The internal struggles, the secessionist tendencies, the greed shown by foreign chancelleries, the destructive statements made by various personalities, the constitutional difficulties, the chaotic extremes of an economic situation which was already alarming—all these things combine to create a picture of utter confusion. I do not wish to describe the situation in more gloomy terms because no one knows what tomorrow may bring there. In the Congo, as elsewhere, men are overwhelmed and left behind by events which are crowding in at full speed.

96. In this fluid and ever-changing situation, at the request of the Central Government of the Congo the United Nations dispatched its troops with a view to producing order and defending the independence and integrity of the Republic of the Congo. Such is the state of political confusion in which the Secretary-General has had to seek the best ways and means of carrying out the mission entrusted to him by the Security Council.

97. The spontaneous impulse of solidarity which has arisen in every quarter throughout the world, in Africa, Asia, Europe and America, and in a number of countries which in response to the Secretary-General’s appeal dispatched troops under the United Nations flag, is surely tangible evidence of international friendship and co-operation which testifies to the success achieved by the United Nations in its work for peace and to the confidence which the peoples place in the Secretary-General.

98. After all, this Organization cannot be required to be, at one and the same time, insurance agent, fireman and banker. The reason why the situation in the Congo has deteriorated to a point where it has become dangerous is that foreign intervention frequently has an ulterior motive. For that reason, my Government would like to see any assistance to the Congo in the
form of equipment or military or other personnel provided exclusively through the United Nations, so as to prevent Africa in general and the Congo in particular from becoming a battlefield in the war of ideologies.

99. Experience provides abundant proof that in the world of suspicion and distrust in which we live, aid from abroad is bound to give rise to serious international difficulties and create sources of trouble. We must place our trust in the United Nations which is endeavouring, in Africa and elsewhere, to remove such sources of trouble. Its desire to assist and defend States which are weak and powerless is most strikingly confirmed in the Congo episode. My delegation considers that all Member States should act jointly through the United Nations, the very principles of which constitute a guarantee of impartiality and justice.

100. We therefore feel that the United Nations action in the Congo should not be hampered in any way by separate intervention concealing aims which imperil international peace and security.

101. A draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1] has been submitted by seventeen Powers. It is fully in keeping with the ideas and principles I have just stated and my delegation will be glad to support it.

102. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): The crisis which engulfed the Republic of the Congo a month and a half ago was the direct result of a colonial administration which ignored the dynamism of the peoples of the continent of Africa. I am certain that anyone who has examined the premises of the colonial administration of the Congo cannot escape the conclusion that had there been a liberal administration of the territory as late as the 1950's, the result at the present time would have been quite different. Therefore, when we take the floor on the item before the Assembly we do it with mixed feelings—a feeling of emotion and a sense of duty. Emotion because we realize the enormous difficulties that the leaders of the Republic of the Congo had to surmount to attain their independence, and a sense of duty because, the Congo being in the heart of Africa, we wish to see it become a stable State with a strong and stable Central Government which can effectively safeguard the unity, the integrity and the sovereign independence of the Congo.

103. Thus it was at the beginning of the Congo crisis that the African States tacitly agreed on a number of fundamental principles which are to be found in all the resolutions of the Security Council. These fundamentals were and are:

104. First, the Congolese people are one and the territory of the Congo must be maintained as a unit.

105. Second, collective action should be taken through the United Nations in order to avoid complications that could only be to the detriment of the Republic of the Congo and indeed of the continent at large.

106. In consequence, the African States responded to the call of the United Nations and sent military contingents and other assistance in order to help maintain law and order in the Congo and thereby attain the goals to which I have just referred, that is, the unity and the integrity and complete independence of the Congo.

107. In subsequent Security Council resolutions the same fundamental purposes are developed and specified. At the present time, when the Security Council has not been able, despite the persistent efforts of the African group, to produce a resolution identical in spirit and purpose with the earlier ones, all the African representatives, with the sincere advice of their Asian colleagues, continued their efforts to find a solution embodying the same fundamental principles while at the same time making progress in the right direction.

108. Accordingly, in draft resolution A/L.292/Rev.1, of which my delegation had the honour to be one of the sponsors, the same central ideas are found in more detail and in more concrete form. Thus we find, in the last paragraph of the preamble, the draft resolution accepting as valid the first proposition to which I just referred.

109. In operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly gives its moral support to all three resolutions adopted by the Security Council regarding the situation in the Congo.

110. Operative paragraph 2 supports the continuation of vigorous action in the Congo in order to maintain the unity of the peoples throughout the Congo and also in order to maintain the Republic of the Congo as an entity—one and indivisible.

111. Operative paragraph 3 is directed to the Congolese people. It appeals to all the leaders in that country to forget their differences and by peaceful means to face the task of reconstruction and the enormous development of the Congo in a united manner. That is to say, it appeals to their sense of duty towards their people to attain a stable and strong government by the fraternal approach of conciliation. The paragraph appropriately, and in case they need it, makes it possible for them to avail themselves of the assistance of some African-Asian representatives to be appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo. The formulation is such that it does not derogate in any sense from the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo. It simply appeals to them to make use of the process of conciliation by a group of African-Asian representatives. This is a bold step and a constructive one, which to our mind goes to the centre of the problem, for as I have made it clear in my brief intervention in the Security Council [907th meeting], without a strong government in the Congo the chances of success of the United Nations effort may not be certain. For this reason and having regard to the serious situation in the Congo my delegation supports this paragraph in particular and very much hopes that all delegations will vote for it.

112. Finally, operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 specify in a more detailed manner the point that I made earlier in this intervention, namely, the paragraph attempt to ensure the United Nations' venture in the Congo by establishing a United Nations Fund for the Congo, to be set up by voluntary contributions, and also, they ensure the maintenance of law and order in the Congo by continued action. Therefore, the draft resolution is built on what the Security Council has done until 16 September—it takes into careful consideration the various points of view advanced in the meetings at the Security Council and in the General Assembly itself.

113. On the basis of these considerations, it is the hope of my delegation that the draft resolution will receive the unanimous support of all delegations to the end that as we began the United Nations venture unanimously, we may also see it move in complete unanimity.

114. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation appreciates the effort of the African-Asian countries to draft a resolution which might help to solve the Congo
problem. We have given this draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1] careful study and in our earlier statement today have made certain comments on the defects to be found in it. It was with the idea of correcting these defects and helping to draft a resolution which might rally the support of the greatest possible number of delegations that we introduced our own draft resolution [A/L.293] touching upon a number of questions which to some extent go beyond those dealt with in the draft resolution of the African-Asian countries.

115. But since the draft resolution of the African-Asian countries was submitted somewhat earlier, and wishing, as we do, to act in a spirit of co-operation with those countries in the solution of a question which is of vital concern to them and, of course, of concern to the entire General Assembly, we should like to make our contribution to the drafting of a resolution which would be acceptable to the largest possible number of delegations. We should, therefore, like to propose certain amendments [A/L.294] to this draft resolution, amendments which, in our view, are entirely in keeping with the position adopted by the African-Asian countries on these most important questions but which did not find a place in the draft for various reasons and perhaps because of the difficulty of reaching agreement among the sponsors on certain questions.

116. We should like to introduce amendments which would, we believe, improve the text and answer the questions which inevitably arise when we consider the problem of the Congo—questions which the General Assembly cannot, we think, ignore.

117. Allow me to comment on these amendments and to submit them formally for discussion. The draft resolution frequently speaks of assistance to the Central Government of the Congo. We fully understand the intention of the sponsors. They mean, of course, the Central Government of the Congo which was that country's legitimate Government and which the United Nations has been called upon to help under the Security Council decision. But the situation in the Congo is somewhat fluid at present, and we cannot be quite certain that there will be the same Government today, tomorrow and the day after. We therefore suggest that it would be proper, wherever there is a reference to the Central Government of the Congo, to add the word "legitimate" before "Central Government", for we can by no means exclude the possibility that some unlawful group may for a short period seize power and call itself the Central Government of the Congo, especially if the United Nations Command and all persons representing the United Nations do not take measures to assist the legitimate Central Government of the Congo.

118. It is for this reason that we suggest that it would be more correct to refer, throughout the draft, to the legitimate Central Government. This applies, in the first instance, to the last paragraph of the preamble, which states that the United Nations should continue to assist the Central Government of the Congo.

119. In other words, we should like to preclude the possibility of the resolution which the General Assembly is going to adopt being interpreted as promising assistance to any Government which may temporarily set itself up in the Congo.

120. We should not wish to help a Government that was not legitimate, nor, we think, would the General Assembly or the authors of the draft resolution. There cannot, therefore, it seems to me, be any objection to the addition I have suggested.

121. Further, the operative part of the joint draft resolution fails to give any assessment of the events which took place in the Congo and were, in effect, the basis of the discussion in the Security Council and subsequently in the General Assembly.

122. We do not quite understand why the authors of this draft resolution make no reference whatever to Belgium's armed aggression against the Republic of the Congo, when it is clear to all that it, and it alone, was the prime cause of all the incidents which have taken place in the Congo. It was not without reason that in its first resolutions the Security Council spoke straight out that the activities of the Belgian forces must be stopped and the forces themselves removed from the territory of the Congo.

123. It seems to me again, therefore, that the authors of the joint draft resolution should not object to the addition, in the operative part, of a special paragraph on this matter. We propose that it should be inserted as operative paragraph 1, and that it should read as follows:

"1. Condemns the armed aggression of Belgium against the Republic of the Congo and urgently demands that the Belgian Government immediately withdraw all its troops and military personnel from the entire territory of the Congo, whatever the cover or pretext under which they are there."

