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## Eightieth session

Item 38 of the provisional agenda\*

**Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial  
embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba**

## **Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba**

### **Report of the Secretary-General**

#### *Summary*

In its resolution [79/7](#), entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations system, a report on the implementation of the resolution in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and to submit the report to the Assembly at its eightieth session.

The present report reproduces the replies from Governments and organs and agencies of the United Nations system, as well as from entities and organizations that have received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, to the request of the Secretary-General for information on the matter.

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\* [A/80/150](#).



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## I. Introduction

1. In its resolution [79/7](#), entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare, in consultation with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations system, a report on the implementation of the resolution in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and to submit the report to the Assembly at its eightieth session.
2. Pursuant to that request, in correspondence dated 3 January 2025, the Secretary-General invited Governments, as well as organs and agencies, to provide information on the implementation of the resolution. A similar invitation was sent to United Nations organs and agencies in correspondence dated 8 January 2025. A reminder was sent on 28 March 2025.
3. The present report reproduces the replies from Governments and organs and agencies of the United Nations system, as well as entities and organizations that have received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly to the request of the Secretary-General for information on the matter.

## II. Replies received from Governments

### Albania

[Original: English]  
[17 March 2025]

The Republic of Albania, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, fully implements General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and does not have or apply any laws or measures of the kind referred to in the preamble to the above-mentioned resolution.

### Algeria

[Original: French]  
[18 March 2025]

On 30 October 2024, the General Assembly adopted resolution [79/7](#) for the thirty-second consecutive year and almost unanimously. This very large majority demonstrates, once again, the urgent need to lift the blockade unjustly imposed against Cuba for more than half a century.

Algeria welcomes the adoption of this resolution and expresses its concern about the persistent obstacles posed by the blockade to the economic and sociocultural development of Cuba, particularly its efforts to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.

Algeria reiterates its support for the international consensus in favour of normalizing relations between Cuba and the United States of America, and for the avoidance of all unilateral coercive measures harmful to the enjoyment of human rights and to the prosperity of peoples.

Algeria reaffirms its principled positions based on respect for and the promotion of the rules of international law, including those relating to good neighbourliness between countries, international cooperation, the sovereign equality of States,

non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and freedom of international trade and navigation.

Algeria also expresses its renewed support for the position adopted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, at the nineteenth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in January 2024, reiterating the call to lift the illegal blockade against Cuba, and endorses the relevant resolution adopted at the thirty-eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa in February 2025.

In the current international context, characterized by the deeply worrisome erosion of international peace and security, Algeria reiterates its support for and solidarity with the people and Government of Cuba, whose courage and resilience it commends, and will continue to promote, in all regional and international forums, a definitive end to the blockade.

## **Andorra**

[Original: French]  
[25 February 2025]

The Government of the Principality of Andorra has never adopted or implemented any laws or measures of the type referred to in the preamble to resolution [79/7](#).

In this regard, the Government of the Principality of Andorra has always voted in favour of the above-mentioned resolution and reaffirms its commitment to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

## **Angola**

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

The Republic of Angola and Cuba share historical ties, long-standing friendship and excellent diplomatic, economic and commercial relations.

Angola reiterates its firm opposition to the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, and to the extraterritorial application of discriminatory domestic trade laws.

Angola condemns the embargo and has continuously contributed to the debate against it. It has advocated for the lifting of these measures for many years. The rejection of the 33-year-old embargo on Cuba enjoys overwhelming support in international forums, particularly within the General Assembly.

Angola considers the sanctions to be unjust and unfounded, and it points out that they come at a significant cost to the Cuban people. The embargo has severely hindered Cuba's imports, exports, financial transactions, foreign investment, remittances and tourism, negatively affecting the trajectory of sustainable development across the board and impacting the standard of living for Cuban citizens. This situation violates the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

The extraterritorial application of the embargo has substantial negative repercussions, as it deprives third countries of business opportunities with Cuba and complicates international mergers and partnerships involving United States firms. The recent redesignation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism, without presenting new facts, has added further obstacles to international financial transactions and continues to restrict Cuba's ability to import essential items such as pharmaceuticals and

medical supplies. Angola calls for the removal of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

Angola believes that ending the unilateral embargo could allow Cuba to re-enter international trade, revitalize its economy and fully implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which would benefit its citizens.

Angola calls for the United States to end its unilateral embargo against Cuba as soon as possible; the removal of Cuba from the United States list of State sponsors of terrorism; and the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba, encouraging constructive dialogue based on mutual respect.

## **Antigua and Barbuda**

[Original: English]  
[14 March 2025]

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda remains fully committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the principles of sovereign equality of States, non-intervention in their internal affairs and freedom of international trade and navigation.

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda expresses its concern at the continued promulgation of the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba by the United States of America, despite the overwhelming support of Member States for General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), previous resolutions against the embargo and other relevant international treaties.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), the Government of Antigua and Barbuda continues to refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures of the kind referred to in the preamble of the aforementioned resolution, in conformity with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law, which, inter alia, reaffirms the freedom of trade and navigation.

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda has staunchly advocated in various international forums the ending of the embargo and its consequential inhumane impact on the population of Cuba. The unilateral imposition of economic pressure on Cuba prevents the development of the Cuban economy and creates a serious obstacle to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for Small Island Developing States: A Renewed Declaration for Resilient Prosperity.

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda recalls and affirms the position of regional and interregional bodies, such as the Caribbean Community, the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda calls upon the United States of America to put an end to its embargo against Cuba. Ending the embargo will significantly contribute to regional development and the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the Caribbean and Americas.

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda wishes to reaffirm its unwavering friendship, cooperation and solidarity with Cuba, and has voted in favour of the resolution on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba since its first introduction in the General Assembly. The Government of Antigua and Barbuda will continue to vote in favour of the resolution until the embargo is repealed.

## Armenia

[Original: English]  
[6 February 2025]

The national legislation of Armenia does not promulgate or apply any laws or regulations which, under General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), can have a devastating effect on the economic and social development of Cuba. The Government of the Republic of Armenia has expressed its readiness to open the borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, but these neighbours are reluctant to reciprocate, thus exercising an economic blockade against Armenia.

Being a landlocked developing country whose structural vulnerabilities have been drastically exacerbated by the land blockade, Armenia is a staunch advocate of equitable and inclusive transport connectivity and regional trade cooperation to ensure full realization of economic and social rights, including the right to development of all peoples. To this end, the Government of Armenia has introduced the Crossroads of Peace initiative, which has been endorsed by numerous organizations and Member States.

## Australia

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The Government of Australia reaffirms its position in support of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). Since 1996, Australia has voted in favour of the annual resolution calling for an end to the trade embargo of Cuba. While Australia does not have any trade or economic legislation or measures that restrict or discourage trade or investment to or from Cuba, the embargo remains an impediment to trade.

## Azerbaijan

[Original: English]  
[28 January 2025]

The Republic of Azerbaijan firmly upholds the norms and principles of international law in its foreign policy.

Azerbaijan enjoys friendly diplomatic, economic and trade relations with Cuba. Azerbaijan has not promulgated or applied laws or measures against Cuba that would prohibit economic, trade or financial relations between Azerbaijan and Cuba. Azerbaijan will continue to undertake appropriate measures to strengthen cooperation and develop friendly relations with Cuba.

## Bahamas (The)

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

The Commonwealth of The Bahamas has enjoyed normal diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba since 1974.

The Bahamas has not promulgated or applied laws or measures that would prohibit economic, commercial or financial relations between The Bahamas and Cuba.

The Bahamas reaffirms its commitment and adherence to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, the

principles of sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs, and freedom of international trade and navigation.

The Bahamas recalls and further reaffirms the position of regional and interregional bodies, including the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, when they have called for an end to the embargo against Cuba.

The Bahamas remains hopeful for a process towards normal bilateral relations between the Governments of the United States of America and Cuba.

## **Bahrain**

[Original: Arabic]  
[6 March 2025]

The Kingdom of Bahrain, for over 65 years, has consistently supported the resolutions of the General Assembly on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba, in keeping with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations regarding cooperation among States. It continuously strives to strengthen friendly relations between States and to observe the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs. The Kingdom of Bahrain expresses its solidarity with the friendly people of Cuba and their right to enjoy fair opportunities for development, prosperity and sustainable development on an equal footing with the other peoples of the world. It supports General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), adopted on 30 October 2024.

## **Bangladesh**

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

The Government of Bangladesh has neither promulgated nor applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). Bangladesh has consistently supported previous resolutions on this item in the Assembly and also voted in favour of the aforementioned resolution.

## **Barbados**

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

The Government of Barbados remains fully committed to the Charter of the United Nations and to international law, particularly, the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and freedom of international trade and navigation of all Member States. The Government of Barbados has not promulgated any legislation or measure that would infringe on the sovereignty of any State or its lawful national interests.

The Government of Barbados notes that the commercial, economic and financial embargo against Cuba imposed for decades by the United States of America is contrary to those principles and norms and is counterproductive in trade relations.

The Government of Barbados has consistently advocated in various international forums for the ending of the embargo and its resultant inhumane consequences. Barbados has voted in favour of the resolution on the necessity of

ending the embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba since the resolution was first introduced in the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session in 1991.

The Government of Barbados acknowledges with deep appreciation that, in spite of the blockade, Cuba has provided invaluable support to the national health service of Barbados, including sending, under a contract agreement, medical personnel to combat the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Cuba's support to Barbados has been mirrored by support to countries across the Caribbean.

The Government of Barbados reiterates its strong support for General Assembly resolution 79/7 and reaffirms its full implementation at the national level, since Barbados has no laws that in any way restrict freedom of trade and navigation with Cuba. The Government of Barbados considers that free and unfettered relations with Cuba and all countries, including the United States of America, would be greatly helped by ending the embargo. Whatever political or ideological differences that may exist between the United States and Cuba do not, cannot and should not justify the actions that result in such great, grave and disproportionate consequences for the Cuban people. The Government of Barbados calls for effective dialogue and constructive engagement between the two relevant parties towards lifting the embargo.

## **Belarus**

[Original: Russian]

[20 January 2025]

The Republic of Belarus categorically opposes unilateral restrictive measures against States Members of the United Nations. The use of unilateral sanctions constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, jeopardizing the system of international relations by increasing the potential for conflict and hostility between States.

The continued economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba – in violation of the principles of international law on non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the duty of States to cooperate with each other, the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the sovereign equality of States, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms – has for decades limited the development of an independent country, preventing it from enjoying fair opportunities for progress, prosperity and sustainable development on an equal footing with other nations of the world.

Illegal restrictions in the trade, currency, banking and tourism sectors – a flagrant violation of human rights – have harmed millions of Cuban citizens, leading to economic uncertainty, a deterioration in the quality of life and a lack of opportunities.

The economic blockade against Cuba, the longest inhumane act of economic warfare ever perpetrated against an independent State, goes far beyond bilateral relations, affecting not only the Cuban people but also trade relations between Cuba and third countries.

The continued attempts to isolate Cuba, in defiance of international law and resolutions adopted on an annual basis by the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations, show blatant disregard for the principle of multilateralism and the political will of the international community.

We regard the extraterritorial effects of the blockade as nothing less than aggression against a sovereign State.

We are absolutely convinced that in an era of profound transformations aimed at establishing multipolarity and increasing global cooperation, which are the basis for global sustainable development, there can be no place for unilateral sanctions.

As friendly States, Belarus and Cuba will continue to cooperate in all spheres for the benefit of the peoples of both countries, thereby contributing to their economic and social development.

We insist on the complete and unconditional lifting of the economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, and call on the United States of America to resume dialogue in order to revitalize the process that was once under way to normalize relations with Havana for the benefit of the peoples of both countries and the world.

## **Belize**

[Original: English]  
[3 February 2025]

Belize reaffirms its absolute commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including, in particular, the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom of international trade and navigation, which also form fundamental principles of international law. In strict observance of the Charter and international law, Belize consistently supports the resolutions denouncing the embargo against Cuba. Belize rejects the extraterritorial application of laws and measures. Belize also rejects the inclusion of Cuba in the United States list of State sponsors of terrorism. The ongoing attempts to isolate Cuba in disregard of the annually adopted resolutions which enjoy the overwhelming support of States Members of the United Nations are flagrant affronts to multilateralism and the political will of the international community.

Belize and Cuba maintain a constructive and mutually beneficial partnership which has yielded concrete benefits for all our peoples. Our policy of engagement is further enhanced through regional cooperation between the Caribbean Community and Cuba.

## **Benin**

[Original: French]  
[27 March 2025]

Benin is peaceful country that is deeply committed to the principles of equality and respect for State sovereignty. It therefore rejects all unilateral coercive measures aimed at restricting fundamental freedoms and undermining a State's means of survival.

Hence, Benin has, in the past and, in particular, on 30 October 2024, advocated the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution [79/7](#).

Benin remains convinced that, within a strong multilateral framework and through dialogue, the peaceful resolution of disputes and the restoration of trust between States will be possible.

It reiterates its unwavering solidarity with Cuba and calls for the definitive normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States of America, to ensure the happiness and prosperity of the peoples of both countries.

## Bhutan

[Original: English]  
[6 March 2025]

The Royal Government of Bhutan has neither promulgated nor applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution 79/7 and has consistently supported similar resolutions in the General Assembly and voted in their favour.

## Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

[Original: Spanish]  
[18 March 2025]

Bolivia is a pacifist State that promotes a culture of peace and the right to peace, as well as cooperation among the peoples of the region and the world, in order to foster mutual understanding, equitable development and the promotion of interculturalism, with full respect for the sovereignty of States.

It is precisely for these reasons that Bolivia strongly condemns and rejects the application of any policy of interference or interventionism and any unilateral coercive measure that violates the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States. That is also the fundamental reason why Bolivia has supported and will continue to consistently support General Assembly resolutions and all multilateral efforts that seek to end the unjust and illegal blockade against Cuba.

On 30 October 2024, the General Assembly adopted resolution 79/7, succeeding resolutions 47/19, 48/16, 49/9, 50/10, 51/17, 52/10, 53/4, 54/21, 55/20, 56/9, 57/11, 58/7, 59/11, 60/12, 61/11, 62/3, 63/7, 64/6, 65/6, 66/6, 67/4, 68/8, 69/5, 70/5, 71/5, 72/4, 73/8, 74/7, 75/289, 77/7 and 78/7, as well as its decision 76/563, which after almost 32 years remain ineffective given the persistence of the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba for more than 60 years.

Despite repeated calls by the General Assembly to all States to refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures contrary to the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and despite the call to respect the sovereignty of States, non-intervention, non-interference, and freedom of international trade and navigation, Cuba still remains under a blockade that is illegitimate and contrary to international law and that also violates its inalienable right to development.

In the framework of the relations of friendship and fraternity that unite Bolivia and Cuba, and in the light of the negative effects caused by the United States blockade that was intensified immorally during and after the world health crisis caused by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, Bolivia sent donations of medicines and medical supplies to Cuba twice in 2021 and a third time in 2022 in shipments containing 20 tons of food and 10 tons of medicines and medical supplies.

In 2022, 2023 and 2024, several high-level meetings were held to address cooperation, environmental, education, cultural, health, sports, economic-commercial, consular and migration issues.

In 2023, Bolivia sent humanitarian aid consisting of 65 tons of food in response to the situation in Cuba caused by intense rains and floods and the associated damage, which reached a level not seen in the past 30 years, resulting in human loss and severe damage to agriculture, railroads and homes. That situation has worsened the

constraints and limitations on commercial development and access to medicine caused by the blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba since 1960.

In February 2025, Cuba and Bolivia signed a cooperation agreement for the development of radiopharmaceuticals to treat cancer and other conditions.

Bolivia will continue to express its consistent support by voting in favour of the resolution entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba” in the General Assembly, and will continue to call upon all States to join it in the knowledge that human rights are inalienable, imprescriptible and non-negotiable, and that their exercise is not subject to political criteria, much less to unilateral reasoning that runs counter to international law.

Bolivia unhesitatingly, firmly and unequivocally states that the blockade that the United States maintains against Cuba must be ended unconditionally and immediately, and urges the United States to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly, the most democratic organ of our Organization.

The Government of Bolivia has not applied and will not apply in the future measures or legislation contrary to international law that would violate or restrict the freedom of trade and navigation in accordance with resolution 79/7. The Government of Bolivia rejects and condemns the fact that other States engage in this illegal and arbitrary practice, which violates human rights, based on criteria of exceptionality that constantly undermine multilateralism and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.

The Government of Bolivia requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with resolution 79/7, to continue to report to the General Assembly on compliance therewith, as well as on the impact and negative effects of the application of the policies and practices of the blockade against Cuba put in place by the Government of the United States, since such unilateral acts not only violate the sovereignty of Cuba but also constitute a threat to the sovereignty of the rest of the international community.

## Botswana

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The Republic of Botswana has not promulgated, applied or enforced any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution 79/7.

Botswana’s unwavering solidarity with Cuba is reflected by our consistent vote in favour of the above-mentioned resolution, which has near-universal support in the General Assembly

Botswana supports the immediate lifting of the economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, which gravely threatens the livelihood of the people of Cuba and is opposed to the continued application of these extraterritorial measures. Botswana calls for the immediate removal of Cuba from the unilateral list of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism.

Despite the maintenance of these measures and their devastating impact, Cuba has made strides in various socioeconomic sectors and is committed to the promotion of South-South cooperation in these areas. It is Botswana’s conviction that the elimination of the blockade will propel Cuba’s full economic potential.

## Brazil

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

Brazil maintains its firm opposition to the extraterritorial application of domestic laws, including trade laws.

It reiterates its long-standing position that unilateral sanctions are not consistent with international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations. Such unlawful measures violate the sovereign equality of States and the duty of non-intervention in internal affairs. They hamper the predictability and stability of international relations and have a disruptive effect on the world economy, international trade and sustainable development.

The economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba has gravely affected its access to essential goods, including medicines and technologies, services and finance. It has also diminished the country's ability to attract needed foreign investment. The embargo has thus seriously hindered Cuba's development and further affected the human rights and the prosperity of its people.

The unjust and unjustifiable inclusion in 2021 of Cuba in the United States' list of State sponsors of terrorism has aggravated the impact of the embargo. Brazil notes with concern that recent promising diplomatic initiatives to remove Cuba from this list were subsequently reversed, thus maintaining significant trade restrictions, such as the prohibition of exports to Cuba of products with a percentage greater than 15 per cent of United States components, along with the limitation of humanitarian assistance.

Brazil expresses particular concern over increased humanitarian difficulties, notably greater restrictions affecting financial remittances and the procurement of essential goods, especially medicines.

The rejection of the embargo against Cuba has become virtually an international consensus, as evidenced by the overwhelming support for the annual General Assembly resolution, which, in October 2024, received 187 votes in favour.

The leaders of Latin America and the Caribbean who gathered at recent summits of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States have consistently and explicitly called for the immediate end of the embargo. They have also demanded the urgent removal of Cuba from unilateral lists of alleged sponsors of international terrorism, since it is widely known that Cuba is committed to the promotion of peace, dialogue and regional integration.

The end of the embargo would be a critical step towards the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States of America, for which Brazil has long advocated.

## Brunei Darussalam

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

Brunei Darussalam reaffirms its commitment to upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Brunei Darussalam opposes the use of unilateral sanctions, as it contravenes international law and the Charter.

In line with this consistent and principled opposition to the use of unilateral sanctions, and in view of the adverse effects of such sanctions on the economic and social development of affected countries, Brunei Darussalam reiterates its support for all General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo on Cuba, including General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

## **Burkina Faso**

[Original: French]  
[31 January 2025]

Burkina Faso categorically rejects all unilateral coercive measures that have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights and the well-being and prosperity of the peoples concerned.

The Government of Burkina Faso continues to maintain normal diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. Burkina Faso has always voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”.

In accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law, Burkina Faso has not promulgated or applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

The Government of Burkina Faso reaffirms the urgent need to put an end to the embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba. This embargo is a major obstacle to the achievement of economic and social development objectives and to the promotion of the values of peaceful coexistence.

Burkina Faso believes in multilateralism and therefore calls on the two parties to prioritize dialogue and negotiation to settle their dispute, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter.

## **Burundi**

[Original: French]  
[27 March 2025]

The position of the Government of the Republic of Burundi has always been to oppose the embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba, which is inconsistent with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States.

Burundi has never applied this embargo and does not intend to apply it in the future.

## **Cabo Verde**

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The Republic of Cabo Verde, in accordance with the principles enshrined in the national Constitution and in conformity with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, which promotes solidarity, cooperation and friendly relations among countries and nations, has never promulgated or applied any law or measures of the kind referred to in the preamble to General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

## Cambodia

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The adoption of General Assembly resolution 79/7 with the overwhelming support of 187 Member States, including Cambodia, underscores the firm and unified stance of the international community against the unjust embargo on Cuba imposed by the United States. It also demonstrates global recognition that unilateral coercive measures contradict the foundational principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

The decades-long economic, trade and financial sanctions continue to inflict severe effects on Cuba's development and significantly impair the country's ability to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. These restrictions have hampered progress across vital sectors such as healthcare, education and infrastructure, placing undue hardship on the Cuban population and limiting their access to essential goods, services and development opportunities.

The Royal Government of Cambodia reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs and the right to engage freely in international trade and navigation. The multilateral system depends on adherence to these fundamental norms, and we stand firmly with the international community in upholding them.

Cambodia urges the United States of America to fully respect the General Assembly resolutions and heed the global call to lift the unilateral embargo against Cuba, enabling the country to achieve its full potential for the benefit of its people and the broader global community.

## Cameroon

[Original: French]  
[19 March 2025]

Cameroon is committed to respecting the Charter of the United Nations and numerous international legal instruments, notably with regard to the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom of trade and navigation.

In line with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 79/7 and of previous resolutions on the subject, and in accordance with the aforementioned principles, Cameroon has never adopted legislative or other measures intended to reinforce or expand the blockade imposed on Cuba and has no intention of doing so.

Cameroon, which has always voted for the lifting of this blockade, maintains excellent relations of friendship and cooperation with Cuba.

## Canada

[Original: English]  
[13 March 2025]

The Government of Canada confirms its support of General Assembly resolution 79/7. Canadian law states that no Canadian corporation shall, in respect of trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba, comply with any extraterritorial measure of the kind referred to in the resolution.

Canada considers the extraterritorial application of unilateral Cuba-related measures to be contrary to international law. Canada is disappointed with the decision by the United States to continue to implement Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act. The embargo has a negative impact on the living conditions of the Cuban people, as well as on Canadians conducting legitimate trade with and investment in Cuba.

## **Central African Republic**

[Original: French]  
[26 March 2025]

The Central African Republic, together with the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, has maintained a consistent position regarding the complete lifting of the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed against Cuba by the United States of America.

The blockade, which has caused incalculable harm to the Government and people of Cuba, is contrary to international law and the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including freedom of trade and international navigation.

The Government of the Central African Republic continues to support the Cuban Government in its efforts to have the embargo lifted completely.

## **Chad**

[Original: French]  
[28 April 2025]

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the Republic of Chad reaffirms its support for General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). The blockade is still in place, seriously penalizing the Cuban people and undermining the country's economic development.

While reiterating the calls of Member States and international organizations, including the African Union, for the complete lifting of the embargo, the Government of Chad, referring also to paragraph 30 of General Assembly resolution [70/1](#) on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, calls upon States to avoid adopting or applying unilateral economic, financial or commercial measures that are inconsistent with international law or the Charter and that impede the full realization of economic and social development, especially in developing countries.

The Government of Chad urges the Governments of the United States of America and Cuba to renew talks with a view to rekindling the process embarked upon some years ago, to ensure development that will mutually benefit the people of the two countries and the world as a whole.

## **Chile**

[Original: Spanish]  
[17 March 2025]

Chile has not adopted any measures aimed at restricting trade and economic relations between Chile and Cuba.

Chile supports the full and free exercise of the right to trade and to establish business relations in the international arena, with no restrictions other than those

placed on activities considered illegal under Chilean law and those imposed by the international community in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

## China

[Original: Chinese]

[12 March 2025]

For 32 consecutive years, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted, by an overwhelming majority, resolutions entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”, urging all countries to comply with the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law and to repeal or nullify any laws or measures whose extraterritorial effects encroach upon the sovereignty of other States, the legitimate interests of entities and individuals within their jurisdiction and the freedom of trade and navigation.

Regrettably, over the years, there has been no effective implementation of the resolutions, and the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba has yet to be lifted. This has run counter to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, caused immense economic and financial losses for Cuba, hindered the efforts of the Cuban people to eradicate poverty, promote economic and social development and implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, severely undermined their right to survival and development, and disrupted the normal economic, commercial and financial exchanges between Cuba and other countries.

China has always advocated respect for the right of all countries to independently choose their own social system and path of development, and opposed the imposition of military, political, economic or any other means of unilateral sanction against other countries. China and Cuba have maintained economic and trade relations as well as people-to-people exchanges. The mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation between the two countries in various areas has continued to grow. This is in line with the aspirations of the people of both countries, and is also conducive to the economic and social development of Cuba.

In today’s world, with the deepening development of multi-polarization and economic globalization, countries are ever more interconnected, interdependent and mutually influential. Communication and cooperation on an equal footing among all countries remain an irreversible trend of the times. Equal dialogue and friendly consultation are the best way to resolve differences. China urges the United States to completely end its policy of embargo against Cuba as soon as possible and to develop normal inter-State relations with Cuba in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the basic norms governing international relations. This is in line with the shared interests of the United States and Cuba and of the people of both countries and will be beneficial to the stability and development of the entire region.

## Colombia

[Original: Spanish]

[19 February 2025]

In accordance with the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the Republic of Colombia has not promulgated or applied any laws or unilateral measures against Cuba.

Colombia is acting in accordance with its policy of respect for international law and adherence to the principles of political independence, self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

Colombia promotes the independent development of the internal policies of each nation and considers that it would be appropriate for all types of measures that threaten economic development, the development of trade and the well-being of populations to cease.

Colombia rejects the classification of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism, a classification which has been used in disregard of that country's commitment to peace in Colombia and the world, and which also has negative impacts on its people and ultimately compounds and exacerbates the unilateral sanctions already imposed under the blockade.

Colombia considers it essential for Member States to make progress in building cooperative and friendly relations based on the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy, respect for the sovereignty and autonomy of peoples, peaceful coexistence, good neighbourliness, multilateralism, respect for the principle of sovereign equality and the other provisions enshrined in Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations.

## **Comoros**

[Original: French]  
[11 April 2025]

The Union of the Comoros reaffirms its unwavering commitment to respecting the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and all other relevant international legal instruments.

In that regard, and in accordance with General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), the Comoros, a peace-loving nation, has neither promulgated nor applied laws or measures whose extraterritorial effects affect the sovereignty of other States or freedom of trade or navigation.

The Government of the Comoros notes that, in recent years, the economic blockade against Cuba has intensified, becoming qualitatively more harmful.

The decision to reinclude Cuba on the list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism, the revocation of the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, which was condemned by the international community, and the re-establishment of the list of restricted Cuban entities are all barriers to the country's development and negatively affect the already difficult living conditions of the Cuban people.

The Comoros highlights the historical resilience of the Cuban people, who, despite decades of adversity, have remained committed to the principles of justice, sovereignty and self-determination.

In its efforts to have the blockade lifted, Cuba has traditionally enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the international community and has always enjoyed the support of the Comoros.

The Government of the Comoros urges the international community to take immediate and effective measures to put an end to the blockade, which is hindering all the development efforts of Cuba.

## Congo

[Original: French]  
[20 March 2025]

The Republic of the Congo remains constant in its position of reaffirming its steadfast commitment to respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and all other relevant international legal instruments.

The Congo reiterates its deep friendship and solidarity with the Cuban people, who are subjected to an unfair punishment, contrary to the rules of international law. Bearing in mind the unspeakable suffering endured by the innocent Cuban population, the Congo consistently advocates the lifting of the unilateral measures against Cuba, to enable that country to pursue its socioeconomic development and participate fully in international trade.

The Congo rejects the inclusion of Cuba, by the United States of America, on the list of State sponsors of terrorism and opposes the extraterritorial application of laws and measures.

The Congo has neither adopted nor applied laws or measures whose extraterritorial effects infringe on the sovereignty of other States or on freedom of trade and navigation.

## Costa Rica

[Original: Spanish]  
[27 March 2025]

In keeping with the fundamental position of its foreign policy, Costa Rica reiterates that it fully rejects any unilateral and extraterritorial measures applied by any State against another through the imposition of its own laws or legislation on third countries.

Costa Rica, which is committed to effective multilateralism, reaffirms its full support for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs, and freedom of international trade and navigation. It has applied and will continue to apply General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), as well as previous resolutions on the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), the Government of Costa Rica reiterates that it has not implemented, nor will it implement in the future, measures, rules, policies or actions that are contrary to international law and violate or limit the freedom of trade and navigation. It also reiterates that the extraterritorial application of unilateral coercive measures is contrary to international law; any type of political, economic or military sanction imposed on States must be based on a decision or recommendation of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Costa Rica has joined the multitude of calls from various regional and international forums for the Government of the United States of America to put an end to the blockade. In that regard, it reiterates that it is concerned that Cuba was added to and remains on the list of State sponsors of terrorism – which makes commercial and financial operations difficult – especially given the high costs and negative consequences that this inclusion entails for the Cuban people.

Firmly convinced that the only way to address differences between States is through direct dialogue, multilateral mechanisms and international law, Costa Rica urges the parties to deepen their dialogue in order to resolve all outstanding issues, including the lifting of the blockade.

Costa Rica and Cuba have continued to strengthen their ties since diplomatic relations were restored on 18 March 2009. Cooperation between the two countries has been developed under the framework agreement on cooperation and bilateral agreements in specific areas of mutual interest, in particular through triangular cooperation.

## **Côte d'Ivoire**

[Original: French]  
[26 March 2025]

The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire reaffirms its commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign equality of States and freedom of trade and navigation, which are fundamental principles of international law.

Côte d'Ivoire has never promulgated or applied any law or measure of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution 79/7, and it has no intention of doing so.

True to the ideals of peace and dialogue in relations between States, Côte d'Ivoire reaffirms its readiness to work with the entire international community to find appropriate solutions to this issue and encourages the parties concerned to focus more on negotiation and dialogue in order to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the dispute.

## **Cuba**

[Original: Spanish]  
[11 August 2025]

### **The blockade of the United States against Cuba in figures**

Four months of blockade are equivalent to the financing required to purchase the buses needed for the country's public transportation system (\$2.85 billion).

Two months of blockade are equivalent to the cost of the fuel needed to meet the country's regular electricity demand (\$1.6 billion).

Two months of blockade are equivalent to the financing necessary to guarantee the delivery of the standard family basket of products to the population for one year (approximately \$1.6 billion).

Sixteen days of blockade are equivalent to the financing required to cover the country's essential medicine needs (approximately \$339 million).

Fourteen days of blockade are equivalent to the financing required to increase the share of renewable energy in the country's energy mix from 24 to 26 per cent (approximately \$300 million).

Twelve days of blockade are equivalent to the annual financing required (excluding fuel and investments) to maintain the national electric power system (approximately \$250 million).

Six days of blockade are equivalent to the financing required to import the medical consumables (cotton, gauze, syringes, needles, suture materials, catheters and

serum equipment, among other supplies) and reagents necessary for the national health system for one year (approximately \$129 million).

Two days of blockade are equivalent to the annual maintenance cost for public transportation in the country (\$40 million).

Twenty-one hours of blockade are equivalent to the financing required to replace deteriorated and obsolete technological resources in the country's educational institutions (\$18,133,050).

Fourteen hours of blockade are equivalent to the cost of purchasing the insulin needed to meet the country's demand for one year (\$12 million).

Five hours of blockade are equivalent to the cost of purchasing toys and teaching aids for all the childcare centres in the country (approximately \$4.5 million).

Two hours of blockade are equivalent to the cost of purchasing medicines to treat psychological, neurological and cardiological conditions, as well as food for children who have genetic conditions or endocrine and metabolic diseases (approximately \$1.4 million).

Nineteen minutes of blockade are equivalent to the cost of the electric and conventional wheelchairs required to meet the needs of the country's special education system (\$280,506).

Seventeen minutes of blockade are equivalent to the cost of purchasing enough of the medicine nusinersen to treat spinal atrophy in children for one year (\$250,000).

Ten minutes of blockade are equivalent to the funding needed to meet the demand for hearing aids for children and adolescents with disabilities in special education in the country (\$142,966.82).

## **Introduction**

The fundamental objective of the Government of the United States of overthrowing the revolutionary Government of Cuba has not changed. The economic, commercial and financial blockade is the cornerstone of its policy to exert maximum pressure on the island. The aim is to stifle the economy, generate shortages and sow discontent in an attempt to spark social unrest that induces a change in the constitutional order that was legitimately established by the Cuban people in the exercise of their self-determination.

Nothing better illustrates the fact that the United States blockade against Cuba is criminal and contrary to international law than the internal memorandum of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory of 6 April 1960: "Every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba ... a line of action which, while as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation, and overthrow of government."

President Donald Trump's policy of economic and financial harassment seeks to fulfil his political commitments to the anti-Cuban extreme right and ignores the overwhelming support of the general public in the United States, of the international community and of Cuban emigrants in the United States for the lifting of the blockade and the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Representatives of the current Government of the United States have acknowledged that their goal is to hone the design of the policy of maximum pressure to render it more effective in causing harm to the Cuban economy and people. They have stated that they will be more creative in identifying and attempting to cut off

external sources of income for Cuba, with the open intention of attempting to collapse the Cuban economy.

Between March 2024 and February 2025, the United States Administration continued to rigorously apply the laws and practices of the blockade, with actions aimed at identifying, tracking down and eliminating, in a surgical and systematic manner, the main sources of income of the Cuban economy.

The most severe measures pursued were the continued inclusion of Cuba on the unilateral list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism; its reinstatement on the list of countries that do not fully cooperate with the anti-terrorism efforts of the Government of the United States; the possibility of initiating litigation in courts in the United States under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act); sanctions or threats against shipping companies, carriers, insurers or reinsurers involved in the supply of fuel to Cuba; the persecution of Cuban financial transactions for the supply of essential resources; and the maintenance of other unilateral lists.

The Government of the United States has perfected a coercive model that includes, among other measures, obstruction of the international medical cooperation agreements offered by Cuba and an offensive against tourism in Cuba. There are also the continuous disinformation and manipulation campaigns on digital platforms, orchestrated and financed by the United States, to present a distorted image of life in Cuba that portrays a country on the verge of collapse and a people turned against its government.

Together with its anti-Cuban politicians, the United States authorities have persisted in asserting, cynically, that the difficulties experienced by the Cuban economy are the result of the socialist model and errors of government, in an attempt to conceal the highly negative impact of the blockade on all areas of the economic and social life of the country, as well as the obvious responsibility of the Government of the United States therefor.

While the shortages and problems faced by the Cuban people are not exclusively due to the United States Government blockade and its cumulative effects, to deny that this policy is the primary obstacle to the development of Cuba, or to suggest that the blockade were not delaying the resolution of all of these problems, would be to lie.

The blockade against Cuba is the most comprehensive, complex and long-standing system of unilateral coercive measures ever imposed against any country in history. This is an undeniable fact.

Between 1 March 2024 and 28 February 2025, the blockade caused material damages to Cuba estimated at \$7.5561 billion, which represents an increase of 49 per cent on the previous period.

This increase is a direct consequence of the intensification of the policy of suffocation and financial persecution of Cuba, with surgically designed actions against our country aimed at undermining the economy, damaging sectors that are strategic to our development, hindering international trade activity and preventing the arrival of supplies that are essential for the population.

The increase in damages is due mainly to the increase in the loss of income from exports of goods and services, estimated at \$2.608 billion, and to the geographical relocation of trade amounting to \$1.2127 billion.

Another contributing factor to the severe impact has been the policy of the Government of the United States of promoting and encouraging the emigration of Cuban professionals and specialists, with the explicit objective of, on the one hand,

generating a migration crisis that would serve to justify its hostility against Cuba and, on the other, depriving the country of part of its labour force, much of which is highly qualified.

In this regard, damages to the Cuban economy are estimated at a total of \$2.5704 billion. This is calculated first by taking into account the considerable resources allocated to the training of these personnel, since education in Cuba is public and free; the Cuban Government subsidizes education, devoting 23 per cent of the State budget to the sector in 2025.

Accordingly, the absence of these professionals and specialists has a direct impact on the country's ability to maintain normal development rates in its economic activity, be that manufacturing, services or other areas. In addition, it affects the capacity for innovation, technological development and intergenerational knowledge transfer in strategic sectors.

These increases demonstrate that the blockade is real and has intensified to unprecedented levels in recent years. The blockade is the main obstacle to the country's development.

The above represents approximate losses of more than \$629,675,000 for every month, more than \$20,701,644 for every day and more than \$862,568 for every hour of the blockade.

At current prices, the cumulative losses over more than six decades of implementation of the policy amount to \$170,677,200,000. Taking into account the performance of the dollar against the price of gold on the international market, the blockade has caused quantifiable losses of more than \$2,103,897,000,000.

It is estimated that, in the absence of the blockade, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices could have grown by around 9.2 per cent in 2024. These data speak for themselves in terms of the damage caused by the blockade. The Government of Cuba would have been able to implement many more social programmes and launch development projects had these resources been available.

There is not a single sector in the social and economic life of Cuba that has escaped the effects of the blockade. The majority of the Cuban population was born and has lived under the constant siege of this criminal policy, which directly affects its well-being, quality of life and rights.

The present report demonstrates the extent of this grave injustice, although the full impact of this criminal policy can never be fully quantified.

## **1. Continuation and tightening of the blockade policy**

### **1.1 Validity of the blockade laws**

Disregarding the unambiguous position of the international community expressed in successive resolutions in the General Assembly, the Government of the United States continues to rigorously apply the laws that form the complex framework of the blockade against Cuba. These laws are outlined in annex 1 to the present report. Annex 2 provides details of the main blockade enforcement actions taken between March 2024 and February 2025.

The so-called Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, known as the Helms-Burton Act, codified the provisions of the blockade with the intention of removing the possibility for the United States Government to relax the policy of suffocation with respect to Cuba. Under that Act, which is contrary to the United States Constitution itself and to the norms and principles of international law, the power to lift the blockade lies with the Congress rather than the President of the

United States. However, it grants the President broad powers to modify its application through licences and executive actions, which are detailed in annex 3.

With only six days left until the end of his term, on 14 January 2025, President Joe Biden exercised those prerogatives by removing Cuba from the United States Department of State list of countries that allegedly sponsor terrorism, suspending the application of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, repealing National Security Presidential Memorandum No. 5 of 16 June 2017 and abolishing the list of restricted Cuban entities. This decision was a belated and limited correction of elements of a cruel and unjust policy.

However, several of these measures were reversed by President Donald Trump on his first day in office, with the signing of Executive Order of 20 January 2025 entitled “Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions”. The Order placed Cuba back onto the list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism, demonstrating the high degree of politicization of such unilateral listings, and the fact that they are based not on evidence, but on the underhanded machinations of United States policy.

Subsequently, as provided by Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, United States courts were authorized to rule on lawsuits brought against individuals or companies with ties to nationalized property, with the aim of internationalizing economic pressure and deterring foreign direct investment in Cuba. That competence had been suspended by every United States president since 1996 by a prerogative provided for in the Act itself. As at the end of March 2025, 45 Title III lawsuits had been initiated, 30 of which are ongoing. The main areas that have been attacked in this law of the United States Congress are tourism, shipping, mining, construction, fuel supply and distribution, airlines and agriculture.

As part of the policy of maximum pressure, in February 2025, the Government of the United States refused to process visas for dozens of Cuban passports and did not grant visas that had been processed by Cuban State institutions. This decision directly affects bilateral exchanges in areas of mutual interest and benefit to the peoples of Cuba and the United States, such as culture, health, education, science and sports, thus politicizing the natural relationship between neighbouring peoples.

The reissue on 30 June 2025 of Presidential Memorandum No. 5 by the Government of the United States confirms that the policy of maximum economic pressure is a criminal and illegal instrument for achieving hegemonic objectives and effecting systemic change in Cuba. It reinforces the aggression and the economic blockade imposed by the Government of the United States. The current text, like the original of 17 June 2017, serves as a foundation for optimizing mechanisms of economic and political coercion against Cuba and third countries with links to Cuba.

Statements by representatives of the Government of the United States, including its Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and anti-Cuban members of Congress, confirm the intention to cut off all possible external sources of income for Cuba, harm tourism and travel by United States nationals and from other countries, sabotage international medical collaboration and the supply of fuel, obstruct the flow of family remittances, deter foreign direct investment and trade, and torpedo the economic and cooperative relations of Cuba with third countries or blocs thereof. The new document joins a body of coercive measures against Cuba that already existed through known laws and regulations.

No other nation is facing such a protracted, anachronistic, systematic and extreme structure of laws and policies of aggression.

## **1.2 Impact of the inclusion of Cuba in the unilateral list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism prepared by the Department of State of the United States**

The arbitrary and unjustifiable inclusion of Cuba in this list not only strengthens the dissuasive and intimidating effects on third parties with respect to their commercial relations with Cuba, but also has increased the country risk, has caused serious difficulties in our operations in the banking and financial sector, international trade, access to financing, the purchase of fuels and access to suppliers of goods and inputs that are essential for economic development, and has discouraged foreign investment.

Dozens of banks suspended their operations with Cuba, including transfers for the purchase of food, medicines, fuels, materials, spare parts for the national electric power system and other essential goods. The Cuban economy lost long-standing suppliers. Due to the country risk and the fact that faster and more efficient logistical routes are inaccessible, additional costs had to be assumed to acquire these supplies.

Many Cuban diplomatic missions have faced difficulties owing to the refusal of foreign banks to provide them with services, disrupting their normal operations. This has also slowed down and, in some cases, prevented payments by Cuba of its financial obligations to international and regional organizations.

Travel and tourism to Cuba, one of the main sources of income for the country, have been severely penalized, as the Electronic System for Travel Authorization<sup>1</sup> visa waiver programme is not valid for persons who have visited Cuba. This is owing to the fact that the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, of the United States, which establishes Cuba as one of the countries arbitrarily designated as a sponsor of terrorism, remains in effect.

In addition, anti-Cuban factions in the Government and Congress of the United States exert their influence to keep Cuba on this list in order to advance the false narrative that the island constitutes a threat to the security of the United States, justify hostility and broaden the legal basis for punitive actions against our country. This pretext has been used by the current United States Government to restrict official bilateral cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, travel by Cubans to the United States and scientific collaboration.

## **2. The blockade violates the rights of the Cuban people**

The economic, commercial and financial blockade of the United States against Cuba is an act of genocide and a large-scale, flagrant and systematic violation of the human rights of all Cuban people. It directly and indiscriminately affects the enjoyment of those rights, as well as national efforts to protect them. The declared purpose of bringing about hardship, hunger and desperation confirms its criminal and inhuman nature.

