



Security Council

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United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) from 18 August to 15 November 2025, pursuant to the mandate set out in Security Council resolution [350 \(1974\)](#) and extended in subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution [2782 \(2025\)](#).

II. Situation in the area of operations and activities of the Force

2. During the reporting period, there were multiple significant violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 1974. The overall security situation in the UNDOF area of operations remained volatile. The situation continued to be characterized by the presence and activities of the Israel Defense Forces in the area of separation, affecting the operations of UNDOF, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution [2782 \(2025\)](#).

3. In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire that it observes. All military presence and activity in the area of separation, other than that of UNDOF, incidents of firing across the ceasefire line, and crossing of the ceasefire line by military aircraft, drones, vehicles, equipment, and personnel, as well as other individuals, constitute violations of the Agreement. In its constant interactions with both sides, the leadership of UNDOF continued to call upon the parties to uphold their obligations under the terms of the Agreement, exercise restraint and avoid activities that may lead to a further escalation of tensions in the region.

4. On 2 September, United Nations personnel in the area of separation heard three explosions that seemed to have originated from the Alpha side (Israeli-occupied Golan). The Israel Defense Forces later informed UNDOF that the explosions were “calibration fire, east of the Alpha line aimed at open areas and nonspecific locations”. The following day, an UNDOF patrol that deployed to the location of the incident observed three impact points outside the perimeter of a former Syrian armed forces position in the area of limitation on the Bravo side.

5. As at 3 November, the Israel Defense Forces maintained and reinforced 10 positions that it had established on the Bravo side: 8 positions in the area of separation,



including a temporary hospital, and 2 in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. UNDOF also observed continued engineering and construction activities by the Israel Defense Forces inside the area of separation, including the erection of communication masts and extensive bulldozing and tree clearing within Jubbata al-Khashab nature reserve. UNDOF also observed that the Israel Defense Forces had placed barbed wire, iron pickets and mine warning signs around certain Israel Defense Forces positions inside the area of separation. UNDOF continued to protest the presence and activities of the Israel Defense Forces in the area of separation, which constitute a violation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.

6. Throughout the reporting period, United Nations personnel observed the continued construction by the Israel Defense Forces of counter-mobility obstacles along the ceasefire line. In addition, they observed excavators and other heavy equipment constructing obstacles along the ceasefire line, in some instances encroaching into the area of separation. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that the construction of these obstacles was “a defensive measure to prevent any intrusion” into the Alpha side by “personnel from the area of separation.”

7. During the reporting period, UNDOF observed a slight increase in incidents of aircraft activity, including fighter jets and drones flying from the Alpha side across the ceasefire line and over the area of separation and, on some occasions, across the area of separation towards the area of limitation on the Bravo side. UNDOF personnel on Mount Hermon also observed the Israel Defense Forces conducting operations using helicopters in the area.

8. Throughout the reporting period, sporadic heavy explosions and bursts of heavy machine gun and small arms fire persisted in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side. UNDOF attributed this to military activities of the Syrian security forces, as well as celebratory fire and hunting by local residents.

9. The movement of United Nations personnel in the area of operations was restricted on six occasions. The Israel Defense Forces established several roadblocks in the area of separation, preventing UNDOF from conducting its planned and mandated patrol activities. The Israel Defense Forces also installed 19 swing gates in the area of separation, some in close proximity to United Nations positions, including one locked gate south-west of the United Nations position at Hermon Base that restricts the evacuation route between United Nations positions Hermon South and Hermon Base.

10. On 19 August, a United Nations patrol was stopped by civilians in the village of Kanakir, in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Shortly thereafter, individuals stating that they were from the Syrian security forces arrived at the location and asked the United Nations patrol to leave the area, citing security concerns relating to armed groups operating in the area. On 9 September, Israel Defense Forces in two vehicles drove behind an UNDOF vehicle in the northern part of the area of separation in a manner deemed by UNDOF personnel in the vehicle to be aggressive. Some of the Israel Defense Forces soldiers threw rocks at the UNDOF vehicle and confronted the UNDOF personnel when they stopped, in a manner the United Nations personnel considered aggressive. The UNDOF personnel withdrew from the location and, upon arrival at a United Nations position, engaged with the Israel Defense Forces, providing them with a video and photographs of the incident. The Israel Defense Forces investigated the incident and apologized formally for the behaviour of the Israel Defense Forces soldiers. On 14 October, the Israel Defense Forces stopped an UNDOF convoy at a temporary checkpoint located in the area of separation and prevented it from proceeding onwards. The UNDOF personnel withdrew from the area.