124. Further, operative paragraph 2 refers to the instructions which the General Assembly has given the Secretary-General. The paragraph states that the General Assembly "requests the Secretary-General, to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions". But everyone here must well remember that a great many representatives of various countries, including African countries, emphasized in their speeches the errors and shortcomings of various resolutions by the Secretary-General and his staff. We believe that attention should be drawn to this fact, although we do not propose that this should be stated in the draft resolution in such a way as to imply a direct accusation of the Secretary-General.

125. We propose the insertion in operative paragraph 2 after the words "Requests the Secretary-General", of the words "not to permit violations of the aforesaid resolutions of the Security Council", and the deletion of the words "to continue".

126. Further, we do not want the Secretary-General to continue to implement the resolutions in the way he has done hitherto. We should like him to correct the manner of their implementation, and to permit no further errors.

127. I believe that it would be quite correct, in this guarded form, to draw the attention both of the Secretary-General and of his staff to the need properly to fulfil the resolutions which have been adopted and to make a serious effort to ensure that no further errors occur.

128. In the same paragraph we should insert the word "legitimate" between the words "to assist the" and "Central Government". This follows from my earlier remarks.

129. We should like the end of operative paragraph 2, after the words "the Republic of the Congo", to be made somewhat clearer from a purely textual point of view. Here there is obviously some confusion in the drafting, for neither the English text nor, more particularly, the Russian text of this phrase, it seems to me,
accurately reflects the thought the authors wished to express. The wording I am going to read out should not, I think, cause any objections on the part of the authors, for in substance there is no difference, but it is, we believe, more exact. After the words "to assist the legitimate Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo", the sentence should, we suggest, read, "and in safeguarding its unity, territorial integrity and political independence, in the interests of international peace and security".

130. The Russian translation before me is so phrased that it suggests that the Secretary-General has been entrusted directly with the task of safeguarding the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. But, notwithstanding the many gifts of the Secretary-General, I do not think that we can ask him to safeguard the unity and territorial integrity, nor yet the political independence of the Republic of the Congo. This is too formidable a task for any one man, however gifted. It seems to me, therefore, that the text I have just read out is more in accordance with the thought the authors wished to express in this paragraph.

131. The English original itself, I think, is inadequate.

132. Then operative paragraph 3 reads: "Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo"—this part causes us no difficulty. We have serious doubts, however, about the second part which says, "with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation".

133. In the first place, no advisory committee on the Congo officially exists. There is no resolution of the Security Council or any other United Nations body providing for the establishment of an advisory committee on the Congo. That was done entirely on the initiative of the Secretary-General himself. He has a perfect right to take such an initiative and he did so in order to facilitate his task of consulting the various Asian and African countries. But no official advisory body of this kind exists. This wording in effect proposes the establishment of such a body; it sanctions the existence of an орган to deal with questions of the Congo. In the first place, however, the draft resolution says nothing at all about the composition of this body — which countries are to be represented on it. In the second place, if the body is to be advisory, why is it necessary for us to confirm this in a General Assembly resolution? Third, why has this advisory body no link with the Central Government of the Congo? If we were to permit the establishment of such a body without the consent of the Central Government of the Congo, this would be nothing short of interference in the internal affairs of the Congo from above, on the initiative of the Secretary-General and with the collaboration of the Asian and African countries. I do not think that the authors of this draft resolution intended, as it were, to impose upon the Central Government their own form of consultation with Asian and African countries. From the conversations we have had with them we understood that they did not intend to initiate such consultations against the wishes of the Central Government. If that is so, we should say so clearly, so that there will be no misunderstandings and so that we do not find ourselves in a short while listening to the protests of the Central Government of the Congo against these consultations imposed from above.

134. It is for this reason that we suggest that the end of paragraph 3 should be redrafted. The text, after the words "with the assistance", should be replaced by the following: "if it is requested by the legitimate Central Government, of Asian and African representatives, for the purpose of conciliation". It seems to us that this is the sense of this paragraph as we understood it from the authors of the draft. In this way we shall not be creating any difficulties for the Central Government and we shall at the same time be giving the Asian and African countries a real opportunity of making an effort and giving all the assistance they can in the solution of those difficult questions which are now confronting the Central Government of the Congo. It seems to us that this in no way conflicts with the central idea of this paragraph, but rather expresses it.

135. Lastly, operative paragraph 4 reads: "Appeals to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Government for the purpose of rendering the fullest possible assistance to achieve the objective mentioned in the preamble."

136. What is wrong with this formulation is that it in effect gives the Central Government a very small part to play in this entire matter. Everything is in the hands of the United Nations, while the Central Government is merely to be "consulted". But assistance can only be of value if the Central Government itself knows to whom and where and to what extent it is to be given. Who ought to know the situation if not the Central Government itself?

137. If we leave everything in the hands of the Secretariat, it will mean in effect United Nations trusteeship of the Congo. That is not, I think, what the authors of the draft resolution intended and paragraph 4 ought, therefore, to be amended.

138. While not objecting to the substance of the paragraph, we should like to suggest that the last part, after the words "to be used", should be replaced by the following text: "by the legitimate Central Government of the Congo, in consultation with the United Nations for the purpose of achieving the objectives set out in the preamble". The general sense of the paragraph is not changed, but our wording, we believe, gives a better indication of the machinery for rendering the assistance.

139. These are the amendments we wish to propose with a view to improving the text of the joint draft resolution so that it may serve as the basis for broader participation by all countries in the solution of this question. The Soviet delegation's attitude to the draft resolution as a whole will depend on the result of the vote on these amendments.

140. Mr. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): On the very eve of the opening of the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly we are meeting here in an emergency special session to deal with a grave issue, which, in the view of my delegation, need not have come before the General Assembly in this manner. In view of its grave urgency, and had there been an earnest desire for sincere co-operation on the part of all members of the Security Council in striving for the restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo, in the interest not of the Congo alone, but of Africa at large, and also of world peace and security, this issue could, I maintain, have been clarified and settled in the
Security Council itself, upon which is laid the responsibility of upholding the higher interests of the United Nations. My delegation cannot but regret such a lack of unanimity in the Council as that which unfortunately prevented the adoption of a resolution. The adoption of the draft resolutions submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia [S/4523] would undoubtedly have helped to clarify matters and would have added fresh life and vigour to the mandate of the United Nations in carrying out the gigantic mission of restoring law and order in the Congo which, in so short a span of existence as a sovereign and independent nation, has suffered so much.

141. The facts relating to the situation in the Congo are well known and I need not therefore recount them all over again. The background has been described in detail in the many meetings of the Security Council ever since the Congo crisis came before it on 13 July 1960. At this emergency special session of the General Assembly, I can therefore confine myself, as other delegations have done, to making some observations and statements of my Government’s point of view on the whole matter.

142. That there exists today an internal political and economic crisis in the Congo, and that this crisis has increasingly assumed an international dimension is clearly evident both from the reports of the Secretary-General and from the proceedings of the Security Council. I could do no better in this regard than to remind representatives in this General Assembly of the grave warning given by the Secretary-General when addressing the Security Council [844th meeting]. Referring to the situation in the Congo then, the Secretary-General declared that in a perspective which might well be short rather than long the problem facing the Congo was one of peace or war, and not only in the Congo.

143. I submit that this warning is as valid today as when it was first given, perhaps even more so.

144. The fourth report of the Secretary-General [S/4482 and Add.1-3] on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions on the Congo situation clearly and unmistakably uncovers a potentially dangerous situation arising from outside interference in the Congo’s internal conflict, a situation which not only renders the mission of restoring and maintaining law and order more difficult and complex, but also contains the seeds of international tension threatening world peace and security. To the Republic of the Congo itself, needless to say, this situation represents a serious threat to the unity and integrity of the country. My delegation firmly believes that a necessary pre-condition for a solution of the Congo crisis must be non-interference by outside Powers.

145. It is only through non-interference that the Congo can be shielded from the threat of becoming a battleground of the cold war, with all the implications that that entails. Because of this consideration, and for the purpose of preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo, my delegation would like to see a fresh call made to all States to refrain from such action as might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority. Moreover, in the context of the present situation in the Congo, all States should refrain from providing any form of war materials except through the United Nations and as part of the United Nations action.

146. As regards the United Nations Force, to which my country is a contributor, my delegation fully supports the continuing action of the Force in the Congo in the task of maintaining law and order in the country and of defending its territorial integrity in accordance with the terms of the Security Council resolutions of 14 July [S/4387] and 22 July [S/4405] and 9 August [S/4426], for it is only in a condition of stability and order, which the Force can help bring about, unhindered by outside interference, that the internal conflict in the Congo can be resolved by peaceful means and by the Congolese people themselves. In this regard a suggestion has been made for assistance towards conciliation of differences through the mediation of some African and Asian members of the Secretary-General’s advisory committee. My delegation welcomes this suggestion. The fact that the African and Asian Members of this Organization most intimately concerned with the problem of the Congo choose to render this assistance through the existing framework of the United Nations operation speaks volumes for the respect they have for the United Nations endeavour and for the Secretary-General.

147. To turn briefly to the subject of economic and financial assistance to the Congo, my delegation is particularly impressed by the highly commendable initiative of the Secretary-General in pointing out, in his fourth report on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, the acute financial needs of the Congo and appealing for international financial aid as a matter of urgency. The appeal for voluntary contributions is indeed a timely one, and will no doubt find ready response from many Member States of this Organization which are in a position to provide the necessary assistance. Needless to say, my delegation believes that this financial aid should form a part of the many-sided United Nations assistance programme which is already acclaimed as the biggest single task ever undertaken by the United Nations.