The unprecedented intensification of the blockade in recent years has particularly affected the public health sector. The resulting fraught state of our economy, the financial persecution of Cuba and the bans on access to the United States market to acquire technologies, medicines and medical devices have hindered the capacity of our health system to obtain these supplies when needed and to provide quality service to the population. This, in turn, has contributed to the deterioration of several health indicators, including those related to mortality.

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<sup>1</sup> The Electronic System for Travel Authorization is part of a United States visa waiver programme that allows citizens of countries that are part of the programme to enter the United States for tourism, business or transit and to remain in the country for up to 90 days.

## 2.1 Social impact

The blockade has a concrete and ongoing impact on the health sector, affecting the free, universal and quality medical care that has always been guaranteed to the Cuban people.

The cancellation of contracts, the refusal of shipping companies to transport cargo to Cuba, the inability to use products or technologies containing a proportion of United States components greater than 10 per cent, together with the increase in costs and the obstruction of sources of income, have seriously impeded the acquisition of essential supplies. Not only does this undermine basic care for the public, it is also exhausting medical personnel, institutions and families and affecting basic services, which are currently being limited. In the period from March 2024 to February 2025, the policy caused \$288,833,610 in losses to the sector.

The list of essential medicines in Cuba has 651 items (250 imported and 401 domestically produced), with 69 per cent affected as a result of the blockade. Of the 651 items on the list, 364 are not available, which represents 56 per cent of the total.

Owing to the blockade, Cuba cannot gain normal access – or must do so through third markets and at much higher prices – to advanced technologies and medicines manufactured in the United States, or to medical equipment in which more than 10 per cent of the components are from the United States. Below are some examples:

- Percutaneous aortic prostheses, such as Edwards-SAPIEN or CoreValve valves, for heart disease, especially in older persons. These valves allow patients with severe valve stenosis to undergo treatment without having to resort to highly complex surgeries. Aortic stenosis is a degenerative disease and is prevalent in adults over 65 years of age. Approximately 30 per cent of patients cannot undergo surgery because of contraindications to surgical treatment due to associated comorbidity. With this equipment, 158,800 patients could be treated without the need to resort to complex surgery.
- Pacemakers by the company Medtronic, as well as pacemaker lead extraction equipment. Due to this restriction, there has been a need to resort to conventional cardiovascular surgeries, with the associated complications. During the period under review, 375 patients were still waiting for a permanent pacemaker.
- Cardiac stimulation devices (implanted automatic defibrillators), since the companies that used to sell these devices to Cuba have increased the percentage of parts made in the United States. Several Cuban patients suffering from hypertrophic cardiomyopathy have been waiting for several months for automatic defibrillator implants, which have been impossible to obtain owing to the consequences of the blockade.
- Non-fluoroscopic mapping equipment made in the United States used for the treatment of atrial fibrillation and complex arrhythmias, such as ventricular tachycardia. Approximately 45,000 people in the country suffer from these conditions. Since 2020, it has not been possible to perform a single operation, so all cases are being treated with medication. There is only one piece of equipment of this type in the country, which is non-operational given that maintenance has not been possible.
- Cancer drugs, such as pemetrexed for lung cancer, palbociclib for breast cancer and brentuximab vedotin for post-transplant refractory Hodgkin lymphoma.
- First- and second-line drugs for the treatment of lung cancer, colon cancer and sarcomas, such as pembrolizumab from pharmaceutical company Merck Sharp and Dohme and nivolumab from pharmaceutical company Bristol Myers

Squibb, as well as treatments for childhood cancers, such as the drug lomustine, for brain and spinal cord tumours.

- Reagents required to correctly diagnose neuroblastoma (a cancerous tumour that develops in nerve tissue). Diagnosis requires chromosome tests, which are used to determine the patient's risk group and identify appropriate treatment. The blockade prevents access to such reagents on the United States market.
- Advanced technological equipment, such as circuit boards for Philips ultrasound equipment, that is critical for treatments in the fields of cardiology and obstetrics and gynaecology; bronchoscopy, argon plasma and cryotherapy equipment to remove skin lesions; and endobronchial prostheses.
- Highly effective advanced and biological therapies for patients with lupus and rheumatoid arthritis.
- Technologies and diagnostic tools that are essential for decisions about cancer treatment, such as Oncotype DX tests for breast cancer and colon cancer from the company Genomic Health.
- Reflectance confocal microscopy equipment to improve the effectiveness diagnoses of skin cancer and other dermatoses.
- Endoscopic surgery equipment, disposable items such as silicone drainage tubes, catheters, prostheses for erectile dysfunction surgery, artificial sphincters for male urinary incontinence, as well as advanced drugs for the treatment of patients with prostate cancer, such as abiraterone and enzalutamide, which reduce mortality and improve quality of life.
- First-line biological treatments for the management of Crohn's disease (a chronic gastrointestinal condition) and ulcerative colitis (an inflammatory bowel disease). The inability to acquire such treatments on the United States market necessitates the use of more distant markets, with the concomitant increase in costs and the negative impact on the number of patients that can be treated.
- Medical supplies for patient care during bile and pancreatic duct examination procedures and the treatment of portal hypertension and esophageal tumours. They are mainly produced by United States companies and it is impossible to acquire them in that territory due to the restrictive measures of the blockade.
- Circulatory assist devices for hemodynamically unstable patients, the overwhelming majority of which is produced in the United States.
- Continuous insulin infusion pumps for patients with type 1 diabetes and continuous glucose monitoring technology from United States company Abbott.
- Paediatric ventricular assist systems, which are manufactured only in the United States, for the treatment of postoperative low cardiac output (a frequent complication after cardiac surgery), which occurs in 15 per cent of patients. The condition can become incurable in some patients, some of whom could survive if they had those devices.
- Equipment for deep brain stimulation and invasive vagus nerve stimulation, an alternative therapy for movement disorders and epilepsy. These devices are produced and marketed primarily by three United States companies (Medtronic, Boston Scientific and Abbott).
- Medications for Parkinson's disease. The most effective is levodopa. Cuban patients do not have access to the United States formulation of this product,

Sinemet, or to other important products such as ropinirole, pramipexole and rotigotine.

- The drug nusinersen is used to treat child-onset spinal muscular atrophy. Its effectiveness has been proven in the fact that it keeps more than half of children with this deadly disease alive. It is produced by the United States multinational company Biogen; therefore, it is not available to Cuban patients.
- Drugs for the treatment of dementia in elderly patients, such as memantine, donepezil and rivastigmine, and insulin for the treatment of diabetes mellitus in this age group.
- Access to arterial prostheses produced by United States firms is blocked in Cuba. This creates serious challenges to the study and treatment of peripheral vascular diseases, which in turn influences the amputation rate.

The leading cause of death in children under the age of 1 in 2024 in the country was congenital disorders. Owing to the restrictions of the blockade, the resources necessary for prenatal and postnatal diagnosis and intrauterine treatment of such disorders are severely limited.

Difficulties in the acquisition of drugs for treating haematological cancer in children have forced us to modify our first-line therapy regimens, which used to achieve survival rates of over 75 per cent. Examples of these drugs are lomustine and methotrexate, which are used in cases of osteosarcoma. As a result, we have to use second- and third-line drugs, which are less effective, meaning that the survival rate has dropped to 60 per cent.

Surgery is one of the areas that has been most affected owing to the scarcity of resources (medicines, disposable items and medical equipment). There are currently 94,729 patients on the waiting list for surgery. Of these, 9,913 are children whose treatment falls under oncology, ophthalmology, general surgery, orthopaedics, urology and gynaecology. In addition, 4,507 cancer patients are waiting to undergo surgery.

It also remains impossible to acquire United States robotic surgery technology. The United States company Intuitive Surgical, which is the only manufacturer of the da Vinci XI robot, refuses to sell it to Cuba because of the blockade restrictions.

The United States firm Baxter Healthcare, which is the leading firm in terms of sales of dialysis machines in Latin America, also refuses to sell equipment to Cuba, as do other similar companies, such as the United States company Drake Whillock, which has expressly cited the blockade as a recurring reason for not selling its products to our country. This has affected nephrology services.

Refurbished dialysis machines are readily available in the United States, but inaccessible to Cuba. The price of a refurbished dialysis machine is between a third and a quarter of the price of a new one. Cuban importers, who had to buy from Europe, could have obtained 54 refurbished machines in the United States for the price of the 18 new ones that were purchased, which would have guaranteed care for an additional 180 patients.

The shortage of raw materials and financing, which is a result of the impact of the blockade, has hindered access to various types of drainage equipment, mammary clips for myocardial revascularization and other basic disposables and medications, such as catheters, diuretics, anticoagulants and hypotensive medications. As a result, during this period, 340 patients have not been operated on.

Surgeries on patients with cardiovascular conditions have been considerably delayed owing to a shortage of the oxygenators that are used during such surgeries.

This has had a significant effect on mortality and the deterioration of the condition for which these patients need to undergo surgery.

The lack of availability of technologies that cannot be acquired because more than 10 per cent of their components are manufactured in the United States hinders the diagnosis of genetic disorders in Cuba, especially those affecting the development of the nervous system. The purchase of the technologies required for massive sequencing for the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of various types of cancer, such as breast cancer, is also hindered, which affects the cancer mortality rate and limits the effectiveness of cancer treatments.

Oswaldo Enrique Fumero, a patient diagnosed with an abdominal aortic aneurysm, is awaiting surgery. The consequences of not performing the surgery could be fatal. The procedure has been postponed while efforts are being made to acquire the necessary arterial prosthesis, which is from the United States.

In June 2024, a supplier of the company Medicuba had to request a licence from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to export cobalt machines, air compressors and spare parts used in the treatment of cancer patients. In line with the genocidal policy of the Government of the United States, one year after the request was made, a response from the Office has yet to be received.

This has made it impossible for these essential resources to enter the country, delaying the appropriate delivery of treatment to cancer patients and preventing patients who are in an advanced stage of the disease from enjoying a better quality of life.

The siege against Cuba also has an impact on the Cuban public health system's assisted reproduction service. The purchase of disposable items, medicines, reagents and embryo culture media is hampered, meaning that the number of in vitro fertilization cycles required in line with the needs of our patients cannot be performed. Lidia Rosalea de la Fuente Pérez and Mijail Chacón de Armas are one of the many Cuban couples who have not been able to make their dream of conceiving come true as the processes that they have to undergo, despite our health system's best efforts, have been delayed owing to the lack of timely access to these materials.

The United States National Institutes of Health has banned scientists from Cuba and five other "countries of concern" from accessing 21 biomedical databases, which contain information on genetic variation, cancer cases, neurodegenerative diseases and more. The decision, taken on 2 April by the Administration of President Donald Trump, which escalates a long-term effort to prevent foreign access to data considered sensitive, also halts projects involving databases that include collaborators in the aforementioned countries.

The blockade affects not only the Cuban people, but also the American people. The business group Labiofam continues to export Vidatox 30CH, a remarkably popular homeopathic product used as a complementary therapy to cancer treatment, to various countries around the world. The United States ranks third in cancer incidence (in absolute terms for both sexes);<sup>2</sup> the annual cost of individual treatments in the United States can be in excess of \$100,000. If the blockade did not exist, United States patients would have access to this product, generating an estimated income of \$1.4 million for Cuba.

The siege does not allow other Cuban products, such as Heberprot-P, a proven effective treatment for diabetic foot ulcers, to be used on United States patients. This medication reduces the number of diabetes-related amputations, and would have a

<sup>2</sup> International Agency for Research on Cancer. *Global Cancer Observatory: Cancer Today* (version 1.1) (Lyon, France, 2024). Available at <https://gco.iarc.who.int/today>.

direct impact on the health of any country. It is estimated that more than 1 million Americans suffer from this disease every year, 500,000 of whom develop complex ulcers that could be treated with Heberprot-P if the blockade did not exist.

In addition, United States companies have expressed interest in acquiring the Cuban drug Proctokinasa for the treatment of acute hemorrhoidal disease. It is estimated that, each year, 10 million Americans suffer from this disease and that, of those 10 million, 1.5 million require surgery. If the blockade did not exist, the drug could benefit those patients, avoiding invasive procedures such as embolectomy.

As if that were not enough, the Government of the United States is also hounding international medical collaboration conducted by Cuba, levelling arbitrary and unfounded accusations of human trafficking at the country. Such slander is an attempt to discredit this honourable and altruistic work and to prevent the inflow of legitimate resources through cooperation in the form of “compensated technical assistance”, under schemes supported by the United Nations and that are fully aligned with international standards in the field of South-South cooperation.

The level of harassment by United States officials in various countries towards Cuban medical brigades, cooperating entities and ministers and health authorities of those countries has increased considerably. Its obstruction of international medical cooperation agreements and other agreements is part of a coercive plan aimed at preventing the flow of essential income to meet the growing needs of the population and has caused an estimated loss of \$3,249,838.

The economic siege on access to foreign currency, supplies, raw materials, fertilizers, machinery, fuel, chemicals and technologies has also led to a considerable decline in food production. In addition, since it is impossible to enter into contracts with a significant number of shipping companies, supplies that have already been paid for cannot be brought into the country.

All this contributes to the shortage of agricultural machinery and animal feed, and the lack of parts, including spare parts, for equipment and industry, which hampers the supply of the agricultural system, preventing it from meeting demand, both on the domestic market and in foreign trade. In the period from March 2024 to February 2025, the losses in this sector amounted to \$51,981,900.

The main losses in the sector are set out below.

- During the period under review, the level of wholesale supplies was insufficient and there continued to be a shortage of products on the retail market, causing fluctuations in the availability of the basic supplies in the standard family basket and disrupting their delivery to the population. In 2024, a group of products could not be delivered to the population as planned, with a marked reduction, as compared with 2023, in beans, sugar, coffee, oil, powdered milk, soy yogurt, meat products, chicken, beef and household fuels (coal and natural gas), as well as products for consumption as part of a medically prescribed diet (those for children with chronic illnesses and pregnant women were prioritized). The shortage of financing resulting from the attack on the Cuban economy’s sources of income, and the late arrival of imported raw materials have had a serious impact on this situation.
- The lack of financing in convertible foreign currency, the decrease in exports and the clear financial persecution resulting from the impact of the blockade have affected the availability of key sources of raw materials, which include agricultural products, milk, fruits for the canning industry, beef and pork; and imports, such as powdered milk and wheat, which are essential to meet the population’s needs.

- It is difficult to hire ships to transport wheat to the country, despite the availability of the financing to do so. This has considerably affected the production cycle of bread intended for daily consumption by the population.
- The country needs 1,800 tons of powdered milk per month to guarantee food for children, special diets and pregnant women, for the family basket of products alone. This represents a cost of \$8.5 million per month. Although food for children up to the age of 2, a priority age group, has been guaranteed, it has not been possible to guarantee powdered milk for all children between the ages of 2 and 6 years in provinces that are in receipt of this product.
- As 1 ton of oil costs approximately \$1,829, supplying the entire Cuban population with oil requires \$4 million per month. The delivery of oil could not be guaranteed for five months during the period under review.
- The meat products company Bravo faced losses estimated at \$905,900 as a result of being unable to acquire raw materials on the United States market. With this amount, the company could have purchased 1,500 more tons of raw meat and produced 2,800 tons of finished product.
- The National Centre for Animal Health cannot acquire raw materials, supplies or materials for the production of vaccines, medicines and other veterinary products, nor can it sell Cuban vaccines on the United States market or in third countries with United States investment.
- Medicines to protect poultry health could not be acquired in time, causing losses in the animal population. In addition, the import of poultry equipment that could have been used to increase the breeding capacity of poultry for consumption by the population was suspended.
- Due to the lack of financing caused by the blockade, approximately 337,000 tons of corn and 120,300 tons of soybeans for the production of animal feed were not purchased. As a result, it was not possible to produce enough eggs for distribution to the population in the standard family basket.
- If the blockade did not exist, it would be possible to acquire the best poultry genetics available in the United States and boost the production of fresh eggs for domestic consumption and surplus for export, a strategy that is also undermined by the scarcity of food and up-to-date technology.
- Pork production in 2024 declined significantly; it reached only 53 per cent of 2023 levels. The inability to import feed and supplies for biosecurity in swine facilities affected the supply of pork in the industry, which caused shortages and increased the prices of pork and pork products.
- The restrictive measures of the Government of the United States prevent Cuban rum and tobacco from entering the United States market. The resulting losses are valued at \$19,511,100, an amount that could have been invested in the purchase of food and medicines and improvements to industrial and social infrastructure.

The main shortfalls faced in the acquisition of goods are related to the non-fulfilment of import plans owing to a lack of funding for payments, inadequate access to credit, an increase in the cost of products and services, a rise in freight costs and delays in the arrival of goods.

Although there are some exceptions to the blockade, such as the limited sale of chicken and a small number of other products, such operations are a far cry from normal trade. Due to agricultural subsidies in the United States, the prices of these products are lower than in other markets; as a result, Cuba chooses to purchase certain

foods in the United States. However, these purchases are made under strict conditions: they require specific licences from the Department of Commerce, and they must be paid in cash and in advance, with no possibility of financing or credit, contrary to modern trade practices. Furthermore, goods may be transported only by United States vessels, which are permitted to make only one-way journeys. This considerably increases the freight cost.

Such restrictions hamper so-called trade between the United States and Cuba and make the existence of the blockade apparent. The sole purpose of these measures is to deter and discourage any type of business with Cuba, thus limiting its ability to trade freely and producing negative effects on its economy.

Overall, the damages caused in the agricultural sector during the period amounted to \$932,316,224.

The blockade imposed by the Government of the United States has a profound, multifaceted impact on the production of educational materials in Cuba, severely affecting the quality and development of the education system at all levels. During the period under review, commercial operations were restricted, and there was limited access to international credit to procure raw materials and other resources used in the production of educational materials. The impact of the blockade on the sector during the period is estimated at \$89,771,200.

Lisandra Guerra Sosa, of the rural workers' school 30 Aniversario de la Batalla de Guisa, in the municipality of Bayamo, Granma Province, said that as a result of the blockade policy, "we have limited basic study materials for language instruction, such as textbooks, workbooks, specialized dictionaries, maps and laboratories, among other things. There is also insufficient technical equipment, such as computers, televisions and spare parts, to ensure quality education. At times, the communication platform on the sector's website is blocked and we cannot share achievements."

Effects such as these are felt across the country and also have an impact on the procurement of materials, spare parts and other items needed for the production of pencils, note paper, notebooks, drawing implements, paint, art supplies, paper, toilets, pens and other materials relevant to education in Cuba, with an impact valued at 33,932,004 Cuban pesos. In 2024, 2,147,300 copies of teaching materials for the school year could not be produced.

Yoelandi Argote Rodríguez is a 15-year-old-old Cuban who uses a cochlear implant. The restrictions imposed by the blockade prevent him from receiving accessories for his medical devices, and he has to use lip reading as an alternative for communication and the teaching-learning process.

In addition, 940 students who are deaf or hard of hearing have not been able to receive adequate care owing to the inability to acquire, from the United States market, assistive and compensatory technology for specialized treatments, cochlear implants, equipment, including for retrofitting auditory stimulation offices, and hearing aids. Acquiring them from a more distant market involves higher costs, which means less equipment can be imported and, consequently, the number of students receiving care is affected.

In addition to these restrictions, the sector is affected in the following ways:

- Of a total of 1,093 children's institutions, 35 have closed because of construction-related problems. The scarcity of financing resulting from the negative impact of the blockade on the country's revenue sources has hindered the prompt resolution of this problem.

- There is still a shortage of toys and pedagogical materials for early childhood education, which hampers the delivery of educational activities to promote skills development. In the absence of the blockade, 67,035 children across age groups could benefit from these materials.
- The education of children and adolescents with vision impairment requires 63 Braille machines and 20 Braille printers; there are currently only three of the latter. Difficulties in accessing financing hampered the procurement of these essential means for educating students in 2024.
- To meet the needs of children with motor and auditory disabilities, 538 electric and conventional wheelchairs and 1,107 auditory prostheses must be obtained. Meanwhile, 16 audiometers currently available in the provinces are in degraded condition, which limits the auditory stimulation available to more than 300 students in special education institutions and 800 in conventional institutions. The cost of the harmful effects of this situation amounts to \$295,548.35.
- Academic exchange is limited, and Cuban teachers, specialists and students are unable to participate in in-person and virtual events. The inability to carry out transactions in United States dollars, the denial of visas for events and the prohibition on access to virtual platforms, such as Zoom, Cisco Webex and Interprefy, impede the training and capacity-building of teaching staff and students.
- The Universidad Central “Martha Abreu” de Las Villas has determined that there are at least three virtual events per week where it cannot participate because the Web platforms are inaccessible. In January 2025, this university received a delegation of professors from Carthage College, from the United States, with a view to establishing cooperation. However, the draft memorandum of understanding cannot be signed until the United States counterpart has assessed the possible punitive measures and actions that could result from such cooperation. This is a clear example of the dissuasive effect of the blockade.

The impact on sports during the period under review amounts to \$4,114,091. There are increased restrictions and costs for the procurement of sports equipment, textiles, footwear, technical and teaching resources and technological devices, among other items, for which the main producer is the United States. Having to acquire those products from third countries increases expenses by more than 50 per cent.

The main impacts reported in this area relate to obstacles to receiving payments for professional services offered abroad and in Cuba. This has been evident in the prohibition on the issuance of payments to Cuba or financial persecution for income earned for participation in sporting events, arbitration, ticket reimbursement and prizes won by Cuban athletes, as well as the export of sports services.

New methods of hindering banking operations compound the issue, such as requests for additional documents to perform transactions, which cause delays and impede the processing of payments for services.

In this regard, the number of obstacles to making payments to Cuban sports federations for the recruitment of Cuban athletes abroad have increased. For example, funds currently held by the Japanese baseball team Club Nippon-Ham could not be transferred to Cuba. The funds had to be used in Japan and were used to purchase balls for children, resulting in higher prices because of the transportation costs. If the funds could have been sent to Cuba, the purchase could have been made in Panama, with savings of 50 per cent. With the funds used to pay for freight, 948 more balls could have been purchased.

Cuba is a member of the World Anti-Doping Agency and as such must pay annual contributions. Last year, the country made the payment in February but in November the Central Bank of Cuba indicated that the transaction had been reversed owing to the internal policies of the beneficiary bank. To date, it has not been possible to pay the contributions for 2024 and 2025, which, if the situation persists, could prevent Cuba from participating in international events or holding events in the country.

As in previous years, the period under review was characterized by the non-issuance of payments for the recruitment of Cuban athletes by various clubs owing to the refusal of foreign banking and financial institutions to carry out transactions with the Cuban bank Banco Financiero Internacional.

In early 2025, the current United States Administration refused to grant visas to the basketball team that was to participate in a qualifying tournament in Puerto Rico. Actions such as this, combined with excessive controls imposed on our delegations by United States immigrations and customs authorities and the discreditation campaigns on social media aimed at preventing Cuba from hosting events, have persisted and generated substantial losses.

In June 2025, the Government of the United States denied visas to the members of the delegation that was to represent Cuba at the North, Central America and Caribbean Volleyball Confederation Final Four women's volleyball tournament to be held in Puerto Rico. This approach, which runs counter to the commitments inherent in the responsibility assumed by the host countries of international sporting events, hinders the participation of Cuba in a competition that is part of the path to qualification for the 2026 Central American and Caribbean Games in Santo Domingo and scoring for Confederation and world rankings.

This is an unfair and discriminatory position that runs counter to the precepts of sport and "fair play" and is in addition to the treatment to which delegations from other disciplines have been subjected so far this year.

The denial of visas to the Cuban girls' softball team in July 2025, without valid justification, is another example of the current onslaught by the Government of the United States against Cuba. The Cuban youth club was thus prevented from participating in the Little League World Series. This decision, which is contrary to the spirit of international sportsmanship, has made these girls' dream another casualty of the blockade and the hatred of the Government of the United States.

With regard to culture, the blockade significantly limits the promotion, dissemination and sale of Cuban talent and makes it difficult to identify niche markets and business opportunities. Consequently, sales prices decline and access to and enjoyment of our art by audiences across all continents is limited. For the period under review, the quantitative impact in this sector amounts to \$195,095,600.

The blockade limits access to technologies for the production of digital books, thus impeding their promotion and sale given that many digital platforms cannot be used within the country, and online stores that establish contractual relationships directly with a Cuban business can be subject to sanctions.

Cuban orchestras and music are directly affected by the blockade as it prevents them from having access to the United States market. In the absence of the blockade, at least 10 Cuban orchestras could tour the United States annually, generating revenue of approximately \$3 million.

The extraterritorial application of the blockade hinders the payment of royalties between the Cuban Music Copyright Agency and foreign companies, as banking

institutions in various countries have refused to process financial transactions with the Cuban bank Banco Financiero Internacional.

The music recording and publishing company Empresa de Grabaciones y Ediciones Musicales de Cuba cannot sell its products directly on the United States market. It relies on intermediaries located in the United States or in third countries. In addition, the company's bank accounts and its potential partners in that country are subject to constant persecution, which forces the company to use intermediaries in third countries. This drives up costs and delays negotiations.

Cuban artists encounter difficulties in obtaining visas and participating in international events, such as the Latin Grammy Awards and other music festivals in the United States. In 2024 they could not participate in major competitions, which affected their careers and the exhibition of their talent.

Owing to the shortage of raw materials, a significant quantity of unprinted titles – some 950 – has accumulated. This has come at an incalculable cultural and scientific cost due to the inability to make publishing plans from 2020 to 2024. In addition, the average value of sales lost on account of this situation totals approximately \$3,770,833.

Long-standing suppliers in the portfolio of the Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and Industry now only accept credit cards approved by foreign banking institutions as the method of payment. The cost they bear as a result of the country risk adds up to an additional 50 per cent to import prices just for conducting commercial transactions with Cuba.

In 2023, the literary agency Agencia Literaria Latinoamericana, which is part of the Cuban Book Institute, concluded a contract with the Mexican broadcasting company Televisa for the renewal of the film adaptation of the work by Félix B. Caignet entitled “Morir por Vivir”. However, Televisa subsequently merged with the United States television network Univision, which cannot make payments to the Cuban agency. Owing to this, the payment is still pending.

The Japanese agency UniJapan concluded a contract for the publication of the complete short stories of the renowned Cuban author Virgilio Piñera. In February of this year, it communicated that it had not been possible to make the payment owing to financial restrictions imposed on Cuba. The contract was for the amount of \$2,916, payment of which is still pending.

The Spotify website, which accounts for 80 per cent of the streams generated by Cuban catalogues and is the main platform for music consumption, is an inaccessible outlet to Cuba in terms of monitoring its operations and creating profiles of Cuban artists, which affects international promotion of Cuban culture.

## **2.2 Impact on economic development, trade and finance**

Economic development in Cuba in 2024 became more complex as a result of the impact of the escalation of measures that constitute the blockade imposed by the United States. The GDP contracted by 1.1 per cent in 2024.

If this genocidal policy did not exist, GDP growth for that year at current prices would have been more than 9.2 percentage points higher than the figure reported. The economy contracted in 2024, with a cumulative drop of 11 per cent since 2018.

At the end of 2024, exports reached \$9,639,000,000, representing 92.5 per cent of the target for goods and 101.6 per cent of the target for services. In spite of this, total exports were \$770 million below the amount projected. Combined with the fact

that economic revenue was \$900 million below the amount anticipated, the Cuban economy was subject to even greater strain than in previous years.

The imports supplied, largely consisting of fuel, food, medication and medical supplies, totalled only 82.4 per cent of the planned amount in 2024. Continued declines were reported in key sectors, such as food production, where the standard family basket is currently composed of 100 per cent imported products.

Cuba has faced a critical situation since the end of 2023, when a stable supply of various forms of fuel was lost. In 2024, particularly in the second half, there was an acute crisis in electricity generation resulting from equipment failure, the impact of two hurricanes and a lack of fuel, especially diesel, with losses of between 1,400 and 1,500 megawatts per day, including three complete breakdowns of the national electric power system between October and November 2024. This situation had a marked effect on the economy and population of Cuba.

Eliminating the cost of the embargo would increase the country's payment capacity and provide an additional, substantial and sustained source of financing that would invigorate the investment programmes linked to the strategic sectors of the national economic and social development plan to 2030. This would create the necessary conditions to gradually achieve sustained growth. The blockade policy represents the most significant obstacle hindering the development of the economy of Cuba.

The inclusion of Cuba on the unilateral list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism has resulted in an increase in costs for businesses with foreign investment, as well as the cancellation of commercial transactions, cooperation activities and investment projects that were at various stages of implementation.

The severe restrictions imposed on the socioeconomic sectors in Cuba had adverse consequences, including for United Nations programmes in Cuba, particularly with respect to access to financing, including financing for development, as well as higher operating costs and limited access to goods, services, information technology platforms and patented technologies in the United States, and financial services from United States banks.

Moreover, the blockade prohibits vessels of shipping companies from other countries from docking at a United States port for six months after docking at a Cuban port. This provision entails a significant additional cost for maritime transportation and foreign trade for our country, and is an aggressive measure against third parties.

It estimated that losses due to the geographical relocation of trade to more distant markets between March 2024 and February 2025, totalled \$1,212,700,000.

In addition, costs relating to freight, insurance and the use of commercial intermediaries, and the resulting increase in the cost of goods, amounted to \$1,127,100,000.

The effects of the blockade on production and services owing to the inability to acquire spare parts, raw materials and products from the United States market, with specifications that cannot be met by other suppliers, has caused losses of up to \$880,800,000, a figure that is 80 per cent higher than that reported in the previous period.

There is also a system of draconian fines to prosecute transactions of third countries with Cuba, which makes our foreign trade even more expensive. Between March 2024 and February 2025, 40 foreign banks (27 in Europe, 6 in the Americas and 7 in the rest of the world) refused to carry out transactions with Cuban banks for various reasons, with 140 transactions involved.

In the period under review, the relentless prosecution by the Government of the United States of financial transactions involving Cuba has affected practically every sector of the economy. The siege has resulted in terminations and breaches of contracts, loss of relationships with financial entities that have traditionally worked with Cuban entities, debts, and delays in the shipment and receipt of funds and goods, among other difficulties.

Many companies from third countries that have traditionally exported goods and materials that are essential to the Cuban economy are refusing to act as suppliers or are encountering additional difficulties in financing exports to Cuba. This extraterritorial effect costs tens of millions of dollars and results in delayed supplies, a shortage of raw materials and severe damage to manufacturing production in the country.

This has done untold harm to the Cuban economy, in particular the business activities of companies and ties between Cuban and international banks.

Some of the major impacts of this intimidation include the ban on transfers of funds in United States dollars or other freely convertible currencies; the closure of the accounts of embassies and companies with Cuban interests abroad; the cancellation of financial services for businesses with ties to Cuba; and the refusal to provide credit facilities or process letters of credit.

This is a result of the monitoring and control mechanisms imposed by the United States on international banking activity and a direct consequence of the million-dollar fines imposed on foreign banks in recent years.

At the same time, the interference with the country's sources of foreign currency income has deprived us of critical financial resources to acquire essential supplies for the Cuban people.

During the period under review, the impact recorded by Cuban banks was \$169,500,000 owing to significant exchange-rate fluctuations caused by the use of third-country currencies, the prohibition of the use of the United States dollar and the need to identify alternatives to ensure that financial flows reach Cuba and other destinations.

This attests to the worsening crisis that the country continues to face, in a very complex environment characterized by the continued decline in foreign trade activity, with an incalculable impact on the socioeconomic situation. At present, there are practically no remaining accounts in United States dollars held by Cuban commercial banks in foreign banks.

Cuba could only gain access to very limited external financing under extremely onerous conditions. Cuban banking and business entities continue to pay higher interest rates than the market rates owing to the country risk classification applied to them. This exacerbates macroeconomic imbalances, reflected in annual inflation of 24.88 per cent in 2024, with varying levels depending on the market (13.97 per cent in the State sector, 82 per cent in the non-State sector and 4.03 per cent in the agricultural sector).

These high inflation levels are affected by the issuance of currency by the Government to finance the budget deficit; the contraction of supply, mainly in the State sector; imported inflation due to high prices on the global market; and, in particular, the limited flow of foreign currency into the country as a result of the intensified effect of the blockade.

Other contributing factors are disinformation campaigns and financial manipulation through virtual tools, such as the online news outlet El Toque, which

receives monetary support from the National Endowment for Democracy and the United States Agency for Global Media. The goal is to distort the exchange rates in the country, prompting the depreciation of the Cuban peso against the United States dollar, in order to cause price instability, a reduction in people's purchasing power and the consequent social discontent.

The shortage of goods and services on formal markets, the growth of the informal market and the increase in prices have eroded the purchasing power of salaries and pensions.

Despite the Government's strong will to find ways to mitigate the effects of the blockade, the economic reality continues to be adverse. The economy has not advanced more quickly and vigorously owing to the fact that the projected export revenue cannot be achieved. For this reason alone, the blockade caused losses amounting to \$2,608,000,000 during the period under review.

Harming the tourism sector remained a priority of the blockade policy. For the period March 2024 to February 2025, losses in this sector in areas related to travel, services, operations and logistical insurance amount to \$2,528,791,469.

The number of visitors to Cuba decreased by 9.6 per cent compared to 2023. The 2,203,117 international visitors account for 71.07 per cent of the target number. The cumulative impact of the blockade, the continued inclusion of Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism and the maintenance by the Government of the United States of the list of restricted Cuban entities, which includes almost all the country's hotel facilities, contributed to this situation. In terms of exports, losses in the tourism sector during the period under review reached \$1,114,600,000.

Compared to 2023, arrivals of United States visitors declined by 11 per cent. The prohibition on accommodation in most of the hotels included on the list of restricted entities of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, as well as the conditions imposed by the Government of the United States for the use of private sector providers under the travel category influenced this situation.

The decision by the Government of the United States to eliminate general licences for people-to-people group educational trips has further restricted the flow of United States visitors. Travellers from the United States were already obliged to visit Cuba under the sponsorship of a United States organization, which discouraged visitors from that country. The new measure completely removes the option of travel under that category.

In the absence of the blockade and the ban on travel by United States nationals to Cuba as tourists, the country would have received between 1 million and 2 million United States visitors per year, contributing \$2,410,826,390 to the economy of Cuba.

The application of the Helms-Burton Act has directly contributed to the termination of business deals and contracts with foreign hotel operators and has led operators from third countries to lose interest in business opportunities; 41 international operators have found themselves in this situation.

Restricted access to Cuban ports by United States cruise lines, exacerbated by sanctions and legal proceedings initiated against those who have engaged in transactions with Cuba, has hindered progress in the sector. Consequently, some 800,000 United States visitors have refrained from travelling to Cuba.

The decision by the Government of the United States to require an entry visa from anyone having travelled to Cuba or who would like to travel from our country, including those using the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, has had a negative effect on entry into the country by Cubans residing abroad and by visitors

from the 42 countries participating in the programme. It has also deterred nationals of the United States from travelling to Cuba.

As a result of the financial persecution by the Government of the United States, a growing number of foreign banks have refused to work with Cuba, which has led to a drastic reduction in commercial transactions and, consequently, in the sale of tourism packages. Havanatur, a leader in the promotion and marketing of Cuban tourism products, has faced the closure of its accounts abroad, with losses totalling \$2,180,900.

Slow payment processes of the banks currently used has caused serious losses. The inability to use the United States dollar has compelled travel agencies to resort to highly risky and costly transfer methods, often involving more than three currency conversions, which leads to significant losses.

The restrictions imposed on commercial transactions with Cuba has led to a reduction in potential investment opportunities in the tourism sector, thus affecting the business development of the company Empresa Extrahotelera Palmares and four pipeline projects with opportunities for foreign investment. In the case of the Varadero water park project, approximately 30 companies that had been invited to participate did not accept or lost interest.

In addition, there have been aggressive political communications campaigns to discredit the quality of tourism services and Cuba as a safe destination.

The biotechnology sector is also affected by the blockade. The Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli Act) explicitly prohibits the sale to Cuba of supplies and raw materials for the biotechnology industry. During the period under review, losses in this area amounted to some \$1,129,270,055 in lost export revenues owing to the geographical relocation of trade and monetary losses.

For the Finlay Vaccine Institute, the blockade caused difficulties in 14 operations, related to reagents, raw materials and supplies. Most of these materials had to be purchased through third parties, which resulted in significant increases in unit prices and shipping costs.

Laboratorios MedSol could not produce omeprazole, fluconazole and oseltamivir capsules owing to a breakdown in its German-made equipment, the Harro Hofliger encapsulator. Although the importation of spare parts and technical assistance was managed through FarmaCuba, in December 2024 the manufacturer decided to halt negotiations with Cuba because of the blockade. This led to a loss of \$1,020,272.99 and limited the availability of these medicines for the Cuban people.

The commercial operation for the purchase of haemodialysis bags from the Argentine company then known as Compañía KAM Bag in Box Latam could not be carried out because, as a result of its merger with a United States entity, it cannot establish trade relations with Cuban institutions.

The tightening of the blockade has led to a continued high perception of risk among United States companies with regard to negotiations on and the future sale of the Cuban product Heberprot-P, which is the only one of its kind in the world for the treatment of diabetic foot ulcers and reduces the number of amputations resulting from that condition. If this product could have been exported to the United States, patients would have had access to this innovative treatment, and the revenue during the period covered in the present report would have amounted to some \$90 million.

In the energy and mining sector, estimated losses during the period under review amount to \$496,075,620. The National Electric Union reports the largest loss, at \$279,345,500.

The economic siege has exacerbated limitations with regard to finance and access to the loans needed to repair the country's thermoelectric plants and obtain the technologies and fuel required to guarantee a stable electricity supply for the population and the strategic sectors of the national economy, and to create additional capacity for electricity generation from renewable energy sources that would afford the island greater energy independence.

The blockade has affected imports for the Cuban petroleum industry. In 2024, the average cost of a 20-foot container from China was \$5,980, from Europe \$2,590 and from Canada \$3,925. From Houston to Mariel, under normal conditions, it would not exceed \$800 to \$1,000, depending on the time of year. Cuba would therefore have saved \$1,014,298 in 2024 in freight costs if it could have acquired fuel in the United States.

Interference in operations for the transport of fuel to Cuba – including those of shipping companies, insurance companies, banks, individuals and Governments – has reduced the portfolio of foreign suppliers; and those that have remained have considerably increased prices on account of the country risk.

As a result of that interference, payments for fuel imports are made with confirmed irrevocable letters of credit (payable at sight) with a single bank, whose confirmation capacity is limited and often does not cover the value of the cargo to be imported during the month.

Obstacles to the importation of fuel, spare parts and machinery, including suppliers' fear resulting from the threat of United States sanctions, have significantly contributed to the ongoing instability of the national electrical grid and constant breakages in the power infrastructure, which have reduced the country's distributed generation capacity.

Electricity generation accounts for the largest share of consumption of the fuel imported to sustain the Cuban economy: more than half of all the fuel used in the country is allocated to power generation. To sustain electricity generation alone, under normal operating conditions, between \$250 million and \$350 million would need to be allocated every year. The attack on the country's sources of foreign exchange income has made it difficult to ensure the financial resources required to maintain the national electrical grid.

At the end of 2024, the lack of material and financial resources stemming from the effects of the blockade caused domestic crude oil production to decline by some 138,028 tons. Amid this complicated context, the country managed to produce approximately 40,000 barrels daily, which could only cover one third of national consumption.

The total generation capacity of the Unión Eléctrica de Cuba power company is 5,646 megawatts. However, it only generates 2,122 megawatts daily, or 38 per cent. Between 4.8 million and 5.0 million tons of fuel are needed to meet the country's normal electricity demand, costing between \$1.6 billion and \$1.8 billion per year, depending on the variability of oil prices on the market. As a result, there have been constant interruptions to the electricity supply that affect the population and have an impact across all sectors of the economy.

Since 10 January 2024, spare parts for pumps for the Ernesto Che Guevara thermal power plant have not been received since the Italian supplier, C.R. Technology Systems was acquired by Trillium Flow Technologies, which manages its purchases from the United States. The lack of authorization of legal permits by the Office of Foreign Assets Control prevented the contract from being concluded. This has caused challenges that extend to the period currently under

review, resulting in the limited availability of generating units, higher energy costs and outages that have affected the country's electricity supply.

The modernized turbines in the Ernesto Che Guevara, 10 de Octubre and Máximo Gómez thermal power plants use Voith electro-hydraulic actuators. This equipment wears down over time. Regular suppliers, such as Real Control and EnergoControl, have indicated that owing to the Helms-Burton Act, they cannot sell this equipment to Cuba. As a result, it is not currently possible to operationalize block 2 of the Ernesto Che Guevara thermal power plant.

The company Taichi HD Cuba, which was requested to supply a new automatic voltage regulator excitation system, the VCS-6000, for the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes thermal power plant, responded that, while Mitsubishi Generator was the appropriate company to handle this issue, it could not submit a quotation for the new system owing to the strict sanctions by the Government of the United States, and that decision could not be reconsidered.

The economic losses caused by the blockade in the communications and information technology sector, including telecommunications, during the period under review are estimated at \$78,064,500. The Cuban telecommunications company Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba continues to be the most seriously affected, recording \$73,675,900 in losses, which represents 94.3 per cent of losses in the sector.

Financial difficulties resulting primarily from the impact of the blockade have affected infrastructure and the quality of services provided by Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba, which reported losses of more than \$500 million annually over the past three years. Owing to the accumulation of debt and the fraud perpetrated by illegal operators abroad, for every \$20 of sales of international top-ups, \$18 was illegal and, therefore, was not paid to the company.

The constant harassment and pressure faced by entities that maintain trade relations with Cuban communications companies as well as by others interested in doing business with such companies have a negative impact on the availability of adequate infrastructure, greater Internet access and digitization to advance the process of technological modernization in the country.

The main providers of telecommunications technologies (Ericsson, Alcatel and Huawei) request an end-user statement, which slows the process of contracting and delivering equipment and infringes on the sovereignty of third countries in their relationships with Cuba in the area of information and communication technology.

The blockade hinders access to high-performance equipment and brands distributed by leading United States companies in the sector, such as Dell, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, Netgear, Grandstream Networks and APC, among others. Restrictions on the supply of technologies and equipment produced under licence or with United States components make it necessary to acquire them from more distant markets, resulting in increased costs for freight, repair and maintenance.

The continued inclusion of Cuba on the list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism prevents it from receiving private express packages from the United States. In the absence of an agreement regarding money orders between the United States and Cuba, citizens of both countries continue to use riskier alternatives. The suspension of services from Western Union due to punitive measures by the Government of the United States has exacerbated the situation, resulting in a loss of more than \$837,200 in revenue for the country, with an expected impact on countless Cuban families.

Postal administrations in various countries across all continents, which previously paid Cuban banks directly, found themselves unable to do so owing to the financial blockade.