11. The continued presence of Israeli Iron Dome systems, artillery systems and multiple rocket launcher systems in the area of limitation on the Alpha side constitutes a violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Pursuant to the Agreement, the presence of any unauthorized military equipment or personnel in the areas of separation and limitation represents a violation.

12. UNDOF protested to the parties with regard to all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that it had observed, including the continued presence and activities of the Israel Defense Forces on the Bravo side, firing into and across the area of separation, as well as across the ceasefire line, the presence of unauthorized equipment and personnel in the areas of separation and limitation, and crossings of the ceasefire line by Israel Defense Forces personnel, drones, aircraft and individuals from the Bravo side. UNDOF liaised closely with the parties to de-escalate the situation, including during periods of heightened tension. UNDOF protested all restrictions on the movement of United Nations personnel carrying out their mandated activities.

13. UNDOF maintained engagement with both parties regarding observations of activities that were inconsistent with the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. This constructive dialogue with the parties resulted in the resolution of specific access issues and facilitated critical movements where possible.

14. UNDOF continued to observe crossings of the ceasefire line by individuals from the Bravo side. While the individuals were not identified, UNDOF assessed that, in most cases, they were shepherds tending livestock and farmers from the surrounding areas owing to the nature of their activities. The Israel Defense Forces continued to express deep concern about the crossings, which they stated were a threat to the safety and security of their personnel operating in proximity to the ceasefire line. On several occasions, the Israel Defense Forces fired warning shots to discourage individuals from approaching the Israeli technical fence.

15. On 15 October, United Nations personnel observed approximately 100 individuals standing on the Alpha side close to the Israeli technical fence gate in the southern part of the area of operations. Subsequently, the individuals left the area and headed south. Reports in open media suggested that the group had unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Israeli technical fence into the area of separation.

16. Members of the communities in the area of separation continued to appeal to UNDOF and protest regarding the presence and activities of the Israel Defense Forces in the area of separation. During the reporting period, UNDOF received 11 complaints from members of the communities. They stated that the Israel Defense Forces had entered and searched their homes at night, interrogated individuals and apprehended and detained some community members, particularly in Jubbata al-Khashab and Ufaniyah in the area of separation, as well as Jamlah, Abdin, Ayn Zivan and Kudnah in the area of limitation. They further stated that the Israel Defense Forces prevented farmers in the village of Tall al-Ahmar from grazing their livestock and residents in Jubbata al-Khashab from collecting firewood. On 8 October, an individual informed UNDOF that the Israel Defense Forces had shot him in the leg while he had been collecting firewood in the vicinity of Jubbata al Khashab. UNDOF shared the complaints and continued to engage with the Israel Defense Forces to address them. UNDOF also regularly engaged with local leaders, including mukhtars, on the concerns raised by the communities in the area.

17. UNDOF assessed that the security situation in some areas on the Bravo side remained tense and volatile, with open-source reports of continued military activity and localized violence, as well as of the Israel Defense Forces engaging in frequent movements, searching homes in and around villages in the area of separation and area

of limitation on the Bravo side. UNDOF observed the Israel Defense Forces establishing temporary checkpoints along main routes for local residents and temporarily occupying a former Syrian armed forces position south of Bayt Jinn on 24 and 25 August, involving approximately 60 troops. On 7 October, UNDOF personnel observed the Israel Defense Forces releasing two individuals at the swing gate in the northern part of the area of separation. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that it had “observed these two individuals attempting to smuggle suspicious items into Israeli territory. Therefore, they were apprehended for further questioning”. On 23 October, UNDOF personnel observed four individuals, who had been apprehended by the Israel Defense Forces for allegedly trying to smuggle grenades, pistols, anti-tank rockets and ammunition from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon, being released by the Israel Defense Forces at a swing gate in the northern part of the area of separation.