148. In this respect my delegation would like to pay the highest tribute to the man whose devotion to the cause of humanity, whose untiring efforts in the face of taxing difficulties, and whose skill, patience and forbearance have made this task a working reality. I refer, of course, to none other than the Secretary-General. The ceaseless and determined efforts of Mr. Hammarskjold and his able staff, both here at Headquarters as well as in the Congo, have contributed in no small measure to the containment of the present difficulties in the Congo and, indeed, to the remarkable progress so far achieved in the restoration of law and order in the Republic. The task is gigantic as well as delicate. In the face of many difficulties the United Nations Command, which works under the direction of the Secretary-General, has to walk the tightrope of impartiality and neutrality.

149. Many unjustified and erroneous accusations have been levelled against the United Nations Command, whose integrity and sincerity have been unfairly questioned by these accusations. The Secretary-General has been accused of introducing neo-colonialism in the Congo. He has been labelled a conscious tool of the imperialist Powers. He has been branded an accomplice of evil intrigue aimed at undermining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo. Under normal circumstances these charges, because of their fallacious character, could easily be dismissed, but when they seem to have the intention of publicly discrediting the Secretary-General, and thereby endangering the authority of the United Nations, in which we small nations place our hope and faith in this troubled age, my delegation feels it incumbent upon it
to speak up and take strong exception to these unwarranted and unjustified accusations.

150. In conclusion, may I stress the great significance of the United Nations operation in the Congo? This operation represents a response of this international body to the appeal of young State for assistance to maintain its political independence and territorial integrity. The success or failure of this operation may well determine the future of the United Nations itself. On this note I conlude my intervention by expressing the fervent hope of my delegation that this great endeavour of the United Nations will succeed.

151. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon): The very fact that we are assembled here at this emergency special session, summoned on the very eve of the fifteen regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization, is an indication of the urgency as well as of the importance of the complex and delicate problem that faces the United Nations in the Congo. The time is late, and I do not intend in any way to add to the delays that have already attended our efforts in this matter over the last few days. Undoubtedly our discussions serve a very important purpose, but we should not forget that we have been discussing this matter for nearly ten days, while the situation in the Republic of the Congo is not getting any better.

152. My delegation, as a member of the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, has, since 13 July 1960, in association with the delegation of Tunisia and all the other delegations in the Security Council, given its most patient, serious and dedicated attention to devising ways and means of helping the Congolese people in the most unfortunate events that have taken place in their country in the short time since they gained their national independence.

153. I wish to state here firmly and very categorically before this august body that the only objective of the efforts of the Security Council has been the eventual welfare and the harmonious development of the Congolese people to a full realization of their political, social and economic aspirations. I do not need to repeat here, at this late hour, the policy of my own Government in relation to the several problems that have arisen as a result of the unhappy events in the Republic of the Congo. It has been several times stated in the Security Council, and the records of that body are open for all to see.

154. My delegation has also supported several resolutions which have indicated the principles and the purposes of the Security Council’s action in response to the request of the Government of the Congo for assistance in their difficulty. These resolutions have been referred to in the course of this debate with appreciation and approval. The representative of the Soviet Union and other representatives have, however, not only declared without any exaggeration the action undertaken under these resolutions, but have acclaimed them as the only action that could have been taken for meeting the situation that had arisen in the Congo. So there is no dispute whatsoever with regard to either the objectives of the Security Council or the actual resolutions that were adopted by that Council.

155. This is a significant and important point because of the criticism which has followed activities of the United Nations in the Congo.

156. Let me here briefly summarize the general principles we have followed and continue to follow. First, we support unreservedly the political independence, territorial integrity and unity of the sovereign Republic of the Congo, which the Security Council recommended for admission to the United Nations.

157. Second, we accepted with sympathetic understanding of the appeal of the Government of the Republic of the Congo for assistance, the request which was addressed to the United Nations on 13 July 1960 [see S/4382]. Here it is important to emphasize that the presence of the United Nations in the Congo is by invitation, on request; that the United Nations did not force itself on the country, but had been invited and requested to come there to render assistance.

158. Third, we fully endorsed also the ready response of the United Nations to this appeal, and we appreciate the generosity and speed with which several countries answered the Secretary-General’s call, enabling him to assemble in the territory of the Congo a military force of almost 11,000 troops in a few days’ time. That figure has since risen to 18,000. In passing, let me observe that sometimes we are, in the march of events, inclined to forget the constructive work some people do, and here is an illustration of the dynamic energy and speed with which the Secretary-General carried out the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960 [S/4387] in bringing into the Congo a very large force able to undertake the task with which it was entrusted, namely, the restoration of law and order in the territory of the Congo, and making it possible for the Government of the Congo to ask for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. That is a point which in our criticisms we should not fail to remember.

159. Fourth, we are convinced that if international peace and security are to be maintained, it is absolutely essential that the Republic of the Congo be insulated from the direct or indirect effects of the cold war, for, if by our indifference we permit that conflict to enter into the situation in the Congo, we fear it will be difficult to prevent the rest of the African continent from becoming also involved.

160. It is our belief that the only instrument at present available to us for such insulation is our own Organization, and we whole-heartedly welcome the Secretary-General’s decision to exclude from the whole field of the United Nations military forces those of any of the permanent members of the Security Council, thus ensuring the protection of the Congo from any direct or indirect influence by any of the great Powers.

161. Now, this was one of the principles of the operation which was put before the Security Council by the Secretary-General in one of his reports [S/4389], and the Security Council accepted this principle, which means that the permanent members of the Security Council accepted the principle of the exclusion of military forces coming from the permanent member countries. We similarly uphold the view that we recognize and can deal only with the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo. We cannot and will not encourage, recognize or tolerate any attempts, overt or covert, at dismemberment of the fledgling State, from whatever source or quarter such attempts may come.

162. We are firmly of the opinion that, given the time and given the opportunity for untrammeled and disinterested discussion between several Congolese leaders, the Congolese people will sooner be able by themselves to overcome their present constitutional and political
difficulties; but we are convinced that interference from outside, directly or indirectly, except in the capacity of helpers and advisers, will merely add to these problems and will tend to perpetuate the present disorders.

163. We do not exclude the urgent necessity of advice, guidance from countries which are able and willing to give it, and advice to the young Republics in order to enable them to compose among themselves their political difficulties and conflicts, and try to establish unity and harmony among themselves.

164. It is for these reasons that we supported and will continue to support the view that the United Nations, and the United Nations alone, should be the fountainhead of guidance, assistance and advice to the Government of the Congo. We wish to reaffirm that it is for these reasons that we not only voted in favour of, but joined with Tunisia in sponsoring, each of the three resolutions adopted by the Security Council.

165. Much has been heard about the implementation of those resolutions by the Secretary-General and his representatives. As we have already stated, at the last meeting of the Security Council [96th meeting], some errors may have been committed. We must be prepared to recognize the probability of honest mistakes in the execution, supervision and control of an operation of such vast proportions as that being performed now under the flag of the United Nations, an operation involving 18,000 troops from 15 countries on the military side, and involving an administrative and technical crash programme on the civil side covering almost every aspect from river dredging to monetary and banking facilities.

166. The Secretary-General, in our opinion, has performed an extremely difficult task, under the most trying conditions, in a way remarkably acceptable to most of us. I wish, therefore, to pay tribute to his sense of dedication, to his skill, his patience and his integrity. He may have made mistakes. Such mistakes are sometimes inevitable in operations of this kind, and sometimes they are not mistakes but differences of opinion. May I cite one instance. There are those who have urged very strongly that the Secretary-General should have forced his way into the province of Katanga, and not be forced to negotiate or converse with the provincial President, Mr. Tshombé. But there are others who would have equally strongly criticized the Secretary-General if he had ignored or forgotten the basic principles of United Nations action in situations of this kind. A decision had to be made.

167. But in this case, for which he is blamed so much, the Secretary-General did not take action on his own judgement. He immediately referred the matter to the Security Council. An emergency meeting of the Security Council was called and this particular question of whether in that case the Security Council would suspend the normal rules of the United Nations to enable force to be used so as to obtain entry into the province of Katanga, was considered. The resolution of 9 August 1960 [S/4426] is the clearest vindication of the Secretary-General in that particular instance, for that resolution clearly and definitely stated, in two succeeding paragraphs, first, that it is essential for the United Nations to enter Katanga, and second, that the United Nations shall not interfere in or be used to influence the internal affairs of the country, clearly demonstrating the decision which the Security Council took on that occasion.

168. Therefore, if there is any one to be blamed, it must be the Security Council that is to be blamed for that particular action. I mention this to illustrate the difficulty of the position and that sometimes one may differ in a matter of judgement, and in such cases it does not even amount to a mistake.

169. I would now like to make a few comments on the draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1] which was so ably introduced last night [860th meeting] by the representative of Ghana, and which my delegation has the privilege of sponsoring, in association with sixteen other delegations of African and Asian States, and to refer to a very important resolution which was adopted at the Conference of Independent African States meeting in special session, at Leopoldville, from 25 to 30 August 1960.

170. This is relevant to what I have tried to say about the actions of the Secretary-General which have been criticized. This meeting was composed of a large number of representatives from very many African States. I do not wish to take up the time of the General Assembly by reading the whole of what is called resolution III, which is entitled “Co-operation between the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations”, but there are certain paragraphs in the resolution which I think I should read. Let me quote one paragraph:

“Pays a tribute to the United Nations for the work it is doing for peace in the Congo, both by effecting the complete withdrawal of the Belgian troops of aggression from the entire territory of the Republic of the Congo and through the recovery of the Kamina and Kitona bases by the Government of the Republic of the Congo.”

171. Perhaps since this proposal was adopted there have been certain changes, for the information is that certain Belgian troops have entered this province since then. I do not want to go into that, but to find out the spirit in which this resolution was adopted. It says:

“Regrets the occurrence of incidents to disturb the collaboration and co-operation between the Government of the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations, which must be complete;

“Expresses the hope that similar incidents will be avoided and that all necessary steps will be taken to ensure mutual understanding until the United Nations mission in the Congo comes to an end.”