For the televised broadcast in Cuba of the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris, payments increased by \$114,807.21, exceeding the cost of the service, owing to the ban on conducting commercial operations involving United States companies or other associated companies that relied on United States banks for their transactions. Intermediaries had to be used, with a consequent increase in costs.

Broadband Internet access continues to be restricted, which affects download speeds for software, music, and radio and television programmes that are broadcast in real time and access to sites that provide updates to programs used by millions of people around the world. The Adobe website is still blocked for Cuba, which makes it impossible to access help for certain programs that are only available online, as is the case for the most up-to-date versions of the multitrack editing software Audition CS6. This is compounded by other restrictions relating to SourceForge, WeTransfer, Dell and Intel.

These obstacles restrict the flow of information and the expansion of Internet access in Cuba, making connectivity more difficult and expensive and hindering entry by Cuban users to various virtual platforms.

Representatives of Cuba have faced many difficulties in participating in meetings and other virtual events because the country's access to several digital platforms, such as Zoom, is restricted. In other cases, sites appear to be restricted for having Cuban Internet protocol addresses owing to the measures imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, a practice that is discriminatory and illegal.

The global market for radio and television products is dominated by large international corporations, such as Sony Group Corporation, Panasonic Corporation and JVC Kenwood Holdings, which distribute their products in specific geographic regions. Accordingly, the Institute of Information and Social Communication of Cuba must obtain resources through authorized distributors for Latin America, many of which are located in Miami. Because of the blockade, requests from Cuba are frequently overlooked, which forces it to resort to intermediaries in Europe, placing it at a considerable disadvantage in terms of technological modernization.

During the period under review, it is estimated that the blockade has caused \$51,069,079.54 in losses to Cuban industry from the loss of revenue from exports of goods and services, the geographical relocation of trade, exchange rate fluctuation, impacts of the technological blockade and the shortage of fuel. Some of the most relevant impacts on this sector are detailed below:

- The metal export company Acinox cannot buy raw materials, spare parts and the metals needed for metallurgical production on the United States market and must therefore acquire these products from more distant markets.
- As a result of the application of the Torricelli Act, the Mediterranean Shipping Company, A.P. Møller-Mærsk, Cosco Shipping Lines, Evergreen Marine Corporation and Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd. have suspended trade with Cuba, with just three shipping companies maintaining commercial ties with the country.
- The telecommunications company Copextel was able to receive imports from only 57 suppliers out of a portfolio of 628, representing an effective utilization rate of 9.08 per cent. Of those 57 providers, 91.2 per cent are intermediaries while 8.8 per cent are manufacturers, which drives up the costs of the products and services obtained.

- The termination of banking operations between international banks and Cuban banks was confirmed; for example, the National Bank of Canada rejected the letter of credit for operations with the Cuban chemical industry business group.
- Steelworks were expected to produce 87,015 tons of exportable steel over the year, which would have resulted in an export trade margin of \$894,780.42. However, this was not possible owing to the energy crisis and the fuel shortage caused by the impact of the blockade.
- Consequently, there have been shortages of toothpaste, chlorine bleach and mop cloths due to a scarcity of raw materials in the industry, in addition to fluctuations in the availability of supplies.
- The store chain Caribe reported losses of approximately \$50,180,000, an increase of 319 per cent from 2023. In addition, a large amount of equipment had to be written off in 2024 owing to a lack of parts for repairs.
- Refrigerated products such as chicken, turkey and beef, most of which is produced in North America, must be purchased from other countries, leading to increased freight costs, higher merchandise costs, longer voyages and the storage of these products in warehouses to cover the necessary reserves and ensure the replenishment of commercial units.
- The Cuban entity Fincimex is barred from operating in the main market for remittances to Cuba as a result of being included on the list of restricted entities by the State Department of the United States. In the absence of the blockade it would have earned \$900,000 during 2024 from family remittance transfers for Cuban citizens.

The construction sector continues to face serious difficulties in acquiring more efficient and lightweight building technologies that consume fewer basic materials and less energy. Between March 2024 and February 2025, losses in this area were reported to amount to \$161,862,700.

The housing construction programme was one of the worst affected, with losses amounting to \$34,324,900. Only 28 per cent of supplies for the programme could be sourced.

Most of the losses were due to difficulties in procuring basic goods and technologies for the materials industry, including cement, aggregate, steel, paint, water tanks, lightweight trusses, blocks, fibre cement tiles, asphalt blankets and carpentry items. The termination of contracts with foreign suppliers and transportation difficulties linked to the fuel shortage were additional factors.

The fuel shortage and the lack of material resources were reported to have had the greatest impact on construction work at airports, on the national highway and central motorway, in the northern cays and on the central and eastern canals for transporting hydraulic resources.

The losses caused by the blockade to the four branches of the transportation sector – sea, road, rail and air – amounted to \$353,034,200 between March 2024 and February 2025.

In recent years, the capacity and infrastructure for passenger transportation has been progressively deteriorating because of the low technical readiness of vehicles, the inability to acquire spare parts due to both lack of liquidity and the refusal of suppliers to provide them, as well as the measures adopted since 2019 by the Government of the United States to obstruct fuel supplies. As a result, fewer services are available to the population.

For example, at least 1,200 working vehicles are required to transport passengers in the capital. There are currently only 566, of which between 120 and 170 operate on a daily basis. Some 48,000 tons of diesel are needed every year for the various modes of transport in Havana, but this demand cannot be met owing to the scarcity of financing and the increased operating costs caused by the siege against Cuba.

Restrictions on international shipowners employing Cuban crew members on their vessels remain in place, as do obstacles preventing access to United States ports under the Torricelli Act. Upon learning that the crew of a vessel includes any Cuban personnel, the authorities detain the vessel outside the port for several hours, establish a watch on the vessel at a cost of \$1,500 per day spent in port, payable by the shipping company or shipowner, and prohibit our sailors from going ashore.

In the case of air transportation, the Government of the United States has not reinstated aircraft leasing licences; the airline Cubana de Aviación cannot, therefore, quote for international flights. Furthermore, Cuban operators are unable to purchase aircraft that contain a proportion of United States components greater than 10 per cent, a situation that also affects domestic air transportation.

Interline agreements for the transportation of cargo remain cancelled, which prevents the sale of the cargo service with air waybills of Cubana de Aviación and the increase of multiple-destination sales in commercial partnerships with Avianca, DHL, Air France, LATAM and Lot Polish. The cancellation of these agreements is affecting the import and export service that can be provided to the business and non-State sectors, since they must use alternative, more expensive routes.

### **2.3 Impact on the non-State sector of the Cuban economy**

As at April 2025, there were 11,233 private micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises registered in Cuba. The blockade also affects the activities of these Cuban entrepreneurs, business owners and cooperative members. In 2024, 608 of these enterprises, or 6 per cent of the total, reported operational losses.

The United States Government has argued repeatedly that the blockade is intended to punish only the Government of Cuba and not the people or the private sector. The measures announced in May 2024, supposedly designed to improve access to digital and financial services in the private sector, never materialized. The structural barriers of the blockade and its legal framework remain the primary obstacle to all forms of economic activity in Cuba.

In order to unblock technology tools and software, United States technology firms must first face the challenge of distinguishing between State and private actors.

The inclusion of Cuba on the list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism has a dissuasive effect on international transactions owing to a fear of fines. This is compounded by the refusal of foreign shipping companies and banks to do business with Cuba due to secondary sanctions and regulatory volatility, which also has an adverse impact on the non-State sector.

The warnings and restrictions on travel to Cuba have affected revenue from tourism and accommodation, services provided by most of the Cuban private sector. The Cuba prohibited accommodations list, the inclusion of Cuba on the list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism and the ban on individuals travelling for people-to-people exchanges, along with the other measures described above, have affected this sector and considerably reduced the number of reservations in private rental houses. The main limitation for these actors is that they do not have access to the United States

tourism market, so they compete on an unequal footing with those in other destinations in the region.

Cuba has a capacity of over 20,000 rooms in private rental houses. Between March 2024 and February 2025, only 9.6 per cent of the 139,358 people from the United States who visited the country stayed in such accommodation, which represents a sharp fall of 82.2 per cent compared with the previous period as a result of the policies in place. In the absence of the current restrictions and prohibitions, and if the flow of United States visitors had increased, the Cuban private sector could have earned approximately \$14,400,000 in additional revenue.

In Old Havana, when cruise ships from the United States began visiting in 2016, private businesses catering to the tourists proliferated and new restaurants opened, along with shops selling Cuban handicrafts, stands offering Cuban literature, and car hire and taxi services, among others. All of those businesses were affected by the ban on cruise ships visiting Cuba and many of them, across various provinces, closed as a result.

The fact that non-immigrant visas cannot be processed in Havana has restricted the ability of Cuban entrepreneurs to travel to the United States, which is the closest market for them to regularly obtain the supplies that they need for their businesses.

The coercive measures of the Government of the United States against financial institutions have caused several payment and e-commerce platforms, such as PayPal, to refuse to provide services to such entrepreneurs just because they are Cubans, regardless of their company's form of management. In addition, Cuban entrepreneurs cannot access Visa or MasterCard cards to supply their businesses, as they are banned for Cubans anywhere in the world.

Consequently, Cuban entrepreneurs do not have access to a secure online payment method, even through a third country. Bank branches, therefore, do not process their transactions and many customers decide not to pursue relationships with private Cuban entities.

Limitations on access to the United States market make imports and exports by these players more expensive and often more difficult. The Nuevo Golfito local development project, based in the Alamar neighbourhood in Havana, is a recreational community space for local people, especially children. It offers a traditional mini golf course as well as other leisure activities. The founder and manager of Nuevo Golfito, Roger Núñez Hernández, is working on acquiring solar panels to enable his project to thrive despite the power cuts caused by the adverse impact of the blockade on the performance of the national electric power system. Mr. Núñez Hernández explains: "We've tried to look for ways to import them from the United States or other nearby markets, but our access is limited by the blockade regulations. We're exploring markets further afield, although shipping costs make that alternative too expensive."

Similarly, the local development project Remolques YGC has faced obstacles in the manufacture of its products: trailers for cars, motorbikes and bicycles. The founder, Yosvany García Cruz, explains: "Although are trailers are made using recycled materials and are popular with users, our production and delivery process would be smoother and faster if we could purchase certain parts and supplies from the United States or other nearby markets. Unfortunately, our options are limited due to the obstacles imposed by the blockade."

### **3. The blockade violates international law: extraterritorial application**

The blockade violates international law. It runs counter to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is a violation of the rights to peace,

development and self-determination, and of the sovereignty of the people and State of Cuba.

It is, in its essence and its aims, an act of unilateral aggression and an ongoing threat to the stability of the country. It violates the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, sovereign equality, the promotion of friendly relations among countries and free trade.

Not only does the blockade damage the economic, commercial and financial ties between Cuba and the United States, it is also aimed at and succeeds in undermining the economic and commercial relationships of Cuba with all other countries, in breach of their sovereign prerogatives and the rights of their citizens. It is a malicious aim that is given legal form in the Helms-Burton Act.

In its attempt to prevent foreign investment in the country, interfere with Cuban transactions and restrict the normal course of all Cuban operations abroad, the Government of the United States resorts to a wide range of instruments and forms of pressure through its regulatory agencies.

The blockade is an act of genocide and a flagrant, large-scale and systematic violation of the human rights of all Cubans. It is a cruel policy of punishment, as shown in the present report through information and factual data that substantiate the denunciation of this grave injustice.

In addition to the examples set out above, four further cases of the extraterritorial application of the blockade between March 2024 and February 2025 are described in annex 4.

#### **4. Universal rejection of the blockade**

The international movement demanding an end to the blockade has been highly active. More than 2,000 public events, speeches and documents adopted at international events condemning the blockade, its unjust nature and its devastating impact on the people of Cuba were recorded, as well as over 1,703 statements against the country's arbitrary inclusion on the unilateral list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism. The latter were made by 57 Governments, 107 political parties and 600 parliamentarians who signed the Progressive International initiative, in addition to the parliaments of Russia, Syria, Namibia, Burundi and Jamaica. There were also 473 statements made by solidarity movements, associations and groups, 28 by international organizations, including those mentioned above, and 87 by other public figures, as well as 254 instances of media coverage.

In addition, there were growing calls within United States society for an end to the blockade and to the arbitrary classification of Cuba as an alleged State sponsor of terrorism. Federal and state legislators; the academic, economic, political, religious and scientific sectors; young people; and the solidarity movement carried out various initiatives to put pressure on the White House.

These included statements against the blockade by numerous Governments and public figures, United Nations experts, solidarity movements and associations of Cubans living abroad, as well as parliaments and Heads of State and Government.

Condemnation of the blockade and its extraterritorial nature were included in the outcome documents of the nineteenth summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Third South Summit, the eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the twenty-third Summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Agreement, the forty-seventh regular meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community and the forty-eighth ministerial meeting of

the Group of 77 and China, among other relevant forums, as well as in the resolution against the blockade adopted at the thirty-eighth African Union summit and the declaration of the Joint Coordinating Committee of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of 77 and China.

It should be noted that, in July 2024, various special procedure mandate holders of the Human Rights Council<sup>3</sup> urged the Government of the United States to abolish the blockade, to remove Cuba from the list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism and “to fully comply with all its international human rights obligations, even extraterritorially, and to undertake prompt action to terminate such measures”, arguing that the redesignation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism had imposed a panoply of additional economic and financial restrictions with compounded adverse effects on the country’s ability to meet the needs of its population in a critical moment when Cuba faced serious economic challenges.

On 7 February 2025, four of those human rights experts<sup>4</sup> urged the United States Government to end the blockade against Cuba and rejected the island’s reinstatement on the list of State sponsors of terrorism by the Administration of Donald Trump. They recalled that they had sent communications on that topic to the United States Government in the past and received no response. They denounced the decision as having grave consequences for the human rights of the Cuban people, negatively affecting the country’s commercial and financial relations and undermining national efforts to respond to the cumulative adverse effects of the blockade, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and natural disasters. In their view, the measure was an act of unilateral coercion, incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and a violation of United Nations resolutions in which the use of unilateral coercive measures had been declared illegal and that included a call for an end to the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba.<sup>5</sup>

On 18 October 2024, Cuba submitted its ninth periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The Committee acknowledged the adverse impact of the economic, commercial and financial blockade on the enjoyment of the human rights of women and girls in Cuba, as well as the harm caused by the unjust inclusion of Cuba on the list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism.

Annex 5 contains details of a range of actions carried out in rejection of the blockade within United States society and at the international level during the reporting period.

## Conclusions

The economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed on Cuba by the Government of the United States constitutes a unilateral, coercive and extraterritorial

<sup>3</sup> The Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Alena Douhan; the Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity, Cecilia Bailliet; and the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, George Katrougalos.

<sup>4</sup> The Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Alena Douhan; the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Attiya Waris; the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, George Katrougalos; and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, its causes and consequences, Reem Alsalem.

<sup>5</sup> See [www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/united-states-experts-dismayed-decision-reinstate-cuba-state-sponsor](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/united-states-experts-dismayed-decision-reinstate-cuba-state-sponsor).

policy that violates international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It runs counter to the rights to peace, development and self-determination of the people of Cuba. It is a large-scale, flagrant and systematic violation of their human rights. It undermines the economy of Cuba and directly affects the well-being of the population. It does not distinguish between segments of society or economic actors. It impinges upon the constitutional rights of United States citizens and threatens the sovereignty of third countries through the imposition of extraterritorial sanctions.

It is unacceptable, illegitimate and immoral for any people to be subjected to a coercive and harmful policy that has caused losses in excess of \$170,677,200,000 at current prices, and \$2,103,897,000,000 when the performance of the dollar against the price of gold is taken into account. Between March 2024 and February 2025 alone, the blockade resulted in estimated losses to Cuba of approximately \$7.5561 billion.

The figures and examples provided can never fully reflect the harmful impact of the blockade on the people of Cuba. The Government of the United States, however, remains constant in its application of this cruel and illegal policy. After more than 60 years, the central objective of the blockade has not changed: to lower people's standard of living, and to cause dissatisfaction, desperation and irritation, in order to bring about a change to the constitutional order freely chosen by the people of Cuba.

The United States Government continues to ignore the near-unanimous call of the international community for an end to this illegal and inhumane policy against Cuba, as expressed in 32 resolutions of the General Assembly.

The call for the unconditional lifting of the United States blockade is near universal, and with just cause. Together with the people of Cuba, there are more and more voices calling for the immediate lifting of the blockade, an end to the interference in the country's international economic and financial relations, the elimination of funding aimed at the subversion of its internal order and disinformation campaigns, and the exclusion of Cuba from the unilateral list of State sponsors of terrorism.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Cuba remains willing to establish a civilized and respectful relationship with the Government of the United States through dialogue and cooperation with all sectors of United States society interested in improving bilateral relations.

As stated by the President of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, at the closing of the fourth session of the National Assembly of People's Power in December 2024: "Yes, there is a blockade; yes, it has intensified; yes, we are facing economic warfare; yes, we are looked down upon; yes, we are being poisoned by vulgar, obscene and hate-filled content on social media. But we can also rely on, most importantly, our heroic and dignified people. We will always prevail so long as the heroism inherent to Cubans grows and reveals itself to all our adversaries, coupled with that essential and sacred element of a common purpose: preserving independence, sovereignty and social justice."

## **Annex 1**

### **United States blockade laws and regulations**

- The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, section 5 (b), provides that the President may impose coercive measures in time of war or any other national emergency, and prohibits trading with the enemy or with allies of the enemy during hostilities.

- Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President was authorized to establish and maintain a total “embargo” upon trade with Cuba, and the granting of any aid to the Government of Cuba was prohibited.
- Proclamation 3447, issued by President J. F. Kennedy on 3 February 1962, decreed a total “embargo” on trade between the United States and Cuba.
- Under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of 1963, issued by the Department of the Treasury, all Cuban assets in the United States were frozen, all financial and commercial transactions were prohibited unless they were approved under a licence, Cuban exports to the United States were prohibited, and any natural or legal person of the United States or a third country was prohibited from conducting transactions in United States dollars with Cuba, among other provisions.
- Section 2401 (b) (1), “National security controls”, “Policy toward individual countries”, of the Export Administration Act of 1979 established the commerce control list, on which the President keeps a number of countries on which special export controls may be imposed for reasons of national security. Cuba is included on that list.
- In the Export Administration Regulations of 1979, a general policy of denying exports and re-exports to Cuba was established.
- In the Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli Act) of 1992, the subsidiaries of United States companies in third countries were prohibited from trading in goods with Cuba or with Cuban nationals. Third-country vessels that had visited a Cuban port were banned from entering United States territory within 180 days without a licence from the Treasury.
- In the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, or Helms-Burton Act, the provisions of the blockade were codified and its extraterritorial scope was expanded through the imposition of penalties on directors of foreign companies conducting transactions involving United States property nationalized in Cuba and through the threat of actions in United States courts. The President’s powers to lift the blockade as a whole were limited.
- Section 211 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999 prohibited United States courts from recognizing the rights of Cuban companies to trademarks associated with nationalized property.
- In the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, the export of agricultural products to Cuba was authorized, on condition that payment was made in cash, in advance and without United States financing. Travel to Cuba by United States persons for tourist activities was prohibited, with tourist activity defined as any activity involving travel to, from or within Cuba that was not explicitly authorized under Title 31, section 515.560, of the Code of Federal Regulations. In other words, travel was limited to the 12 categories authorized when the Act was passed.

## **Annex 2**

### **Blockade actions taken by the Government of the United States between March 2024 and February 2025**

On 15 March 2024, the Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed a penalty of \$3,740,442 on the bank EFG International AG for violating the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and other sanctions programmes.

On 23 March 2024, President Biden signed the appropriations bill for the fiscal year 2024, under which \$25 million was allocated to illegal radio and television broadcasts to Cuba and the same amount to programmes supposedly designed to promote democracy. It was made clear that those funds could not be used to promote companies, economic reforms, business ventures or any other activities in Cuba not authorized under the Helms-Burton and Torricelli Acts.

On 13 September 2024, the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a final rule (CFR part 501) whereby the period during which persons subject to United States jurisdiction that provide authorized services to Cuba must maintain records in relation to those services was increased from 5 to 10 years.

On 13 September 2024, President Biden extended the blockade restrictions against Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy Act for one year.

On 27 September 2024, President Biden issued a presidential determination for the Secretary of State to present before Congress, in which the United States executive director of every multilateral development bank, and of the International Monetary Fund, were tasked with doing everything in their power to deny all lending to Cuba and all other uses of the funds of each institution by Cuba.

On 2 December 2024, the President of the United States signed the bicameral and bipartisan No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023, codifying it into law and thereby integrating it into the measures comprising the blockade.

On 13 December 2024, the Office of Foreign Assets Control announced a \$257,690 settlement with the global transport and logistics company C.H. Robinson International, which had transported products to Iran and Cuba on multiple occasions in violation of the coercive programmes against those countries.

On 20 January 2025, his first day in office, President Trump signed an executive order entitled “Initial recessions of harmful executive orders and actions” through which he repealed many of the measures that President Biden had taken with respect to Cuba on 14 January of that year and ordered that a list of restricted entities be compiled again.

On 31 January 2025, the Department of State announced the revocation of the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.

On 5 February 2025, the Department of State published an updated list of restricted entities associated with Cuba that included the Cuban remittances company Orbit.

On 21 February 2025, the White House published the “America first investment policy” memorandum to facilitate the investments of allied countries and limit the investment capacities of China and countries considered “foreign adversaries”. Cuba was listed as an adversary and its access to United States technology, including in the artificial intelligence sector, was limited.

On 25 February 2025, the Secretary of State announced the expansion of the visa restrictions policy for individuals “exploiting Cuban labour”. The purpose of this measure was to intensify the financial persecution of Cuba by targeting the country’s revenue from medical cooperation programmes and undermining its relationships with other countries by imposing visa restrictions on current and former officials of the Government of Cuba, as well as on officials of foreign Governments and their families, involved in what is referred to as a “Cuban labour export programme”, particularly the overseas medical missions of Cuba.

In March 2025, the United States Government announced the termination of the humanitarian parole programme for Cubans, Haitians, Venezuelans and Nicaraguans, and of the use of the CBP One application.

On 19 March 2025, the United States Government included Cuba on the list of countries that do not maintain “effective anti-terrorism measures” in their ports. The United States Coast Guard is thereby authorized to impose entry requirements on vessels arriving from Cuban territory.

On 30 June 2025, the United States Government reissued Presidential Memorandum No. 5, ratifying the policy of maximum economic pressure as a criminal and illegal instrument for achieving hegemonic objectives and effecting systemic change in Cuba. The new document supplements the preexisting body of coercive measures against Cuba and offers a platform for fine-tuning mechanisms of economic and political coercion against Cuba and third countries with links to Cuba.

### **Annex 3**

#### **Powers of the President of the United States to modify the application of the blockade against Cuba**

- Removing Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism issued by the Department of State.
- Reversing the policy of financial persecution against Cuba, including in relation to the country’s fuel supplies.
- Suspending the possibility of bringing actions in United States courts against United States and third-country companies under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.
- Modifying the permissible limit of 10 per cent United States components in the goods that Cuba can import from any country in the world.
- Requesting the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to remove Cuban entities from unilateral lists, such as the list of restricted entities and subentities associated with Cuba, the Cuba prohibited accommodations list and the specially designated nationals and blocked persons list.
- Instructing United States representatives in international financial institutions not to block the granting of loans or other financial facilities to Cuba.
- Enabling Cuban entities to open correspondent accounts in United States banks.
- Authorizing the export to Cuba of United States products for key branches of the Cuban economy, such as mining, tourism and biotechnology.
- Authorizing the import by the United States of any goods made or derived from products grown, produced or manufactured in Cuba by State enterprises (including nickel, sugar, tobacco and rum).
- Allowing the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that could be used to manufacture Cuban biotechnology products.
- Relaxing the licensing policy on investments by United States companies in Cuba.
- Authorizing United States citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.
- Allowing broader forms of collaboration for the development, marketing and supply of medicines and biomedical products of Cuban origin, for example, through direct investment by United States companies and joint ventures.

- Allowing the sale of the raw materials that Cuba needs in order to produce medicines for its people and people in other developing countries.
- Authorizing United States subsidiaries to do business with Cuba that does not involve the import and export of goods from and to Cuba (prohibited under the Torricelli Act).

#### **Annex 4**

##### **Cases of extraterritorial application of the blockade against Cuba between March 2024 and February 2025**

In March 2024, the Office of Foreign Assets Control refused to allow Cuba to open a bank account in Japan in connection with Expo 2025, held in Osaka. This increased the costs for Cuba and hindered its attendance at the international event.

On 15 March 2024, the Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed a penalty of \$3,740,442 on the bank EFG International, based in Switzerland, for violating the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and other sanctions programmes.

On 15 April 2024, the company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) in Argentina officially announced that it would no longer be able to supply fuel to Cubana de Aviación, as its commercial ties could involve risk and exposure under United States regulations.

In early May 2024, a Courtyard hotel belonging to the Marriott chain cited blockade restrictions when it turned down a booking request from the Cuban embassy in Trinidad and Tobago for accommodation for the Cuban delegation attending the fourth International Conference on Small Island Developing States in Antigua and Barbuda.

On 12 June 2024, Société Générale bank in Senegal issued a letter to communicate the closure of the account of the Cuban embassy in Senegal in response to the application of the blockade and the impact of Cuba being designated a State sponsor of terrorism.

Since August 2024, the company Presencia Latinoamericana, which specializes in marketing and selling Cuban cultural goods and services in Mexico, has been negatively affected by its inclusion on the list of restricted entities of the United States Department of State. For example, the bank BBVA cancelled the firm's accounts, citing the prohibition on conducting transactions with Cuba under the provisions of the blockade.

On 30 September 2024, a senior official from Honduras seeking to renew the visa waiver on her Spanish passport, which she had obtained through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, had her application denied because she had travelled to Cuba.

On 3 October 2024, the Cuban embassy in Dominica reported that the country's central bank had not been able to make a donation to Cuba because the intermediary bank, Bank of America, would not allow the transaction.

On 29 November 2024, the Mexican financial group Inbursa announced that it was closing the Cuban account belonging to the company Taino Tours in order to "act in the interests of the institution". In practice, this reflects United States pressure under the blockade against Cuba.

On 13 December 2024, the Office of Foreign Assets Control announced a \$257,690 settlement with C.H. Robinson International to resolve its potential civil liability for 82 apparent violations committed by five of its subsidiaries outside the

United States that had provided freight brokerage or transportation services for shipments in apparent violation of the Office's sanctions against Cuba and Iran.

In January 2025, the Belgian bank KBC denied a request for credit cards to be issued to personnel of the Cuban embassy in Belgium on the grounds of compliance with national laws and the bank's internal policies for the prevention of money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, demonstrating alignment with the extraterritorial blockade policy of the United States Government against Cuba. In so doing, the bank limited the financial dealings it had maintained with the embassy since 1991.

In April 2025, it became known that the owners of the aircraft of an airline based in Serbia would not authorize its planes to be flown to Cuba owing to the extraterritorial effect of the United States blockade against Cuba, thereby limiting the flow of travellers, in particular tourists, from Serbia to Cuba.

In June 2025, the online platform Stripe notified the coordinators of "From Australia to Cuba with love", a campaign of solidarity with Cuba, that its account on the platform would be closed on the basis that Cuba was a "risk jurisdiction". The campaign had used the site to collect funds for donations to Cuban hospitals and various projects in the country.

## **Annex 5**

### **Denunciation of the blockade against Cuba between March 2024 and May 2025**

#### **Denunciation of the blockade within the United States:**

On 2 April 2024, political, religious and civil rights leaders from Maryland sent a letter to the then Senator and chair of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Ben Cardin, urging the lifting of the blockade against Cuba. The coalition of over 100 groups and individuals argued that United States Government sanctions were the principal cause of the dire humanitarian and economic conditions on the island.

On 29 April 2024, a well-known economist, University of Columbia professor and political analyst, Jeffrey Sachs, called for the lifting of the blockade and an end to the hostile policy pursued by the United States Government against Cuba in the concluding remarks of his statement at an event organized by Progressive International on the new international economic order, held in Havana.

In early May, while visiting Cuba to celebrate International Workers' Day, attendees at the seventeenth International May Day Brigade of Voluntary Work event expressed their support for the lifting of the economic blockade and an end to the hostile policy of the United States Government.

On 6 May 2024, the Alliance for Cuba Engagement and Respect, headquartered in Washington, D.C., arranged for a letter to be sent to President Joseph Biden, urging him to fulfil his 2020 campaign promises regarding Cuba policy, an end to the blockade and the removal of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism. The signatories included Cuban Americans; former federal, state and local civil servants; academics; business owners, executives and investors; lawyers; doctors; scientists; educators; and artists, musicians and filmmakers.

On 21 May 2024, at a congressional hearing, the representative Jim McGovern requested that the Administration of President Biden remove Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, acknowledging its impact on the suffering of the Cuban people and the rise in migratory flows.

On 5 June 2024, the congresswomen Pramila Jayapal (Washington), Ilhan Omar (Minnesota) and Nydia Velázquez (New York) issued a public statement calling on President Biden to exclude Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On 6 June 2024, at its thirty-second convention, the Communist Party of the United States approved a resolution in favour of the exclusion of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism and the lifting of the blockade.

On 17 June 2024, the New York-New Jersey Cuba Sí Coalition issued a statement calling on the Administration of President Biden to exclude Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism and end the blockade.

On 18 June 2024, the chair of the executive committee for the southern California region of the Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, which is part of the Marine Division of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, included a resolution entitled "Send pacemakers to Cuba and end the embargo" in the outcome document of the thirty-ninth international convention. He called for Cuba to be excluded from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On 5 July 2024, the International Committee of the Democratic Socialists of America organization reported that 760 letters had been sent through the Activa Network platform to United States senators in support of the exclusion of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On 25 July 2024, the Latin America Working Group, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Alliance for Cuba Engagement and Respect and the Center for Economic and Policy Research wrote a letter to President Biden calling for Cuba to be removed from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On 27 July 2024, the Director of Radio Miami today, Max Lesnik, and the coordinator of the Puentes de Amor movement, Carlos Lazo, called for the end of the blockade and the exclusion of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism as part of a demonstration at an airport in Miami.

On 31 July 2024, 46 congressional Democrats sent a letter to President Biden in support of the peace process in Colombia. In the letter they called for the exclusion of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On 12 August 2024, 40 legal organizations and 200 lawyers sent a letter to President Biden in support of ending United States economic sanctions on other countries. Explicit reference was made to the need to lift the blockade against Cuba.

On 19 November 2024, 18 members of Congress, led by the Democrats Barbara Lee and James McGovern, sent a letter to President Biden stressing the need to ease coercive measures against Cuba, exclude the country from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, offer technical support and emergency humanitarian assistance, and facilitate efforts to modernize and repair the country's energy infrastructure.

On 17 December 2024, the senators Peter Welch, Jeffrey A. Merkley, Bernard Sanders, Ron Wyden and Chris Van Hollen sent a letter to President Biden, in which they urged him to remove Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, restore the right of United States nationals to travel freely to Cuba and end the Trump era "Cuba prohibition lists".

On 17 December 2024, the former Havana Chief of Mission, Vicki Huddleston, and the former Deputy National Security Adviser, Ben Rhodes, sent a letter to President Biden in which they called on the outgoing Administration to remove Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, increase humanitarian aid to the country and streamline rules on access to the United States financial system by Cuban citizens.

On 25 January 2025, the senator Peter Welch condemned the renewed designation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism.

The main activities at the international level were the following:

On 15 June 2024, the Joint Coordinating Committee of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of 77 and China adopted a declaration in which it called for the exclusion of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism and the end of the blockade.

On 19 June 2024, the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations, in New York, issued a special communiqué condemning the blockade and calling for the removal of Cuba from the list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism.

On 27 June 2024, during the fifty-sixth session of the Human Rights Council, a declaration was submitted by 123 countries in which they called for the removal of Cuba from the unilateral list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism.

On 30 July 2024, at the forty-seventh regular meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, held in Grenada, attendees approved a declaration condemning the blockade against Cuba and the inclusion of Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On 27 September 2024, in a declaration adopted at their forty-eighth annual meeting, held in New York, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 and China called for an end to the blockade against Cuba and, for the first time, condemned the inclusion of Cuba on the arbitrary list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism.

Between 24 and 30 September 2024, during the general debate at the seventy-ninth regular session of the General Assembly, the heads of delegation of 46 countries condemned the blockade in their statements. In 23 of those statements, the inclusion of Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism was also denounced.

On 30 October 2024, the General Assembly adopted, by 187 votes in favour to 2 against, with 1 abstention, a resolution entitled, “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”. A total of 54 speakers spoke in favour of lifting the blockade, while 43 spoke against the inclusion of Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism. Nine regional consultation groups and organizations also spoke against the blockade and the country’s inclusion in the list, as follows: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Group of 77 and China, the Caribbean Community, the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Group of African States and the European Union.

On 14 December 2024, at the twenty-fourth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade Agreement, a declaration was adopted condemning the blockade and denouncing the inclusion of Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On 15 February 2025, at the thirty-eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Assembly of the Union adopted, for the sixteenth consecutive time, a resolution on the lifting of the blockade imposed on Cuba by the United States. In the resolution, the Assembly also called for the removal of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

In March 2025, the countries comprising the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations submitted a declaration to the Human Rights Council in which they condemned, in no uncertain terms, the re-inclusion of Cuba on the unilateral list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism compiled by the United States Government.

## **Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

[Original: English]  
[30 January 2025]

The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution [79/7](#) demonstrates once again the international community's unwavering support for the Government and people of Cuba and reiterates the urgent need to put an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed unilaterally by the United States against Cuba.

The decades-old economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States continues to have dire consequences for the economic growth and socioeconomic development of Cuba and seriously hamper its efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

In line with the principles of its foreign policy, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular to developing friendly relations among States and respecting the principles of the sovereign equality of States and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and proceeding from this steadfast position, it joins the absolute majority of States Members of the United Nations in categorically rejecting the imposition of all unilateral decisions and measures, which undermine the right to existence and impede the well-being and prosperity of peoples.

At the nineteenth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, in January 2024, the principled position was unanimously adopted, reiterating the urgent call to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba, in flagrant violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea strongly urges the United States to lift the extraterritorial economic and financial embargo against Cuba without any further delay and reiterates its firm support to and solidarity with the Government and people of Cuba in their efforts to safeguard national dignity and sovereignty and to promote socioeconomic development.

## **Democratic Republic of the Congo**

[Original: French]  
[29 April 2025]

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo welcomes the importance that the Secretary-General continues to attach to the issue of the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo remains greatly concerned and reiterates its long-standing position in support of lifting the blockade.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo also supports any initiative through which Cuba and the United States are urged to pursue a constructive, fruitful dialogue that could help to bring about a peaceful and mutually beneficial settlement for the peoples and Governments of the two countries.

## Djibouti

[Original: English]  
[14 January 2025]

The Republic of Djibouti wishes to reaffirm its fundamental commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law. Djibouti voted in favour of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), and thus has not promulgated or applied any laws of the type referred to in its preamble of the above-mentioned resolution and, therefore, the necessity of repealing or invalidating any such laws or measures does not arise.

## Dominica

[Original: English]  
[1 April 2025]

The Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica reaffirms its unequivocal commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, particularly as they relate to the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and freedom of international trade and navigation.

In accordance with obligations under the Charter and international law, and pursuant to General Assembly Resolution [79/7](#), the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica has neither promulgated nor applied any law or measure that would in any way hinder the freedom of trade and navigation with the Republic of Cuba.

The Government of Dominica expresses deep concern about the over six decades-long economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed on Cuba and all the associated measures that impede its full integration into the international community. The Government of Dominica regards such measures as contrary to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and customs, and the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, and as a result continues to call for the cessation of such actions and a return to the well-established reliance on dialogue and diplomacy as core strategies for the resolution of outstanding issues between members of the international community.

The Government of Dominica remains in solidarity with the Government and people of the Republic of Cuba and continues to implore that due consideration be given to the unconditional end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba, in order to see to the enhancement of peace, stability, prosperity and the full realization of the economic and social rights of the Cuban people.

## Dominican Republic

[Original: Spanish]  
[12 May 2025]

The Dominican Republic has repeatedly stated that it respects the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, as established in article 3 of its Constitution. Furthermore, article 50 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees freedom of enterprise, commerce and industry. The country accepts an international legal system that ensures respect for basic rights, peace, justice, peaceful coexistence among peoples and the duties of solidarity with all nations.

The Government of the Dominican Republic has expressed its clear position in different international forums and is committed to respecting the rules of international law, such as the principle of self-determination of peoples and sovereignty of States enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, of which we are a founding member.

The Dominican Republic does not have laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), and it meets its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including respect for the freedom of trade and navigation.

## **Ecuador**

[Original: Spanish]

[26 March 2025]

The Republic of Ecuador reaffirms its commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reiterates its commitment to international law and the principles governing relations between States. Ecuador applies only those sanctions established by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

## **Egypt**

[Original: English]

[26 March 2025]

The Arab Republic of Egypt voted in favour of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), in line with its consistent position that unilateral sanctions imposed outside the framework of the United Nations are not a course of action that Egypt can condone.

The embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba constitutes a clear violation of the principles of multilateralism and is in breach of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, as well as of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual trust. The unjust and unjustifiable embargo causes undue economic and social hardship on the Cuban people. It also affects the vital sectors of the Cuban economy.

The embargo is an anachronism from a bygone era that must be lifted. The embargo has an extended effect on companies and citizens from third countries. The extraterritorial effects violate the sovereign rights of many Member States. Egypt is deeply concerned about the widening of the extraterritorial nature of the embargo, which is an added argument in favour of its prompt elimination. The embargo has posed additional challenges for Cuba, negatively impacting its efforts to prepare and respond to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Access to the health products necessary to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19 was affected by the embargo.

While previous advances constituted a step in the right direction, they remain insufficient, as the imposition of the blockade has remained unchanged and the laws and regulations underpinning it continue to be in force and implemented with utmost severity. Egypt believes that many steps and brave decisions still need to be taken by the United States towards the immediate lifting of the embargo against Cuba, to allow for the full normalization of bilateral relations.

Egypt believes that the embargo continues to be a counterproductive and morally insupportable policy, which has not served the purpose of breaking the Cuban people's determination to control their own future. And, despite all the detrimental repercussions and adverse impacts of the embargo, the Government of Cuba has made

enormous efforts in meeting the needs of its people. It has been proved through over 65 years of embargo that, in this globalized world, the Cuban people can still survive thanks to their perseverance and hope. Egypt hopes that dialogue between Cuba and the United States, based on mutual respect and on observance of the principles of international law and the Charter, will lead to the immediate lifting of the embargo and the normalization of bilateral relations in all their aspects.

Egypt once again urges the United States to comply immediately and fully with all 32 resolutions, which were adopted by the overwhelming majority of the international community, and to put an end to the unjustified embargo, which should never have existed and must cease once and for all.

## **El Salvador**

[Original: Spanish]

[28 January 2025]

The Republic of El Salvador, fully respecting the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law and the need to eliminate the unilateral application of coercive economic, commercial and financial measures that affect the development of any State's population, reiterates its firm commitment to implementing General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

El Salvador declares that it has not promulgated or applied laws or measures of any kind that are contrary to the provisions of that resolution, the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter or the freedom of international trade and navigation, in line with the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs set out in numerous international legal instruments.

El Salvador has stressed in various regional forums the necessity of ending unilateral measures, not only to ensure compliance with international law but also because they constitute regrettable actions that have caused incalculable harm to the Cuban people at a time when the world is facing a multidimensional crisis.

Aware of the serious effects of the blockade on vital areas such as health, education, food, sports and culture, El Salvador reiterates the call made in resolution [79/7](#) and the contents of all previous General Assembly resolutions on ending the embargo against Cuba.

## **Equatorial Guinea**

[Original: English]

[14 March 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea reaffirms its commitment to fulfilling the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular, respect for the principles of the sovereign equality of States and non-interference and non-intervention in their internal affairs; it also defends the right of countries and their citizens to freely enjoy the benefits offered by international navigation and trade.

All States must act in accordance with these principles of international law, avoiding unilateral measures that could affect the proper functioning of the social, economic and financial structures of other countries.

Equatorial Guinea reiterates its deep concern about the negative impact that the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba for more than half a century has had on the population of that

Caribbean country, evident during the years of the extreme offensive of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) emergency, during which there was difficulty accessing basic resources, technologies and raw materials to strengthen public services and save lives.

Equatorial Guinea calls upon the United States to rectify its policy towards Cuba and calls upon its Government to fully comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and not enact or apply laws or coercive measures that impose economic, commercial or financial restrictions against the friendly and sister Republic of Cuba.

## **Eritrea**

[Original: English]  
[7 March 2025]

The Government of the State of Eritrea has not promulgated or applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

Eritrea remains strongly opposed to any continuation of the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba, which is inconsistent with the principles of international law, and undermines the efforts of Cuba and its people in their endeavour towards the achievements of all the internationally agreed development goals, including the Sustainable Development Goals.

Eritrea joins other States in calling upon the US for the immediate repeal or invalidation of all laws or measures that continue to adversely impact the livelihoods of the Cuban people and on Cuban nationals living in other countries.

## **Eswatini**

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The Kingdom of Eswatini does not have any laws or measures of the kind referred to in the preamble of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), owing to the historic friendly and fraternal ties of cooperation with Cuba. Eswatini reiterates its call for an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba. Eswatini particularly appeals for strict compliance with the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as international law, in guaranteeing Cuba's freedom of international trade and navigation.

## **Ethiopia**

[Original: English]  
[19 March 2025]

The adoption of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) for the thirty-second consecutive year is testament to the urgent need to lift the sanctions unjustly imposed on Cuba for more than half a century.

Unilateral economic measures serve no purpose. They are blatant violations of international law and inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations.

These measures have negatively impacted Cuba's socioeconomic development, impeding the country's efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by

2030. The unilateral sanction has also hindered Cuba's participation in international trade and finance.

The international community therefore should continue to stand by the people and Government of Cuba and provide the necessary support to enable the country to overcome its development challenges. It should call for the lifting of the embargo and full reintegration of Cuba into the international political and economic system. The lifting of the sanctions will unlock the full potential of Cuba to effectively use its domestic resource and capability to build resilience and accelerate its development, including the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Ethiopia has consistently supported resolutions calling for an end to the embargo against Cuba and voted in their favour.

Ethiopia reiterates the call by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union for the lifting of the unjust economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba.