18. UNDOF continued to liaise with the Israel Defense Forces to ensure the effective implementation of crossing procedures at the Alpha gate at the Qunaytirah crossing, including the need for UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel to cross using only documents issued by UNDOF at the crossing and to return to established procedures, so as to facilitate the operational and administrative effectiveness of UNDOF. The Israel Defense Forces maintained two scheduled weekly crossings at the Alpha gate and facilitated 19 operational crossings at that gate.


19. UNDOF continued to engage with the Syrian interim authorities through the established liaison mechanism to facilitate operations, including administrative and logistics activities.

20. Both parties facilitated, through engagement with UNDOF on specific restrictions of movement, the freedom of movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan to conduct their mandated activities in the areas of separation and limitation. UNDOF continued to engage with the Israel Defense Forces with a view to addressing these issues.

21. Since 8 December 2024, authorities on both the Alpha and Bravo sides have not facilitated the conduct of the fortnightly inspections, carried out by Observer Group Golan, of military positions of the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian security forces in the respective areas of limitation.

22. UNDOF continues to restore, repaint and refurbish the barrels marking the ceasefire line and the Bravo line, which delineate the area of separation, with 132 barrels restored along the ceasefire line and 153 barrels along the Bravo line (see figure I). UNDOF continued to consult with the parties on barrel refurbishment and, in some instances, replacement activity, along the ceasefire line.


Figure I
**Number of barrels restored, repainted and refurbished along the ceasefire line
 and the Bravo line**



23. UNDOF operations continued to be supported by United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers in Observer Group Golan, who are under the operational control of the UNDOF Force Commander and maintain 11 fixed observation posts within the UNDOF area of operations. The focus of Observer Group Golan remained on continuous static observation and situational awareness. In addition, the military observers are tasked with conducting investigations of incidents within the UNDOF area of operations. During the reporting period, Observer Group Golan conducted three incident investigations.

24. UNDOF monthly operational activities continued in the areas of separation and limitation, with 860 operational activities carried out in August, 858 in September and 590 in October (see figure II). The reduction in the number of UNDOF patrols during August and September reflected a deliberate operational adjustment to extend patrol duration. During this period, patrols prioritized community engagement to strengthen local interaction and develop a comprehensive community database.

Figure II
Number of Force patrols carried out per month



25. UNDOF continued to utilize its main supply route through the Judaydah and Masna'a border crossing between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. UNDOF continued to source its fuel supplies primarily from the Alpha side through the Alpha gate at the Qunaytirah crossing, enabling timely supplies to positions on the Alpha and Bravo sides.

26. UNDOF continued to assess that there remained a significant threat to United Nations personnel in its area of operations from explosive remnants of war, including unexploded ordnance and mines, as well as possible threat as a result of localized violence, including the possible presence of sleeper cells of armed groups. UNDOF continued to clear, for operational purposes, any unexploded ordnance or remnants of war found or reported to the best of its ability. Over the reporting period, UNDOF found and disposed of 177 explosive remnants of war and one improvised explosive device in the area of separation.

27. UNDOF continually conducts assessments and updates contingency plans for the reinforcement, extraction and evacuation of positions and observation posts on both the Alpha and Bravo sides, in addition to regular rehearsals, exercises and training for various contingencies. Risk mitigation measures, including force protection measures, continue to be developed at positions, observation posts, the operational base at Camp Ziouani and headquarters at Camp Faouar.

28. UNDOF recorded one allegation of misconduct during the period of 18 August to 2 November 2025. The mission continued to implement regular personnel training related to the prevention of misconduct.

29. As at 2 November, UNDOF had met all evaluation requirements, achieving high standards of compliance in implementing the Action for Peacekeeping commitment and Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#). UNDOF observed a steady improvement in evaluation performance across its military component.

30. During the reporting period, to address financial challenges facing all United Nations peacekeeping operations, UNDOF adopted contingency plans to ensure continued effective, efficient, safe and secure mandate implementation. This will involve reconfiguring the Force, including a reduction of the troop strength from 1,181 to 947, while realigning its core tasks.

31. As at 6 November 2025, UNDOF comprised 1,167 troops, including 91 women peacekeepers. Troops are deployed from Argentina (1), Australia (4), Bhutan (2), Czechia (3), Fiji (149), Ghana (13), India (196), Ireland (3), Kazakhstan (142), Nepal (440), Republic of Korea (1), Uruguay (211) and Zambia (3). In addition, 41 military observers from Observer Group Golan, including 8 women, assisted UNDOF in carrying out its tasks.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

32. In its resolution 2782 (2025), the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement resolution 338 (1973). It decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a period of six months, until 31 December 2025, and requested the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973). The search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was addressed in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/80/327), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/83, entitled “The Syrian Golan”.

33. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no formal negotiations between the parties under United Nations auspices. With facilitation from Member States, the parties have directly discussed security arrangements in the southern Syrian Arab Republic, including a stated intention to “return to the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement”. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

IV. Financial aspects

34. The General Assembly, by its resolution 79/307 of 30 June 2025, appropriated the amount of \$69.6 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026.

35. As at 3 November 2025, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNDOF amounted to \$38.3 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$3,665.8 million.

36. Reimbursement of troop costs have been made for the period up to 30 June 2025, whereas the reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 31 December 2024.

V. Observations

37. I remain deeply concerned about the continued violations of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, including breaches of the ceasefire, as well as the continued presence and activities of the Israel Defense Forces in the area of separation, in violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic. All actions inconsistent with the Agreement are unacceptable and must cease immediately. I call upon the parties to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement, including by ending all unauthorized presence in the areas of separation and limitation, as well as by refraining from any action that would further undermine the ceasefire. There should be no military forces and activities in the area of

separation other than those of UNDOF. I reaffirm the commitment of the United Nations to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am encouraged by reports of direct and facilitated contacts between the two sides. The parties should seize the opportunity to resolve their conflict and, at a minimum, restore full compliance with the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.

38. Any crossing of and firing across the ceasefire line is in violation of the Agreement and must cease immediately. The continued presence of unauthorized weapons in the areas of limitation on both the Alpha and Bravo sides, as well as the flying of aircraft and drones across the ceasefire line and over the area of separation, violates the Agreement. I continue to encourage members of the Security Council to support efforts to raise awareness of the risk of escalation and the need to preserve the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

39. I note that both parties to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement continue to express commitment to the terms of the Agreement. It remains critical that the parties maintain and enhance their liaison with UNDOF. All violations of the ceasefire line increase tensions between the signatories to the Agreement and undermine stability in the area. The continued liaison of UNDOF with the parties has contributed to de-escalation during times of heightened tension in the region.

40. The continued commitment of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and support for the presence of UNDOF remain essential. I count on the continued cooperation of both parties to ensure that the Force can fully implement its mandate, including the resumption of inspections on both sides. I note the parties' continued improvement in the facilitation of the freedom of movement of UNDOF in its area of operations and call for the lifting of any remaining restrictions, including at the Israeli technical fence gates and at Alpha gate at the Qunaytirah crossing. UNDOF must have full freedom of movement to carry out its mandated tasks. I further note the facilitation by both sides of the Force's operations and logistics, and access to medical facilities and fuel supplies from the Alpha side.

41. Given the worrying trend of continued violations of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and the volatile security situation on the Bravo side, the safety and security of military and civilian personnel in UNDOF and Observer Group Golan are of particular concern. The parties must refrain from any activity that may threaten the safety of the peacekeepers. It is therefore of particular importance that the Security Council continue to use its influence with the concerned parties to ensure that UNDOF can operate safely, securely and freely in accordance with the Agreement. It is also crucial that the parties continue to facilitate the deployment of all personnel to UNDOF for the effective implementation of its mandate.

42. The continued support of Member States, particularly the confidence of troop-contributing countries in UNDOF and their commitment to it, remains a key factor in the Force's ability to carry out its mandate. I am grateful to the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Bhutan, Czechia, Fiji, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Nepal, the Republic of Korea, Uruguay and Zambia for their contributions and for the commitment, resolve, and consummate professionalism of their military personnel in UNDOF. I am also thankful to the Member States that have contributed military observers to UNTSO. I also take this opportunity to stress the importance of all Member States paying their assessed contributions to the peacekeeping budget in full and on time.

43. I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for six months, until 30 June 2026. The Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel also has expressed its agreement.

44. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Anita Asmah, the military and civilian personnel serving under her leadership in UNDOF, and the military observers in Observer Group Golan, who continue to perform the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council with efficiency and commitment, under extremely challenging circumstances, including the current liquidity situation of the United Nations, and a continually evolving operational environment.

Map