172. Here we have these African States looking to the future, and that is what we have to do at this time. Even if any mistakes have been made in the past, we have to look to the future for greater co-operation and greater mutual confidence between the Government of the Congo on one side and the United Nations and those who are responsible for the execution of our policy in the Congo, on the other. If we act in that spirit, perhaps such mistakes as may have occurred can easily be avoided in the future.

173. I would like to say that my delegation was greatly gratified to hear from the representative of the Soviet Union that he had decided to introduce certain amendments [A/L.294/Rev.1] to the draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1] submitted by the seventeen Powers in a spirit of co-operation. We gathered from his statement that he would put aside his own draft resolution [A/L.293] if some or all of these amendments could be accepted. We would certainly like to welcome the offer of co-operation and the co-operative spirit in discussing
these matters, and we would certainly like to meet him on that level, except that we have to remember one thing: that if we embark at this time on a discussion which involves an attempt to get what was termed a precise legal formulation of parts of the joint draft resolution, we may perhaps not reach a decision on it for some time to come. That is a factor which must be borne in mind.

174. There is another point which I would like to urge in general terms on the amendments which have been formulated. I would like to remind members, and the representative of the Soviet Union, that days and nights were spent by a substantial group of representatives of Asian and African countries in formulating their draft resolution, and I presume that we may, on an occasion like this and in the context of the situation in the Congo, take it that the representatives of the African States are particularly well-qualified to understand and convey the needs of the Congo situation when formulating resolutions.

175. I do not wish in any sense to exclude the right of all members here present to take part in the formulation of such draft resolutions, nor to say that they cannot give any suitable assistance. But let us at least on this occasion bear in mind that this draft resolution was formulated mainly through the efforts of a large number of representatives of African States, who have the interest of the Congo at heart as much as we all have, but perhaps in a special way; who are near neighbours of the Republic of the Congo; who understand the needs, the weaknesses and the strong points of the people in the Congo more than others. We might at least on this occasion take the draft resolution given to us as a result of the patient labours of these representatives, place our confidence and faith in their good judgement and understanding and accept their position as one which would lead to the benefit of the Congo.

176. Undoubtedly the representative of the Soviet Union, inspired by the same motive of helping the same cause, conveyed his own ideas, resulting from his own study, his own judgement, which we respect and which we do not discard. He tried to improve these things. But if, for practical reasons, we embark on a discussion of a detailed kind, in an attempt to improve the draft resolution in such a way as to secure a precise text and one that has all the legal niceties, to obtain a balance between one Government and another Government by the test of which is the legal Government—whether it should be the Central Government which is in power today, or the Central Government which might be in power tomorrow, is the Government to be recognized—these are legal niceties, very elegant and very important, and we would certainly like to have them adopted if there was time to go into them all. But while we are discussing the legal niceties of the question there is a very serious situation developing, which we are trying to prevent, or fires starting which we ought to be trying to put out.

177. These are the difficulties to which I would like to refer in a general way. I understand also that some of these amendments have been considered by many of the sponsors of this draft resolution and, again, the feeling as conveyed to me seems to be that they feel the text now before the members of this Assembly satisfies the sponsors of the resolution and they would not wish at this stage to enter into a more detailed examination of it.

178. This does not mean that there is a desire to exclude from consideration the amendments which have been put before us by the representative of the Soviet Union; but our plea to the representative who sponsored these amendments is to take the draft resolution as it is, because of the quarter from which it came, because of the patient efforts that preceded its formulation, and, because of their special knowledge, to place faith not only in the ability and judgement of the authors of the draft resolution, particularly of the African States, but in their desire to promote the best interests of the Congo.

179. I regret having taken so much of the Assembly's time, but I did wish to comment generally on the amendments which have been submitted in this case. There is only one further point before I conclude. I would like to make a comment with regard to operative paragraph 3 of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. I mention this particularly because it is liable, in some cases, to be misunderstood, and it is so important in the situation we are facing.

180. I refer to the call to the Congolese people to settle their differences, their internal conflicts, in the interests of the "unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation".

181. The text might have taken many different forms, but this one is the result of an attempt to meet many differing points of view, and it is in that sense a compromise text. Some of us would have liked a more precise and definite text, to set up a good offices committee to assist the people of the Congo. But I do not emphasize that this is one of the most important ways of assisting the people of the Congo, as important as the other ways prescribed in the resolutions of the Security Council which the Secretary-General has been attempting to implement.

182. This committee is not being appointed to report, or to pass judgement, on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, or to implement them on behalf of the Secretary-General. This is something totally different. The function of this group is to meet the people of the Congo, to discuss their political and constitutional difficulties and the reasons for the division which may prevail in that country and find a way of settling the differences that exist between them. We want that done because it is only in the last three months that the people of that country have become independent. They might benefit by the mature judgement of people from other African and Asian States who are interested in their welfare, who might be prepared to go to their country, advise them and guide them in the settlement of these difficulties which they are facing. That is why I refer to this as an important clause.

183. I would therefore urge that the draft resolution of the seventeen-Powers be accepted in the form in which it has been submitted, and I would appeal to the representative of the Soviet Union to consider whether he might not be prepared to accept this draft resolution, for we are very conscious of his desire to cooperate with us and of his intention to improve the text for the benefit of the people of the Congo.

184. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): This emergency special session of the General Assembly has been convened because of the deadlock in the Security
Council on further recommendations designed to advance a solution of the Congo problem. The Indonesian delegation was honoured to participate in the discussions of the Council. On the occasion of our intervention in the Council [905th meeting], Indonesia called attention, among other things, to what it considered a key aspect of the Congo problem. This key aspect is that the Congo must have a strong central government.

185. This is the starting point, the positive starting point, to resolving the turmoil in the Congo. It is a positive approach in contrast to the negative approach of stressing merely the absence of a strong central government. Let us indeed abandon this negative attitude. Its advocates are obviously hoping that the Congo will be saddled with a weak and docile leadership, open to influences and pressures from outside. But we who advocate a positive approach to the Congo problem want to see the Republic of the Congo move ahead under a strong and effective leadership, dedicated solely to promoting and realizing the will and aspirations of the Congolese people.

186. These two differing—in fact, these two opposing—approaches to the Congolese problem epitomize what is really at stake. We are confronted in the Congo with a life and death struggle between nationalism and colonialism. And, as I have already stated in the Security Council, there is but one choice. The United Nations must choose the force of nationalism.

187. It is said—I have been told—that colonialism is dead. But it is not dead. It is still alive. It is still alive in the Congo, and especially in the provinces of Katanga and Kasai where the Belgian forces—in or out of uniform—still carry on their pernicious activities. We know that their days are numbered. What we are witnessing now are the final throes of colonialism in the Congo. They can do harm to the cause of peace. They are doing harm.

188. However, we are convinced that these activities can be speedily stopped if there is a strong central government in the Congo. A strong central government, together with the United Nations Force, can end the civil strife without recourse to further bloodshed. Confronted by the combined will and determination of the Central Government of the Congo and the United Nations Command, the defiance of the dissidents and their colonial supporters will soon collapse. After all, the present opposition to the Central Government of the Congo is a political disease that calls for a political cure, rather than an appeal to military force.

189. Another reason why my delegation advocates a strong central government is to protect the newly-independent Republic of the Congo from becoming a battleground of the cold war. A weak and docile government in the Congo would inevitably find itself torn to and fro by one side or the other in the cold war, and thereby deprived of any possibility of exercising effective and stable leadership in the national interest. Therefore, conscious of the national interests of the Congolese people and of the need to keep the Congo outside the conflux of cold-war tensions, the United Nations should not hesitate for even one minute in promoting the establishment of a strong central government of the Republic of the Congo.

190. It was and it is our belief that a non-aligned Congo, free from all cold-war entanglements, will be a positive contribution to peace. We are of the firm opinion that a policy of non-alignment is the most suitable one for newly-independent countries in order to ensure a healthy and stable national growth.

191. Finally, our advocacy of a strong central government for the Congo is based on the conviction that this will serve the best interests of the United Nations itself. It is not only through the existence of a strong central government that the United Nations can help to bring about an end to civil strife and thus attain its objective of a peaceful settlement, but such a government is also the prerequisite for obtaining conditions under which United Nations financial and technical assistance can be utilized for exclusively productive ends, rather than for military operations.

192. It is, moreover, important that we begin as soon as possible to secure conditions under which the people of the Congo, as a whole, can be mobilized to advance the task of national reconstruction and rehabilitation. For this we need a strong central government. It is only in co-operation with a strong central government that the energy, spirit and wholehearted support of the entire Congolese people, that the United Nations can be assured that its financial and technical assistance will return the greatest profit in concrete achievements at the lowest rate of investment.

193. It is with these aims and purposes in mind that the Indonesian delegation is sponsoring a draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1]. Since it has been clearly and sincerely presented to this Assembly by the representative of Ghana, and noted by other sponsors, I feel that I need not elaborate on its various provisions.

194. But I should like to emphasize that this joint draft resolution looks towards and is promotive of a stable and effective central Congolese Government. We have heard statements by some representatives concerning the lack of such a stable and effective central government in the Congo. I am convinced that these statements reflect a sincere anxiety over the present situation, and consequently I expect that they will eagerly join in our efforts to pave the way for the formation of a strong central government in the Congo. They can do this now by supporting the joint African-Asian draft resolution before this Assembly.

195. This joint draft resolution, of which we have the honour to be a sponsor, is conciliatory in tone, practical and flexible in its implementation and in conformity with the declared goals of the United Nations in the Congo. We commend it to this emergency special session of the General Assembly for unanimous approval.