## European Union

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The European Union and its member States consider that the unilateral measures against Cuba should be terminated. The economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States contributes to the economic crisis in Cuba, negatively affecting the living standards of the Cuban people, being a factor in the current shortages, and having humanitarian consequences. The embargo has, inter alia, restricted Cuba's ability to import pharmaceuticals, medical devices and other medical supplies. The designation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism has introduced further obstacles, affecting in particular international financial transactions with the island. The European Union and its members consider that all these measures should be removed. External trade and foreign investment, which are undermined by the persisting embargo and the State sponsor of terrorism listing, can play a crucial role in setting Cuba on a path towards modernization, reforms and sustainable growth, and help it to overcome the economic hardship endured by the population.

The measures directed against Cuba negatively affect the European Union's interests and violate commonly accepted rules of international trade. The European Union and its member States have continued to express their opposition to the unlawful extraterritorial application of the United States embargo, such as that contained in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and in the Helms-Burton Act of 1996.

In 1996, the Council of Ministers of the European Union adopted a regulation and a joint action to protect the interest of natural or legal persons resident in the European Union against the extraterritorial application of the Helms-Burton Act. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 prohibits compliance with that legislation and forbids the European Union member States from giving effect to that legislation.

In 1998, at the European Union-United States Summit, held in London, a package was agreed covering waivers to Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act, a commitment by the United States Administration to resist future extraterritorial legislation of that kind and an understanding with respect to disciplines for the strengthening of investment protection. However, these waivers have not been implemented by the United States, in violation of the Agreement. The European Union recalls that it has delivered – and is continuing to deliver – on its commitments under the Agreement and calls upon the United States to do the same.

Taking into account the current situation, which adversely impacts on companies and nationals from European Union member States, the European Union must consider all possible instruments and options to protect its interests, including economic activities and investments. This includes Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, whose provisions can be invoked by European Union operators that are negatively affected by the extraterritorial application of the Helms-Burton Act.

The European Union is convinced that critical but constructive engagement with Cuba at all levels, including with civil society, is the most effective approach to contributing to the country's institutional, economic and social modernization, including a frank and open dialogue on the necessary improvements regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the framework of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Cuba, which has been provisionally applied since 2017, the European Union supports Cuba's economic and social reforms, sustainable development and common solutions to global challenges, while continuing to promote democracy and respect for human rights.

## **Fiji**

[Original: English]  
[19 March 2025]

The Government of Fiji reaffirms its support for General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and remains concerned about the continued application of the blockade. We believe that the United States unilateral measures against Cuba should be ended.

The Government of Fiji reiterates its position that all nations should refrain from imposing or supporting economic sanctions of the nature referred to in this resolution, thereby conforming to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Government of Fiji has consistently opposed any unilateral measures by countries that impinge on the sovereignty of another country, which includes any attempt to extend the application of a country's laws extraterritorially to other sovereign nations, and thereby fully supports every effort that calls for the lifting of the unilateral measures against Cuba.

## **Gabon**

[Original: French]  
[18 March 2025]

Gabon reiterates its principled position that the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba for over six decades should be lifted. This embargo not only poses a significant impediment to diplomatic relations between the countries concerned, but also has a negative impact on the Cuban economy and on the standard of living of Cuban citizens, who suffer the consequences of the embargo on a daily basis.

Gabon urgently calls for unfailing respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the sovereign equality of States, to ensure the peaceful settlement of disputes in a context characterized by many global challenges.

## Gambia

[Original: English]  
[9 January 2025]

The Government of the Gambia has neither promulgated nor applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution 79/7. The Gambia is opposed to the continued enactment or application of such laws, acts or measures against Cuba that impede the free flow of international trade and navigation. The embargo against Cuba contravenes the fundamental principles of international law, international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States, violating the sovereign equality of States and of non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other Member States. The embargo has no legitimate or moral justification as it continues to undermine the essential rights to economic emancipation and development of the Cuban people; it must come to an immediate end.

As a responsible member of the international community, the Gambia joins other Member States in calling for the immediate repeal or invalidation of such laws, measures or policies that impede the free flow of international trade and navigation as they are contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

It is our fervent desire that the relevant United Nations resolutions echoing collective concerns about the necessity of ending the embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba will be respected and implemented.

## Georgia

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

Georgia reaffirms its support for General Assembly resolution 79/7. Georgia has not promulgated or applied laws or taken measures against Cuba that would prohibit or restrict economic, commercial or financial relations between Cuba and Georgia.

## Ghana

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Ghana remains steadfast in its commitment to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, particularly the sovereign equality of States and the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs.

Ghana joins the overwhelming majority of Member States in once again calling for the immediate lifting of the United States embargo against Cuba. This long-standing measure continues to undermine the legitimate political, social and economic aspirations of the Cuban government and its people.

At a time when global challenges exacerbated by the lingering effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and ongoing geopolitical tensions have placed immense strain on developing economies, the continued imposition of this unilateral embargo is both unjustified and unsustainable. The embargo imposes severe hardships on the Cuban people, restricting access to essential goods and services, including food, medicine and critical social support systems. It hampers Cuba's ability

to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at a moment when international cooperation is most needed to advance collective global progress.

The embargo remains a matter of serious international concern, as consistently reaffirmed by successive General Assembly resolutions. Its disruption of international financial transactions, medical cooperation and trade relations not only deepens economic hardships for Cuba but also hampers global economic prosperity, adversely affecting neighbouring countries and beyond. Ghana stands in full support of the General Assembly's resounding call for its removal and remains committed to refraining from enacting or enforcing any measures that contravene Assembly resolution 79/7. We urge all Member States to do the same, in the spirit of multilateralism and solidarity.

Ghana reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Cuba and renews its solemn call for the United States to heed the overwhelming voice of the international community. Lifting this embargo is not only a matter of justice for Cuba but also a necessary step towards strengthening global cooperation, fostering economic resilience and upholding the principles upon which the United Nations was founded.

## Grenada

[Original: English]  
[19 February 2025]

Grenada reiterates its steadfast recognition of the sovereign equality of States and its adherence to the principles of the United Nations and urges all Member States to do the same.

Grenada continues to unequivocally reiterate that it neither promulgates, applies nor condones laws or measures that encroach on or undermine the sovereign rights of any State, as well as laws that restrict or hinder international trade or navigation by any State.

Grenada rejects the economic, commercial and financial embargo unilaterally imposed on the Government and people of Cuba by the United States of America and issues another clarion call for its immediate removal.

The measures of this blockade have deterred and impeded Cuba's economic development; they have suppressed the socioeconomic advancement of the Cuban people, have created untold hardship against the Cuban people and have been counter-productive to the goal of human development, and they continue to violate the sovereign rights of the Cuban Government and people in direct contravention of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

Grenada thus unreservedly supports General Assembly resolution 79/7.

Grenada adds its voice to that of the international community in expressing the desire to see the complete removal of this imposition based on mutual respect and the right to participate fully in the global activities of the international community of nations.

## Guatemala

[Original: Spanish]  
[3 February 2025]

Since 1997, the Republic of Guatemala has supported the resolutions on the economic, commercial and financial embargo against the Republic of Cuba, in

accordance with its commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

In 2018, the country joined the efforts of the United Nations system by adopting General Assembly resolution 73/8. Guatemala declares that it has not promulgated or applied laws or measures of any kind contrary to the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter or contrary to the freedom of international trade and navigation.

Guatemala rejects any unilateral measures that contravene the principles of free trade and international law, and urges those countries that continue to maintain those provisions in their domestic legal system to take the necessary steps to repeal them.

Consequently, there are no legal or regulatory impediments to freedom of transit or trade between Guatemala and Cuba, as reflected in the excellent relations between our countries.

Guatemala is concerned that, despite the unanimous resolve of the General Assembly, the policies of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba are increasingly being tightened, with consequences that undermine the development and well-being of the Cuban people.

Guatemala reiterates and makes a strong call for the restoration of a fruitful dialogue between the two parties to ensure the rapid re-establishment and normalization of their diplomatic, economic, commercial and financial relations and mutual cooperation.

Guatemala will continue to join the international community in supporting and promoting actions that lead to a prompt and definitive solution to end the blockade against Cuba.

## Guinea

[Original: French]

[29 April 2025]

Referring to the rules of international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the Republic of Guinea, faithful to the ideals of the sovereignty and equality of peoples, reaffirms its support for the international community's efforts to lift the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.

The Government of Guinea notes with regret that this blockade negatively affects efforts by the Cuban Government towards the economic and social development of the country, causing a worrying humanitarian situation and the loss of considerable financial resources that could have contributed to the development of the population.

The Government of Guinea offers its traditional support to the Cuban cause and expresses its commitment to strengthening the relations of friendship and cooperation that have always existed between Guinea and Cuba.

The Government of Guinea once again encourages the high authorities of the United States and Cuba to resume the dialogue initiated earlier for the unconditional lifting of the embargo, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

## Guinea-Bissau

[Original: French]  
[25 March 2025]

Guinea-Bissau reaffirms that discriminatory trade practices and the extraterritorial application of domestic law are contrary to the obligations to promote dialogue and to uphold the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

The Government of Guinea-Bissau has not endorsed any resolutions against Cuba and has adopted no internal mechanisms for their implementation, as they are unilateral and contrary to the norms of international law, in particular with regard to freedom of trade and navigation.

Guinea-Bissau notes with concern the actions and measures aimed at tightening the blockade.

Guinea-Bissau regrets that this blockade, which has been in place for over 60 years, continues to cause the Cuban people highly significant harm in all major sectors of the Cuban economy, such as public health, nutrition, transport, agriculture, banking, trade, investment and tourism.

This blockade continues to hinder the socioeconomic progress and development of the Cuban people and, for as long as it lasts, will continue to obstruct the efforts of Cuba to achieve sustainable development.

Guinea-Bissau acknowledges the importance attached by the Secretary-General to this issue and calls for the full implementation of resolution [79/7](#).

Guinea-Bissau also calls upon both countries to reach an agreement through sincere and constructive dialogue, with a view to improving ties between the two States.

## Guyana

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The Government of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana has consistently demonstrated its unwavering respect for and adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including those enunciated in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). To this end, and in compliance with resolution [79/7](#), Guyana has not promulgated nor applied laws and measures of the kind referred to in its preamble, the extraterritorial effects of which affect the sovereignty of other States, including Cuba.

Guyana maintains its call for an end to the embargo in compliance with the Charter. Guyana supports the call for the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States of America in the conviction that such a development would contribute to the economic, social and cultural integration of the Americas. We urge the support of the international community for developing countries such as Cuba as they seek to advance implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, consolidate post-pandemic recovery and grapple with the impacts of climate change.

The Government of Guyana recognizes the active contributions that Cuba has made over several decades in areas such as human resource development, health, agriculture, sports and culture, despite the ongoing embargo, and which have been integral to socioeconomic progress in the Caribbean Community, many of the

countries of the Latin America and Caribbean region and further afield. Guyana expresses its appreciation to the Government of Cuba for the valuable support provided in the area of health and the thousands of scholarships awarded to Guyanese in various fields over many years.

## Haiti

[Original: French]

[7 April 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Haiti has never promulgated any laws, legal provisions or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution 79/7.

Haiti reaffirms its commitment and adherence to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including respect for the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, as well as the rights of States and their nationals to the free enjoyment of the benefits of navigation and trade. States must act in accordance with these principles of international law and renounce unilateral measures that could undermine the social, economic and financial structures of other States.

The Government of Haiti has always supported the efforts of the sister Republic of Cuba regarding the urgent necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial blockade that has been affecting that country for many years, within the United Nations and at various summits of the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

The Government of Haiti hopes for bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States of America to be normalized, leading to the lifting of the blockade.

## Honduras

[Original: Spanish]

[13 March 2025]

In fulfilment of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law, Honduras has not promulgated or applied any unilateral economic and commercial laws or measures against other States that might affect the free flow of international trade.

## Iceland

[Original: English]

[18 March 2025]

The Government of Iceland reaffirms its position in favour of General Assembly resolution 79/7. Iceland neither promulgates nor applies any laws or measures referred to in resolution 79/7. Iceland does not apply trade or economic legislation against Cuba that restricts or discourages trade or investment to or from Cuba. Iceland opposes the extraterritorial extension of unilateral measures against a third country.

## India

[Original: English]  
[31 January 2025]

India has not promulgated or applied any laws of the type referred to in the preamble of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and, therefore, the necessity of repealing or invalidating any such laws or measures does not arise.

India has consistently opposed any unilateral measure by countries that impinge on the sovereignty of another country. These include any attempt to extend the application of a country's laws extraterritorially to other sovereign nations.

India recalls the final documents adopted by the nineteenth Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held on 19 and 20 January 2024 on this subject, the outcome document of the Third South Summit of the Group of 77, held in Kampala on 21 and 22 January 2024, and other high-level decisions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and urges the international community to adopt all necessary measures to protect the sovereign rights of all countries.

## Indonesia

[Original: English]  
[18 March 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia reiterates its strongest opposition to unilateral coercive measures with an extraterritorial effect on the sovereignty of other States and reiterates the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction and the freedom of trade and navigation. Indonesia continues to reject additional measures aimed at further strengthening the unilateral embargo against Cuba.

Indonesia reaffirms that the prolonged imposition of the unilateral economic, commercial and financial embargo by the United States of America against Cuba violates the principles of sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs, which are enshrined in many international legal instruments, including the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States. Indonesia consistently opposes unilateral coercive measures, which have severely impacted Cuba's economy, development and humanitarian conditions, hindering its progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

At a time when global efforts are focused on accelerating progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, any act that would impede other countries' capacity to fulfil their economic and social development is deemed intolerable. The embargo runs counter to the spirit of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, undermines international efforts towards restoring trust in multilateralism and risks leaving the people of Cuba behind.

Despite our support for consecutive resolutions on the necessity of ending the embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba, regrettably, we have witnessed little to no improvement in the situation. The suffering and hardships of the people of Cuba, particularly vulnerable groups such as children, women and elderly people, remain.

The Government of Indonesia continues to underline the importance of an enhanced dialogue with a view to ending the embargo imposed against Cuba and toward normalization of bilateral relations.

## Iran (Islamic Republic of)

[Original: English]  
[11 March 2025]

The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its strong opposition to unilateral coercive measures, especially those with extraterritorial effects on the sovereignty and independence of other States. These sanctions deliberately violate the principles of sovereign equality of States and non-interference and non-intervention in their internal affairs, which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States. It causes great suffering and untold hardship to ordinary people, especially those in vulnerable situations, such as the elderly, women and children and the sick, and violates basic human rights. Unilateral coercive measures are the main source hindering the full implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the realization of the economic rights of the people. Cuba, because of its decision to pursue an independent policy in international relations, is one of the countries that has suffered from this illegal policy for more than six decades.

Cuba, a peaceful country, has been under the severe embargo imposed by the United States for more than 60 years. It has also been nearly 60 years of all Member States of the United Nations vehemently rejecting this unjust and unlawful practice against Cuba, except for the United States of America and the Israeli regime, which enjoys the unwavering support of the United States in its atrocities and genocidal acts against the Palestinians.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, which has also been a victim of the United States policy of imposing unilateral coercive measures for more than four decades, expresses its solidarity and sympathy with the Cuban government and people. The Islamic Republic of Iran, through its close and various bilateral relations with Cuba, testifies to the constructive role played by this country in international relations, whether in multilateral forums, such as the United Nations, or in bilateral relations, including the provision of medical assistance and vaccines to other nations despite suffering from severe economic and financial pressure from the United States.

With regard to General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains its principal position, which has been reflected in numerous previous reports of the Secretary-General under this resolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran fully supports the implementation of resolution [79/7](#) in accordance with its historical position of refraining from the promulgation or application of laws or measures referred to in the resolution and strongly opposes the imposition of unilateral coercive measures against Cuba. In the same vein, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to categorically reject the inclusion of Cuba in the fabricated list of the United States of America as a State sponsor of terrorism on the basis of an internal political agenda and baseless and unsubstantiated allegations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, in close coordination and cooperation with other Member States that are victims of unilateral coercive measures, and first and foremost Cuba, will continue its efforts to prevent, eliminate and minimize the adverse effects of unilateral coercive measures. Iran will not hesitate to further strengthen its bilateral relations with Cuba, which help both countries to alleviate their suffering from United States sanctions.

The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the Cuban people and government and joins the global call for the United States to immediately and fully comply with its international obligations and lift sanctions against Cuba.

## Iraq

[Original: English]  
[25 April 2025]

Unilateral coercive measures negatively affect individuals, companies and human rights, resulting from sanctions imposed by one or more countries for political or economic considerations. The negative impacts of unilateral sanctions and unilateral coercive measures are represented in the following matters:

1. Increased poverty. Poverty rates tend to rise among poor and middle classes in countries subject to sanctions due to the lack of access to economic resources. The decline in the standard of living occurs when needed supplies and resources in countries subject to sanctions are cut off and the countries become economically isolated. Consequently, these sanctions lead to a noticeable decline in the per capita gross domestic product, which is followed by a deterioration in the country's general economic situation. Poverty rates are directly proportional to the severity of sanctions in the countries subject to them.
2. Low level of health. Although sanctions are not imposed on medicines and medical equipment, they have indirect consequences, represented by the difficulty of providing medicines to the countries under sanctions, which negatively affects the right of citizens to obtain equitable healthcare.
3. Impeding access to justice. The right to litigation, as one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the individual before the competent judicial authorities, is exposed to negative consequences due to unilateral sanctions, including the inability of individuals to pay litigation fees to judicial institutions.
4. The impact of unilateral economic sanctions on the relations of countries under sanctions with other countries. Countries often withdraw from bilateral relations due to the restrictions imposed, which creates isolation for the countries under sanctions, such as the abstention of banks and companies from dealing with them.

### Recommendations:

- Urge all countries to refrain from imposing unilateral coercive measures that are inconsistent with the rules of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and the principles regulating peaceful relations between countries, especially measures whose effects exceed territorial borders and which create obstacles to trade relations between countries.
- Settle differences between countries through dialogue and peaceful means to resolve disputes.
- Iraq has consistently supported the resolutions of the General Assembly on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba.
- Iraq supports diplomatic mediation efforts to encourage negotiations and dialogue to end the embargo.
- Iraq welcomes all efforts to normalize relations between the United States of America and Cuba, lift all restrictions and enable the Cuban people to engage freely in trade and economic activities, in keeping with the efforts of the United Nations to achieve sustainable development for all peoples, without exception.

## Jamaica

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

The Government of Jamaica remains fully committed to the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and freedom of international trade and navigation.

In keeping with the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/7, the Government of Jamaica has not promulgated any legislation or measure that would infringe on the sovereignty of any State or its lawful national interests.

Jamaica views economic sovereignty as a cornerstone of a State's development. On 29 October 2024, for the sixteenth consecutive year, the Parliament passed a resolution that, inter alia, called for renewed dialogue between the United States and Cuba and for the ending of the embargo. Jamaica believes that the embargo constitutes the principal obstacle to the development of the Cuban economy and hinders the implementation of the country's National Plan for Economic and Social Development, as well as efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Jamaica agrees that the imposition of unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and undermines the principles of multilateralism, sovereignty and free trade.

Jamaica remains concerned about the impact of these measures on the resolve of the Government of Cuba to improve the socioeconomic situation of its people, and urges the dismantling of outdated and discriminatory measures that have exacerbated Cuba's economic and social struggles. Jamaica has consistently joined the call for Cuba's removal from the list of countries considered to be State sponsors of terrorism by the United States of America, maintaining that the unwarranted classification deepens the challenges that Cuba faces with third parties and ought to be justly removed. Jamaica welcomes the measures taken by the United States Government in January 2025 on this designation, which, though partial and limited, are steps in the right direction.

Jamaica's strong advocacy for Cuba to be fully reintegrated into the hemisphere is based on its view that the embargo is not only a punitive measure against Cuba, but also an impediment to our shared regional development.

Jamaica has consistently supported General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 79/7, and has urged all Members States to uphold the Charter of the United Nations by ceasing the application of such inimical measures.

Within regional forums, Jamaica has joined other Member States in affirming this position. The Heads of State and Government of the Caribbean Community have repeatedly issued public statements rejecting the imposition of these unilateral coercive measures and have called for an immediate and unconditional end of the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed against Cuba.

Jamaica therefore reiterates its call for the complete and immediate removal of the embargo, which continues to have dire social and economic effects on Cuba and its people.

## Japan

[Original: English]  
[21 March 2025]

The Government of Japan has not promulgated or applied laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

The Government of Japan believes that the economic policy of the United States towards Cuba should be considered primarily as a bilateral issue. However, Japan shares the concern, arising from the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as the Helms-Burton Act) and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, that, if the application of such legislation causes undue hardship in relation to the economic activities of the enterprises or nationals of a third party, the legislation is likely to run counter to international law regarding the extraterritorial application of domestic laws.

The Government of Japan has been closely following the situation in relation to the above-mentioned legislation and the surrounding circumstances, and its concern remains unchanged. Having considered the matter with the utmost care, Japan voted in favour of resolution [79/7](#).

## Jordan

[Original: English]  
[24 January 2025]

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has not applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in resolution [79/7](#). The Government of Jordan has consistently voted in favour of resolutions on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba and reaffirms its commitment to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

## Kazakhstan

[Original: English]  
[19 March 2025]

Kazakhstan traditionally adheres to the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom of international trade, and supports the resolutions of the General Assembly on lifting the economic, trade and financial blockade against Cuba.

## Kenya

[Original: English]  
[24 February 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Kenya has neither promulgated nor applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

The Government of Kenya believes in a rules-based multilateral system and, as such, cannot support unilateral decisions that seek to block Cuba and cause continued suffering for the friendly Cuban people.

The United Nations should never uphold or support any sanctions or embargos in perpetuity, particularly when these have undermined Cuba's overall objectives of national ownership, sustainable peace and sustainable development.

It is for these reasons that Kenya always votes in favour of the resolutions on the necessity to eliminate this prolonged burden on the Cuban people. The Cuban people have a right to protect their statehood and free participation in the global market, as well as in other trends and events at play, as a nation duly recognized by the United Nations.

## **Kiribati**

[Original: English]  
[15 April 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Kiribati again reiterates, for the eleventh time, its support for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution calling upon the United States to bring an end to its unilateral embargo against Cuba in conformity with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The resolution addresses moral and human considerations, and, when implemented, will contribute positively to the general welfare and well-being of the people of Cuba and to a more peaceful, humane and loving world for all.

## **Kuwait**

[Original: English]  
[7 April 2025]

The State of Kuwait expresses its support for the implementation of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and reiterates its strong commitment to international law and to the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including those pertaining to the sovereign equality of States and non-interference in their internal affairs, non-aggression, peaceful coexistence and the settling of disputes by peaceful means.

Kuwait further reaffirms its adherence to the principles of freedom of trade and navigation in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

## **Kyrgyzstan**

[Original: English]  
[27 February 2025]

The Kyrgyz Republic reaffirms its commitment to the fundamental norms and principles of international law, including the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and advocates respect for the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom of international trade and shipping. The Kyrgyz Republic consistently supports the efforts of the States Members of the United Nations to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba.

## **Lao People's Democratic Republic**

[Original: English]  
[15 March 2025]

The Lao People's Democratic Republic reaffirms its position that an embargo, with its extraterritorial implications, not only hinders the socioeconomic development of a nation, but it also contradicts the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter

of the United Nations and international law, the sovereign equality of States and freedom of international trade and navigation. The Lao People's Democratic Republic has neither promulgated nor applied laws and measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

The imposition of the economic, commercial and financial embargo on Cuba by the United States of America not only violates international law but also imposes severe restrictions and obstacles to the socioeconomic development of Cuba. The Lao People's Democratic Republic calls for the lifting of the embargo as early as possible.

## **Lebanon**

[Original: English]  
[29 January 2025]

The Government of Lebanon fully complies with General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. This is a long-standing position of Lebanon, based on the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law that emphasize the need to respect the sovereignty of States.

## **Lesotho**

[Original: English]  
[13 March 2025]

The Kingdom of Lesotho reaffirms its commitment to the provisions and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, which, inter alia, provide for the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and freedom of international trade and navigation.

Lesotho is deeply concerned about the harmful effects of the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba. Lesotho calls upon the United States of America to lift the embargo.

## **Liberia**

[Original: English]  
[15 April 2025]

The Government of Liberia supports the call to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba, principally as the embargo poses challenges for the people of Cuba.

The position of the Republic of Liberia is in consonance with the common position of the African Union, which calls for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the necessity of ending the embargo.

Liberia cooperates with the other Member States of the United Nations to support the call to end the embargo and the resolution on that matter.

## Libya

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

Libya reiterates its strong opposition to unilateral measures imposed on States for political purposes and stresses that such conduct does not help to resolve differences between States but, rather, complicates and exacerbates them.

Libya has consistently expressed its commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law. It has not enacted or applied any laws of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution 79/7.

Libya voted in favour of resolution 79/7 in order to reiterate that it opposes the economic, commercial and financial embargo. It calls upon States to resolve their differences by peaceful means and to shun coercive unilateral measures, which violate the principles of the Charter and human rights and impede efforts to achieve development, especially the Sustainable Development Goals.

## Madagascar

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Madagascar, as a State Member of the United Nations, respects the principles enshrined in its Charter, including the sovereign equality of States and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of another State.

The Government of Madagascar had neither promulgated nor applied laws or economic, trade or financial sanctions against Cuba.

Madagascar supports for this purpose the measures aimed at lifting the economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba.

## Malawi

[Original: English]  
[20 May 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Malawi, which has diplomatic relations with Cuba, has never promulgated country-specific targeted legislation or instruments barring trade or cooperation with Cuba.

## Malaysia

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

Malaysia continues to strongly oppose the imposition of unilateral coercive measures against any country, including Cuba.

Such measures are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations. They have deprived millions of people of socioeconomic development and assistance in combating climate change.

In keeping with its principled and consistent position, Malaysia supported General Assembly resolution 79/7.

Malaysia reiterates the urgent need to eliminate unilateral coercive measures and calls upon the parties concerned to strengthen diplomatic efforts toward this end.

## **Maldives**

[Original: English]

[20 January 2025]

The Republic of Maldives is against imposing any kind of sanctions against any country without an explicit mandate from the Security Council. Maldives has not imposed any sanctions on Cuba nor has it enacted any laws or regulations that would contravene the provisions of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), in support of which the Maldives has voted.

## **Mali**

[Original: French]

[3 March 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Mali has always voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba.

The Government of Mali, which fully supports General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), has not promulgated any laws or applied any measures of the kind referred to in the preamble to that resolution.

Mali maintains its position that the blockade imposed against Cuba should be lifted.

## **Mauritania**

[Original: French]

[6 March 2025]

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania disagrees with and is opposed to any embargo that hinders the economic and social development of a country and leads to human suffering. Mauritania has always voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.

Mauritania remains committed to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and freedom of trade and navigation.

## **Mauritius**

[Original: English]

[14 February 2025]

Mauritius reiterates its commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs. In line with these principles, and in conformity with international law, the Republic of Mauritius has not promulgated any law or measure aimed at imposing a unilateral economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba.

Mauritius enjoys good bilateral relations with Cuba and remains open to developing its trade relations with Cuba.

## Mexico

[Original: Spanish]

[26 March 2025]

Mexico categorically condemns the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed for almost six decades against Cuba.

On 30 October 2024, our country reaffirmed, before the entirety of the United Nations, our unreserved condemnation of the economic blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba, which has become a structural cause of the undermining of the human rights of the Cuban people, with major ramifications for the economy of Cuba and the country's economic and social development, and we stated before the international community our intention of leading efforts to eliminate this measure, while promoting cooperation for development.

Mexico reiterates that, in relations among sovereign nations, any unilateral measure intended as a means of political pressure to achieve changes from outside in the internal decisions of another State contravenes the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and undermines peace and stability among peoples. Accordingly, our country affirms that there is an urgent need for Cuba to be removed from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, which impedes international financial transactions and hampers the operations of foreign companies, thus causing shortages of basic products.

One example of the effects of the blockade is the deterioration in the ability of Cuba to repay the debt incurred by the Cuban financial institution with the National Foreign Trade Bank of Mexico. While a debt acknowledgement agreement has been concluded, bilateral commercial activities between the institutions were put on hold, adversely affecting potential benefits not only for businesses (financing programmes, technical cooperation, training and financial services), but also for citizens of the two countries.

The Government of Mexico has implemented measures, programmes and strategies supporting Cuba, including the “Sembrando vida en Cuba” [“Sowing life in Cuba”] programme, which is aimed at increasing agricultural production through in-kind support, such as plants, seeds, tools, machinery and tailored technical support, thereby strengthening food sovereignty and improving quality of life.

Since 2022, humanitarian aid has been provided through the Federal Electricity Commission to assist in the restoration of electricity infrastructure in Cuba, sometimes following natural events.

In the new global geopolitical reality, unity and multilateralism are advisable and expected when addressing global challenges. Consequently, and in keeping with the historical relationship between our country and Cuba, we consider the blockade unacceptable, not only in terms of human rights, but also because of the incalculable harm to the economic and social development of the island and the Cuban people.

All the above was reaffirmed by the President of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, in October 2024, when she said that Mexico has never supported the blockade. The integration of Latin America and the Caribbean is essential for the economic development and well-being of the peoples of the region, and the nations involved will never cease to promote mutual commercial, social and economic strengthening.

The blockade has undoubtedly prevented Cuba from engaging in international trade and finance, which translates in particular into commercial underdevelopment, financial exclusion of individuals and companies, withdrawal of contracts, the loss of relations with banking establishments and indebtedness, among other impacts.

Mexico stands in solidarity with the Cuban people and reiterates the need to lift the blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.

## **Monaco**

[Original: French]  
[6 March 2025]

Pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the general principles of international law, the Principality of Monaco has not promulgated or applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

## **Mongolia**

[Original: English]  
[17 February 2025]

The Government of Mongolia has neither promulgated nor applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in the preamble to General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

Mongolia reaffirms its commitment to the objectives and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, particularly the principles of sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, and freedom of international trade and navigation.

Mongolia has consistently opposed the continued imposition of unilateral measures and reaffirms its support for the complete lifting of the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba. Mongolia is deeply concerned about the severe impact of these restrictions on Cuba's economic growth and overall socioeconomic development, particularly in essential sectors such as food security and trade.

As part of its commitment to international solidarity and zero hunger, Mongolia contributed \$1 million to the World Food Programme in 2024 to support food security efforts in Cuba. This contribution was aimed at enhancing the food security and nutrition of pregnant women and vulnerable people registered for the social assistance programme in the provinces of Villa Clara and Cienfuegos.

## **Montenegro**

[Original: English]  
[28 January 2025]

The Government of Montenegro supported General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

Government of Montenegro reaffirms its commitment to the purpose and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and has neither promulgated nor applied laws or measures of the kind referred to in the preamble to the resolution. Government of Montenegro is ready to further develop cooperation with Cuba both at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

## Mozambique

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The Republic of Mozambique has never promulgated, applied, collaborated on or contributed to the application of any laws or regulations contravening General Assembly resolution 79/7.

This position is consistent with the favourable vote of Mozambique in support of the resolution.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation takes this opportunity to reiterate the unconditional support of Mozambique for the provisions of the resolution and calls for the unconditional lifting of the embargo against the Republic of Cuba.

## Namibia

[Original: English]  
[26 February 2025]

Namibia confirms its support of General Assembly resolution 79/7. Namibia reaffirms its commitment to upholding the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and requests that the embargo against Cuba be lifted immediately and unconditionally.

Namibia firmly believes that such unilateral sanctions hinder the ability of the Cuban people to exercise their fundamental rights and pursue their own socioeconomic development. The embargo has not only adversely affected the livelihoods of millions of Cubans, but also obstructed vital medical assistance and humanitarian aid, especially in times of crisis.

Namibia urges all Member States, particularly those in a position to influence the situation, to recognize the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations and highlight the importance of upholding international law.

As a member State of both the Southern African Development Community and the African Union, Namibia's support for the resolution aligns with the broader regional and continental stance against sanctions and external interference. It reinforces the idea that African nations and other developing countries should support each other in their quests for independence and economic development. Every year, the States members of the African Union adopt a decision to end the illegal sanctions against Cuba, a tradition that we believe the African Union will uphold until the people of Cuba can truly enjoy their hard-earned independence.

Besides the African Union, Namibia has also supported the lifting of the United States embargo on Cuba through other international organizations, such as the United Nations and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, where Namibia has endorsed resolutions calling for the end of the embargo against Cuba, reflecting its commitment to solidarity with developing nations, as well as the Commonwealth, where Namibia has continued to engage with Commonwealth initiatives that advocate for the normalization of relations with Cuba and lifting of the embargo.

Namibia reiterates its unwavering commitment to supporting General Assembly resolution 79/7 and stands ready to work with fellow States Members of the United Nations to promote a just and equitable world free from undue external pressures and interventions.

On the basis of a number of bilateral agreements, the Government of the Republic of Namibia maintains cordial mutual relations and long-term collaboration

with the Government of Cuba. The two countries convene joint working sessions covering various sectors every two years.

The Government of Namibia maintains excellent and cordial relations with the Government of Cuba, based on a number of bilateral agreements entered into between the two nations for mutual benefit of the Namibian and Cuban people.

Namibia and Cuba have mutual bilateral cooperation in several areas, described below.

Under a specific agreement between the Ministry of Public Health of Cuba and the Ministry of Health and Social Services of Namibia, signed in 2015, the two countries have forged good relations, which have enabled Namibia to benefit from the service of 98 Cuban medical specialists who are currently serving in Namibia, primarily assisting the government with its challenging responsibility of extending public health to the local population.

Under the umbrella of the bilateral agreement on the provision of the Cuban medical brigade, Cuban medical practitioners are deployed in public hospitals across the country, including remote areas, which includes specialists in health fields such as internal medicine, neurosurgery, intensive care, paediatrics, orthopaedics, psychiatry, gynaecology, neonatology, plastic surgery, forensic medicine, stomatology, electro-medicine, pharmacy, anaesthesia, urology, radiology and maxillofacial surgery.

At the same time, the Cuban medical practitioners are also contributing to skills and knowledge transfer in the health sector, as they work alongside local medical personnel.

The Government of Namibia, through its Ministry of Urban and Rural Development, signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Construction of the Government of the Republic of Cuba in 2013, which makes provision for the secondment of Cuban engineers and architects to serve in Namibia. There are currently 21 Cuban consultants working in 12 of the 14 regions of Namibia.

The Cuban experts serving under the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development have been instrumental in the supervision of design and implementation of capital projects being carried out by the regional councils, such as the construction of houses, offices, bridges and other public infrastructure.

The Cuban technical experts seconded to the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development have been instrumental in the transfer of knowledge and skills to local personnel who serve in the geological services and material development research and in innovation, at the Habitat Research and Development Centre under the Directorate of Housing and Rural Development of the line ministry.

The Ministry of Works and Transport of the Republic of Namibia and the Ministry of Construction of Cuba signed an Agreement in July 2024 on the secondment of Cuban technical professionals.

Upon receiving approval from the Public Service Commission of Namibia, the Ministry of Works and Transport of the Republic of Namibia is currently at an advanced stage of making logistical arrangements towards receiving 20 Cuban technical professionals in Namibia, in order for them to commence with rendering their services.

In 2022, the Ministry of Works and Transport of the Republic of Namibia and the Ministry of Higher Education of the Republic of Cuba signed an Agreement which makes provision for the training of Namibian students in Cuba in technical fields of engineering, with scholarships sponsored by the line ministry.

Upon completion of the selection process, which was made public for all eligible young Namibians to apply, the Ministry of Works and Transport sent a group of 33 Namibian students to Cuba in October 2024 to commence with their engineering studies.

In 2016, the Cuban Ministry of Public Health, (represented by the Cuban Medical Services ) and the Ministry of Health and Social Services of Namibia signed a specific agreement for academic services.

Under the same scholarship programme sponsored by the Ministry of Health and Social Services, a total number of 177 medical science students and 49 dentistry students have since graduated from Cuban institutions of higher learning between 2022 and 2024.

Namibia and Cuba entered into a framework agreement in the domain of defence in 2011, which facilitates the training and capacity development of Namibian Defence Force officers at Cuban military training institutions.

Since the inception of the programme, eight members of the Namibian Defence Force started their training in Cuba, specializing in computer engineering and exploration and radio electronic engineering.

Apart from the fruitful bilateral cooperation between Namibia and Cuba, the following high-level exchanges have recently taken place between the two countries, with the aim of further cementing bilateral relations between them:

- At the invitation of Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, President of Cuba, Nangolo Mbumba, President of Namibia, undertook an official visit to Cuba from 16 to 18 December 2024.
- During the official visit, the two countries concluded a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of an intergovernmental commission for bilateral cooperation, to be chaired by ministers responsible for international relations and foreign affairs.
- Peter Katjavivi, Speaker of the National Assembly, undertook a visit to Cuba from 19 to 26 October 2024 to strengthen bilateral cooperation in parliamentary affairs.
- Lukas Sinimbo Muha, Chairperson of the National Council, undertook a visit to Cuba from 14 to 25 September 2024 to strengthen bilateral cooperation in parliamentary affairs.
- Yvonne Dausab, Minister of Justice, undertook a visit to Cuba from 22 to 24 October 2024 to attend the fourth international JurisCuba congress (2024).
- Festus Katuna Mbandeka, Attorney General of Namibia, undertook a visit to Cuba from 19 to 26 October 2024 to conclude a cooperation agreement between the offices of the attorneys general of the two countries.

## Nauru

[Original: English]  
[13 March 2025]

The Republic of Nauru reaffirms its commitment to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign equality of States and the importance of non-interference in internal affairs. Nauru acknowledges the significance of freedom in international trade and navigation, as established by international law. Nauru expresses its concern regarding the economic, commercial

and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba. It highlights the importance of ending this embargo, especially during these challenging times when the global community faces multiple crises. Nauru fully supports General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). Nauru urges all parties involved to approach this issue with an open mind and a spirit of cooperation in order to reach a mutually beneficial solution.

## **Nepal**

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

The Government of Nepal has firmly adhered to the provisions of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and has not enacted or applied any laws or measures contrary to it.

## **New Zealand**

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The Government of New Zealand reaffirms its position in support of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). The Government of New Zealand has consistently supported General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the trade embargo against Cuba. We reiterate those calls.

New Zealand has no trade or economic legislation or measures that restrict or discourage trade with Cuba or investment in or from that country, and welcomes all steps towards normalization, including lifting the embargo.

## **Nicaragua**

[Original: Spanish]  
[10 February 2025]

Nicaragua reaffirms its commitment to the defence and promotion of multilateralism and the right to development of our peoples, basing its relationships on respect, solidarity, equality and mutual cooperation with all peoples of the world, respecting and upholding international law and the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, including non-interference in internal affairs.

Nicaragua promotes a culture of peace, recognizing the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes between States through the means available under international law.

The Government of National Unity and Reconciliation defends the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination, national sovereignty, independence, and the building of their own model of political, economic, social and cultural development, free from foreign interference, intervention, threats or aggression.

Nicaragua believes that the international community must move forward and come together in this new multipolar world, striding towards greater integration and rejecting and denouncing the vestiges of imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism.

Nicaragua notes with concern that, even today, there are States that continue to impose the use of illegal unilateral and arbitrary coercive measures as a targeted political tool to lash out against independent, dignified peoples who reject their interventionist measures and do not agree with their impositions.

Nicaragua denounces the application or promotion of the use of economic, political or any other type of measures as a flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Since 1959, the United States has attempted to destroy the heroic and generous Cuban Revolution by imposing an illegal economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba, which has evolved and has been tightened over more than 65 years. The blockade is just one of numerous terrorist acts perpetrated against Cuba.

In addition to massively and flagrantly violating the fundamental human rights of the Cuban people, the United States has demonstrated its total contempt, violating the right to life, health, food and education, including the right to development and the right to self-determination.

This immoral, illegal and inhumane blockade has caused cumulative damage in the amount of \$164,141.1 million over more than six decades of anachronistic policies, causing the Cuban economy to undergo extraordinary pressures that have affected industry, the service sector and retail trade, as well as causing food and medicine shortages and leading to a decline in the level of consumption and in the general well-being of the population.

Nicaragua condemns the blockade imposed against Cuba and demands that the Government of the United States end all economic, commercial and financial measures imposed against the people and Government of Cuba, which have already caused irreversible harm, as has been amply demonstrated in the reports of the Secretary-General on the matter.

Nicaragua rejects and condemns all aggressive policies against Cuba, the claims filed under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act; the targeting of businesses, ships and shipping companies that send fuel supplies to the country; the arbitrary and unjustified inclusion of Cuba on the State Department's list of State sponsors of terrorism, the attack on all sources of income and foreign currency inflows; the intimidation of third parties; and the strengthening of pressure on Governments, banking institutions and business owners around the world.

The United Nations must fulfil its historic purpose of promoting, on the basis of sovereign equality, a multilateralism where the voices of our peoples prevail, where the yearnings of humanity are fulfilled, and where the intensification of the blockade and its extraterritorial effects are denounced and rejected.

Nicaragua insists that the numerous United Nations resolutions must be respected and implemented once and for all, putting an end to this illegal policy against Cuba.

We once again urge the United States to initiate a respectful dialogue aimed at resolving its pending bilateral issues with Cuba, on the basis of the equality of States, reciprocity and respect for the sovereignty and independence of Cuba.

## **Niger**

[Original: French]  
[30 January 2025]

The United States embargo against Cuba, which was enacted in February 1962 following nationalizations involving the expropriation of United States companies, and which is still in force, remains one of the longest-standing unilateral sanctions regimes in the world.

The Government of the Niger is deeply committed to respecting the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and freedom of international trade and navigation, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and reiterates that it has no intention of applying any laws or measures of any type whereby embargoes are imposed against a State, including the laws and measures referred to in General Assembly resolution 79/7.

In addition, the Niger reaffirms its principled position in support of that resolution, as well as its adherence to the relevant positions affirmed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of 77 and China, among others, calling for an end to the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed against Cuba.

This blockade is causing great suffering for the Cuban people, hindering their economic and social development, and must therefore be urgently lifted.

The Republic of the Niger thus continues to offer its solidarity to the Cuban people and its support to Cuba and trusts, once again, that it will be able to rely on the support of the international community for ending this unjust blockade, which has lasted far too long.

## **Nigeria**

[Original: English]  
[14 February 2025]

The Federal Government of Nigeria reiterates its continued resolve to maintain friendly relations with all States and condemns the application of unilateral measures for the settlement of disputes between States. Nigeria also reiterates its support for ending the embargo against Cuba and for the promotion of international cooperation among Member States. Nigeria believes that the easing of the embargo on Cuba would be a demonstration of peaceful settlement of disputes in the international system.

## **Norway**

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The Government of Norway reaffirms its position in favour of General Assembly resolution 79/7. Norway does not promulgate or apply laws or measures of the kind referred to in the resolution. Norway does not apply trade or economic legislation that restricts or discourages trade with or investment in or from Cuba. Norway opposes the extraterritorial extension of unilateral measures against a third country. Norway regrets that the United States has not resumed its previous commitment to waiving Title III of the Helms-Burton Act and encourages the United States and Cuba to work for the normalization of bilateral relations with a view to bringing about the end of the embargo against Cuba. Norway also encourages the United States to remove Cuba from its designation as a State sponsor of terrorism.