196. As I stated at the beginning of my remarks, this emergency special session of the General Assembly was convened to rescue the Security Council, which found itself unable to adopt further decisions on the Congo problem. And if this session of the General Assembly also cannot produce the required recommendations, then it will signify the bankruptcy of the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining international peace in the interest of mankind.

197. There are tremendous problems facing the United Nations. Surely it would amount to an admission of bankruptcy if we could not solve the Congo problem and restore peace to this disturbed little corner of the world. This is a decisive moment for the United Nations.

198. Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) (translated from Spanish): Although the specific points which the Security Council has referred to the General Assembly restrict the scope of this debate to a certain extent, we cannot begin to discuss this subject without pointing
out the importance and the nature of the United Nations operation in the Congo.

199. On 13 July 1960, when the Secretary-General, in timely, sound and forthright fashion, transmitted to the Security Council the Congolese Government's appeal and unequivocally recommended that the Council should accord it favourable treatment, the international situation surrounding the Congo problem was in some respects unprecedented in the life of nations.

200. A few days previously the Republic of the Congo had begun its independent life in extremely unfavourable circumstances. The Power administering the Congo had neglected its duty of preparing the Territory for independence, and as a result the new State lacked stable elements capable of exercising the responsibilities which the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of its security entailed. A vacuum was then created which led to the presence of Belgian troops and to an agonizing situation in the Congolese Government, which caused it to seek unilateral support from various Powers in such a manner that an armed conflict of serious proportions appeared imminent.

201. It would be a mistake for this Assembly to forget how serious the situation was in mid-July, and to examine the present state of affairs without reference to the situation which prevailed then.

202. Faced with that situation—the situation in mid-July—the Security Council acted rapidly and authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Republic of the Congo with such military assistance as might be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the Congolese national forces might be able to meet fully their tasks.

203. The Security Council thus set an unforgettable precedent in the protection of a State's independence and sovereignty. The Secretary-General, for his part, complied with the Security Council's instructions with exemplary dispatch, with efficiency, and with a display of political sense and diplomatic ability which were generally applauded and which considerably raised the prestige of the United Nations in the eyes of the world.

204. A few days after the Council adopted a resolution [S/4387], United Nations military forces, most of them the forces of African States, disembarked in the Congo and took the situation in hand and Belgian troops began leaving the territory. It is an act of strict justice to pay a tribute from this rostrum to the Secretary-General and his staff for this vigorous action, which radically changed the course of events in the Congo. The Security Council's resolutions and records and the records of this Assembly testify to the approval accorded the Secretary-General by a vast majority of Member States.

205. The problems of the Congo could not, of course, be solved overnight; and even though, through the United Nations operation, significant progress has been made towards the virtually complete evacuation of Belgian troops, the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of an armed conflict of serious proportions, pressing problems still remain unsolved. The problem of the country's unity is very serious; the constitutional problem is not an easy one to solve; and the problem of the political vacuum is at times a source of real anguish.

206. Unfortunately the solution of these problems is seriously hampered by adverse economic and social conditions and by influences, likewise adverse, exerted from abroad.

207. At this stage in the Assembly's proceedings I shall refer specifically to three fundamental points which were raised in the Security Council at its last meeting [206th meeting] and which could not be resolved: first, the impartiality of the United Nations in relation to the domestic problems of the Congo; second, foreign intervention outside the United Nations; and third, the economic problem.

208. As regards the problem of the impartiality of the United Nations Force, the Assembly will recall that that point was raised in the Security Council in connexion with the struggle between the Central Government and the authorities of Katanga province, a struggle having its roots in constitutional factors which must not be underestimated. The point was raised again in connexion with the struggle between opposing forces seeking to control the Central Government. In both instances the authorities concerned appeared somewhat confused regarding the scope of the Security Council resolutions, especially that of 14 July. They seemed to be under the impression that the United Nations Force had been sent to the Congo to serve as an instrument of the Government—a clearly mistaken idea. The Force, in our judgement—and the Security Council has sanctioned this interpretation—has among its other functions that of preserving law and order in the Congo; but it is not an instrument of the Government.

209. In authorizing the Secretary-General to provide the Congolese Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until the national forces might be able to meet fully their tasks, the Security Council counseled the Force to proceed with the utmost prudence and due respect to the principles of the United Nations Charter; that it was sound action to take under
to the common denominator of the majority position in the Assembly. I wish to congratulate those delegations on their initiative, which is all the more deserving of respect in coming from delegations whose geographical closeness to, and regional feeling for, African problems give them special authority. The Ecuadorian delegation intends to vote for this draft resolution.

219. As the sponsors of the draft resolution know, we feel that some paragraphs of the text could be improved in order to eliminate ambiguities or redundancies. In consultation with the sponsors, my delegation and others ventured to make some suggestions to this end. The sponsors considered them carefully, but ultimately asked us to leave the text as it stood, since it was a compromise wording arrived at among them by no easy process of negotiation. They have told us that they do not intend to accept amendments to this proposal, but to have it put to the vote as it stands. In view of this request from the sponsors, the delegations which suggested certain changes have refrained from pressing them. Since the sponsors' task presented difficulties in the negotiations outside the Assembly, we do not wish to make it more difficult within the Assembly. It is our hope, therefore, that the draft resolution of the African-Asian delegations will be adopted, if possible unanimously, in its present form.

220. Permit me to close this statement as I closed my last statement on this subject in the Security Council [903rd meeting]. Permit me to emphasize the importance of success in the United Nations operation in the Congo to the higher interests of peace, and to the future of the United Nations.

221. We must not lose sight of the fact that the African countries first and foremost, and those of other continents as well, will continue to need the United Nations, time and again, as a shield for their integrity, as a weapon in the struggle against aggression, as diplomatic machinery for the settlement of disputes, as a force to advance the great principles of the Charter, and as a centre for the co-ordination of international co-operation in raising levels of living.

222. At this juncture, the United Nations faces a difficult situation in its Congo operation. If we, today, were to allow the authority and prestige of the United Nations to be weakened; to allow its Secretary-General to be the victim of an unjust campaign, unchecked by support from the rest of us; to allow the motives and intentions of Member States which are contributing generously and selflessly to the Congo operation to be misinterpreted; then in the future, when the efforts of the United Nations are needed elsewhere in Africa or in another continent, we may find, to our distress, that the Organization has lost its vigour and effectiveness.

223. We cannot allow that to happen; but the only way to avoid it at the present stage of events is by joint action which, fortunately, is taking shape in this Assembly and which, by ensuring the success of the United Nations in the Congo today, will preserve its authority, prestige and effectiveness in the future.

224. Mr. AUGUSTE (Haiti) (translated from French): For many weeks now, international news reports have devoted their most sensational and frequently their most vehement commentaries to the Congo crisis. The delegation of Haiti does not wish to try the patience of the Assembly, and will therefore refrain from analysing the situation in detail. It is an extremely unfortunate situation, one fraught with danger for the peace we all seek. My delegation believes that the primary task is to assist the young Republic in recovering as rapidly as possible from the fever with which it is stricken.
225. The United Nations is the only agency with all the means of acting with the necessary speed and in a genuinely disinterested manner. Ever since its inception, it has provided proof of its objectivity and efficacy not only in the Congo but elsewhere, in equally difficult circumstances. However, in referring to its action, which might be described as a kind of apostolate, it is impossible to avoid mentioning one name and paying a public tribute to the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, who is, in a manner of speaking, the very epitome of our Organization and who once again, in the Congo crisis, has shown his impartiality in the supreme cause of peace.

226. For all these reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of the seventeen-Power draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1].

227. Mr. JHA (India): This emergency special session of the General Assembly has been called by the Security Council to deal with the situation regarding which the Council itself was unable to reach a decision. In some ways therefore this session may be taken to have a somewhat particular purpose. The United Nations action with regard to the question of the Congo, and its current activities sanctioned by the Security Council, are among the most important and far-reaching activities of the United Nations.

228. The United Nations and the General Assembly are seized of the Congo problem. The situation in the Congo itself is not altogether clear. It is a developing and rather confusing situation of the greatest complexity. My delegation would therefore like to deal with the profound issues and problems raised by the question of the Congo, not only in its current but also in its future aspects, at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly which is due to convene in less than twenty-four hours and at which there will be no doubt occasion for my delegation to state its views. I therefore confine myself to the somewhat limited though nevertheless extremely important purpose of this emergency special session.

229. The United Nations action in the Congo was undertaken at the request of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo in the situation arising from the incursion of Belgian troops into the Congo. This had brought about chaotic conditions with all the internal conflicts, disruptions and dangerous secessionist tendencies which threaten the very existence of the young Republic. My Government believes that the Security Council took the right course by responding to the request of the Central Government of the Congo through its Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba. There is no doubt that if the United Nations had not acted at that time, not only would the Congo have suffered internal disruption and disintegration, but it would have become a scene of international conflict and even endangered the peace of the world.

230. We believe that despite possible shortcomings the United Nations action in the Congo has been beneficial. In our view the United Nations mission must continue in the Congo. The alternative of direct assistance by interested Powers to various groups would mean the total disintegration of the Congo. Obviously, the United Nations mission in the Congo must function in accordance with the directions given by the Security Council or by the General Assembly. If there has been any misunderstanding in the past, this could be corrected. But the United Nations mission itself must continue so that conditions in the Congo do not worsen.

231. It is well to remember that the entire basis for United Nations responsibilities in the Congo is the request by the Central Government. This Government must, therefore, at all times be upheld. It is essential for the success of the United Nations mission in the Congo that there should be the fullest co-operation and understanding with the Government of the Congo. The latter, on its part, should give full co-operation to the United Nations in its operations.

232. It has grieved my delegation, as indeed it has grieved others, that ever since its accession to independence on 30 June 1960, at which the Government and the people of India rejoiced, the Congo has been the scene of bitter conflict, internal strife and disunity which have made it difficult for the Central Government to function effectively in all parts of the Congo. The Congo is a large country, with a large and varied population of freedom-loving Africans and with immense natural resources.

233. In order that the people of the Congo should enjoy in the fullest measure the blessings of freedom which has come to them after long delay and nearly a century of colonial exploitation, nothing is more essential than the forging of unity among the peoples of the Congo. The future of the Congo indeed lies in the hands of the people themselves. So long as they are divided, so long will they be weak and unable to fulfil their destiny.

234. We believe that the Congo should be helped to achieve unity. The United Nations can greatly assist the peoples of the Congo in the achievement of this unity. It has a positive role to perform. It is desirable that the United Nations should set in motion the processes of conciliation. Above all, we think that the Congo should be insulated from outside military assistance. The rendering of assistance by the United Nations for the maintenance of peaceful conditions ensures that extraneous factors will not disturb or retard the restoration of peaceful conditions, and will help to preserve the unity, integrity and the political independence of the Congo.

235. The draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.2] sponsored by seventeen African and Asian countries is, in our opinion, fully meets the present situation. It embodies the general principles which I have indicated. It seeks to isolate the Congo from arms and other military assistance. It appeals to the Congolese peoples to settle their differences and internal conflicts peacefully. It underlines the importance of maintaining the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo. It requests the States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the attainment of peaceful conditions. It appeals to all Member States to contribute voluntarily and generously to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to provide the wherewithal for the stability of essential and administrative services and for the economic development of the Congo.

236. This is a constructive approach which we welcome and support. Therefore, the draft resolution meets, as I have said, the needs of the present situation, and my delegation will support it. In doing so, we should like to make it clear, as paragraph 6 of the draft resolution seeks to do, that the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo should not be prejudiced in any way. Normally we would not support an injunction of this nature, but we believe that, in the exceptional and dangerous situation in the Congo, this is necessary and beneficial.
237. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Discussion being closed, the Assembly will now vote on the draft resolutions before it and the amendments thereto.

238. Rule 93 of the rules of procedure provides that, if two or more proposals relate to the same question, the Assembly shall vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. I shall therefore put to the vote first the resolution submitted by seventeen Member States [A/L.292/Rev.1], and the amendments presented by the Soviet Union, which appear in document [A/L.294]. The Chair will then put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union [A/L.292].

239. It is the ruling of the Chair that explanations of vote will be heard after the voting has been completed.

240. The delegations of the United States of America and the Republic of Ghana have just requested permission to speak on the USSR amendments.

241. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): In my opening speech to this emergency special session [858th meeting] I said that the historic United Nations action in the Congo was at the cross-roads. It was at the cross-roads in two ways.

242. First, the actions and impartial direction of the Secretary-General have been put under bitter and unfounded attack from the USSR. The whole Assembly, the whole world, has heard this attack. This attack was even participated in by the Head of Government of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, who said on 12 September:

"The colonialists and imperialists are carrying out their policy through the hands of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold. It is not as if Mr. Hammarskjold does not understand this. No, he is fully aware of it and he is doing it consciously."

This attack on the Secretary-General and the others preceding and following it have now been formalized further in the draft resolution [A/L.293] that the USSR has introduced today, as well as in the amendments [A/L.294] that it has produced to the Asian-African draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1].

243. Second, the Soviet Union was and is doing everything in its power to frustrate the success of the United Nations effort, by sending men, supplies and equipment to the Congo in defiance of Security Council decisions. The Soviet representative reflected this brazen Soviet desire to make a satellite of the Congo when in the Security Council he vetoed the draft resolution introduced by Ceylon and Tunisia [S/4523]. He then said—and he accused these two States:

"They also said that such [military] assistance should be provided exclusively through the United Nations... We consider that it is not possible to take such a course."

244. This policy, and nothing else, is what dictated the Soviet Union's cold fury against the Secretary-General and the United Nations Command in the Congo. This was an issue which had to be faced and faced squarely. The only alternative to United Nations preventive action was unilateral action, with all the grave consequences that that would entail.

245. These issues were the same as those which faced the Security Council. The draft resolution submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia in the Security Council dealt with them forthrightly. It backed up the Secretary-General for his vigorous efforts to carry out the Security Council resolutions. It called on all States to refrain from sending any supplies or men for military purposes to the Congo. The draft resolution was therefore vetoed by the USSR, and it was necessary for this Assembly to be convened.

246. We now have before us a draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1] presented by seventeen States including all the African States. I must say frankly that there are some deficiencies in this draft which under ordinary circumstances we should feel it desirable to correct. In fact, I have quite frankly voiced this opinion in discussion with various delegations since the introduction of the draft resolution. However, we are not acting in normal circumstances; we are acting in emergency special session and we should reach decisions quickly. The best, therefore, must not become the enemy of the good.

247. On the two key issues on which this Assembly was required to express itself, this draft is unequivocal.

248. First, the draft resolution fully supports the resolutions of the Security Council. It then asks the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with them and to continue to assist the Government of the Congo to maintain order and safeguard the unity of the Congo. This language clearly expresses the opinion of the Assembly that the Secretary-General has properly in the past acted, and should continue in the future to act, in accordance with those resolutions and in accordance with the principles set forth in the Secretary-General's reports which the resolutions endorsed. The confidence of the Assembly in the Secretary-General and in the execution of United Nations resolutions in the Congo is thus clearly stated.

When contrasted with the demands of the Soviet draft resolution [A/L.292] for a censure of the Secretary-General, the intent of the sponsors of this draft is even more pointedly apparent.

249. Second, the draft resolution has faced directly and squarely the realities of Soviet policy towards the Congo. Operative paragraph 6 is crystal clear in stating that, even though the United Nations recognizes the sovereign rights of the Congo, it is nevertheless calling upon all States—and that must include the Congo as well as the USSR and its friends—to refrain from allowing any assistance of a military nature in the Congo except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General.

250. I note with pleasure the straightforward interpretation which the representative of Ghana made on this point in introducing the draft resolution last night:

"We go on to say that there should be no provision of arms, whether directly or indirectly, or of other materials of war and military personnel, or other assistance for military purposes, during the temporary period of military assistance through the United Nations... I think that the phrase 'except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General' must be underlined. We feel very strongly that no help whatsoever should be sent to the Congo without the express request of the United Nations and that this help should go only through the United Nations medium." [860th meeting, para. 164.]

251. The injunction is categorical. It is made even more categorical by endorsing the Security Council's call on all States not to take any steps which would make the maintenance of law and order more difficult.

252. For our part, I can assure the Assembly that the United States has not sent any men, supplies or
materials to the Congo for military purposes except in support of the United Nations Force and at direct United Nations request. The United States fully intends to continue that policy. It is now the responsibility of the Soviet Union and any others to do likewise.

253. The draft resolution, of course, is not confined to these overwhelming issues. It also proposes other constructive steps. Among other things, paragraph 3 appeals to all Congolese to seek a solution of their own conflicts by peaceful means and authorizes, as appropriate and in consultation with the Secretary-General, the appointment by the Advisory Committee of representatives for the purpose of assisting in conciliation. We concur with this appeal for a solution by peaceful means and can foresee circumstances where United Nations assistance in conciliation might be useful. We are pleased, moreover, that the language of the last part of the paragraph is permissive and that consultation with the Secretary-General is also envisaged.

254. We must guard carefully against introducing, ourselves, any complicating element into the Congo. The timing and nature of any action, as well as the willingness of those concerned to accept it, should be carefully considered before they are initiated.

255. Finally, the draft resolution makes an appeal for voluntary contributions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control. We feel that the language which sets out the purposes of this Fund is slightly ambiguous. We take it to mean, however, that the Fund is to be used for purposes specified in the Secretary-General's fourth report [S/4482 and Add.1-3]. With this understanding, the United States will give prompt consideration to the appeal.

256. The United States, in the context of these comments, will vote for the draft resolution if it is not adversely amended.

257. There is also another draft resolution before us, the draft resolution of the USSR [A/L.293]. I do not believe that too much comment on it is necessary. To our mind, it is full of misstatements of fact and of slanderous allegations against the Secretary-General, the United Nations Command and States Members of the United Nations. It demands a policy totally at variance with the one in the other draft. The United States will vote against it and hopes that the General Assembly will reject it decisively.

258. The same considerations apply to the amendments [A/L.294] which the Soviet Union has moved to the African-Asian draft resolution under the guise of seeking general agreement. The Soviet Union, in our opinion, is trying in these amendments to impose its own views concerning the Government of the Congo. It is trying to shift the attention of the General Assembly from the Soviet Union, which has been sending military equipment and personnel into the Congo, to Belgium, which has been taking its troops out. It is trying to change the draft resolution from one supporting the Secretary-General to one critical of him. It is trying to take out of United Nations control a fund which is supposed to be a United Nations fund. The United States will, therefore, vote against these amendments and hopes that the General Assembly will reject them decisively.

259. Mr. QAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): At this late hour it should have been impossible for me to be here, but I have come to make an appeal. It seems as if I am specializing in making appeals nowadays, but I think that it is worthwhile doing so at the present juncture.

260. Without prejudicing the rights of my friend the representative of the Soviet Union, I would appeal to him to withdraw his amendments [A/L.294] to our draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1]. I do so because I am convinced that there are various points which he has made and which other delegations have made, which we could have considered, but, as I said yesterday [860th meeting], our draft resolution is a result of deep thinking, considered consultation and discussion among ourselves, and it is a result of harmony among different views. If we were to listen to every representative here, I am sure that we should not have a draft resolution to present. It is in this spirit that I make my appeal.

261. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics translated from Russian): The representative of the African-Asian group has just appealed to the Soviet delegation to withdraw its amendments [A/L.294] and thus ensure greater unity in the solution of this question. I must say that the amendments submitted by the Soviet delegation have a significant bearing on the understanding and hence the implementation of the draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1] in question and we continue to uphold our interpretation of the paragraphs of that resolution as expressed in our amendments. Nevertheless, heeding the appeal just made by the representative of Ghana, we shall not press for a vote on those amendments. Without the introduction of those amendments, however, we shall not be able to support the resolution as a whole.

262. We consider that without those amendments, the draft resolution before us may be used by those who, as Mr. Wadsworth clearly indicated today, have taken a very definite stand on this matter. It may be used by them to distort in practice the position taken by the Security Council on the solution of the Congo problem.

263. In view of these considerations, and because, in our opinion, the United States representative's interpretation of this draft resolution as expressed by him today does not coincide with the interpretation of the sponsors, we find ourselves unable to support the draft resolution in its present form. We do not wish to complicate the voting on this question and for that reason we shall not press for a vote on our amendments; we shall, however, abstain in the vote on the resolution.

264. At the same time I should like to state that, mindful of the appeal made by the representative of Ghana, we shall not press for a vote on our draft resolution [A/L.293], the statements of the representatives of the African and Asian countries having made it clear that they want their text to be the basis for action in settling the Congo problem. We believe that a settlement of that problem will in the last analysis depend on the Congolese people themselves.

265. The resolution which is about to be adopted here can, of course, either simplify or complicate the solution of the problem, depending on how it is carried out. We are firmly convinced that if this resolution is carried out in the same way as the resolutions of the Security Council, the situation in the Congo will inevitably deteriorate and we shall again be obliged to revert to this problem.

266. That is why we think that it will not be possible to arrive forthwith at a complete solution of all the problems which have been raised by events in the Congo and that this question should be discussed at the
regular session, which opens tomorrow, 20 September, to which we have submitted an additional agenda item entitled "Threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo" [A/4495]. The participation of the Heads of Government of many African States in the work of that session will enable us to give very thorough and serious consideration to this question and we expect that in the discussion of it the actual results of the operation in the Congo and the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and by this Assembly will be taken into account.

267. Accordingly, the Soviet delegation, as I have already said, will not press for a vote either on its amendments or on its draft resolution. We shall abstain in the vote on the draft resolution submitted by the African-Asian group.

268. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): In view of the statement we have just heard from the representative of the Soviet Union, we have before us only the draft resolution [A/L.292/Rev.1], submitted by Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen.

269. A separate roll-call vote has been requested on paragraph 6. We shall therefore vote first on the preamble and paragraphs 1 to 5.

The preamble and paragraphs 1 to 5 were adopted by 71 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

270. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We shall now vote on paragraph 6.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Morocco, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first:

In favour: Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Union of South Africa.

Paragraph 6 was adopted by 80 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

271. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We shall now vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Turkey, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Turkey, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia.

Against: None.


The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 70 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

272. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call upon the Secretary-General.

273. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: May I be permitted to say one word with regard to the resolution just adopted.

274. In a report to the Security Council on 9 September 1960 [896th meeting] I proposed that the Council appeal for financial support for the Republic of the Congo. Owing to well known circumstances the Security Council did not reach a positive decision on this matter. Knowing the desperate needs of the Republic of the Congo, I am deeply gratified indeed by the decision which has now been taken by the General Assembly on this subject. Members will undoubtedly bring this appeal to the notice of their Governments. They will, certainly, permit me to do the same, stressing the urgency of the appeal. I am sure that Governments will respond with their usual generosity. It must give the Congo and its people special satisfaction that, whatever differences of opinion have been reflected in the debates, there has been full agreement on the substance of this specific proposal.

275. Having taken the floor, I may, perhaps, add that I have carefully noted the explanations given by the sponsors of the text of their draft resolution. These explanations will provide helpful guidance for its implementation.

276. I have been happy indeed to note the correspondence between the attitude reflected in the resolution and that of the Secretariat as presented most recently in the fourth report [S/4482 and Add.1-3]. I believe that I am right in finding in this fact evidence of a fundamental and encouraging agreement with and within the African world regarding the aims and the very philosophy of this major United Nations operation.

277. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I give the floor to the representative of Brazil for an explanation of vote.

278. Mr. GIBSON BARBOZA (Brazil): In view of its statement at the beginning of this debate [859th meeting] the Brazilian delegation considers it unnecessary to explain its affirmative vote on the resolution just approved as a whole since that resolution conforms in its general lines with the opinions we have voiced here. Of course, the resolution, being the result of an effort towards the conciliation of several viewpoints, has certain aspects that some of us would have preferred
to have written otherwise or not written at all. But the resolution as a whole is a good one, and we congratulate the Assembly on its adoption. I should like, however, to explain the affirmative vote of Brazil on operative paragraph 6.

279. We have listened with great attention to the explanations offered by the sponsors of the resolution, from which we infer that the first sentence of paragraph 6, “Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo”, does not imply an encouragement to or an approval of the rendering of direct military assistance by any State to the Congo. We take note of those assurances not only because they make good sense, but also because if interpreted otherwise the sentence in question would run counter to the very sense of paragraph 6 as a whole.

280. It goes without saying that all of us in this Assembly recognize the full sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo, a country which we are ready and anxious to join in the Organization. What the Brazilian delegation wishes to stress is that no State should try to interfere in the Congo by furnishing any military assistance otherwise than through the United Nations.

281. To sum up, in the opinion of the Brazilian delegation this is the only way to respect the sovereignty of the Congo. Any other kind of action is just paying lip-service to it.

AGENDA ITEM 3

Appointment of a Credentials Committee (concluded)

REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (A/4499)

282. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Before putting to the vote the report of the Credentials Committee [A/4499], which recommends that the Assembly should approve the Committee's report, I call on the representative of Hungary, who wishes to explain his vote in advance.

283. Mr. SZITA (Hungary): In explaining the vote of my delegation, I wish to state the following. I believe that it is not very difficult to define the real aim and character of the United States proposal submitted in the Credentials Committee in connexion with the credentials of the Hungarian delegation. Therefore, at this late hour I beg leave to limit my remarks to two points.

284. First, those who are confronted with the so-called question of the Hungarian credentials might at first believe that this matter involves a legal problem. In reality, however, it has nothing to do with law. The proposal of the United States is not only against the law and the rules of procedure, but it is a patent absurdity. According to that proposal, the Credentials Committee, which was elected for the sole purpose of deciding upon the validity of the credentials, should not take a decision on the credentials of my delegation. This proposal would also induce the Assembly to approve the report of the Credentials Committee [A/4499], which contains an absurdity. It is commonly known that no doubt can be raised, either from the legal or any other point of view, about the validity of my delegation's credentials. These credentials are in conformity with the corresponding provisions of the Charter and the rules of procedure, just as much as the credentials of any other delegation here.

285. It seems to be totally superfluous to deal with this matter in detail, because every representative sitting in this hall, including the United States delegation, is well aware of the validity of the Hungarian credentials.

286. My second remark refers to the fact that, as it follows from all this, the United States proposal has been put forward not from legal but clearly and solely from political motives. These political motives have become obvious in the light of our recent debate. Certain circles in the United States are unable to become reconciled to the fact that four years ago they failed to achieve in Hungary the very objectives which they had hoped to attain in the Republic of the Congo; that is, to misuse the United Nations in order to violate the independence and sovereignty of a Member State, serving their own political interest.

287. It is understandable that these circles are unable to forget that failure easily. But this cannot prevent Hungary from following its own way independent of the wish of the United States Government. The only value of this and similar actions of the United States Government consists in revealing its constant but less effective effort against social progress in many parts of the world. My delegation is firmly convinced that the real character of this manoeuvre is clear to the General Assembly. My delegation will, of course, vote against the adoption of the report of the Credentials Committee.

288. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution, appearing in the report of the Credentials Committee [A/4499].

The draft resolution was adopted by 70 votes to 1.

289. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now give the floor to representatives who wish to explain their vote.

290. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): I will be very brief. My Government's attitude with regard to the credentials of the delegations of the Republic of China and the Hungarian People's Republic is well known and has been stated by my delegation on many previous occasions. Tonight, in voting for the draft resolution on the report of the Credentials Committee, my delegation wishes to put on record that it approved that report with the following reservations. First, having friendly diplomatic relations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Indonesian delegation accepts the credentials of the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic. Second, while recognizing only the Government of the People's Republic of China as the legal Government of China, my delegation does not accept the credentials of the persons who describe themselves as the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China.

291. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): I have asked for the floor merely to say that our acceptance and approval of the report of the Credentials Committee does not in any way imply a change in my Government's views on the question of the recognition of the People's Republic of China and its representatives.

292. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (translated from French): We shall be very brief in explaining our vote. My delegation, though it voted in favour of the report of the Credentials Committee of this emergency special session of the General Assembly, wishes to point out that it cannot endorse the reservations expressed by certain members of the Committee. We recognize only the People's Republic of China, whose absence from the United Nations astonishes us. The Republic of Guinea considers that the People's Republic of China,
a country of 650 million inhabitants, ought to be given its place in the United Nations. We believe that it is impossible to ignore the existence of that great people. We also wish to point out that the Republic of Guinea in no way questions the credentials or the representative character of the Hungarian delegation. We have economic, cultural and friendly relations with the Hungarian People's Republic, based upon reciprocity of interests, absolute equality and mutual respect for the sovereignty of our two countries.

293. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia): I wish to place on record that our vote in favour of the resolution does not in any way imply any change in regard to the well-known position of my Government with regard to the question of the credentials of the Hungarian delegation and the question of the representation of China in the United Nations.