## **Oman**

[Original: English]  
[26 February 2025]

The Government of Oman complies with and implements General Assembly resolution 79/7 and does not apply any laws and measures of the kind referred to in the preamble of the said resolution.

## Pakistan

[Original: English]  
[17 January 2025]

Pakistan is fully in observance of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

## Panama

[Original: Spanish]  
[26 March 2025]

As a founding Member of the United Nations and a State that advocates peace, Panama maintains relations of friendship and cooperation with all States on the basis of inclusion and respect for the principles of justice and international law, as well as for the right to self-determination of peoples, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in matters that lie essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States.

Panama promotes and will continue to promote dialogue and the peaceful settlement of disputes, free trade and transparent international trade.

## Papua New Guinea

[Original: English]  
[15 April 2025]

Papua New Guinea recalls its support for General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). Papua New Guinea is opposed to any extraterritorial application of laws and regulations that infringe on the sovereignty of other United Nations Member States.

Papua New Guinea has no restrictive legislative, policy or other measures against Cuba but on the contrary encourages constructive and friendly relations between both countries consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international law.

## Peru

[Original: Spanish]  
[25 March 2025]

Peru reiterates its firm commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, in particular the sovereign equality of States, the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, freedom of international trade and navigation, and full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba has been detrimental to the country's economic growth, has hindered its economic development and has limited its population's access to resources, such as technology, private loans and international markets, as well as to basic rights, such as food, health and other social services.

Peru believes that the unilateral imposition of a blockade is incompatible with international law, the principles of peaceful coexistence and the Charter of the United Nations, in addition to being a violation of international trade rules, which are grounded in the covered agreements of the World Trade Organization, and the principles of cooperation.

At the multilateral level, Peru has voiced its firm rejection of this measure on multiple occasions, having voted in favour of not only resolution [47/19](#) on the necessity of ending the embargo in 1992 but all Assembly resolutions on the matter since then. At the bilateral level, commercial relations between Cuba and Peru continue and are governed by the Economic Complementarity Agreement, in effect since 2001.

In systematically opposing the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed against Cuba, Peru will continue to support the resolutions introduced in the United Nations on the need to end the embargo and promote commercial and economic exchanges with the country at the bilateral level.

## **Philippines**

[Original: English]

[7 March 2025]

The Philippines fully supports and reiterates its commitment to adhere to General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). The Philippines has not imposed and does not intend to impose any laws, regulations or measures that are contrary to resolution [79/7](#).

## **Qatar**

[Original: Arabic]

[26 March 2025]

The position of the State of Qatar remains unchanged with regard to the resolution, which it fully supports. Qatar firmly supports the rules and principles of international law and applies them in its foreign policy and fully complies with the purposes and principles of Charter of the United Nations. Qatar has consistently urged against the imposition of any unilateral coercive measures.

Accordingly, the State of Qatar has not introduced or applied any laws or measures that are inconsistent with the resolution.

## **Republic of Korea**

[Original: English]

[6 March 2025]

Since 1999, the Government of the Republic of Korea has consistently supported General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba. Therefore, the Republic of Korea has not applied laws and administrative measures of the kind referred to in resolution [79/7](#).

## **Republic of Moldova**

[Original: English]

[19 March 2025]

The Republic of Moldova fully upholds the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and has never promulgated nor applied laws and measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) on the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba.

## Russian Federation

[Original: Russian]  
[21 March 2025]

The Russian Federation reaffirms its principled position in favour of an immediate and complete end to the illegitimate United States blockade against the Republic of Cuba.

This discriminatory practice is a throwback to the post-colonial world order, which remains a challenge to the system of international relations. It is an example of a futile attempt to impose unilateral coercive measures as the norm for responding to disagreements between States. In that regard, it is highly revealing that a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly expressing the solidarity of the international community with the legitimate demands of the Cuban people has been adopted for more than 30 years by the votes of virtually all States Members of the Organization.

It is clear to all that the purpose of Washington's unjust restrictions on Havana, which have been in force since 1962, is the island's economic "strangulation" in order to destabilize the social situation and, ultimately, bring about an unconstitutional change of government. It is impossible to interpret such a policy of the United States leadership other than as open and blatant interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign State of Cuba.

The blockade is having a destructive influence on Havana's insertion into the global financial and economic system. By declaring the extraterritorial effect of the blockade, the United States of America is preventing other countries from trading and investing in Cuba. As a consequence, the island of freedom's industry is virtually deprived of the ability to acquire raw materials, energy, machinery and spare parts for equipment. Interbank transactions have been noticeably complicated. The well-being and health of ordinary Cuban citizens have been significantly and unjustifiably harmed.

As part of the sanctions pressure, Cuba has also been placed by the United States on its unilateral list of so-called State sponsors of terrorism. We see purely political motives in this step taken by Washington that have nothing to do with real counter-terrorism.

The figures speak for themselves: from March 2023 to February 2024, the damage to the Cuban economy from the United States blockade amounted to more than \$5.056 billion, or more than \$421 million per month. As of October 2024, Cuba's total losses from the blockade over its history reached \$164.141 billion.

At the same time, the Cuban people have shown remarkable resilience and courage, proving the futility of the policy of pressure and isolation. Enjoying well-deserved respect among the countries of the global South, Cuba has consistently pursued an independent course and has made a constructive and supportive contribution to the development of regional integration processes.

In continuation of our steadfast position, we call for the immediate lifting of the blockade against the Republic of Cuba without preconditions, guided by the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the inadmissibility of any discriminatory measures, infringement of national sovereignty or interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States.

## Rwanda

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

The position of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda remains unchanged regarding the resolution on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba.

The Government of Rwanda, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, fully implements General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). The Government of Rwanda stresses that there are no legal or regulatory impediments to free transit or trade between Rwanda and Cuba.

## Saint Kitts and Nevis

[Original: English]  
[1 April 2025]

The Government of Saint Kitts and Nevis remains steadfast in upholding the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, which form the foundation of multilateralism. In keeping with its global obligations, Saint Kitts and Nevis advocates an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo that the United States of America has maintained against Cuba. Likewise, the Government of Saint Kitts and Nevis strongly appeals to the Government of the United States to remove Cuba from its list of State sponsors of terrorism.

The embargo, compounded by hundreds of sanctions and recent policy implementation, continues to negatively affect Cuba's socioeconomic development and has devastating effects on the well-being of its people. Unilateral decisions by the United States Government to impose visa sanctions on Cuban officials linked to the country's medical cooperation programmes are another measure that will have deleterious effects on the nation. These restrictions will also have serious extraterritorial and socioeconomic implications particularly for small countries such as Saint Kitts and Nevis, considering the potential expansion of visa sanctions on foreign Governments that engage with the programme and benefit from Cuban medical expertise.

Cuba's dedication to Saint Kitts and Nevis, even in the face of these mounting challenges, demonstrates the depth of our bilateral relationship. The Cuban Medical Brigade, along with the Cuban Government Scholarship Programme, has provided unprecedented contributions to our health sector and capacity-building efforts, reinforcing their commitment towards shared development between our nations.

The Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis reaffirms the importance of constructive dialogue and engagement between Cuba and the United States to resolve outstanding concerns, including the complete removal of this outdated embargo, with hopes of the establishment of a relationship built on mutual respect and cooperation.

Saint Kitts and Nevis reiterates its position alongside the international community in supporting General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), which upholds the right to free trade and international cooperation, which must be honoured without exception.

## Saint Lucia

[Original: English]  
[4 March 2025]

The Government of Saint Lucia affirms its commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, to the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among nations.

The Government of Saint Lucia affirms the consistent economic, educational, scientific and technical cooperation between Cuba and Saint Lucia in furtherance of socioeconomic advancement and sustainability.

The Government of Saint Lucia, in compliance with international legal obligations and with the commitment to the principles of the sovereign equality of States, has not promulgated any law, legislation or measure, or taken any other action that would contravene the exercise of sovereignty by a Member State in its lawful interests or obstruct the freedom of commercial activity, trade or economic cooperation.

Saint Lucia reaffirms its position that the extraterritorial application of national legislation runs contrary to the principles of international law, the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among nations.

The Government of Saint Lucia has consistently supported the relevant General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba.

## Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The adoption of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) reflects the unwavering opposition of the international community to the ongoing blockade imposed on Cuba by the United States of America. The opposition to these extraterritorial, unilateral measures is grounded in the central principles that underpin our civilized world and enable our prosperity and peaceful coexistence, namely the sovereign equality of all States, non-intervention and non-interference. All States have an equal obligation to adhere to these principles and an equal right to enjoy them.

The debilitating measures adopted by the United States continue to have a devastating impact on the daily lives of the Cuban people, who carry the unjustified burden of this policy. It hinders the overall development of the country, including its efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in which the international community committed to leaving no one behind. This notwithstanding, Cuba remains a responsible member of the international community and does not allow these onerous measures to deter it from contributing positively to the advancement and overall well-being of many countries.

Lifting the embargo, immediately and without preconditions, is a prerequisite for creating an environment conducive to dialogue that can engender a relationship that is mutually beneficially to both countries and further strengthening hemispheric relations and diplomacy. We therefore urge the United States to revisit this harmful policy.

Against this backdrop, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines echoes the calls of the international community for the lifting of the discriminatory and outdated economic, commercial and financial blockade, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

## **Samoa**

[Original: English]

[26 March 2025]

The Government of the Independent State of Samoa reaffirms its full commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of international law, including the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom of international trade and navigation.

The embargo on the people of Cuba must end. It is a relic of the cold war era. As a member of the United Nations family and as a small island developing State, Cuba deserves to be treated like other members, with respect, dignity and pragmatism in international relations.

By restoring relations with Cuba, the United States stands to be in a much better place to engage in more constructive dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual concern and thereby effect much-needed changes in their economic, social and security relations. Resuming travel and cultural exchanges could promote greater understanding and goodwill between the two peoples.

Opening trade with Cuba could create economic opportunities for both countries. Cuba has untapped markets for American goods and services, while United States businesses could benefit from investing in Cuba's emerging economy. Increased tourism could provide a much-needed boost to Cuba's economy.

On humanitarian grounds, the embargo has had adverse effects on the Cuban people, limiting their access to essential goods such as food, medicine and other necessities. Lifting the embargo could alleviate the suffering of ordinary Cubans and improve their quality of life.

In the current climate of mistrust and geopolitical manoeuvring, it is crucial that members of the United Nations family demonstrate humanity and goodwill in our joint efforts to achieve future resilient prosperity and leaving no one behind.

## **San Marino**

[Original: English]

[6 February 2025]

The Republic of San Marino has always and generally been against any imposition of any embargo and is therefore against the imposition of the unilateral embargo against Cuba as a means of pressure and because of the serious repercussions for the population.

## Sao Tome and Principe

[Original: French]  
[28 January 2025]

To ensure respect for the right to economic and social well-being, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe supports all initiatives aimed at urgently lifting the sanctions imposed against the Cuban people.

Sao Tome and Principe reaffirms its solidarity with the people and Government of Cuba, as well as its responsibility to contribute to the lifting of these sanctions.

## Saudi Arabia

[Original: English]  
[27 January 2025]

Saudi Arabia enjoys normal diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba.

Saudi Arabia has not applied laws or measures against Cuba that would prohibit economic, commercial or financial relations between Saudi Arabia and Cuba.

Saudi Arabia is committed to the purpose and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recalls and reaffirms its commitment to the rules and principles of international law.

## Senegal

[Original: French]  
[24 January 2025]

In accordance with its international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, Senegal will continue to comply with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on ending the embargo against Cuba.

## Serbia

[Original: English]  
[6 March 2025]

The Republic of Serbia, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirming its commitment to the rules and principles of international law, fully implements General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and has never promulgated or applied any laws or measures or acts of the kind referred to in the preamble to the resolution.

Serbia has consistently supported the aforementioned resolution in the General Assembly and voted in its favour.

Serbia calls for an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba, expressing the desire of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations.

## Seychelles

[Original: English]  
[17 January 2025]

In support of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), the Government of the Republic of Seychelles aligns itself once more with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in endorsing its content.

Seychelles is steadfast in its commitment to the equality of sovereign States and respect for non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Consistent with these principles, Seychelles rejects the imposition of extraterritorial laws, regulations or any unjust or unilateral coercive economic actions.

In this context, Seychelles underscores the importance of economic well-being and human rights for all people, and it recognizes that the United States blockade against Cuba undermines these fundamental principles. Seychelles supports efforts by both parties to lift the embargo and facilitate Cuba's full reintegration into the international community which will surely have positive impacts on global economy.

The Government of Seychelles reaffirms its solidarity with the Government and people of Cuba and advocates for the normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States reflecting dynamism and call to action for positive change.

## Sierra Leone

[Original: English]  
[21 March 2025]

The Republic of Sierra Leone reiterates its unwavering commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law. Noting further the cordial and fruitful bilateral relations between Sierra Leone and Cuba, promoted largely through solidarity and technical cooperation, Sierra Leone remains committed to international efforts aimed at ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.

Mindful of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law which, inter alia, reaffirm the freedom of trade and navigation, Sierra Leone has never initiated, adopted or implemented any restrictive laws or measures not in conformity with obligations.

Sierra Leone is committed to strengthening the excellent relations between the two sister countries on both bilateral and multilateral fronts. Sierra Leone has therefore been consistent in its enduring support for all previous resolutions demanding an end to the United States blockade against Cuba and its people, and reaffirms its call for the total elimination of the embargo, which continues to gravely affect the lives and livelihoods of the Cuban people. Sierra Leone reiterates its full and unreserved support for the implementation of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

Sierra Leone hopes that efforts will be made by the United States of America and Cuba to normalize relations and explore mutually beneficial socioeconomic and political relation.

## Singapore

[Original: English]  
[12 March 2025]

The Government of Singapore reaffirms its support for General Assembly resolution 79/7. Singapore has consistently supported resolutions calling for an end to the United States trade embargo on Cuba since 1995 and has voted in their favour.

## Solomon Islands

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

Solomon Islands remains fully committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the principles of sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic and internal affairs of another State. Solomon Islands reiterates its call upon the United States for the unconditional ending of the economic, commercial and financial blockade against the peaceful people of Cuba, in the name of peace and within the spirit and purposes of the Charter. Such unilateral action is contrary to international law, undermines the spirit of multilateralism and impedes Cuba's progress towards achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Solomon Islands greatly values its diplomatic relations with Cuba and appreciates the generosity of the Government and people of Cuba for their support through the training of medical doctors.

## South Africa

[Original: English]  
[7 March 2025]

The Government of South Africa views the United States embargo as the most notable obstacle that Cuba faces in its efforts to achieve its development goals, particularly the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. South Africa is deeply concerned about the harmful impact that the United States embargo has on the livelihoods of the Cuban people, especially the most vulnerable persons, and urges the United States to withdraw this unjust burden of sanctions and choose to engage Cuba in constructive dialogue.

The United States embargo is aggravating the shortage of basic products in Cuba, leading to hyperinflation, especially in the food sector, coupled with an increase in the price of fuel, which raises the cost of food and other items, causing tremendous hardship for the Cuban population and particularly for those who cannot rely on remittance payments. The United States demands advance cash payment of all transactions related to Cuba's imports of American products, such as basic foods like soy, poultry products and others. It further forbids any American companies from importing anything from the island nation, including its cigars and rums, medicines produced by the Cuban biotechnological industry, honey and charcoal, among others.

The embargo limits the benefits that Cuba can derive from tourism and the provision of professional skills as the main drivers of its economy. Thousands of travellers cannot visit Cuba. United States law forbids any ferries and vessels which have called on a Cuban port to visit an American port, for at least 180 days after departing the island.

Cuba deploys medical professionals as part of exchange programmes and has an emerging biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry, but the United States embargo continues to prevent these sectors from achieving their full potential, leading to hundreds of millions of dollars in potential losses and income.

South Africa is concerned about the extraterritorial application of the United States embargo, which hinders Cuban trade with other nations by increasing legal, economic, commercial and financial risks while restricting the strengthening of bilateral trade relations. Its extraterritorial application remains a major constraint to the strengthening of trade and economic relations between South Africa and Cuba.

Relations between South Africa and Cuba continue to serve as a successful model of South-South cooperation. South Africa has recommitted to existing bilateral cooperation programmes with Cuba in the areas of health, basic education, water, sanitation and public works. The two countries continue to pursue new areas of cooperation such as infrastructure development, agriculture, science and technology, and innovation.

South Africa urges the United States Administration to remove Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism and the list of “restricted entities” that are associated with Cuba and barred from certain financial transactions under United States law.

The United States embargo is not stifling only Cuba’s growth, but that of the entire region. The United States designation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism and the enforcement of the Torricelli Act and later the Helms-Burton Act – with the purpose of undermining the authority of the United States President, who would be unable to lift the blockade without Congressional approval – further entrench the embargo.

As a lonely star, Cuba irradiates a huge moral force in Latin America and the Caribbean, in Africa and Asia, inspiring their peoples in the struggle against colonial, neocolonial and imperialist domination. South Africa reiterates its solidarity and friendship with Cuba and recalls the sacrifices made by the Cuban people with their lives to fight for the liberation of South Africa and that of other African countries.

The global commitment to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development remains in jeopardy when the embargo prevents a State Member of the United Nations from fairly participating in its own socioeconomic development.

South Africa appeals to the international community to augment its efforts to promote constructive and transparent dialogue between Cuba and the United States, bilaterally and through the appropriate United Nations structures, with a view to achieving the objectives of all the resolutions already adopted by the United Nations on the matter and ensuring the sustainable development and progress of the people of Cuba.

## **South Sudan**

[Original: English]

[29 April 2025]

The Republic of South Sudan expresses its firm alignment with the majority of United Nations Member States and the resolutions of the African Union in calling for the immediate lifting of the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed on Cuba.

South Sudan underscores that these unilateral measures are inconsistent with the principles of international law, including the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the right of peoples to self-

determination and development. The continued imposition of the embargo has severely hindered Cuba's economic growth, obstructed its social development and inflicted long-lasting humanitarian consequences on its people.

South Sudan fully supports the implementation of resolution General Assembly resolution 79/7. We recognize the resolution's overwhelming support by the international community and reaffirm our solidarity with the people of Cuba, who continue to suffer the multifaceted impact of these restrictive measures.

South Sudan joins the collective voice of the international community in urging the immediate and unconditional lifting of the embargo, in the spirit of multilateralism, international cooperation and respect for the sovereignty of nations.

## **Sri Lanka**

[Original: English]  
[14 March 2025]

Sri Lanka does not approve of the use of unilateral economic measures, against any country, that are inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The implementation of such measures impedes the rule of law, the transparency of international trade and the freedom of trade and navigation.

Sri Lanka has not promulgated any laws and measures of the kind referred to in the provisions of General Assembly resolution 79/7. Unilateral sanctions imposed on Cuba have had harmful effects on civilian life, creating shortages of goods and services. Unilateral sanctions, in general, have also been ineffective in the promotion and protection of human rights of the targeted country.

Sri Lanka has continuously supported the adoption of the resolutions on this item in the General Assembly and has taken the position that the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed against Cuba needs to end.

## **Sudan**

[Original: English]  
[5 March 2025]

The Sudan has fully and continuously supported and voted in favour of the annual General Assembly resolution calling for lifting the sanctions imposed on Cuba.

The Government of the Sudan pursues a policy of full respect for international law, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereign equality of States and non-interference in their internal affairs. The Sudan opposes the imposition of sanctions on developing countries because of their devastating impact on the efforts of those countries to achieve sustainable development and because they constitute a violation of the Charter.

Like Cuba, the peoples of the Sudan have been suffering tremendously from the unilateral coercive measures imposed on the Sudan more than 15 years ago. These sanctions impede any progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and integration into the international monetary system. The health sector, along with other sectors, has been hit hard by these sanctions.

The Government of the Sudan reaffirms that it does not promulgate or apply any laws or measures that could, by being applied outside its own national borders, affect the sovereignty of any State. The Government of the Sudan calls for the repeal of laws that impose such measures.

## Suriname

[Original: English]  
[15 January 2025]

The Republic of Suriname remains firm in its commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and to upholding respect for international law. Suriname is of the considered view that sovereign equality and the right of nations to develop in accordance with their own charted paths should be respected at all times. Adherence to these principles is of the utmost importance to the maintenance of a stable international order.

Suriname notes that the commercial, economic and financial embargo against Cuba is contrary to those principles and norms and is counterproductive in trade relations. The impact of this embargo on the Cuban people has been significant, affecting their access to essential goods and services, including healthcare and education.

Suriname calls for the lifting of the embargo against Cuba, which harms all sectors of Cuba's economy and healthcare, deprives its people of using the full potential of its resources, and provides the single biggest challenge to the full development of Cuba.

It has been the most vulnerable members of Cuban society, such as women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities, who have suffered the most severe consequences of this policy.

Suriname expresses its solidarity with the Government and people of Cuba and places on record that the Government of Suriname has never promulgated or applied laws or measures affecting the economic, commercial and financial rights of the people and Government of Cuba, as referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

## Switzerland

[Original: French]  
[24 January 2025]

As in previous years, Switzerland supported the General Assembly resolution entitled "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba" in 2024. Switzerland considers that the economic, financial and commercial measures taken against Cuba have negative repercussions for the living conditions of the Cuban people and exacerbate economic hardships. For these reasons, they should be repealed.

## Syrian Arab Republic

[Original: Arabic]  
[24 March 2025]

I. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its full commitment to General Assembly resolutions calling for an immediate end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba. It has voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions in that connection, the most recent of which has been General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

II. The adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution to lift the United States embargo by an overwhelming majority for the thirty-second time in a row reaffirms the validity and justice of this cause and the support of the international community for it. Ending the blockade of Cuba is all the more urgent given its implications for

the lives of the Cuban people, their right to self-determination and their ambitions for achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

III. The Syrian Arab Republic encourages peaceful resolution of international disputes and avoidance of the use of unilateral means of economic pressure, which have a negative impact on the living conditions of the peoples of the targeted States and violate the provisions of international law and the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, above all those of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and respect for the sovereignty of States.

## Tajikistan

[Original: English]

[3 April 2025]

The Government of Tajikistan reaffirms its position in support of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

Tajikistan stands by the principles of international law and supports the right of all nations to choose their own development paths freely. Tajikistan believes that, in line with principles such as the equality of States, non-interference in internal matters and the freedom of trade, the ongoing economic and financial measures against Cuba are harming the Cuban people's living conditions and hindering the Cuban Government's efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

Additionally, given the current instability in international relations, which has led to increased poverty and unemployment, the imposition of sanctions and embargoes is more unjustifiable than ever. Such actions go against the core principles of international law, including the equality of States, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal matters, and peaceful coexistence.

Tajikistan continues to advocate a peaceful and cooperative international environment where all nations can pursue their development in accordance with their national interests and in line with global norms.

## Thailand

[Original: English]

[3 March 2025]

Since 1994, the Royal Thai Government has consistently supported General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the trade and economic embargo against Cuba, including General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

Thailand opposes the imposition by one country of its national law on another country which, in effect, compels a third party to comply with it. Such an act would be contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

The imposition of the unilateral embargo against Cuba has undermined the socioeconomic development of the country and its efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as caused suffering for its people.

Thailand has neither legal provisions nor domestic measures of such a nature and continues to discourage them.

## Timor-Leste

[Original: English]  
[12 March 2025]

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste fully adheres to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including the principles of the freedom of international trade and navigation. Timor-Leste reaffirms its position of support for General Assembly resolution 79/7 and reiterates that it has not promulgated or applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to therein.

The Government of Timor-Leste is strongly opposed to the continued adoption and the application of such extraterritorial measures and supports the immediate and unconditional lifting of the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba. It is our belief that the imposition of the said measures will hinder the ability of Cuba to attain the Sustainable Development Goals in the most effective and timely manner, as well as weaken its capacity to implement the rule of law.

## Togo

[Original: French]  
[12 March 2025]

In keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Togo has always strived to promote respect for the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and for non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs.

It supports unreservedly the principle of freedom of trade and navigation, which is enshrined in numerous international legal instruments. Togo systematically rejects the use of any unilateral measures to exert pressure on States.

It has never promulgated or applied any laws or regulations that curtail the sovereignty of other States or the legitimate interests of entities or individuals under their jurisdiction. The Government of Togo has always supported the initiatives taken by the Government of Cuba and other actors to end the blockade imposed against Cuba by the United States of America.

The blockade must end, as that would contribute to further advances towards the restoration of economic and trade relations between the two countries, a goal that Togo wholeheartedly supports. Togo urgently hopes that the rapprochement that began with the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two States in 2015 will continue.

## Tonga

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

The Kingdom of Tonga adheres fully to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and accepted under international law, in particular, the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and non-interference in their internal affairs and the freedom of international trade and navigation. Thus, Tonga has not promulgated or applied any laws or measures of the kind referred to in the preamble to General Assembly resolution 79/7. Tonga maintains friendly and diplomatic relations with Cuba.

## Trinidad and Tobago

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago upholds as fundamental the principles of sovereign equality among States, non-interference in their internal affairs and the freedom of international trade and navigation. These principles are aligned with the objectives outlined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

The values enshrined in the Charter and international law are at odds with discriminatory trade practices and the extraterritorial enforcement of domestic laws. In line with its commitments under the Charter and international law, Trinidad and Tobago does not support the use of unilateral economic sanctions as a tool for political or economic coercion against other nations.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1972, Trinidad and Tobago has participated in a mutually respectful and productive arrangement with a significant focus on economic cooperation. Trinidad and Tobago has consistently backed both regional and international efforts aimed at fostering constructive dialogue, with the goal of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed on Cuba, which hampers the country's ability to achieve sustainable development.

Trinidad and Tobago welcomes open dialogue with Cuba regarding the embargo and reaffirms its support for the removal of these measures. The country calls upon all parties involved to engage in good faith to build a mature and respectful bilateral relationship grounded in mutual respect and sovereign equality. Trinidad and Tobago reiterates its position that the full realization of such a relationship will remain unattainable without the lifting of the embargo. This essential objective must be a priority for both governments and peoples. Consequently, Trinidad and Tobago renews its strong and long-standing appeal for Cuba's full reintegration into the global economic and political system and for the unjust embargo to be lifted.

## Tunisia

[Original: French]  
[5 March 2025]

Tunisia reaffirms its commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. In that context, Tunisia supported General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and all previous Assembly resolutions calling for the lifting of the blockade imposed against Cuba.

Tunisia does not apply unilateral laws or measures with extraterritorial effects. It therefore has not promulgated or applied any laws or measures against Cuba prohibiting economic, commercial or financial relations between the two countries.

## Türkiye

[Original: English]  
[12 March 2025]

The Republic of Türkiye does not have any laws or measures of the kind referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#). Türkiye expresses concern at such measures, which adversely affect the living standards of people and free trade between States.

Türkiye reaffirms its adherence to the principles of freedom of trade and navigation in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The Government of Türkiye maintains its stance that differences and problems between States should be settled through dialogue and negotiations.

## **Turkmenistan**

[Original: English]  
[6 March 2025]

The Government of Turkmenistan supports the adoption of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

The unilateral blockade against Cuba hinders the development of the Cuban economy and creates difficulties in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Turkmenistan focuses on the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom of international trade and navigation, including those enshrined in many international legal documents.

The Government of Turkmenistan is in favour of establishing a constructive dialogue with the active participation of the relevant United Nations agencies in resolving issues between the parties as a mechanism for promoting peace.

## **Tuvalu**

[Original: English]  
[16 April 2025]

The Government of Tuvalu continues to embrace the principles outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, emphasizing solidarity, cooperation and equitable relations among nations. Tuvalu stands firmly in favour of lifting the economic, commercial, immigration and financial restrictions imposed on Cuba. It is our belief that such measures hinder rather than foster the pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals by the Cuban Government and its people. The recent strides towards improving relations between the United States and Cuba are commendable, aligning with the Charter's emphasis on sovereignty and equality among nations and peoples.

The Tuvaluan Government has neither enacted nor enforced any legislation or measures targeting Cuba. It stands in full support of the lifting of the embargo, echoing the persistent and unanimous call from the majority of United Nations Member States. Such a move would facilitate Cuba in strengthening and expanding its collaboration with small island developing States such as Tuvalu.

## **Uganda**

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

Uganda has cordial bilateral relations and close diplomatic ties with the people and Government of Cuba, in accordance with the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

In the spirit of friendship, cooperation and solidarity with the people of Cuba, Uganda is concerned about the negative impact of the decades-old extraterritorial economic, commercial and financial embargo by the United States against Cuba,

which have impeded the full achievement of economic and social development in the country.

All countries have an inalienable right to development. Based on this conviction, Uganda rejects the embargo as a violation of the rights of sovereignty, development and well-being of the Cuban people.

Uganda commends the resilience of the people of Cuba and calls upon the United States of America to lift, unconditionally, the blockade imposed on Cuba in line with the request made by the clear majority of States Members of the United Nations.

Uganda condemns the recent escalation of hostile actions against Cuba, including the decision to reinstate Cuba on the arbitrary list of States alleged to support terrorism, a designation that shows absolute contempt for the truth. Similarly, the revocation of the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act and the reinstatement of the list of Cuban entities subject to restrictions further reinforce the already damaging economic blockade. These measures serve only to intimidate foreign investors and hinder Cuba's economic development, exacerbating the already difficult living conditions of the Cuban people.

Furthermore, Uganda condemns the actions of the US government, which seek to disrupt the ability of Cuban emigrants to send remittances to their families, further punishing innocent people who are already suffering from the effects of the blockade. Uganda calls for an immediate end to these hostile policies, which aim only to further isolate Cuba and punish its people.

Deserving of similar rejection are the recent measures announced to undermine the Cuban medical cooperation programmes with many nations of the world by threatening officials from all over the world with visa restrictions to the US if they support such programmes.

## **United Arab Emirates**

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

The United Arab Emirates voted in favour of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), which was adopted with 187 votes in favour. The United Arab Emirates acts in accordance with its obligations under the principles and goals of the Charter of the United Nations and international law and emphasizes that all States should enjoy full freedom of trade and navigation in all international sea lanes in accordance with international law. Therefore, the United Arab Emirates does not apply any economic, commercial or financial embargo on Cuba.

## **United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

[Original: English]  
[21 March 2025]

The United Kingdom calls upon the United States to end its economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba. We consider the embargo to be harmful and counterproductive. While it is not the cause of all of the problems that Cuba faces, the embargo negatively affects the living standards of the Cuban people and impedes the political and economic development of the country.

In particular, through restrictions on remittances, tourism and travel to and from the United States, the embargo is having a negative impact on Cuba's nascent private

sector, the development of which is important for the island's economic prospects. Restrictions on travel, both of Cuban citizens to the United States and of United States citizens to Cuba, reduce the exposure of the Cuban people to United States citizens and the exchange of values, ideas and social and cultural understanding.

The extraterritorial effects of the embargo – in particular the activation of Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act – prevent and restrict the conduct by foreign companies, including British companies, of legitimate and lawful business in Cuba. The United Kingdom considers the extraterritorial effects of Titles III and IV to be contrary to international law and will continue to defend vigorously the right of British businesses to conduct trade with, and invest in, Cuba. To protect the interest of natural or legal persons resident in the United Kingdom against the extraterritorial effects of the Helms-Burton legislation, the United Kingdom has promulgated blocking legislation, which prohibits compliance with the Helms-Burton Act and includes provisions for counterclaims to be brought against United States plaintiffs in United Kingdom courts.

The United Kingdom shares the serious concerns of many of our partners about restrictions on civil, political and other human rights in Cuba. We will continue to raise those concerns directly with the Government of Cuba and publicly. The United Kingdom considers that dialogue and engagement with Cuba and the Cuban people are the best ways to encourage progress in Cuba and to promote greater respect for human rights of all kinds. We consider that the United States embargo has the effect of making economic reforms, which will serve the best interests of the Cuban people, more difficult to achieve.

## **United Republic of Tanzania**

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

Tanzania reaffirms its principled position in calling for the immediate and unconditional lifting of the embargo imposed on Cuba. This long-standing measure continues to present significant economic and social challenges, restricting Cuba's ability to achieve its full development potential. Such restriction runs counter to the principles of international law, fundamental human rights and the spirit of multilateral cooperation.

As a dedicated advocate of the United Nations and its core values, Tanzania remains firmly committed to the principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereign equality and an open, rules-based global trading system. Tanzania opposes the use of unilateral coercive measures against any State Member of the United Nations and reiterates its unwavering solidarity with Cuba and all nations facing similar constraints, emphasizing the need for constructive dialogue, engagement and respect for international norms.

The United Republic of Tanzania and Cuba enjoy a strong and historically beneficial partnership, particularly in education, healthcare and cultural exchange. It is our belief that lifting the embargo would create further opportunities to deepen our cooperation, foster economic growth and strengthen South-South collaboration. We remain steadfast in our solidarity with Cuba and trust that the principles of justice, fairness and multilateralism will ultimately lead to the full normalization of Cuba's economic and trade relations with the international community.

## Uruguay

[Original: Spanish]  
[19 February 2025]

With regard to resolution [79/7](#), Uruguay has always strictly respected and observed the principles of international law and all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Uruguay has not promulgated or applied any provisions affecting the sovereign equality or decisions of other States, respecting the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

Uruguay has strongly condemned any theory that supports or justifies the extraterritorial application of domestic laws, the sole exception being those that form part of international law, primarily in relation to protective jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction.

Our country rejects any direct or indirect mechanism constituting unilateral action by one State to impose sanctions for sovereign decisions taken by another State in the political, economic, commercial, social, cultural or other arena.

Uruguay believes that the sanctions imposed and the extraterritorial laws enacted against Cuba are not only a violation of international law but also have caused harm to the economic development of Cuba, and constitute a way of depriving the Cuban people of their right to development and of inflicting incalculable damage on their dignity and sovereignty.

## Uzbekistan

[Original: English]  
[30 January 2025]

The Republic of Uzbekistan supports General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and reaffirms its commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law.

Uzbekistan fully complies with the provisions of this resolution and has never promulgated or applied laws or measures of the kind referred to in its preamble.

## Vanuatu

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The Republic of Vanuatu formally expresses its objections to the unilateral coercive measures imposed against Cuba, referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

The Government of Vanuatu has underscored its commitment to maintaining economic relations with Cuba and has reiterated its stance against measures that contravene the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Furthermore, Vanuatu has not promulgated or applied laws or measures against Cuba that would prohibit economic, commercial or financial relations between Vanuatu and Cuba.

## Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

[Original: Spanish]

[18 February 2025]

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela considers the Charter of the United Nations a fundamental norm of international law governing relations between States and ensuring the prevalence of harmonious and peaceful relations. It upholds the principle that no State is empowered to impose any type of measure to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.

The Venezuelan Constitution upholds fundamental universal tenets and values, such as humanism, cooperation, solidarity among peoples and staunch pacifism guided by unconditional respect for the norms and principles of international law. Venezuela rejects, once again, the application of unilateral measures for extraterritorial purposes that violate the rights of sovereignty and political independence of States and human rights.

It has been 63 years since the entry into force of the economic, commercial and financial blockade of the United States of America against Cuba, which deliberately and systematically violates the human rights of more than 11 million Cubans, and which continues, to this day, to represent the main obstacle to the attainment of their inalienable right to development.

That has been recognized at the General Assembly, which has called for its repeal for more than 30 consecutive years.

Venezuela has supported the resolutions on this subject that have been adopted by an overwhelming and exceptional majority of the General Assembly since 1991. The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela urges the United States of America to immediately comply with resolutions [47/19](#), [48/16](#), [49/9](#), [50/10](#), [51/17](#), [52/10](#), [53/4](#), [54/21](#), [55/20](#), [56/9](#), [57/11](#), [58/7](#), [59/11](#), [60/12](#), [61/11](#), [62/3](#), [63/7](#), [64/6](#), [65/6](#), [66/6](#), [67/4](#), [68/8](#), [69/5](#), [70/5](#), [71/5](#), [72/4](#), [73/8](#), [74/7](#), [75/289](#), [77/7](#), [78/7](#) and [79/7](#), which when adopted set all-time records in terms of votes in favour at the United Nations.

Venezuela welcomes the provisions contained in General Assembly resolution [78/135](#), entitled “Unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries”.

The imposition of unilateral measures and blockades contrary to international law affects the entire international community because of their extraterritorial repercussions and because they flagrantly violate political sovereignty, territorial integrity, the legal equality of States, the peaceful settlement of disputes, multilateralism, and the principles and foundations on which the existing rules-based international system has been built for the purpose of ensuring the peaceful coexistence of nations.

The international community must not cease in its efforts to demand an end to the application of unilateral coercive measures that seek to curtail the sovereign right of States to determine, in keeping with the right of self-determination, their political and social systems, with the situations and particularities of their respective countries.

The illegal measures of the United States of America against Cuba are an anachronism that violates the Charter of the United Nations and other international legal instruments and also impinges upon freedom of trade and navigation and violates the norms of the international system of trade. These measures, which were adopted for political reasons, directly affect the effective fulfilment of human rights, are selective and, in most cases, are being promoted for the purposes of exacerbating

a particular set of domestic political conditions and creating situations that may lead to conflicts that could be exploited by the country that adopted the measures.

Venezuela reaffirms its condemnation of the application of the extraterritorial provisions of the Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act, which have caused additional serious harm to the economy of Cuba, in terms of its economic relations with third countries and with the subsidiaries of United States companies.

The tightening of these measures since 2019 has escalated them to a qualitatively more harmful and inhumane level. In addition, the United States Department of State has arbitrarily and unjustifiably included Cuba on its unilateral list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism, as part of the United States Government's strategy of isolating Cuba and provoking the collapse of its economy, a strategy that has been implemented incrementally over the years and has been escalated significantly in recent times.

The impacts of elements of non-conventional and multidimensional warfare against Cuba also should not be overlooked, since these measures are accompanied by aggression on the political, diplomatic, media and communications fronts – aggression that the United States replicates against other sovereign nations that do not submit to its interventionist policy.

That policy of confrontation, promoted and implemented by the United States of America, has affected the well-being of the Latin American and Caribbean sister nation, whose human rights have been violated by the implementation of these illegal measures.

As a consequence of the illegal blockade upheld against Cuba for more than six decades, the country had, as of 2024, suffered damage in excess of \$1,499,710 million, demonstrating the pernicious effects of the unrelenting continuation of the blockade.

During the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, despite calls from authorities, organizations and Governments around the world to lift and suspend these measures, the United States of America intensified the blockade against Cuba, thereby hindering the response to the emergency and making it even more harmful and inhumane. According to official data, Cuba is capable of producing more than 60 per cent of its essential medicines; however, this level has not been attained for months owing to the impact of the United States blockade on the country's capacity to pay.

From 18 to 23 October 2024, Cuban households experienced a prolonged blackout, which severely disrupted daily life, causing anxiety about the potential loss of food and the lack of running water, while hospitals were operating in emergency conditions, and school and work activities were cancelled. The situation was compounded by the devastating impact of Hurricane Oscar in eastern Cuba, in particular in Guantánamo, where there were reports of eight deaths and significant damage in a number of municipalities.

Despite adversity, the Cuban people have demonstrated remarkable solidarity and drive, supported by thousands of electrical workers who worked tirelessly to restore service. The main cause of the breakdown of the electrical network was a lack of fuel resulting from the economic sanctions imposed by the United States Government since 2019, which are designed to hinder access to essential resources. While the immediate electricity crisis has passed, normalcy in Cuba continues to be characterized by frequent blackouts. Meanwhile, the cost of the United States blockade over an 18-day period amounted to \$252 million, severely undermining the economy and maintenance of the country's energy infrastructure.

It is important to mention the report on secondary sanctions, overcompliance and human rights, prepared in 2023 by the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Alena Douhan. In paragraph 41 of the report, she indicates that the European Union, itself a sponsor of sanctions, has highlighted the devastating effects of the United States embargo against Cuba on European Union economic interests and on European Union citizens' and businesses' economic and commercial relations with Cuba, due to the extraterritorial application of such measures, which is considered to be in violation of commonly accepted rules of international trade, including the obligations of the World Trade Organization.

Paragraph 47 of the report indicates that limited access to foreign currencies and international food markets has significantly reduced the availability of food commodities and machinery for agricultural production in Cuba.

Even the implementation of food programmes by United Nations agencies is reported to be hampered by rising costs for imports, cancellations of maritime transport contracts and delays in deliveries of goods, or rejections and delays of banking transactions to and from suppliers. Furthermore, restrictions imposed on Cuban businesses to trade in United States dollars and other currencies hinder payments for certifications of Cuban products, while the inability of suppliers to deliver products purchased from United States companies to Cuba results in rising costs of procurement via alternative routes.

Paragraph 48 of the report indicates that shipping companies have reduced their capacity and the volume of goods transported to Cuba, and only 9 of 518 requests from the Cuban agricultural sector on the international market for tractors, motors, batteries, forklifts and spare parts for agricultural machinery were approved in 2022 owing to a fear of being punished because of the blockade imposed against the Cuban people.

With respect to the right to health, paragraph 53 of the report notes the growing number of reported cases of pharmaceutical companies refusing to deliver medicine, medical equipment, spare parts, technology or post-sale services to sanctioned countries, breaking decades-long contracts. It also notes the challenges faced by banks in the countries under sanctions when acquiring letters of credit or making payments for medical imports, and the refusals by delivery and insurance companies, which forces sanctioned countries and their entities to find riskier and costlier alternative procurement routes, with possible adverse impacts on the quality of procured medical goods, including as the result of a failure to store sensitive medicines and vaccines properly.

The report of the Special Rapporteur also indicates that, in early 2022, owing to the ongoing United States embargo against Cuba, the Dutch multinational bank Internationale Nederlanden Groep decided to block all donations that an international delegation intended to send to Cuba as part of an initiative to support access to COVID-19 vaccines worldwide; pursuant to article 7 of the Rome Statute, this constitutes a crime against humanity.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela condemns the continuation of this illegal, obsolete, criminal and inhumane measure that does nothing to foster the dialogue and cooperation that should prevail in international relations among sovereign, independent countries, in conformity with the spirit and purpose of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution [2625 \(XXV\)](#), on the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.

As it denounces the criminal measures of the United States against Cuba, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela continues to comply with resolution 79/7 out of an ongoing commitment to international law, based on which Venezuela reiterates to the United States of America that it must put an end to all measures that threaten international peace and security, including the criminal application of blockades and other arbitrary and unilateral measures, and must comply with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this issue and end the merciless and criminal blockade that has been illegally maintained against Cuba for more than 63 years, causing harm to the Cuban people and, owing to its extraterritorial effects, to all States that have economic, financial and commercial relations with Cuba.