294. U THANT (Burma): In voting for the adoption of the report of the Credentials Committee I wish, on behalf of my delegation, to place on record that the Government of the Union of Burma recognizes only the Central Government of the People's Republic of China. Therefore, my delegation holds that the credentials of the present representatives of China are not valid. The Government of the Union of Burma has recently recognized the Government of Hungary, and therefore my delegation holds that the credentials of the representatives of Hungary are valid.

295. With these two reservations, we voted for the adoption of the report of the Credentials Committee.

296. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): My delegation cast an affirmative vote in favour of the report of the Credentials Committee, but we have two reservations to make regarding the credentials of two delegations.

297. My Government recognizes and has diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and the Hungarian People's Republic. We recognize the representatives of the People's Republic of China, as the only representatives legitimately entitled to speak for China in the Organization, and the same applies to the representatives of Hungary who sit in this Assembly.

298. Mr. ASHA (United Arab Republic): I also wish to explain the vote of my delegation on the report of the Credentials Committee. My Government recognizes only the People's Republic of China as the legitimate Government of that country, and therefore we believe that the report is incorrect in that respect.

299. We also recognize the Hungarian People's Republic, and we believe that the credentials presented by the representative of that State are valid.

300. Mr. JHA (India): I would like to make it clear, on behalf of my delegation, that our support of the report of the Credentials Committee does not affect the position, first, that we recognize the People's Republic of China as the only lawful and legitimate Government of China entitled to a place in the United Nations; and, second, that we recognize the Government of Hungary, with which we have diplomatic and commercial relations, and we think that it is rightfully represented here.

301. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland): In accepting the report of the Credentials Committee, my delegation wishes to present its position on the two following questions:

302. First, concerning the problem of the representation of China. The delegation of the Polish People's Republic has had the opportunity on many occasions to express its strong conviction that the rightful representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations can only be the representative appointed by the Central People's Government the People's Republic of China.

303. In preventing the representative of the People's Republic of China from occupying his place in this Assembly, the countries responsible for this state of affairs are acting against the best interests of the United Nations.

304. The second question concerns the credentials of the Hungarian delegation. On behalf of the Polish delegation I would like to voice the strongest protest against the questioning of these credentials by the Committee. These credentials were issued by the Hungarian Government in compliance with established United Nations procedure. To question them amounts to interference in the internal affairs of Hungary, and to disregarding the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

305. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR delegation wishes to confirm once again that its vote for the approval of the Credentials Committee's report does not signify agreement with the decisions concerning credentials in the cases of the People's Republic of China and the Hungarian People's Republic.

306. The Soviet Union has consistently maintained and continues to maintain that the great People's Republic of China should be represented only by the Central People's Government and not by persons whom the Chinese people have driven from their country and who are the puppets of another Government.

307. We wish to state emphatically that the time has come when that problem must be settled and that the policy of the United States with regard to it is the only thing which stands in the way of a common-sense solution in the interests of consolidating peace and strengthening the United Nations. We hope that the time is not far distant when the question will be settled at last in spite of the United States policy with regard to it.

308. Where Hungary is concerned, we also consider entirely incorrect the position of the United States with regard to the Hungarian People's Republic, which has won the right to participate entirely in all the work of the United Nations and to be a full-fledged Member of the Organization, a right of which the Hungarian people cannot be deprived by anyone.

309. The Soviet delegation once again confirms its earlier position with regard to these questions and accordingly has deemed it necessary to make this statement.

310. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon): On behalf of my delegation I wish to state that my acceptance of the report of the Credentials Committee does not involve any change in the policy of my Government toward the People's Republic of China and the Hungarian People's Republic.

311. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq): Our vote in favour of the report of the Credentials Committee does not affect our position regarding the right of the Chinese People's Republic to represent China in the United Nations nor does it affect our recognition of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic.

312. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translated from French): My delegation, though it voted in favour of the report of the Credentials Committee, wishes to enter an express reservation regarding the
report’s provisions relating to the credentials of the representatives of the Hungarian People’s Republic and those of the so-called representatives of the Republic of China.

313. By making the Credentials Committee submit this report to the Assembly and then imposing that decision on the Assembly, the United States and its allies who are parties to the various well-known aggressive treaties have again succeeded in making the United Nations accept fiction for fact while attempting to present what is a fact as if it were fiction. This would be farcical if it did not reflect the dangerous policy of fanning international tensions in circumstances which are already grave.

314. In the opinion of my delegation, it is high time such manoeuvres were thwarted. We hope that the time will soon come when such attempts, on the part of the United States or any other Government hostile to peace, will no longer be possible.

315. Mr. LIU (China): This is not the first time nor will it be the last time that the question of the representation of China is raised. At this late hour I do not wish to impose on the Assembly by dwelling on the political and juridical considerations which support the position of my delegation as the rightful representatives of China. I think it will not be long before we have the opportunity to discuss these important considerations. For the time being, I think that the findings of the Credentials Committee, which reflect the views of the majority and which have been endorsed by the Assembly, will be sufficient answer to those who still question the rightful status of my delegation.

316. Mr. MALILE (Albania) (translated from French): Although we voted in favour of the report of the Credentials Committee, my delegation deems it necessary to state that it does not recognize as valid the credentials submitted by the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. We also consider it necessary to state that only the Government of the People’s Republic of China is entitled to represent the Chinese people in the General Assembly and all its organs.

317. My delegation likewise protests against the doubts cast on the credentials of the Hungarian delegation. The Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic is the only lawful Government of the Hungarian people, and any attempt to cast doubts on its representatives is part of the cold war policy.

318. Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation voted for the adoption of the report of the Credentials Committee but that, of course, by no means signifies that we do not have serious reservations concerning the Committee’s decision on the credentials of the delegation of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the so-called “representatives of China”.

319. I must express a most vigorous protest against the decision of the Credentials Committee on the credentials of the representatives of the Hungarian People’s Republic. As has happened repeatedly during the past few years, the majority in the Committee, under pressure from the United States, has taken a position which casts doubt on the Committee’s impartiality. This is all the more striking in that the same majority in the Committee has shown no hesitation in recognizing the credentials of persons who never have had and do not now have the right to represent the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations.

320. My delegation will not recognize any credentials which have not been confirmed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the only one which represents the Chinese People.

321. Mr. TODOROV (Bulgaria): In connexion with the affirmative vote for the resolution contained in the report of the Credentials Committee, the Bulgarian delegation would like to declare that only the delegation accredited by the Government of the People’s Republic of China can be recognized as the legal representative of China in this body.

322. In the second place, the Bulgarian delegation would like to make a strong protest against the report of the Credentials Committee in connexion with the representation of Hungary. The Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic is the only legitimate government of that country which has sent a Hungarian delegation, and that delegation, further, is the legal representative of that Government.

Statement by the President

323. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We have postponed consideration of the first item on our agenda, concerning the admission of new Members.

324. It is my understanding that this is not the time to take a decision on this subject, particularly since the day on which the new Assembly takes over has already begun.

325. Before closing the meeting I wish to express very briefly my views on the resolution on the Congo which has been adopted.

326. I thank divine Providence for having granted me the opportunity to bring my presidency to an end by directing this memorable Assembly which has adopted, we may say unanimously, a resolution of a nature decisive for the destinies of the Congo, for the solidarity of those countries of Africa which we are about to welcome with enthusiasm and those which have already joined the United Nations and for the prestige of our Organization.

327. We have worked diligently, and I thank all delegations for their assistance and for the spirit of sacrifice they have shown; they may take satisfaction in having contributed to one of the most important measures ever taken by the United Nations. To this I must add that justice has been done to the resolutions of the Security Council, to the operation directed with such intelligence, skill, boldness and dispatch by the Secretary-General, and to all those who are working for the United Nations in the Congo.

328. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I am somewhat surprised at the casual way in which the President has disposed of the first item on the agenda. In fact, I am not quite sure what happened to it and what we are doing. Are we ever going to discuss the first item before the emergency special session of the General Assembly or are we not? It is my understanding that this was the day on which we were going to decide that question. But, may I ask, is it going to be decided at the emergency special session or at the regular session of the General Assembly? If it is to be decided at the emergency session, then we must obviously convene the emergency session tomorrow. But the President appears already to have reached a conclusion for us. That item has not been discussed at the emergency session. Hence it must be asked why it was introduced as the first item on the agenda. Who introduced it? The representative of the United States. Why did he introduce it? Only in order
to show that his delegation favours having the young African States take part in the discussion of the Congo question. But we have discussed the question of the Congo, we have taken a decision on that question, and the representatives of the young African States have not participated. That being the case, why was the item introduced? Are not the manoeuvres of the United States in this matter clear to everyone?

329. I believe that they are entirely clear. This manoeuvre has failed and we are going to take note of it; but the President does not want it to be recorded that the item has been removed from the agenda, preferring to say that we are going to take up the question tomorrow. But we are going to take it up at the regular session of the General Assembly and not at the emergency special session to which the United States representative referred. This is the result of the manoeuvring of the United States.

330. The President (translated from Spanish): I do not think this is the time to embark on the discussion which the USSR representative is introducing. The President is always open to suggestions from the Assembly. If the representative has a better suggestion than the one I have just made, then since we are within the period of authority of the new Assembly I shall put it to the vote.

331. As I have already told Mr. Zorin, any explanation or observation from representatives should not be merely academic or theoretical but practical, and should take the form of a motion.

332. If the USSR representative wishes to make a proposal, nothing could give me greater pleasure than to open discussion on it and then put it to the vote. If he prefers merely to make criticisms, we shall also listen to them, if not with pleasure, at any rate with interest; but we have nothing on which to take a resolution.

Closing of the session

333. The President (translated from Spanish): I declare closed the fourth emergency special session of the General Assembly.

The meeting rose on Tuesday, 20 September, at 1.10 a.m.