Venezuela has made and supported declarations in other international forums repudiating such actions, which are by definition hostile and therefore undermine peaceful coexistence between nations and international law.

The Bolivarian Government also urges the international community to unanimously reject any unilateral coercive measure against any State, regardless of how it is implemented, and to recognize the unfavourable and inhumane impacts that such measures have on all human beings and on the enjoyment of all human rights, including the right to development, as well as the obstacles they pose to international commercial relations, peace, security and the well-being of humankind.

Venezuela also endorses the repeated declarations made by, inter alia, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the States, Countries and Territories of the Association of Caribbean States, repudiating the application of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effects as being counter to dialogue and cooperation, which are genuine expressions of inclusive and transparent multilateralism, that have been consistently ignored by the Government of the United States of America.

Venezuela would like to highlight the regional support for the General Assembly resolutions on this issue, as expressed in the CELAC Special Declaration on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial blockade of the United States of America against Cuba, approved by the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023 in Buenos Aires, reaffirming their rejection of coercive economic measures not based on international law, including all unilateral actions taken against sovereign countries that affect the welfare of their peoples and are designed to prevent them from exercising their right to decide, of their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems, and urging the President of the United States of America to end the blockade against Cuba and the Congress of the United States to support that step.

Likewise, in the Kingstown Declaration, adopted at the eighth Summit of the Heads of State and Government of CELAC in 2024, the Heads of State and Government of the Community reiterated the call made by the United Nations General Assembly to put an end to the embargo against Cuba, which, in addition to being contrary to international law, causes severe harm to the well-being of the Cuban people. They also reiterated their rejection of unilateral lists and certifications that affect Latin American and Caribbean countries and requested that Cuba be removed from the unilateral list of countries that allegedly sponsor international terrorism.

Similarly, in the CELAC special declaration issued at the summit in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 2024, the Heads of State and Government of the Community also express concerns about the tightening of the blockade imposed against Cuba despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and about the

harmful effects of that blockade on the Cuban population and on Cuban nationals living in other countries.

In the declaration adopted by consensus at the twelfth Extraordinary Summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' Trade Agreement, held virtually on 4 February 2025, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance demanded “the lifting of unilateral and extortive coercive measures, which seriously impact the functioning of economies”, reaffirming their firm support and solidarity with Cuba amid recent hostile actions by the Government of the United States and rejecting the use of coercive measures aimed at destabilizing the Cuban Revolution and the establishment of a migrant detention centre at the Guantanamo Naval Station.

## Viet Nam

[Original: English]

[21 March 2025]

For over a quarter of a century, since 1992, the General Assembly has adopted annually the resolutions entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”. These resolutions have received near unanimous support, calling upon the United States of America to lift its economic, trade and financial blockade and embargo policies against Cuba.

Viet Nam is concerned that the blockade and embargo are impeding Cuba's socioeconomic development and exacerbating humanitarian and economic challenges. Furthermore, the reinclusion of Cuba on the United States' list of State sponsors of terrorism has intensified the impacts of the blockade, severely hindering Cuba's legitimate bilateral cooperation with partners and its ability to participate fully in international cooperation.

Drawing from our own history of being subjected to unfair and illegal sanctions and external pressure, Viet Nam stands in solidarity with Cuba and empathizes with the immense hardship endured by millions of Cubans. Viet Nam reaffirms its unwavering support for General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) and other relevant United Nations resolutions. Viet Nam joins the international community in urging the United States to heed these calls, end its illegal unilateral blockade against Cuba and remove Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism. The United States of America and Cuba should engage in dialogue to resolve differences in a spirit of mutual understanding and respect for each other's independence and sovereignty.

Once again, Viet Nam reaffirms its friendship, cooperation, unwavering solidarity and commitment to supporting the brotherly Cuban people. Viet Nam calls upon the international community to do its utmost to help the Cuban people to overcome the consequences of the illegal blockade and embargo. Viet Nam has stepped up its assistance to ensure food security for Cuba through bilateral projects on rice and corn production, as well as aquaculture cooperation. We have also provided support, including more than 10,000 tons of rice, personal computers and rescue equipment in 2024, to assist Cuba's efforts in addressing socioeconomic challenges as the country faces its worst economic crisis in decades.

## Yemen

[Original: English]  
[8 January 2025]

The Republic of Yemen reaffirms its steadfast commitment to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including respect for national sovereignty, the prohibition of aggression, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and the resolution of disputes through peaceful means.

Yemen supports the efforts of the Secretary-General to advance the implementation of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#).

For more than four decades, Yemen has enjoyed a historic and fraternal relationship with the Republic of Cuba, built on mutual respect and shared aspirations. These relations have been strengthened through bilateral cooperation agreements in diplomacy, economic, trade, culture and health. There has been active cooperation in a number of areas. Yemen has sought to develop and strengthen those relations in the joint interest of both countries and peoples.

## Zambia

[Original: English]  
[13 March 2025]

The Government of the Republic of Zambia reaffirms its opposition to the unilateral coercive measures by any Member State of the United Nations in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and international humanitarian law.

The Zambian Government notes with great concern the continued negative impact that the people of Cuba continue to suffer as a result of the long-standing economic, commercial and financial embargo that has cost the Cuban economy more than \$1 trillion since inception, and calls upon all nations to uphold the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and refrain from promulgating measures that hinder the freedom of trade and navigation on Cuba.

Zambia strongly encourages immediate dialogue, action and the promotion of solidarity, cooperation and friendly relations that will promote development, trade, navigation and beneficial partnership for the people of Cuba.

## Zimbabwe

[Original: English]  
[2 May 2025]

The decades old unilateral sanctions on Cuba are unjust, reprehensible and a serious violation of its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty.

The sanctions have, directly and indirectly, affected the enjoyment of basic fundamental human rights by the people of Cuba, as service provision has been severely crippled.

Through economic asphyxiation, the economic and financial blockade has disrupted the economic activities in Cuba. This has negatively affected the ability of its Government to develop the country and transform the lives and livelihoods of its citizens.

The sanctions have cut off Cuba's access to international finance for her development programmes which impedes the economic prosperity of the country.

The embargo is a serious violation of the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the basic tenets of international law that clearly emphasize the right to self-determination and sovereign equality among States.

Zimbabwe strongly condemns the maintenance of illegal sanctions against Cuba. Zimbabwe has been a victim, like Cuba, of illegal unilateral coercive measures, whose devastating effects have been acutely felt by ordinary citizens.

The Charter of the United Nations clearly calls upon States to desist from any unilateral means that create obstacles to trade relations among States and impede the enjoyment of human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Member States have clearly and unequivocally spoken against the blockade and, through the passage of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), sent an unequivocal message that the blockade must be immediately and unconditionally removed.

Zimbabwe therefore reiterates the call upon the international community to unite and collectively demand the lifting of the unjust blockade on a sovereign State.

## **Holy See**

[Original: English]  
[1 March 2025]

The Holy See has never drawn up or applied economic, commercial or financial laws or measures against Cuba. The Holy See has maintained a consistent policy calling for an end to the embargo against Cuba.

The Holy See has consistently appealed, and continues to do so, for the consolidation of mutually beneficial relations between Cuba and the entire international community, by building bridges and more meaningful civil society participation, opening new avenues of dialogue and strengthening those already existing.

The Holy See hopes to see as soon as possible an end to the embargo that, for decades, has had humanitarian consequences, especially for those most excluded in Cuba, and has caused Cuba's economic isolation. The Holy See believes that the end of the embargo will contribute to more harmonious and fraternal relations between the people of Cuba and those of the United States of America.

The Holy See therefore urges both Cuba and the United States of America to pursue perseveringly the process of normalizing their relations and encourages their respective political leaders to assume their responsibility in leading this process.

## **State of Palestine**

[Original: English]  
[4 April 2025]

The State of Palestine reaffirms its full and principled solidarity with Cuba against the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed on it by the United States of America and joins the overwhelming majority of nations in calling for an immediate end to this prolonged, unjust embargo that has caused so much loss and so many challenges to Cuba and the Cuban people.

The State of Palestine – which continues to suffer the vast and destructive socioeconomic, humanitarian, developmental, political, security and environmental impacts of 58 years of an illegal colonial occupation, compounded by a complete, inhumane siege on the Gaza Strip, imposed by Israel, the occupying Power, in grave breach of international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, and with dire consequences for our people and all dimensions of our society – reiterates its firm opposition to the punitive embargo and unilateral coercive measures imposed on Cuba. We reaffirm our unequivocal support for the global calls and diplomatic efforts to bring an end to this embargo, which continues to detrimentally affect Cuba and undermine the rights of the Cuban people, including their rights to self-determination and to development.

The State of Palestine reaffirms its principled position in support of General Assembly resolution 79/7 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions, as well as its adherence to the relevant positions affirmed in this regard by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and China, among others, calling for an end to the embargo on Cuba. We urge serious efforts to implement resolution 79/7, aimed at upholding international law and respect for the sovereignty and independence of States and the freedom of commerce and navigation.

We regret the regression of positive trends of past years and that the United States embargo against Cuba persists. We join the international community's abiding call for mobilization of the necessary political dialogue to bring the embargo to an immediate end, allowing for unimpeded Cuban trade and normal economic activity, essential for the sustainable development that Cuba and all nations are entitled to and need in order to promote the prosperity and ensure the stability of their peoples and countries, objectives that have become even more urgent in the light of increasing instability and vulnerability being experienced by all nations as a result of ongoing and proliferating global shocks.

The State of Palestine, guided by and fully adherent to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, affirms that it has never promulgated or applied laws or measures of the kind referred to in resolution 79/7. The State of Palestine, which enjoys full diplomatic relations with Cuba, reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the Cuban people and Government and will continue working to strengthen the political, economic, social and cultural relations and historic cooperation and friendship between our countries and peoples.

### **III. Replies received from organs and agencies of the United Nations system**

#### **Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean**

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

#### **I. Background: recent developments in the United States' policy stance towards Cuba**

United States policy on Cuba during the administration of President Joseph Biden represented a partial continuation of measures implemented by his predecessor, Donald Trump, but with changes in certain sectors.

In May 2022, the Biden Administration announced a series of regulatory changes aimed at easing some aspects of the embargo. These included:

- Resumption of commercial and charter flights from the United States to other Cuban provinces besides Havana.
- Removal of limits on family remittances and authorization of remittances of donations to Cuban citizens.
- Modification of restrictions on authorized categories of travel from the United States to Cuba.

The general structure of the economic, commercial and financial embargo was left largely intact, including limitations on key sectors. The United States' unilateral designation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism continued to negatively affect the Cuban economy, especially in terms of access to international financing and banking, in addition to tourism and foreign investment.

On 14 January 2025, the Biden Administration removed Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, issued a waiver for Title III of the Helms-Burton Act and eliminated the restricted list of Cuban entities with which United States citizens and institutions are prohibited from conducting financial transactions. However, President Donald Trump reversed these decisions on his first day in office (20 January 2025), reinstating previous sanctions and increasing economic pressure on Cuba.

This about-face leaves Cuba to grapple with uncertainty, amid a global economic crisis and mounting geopolitical tensions.

## **II. Multidimensional impact of the embargo on the Cuban economy**

### **1. Impact on exports**

United States sanctions have significantly restricted external trade, limiting the access of Cuba to international markets and creating disincentives for foreign firms that might otherwise establish commercial relations with the island. In 2024, Cuban exports reached \$9.639 billion, up slightly from the previous year but still below the historic high of 2018 (\$13.122 billion).

### **2. Impact on foreign investment**

The embargo has acted as a deterrent against foreign direct investment in Cuba. The number of new investment agreements signed in 2024 was 30, and agreements in force totalled 328, representing a decrease compared with the previous year. Cuban residents abroad accounted for just three of the agreements.

Experts on the Cuban economy estimate that achieving a 5 per cent rate of growth would require between \$2 billion and \$5 billion in annual foreign investment; however, according to public officials interviewed in 2024, actual investment fell far short of that (although the exact figure has not yet been published).

### **3. Contraction of tourism**

Tourism, one of the country's main sources of revenue, continues to be affected by the United States' imposition of travel restrictions and its inclusion of Cuba in the list of State sponsors of terrorism. In 2024, international tourist arrivals numbered 2.2 million, representing a 9.7 per cent decrease relative to 2023 and standing in sharp contrast to the 4.7 million recorded in 2017/18.

Hotel occupancy remained low in 2024, at 24.2 per cent (compared with 25.8 per cent in 2023).

#### 4. Challenges in the financial and banking system

Between March 2023 and February 2024 (according to the latest report), the number of foreign banks that refused to transact with Cuban banks was 48 (28 from Europe, 14 from the Americas and 6 from the rest of the world), with 155 transactions involved. The drop relative to last year's 130 foreign banks is attributable to a decrease in external trade, including import volumes, due to lack of liquidity and access to foreign exchange. Given the reduction in trade and, by extension, banking activity, the impact on Cuban banks for the period March 2023–February 2024 is estimated at \$360 million, representing a 28.5 per cent increase compared to the previous report, owing to marked exchange-rate fluctuations deriving from the use of third-country currencies, the ban on using the dollar and the need to identify alternative channels for financial flows to Cuba and other destinations. The access of Cuba to external financing was limited and subject to onerous conditions. Cuban banks and businesses continue to pay above-market interest rates because of the country's high risk rating.

#### 5. Limited access to and transfer of advanced technology

The embargo prevents Cuba from accessing advanced technology and latest-generation equipment, which affects development in strategic areas such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, digitalization and manufacturing. This poses major challenges in terms of productive infrastructure modernization and the economy's access to global value chains.

##### *Impact on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors*

The biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors of Cuba, internationally renowned for advances in vaccines and innovative drug products, face challenges due to embargo-related restrictions:

- Access to medical inputs and equipment: the ban on medical technology imports with more than 10 per cent of their components originating in the United States and the impact of that ban on the availability of essential equipment for developing and manufacturing medication has rendered domestic production of the human papillomavirus vaccine and other drugs difficult amid refusals by companies such as Addgene (United States) and Macrogen (Republic of Korea) to ship reagents and testing tools to Cuba.
- Challenges in drug production: in 2024, Cuba lacked 51 per cent of the basic table of medicines, largely because of the country's inability to import commodities and finished goods.
- Impact on research and development: with access to cutting-edge technologies restricted, the Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology and the Finlay Vaccine Institute, among other entities, have to work with outdated equipment, which impedes the development by Cuba of new treatments and vaccines.

##### *Effects on digitalization and artificial intelligence*

Technological progress is accelerating globally, including in digitalization, artificial intelligence and robotics, but Cuba faces major barriers in accessing these innovations because of the embargo:

- Restricted access to essential platforms and software: United States corporations, such as Adobe, Zoom, Slack, GitHub and WeTransfer, have blocked Cuban users' access to their services, hindering scientific collaboration, software development and training in emerging technologies.

- Disadvantage in digitalization: despite government efforts to support the digital transformation, the lack of access to key tools and advanced telecommunications infrastructure is keeping key sectors from modernizing.
- Impact on education and technology training: Cuban students and researchers have limited access to online courses, virtual libraries and scientific publications and, as a result, few training opportunities in key areas, such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and cloud computing.

#### *Limitations on manufacturing and production*

The embargo also affects the access of Cuba to the machinery, spare parts and industrial technology that it needs to modernize production and enable domestic goods to compete in international markets.

### **6. Energy crisis and access to fuel**

Cuba is in the midst of a severe energy crisis, exacerbated by United States sanctions against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Russian Federation – the main oil suppliers of Cuba. In 2024, Cuban imports of Venezuelan crude oil averaged 32,000 barrels per day, significantly less than the 55,615 barrels per day averaged in 2023.

National electricity generation has been unstable, with the national electrical system operating at 38 per cent availability in 2024. In the second half of the year, daily power outages of 1,400–1,500 MW had an acute impact on the economy and daily life, affecting just over 50 per cent of the Cuban population. As of early March 2025, the situation had degenerated further, leaving 57 per cent of the country without electricity – the highest rate in at least two years.

## **III. Economic cost of the embargo**

The embargo has caused economic losses across all sectors, with effects on development, external trade, foreign investment and the well-being of the population.

Between March 2023 and February 2024 (the most recent period for which data are available), economic losses attributed to the embargo rose to \$5.06 billion (equivalent to 52.5 per cent of the total exports of Cuba in 2024), an increase of \$189.8 million compared with the prior-year period. This translates into monthly losses upward of \$421 million and daily losses of \$13.8 million, resulting in considerable financial hardship that is taking the economic situation of Cuba from bad to worse. Similar economic losses are expected for the period March 2024–February 2025.

## **IV. Structural weaknesses of the Cuban economic model and the impact of the embargo**

Structural challenges in the economic model of Cuba have limited its recovery and sustainable growth. These are compounded by the negative impact of the embargo. Despite government efforts to implement macroeconomic stabilization measures, the embargo has restricted access to external financing which, in turn, affects exports and drives up the cost of imports, deepening the economic crisis on multiple fronts.

### **1. High dependence on imports and low domestic production**

One of the most concerning aspects of the economic situation of Cuba is its high dependence on essential goods imports, in particular food, fuel and production inputs. Shortages in these goods, which account for a significant portion of the country's imports, have been a major factor in its economic crisis in 2024.

The agricultural sector remains inefficient; its access to inputs is almost entirely dependent on imports, which have been restricted by the embargo. The impact of United States sanctions has diminished the capacity of Cuba to access external financing and advanced agricultural technology, further reducing domestic production. Demand for food continues to outstrip domestic production, keeping prices high and perpetuating food insecurity.

### **2. Energy crisis and deterioration of the electrical system**

United States sanctions have exacerbated an unprecedented crisis in the energy sector, restricting the access of Cuba to fuel suppliers and the technology needed to update its electrical system.

In 2024, Cuba suffered three total blackouts, occurring in October and November, which led to equipment failures and fuel shortages. The Government has announced planned improvements to the national electrical system and the installation of solar panels with a 1,200 MW capacity by the end of 2025, but the crisis continues to affect industrial production and quality of life in the meantime.

### **3. Chronic fiscal deficit and persistent inflation**

Facing restricted access to external financing as a result of the embargo, the Government of Cuba has turned to new money issuance to cover its fiscal deficit, which reached 15 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023 and 14 per cent in 2024. This monetary expansion has fuelled persistent inflation.

Inflation closed out 2024 at 24.88 per cent amid a sustained rise in food and commodities prices. Household liquidity rose sharply, from 400 billion Cuban pesos in June 2024 to 700 billion Cuban pesos at year-end, propelling a further devaluation of the national currency in the informal market.

### **4. Stagnant foreign investment and regulatory barriers**

Foreign investment remains insufficient to drive economic growth, owing in large measure to United States sanctions penalizing firms and banks that do business with Cuba. Internal restrictions also keep foreign direct investment out: bureaucratic red tape, inflexible legislation and State control of key sectors make investment in Cuba less attractive, especially considering the more flexible opportunities that nearby countries offer investors.

Sanctions have exacerbated regulatory challenges and exchange-rate uncertainty, blocking Cuba's access to international financial markets. The embargo prevents the use by Cuba of dollars in international transactions, driving up the prices of imports and making the country less attractive to foreign capital.

### **5. External sector crisis and rising debt**

The embargo has been a major contributor to the crisis in the external sector, with commercial and financial restrictions limiting exports and making imports more expensive.

Blocked from accessing international institutional lending from the likes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Cuba has had to seek out bilateral agreements with other partners, such as China and the Russian Federation. Even after accounting for its debt renegotiation with the Paris Club in January 2025, Cuba has a structural external debt problem, estimated at \$29.8 billion (115.1 per cent of GDP in 2023).

## **6. Deterioration of social well-being and increase in poverty**

The economic crisis and the embargo have affected Cubans' quality of life:

- Economic contraction: Cuba recorded negative GDP growth of 1.9 per cent in 2023 and an estimated 1.0 per cent in 2024, and a negative rate of 0.1 per cent is projected for 2025.
- Inflation: 2024 ended with inflation at 24.88 per cent, and food and non-alcoholic beverage prices were up by 28.15 per cent.
- Medication shortages: in October 2024, Cuba lacked 51 per cent of the basic table of medicines, largely because of United States restrictions on importing medical inputs.
- Housing deficit: urgent demand for housing was not met in 2024, owing in part to a lack of access to construction materials, with fewer than 7,500 units built.
- Migration: emigration represents a challenge for the country's socioeconomic stability, with 621,120 Cubans emigrating between 2021 and 2023 (5.6 per cent of the population as recorded in 2022).
- Reduction in purchasing power: 70 per cent of household income is used to pay for food, reflecting a high cost of living that is exacerbated by the inability to import essential goods from more competitive markets.

## **V. Conclusions**

The United States embargo has restricted the access of Cuba to foreign exchange, technology and international markets, magnifying structural challenges in the Cuban economic model. Despite government attempts to correct distortions and boost the economy, challenges such as import dependence, the energy crisis, the fiscal deficit, inflation and external debt continue to hamper the development of Cuba.

Notwithstanding the debt renegotiation of Cuba with the Paris Club, its status as a new BRICS Plus partner State and the economic opportunities that these developments represent, economic recovery continues to hinge on ending the embargo; as long as it remains in place, restrictions on Cuba will make it difficult to achieve sustainable economic growth and a better quality of life.

## **Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations**

[Original: English]  
[12 March 2025]

Key factors behind the decline in domestic food production are the limited supply of imported agricultural inputs due to shortages in foreign exchange reserves and difficulties experienced by entities within the agrifood systems in gaining access to financial resources. These challenges have weakened the resilience of participants in the agrifood systems, including against extreme weather events.

In 2024, cereal production was estimated to have fallen below the level of the previous five-year average. The estimated decline was compounded by two hurricanes in the last quarter of 2024, followed by two major earthquakes that caused significant damage and losses in agriculture and affected about 800,000 people. These natural disasters triggered island-wide power outages, disrupting agrifood supply chains and resulting in a high number of livestock deaths.

As of January 2025, the annual food inflation rate was officially estimated at 26.3 per cent. Although lower than in early 2024, the persistently high level of food price inflation is being sustained by several factors, including foreign exchange reserve shortages, exchange rate depreciation and limited domestic food production.

The overall economic damage to the agricultural sector between March 2023 and February 2024 is estimated to exceed US\$ 270 million, according to the Ministry of Agriculture.

### **Technical assistance**

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) supports Cuba with technical assistance in two main areas. FAO supports the strengthening of national capacities in the development and implementation of gender-sensitive sectoral and intersectoral policies, programmes and instruments with an impact on food security and nutrition. In particular, FAO is supporting the implementation of the Food Sovereignty and Nutrition Education Plan and the Food Sovereignty and Food and Nutritional Security Act. FAO is supporting the strengthening of national capacities in the reduction of food loss and waste, the increase in food safety and quality and the collection, processing and marketing of food. In addition, FAO supports the strengthening of national capacities on food security and nutrition statistics, monitoring and reporting compliance with the goals agreed upon within the framework of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Cuba is an island State with environmental problems such as soil degradation, forest cover issues, pollution, loss of biological diversity, deterioration of ecosystems, lack of water availability and the impacts of climate change. FAO is supporting efforts to build the climate resilience of agricultural production to guarantee food security through improved ecosystem services in agriculture and fisheries, the integration of conservation, the use of agrobiodiversity in public policies and the scaling up of sustainable agricultural and fishing intensification practices.

Cuba is implementing the Hand-in-Hand Initiative, a flagship initiative of FAO. The country-owned and country-led programme provides targeted and innovative support to enable Governments to better target investments and policies for more resilient, sustainable, productive, efficient and inclusive agrifood systems. The initiative provides tools such as access to and use of geospatial data, technical support and capacity strengthening to allow national policymakers to make more informed and evidence-based decisions. Its distinctive matchmaking services forge effective partnerships between Governments, development partners, investors and the private sector to facilitate funding at scale for agrifood systems transformation.

### **Effects of the embargo on projects of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations**

Due to the embargo, FAO projects are affected with regard to the procurement of equipment and supplies that complement technical assistance, because the resources that could be imported from the United States of America have to be imported from far more distant markets, at much higher prices and higher freight

costs. If acquisitions could be made in the United States of America, it would be much cheaper, and more activities could be supported with the available budget.

The embargo, which allows third-country companies trading with the country to be sued in United States courts, has negatively impacted Cuban trade by drastically reducing the commercial partners that operate in the country. This has had a direct impact on the procurement operations of FAO in Cuba.

The embargo prevents the FAO country office from being able to manage Internet communications and the FAO network more efficiently, despite the fact that globally FAO has provided its country offices with the necessary equipment. There are hundreds of sites and services that cannot be accessed from Cuba through the national Internet service provider. The acquisition of information and communications technology equipment for the FAO country office or for projects in the country are also affected since the global long-term agreement contractual provisions of FAO with the provider DanofficeIT cannot be used in Cuba without authorization from the Government of the United States of America. The processing of this permit generates delays in the acquisition of the equipment and changes in the costs initially foreseen.

Under the embargo, conditions hinder the processing of payments and banking transactions to and from suppliers who provide services for cooperation projects and to the FAO country office. This is demonstrated by banks' rejections of transfers from FAO for sales to Cuba, the impossibility for suppliers to offer products to Cuba obtained from other North American companies and the inability of suppliers to transfer funds to Cuba for payment of services contracted in the country. The situation has deteriorated further since Cuba was redesignated a State sponsor of terrorism.

Banks reject Cuban enterprises' commercial or financial transactions in United States dollars and even in other currencies, which obstructs the payment the certifications of Cuban products with high potential to be commercialized in Europe.

The losses originate mainly in:

- (a) Price difference owing to changes in the import market;
- (b) Additional costs related to freight insurance;
- (c) Additional costs owing to a freeze on assets;
- (d) Monetary damages;
- (e) Losses owing to lack of access to the latest technology from the United States of America;
- (f) Relocation of exports.

The agroforestry sector, which FAO supports with several projects, suffered a loss of more than \$10 million.

## **International Atomic Energy Agency**

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

Cuba has been a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1 October 1957.

The existing embargo continues to pose certain difficulties for the implementation of the Agency's technical cooperation programme for Cuba. For instance, the procurement of equipment, consumables and material is affected due to

the limited number of vendors willing to supply for and/or ship such items to the country. Restrictions are also applied to the participation of Cuban nationals in IAEA-organized training activities, fellowships and meetings that take place in certain member States.

In recent years, challenges also occurred with respect to the participation of Cuban nationals in virtual trainings, as difficulties persisted in the use of information technologies due to poor internet connection and limited access to some information technology platforms.

In accordance with its statute and its Guiding Principles, IAEA tries to overcome these difficulties, to the extent possible, to facilitate the implementation of its technical cooperation programme in Cuba.

## **International Civil Aviation Organization**

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

Cuba is a member of the Air Transport Regulation Panel and has actively participated in its meetings. In 2024, Cuba also took part in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Air Services Negotiation Event held from 21 to 25 October 2024. This event provided a platform for States to conduct air services negotiations.

Cuba continues to be an active member of the regional safety oversight organization known as the Regional Safety Oversight Cooperation System. The latter has developed and kept up to date a set of model civil aviation regulations known as the Latin American aviation regulations, which include guidance material for government safety inspectors and the industry and a comprehensive training programme for States and the industry. Thanks to that collaborative project, Latin America is reaching a high degree of harmonization, boosting competitiveness and enhancing aviation safety with levels of compliance and safety statistics that place the North American, Caribbean and South American regions as leaders among other highly developed regions. Cuba has not only received implementation support, but continuously provides highly talented human resources and cooperates as part of its commitment as a member of the System.

In 2023, the Cuban Aviation Corporation and ICAO signed a management services agreement and a project document aimed primarily at providing the Corporation with assistance and specialized support in local capacity-building, including the establishment and consolidation of safety and security management systems in the Corporation, improved technological development of airport and air navigation services, national airline operations and air cargo management and operation, and improved development and overall sustainability of the country's civil aviation infrastructure. ICAO published an expression of interest on behalf of the Corporation requesting suppliers to respond regarding their capabilities to implement the expansion of the existing terminal 2 at José Martí International Airport, in Havana.

Due to the embargo, the above project is still on hold owing to lack of funding. Potential donors need reassurance that the embargo will not impede the implementation of the project, if suppliers interested in the tender for procurement of systems and/or services, due to the potential measures derived from the embargo, are not found.

Cuba continued its active participation in ICAO regional projects implemented through the Capacity Development and Implementation Bureau of ICAO. It renewed its membership in the regional implementation project for the Caribbean region and

supported the tender process and modernization project of the regional telecommunication network, the Caribbean Air Navigation Services Network (CANSNET). All those actions encompass the requisite technical, logistical and administrative support in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its annexes. All those regional projects fostered regional collaboration on air navigation and safety implementation, with all the States of the Caribbean region, including the United States of America, as members.

Regarding the CANSNET modernization phase, which is planned for 2026, the current acquisition and delivery of telecommunications equipment has been subject to certain restrictions due to the United States sanctions. ICAO sent a letter to the project service provider informing it that it was the selected winner of the ICAO bidding process, something that will help Cuba with such delivery.

Cuba has supported several air traffic implementation initiatives with subject-matter experts to develop practical guidance and reference documents on implementation. Cuba has participated in and led some of the regional air navigation and safety implementation groups in the Caribbean and the Pan-American regions with the Regional Planning and Implementation Group for the Caribbean and South American regions, and with the “champion State” of the Strategic Assistance Programme for the North American, Central American and Caribbean Regional Office, assisting other States.

The videoconference provider Zoom still imposes restrictions on Cuba, as stated on its website, further to sanctions stipulated by the United States Department of the Treasury. The secretariat of ICAO continues assisting Cuban participants to enable them to join the virtual or hybrid meetings of ICAO and conferences organized by ICAO headquarters and the North American and Caribbean Regional Office.

## **International Fund for Agricultural Development**

[Original: English]  
[21 March 2025]

During 2024, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) co-financed two projects in Cuba: the Livestock Cooperative Development Project in the Central-Eastern Region, which closed in September 2024, and the Agroforestry Cooperative Development Project, which will be completed in March 2027. These projects are implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture of Cuba and have been designed to provide agricultural support services to small rural producers, including women, youth and other groups who are highly vulnerable to external economic shocks and to climate change.

Projects supported by IFAD in Cuba face delays in their implementation because of scarce foreign exchange services, as well as a lengthy and costly import procedures, with the cash flow and disbursements closely linked to the procurement cycles of the projects. Measures imposed by the United States of America against shipping companies from third countries ferrying cargo to Cuba for example, impede the flow of oil, foodstuffs and other commerce critical to the daily needs of Cuban citizens and residents, particularly the poor and vulnerable. They further affect the financial transactions of Cuba and its ability to export and import needed materials that support opportunities for agricultural, as well as rural development and human development in general.

In the agricultural and rural sectors, the following limitations are observed: (a) obsolete agricultural equipment and lack of spare parts; (b) high cost and lack of inputs required for agricultural and livestock production, processing and distribution;

(c) insufficient access to hard currency for the import of equipment and inputs; (d) limited access to providers of new agricultural technologies; and (e) limited export opportunities. These limitations contribute to low productivity levels, limiting the quantity, quality and competitiveness of domestic food production and making high levels of food imports necessary to cover the needs of the rural population.

The measures imposed by the United States of America have affected IFAD projects and likely played a significant role in the limited outcomes of the Livestock Cooperative Development Project in the Central-Eastern region. As a result, key objectives – particularly improvements in milk and meat productivity and the rehabilitation of processing infrastructure – were not fully achieved.

The country is grappling with a severe economic crisis and has struggled to honour its debt obligations to IFAD – one of the few multilateral financial institutions with operations in the island. Consequently, IFAD loan instruments in Cuba have been suspended pending the settlement of outstanding debts. The current collaboration of IFAD with the Government of Cuba is limited to grant resources.

## **International Labour Organization**

[Original: English]  
[20 March 2025]

Cuba is facing a complex economic panorama marked by shortages of food, fuel, energy and medicine. The persisting embargo and the renewed designation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism in January 2025, following a brief removal of the designation earlier that same month, have negative effects on the economy, people and businesses. Among them are the following:

- Limitations on commercial and financial transactions still represent a serious bottleneck and an additional cost burden for business development and job creation, as decent work largely depends on productive investment and access to financing.
- Limited access to technology transfer implies further difficulties for enterprise, social and economic development.
- Limited access to and delivery of essential goods, including food and medicine, represents a risk of humanitarian crisis.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) is particularly concerned about the impacts on workers, especially women, youth and elderly people. A complete lifting of the embargo would turn the overall loss into an opportunity for productive investment, employment generation and new business opportunities, and for achieving the goals of the National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030 and other reforms to improve their economic and social system.

Cuba is an active member of ILO and deputy member of the ILO Governing Body for the period 2024–2027.

## **International Maritime Organization**

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

As a State member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Cuba benefits from participation in the meetings of IMO bodies and is a recipient of the technical cooperation programmes available (the IMO regional programmes “Support

to maritime development, Latin America” and “Support to maritime development, Caribbean”, as well as global programmes).

IMO maintains collaborative relations with Cuba. Since the early 1980s, IMO has collaborated closely with the Operative Network for Regional Cooperation among Maritime Authorities of the Americas, which includes Cuba.

IMO assistance to Latin America is guided by the maritime strategies of the region, and the organization will continue to focus on supporting their implementation. The countries of the Operative Network have addressed issues such as safety standards, training aspects and marine environment protection through regional strategies, with numerous training activities organized in cooperation with IMO. Most IMO support is channelled through the Operative Network by virtue of a memorandum of understanding signed with the Operative Network secretariat. Through that instrument, the Operative Network is assigned responsibility for the management and execution of regional technical cooperation activities identified by the respective countries, including Cuba, as priorities in building capacities for the implementation and enforcement of the global maritime standards of IMO.

Cuba receives technical assistance from the Regional Activity Centre for Marine Pollution Emergency, Information and Training for the Wider Caribbean Region, which aims to assist countries in implementing international conventions established to reduce pollution from shipping.

Although IMO has not encountered difficulties in delivering any of the activities in the projects mentioned above as a result of the embargo against Cuba, the organization has had to address logistical challenges associated with daily subsistence allowance payments to participants from Cuba.

On 11 February 2025, Cuba informed IMO that the economic, commercial and financial embargo directly affected its ability to fully participate in IMO activities, since delegates from the Cuban maritime administration encountered difficulties in attending IMO meetings held in a hybrid format, due to inability to access Zoom services in Cuba.

## **International Organization for Migration**

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) continues to support the priorities outlined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Cuba for the period 2020-2024, which has been extended until 2025. IOM participates in three of the four working groups of the Cooperation Framework, which address key areas jointly identified by the Government of Cuba and the United Nations system. In addition to the IOM activities, joint efforts involve the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Population Fund, and the United Nations Children’s Fund.

Throughout the past year, efforts have been focused on key initiatives, including supporting the finalization of the migration profile, strengthening the United Nations Network on Migration in Cuba, initiating migration data projects and enhancing territorial resilience, specifically by identifying pertinent migration indicators. IOM remained engaged in providing services, including assisted voluntary return for stranded migrants and resettlement assistance for refugees.

## International Telecommunication Union

[Original: English]  
[21 March 2025]

During the period in question, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has received the following correspondence:

- Note dated 27 January 2025 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba addressed to the Secretary-General of ITU.
- Note dated 12 March 2025 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba addressed to the Secretary-General of ITU.

## Office for Outer Space Affairs

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

Cuba has been a State member of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space since 2001.

The potential for disasters as a result of natural hazards is high in the Caribbean. In the course of multiple crises over the years, the Government of Cuba has put in place an efficient and unique alert system reaching all corners of the country. However, the use of satellite-based data, as well as of precise positioning and navigation systems or of modern satellite telecommunication, by its civil protection agency could improve the performance of the alert system, while providing for improved contingency planning and preparedness. The integration of these tools in the existing systems in Cuba would be greatly facilitated by well-structured participation of all stakeholders at the various levels of administration in Cuba.

The United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response implemented by the Office for Outer Space Affairs ensures “that all countries and international and regional organizations have access to and develop the capacity to use all types of space-based information to support the full disaster management cycle”.

A technical advisory mission to Cuba delivered by the Platform, through a Spanish-speaking international expert team that, consulting key entities in Cuba with responsibilities or potential roles in disaster risk reduction and emergency response, would allow the assessment not only of the current capabilities but also of the priorities for action. Such a mission could be planned and executed in 2026, funds permitting, delivering clear recommendations for the consideration of the Government of Cuba. A formal invitation from the Government for a technical advisory mission, addressed to the Office for Outer Space Affairs, would be required.

With facilitation from the Platform, among others, the disaster management authorities in Cuba are currently in the process of becoming authorized users of the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters, a mechanism whereby various space agencies are providing countries with free satellite imagery to respond to natural disasters worldwide.

## Office of the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations system for operational activities for development, Cuba

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

Cuba is classified as a high-development country, ranking 85th out of 189 countries in the human development index compiled by the United Nations Development Programme for 2023/2024. The Government of Cuba has reaffirmed its commitment to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals enshrined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which are implemented at the national level through the National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030.

Following the adoption of the new Constitution in 2019, Cuba is enacting an intense legislative agenda to operationalize constitutional reforms, creating opportunities to strengthen rights and inclusion across society and the economy. The country is implementing policies and programmes to advance the Sustainable Development Goals, including in health, education, gender equality, social protection and environmental sustainability. Cuba also promotes science, technology and innovation – it is home to world-class research institutions and medical advancements – and actively engages in South-South cooperation.

Cuba is advancing those priorities related to the Sustainable Development Goals in a complex context, facing an economic crisis that threatens the quality and sustainability of its social achievements and the well-being of its people. In addition, there is a complex external environment that has worsened the scenario for the country in recent years, with at least three consecutive and severe shocks: the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the impact of the current conflict in Ukraine and increased sanctions imposed by the United States of America. In addition, at the end of 2024, two hurricanes and two earthquakes struck Cuban territory in just 20 days, amid an energy emergency that had already knocked out the national power grid two days before the first hurricane hit. These three disasters had a significant negative impact on key sectors critical to the well-being, livelihoods and socio-economic development of the population. They affected 7 provinces and 17 municipalities, directly affecting more than 1 million people.

The financial, economic and commercial restrictions imposed by United States sanctions significantly reduce the capacity to manage the crisis and respond to the growing development and humanitarian needs. Among those needs, the following elements stand out as not having changed since the previous report:

- The embargo prohibits United States companies from conducting business with Cuba and imposes limitations on transactions involving United States dollars. That measure affects trade and commercial operations and makes it difficult for foreign companies to do business with Cuba. It also restricts the export of goods and services from the United States to Cuba, as well as imports from Cuba to the United States. It further prevents United States companies from investing in Cuba and limits the ability of Cuban entities to access financing from United States banks.
- Cuban or foreign companies established in Cuba may not access, use or purchase goods, services (including patents) or products or technologies more than 10 per cent of whose components are linked to the United States, even though the United States is the most competitive and diversified market close to Cuba.
- The embargo places restrictions on shipping lines whose vessels dock in Cuban harbours. That measure not only limits tourism, but also has a negative impact on trade and the availability of key items such as health and humanitarian goods

and services that are needed by vulnerable groups, particularly women, adolescents and youth.

- The implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act reinforces the general conditions of the embargo against Cuba by allowing legal claims to be made in relation to property confiscated in the country following the Cuban revolution.
- The exclusion of Cuba from international financial institutions may be the most significant obstacle to the country's development and the realization of its goals under the 2030 Agenda. Sanctions limit access to lending and other development and emergency financial resources provided by international financial institutions. They also concurrently ban international banks from operating with Cuban institutions when transactions in United States dollars are involved. These restrictions not only hinder national development directly but also increase the country's risks on capital markets, threatening access to external financing, creating disincentives for foreign investment, affecting the means for implementing the 2030 Agenda and limiting business development and job creation.
- The broad restrictions owing to the embargo also affect nascent non-State economic actors, such as entrepreneurs, cooperatives and small businesses, which represent a transformative force in the country's economy. Despite exemptions for private-sector trade under United States law, these actors face de facto barriers: limited access to international banking, including the blocking of digital payments; the inability to import inputs originating in the United States, even via third countries; and exclusion from such global platforms as Stripe or PayPal. Restrictions on shipping raise costs for micro-enterprises that are reliant on imported goods, while financial sanctions force them into cash-based or informal transactions, undermining economic diversification and the growth of the private sector in the country. By constraining the very sector that could represent a transformative force in the country's economy, the sanctions are inadvertently reinforcing the conditions that they are intended to change.
- The embargo also has had an impact on the human rights of the Cuban people. It has contributed to economic hardship and shortages of basic necessities in Cuba, something that has negatively affected the health and well-being of Cubans. The embargo limits access to educational resources, hindering the ability of students and educators to access specialized literature, software programmes and school and artistic materials. The embargo has limited access to essential medical supplies. The obstacles which it places before the import of agricultural equipment and inputs have also had an impact on agricultural productivity in Cuba, placing a strain on the country's budget and potentially affecting those who rely on social safety nets. Furthermore, this situation poses a threat to food security in the country.

In January 2025, the previous United States Administration lifted the designation by the United States of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism, granted a six-month waiver of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. However, the incoming United States Administration immediately reversed those measures. It reinstated Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism, updated the list of restricted Cuban entities and activated Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. It suspended licences for transactions with the entity that receives remittances, revoked humanitarian "parole" and suspended visas for cultural, sporting, academic and scientific exchanges. The administration also restricted and suspended visas for persons associated with the international cooperation programmes of Cuba, particularly those related to health. Recently, it was announced that new entry restrictions would be imposed on ships arriving from Cuba.

### **Impact on United Nations programmes and operations**

The United Nations system in Cuba comprises 22 agencies implementing the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Cuba for the period 2020–2025. This framework addresses the strategic development priorities of Cuba, including effective governance systems, economic transformation, environmental sustainability, disaster risk management and equitable human development. The United Nations country team is formulating the next cooperation framework, for the period 2026–2030, which will be aligned with both the 2030 Agenda and the National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030 of Cuba.

In late 2024, the United Nations system activated an emergency action plan following multiple natural disasters, including Hurricane Oscar on 20 October 2024, Hurricane Rafael on 6 November 2024 and two earthquakes on 10 November 2024. This coordinated response provides targeted assistance for approximately 930,000 affected individuals, addressing urgent humanitarian needs and support for recovery efforts. The embargo affects the ability of the United Nations system in Cuba to respond to the country's sustainable development priorities, its most urgent needs and the well-being of the population, both in development contexts and in response to disasters.

While each United Nations entity has submitted its own report, we summarize below the main implications of the embargo for the United Nations system as a whole. Since the previous report, no positive progress can be reported.

Restrictions on the acquisition of essential supplies and increased transaction costs have delayed operations and affected the efficiency of United Nations projects and the implementation of the United Nations cooperation programme in Cuba. That has been the case both for the regular programme and for humanitarian response initiatives, in view of a particularly challenging disaster response in 2024. For example, during emergency situations, some United Nations agencies have been unable to gain access to critical humanitarian pre-positioned items stored in the United Nations depots, as some are owned by entities associated with the United States. More complex and time-consuming procurement processes are required, leading to higher costs and delaying the ability of United Nations entities to deliver a timely emergency response to affected populations.

In general, goods, services and technologies produced in the United States, and those covered by United States patents or containing components produced or patented in the United States, are not available to United Nations projects. This has resulted in acquisitions having to be made from third-party countries and secondary suppliers and at prices higher than those for comparable products sold on the international market. That situation occurs both in projects intended to support basic goods for the welfare of the people in Cuba, in key sectors such as health, food, education, water and sanitation, as well as in other sectors with potential for development in Cuba, such as energy, information technology, agriculture and biotechnology.

Challenges continued in the use of long-term agreements with United Nations entities for the procurement of key office supplies, as contracting processes have to be delayed due to requests for end-use certifications in relation to entities with which the office engages. Similarly, other purchases through long-term agreements required additional processing time due to the need for suppliers to obtain specific licences from the United States Department of Commerce.

Financial proposals and new projects must consider, in their design, an extended period for procurement processes; they must also allocate additional financial resources to cover incremental costs that could otherwise be allocated for

development activities. Those additional costs are covered by the funds provided by international development partners, which are channelled through United Nations entities.

Additional logistical difficulties and transaction costs have arisen in procurement processes due to the lack of access to the United States market, despite its proximity. Costs associated with intermediaries and long-distance transportation negatively affect access to the key inputs needed for implementing development projects, the final cost of imported project goods and equipment, and the provision of goods and services to vulnerable groups. Shipments of food and non-food commodities purchased by United Nations projects are frequently delayed due to the difficulty of finding companies willing to operate in Cuban ports, as shipping companies with vessels that dock in Cuban ports are also subject to sanctions.

The United Nations system in Cuba faces other significant operational constraints due to financial restrictions stemming from United States sanctions. Those limitations manifest across multiple dimensions:

#### *Banking and transaction restrictions*

- United Nations agencies are prohibited from maintaining corporate accounts with United States financial institutions or conducting transactions in United States dollars. All payment processing requires exhaustive verification of compliance with the regulations of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, creating substantial administrative burdens.
- Even transactions not processed in United States dollars encounter increased scrutiny, with international banks imposing additional withholding requirements. To maintain operational liquidity, agencies must utilize third-party banking intermediaries for monthly replenishments of accounts in United States dollars, a process that incurs exchange rate losses and transaction fees.

#### *Challenges to cooperation with international financial institutions*

- Collaboration with international financial institutions is hampered by sanctions. A 2024 case study illustrates these challenges: a critical project disbursement required conversion to non-dollar currencies and routing through intermediary banks, delaying implementation by several months.
- The sanctions regime has created a risk-averse environment in which many international banks now decline transactions related to United Nations development projects in Cuba, regardless of their humanitarian nature.

#### *Impacts on the supply chain and vendors*

- Established commercial relationships have been disrupted as regional banks freeze accounts of suppliers working with Cuban entities. This situation has led to delayed vendor payments, increased procurement costs and budgetary reallocations away from programmatic work to cover financial overheads.

#### *Limitations on personal banking*

- United Nations staff face parallel restrictions in their personal banking, including the inability to transfer funds to United States-linked financial institutions, restrictions on using Cuban accounts for travel-related transactions, and complex visa requirements for official travel, something that affects regional coordination.

*Digital and technological constraints*

- The impact of the embargo extends to digital infrastructure and communications, including e-commerce and access to information, as United Nations offices encounter systemic barriers in digital procurement processes; most international e-commerce platforms are inaccessible from Cuban Internet protocol addresses. In addition, critical operational resources, including technical documentation, pricing data and support portals, remain blocked by United States technology providers.
- Standard United Nations procurement mechanisms, such as long-term agreements, cannot be implemented without case-by-case approvals by the United States, causing equipment acquisition delays averaging 6–8 weeks and unbudgeted cost increases that are typically between 15 and 30 per cent above market rates.
- Telecommunications operate at suboptimal efficiency due to prohibitive costs as a result of routing around United States infrastructure, limited bandwidth for United Nations digital platforms and restricted access to cloud-based collaboration tools.

This comprehensive financial and technological exclusion creates a multiplier effect, in which each restriction compounds others, significantly reducing the operational efficiency of the United Nations in Cuba. The resulting administrative overhead consumes resources that would otherwise support programme implementation, while delays and barriers to access undermine the timely delivery of development assistance.

## **Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights**

[Original: English]  
[12 May 2025]

### **Introduction**

1. During the reporting period, the High Commissioner and the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights commented on the adverse impact of unilateral sectoral sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights and called for the reconsideration of such measures with a view to lifting them as they disproportionately impacted the population, in particular the most vulnerable.<sup>1</sup> Broad sectoral sanctions also affected the work of human rights and humanitarian organizations.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) received information indicating that the embargo continues to adversely affect the enjoyment of human rights in the country, such as the rights to food, health

<sup>1</sup> See [www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/01/syria-visiting-turk-calls-human-rights-be-central-face-tremendous?sub-site=HRC](https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/01/syria-visiting-turk-calls-human-rights-be-central-face-tremendous?sub-site=HRC); [www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/01/hc-brussels-europe-has-opportunity-advance-human-rights-home-and](https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/01/hc-brussels-europe-has-opportunity-advance-human-rights-home-and); and [www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/oral-update-human-rights-situation-venezuela](https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/03/oral-update-human-rights-situation-venezuela).

<sup>2</sup> See [www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/12/high-commissioners-update-human-rights-council-venezuela](https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/12/high-commissioners-update-human-rights-council-venezuela).

and education, in particular of the most vulnerable.<sup>3</sup> OHCHR encourages the relaxing of such measures to relieve the needs of the most vulnerable segments of the population.

3. Cuba experienced three major earthquakes and several hurricanes,<sup>4</sup> causing damage to power, infrastructure, water supply and agriculture. No humanitarian exemptions to the embargo were granted. The embargo-related financial barriers, along with the reluctance of vessels to dock in Cuba as it would bar them from accessing ports in the United States for 180 days pursuant to the embargo, reportedly hindered the State's ability to respond effectively.<sup>5</sup>

4. Widespread power outages, four in the six months leading up to March 2025,<sup>6</sup> worsened by hurricanes and storms, affected the availability and accessibility of health, food and education services. Approximately 40 per cent of the electricity in Cuba is produced in thermoelectric plants, many surpassing the intended lifespan.<sup>7</sup> According to information received by OHCHR, embargo-related import restrictions, obstacles to loans and the reluctance of foreign companies to engage with Cuba hinder energy infrastructure upgrades. Lack of access to the international credit system, declining exports of Cuban services and goods, owing, inter alia, to reduced national production<sup>8</sup> and declining tourism,<sup>9</sup> deterred inter alia by the frequent power outages and United States visa restrictions for travellers entering Cuba,<sup>10</sup> reduced even further Cuban foreign currency reserves available to buy fuel, further affecting other power plants<sup>11</sup> and to run the transport fleet, rendering it more exposed to supply shortages. According to media sources, the country's energy transition to renewable sources is affected by the obstacles to the importation of spare parts for hydroelectric power systems, solar panels or wind turbines.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Information obtained by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) through interviews during the period under review with the following: World Health Organization; United Nations Population Fund; Department of Medicines and Health Technology and the Elders Programme of the Ministry of Public Health; MediCuba S.A.; Cuban Society of Cardiology; Cuban Society of Oncology, Radiotherapy and Nuclear Medicine; Centre for Molecular Immunology; Cuban Association of Persons with Motor and Physical Disabilities (ACLIFIM); National Association of Deaf Persons of Cuba (ANSOC); National Association of Blind Persons of Cuba (ANCI); Cuban Association of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (ACDPI); Cuban Association of Animal Production (ACPA); Higher Management Organizations (OSDE) for AgriFood and Food of the Ministry for the Food Industry; Papas&Co.S.A.; Cuba Ron S.A.; La Estancia S.A.; CARIBEX S.A.; National Institute of Economic Research; early childhood, and primary and secondary education methodologists of the Ministry of Education; academic staff of the University of Havana.

<sup>4</sup> Data reported by the National Seismological Service of Cuba, 7 January 2025, available at [www.citma.gob.cu/2024-ano-de-mayor-cantidad-de-sismos-registrados-en-cuba/](http://www.citma.gob.cu/2024-ano-de-mayor-cantidad-de-sismos-registrados-en-cuba/).

<sup>5</sup> For example, according to the Cuban Association of Animal Production, \$100,000 of household and agriculture goods and inputs purchased in Mexico through donations for the recovery after the climate events in December 2024 had not yet been shipped by March 2025 owing to the reluctance of vessels to dock in Cuba.

<sup>6</sup> See <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250315-cuba-suffers-fourth-nationwide-blackout-in-five-months>.

<sup>7</sup> See [www.powermag.com/thermal-power-plants-in-cuba-struggle-to-meet-demand/](http://www.powermag.com/thermal-power-plants-in-cuba-struggle-to-meet-demand/).

<sup>8</sup> Information obtained through interviews with ACPA and enterprises of the Ministry for the Food Industry of Cuba.

<sup>9</sup> Data of the Office of National Statistics, obtained through interviews with the National Institute of Economic Research.

<sup>10</sup> Information obtained inter alia through interviews with the National Institute of Economic Research.

<sup>11</sup> See [www.powermag.com/thermal-power-plants-in-cuba-struggle-to-meet-demand/](http://www.powermag.com/thermal-power-plants-in-cuba-struggle-to-meet-demand/). Approximately 22 per cent of the electricity is produced with fuel oil engines, and 22 per cent with diesel engines.

<sup>12</sup> See <https://oncubanews.com/cuba/economia/2024-apagones-crisis-energetica-cuba/>.

5. Cuba continued to be designated in the “list of States sponsors of terrorism” by the United States, except for a few days in January 2025.<sup>13</sup> Following measures under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, the “Cuba restricted list” was reissued,<sup>14</sup> with the addition of a remittance processing company, significantly hindering official United States-Cuba remittance channels. The inclusion of Cuba in the list, coupled with the cumulative effect of more than 60 years of other sanctions measures imposed under the embargo and other economic factors, continue to have a serious impact on the State’s ability to fulfil its human rights obligations. The United Nations special procedures mandate holders of the Human Rights Council again addressed the inclusion of Cuba on the United States “State sponsors of terrorism” list and its devastating impact on the human rights of vulnerable groups such as children, older persons and persons with disabilities, further deepening the economic and humanitarian crisis.

### **Impact on the right to health**

#### *Availability of medicines and medical services*

6. According to the Department of Medicines and Health Technology of Cuba, 80 per cent of the country’s 651 essential medicines are produced locally. However, medicine stock levels cover only 30 days instead of the 120 days required by national protocol, affecting more than 50 per cent of essential drugs. This production shortage is reportedly due, inter alia, to a lack of raw materials, equipment and packaging and restrictions on United States-patented medical technologies, including those for which United States components make up just 10 per cent. Medicine supplies in pharmacies remain low, with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) confirming the stockout of medicines needed to respond to the main causes of morbidity and mortality for maternal and child health. Doctors report rising hospital admissions owing to limited medicine availability and an ageing population, increasing strain on the health system.

7. Although the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 allows the export of medical equipment and medicines to Cuba subject to regulatory licensing, few United States suppliers are reportedly interested, owing to overcompliance. The country’s medical import agency, MediCuba S.A., reportedly reached out to 51 new United States pharmaceutical companies in early 2025, but none had responded positively by 31 March. In addition, Cuba should pay for United States imports in full and up front, which is increasingly difficult owing to limited Cuban access to foreign currency.

8. Import companies, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNFPA operating in Cuba and the Ministry of Public Health reported growing overcompliance by providers owing to banks’ procedures with the restrictions imposed by the inclusion of Cuba in the “list of States sponsoring terrorism”. According to all of them, payments are blocked, and banks demand many documents, deterring third-country suppliers and increasing costs. MediCuba S.A. noted a brief rise in supplier interest when Cuba was temporarily removed from the list in January 2025 – raising its portfolio from 501 to 524 suppliers – but many agreements were

<sup>13</sup> See <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2025/01/14/certification-of-rescission-of-cubas-designation-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism/>; <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2025/01/14/letter-to-the-chairmen-and-chair-of-certain-congressional-committees-on-the-suspension-of-the-right-to-bring-an-action-under-title-iii-of-the-cuban-liberty-and-democratic-solidarity-libertad-act-of/>; and <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2025/01/14/memorandum-on-the-revocation-of-national-security-presidential-memorandum-5/>.

<sup>14</sup> See [www.state.gov/restoring-a-tough-u-s-cuba-policy/](http://www.state.gov/restoring-a-tough-u-s-cuba-policy/).

cancelled after the reinclusion of Cuba. WHO reported difficulties in finding alternative timely and affordable solutions to United States and third-country imports, owing to overcompliance by several companies that denied the sale of licensed products for Cuba and the limited number of providers accepting the risk of the transactions. UNFPA also reported delays of more than six months for contraceptive shipments. MediCuba S.A. reported added costs and delays from rerouting shipments through intermediate ports to bypass the United States 180-day rule. As a mitigating measure, authorities have reached agreements with the private sector, resulting in in-country purchases from private importers – at higher prices, but with faster delivery and no upfront payments.

9. According to the Department of Medicines and Health Technology, the availability of medical equipment and supplies declined during the reporting period owing to obsolete equipment and limited access to spare parts or new technology. For example, permanent catheters are reportedly unavailable, forcing the use of infection-prone temporary catheters. Surgical capacity continues to be low, with only 770,000 operations annually – well below the pre-COVID level of 1.2 million. To reduce wait times for medical examinations, State resources and international support have prioritized strengthening primary care and improving resource management, focusing on priority medical sectors.

10. The embargo has reportedly limited early diagnosis and treatment of cardiovascular diseases by the Cuban healthcare system. According to the Cuban Society of Cardiology, non-functional equipment, often dependent on technology produced in the United States, is too costly to replace, so the system now prioritizes urgent cases and promotes inter-hospital coordination. A lack of reagents also impedes accurate blood testing, delaying diagnoses and treatments. Cardiovascular surgeries have dropped from 1 to 2 per week in 2024 to only emergencies in early 2025, mainly owing to shortages of anaesthetics, antibiotics, consumables and respiratory equipment. Key procedures, such as transcatheter aortic valve implantation, are unavailable in Cuba owing to their reliance on technology produced in the United States, while other valvular surgeries are limited by the lack of replacement valves. The practice of explanting pacemakers from deceased patients, sterilizing and reprogramming them for a new implant has increased but remains insufficient because, inter alia, removal is dependent on authorization by the families and the quality and remaining lifespan of the devices.

11. Access to diagnostic and treatment equipment for cancer diagnosis and care has further declined, without the possibility of repair or replacement, owing to costs and/or obstacles to imports. According to the Cuban Society of Oncology, Radiotherapy and Nuclear Medicine, fewer than half of all diagnostic machines (X-ray, Computer Tomography (CT) scans, magnetic resonance imaging (MRIs), ultrasounds) remain functional. At the Institute of Oncology and Radiology in Havana, only one CT scanner and one of three tomographs are operational; throughout the capital, just three tomographs are working. Radiotherapy equipment has also decreased in availability, primarily owing to the lack of spare parts, high import costs from remote markets and United States technology restrictions. Many cobalt machines have reportedly surpassed their radiation lifespan (12–15 years), requiring longer exposure times. Treatment delays are common, and therapy is often interrupted, reducing its effectiveness. To mitigate this, hospitals have extended shifts – adding pressure on staff – and apply hypofractionated radiation therapy (higher doses in fewer sessions) to treat more patients. For paediatric oncology, urgent surgeries and treatments are preserved, although often adjusted in timing and frequency.

*Accessibility of medicine, medical and support services*

12. Medicine and medical supply shortages in the national healthcare system are partly offset by unofficial market sources and foreign home-delivery online platforms that sell in freely convertible currency (*moneda libremente convertible* – MLC) or foreign currency. However, high prices make them inaccessible for most people without family support abroad.<sup>15</sup> According to media sources, the inclusion of a remittance processor company on the “Cuba Restricted List” led to the suspension of official channels of remittance,<sup>16</sup> further reducing household purchasing power. The elderly, often without internet access and living on low pensions amid rising inflation, are, in particular, excluded from these options.<sup>17</sup>

13. Fuel shortages and a deteriorating public transport fleet have reportedly reduced transport availability and raised costs for patients, especially those needing regular treatments, who need to rely on expensive private transport instead.<sup>18</sup> As a mitigation measure, doctors provide at-home rehabilitation plans, albeit often less effective and slower. Limited access to nearby care has led to more hospitalizations, adding strain on the health system and financial burdens on families who must pay for accommodation near hospitals.<sup>19</sup>

14. Access to health equipment and assistive devices for people with disabilities has also declined, reportedly owing to limited State funding and import restrictions on materials and spare parts.<sup>20</sup> Many relied on family support from abroad, now affected by remittance and donation restrictions. The Cuban Association of Persons with Motor and Physical Disabilities (ACLIFIM) reported rising unmet needs: 11,000 members required wheelchairs in 2024, with 5,000 lacking sanitary chairs and 1,864 needing orthopaedic footwear, the quality of which has worsened owing to poor materials. Protheses are also scarce – 99 members lacked upper limb and 418 lower limb devices. The National Association of Deaf Persons of Cuba (ANSOC) noted that cochlear implants must be changed once broken because they can no longer be repaired, since the technology has changed and is not available in Cuba. The National Association of Blind Persons of Cuba (ANCI) reported that only 2,500 of 6,000 visually impaired people received walking sticks through donations, and advanced visual, hearing aids and digital assistive tools are unavailable or limited in availability, owing to restrictions by payment platforms and United States software stores. The Cuban Association of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (ACDPI) reported a shortage in the production of psychopharmaceuticals owing to the lack of raw materials. The country’s only National Rehabilitation Centre was forced to close, as renovation could not be completed owing to high fuel costs, material shortages and limited government funding.

15. According to the Elders Programme of the Ministry of Public Health, social protection for the elderly – through 156 elder homes and 35 day centres for older persons – faced major challenges in 2024 owing to energy shortages, lack of assistive devices and reduced access to subsidized food and psychiatric medicines, largely linked to the embargo.

<sup>15</sup> Information obtained through interviews with the National Institute of Economic Research and associations of people living with disabilities.

<sup>16</sup> See [www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-10/western-union-halts-money-transfers-to-cuba-citing-new-sanctions?embedded-checkout=true](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-10/western-union-halts-money-transfers-to-cuba-citing-new-sanctions?embedded-checkout=true).

<sup>17</sup> Information obtained through interviews with associations of people living with disabilities.

<sup>18</sup> Information obtained through interviews with the Cuban Society of Cardiology and ACLIFIM.

<sup>19</sup> Information obtained through interviews with the Cuban Society of Cardiology, the Cuban Society of Oncology, Radiotherapy and Nuclear Medicine and associations of people living with disabilities.

<sup>20</sup> Information obtained through interviews with associations of people with disabilities.

### *Quality of health services*

16. Medical staff reportedly had to work longer hours to manage growing waiting lists and adapt treatments amid medicine shortages, impacting their psychological well-being. Limited access to training, owing to blocked online platforms and refusal to process payments for registrations or membership fees, and the limited medical resources, has also reportedly affected access to most updated diagnostic and treatment knowledge.

### **Right to food**

#### *Availability of food*

17. According to the Cuban Association of Animal Production (ACPA), agricultural and livestock production reportedly declined further in 2024, worsened by extreme weather that damaged crops and limited supply for months. Shortages of equipment, fertilizers, herbicides and animal vaccines – caused by financial constraints, high shipping costs from remote countries and embargo-related delays – hampered productivity. Fuel shortages forced a return to animal traction at times, reducing the area of cultivated land. ACPA noted that potato seeds stored in cold rooms had to be planted prematurely owing to power outages, lowering yields. International cooperation played a key role in the supply of farming equipment and tools, albeit below national needs. Embargo restrictions disrupted donations of agricultural inputs purchased after natural disasters. Uncultivated land expanded and yields dropped, especially for fertilizer-dependent crops such as sugar cane, bananas, rice and potatoes.

18. According to ACPA, livestock breeding – especially cattle – further declined in 2024 owing to shortages of animal feed, medicines and supplements. The Higher Business Management Organization (OSDE) for AgriFood reported a 21 per cent drop in beef production from 2023 to 2024. The Government promoted municipal self-sufficiency through the Food Sovereignty and Nutritional Security Law of 2022, encouraging small livestock farming (pigs, poultry, fish, rabbits), but this failed to meet the target of 5 kg of meat per person per month, reportedly in part owing to the impact of the embargo on the shortages of animal feed, medicines and supplements. Poultry production remained low owing to feed shortages, with high mortality from vitamin deficiencies and infections. Egg production declined, necessitating imports. Pork and rabbit production fell owing to input and vaccine shortages, despite efforts to promote the lower-input Criollo pig, while fish farming was limited by lack of feed.

19. Owing to declining agriculture and livestock output, the food industry in Cuba has increasingly relied on imports for raw materials such as oil, wheat, corn, sugar and fruit, as well as the usually imported equipment and additives, for the subsidized food basket.<sup>21</sup> According to industry representatives, import costs have soared owing to high shipping fees, financial barriers and lack of credit, while overcompliance by financial institutions further delayed transactions. The Higher Business Management Organization for Food reported that only 34 per cent of planned imports had been fulfilled, in particular affecting wheat flour availability, and that financial barriers delayed spare part shipments for mills from Europe, causing 111 days of lost bread production and a 30 per cent drop overall. Mitigation measures included blending yucca into flour and sourcing from micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Import delays were also reportedly due to the United States 180-day rule and reliance on intermediaries, with companies such as CARIBEX, the national fishing enterprise, reportedly paying \$90,000 additional costs. La Estancia S.A. was reportedly awaiting

<sup>21</sup> Information obtained through interviews with the Higher Business Management Organizations for Food and AgriFood, La Estancia S.A., Papas&Co.S.A. and Cuba Ron S.A.

Swiss spare parts by March 2025 – an order paid in November 2024 and essential to five production lines. During the brief removal of Cuba from the United States terrorism list, the Higher Business Management Organization for Food reportedly observed a notable increase in outreach from importers and payment agencies – highlighting the chilling effect of compliance. Production interruptions became widespread, with many lines shut or running minimally. Milk output reportedly fell 5 per cent, and La Estancia S.A. was operating at just 3 per cent capacity on some lines, halting the production of milk and tomato by-products owing to unrepaired equipment. Cuba Ron S.A. reported a 20 per cent decline in juice and puree production for the child food basket.

20. Power outages severely disrupted production, in particular automated systems and cold storage, reducing milk availability for children's food baskets. Papas&Co.S.A. reported a 1.5-month halt in production, Cuba Ron S.A. met less than 50 per cent of its 2024 fuel needs, and La Estancia S.A. reported that, in January 2025, it had halted the production of fruit puree. The fishing capacity of CARIBEX dropped by 50 per cent, and it suspended shrimp fishing to conserve fuel. These disruptions led to lower production capacity and reportedly affected medical diets, household incomes and export revenues. Businesses were affected by blackouts, leading to lower production capacity. Distribution was also affected, causing losses of perishable goods, delays and unpredictable delivery schedules.

21. According to ACPA and the Higher Business Management Organizations for Food and Agrifood, reduced local production meant that more than 50 per cent of the subsidized food basket remained imported, making the country vulnerable to global price shifts. Milk, once guaranteed for all children aged 0–6, was reduced to powdered milk for children aged 0–1, with reduced availability for ages 2–6. Social programmes such as homes for the elderly and hospitals received only 20–30 per cent of planned food supplies. Medical diets were maintained for chronically ill children and pregnant women, but soy yogurt, eggs and processed meats were distributed in sharply reduced amounts. Chicken and beef were reserved for young children and producing provinces. Staple rations – potato, salt, bread, coffee, oil, sugar, legumes – decreased in quantity and availability. Food quality and variety in schools and social programmes continued to deteriorate.

#### *Accessibility of food*

22. While State-owned MLC stores have less food available, private shops, e-shops selling in United States dollars, and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises have expanded food variety and availability – often at much higher prices.<sup>22</sup> These remain out of reach for many; in 2024, the average monthly State salary was 5,839 pesos (approximately \$48.66),<sup>23</sup> while a 30-egg box cost from 2,000 to 3,500 pesos.<sup>24</sup>

#### *Adequacy of food*

23. Reduced availability of and access to nutritious food has severely affected vulnerable groups needing specific diets, such as people with chronic illnesses or HIV/AIDS, pregnant and breastfeeding women and children. Subsidized special diets were especially impacted, with full coverage maintained only for children aged 0–1.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Information obtained through interview with the National Institute of Economic Research.

<sup>23</sup> Public information obtained from the Office of National Statistics and Information (onei.gob.cu).

<sup>24</sup> Information obtained through interviews with ACPA.

<sup>25</sup> Information obtained through interviews with the Higher Business Management Organization for Agrifood.

A 2024 report from the mother-child programme<sup>26</sup> indicated the suspension of key measures, such as including milk distribution for nutrient-deficient mothers, food support for malnourished women, Trofin production for anaemia and garden-based nutrition programmes. Schools struggled to meet planned daily calorie intake for children, despite efforts to promote healthy diets.<sup>27</sup>

## **Right to education**

### *Availability of education/research material and equipment*

24. According to information provided to OHCHR, access to books and educational materials declined owing to high shipping costs, import delays and limited State funding, posing education challenges. The three main printers reportedly reduced operations owing to ink and paper shortages, with priority given to newspapers and official content. As a result, materials for the curriculum reform for all education levels, “III Perfeccionamiento”, have not yet been printed. Fuel shortages and limited transport further delayed distribution, especially in remote areas, deepening regional disparities.

25. Methodologists and school directors reported a 50 per cent reduction in essential educational materials, including learning aids and evaluation tools. In the 2024–2025 academic year, only 25 per cent of the required paper and 50 per cent of the pencils and notebooks were supplied, with priority given to vulnerable and children and children in foster care. Preschool educators noted a severe lack of early childhood materials, while resources for science, arts, sports and music remain largely unavailable. School laboratories lack basic reagents and equipment, and foreign language laboratories at the Enrique José Varona University of Pedagogical Sciences are closed owing to unrepaired audiovisual systems. Uniform distribution fell by 50 per cent owing to reduced fabric imports, with two uniforms given only to students newly enrolled in the initial grades.

26. Authorities and personnel of schools and universities reported that most IT equipment was obsolete or broken owing to years without new purchases and a lack of spare parts.<sup>28</sup> Limited access to the Internet and digital resources further hinders learning and teacher development. Approximately 27 per cent of preschools lack computers entirely, and even prioritized schools for children aged 4–6 have outdated devices. Universities face similar challenges; at the University of Information Sciences of Havana, 60 per cent of devices are out of service owing to lack of spare parts and replacement equipment.

27. School infrastructure has worsened owing to limited maintenance following severe weather in 2024. Despite a stable education budget, rising material costs, inflation and embargo-related restrictions made repairs difficult. By March 2025, 35 out of 1,093 preschools were closed, while many others faced water and sanitation issues. Schools also reported shortages of chairs and desks, deteriorating gymnasium facilities and scarce hygiene supplies and dormitory linens, with increasingly infrequent deliveries.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> See [www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2024/07/16/disminuye-tasa-de-mortalidad-infantil-en-2024-pero-consolidar-los-indicadores-requiere-esfuerzo-intersectorial/](http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2024/07/16/disminuye-tasa-de-mortalidad-infantil-en-2024-pero-consolidar-los-indicadores-requiere-esfuerzo-intersectorial/).

<sup>27</sup> Information obtained through interviews with early-childhood methodologists and schools.

<sup>28</sup> Information obtained through interviews with early-childhood, primary and secondary education methodologists, and early childhood, primary and secondary schools and university departments.

<sup>29</sup> Information obtained by OHCHR through interviews with a methodologist of the Ministry of Education.

*Accessibility of educational material, tools and services*

28. Access to online educational resources in Cuba reportedly deteriorated. Restrictions imposed by the embargo expanded across websites, software and new technologies, limiting access to knowledge and educational tools. These restrictions affect both licensed and open-source platforms. Civil society and educators report frequent blocks on tools for learning, coding, communication and storage. Researchers lack access to essential programming tools, application programming interfaces, repositories and international coding systems. Access to online conferences remains limited. Although virtual private networks are used to bypass restrictions, poor connectivity limits their effectiveness.

29. Access to online educational resources has declined owing to deteriorating Internet infrastructure. According to the State telecommunications company, ETECSA, 85 per cent of its network is obsolete,<sup>30</sup> with upgrades impeded by the lack of foreign currency reserves and/or loans and import restrictions on United States-licensed technology. Limited interconnection with United States operators forces reliance on costlier routes,<sup>31</sup> while frequent blackouts and outdated IT equipment worsen the situation. Educators reported that slow, unreliable connections hinder access to research, training and virtual events.

30. University professors report barriers to scholarships and academic payments owing to overcompliance by international banks, which block or delay transfers and restrict access to payment platforms. Researchers pay for publication in international journals, often resorting to costly, delayed alternatives such as cash through intermediaries. The Centre for Molecular Immunology, for instance, noted that, despite having the necessary funds, it was unable to pay for its own patents or to pay an online journal for publication. Some platforms require researchers to deny Cuban government affiliation.<sup>32</sup>

31. Fuel shortages and a deteriorating transport fleet have reportedly affected the ability to deliver a range of public services to the population. For example, it has affected access to educational facilities for academic staff and students, especially in remote municipalities where transportation is less frequent. Provincial staff face barriers attending training in Havana owing to travel costs.

32. People with visual impairments are affected by the lack of Braille materials. Perkins Brailers are scarce, owing to embargoes on United States-made components, and Braille paper is both scarce and expensive. Schools for children with disabilities also lack essential tools for assessing and treating motor or language development, as many devices are too costly or restricted for containing more than 10 per cent United States-made components. Although some digital options exist, poor Internet access and software restrictions limit their use.

*Quality of education*

33. Quality of education is affected owing to shortage of materials, equipment and services, including digital tools available on the Internet. These challenges come amid a significant exodus of experienced educators – a 12.5 per cent teacher shortage<sup>33</sup> – placing more pressure on the youngest teachers and increasing the need for continuous professional development. Inflation and poor working conditions continue

<sup>30</sup> Cuba Briefing, Caribbean Council, Issue 1237, 28 May 2024.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Information obtained through interviews with the University of Information Sciences of Havana.

<sup>33</sup> See [www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-curso-escolar-2024-2025-comenzar%C3%A1-en-cuba-con-un-d%C3%A9ficit-de-maestros-del-12%C5-%25/87453026](http://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-curso-escolar-2024-2025-comenzar%C3%A1-en-cuba-con-un-d%C3%A9ficit-de-maestros-del-12%C5-%25/87453026).

to drive staff departures, increasing student-teacher ratios – up to 15:1 in preschools and 35:1 in primary schools.<sup>34</sup>

## Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

[Original: English]

[21 March 2025]

Cuba is a signatory neither to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees nor to the 1967 Protocol thereto. Nevertheless, thousands of refugees have found international protection in Cuba over the years, and the Government has allowed the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to exercise its mandate to protect and find solutions for refugees for over three decades.

Cuba has maintained its de facto policy of non-refoulement for refugees recognized under the mandate of UNHCR. Asylum-seekers in Cuba are allowed to remain in the country while UNHCR conducts a determination of their refugee status and, upon recognition of said status under its mandate, UNHCR endeavours to identify durable solutions for them.

In 2024, nine refugee students from the Western Sahara were registered, and 27 new applications for refugee status, involving 37 people, were received in Cuba. This represents an increase in asylum requests compared with previous years. The increase is despite the lack of solutions for refugees in Cuba and the difficult economic situation that affects the country, also affecting refugees and asylum-seekers. In addition, day-to-day basic products, including food and hygiene items, clothes, shoes and medicines, are increasingly difficult to come by and expensive for refugees and less-well-off Cubans. The scarcity of fuel is causing rising prices and power outages, affecting refugees, Cubans and UNHCR staff.

At the end of 2024, 54 refugees needed durable solutions; for most, resettlement to a third country is the only viable option. Cuba has generally not been prioritized by countries that offer resettlement quotas, limiting access to resettlement as a durable solution. Although Cuba has not developed a local integration policy, a few refugees have been granted permanent residence permits under national legislation on the basis of close family links with Cuban nationals. These individuals were given a legal status that grants them some of the rights and opportunities that nationals have; they face the same challenges as nationals with the economic downturn. While most recognized refugees are not provided with work permits, they have access to free healthcare, education, and subsidized products. Cuba continues to award government scholarships for tertiary education to young people from countries and territories facing unfavourable circumstances. Among those who have received the scholarship are refugees, including those from the State of Palestine and Western Sahara.

Cuba contributes to regional and global frameworks designed to enhance international protection and promote solutions for forcibly displaced and stateless people. In 2024, Cuba participated in Cartagena +40 events, including the Caribbean subregional consultation in Bogotá in August and the ministerial meeting in Santiago de Chile in December, which led to the adoption of the Chile Declaration and Plan of Action 2024–2034. These events were focused on regional cooperation and shared responsibility in addressing protection and solutions for refugees, forcibly displaced

<sup>34</sup> Information obtained by OHCHR through interviews with methodologists and directors of pre- and primary schools.

persons and stateless persons, during which Cuba reaffirmed its commitment to humanitarian principles.

In July 2024, the National Assembly of People's Power approved new migration and citizenship laws. Significant is the explicit mention, for the first time, of refugees and asylum-seekers assisted by UNHCR, who would be granted temporary humanitarian resident status. This would allow them to exercise rights such as work, education and healthcare on equal terms with the national population during their stay in the country. However, these laws have not yet entered into force.

Should the embargo against Cuba end, more favourable conditions in the country would benefit the people whom UNHCR is mandated to protect and seek solutions for. Such a situation could pave the way for meaningful discussions on local integration. UNHCR will continue to advocate the accession of Cuba to the international refugee and statelessness conventions.

## Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

[Original: English]  
[9 May 2025]

Cuba signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 and ratified it in 1997, thereby becoming a member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) from the date of entry into force of the Convention in 1997.

As a member of the Organisation, Cuba is entitled to request technical assistance and support from the OPCW Technical Secretariat and to participate in its capacity-building and training activities. As a State Party to the Convention, Cuba has the same rights and obligations as other States Parties.

The preamble to the Convention lays out the States Parties' desire, inter alia, to promote free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States Parties.

Article XI of the Convention specifically concerns economic and technological development and provides that the provisions of the Convention should be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of States Parties.

Cuban delegates regularly participate in capacity-building events and activities in various areas, and Cuba made unilateral offers of assistance under article X (7) (c) in 1997, 2005 and 2020 for the provision of experts.

Cuba has, on several occasions, stated that it has experienced impediments as a result of the embargo (see for instance the national statement of Cuba to the twenty-ninth session of the Conference of the States Parties).<sup>1</sup>

In the past, the Technical Secretariat experienced technical challenges in ensuring that Cuba had access to official documents of the Organisation and that it could make use of capacity-building and training activities offered by the Technical Secretariat. The challenges related to impediments in accessing the digital platforms used by the Technical Secretariat for these activities. However, in 2023, the Technical Secretariat identified technical solutions that conclusively resolved the issue.

<sup>1</sup> See [www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/CSP-29\\_NatStatements/Cuba\\_CSP-29\\_National%20Statement\\_ol\\_%28s%29.pdf](http://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/CSP-29_NatStatements/Cuba_CSP-29_National%20Statement_ol_%28s%29.pdf).

## **Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization**

[Original: English]  
[11 March 2025]

Cuba signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2021, thus becoming a member of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Cuba does not host an International Monitoring System facility under the Treaty. However, it is a recipient of equipment and technical support related to the establishment of a national data centre that provides access to the data collected by the International Monitoring System and the products created by the International Data Centre Division of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission. Cuba is also entitled to participate in capacity-building or training programmes.

The Secretariat continues to experience challenges and a heightened administrative burden associated with the implementation of its initial projects and activities in Cuba. There has been progress in receiving relevant licences as part of ongoing efforts to establish the satellite connections needed for the national data centre. There have been challenges in supporting the participation of experts of Cuba in virtual trainings and meetings, owing to access limitations that impede the effectiveness of information technology communications platforms. The coordination efforts for the implementation of Preparatory Commission activities in Cuba continue.

## **United Nations Children's Fund**

[Original: Spanish]  
[3 April 2025]

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has been working in Cuba since 1962, with a focus on ensuring the well-being and development of children and adolescents. In 1992, it established a country office with official representation and national and international staff. The work conducted by UNICEF in the country is aligned with the National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030, the UNICEF Strategic Plan and Cuba's national priorities established in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework 2020–2024, which was extended to December 2025 at the request of the Government of Cuba.

The priority areas of UNICEF for the period 2020–2025 include: (a) health and nutrition, to ensure that every child and adolescent survives and thrives; (b) education, to ensure that every child and adolescent learns; and (c) child protection, to ensure that each child and adolescent is protected from violence and abuse. The embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba affects living conditions and access to basic services and limits the opportunities for development of Cuban children, adolescents and their families.

Access to medical supplies and medicines for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases affecting children is limited by the high cost of bringing those supplies from other regions, including markets in Asia or Europe, instead of closer markets, such as the United States. The embargo also makes it difficult to have access to state-of-the-art supplies and technology. Children and adolescents who require specialized, high-quality medical care are deprived of the benefit of technological advances. In 2024, arrangements were made for the donation of oxygen therapy equipment and supplies to the Ministry of Public Health of Cuba from the United States, but the embargo caused a delay in the processing and shipping of the supplies, since the supplier needed to apply for special licences from the United States Department of Commerce.

These licences carry certain conditions, such as UNICEF acting as guarantor for the supplies in Cuba, which makes it difficult to accept this type of donation.

The embargo has a negative effect on the ability to have access to study materials, including books, computer equipment and school supplies. In 2024, the purchase of supplies for the diagnosis and treatment of autism in children became more expensive due to the fact that the leading supplier in the market did not accept the sale to Cuba, making it necessary to identify another supplier and purchase the supplies at a 73 per cent higher cost.

There was also a decrease in the frequency of ships entering Cuban ports, with fewer and fewer shipping companies conducting direct operations to Cuba, leading to a backlog of cargoes in trans-shipment ports and delaying shipments, with especially serious effects on the humanitarian response. If it were possible to manage procurement and freight logistics from the United States market, UNICEF estimates that freight costs could be reduced by an average of 40 per cent.

Challenges continued in the use of UNICEF long-term agreements for the procurement of key supplies for the office, with procurement processes having to be delayed by requests for end-use certificates and certificates for the entities with which the office engages. Similarly, some purchases through long-term agreements required longer processing times due to the suppliers' request for specific licences from the United States Department of Commerce (with estimated processing times of four to six months).

Restrictions on monthly bank transfers in United States dollars to Cuba remained in place in 2024. Returned payments increased due to suppliers being asked to make payments to foreign accounts associated with office addresses in Cuba. This situation not only complicated transactions but also affected the operations of the office owing to delays in the sending of transfers to cover operational costs, even affecting the timely payment of local staff salaries. In addition, delays in the sending of transfers to cover operational costs could affect the reputation of UNICEF with its suppliers.

The UNICEF Cuba Office had to use a third-party bank in a currency swap to replenish funds in its local United States dollar account on a monthly basis. This process involved additional exchange rate costs and bank and transaction fees, leading to a loss of approximately 15 per cent of the total value transferred, estimated at \$35,000 annually. This situation not only reduced the funds available for UNICEF operations and programmes in Cuba, but also increased the administrative burden significantly, diverting resources that could have been used to fund essential programmes in areas such as health, education and child protection.

Moreover, the office was not able to deliver impact in its management of international payments through the international corporate card due to limitations in its issuance for the Cuba office. This affected the number of low-value transactions that had to be issued through the Global Transaction Services Centre, generating high transaction costs. Without an international corporate card, the flexibility and efficient financial management of the office was limited and its reliance on more costly and less efficient processes increased, affecting the ability of UNICEF to manage its resources optimally.

In the case of international personnel of the United Nations accredited in Cuba, banking transactions are affected significantly when Cuba is declared as the country of residence. A temporary declaration of residence has direct risks in banking transactions, including the blocking of accounts and bank transfers. This does not only affect staff members' ability to manage their personal finances, it also can have a negative impact on their well-being and ability to carry out their duties effectively.

In summary, the financial restrictions do not only complicate the day-to-day management of the UNICEF office in Cuba, but also have a direct impact on the organization's ability to carry out its projects and fulfil its mission of supporting children and communities in Cuba.

## United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

[Original: English]

[19 March 2025]

### Introduction

Paragraph 99 of the Bridgetown Covenant (TD/541/Add.2), adopted at the fifteenth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2021 provided as follows:

The challenges to multilateralism need to be addressed through enhanced international cooperation underpinned by full respect for international law and the purposes and principles enshrined under the Charter of the United Nations. States are strongly urged to refrain from promulgating and applying any unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in light of concerns over the constraining nature and developmental implications of such measures that negatively impact the well-being of the populations and can impede the full achievement of economic and social development in the concerned States, as well as impair their trade relations.

Cuba has been under the United States embargo since 1962. The current United States policy towards Cuba was laid down in the National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba enacted in 2017.<sup>1</sup> The directive established a major policy direction which sought to tighten the embargo, including through restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by certain government entities, and elimination of individual people-to-people travel.<sup>2</sup> Measures were taken to further strengthen restrictions, including by enforcing all provisions of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad Act) of 1996, known as the Helms-Burton Act.

In 2022, steps were taken on easing immigration and financial restrictions affecting Cuban nationals. Immigrant visa processing was increased in the United States Embassy in Havana, travel restrictions were eased and flights were expanded. Financial restrictions on remittances have been eased, eliminating monetary and frequency limits for family remittances.<sup>3</sup> The Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program was revamped to allow up to 20,000 visas for entry every year.<sup>4</sup> In 2023, a new humanitarian parole programme was introduced to allow 30,000 individuals per month to enter the United States for two years with work authorization under certain conditions.

Decisions were taken on 14 January 2025 to remove Cuba's designation as a State sponsor of terrorism, revoke the National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba, and to suspend

<sup>1</sup> United States of America, Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 202, 20 October 2017.

<sup>2</sup> United States of America, Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Cuba Policy: Recent Developments and the 119th Congress", 2025.

<sup>3</sup> United States of America, Congressional Research Service, "Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview", 2025.

<sup>4</sup> See <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/the-cuban-family-reunification-parole-program>.

lawsuits under Title III of the Libertad Act.<sup>5</sup> These policies were rescinded by the current United States Government at the end of January 2025.<sup>6</sup> The designation of a country as a State sponsor of terrorism implies a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, prohibition on United States foreign assistance and other restrictions such as the prohibition of any United States person from engaging in a financial transaction with the government of a listed country.<sup>7</sup>

### Overall economic trends<sup>8</sup>

After a sharp contraction in real gross domestic product (GDP) by 11 per cent in 2020 due to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and a moderate recovery in 2021 and 2022, the Cuban economy grew by 1.5 per cent in 2023. The estimated average growth of real GDP in the period from 2020 to 2023 was 1.5 per cent. This outcome, modest as compared with the average growth rates of the Latin America and the Caribbean region of 4.3 per cent during that period, is still positive, given the Cuban economy's contraction between 2015 and 2020, when its real GDP decreased on average by 0.6 per cent annually. Cuba is estimated to register a growth rate of 1.3 per cent in 2024 and forecasted to grow by 2.1 per cent in 2025 and 1.9 per cent in 2026.<sup>9</sup>

Consumer price inflation remained high in 2023 (39.9 per cent) but represented a substantial decrease compared with 73.7 per cent in 2021, the year of the unification of the dual currency system. The outlook is positive. Inflation in 2024 is estimated at 31.2 per cent, while forecasts for 2025 and 2026 are 14.1 per cent and 7.8 per cent, respectively.<sup>10</sup>

With a GDP worth \$22.7 billion (2021), Cuba has a small and labour-intensive agricultural sector that accounts for 1 per cent of GDP but absorbs 17 per cent of the workforce,<sup>11</sup> and a manufacturing sector that contributes 11 per cent to GDP and employed 17 per cent of workers in 2022. The services sector is the dominant economic sector, contributing 74.6 per cent to GDP and 66 per cent to employment.<sup>12</sup> Women make up 38 per cent of the labour force, with 7 per cent of them occupied in agriculture, 10 per cent in industry and 83 per cent in services.<sup>13</sup>

Official development assistance towards Cuba increased by 15 per cent between 2022 and 2023, reaching \$160 million. The United Arab Emirates was the biggest donor, providing \$48 million, followed by France (\$17 million), Japan (\$14.5 million), Spain (\$10 million) and the United States (\$7.5 million).<sup>14</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The White House, "Certification of Rescission of Cuba's Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism", 14 January 2025, "Memorandum on the Revocation of National Security Presidential Memorandum 5" and "Letter to the Chairmen and Chair of Certain Congressional Committees on the Suspension of the Right to Bring an Action Under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996", 14 January 2025.

<sup>6</sup> The White House, "Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions", 20 January 2025, and United States Department of State, "Restoring a Tough U.S.-Cuba Policy", 31 January 2025.

<sup>7</sup> United States Department of State, "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism", 29 April 2004.

<sup>8</sup> The source of all data referred to in the text hereafter is UNCTADStat (available at <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/>) unless otherwise specified.

<sup>9</sup> World Economic Situation and Prospects 2025 (United Nations publication, 2025).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> UNCTADStat; World Bank, World Bank Open Data database.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> World Bank, World Bank Open Data database.

<sup>14</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Data Explorer. Available at <https://data-explorer.oecd.org/> (accessed on 29 January 2025).

Multiple crises in food, energy prices and public debt are expected to heighten economic hardship. Global food prices rose by 24 per cent between January 2020 and December 2024.<sup>15</sup> High interest rates and the consequent increased cost of borrowing made financing budget and external trade deficits more difficult to sustain. In January 2024, the Government announced price increases for electricity, fuels and gas, partially due to a reduction in subsidies.<sup>16</sup> Stabilizing commodity prices will be important in alleviating the economic burden on Cuba.

### **Trade patterns and trends<sup>17</sup>**

The trade pattern of Cuba has been marked by a deficit in merchandise trade. Despite a reduction in previous years, the level of deficit increased, reaching \$8 billion, or 81 per cent of imports, in 2023. Access to international markets is fundamental for Cuba to sell its products and meet the domestic demand.

Cuban merchandise exports substantially fell from 2011 to 2023, passing from \$6.4 billion in 2011 to \$1.9 billion in 2023. The value of the country's exports grew by 5 per cent between 2020 and 2023. However, this growth is much slower than the global and Latin America and the Caribbean averages in the same period. Consequently, the share of Cuba in world merchandise exports decreased from 0.035 per cent in 2011 to 0.008 per cent in 2023. In terms of volume, exports contracted by 4.9 per cent annually between 2020 and 2023.

The main export items of Cuba are unprocessed, non-edible raw materials (excluding energy resources such as fuels),<sup>18</sup> which accounted for 22 per cent of exports in 2022. In this category, metalliferous ores and metal scrap accounted for almost 20 per cent, with nickel accounting for half of these exports. These are followed by beverages and tobacco, accounting for 21.3 per cent of total goods exports in 2023 (tobacco and tobacco manufactures represented 15.8 per cent and alcoholic beverages represented the remaining 5.5 per cent). Other important exports are medicinal and pharmaceutical products (11 per cent), sugar (7.5 per cent) and fish, crustaceans and molluscs (3.4 per cent). Despite their diminishing role in the economy, traditional cash crops – sugar and tobacco – remained important foreign exchange earners.

In 2023, 30 per cent of total exports of Cuba went to Asia, 29 per cent to Northern America, 23.3 per cent to Europe, 16.6 per cent to Latin American and the Caribbean and 0.5 per cent to Africa. The main merchandise export partners at the individual country level are Canada (29 per cent), China (18.7 per cent), the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (12.4 per cent) and Spain (7 per cent). In the world markets, Cuban exports faced weighted average most-favoured-nation tariffs of about 12.5 per cent and applied tariffs of 12.3 per cent in 2022. The weighted average applied tariffs imposed by Canada stand at 3.2 per cent, those of China at 6.9 per cent and those of Spain at 6.6 per cent.<sup>19</sup>

Estimated at \$10 billion in 2023, merchandise imports were more than five times larger than merchandise exports as Cuba relies on imports for the supply of machinery and transport equipment, essential foodstuffs, fuel and chemical products. After a contraction of 27 per cent in 2020, imports to Cuba showed sustained growth.

<sup>15</sup> UNCTAD, UN Global Crisis Response Group Dashboard. Available at <https://unctad.org/global-crisis>.

<sup>16</sup> National Assembly of Cuba, "Cuba: incrementan precios de la electricidad, combustible y gas licuado", 12 January 2024.

<sup>17</sup> Data for imports and exports for 2023 are estimated.

<sup>18</sup> At the one-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification system; referred to as "crude materials, inedible, except fuels".

<sup>19</sup> UNCTAD, TRAINS Portal. Available at <https://trainsonline.unctad.org/home>.

The main imported items are food, machinery and transport equipment and mineral fuels. Some 85 per cent of fuel imports into Cuba in 2023 were sourced from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

### **Bilateral trade with the United States**

Trade between Cuba and the United States has been heavily influenced by the embargo, holding a vast untapped potential in view of the size, economic complementarities and geographical proximity of the two economies. Existing Cuban exports to the United States were estimated at \$4 million in 2023, about 0.2 per cent of total exports of Cuba to the world.

Imports to Cuba from the United States were far greater and substantial. In 2023, they reached \$615 million, up from \$338 million in 2019, passing from 3.4 per cent of total Cuban imports to 6.2 per cent. These imports mainly consisted of food items and live animals (74.5 per cent of the total). Furthermore, 9.3 per cent of imports from the United States were oilseeds and oleaginous fruits. This reflects the fact that United States commercial exports of specific agricultural commodities have been authorized, albeit subject to numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. Other exempted items include specific medicines and medical devices, items necessary for the environmental protection of United States and international air quality, waters or coastlines (including items related to renewable energy and energy efficiency), items to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial aircraft engaged in international air transportation, telecommunications items that would improve communications to, from, and among the Cuban people, and items to meet the needs of the Cuban people.<sup>20</sup>

### **Services and remittances**

Cuba has developed important export capabilities in the services sector. In 2023, estimated services exports amounted to \$8.8 billion, as compared with imports of \$1.8 billion. Compared with 2019, that represented a 14.3 per cent decrease for exports and a 9.3 per cent decrease for imports. Key export activities are transport services, travel services and other non-specified services.

Tourism represents one of the most important sectors in the country. It showed signs of recovery, registering 2.4 million international tourist arrivals in 2023. In 2023, 38.4 per cent of tourist arrivals came from Canada, followed by the Russian Federation (7.6 per cent), the United States (6.5 per cent) and Spain (3.7 per cent).<sup>21</sup>

Remittance flows to Cuba were valued at \$2.6 billion in 2023, an increase compared with 2021 and 2022 but far from the peak of \$4 billion in 2018. Since June 2022, the United States has authorized donative remittances to Cuban nationals to support independent businesses and lifted limits on family remittances, which were previously set at \$1,000 per quarter. While Western Union restarted operations in June 2023, it had to suspend them in January 2024 due to technical problems on the payout by Financiera Cimex S.A, a sanctioned entity in charge of paying formal remittance transactions.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> United States of America, Code of Federal Regulations, title 15, subtitle B, chap. Vii, subchapter C, part 746, para. 746.2 (1996).

<sup>21</sup> Cuba, National Office of Statistics and Information, *Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2023* (Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información, 2024).

<sup>22</sup> Manuel Orozco, *Remittances to Cuba and the Marketplace in 2024* (Inter-American Dialogue, 2024). Available at <https://thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Remittances-to-Cuba-and-the-Marketplace-in-2024-1.pdf>.

## Conclusion

A series of global crises affecting food, energy and finance triggered by geopolitical tensions continue to damage the Cuban economy and people's welfare, as they depend highly on international trade, tourism revenues and remittance inflows. Cuba appears to suffer continued hardship on account of modest growth, weak export performance, a rising external deficit and a higher cost of living. Healthy flows of international trade and finance have the potential to support the country's economic recovery and enhance its economic resilience.

The embargo hinders the healthy development of commercial relations between the Cuba and the United States. This continues to be a matter of concern to Cuba as trade plays a crucial role in its economy and as it seeks to navigate through the economic consequences of multiple global crises. The embargo has frustrated the country's efforts to use trade as an instrument of sustainable development.

## United Nations Development Programme

[Original: English]  
[25 March 2025]

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supports national authorities' efforts to address emerging development issues and challenges. The partnership between UNDP and the Cuban authorities is based on a long-standing relationship. UNDP has supported major development strategies and policies for over 50 years. The country programme for 2020–2024, extended to 2025, is aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework agreed between Cuba and the United Nations system. It addresses the strategic priorities of the country, as expressed in the 2030 national plan for economic and social development, and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. Each expected result will prioritize a multidimensional development approach, combining economic improvement, people's well-being and empowerment, the sustainable management of natural resources, climate change adaptation and mitigation, and comprehensive risk management. UNDP will promote coordination between State, non-State, civil society and community-based organizations whose actions contribute to change.

UNDP supports priority areas of cooperation that are often innovative within the national context and have a high strategic relevance in view of the changes made to the Cuban development. Fostering sustainable human development will continue to be at the heart of the cooperation programme, which promotes South-South cooperation, innovation, and technology and knowledge transfer.

## Diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States

Under the previous United States Administration, although major sanctions remained, a group of measures slightly eased the sanctions, such as the suspension of the limit of \$1,000 per quarter on remittances, as well as allowing remittances to be sent to people who are not family members; the reactivation of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program and increased consular services and visa processing, including for educational trips and professional and research meetings; and an increase in flights between the United States and the island. In addition, the Humanitarian Parole programme, a temporary programme that allows Cuban citizens to enter the United States without a visa for a period of two years, was opened. In January 2025, coinciding with the end of the previous administration, the United States designation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism was lifted, a six-month waiver of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act was granted and the so-called "restricted list"

was removed. Subsequent policy changes reversed several of these measures, including the temporary suspension of the Humanitarian Parole programme, contributing to a dynamic and uncertain operational environment.

### **Specific effects of the United States embargo**

The negative impact of the embargo has been growing exponentially and has become more specific and significantly larger than in previous years, particularly on commerce and financial activities. The embargo limits the acquisition of medicines and medical equipment and supplies, it affects the external economic relations of Cuba, and its impact can be observed in all spheres of the country's social and economic activities. The embargo also maintains the restrictions on the use of the United States dollar and on imports from Cuba. It affects opportunities for development and creates economic hardship. The embargo has an impact on the population's most vulnerable groups and on human development in general.

The embargo has excluded or limited the access of Cuba to concessional loans, lending facilities and debt relief programmes granted by international financial institutions.

This has narrowed the possibility of obtaining resources to provide financial support for the development plans of Cuba. Furthermore, financial institutions dealing with Cuba face compliance challenges imposed by the embargo that increase costs of operations, leading to persistent refusals of international banks to establish correspondent relationships and limiting the ability of Cuba to access financing. All of this increases the country risk, which affects the island's ability to access the international financial markets and attract foreign investors.

In the context of updating the Cuban economic model, the embargo limits the participation of foreign investors – not only United States companies but also companies with United States capital or that have United States intellectual property – in prioritized economic projects. The embargo impedes investment flows and limits access to regional and global value chains.

Family remittances, one of the country's main sources of foreign exchange earnings, arrive mostly through informal channels, in cash and at higher costs due to the embargo. In the context of an energy crisis on the island, the authorities' efforts to rehabilitate the electricity system are being hampered by the higher cost of oil and the additional restrictions on and higher costs of access to new energy technologies. Travel by Cuban experts and researchers to the United States in the framework of cooperation agreements has been limited by the process of obtaining visas.

The embargo has continued to negatively affect day-to-day work in external cooperation initiatives, creating many difficulties for the implementation of programmes and projects owing to trade restrictions or prohibitions on purchasing inputs from United States companies and subsidiaries established in the United States or in other countries. It also reduces the number of possible suppliers and limits competitive processes while increasing the cost of goods.

The embargo continues to prevent the UNDP country office in Cuba from making transfers in United States dollars. For this reason, and although budgets of all projects are recorded in United States dollars, transfers abroad are made in other currencies (mainly euros, British pounds, Canadian dollars, Japanese yen and Swiss francs). However, even when payments are made in any of these currencies, bank withholdings have increased, with constant requests by banks for additional information in order to comply with the Office of Foreign Assets Control all along the banking chain system (issuing, intermediate and beneficiary). Most suppliers that have had fluid commercial relations with Cuban companies and with the UNDP

country office for years have continued to have their accounts closed because of policies implemented by many banks, mainly in Mexico and Panama, directly and explicitly related to United States sanctions against Cuba.

In 2024, the UNDP country office in Cuba and its projects continued to face obstacles and delays, with most financial transactions involving intermediary banks that were subject to United States jurisdiction and ending in long processing time or automatic rejections by the banks as part of compliance policies. These measures have affected the ability of the country office to honour payments to suppliers within agreed time frames and have implied additional transaction costs.

The embargo places practical restrictions on transportation for shipping lines whose vessels dock in Cuban harbours. This reduces the number of shipping companies that include Cuba in their routes, thus limiting the availability of transportation and delaying the loading of goods. Costs associated with intermediaries and long-distance transportation negatively affect access to key inputs to implement development projects, as well as the final cost of imported project goods and equipment. Products for development projects must be purchased and imported from more distant places at higher costs. Delays in shipping often go beyond 12 months.

### **Effects on projects**

The embargo has had a direct impact on all UNDP projects and emergency activities because it increases the transaction costs of obtaining project inputs, the shipping cost of imported goods, and transportation time. Finding alternative shipping companies requires additional time and effort.

During emergency situations, the UNDP country office is unable to access critical humanitarian pre-positioned items stored in the United Nations regional depot, as some are owned by entities associated with the United States. As a result, more complex and time-consuming procurement processes are required, leading to higher costs and delaying the ability of UNDP to deliver timely emergency response to affected populations.

The prevailing situation has been particularly complex and worrisome in the case of other projects related to food security and local development, given the lengthy process to access and import agricultural inputs. Procurement processes take longer and are more expensive, delaying project activities and their results.

Therefore, financial proposals and new projects must consider, in their design, an extended period for procurement processes; they must also allocate additional financial resources to cover incremental costs that could otherwise be allocated for development activities. Those additional costs are covered by the funds provided by international development partners, which are channelled through UNDP.

Many of the assets required by country office projects involve United States technologies or include United States manufacturing components. The Torricelli Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 are still in force. Both explicitly prohibit sales to Cuba by United States companies and subsidiaries in third countries and include sanctions against those who violate the prohibition. The full application of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act has limited new partnerships and agreements.

In the current context of the full application of Title III, restrictions have been more rigorously applied, and new challenges have emerged for the implementation of development projects in Cuba. This has not only affected business transactions with the United States but also had a deterrent effect in other countries whose persons, companies, banks and other entities are more apprehensive about sanctions. The decrease in available international suppliers is a direct result of sanctions and a

setback in the context of a local market that depends on imports. This situation affects the acquisition of computer technology.

The projects financed by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, of which UNDP is the principal recipient, provide medicines, reagents and laboratory equipment for the benefit of 31,224 persons of all ages living with HIV/AIDS. These products are purchased from third countries and secondary suppliers at prices significantly higher than those of comparable products sold on the international market. Even when long-term corporate agreements between UNDP and international suppliers apply to the projects in Cuba, the embargo hinders purchases of products that are manufactured or have a component manufactured in the United States. In such cases, the providers must obtain a licence from the Office of Foreign Assets Control to deliver services or products to projects in Cuba, a bureaucratic process that takes much time and effort.

In 2024, the second disbursement for a project funded by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration was processed. However, the disbursement faced challenges, since it had to be converted to a non-United States dollar currency and transferred through an intermediary bank due to ongoing restrictions. This added complexity and delays to the process. The country office has continued to work closely with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and Cuban official institutions to secure funding for other key development projects. However, ongoing negotiations on new initiatives are taking longer. The sanctions imposed on Cuba have made the process of securing and implementing development projects funded by international financial institutions extremely challenging. The sanctions affect the country's capacity to fund sustainable development, as they introduce additional layers of complexity and compliance requirements, hindering the timely execution and success of these projects.

The sanctions affect the country office's capacity to find reliable suppliers, compounded by the volatile international landscape. Suppliers and beneficiaries in Cuba have expressed concerns about potential rapid changes in the global environment, which could further complicate the procurement of essential technology. Despite these challenges, the collaboration between UNDP, Cuban officials and other stakeholders has been significantly strengthened, ensuring that the projects continue to support the modernization and diversification of the biopharmaceutical industry of Cuba. This progress is crucial for enhancing the country's capacity to respond to public health challenges and compete in the global biopharmaceutical market.

### **Effects of the embargo on country operations of the United Nations Development Programme**

The embargo also affects the day-to-day work of the UNDP country office. There are limits on the use of corporate long-term agreements that are meant to implement and monitor development, among other things. As an external restriction, access from Cuba (procure-to-pay cycle) to practically all international e-commerce sites remains completely closed at the level of connectivity. In many cases, it is based on the requirements of the United States embargo.

Many websites and services accessed from Cuban Internet service providers are blocked owing to the embargo. Many websites and services are blocked for Cuban Internet service providers. Access to technical information sites, technical support, studies and price analysis, among other things, is restricted. Payment gateways do not allow operations from the national Internet service providers. Access to online training and webinars is also limited.

Consequently, the country office obtains access to the Internet primarily through a satellite provider, resulting in higher costs, limited bandwidth and inferior quality for video and voice services through the Internet. This situation restrains the effective use of corporate platforms, increasing the amount of time required to perform online processes and activities. In addition, additional costs are incurred, since more than 95 per cent of the country office users connect to the Internet when telecommuting by sharing their data connections from their cell phones with metered connections.

The UNDP office in Cuba is facing delays of shipments due to the application of compliance policies for trade-sanctioned countries by some shipping companies.

The country office is also affected by not being able to use corporate accounts with United States banks or the United States dollar as a currency of payment. The office has been forced to take additional administrative measures to carry out programme-related financial operations.

International Financial Bank is a Cuban bank used by many Cuban entities and foreign companies with a presence on the island. Its inclusion since 2020 on the Specially Designated Nationals List of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and more recently on the United States State Department List of Restricted Entities, constitutes a new obstacle to having commercial and financial relations with the potential emerging local market. Not only are dollar transactions penalized, but also any operation in which International Financial Bank is involved.

In 2024, the negative impact in the financial area was maintained and expressed in further delays in the monthly receipt of funds transfers into UNDP local bank accounts. This has directly affected the payment cycles related to suppliers and those associated with United Nations programmes and personnel, negatively affecting UNDP operations in general.

In addition, a growing number of international commercial banks are not accepting transactions involving UNDP development projects in Cuba, due to the risks of being sanctioned.

One direct effect of the inclusion of entities on the list of restricted entities and subsidiaries associated with Cuba of the Department of State of the United States is the reinforcement of the Bureau of Industry and Security's pre-existing prohibitions of United States entities from carrying out any type of commercial operations with Cuba with any of the products controlled by the Export Administration Regulations. All without exception must apply for a licence, with the recommendation normally denied, except for agricultural products and some medical items and travel which already have general licences. This extends to any North American entity that markets any product, including non-United States products, and to any entity in the world that markets products with non-United States origin having 10 per cent or more of North American components. If they are high-technology products, no matter the percentage, they will always be banned and the entity sanctioned.

The scrutiny of financial operations carried out in Cuba with a more stringent application of policies for anti-money-laundering/combating the financing of terrorism resulted in a ban on granting financing from global institutions. The result is discouraging foreign suppliers of goods and services from participating in UNDP bidding processes.

## United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The embargo imposed by the Government of the United States of America against Cuba continues to affect developments in the fields of competence and activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). These have been aggravated by an unprecedented series of natural disasters (hurricanes and earthquakes) that struck the island in October and November 2024.

The education sector has been affected in terms of hindered access to technological advancements for educational institutions, connectivity issues, limitations on academic exchange and challenges in acquiring essential tools for teaching and learning. In particular, the consequences affect special needs education, where the need for devices to address disabilities is high. Teachers have carried a heavy burden. Low salaries and rising inflation have led many to migrate to other sectors of the economy, affecting the educational continuity of students.

The embargo imposes constraints on accessing technological platforms as well as software programs, websites and digital services owned by companies subject to United States laws. Notably, these restrictions have made it difficult to upload UNESCO-related national periodic reports such as those of the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions or to update information related to the network of UNESCO associated schools.

The embargo affects the sports sector, including for peoples with disabilities. Access to cutting-edge technologies for athlete development, sports equipment, training accessories, and supplies for scientific centres such as the anti-doping laboratory remain limited. Challenges have persisted in obtaining visas for participation in international conferences, despite a partial resumption of consular services by the United States Embassy in Havana.

The decline in tourism due to travel restrictions and difficulties in sourcing inputs and equipment for relevant ventures have been part of the factors leading many young people to seek to migrate, depriving the country of one of its most valuable assets.

The effective promotion, dissemination and marketing of artistic talent continues to be hampered by obstacles in banking operations between Cuba and the United States of America. Cuban artists have not been able to benefit from the sale of the cultural goods and services, particularly in the realm of music, being unable to use online platforms for financial transactions or payments or to use international websites as marketing tools.

The restoration of the Santa Clara Convent, part of the Transcultura programme led by the UNESCO regional office in Havana, has been affected by the delay in procurement processes due to the embargo, as well as by the considerable reduction in the number of suppliers capable of submitting offers. Difficulties in accessing bibliographical materials, resources for the conservation of cultural property and state-of-the-art technological equipment that are under the protection of United States patents have been part of the challenges facing the implementation of this programme.

Activities led by the UNESCO regional office have been affected, including international capacity-building activities and knowledge-sharing on project results, as a number of international guests did not travel to Cuba due to the possible impact on subsequent entry and exchange with the United States of America. Some Cuban

beneficiaries of UNESCO projects and programmes were unable to participate in activities held across the region due to difficulties in obtaining visas for travel.

The UNESCO regional office's activities have also been affected by shortages and difficult access to raw materials for local procurement and service provision, as well as extended delivery times, limitations on the arrival of shipping companies and increasing costs related to freight and insurance, guarantees and maintenance. Some companies with which UNESCO has long-term agreements to secure favourable terms are unable to participate in bidding processes in Cuba.

The nature of the embargo has affected financial transactions by UNESCO and its staff, notably regarding the payment of salaries and official travel, with consequences for official missions and for leading activities. Visa application procedures are obligatory for UNESCO regional office officials, who may need to travel on missions to the United States or other countries where flight routes transit through United States territory. In addition, UNESCO staff members have been affected by the restrictions imposed on numerous health insurance companies working directly with Cuban health service providers.

## **United Nations Environment Programme**

[Original: English]

[19 March 2025]

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) currently implements eight projects to support Cuba in addressing environmental challenges and meeting environmental obligations. One project is at the national level and the rest are components or activities within regional or global projects.

The areas covered include strengthening policies and capacities for green jobs; capacity-building on biosafety to support the full implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity; water and wastewater management, conservation, restoration and sustainable use of critical ecosystems; innovative solutions to waste management; proper disposal of harmful chemicals; and climate change resilience and adaptation.

UNEP projects in Cuba are part of the implementation of the medium-term strategy and programme of work of UNEP, which are approved by the United Nations Environment Assembly.

Cuba participates actively in environmental governance structures managed by UNEP, including the United Nations Environment Assembly, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, and the Forum of Ministers of the Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean. For instance, Cuba led the negotiation and adoption of Environment Assembly resolution 6/1, entitled "Circularity of a resilient, low-carbon sugar cane agro-industry", which was adopted by the Assembly on 1 March 2024.

The embargo hinders the ability of UNEP to support South-South knowledge transfer, capacity-building and technical cooperation between Cuba and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly training events, capacity-building activities and workshops.

Limitations in financial transparency make it difficult to hire and pay experts from Cuba for the implementation of projects and activities. For example, if a consultant is paid via direct transfer and the transit bank is in the United States, the bank can withhold the payment.

The acquisition of goods and services is also affected by the embargo. All equipment that has any component or material associated with the United States is

linked with the embargo, therefore increasing the procurement costs and forcing the acquisition of goods and services from more expensive and distant markets.

The embargo impedes the mobilization of resources and implementation of environmental protection projects, impacting the ability of UNEP to mobilize resources from vertical funds for Cuba.

The effects are also felt at the regional level. Actions implemented in the country for the conservation of ecosystems such as mangroves, coral reefs and seagrass beds can contribute to the provision of ecosystem services that benefit other countries along the coast of the continent. The lack of resources and cooperation in the monitoring and conservation of migratory species has a negative impact on the conservation of shared biodiversity across the region.

The embargo also affects the ability of Cuba to submit its financial contribution to UNEP.

Ending the embargo would significantly facilitate the possibility of supporting Cuba in addressing environmental and climate challenges, and would enable the effective and proper participation of Cuba in regional intergovernmental and technical cooperation processes.

## **United Nations Human Settlements Programme**

[Original: English]

[13 March 2025]

The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) has been operating in Cuba since 2001 and established an Office there in 2007 with the objective of collaborating with and supporting the Government of Cuba in the implementation of its development agendas and priorities that coincide with the priorities and mandates of UN-Habitat.

UN-Habitat continues to support Cuba in implementing several projects whose priorities are outlined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and the UN-Habitat country programme. They include urban planning and management at the national and municipal levels; housing and urban recovery after the impact of hurricanes; support for changes in the housing and habitat sector; and promotion of the implementation of the New Urban Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the national and local levels. Support for strengthening local government to contribute to decentralization and territorial development is a major priority.

The projects are focused on development issues, with an emphasis on the local level. There have been limitations in their execution due to the international implications of the embargo, which places a limit on financial transactions and access to international markets. These are of great importance to guarantee the acquisition of supplies, equipment, technologies and infrastructure for the urban and territorial development of Cuba.

UN-Habitat believes that the implementation of General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) will allow Cuba to contribute decisively to the achievement of the New Urban Agenda and the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, especially of Goal 11, “Achieve inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities”.

## United Nations Industrial Development Organization

[Original: English]  
[5 March 2025]

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is supporting the efforts of the Government of Cuba to promote and develop a competitive industry that meets the needs of the population and provides welfare and a better quality of life for all, through the country programme for Cuba (2021–2025).

The country programme is built around innovation and availability of information; productive transformation; investment and technology transfer; and sustainable management of natural resources and improvement of environmental quality.

The country programme includes projects in strategic sectors for the economic, environmental and social development of Cuba, such as sustainable food systems, the development of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, renewable energies, value chain development programmes and the development of industrial parks and special economic zones.

UNIDO is implementing five projects totalling \$3.5 million. These initiatives include two national projects: the first aims to enhance energy efficiency, while the other is its ongoing country programme. There are two regional projects: one focuses on accelerating progress towards Sustainable Development Goal 9 on resilient infrastructure, and the other aims at improving coordination in aquaculture. There is one interregional project, which is focused on an international innovation cluster for the biopharmaceutical, medical and nanotechnology sectors.

The embargo places constraints on the technical cooperation of UNIDO in Cuba. Complex financial processes have caused delays in project implementation, and supplier options remain limited.

UNIDO is convinced that without the restrictions caused by the embargo, efforts to promote and develop a competitive and sustainable industry that meets the needs of the population could bring more benefits.

## United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

[Original: English]  
[26 March 2025]

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction facilitates the participation of Cuba in disaster risk reduction knowledge-sharing processes and initiatives through the Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americas and the Caribbean. It also engages Cuba in subregional projects in the Caribbean that are aimed at increasing capacities in disaster risk reduction, disseminating good practices in risk-sensitive investment and strengthening and streamlining early warning systems in the region.

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction acknowledges the expertise of Cuba in reducing disaster risks. It also commends Cuba for its sustained efforts to implement the Sendai Framework, as well as its support to the Regional Action Plan for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 in the Americas during the last high-level meeting for disaster risk reduction in the Americas and the Caribbean (5 December 2024). The Office appreciates the contribution and commitment of Cuba to the Sendai Framework implementation midterm review, including its national midterm review report submission and the representation of Cuba in the high-level meeting on the midterm

review of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 convened by the General Assembly on 18 and 19 May 2023 in New York.

The cooperation of Cuba and the sharing of expertise within the region is of great importance for the advancement of the disaster risk reduction agenda. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction notes that Cuba was among the first countries to offer technical assistance to Caribbean countries to cope with the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). It is also one of the countries with expertise in providing early warning systems, which can be an asset for the implementation of the Early Warnings for All initiative and the response to the Secretary General's call for global early warning system coverage in the next five years.

Cuba has joined a disaster risk reduction cooperation agreement with other subregional disaster risk reduction intergovernmental organizations (the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the Coordination Centre for Disaster Prevention in Central America and the Dominican Republic, the General Secretariat of the Andean Community) as well as Chile, Mexico and the European Union. This memorandum of understanding will strengthen subregional exchanges and cooperation to achieve the Sendai Framework targets and reduce disaster losses.

Reducing human and economic impacts of disasters will require access to current scientific and technical advances and optimal technology. Due to the increased intensity and frequency of natural hazards in the Caribbean, Cuba would benefit from access to resources from donors and international finance institutions to achieve further progress. In addition, current efforts to protect the population against different hazards (biological, environmental, technological, hydro-meteorological and geological, among others) will need to be complemented and enhanced by access to disaster response, health and early warning equipment, risk modelling, adapted infrastructure and other information technology.

The achievement of disaster risk reduction goals is hampered by the repercussions of the embargo and the inclusion of Cuba in the list of State sponsors of terrorism, which limits the country's access to key information, knowledge, technology (including virtual platforms and software critical to functioning in current times) and assets that are of the utmost importance for delivering on the commitments of the Sendai Framework and increasing resilience.

## **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime**

[Original: English]  
[27 March 2025]

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has observed the growing presence of organized crime and an increase in lethal violence across the Caribbean. This trend is driven by drug trafficking and the growing influence of various transnational criminal markets originating in Latin America. Data demonstrate that the phenomenon is Caribbean-wide and that no country is immune from the influence of transnational organized crime. UNODC is committed to expanding its technical assistance programming in the Caribbean and to proactively supporting Member States in addressing these challenges. UNODC will continue to support Cuba through constructive engagement and inclusion in regional initiatives.

Cuba is supported by the Regional Office for Central America and the Caribbean of UNODC, located in Panama. Ongoing technical assistance to Cuba is provided through programme offices in Barbados and the Dominican Republic, as well as global programmes. These offices coordinate closely with key regional and national

partners to support Cuba as part of the broad presence of UNODC in the Caribbean region.

In its efforts to address the challenges associated with illicit flows by sea and air, Cuba participates in the global Passenger and Cargo Control Programme.<sup>1</sup> Implemented in cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the World Customs Organization, the Programme supports national efforts to enhance law enforcement and interdiction capacities and facilitate its communication and coordination – targeting illicit drugs, prohibited goods, and high-risk passengers, cargo and mail across origin, transit and destination countries – with the overarching goal of disrupting cross-border illicit flows and transnational criminal networks. Within this framework, Cuba has established two Port Control Units at the ports of Mariel and Santiago and a joint airport interdiction task force at José Martí International Airport in Havana. In 2024, air and cargo operations were expanded to Juan Alberto Gómez International Airport through the establishment of a second joint airport interdiction task force.

UNODC collaborates with both airport units, working alongside Customs, anti-narcotics police, Immigration and INTERPOL. Air and sea units have received basic theoretical, practical, and specialized training, along with mentoring on cargo operations and on matters such as drug trafficking; trafficking in persons; migrant smuggling; analysis of advance passenger information, passenger name records and lists of passengers; insider threat detection; investigative interviewing; forged document detection; international terrorism; and intelligence-led targeting training. The air branch of the Airport Communication Programme of UNODC supported the participation of Cuba in an exchange of best practices with the National Police of Spain from Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas International Airport in Madrid.

In support of the efforts of Cuba to address the world drug problem, UNODC contributed in 2025 to the establishment of a national early warning system on drugs. The Office provided technical manuals and guidelines on drug analysis to forensic laboratories across the country.

In the area of crime prevention and criminal justice, and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 78/227 of 2023, UNODC was mandated to convene a meeting of experts, nominated by Member States, with a view to sharing information on challenges, lessons learned, best practices and enabling factors needed to enhance the functioning of criminal justice systems to ensure equal access to justice for all. Cuba nominated two national experts to participate in the expert group meeting from 9 to 11 December 2024. Bringing together 41 experts from 30 Member States, the meeting served to address seven key thematic areas related to access to justice. The meeting concluded with the adoption of a set of recommendations<sup>2</sup> to guide Member States and UNODC in advancing equitable access to justice. The report on the implementation of resolution 78/227 will be presented to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in May 2025.

Sanctions have significantly limited the delivery of UNODC programmes in Cuba, particularly due to travel restrictions that have impeded in-person training, mentoring, and stakeholder engagement. Unlike in other countries, alternative approaches such as online training and flexible procurement have been difficult to apply in the Cuban context due to limited Internet access, domestic regulations, and

<sup>1</sup> The Passenger and Cargo Control Programme currently includes the former Container Control Programme and Airport Communication Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

<sup>2</sup> A/CONF.241/PM/CRP.2, available at [www.unodc.org/res/justice-and-prison-reform/access-to-justice-for-all\\_html/ACONF241\\_PM\\_CRP2.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/res/justice-and-prison-reform/access-to-justice-for-all_html/ACONF241_PM_CRP2.pdf).

trade restrictions. These constraints not only affect institutional capacity-building but also indirectly affect vulnerable populations, who are often the intended beneficiaries of technical assistance in areas such as public health, crime prevention and access to justice.

UNODC remains committed to deepening its collaboration and operational engagement with Cuba in addressing the complex challenges posed by drugs and crime. The UNODC Strategic Vision for Latin America and the Caribbean 2022–2025 presents a valuable framework for expanding and diversifying technical assistance across the region, including targeted support to Cuba. The Regional Office for Central America and the Caribbean continues to identify opportunities to position Cuba as a core partner and recipient in forthcoming donor-funded initiatives. The lifting of the economic, commercial and financial embargo would likely create a more conducive environment for enhancing the operational presence of UNODC in the country, in close cooperation with national authorities.

## **United Nations Population Fund**

[Original: English]  
[28 March 2025]

The prolonged economic, commercial and financial embargo continues to have an impact on the situation and fundamental rights of the Cuban population, particularly women, adolescents and young people and their access to essential sexual and reproductive health services. Its adverse effects were felt in the shortage of medicines, supplies and services for sexual and reproductive health, including contraceptives, as well as in the provision of essential services for the care of victims of gender-based violence, pregnant women in maternal homes and people with sexually transmitted infections owing to delays in the purchase of sexual and reproductive health commodities from international suppliers.

The implementation of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) country programme continues to face challenges in procurement processes, such as payment restrictions and delays. This is particularly the case in the procurement of reproductive health commodities and supplies produced by the United States or covered by United States patents, which must be purchased in other continents at high transportation and freight costs. These make it more difficult to deliver a rapid, effective, high-quality and inclusive response to emergencies, which negatively affects both development and emergency response programmes. In 2024, the effects of these sanctions were intensified as Cuba continued to be affected by a difficult socioeconomic situation. Two hurricanes and an earthquake at the end of the year compounded the difficulties faced by the population and negatively affected their health and wellbeing.

The permanence of Cuba on the United States list of State sponsors of terrorism in 2024 affected the country in terms of both tourism and the delivery of health commodities, as international freight companies are banned from delivering goods to any country on this list.

The country's limitations in accessing international suppliers of sexual and reproductive health supplies affect the country programme's expected results, especially the positive impact of its advocacy and capacity-building initiatives.

UNFPA is working to mobilize additional resources to mitigate the effects of the embargo-related measures on the availability of sexual and reproductive health supplies, including contraceptives, condoms and supplies for the Maternal and Child Care Programme.

UNFPA reaffirms the commitment to supporting the efforts of Cuba to maintain the progress that it has made in the areas of sexual, reproductive and maternal health, including access to family planning methods, sexuality education, and in data generation on and analysis of population dynamics and sustainable development.

## **Universal Postal Union**

[Original: English]

[27 March 2025]

Cuba is a fully-fledged member of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and enjoys the same rights and obligations as any other UPU member country.

Cuba currently serves as a member of the UPU Council of Administration, following elections in 2021.

Cuba regularly benefits from postal development assistance provided within the framework of UPU technical cooperation activities. The following activities may be highlighted:

- Cuba continues to participate in the UPU Operational Efficiency and E-commerce Development regional project taking place over the 2022–2025 period
- The designated operator of Cuba (Correos de Cuba) continues to receive support from the UPU Quality of Service Fund through a project on improving the quality of service of the Cuban postal network
- Cuba was a participant in the Regional Strategy Forum for the Americas, held on 3 and 4 September 2024. The Forum reunited high-level representatives from ministries, regulatory authorities and designated operators, who provided region-specific feedback towards the final version of the UPU 2026–2029 postal strategy, which is to be submitted for approval at the next UPU Congress

UPU has not encountered difficulties in implementing the aforementioned assistance or undertaking any other joint activities with Cuba as a result of the embargo.

## **World Food Programme**

[Original: English]

[13 March 2025]

For over 60 years, comprehensive social protection programmes in Cuba have significantly reduced hunger and poverty. The country was one of the most successful in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and is still ranked eighty-fifth on the human development index.

During the 1990s, Cuba faced a severe economic crisis with long-lasting effects on food security and nutrition. The 2008 global financial crisis, recurring natural disasters – including prolonged droughts, high global food prices, limited access to credit, low productivity and the United States embargo – have further exacerbated the country's food security challenges. More recently, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic had a profound health impact and devastated one of the most important sources of income for Cuba, namely tourism.

After the adoption of two important measures in 2021 and 2022, namely, the monetary reform and the food sovereignty and security law, Cuba continued its efforts to stabilize its economy, though with limited success. Access to essential goods,

particularly food, remains a significant concern. In December 2024, the year-on-year consumer price index stood at 24.88 per cent, with food and non-alcoholic beverage prices rising by 28.15 per cent (respectively 128 per cent and 302 percent cumulated over the past 36 months). Household purchasing power has sharply declined due to stagnant nominal wages and pensions since the monetary reform in 2021, coupled with four consecutive years of persistent inflation. Domestic food production has struggled due to shortages of investment, inputs and fuel, something that prevented it from reaching planned targets. Additionally, hard currency constraints have prevented the food distribution system from meeting domestic demand through imports.

The World Food Programme (WFP) has been working in Cuba since 1963 to support vulnerable people and the Government's efforts to promote food security and nutrition. In 2021, the WFP Executive Board approved a new country strategic plan for the period 2021–2024. The plan was later extended to be aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the country, which is in place until December 2025. To address increasing needs, WFP has expanded its operations across the country, with a permanent presence in six provinces, namely Granma, Guantánamo, Holguín, Las Tunas, Santiago de Cuba and Villa Clara. In addition to its core food security and nutrition programmes, WFP collaborates with the Cuban Civil Defence to enhance preparedness and response to extreme natural events.

The WFP programme in Cuba focuses on capacity-building and augmentation, using targeted transfers to address critical food and nutrition needs. To improve efficiency, WFP supports national and local authorities in transitioning to more sustainable and targeted social protection systems, with a focus on strengthening their food and nutrition-related components.

### **Effects of the embargo**

Throughout 2024, the embargo continued to have severe economic repercussions for Cuba, as well as operational challenges for WFP. The designation of Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism has hindered the development of a market-based economy. The high costs of importing agricultural equipment, inputs and food, combined with financial transaction difficulties, have impacted the ability of Cuba to meet its food requirements. This places a burden on the national budget, threatens those most reliant on social protection programmes and exacerbates food security challenges.

Due to import restrictions, Cuba was unable to secure sufficient fuel in 2024 for individual consumption (both for public transport and private vehicles) and national consumption (power generation), leading to extended nationwide blackouts and disruptions to essential services.

The embargo affects WFP operations, limiting the Programme's ability to procure services and products from United States-based companies, businesses using products containing a proportion of United States components greater than 10 per cent, or firms processing payments through United States subsidiaries.

The procurement and shipment of food and non-food commodities, including fortified foods supplied by WFP, face delays due to the limited availability of shipping companies willing to dock in Cuban ports. As a result, shipments often require transshipment through neighbouring countries, leading to additional costs and delays affecting WFP deliveries.

WFP operations in Cuba struggle with higher costs due to restricted access to competitively priced equipment and supplies. Many regional and international suppliers are either unwilling or unable to sell directly to Cuba, impacting essential

goods such as vehicles, spare parts, office materials and specialized technical equipment. Voice and data communications remain costly as they must circumvent United States telecommunications infrastructure.

Banking transactions are another challenge. Restrictions imposed by the embargo limit financial institutions' ability to conduct transactions with Cuba, affecting payments for staff salaries and entitlements, as well as WFP operational expenditures.

## **World Health Organization/Pan American Health Organization**

[Original: English]  
[10 March 2025]

As reported by the Government of Cuba, the embargo has a negative impact on the country's health sector, mainly due to the difficulties caused in acquiring medicines, raw materials for the local production of essential medicines, instruments, spare parts for medical equipment, reagents and other supplies necessary for the operation of the sector. This includes impacts on other sectors that are determinants of health, such as food security and nutrition. Sources of financing for the health sector are also limited.

Although the Government of the United States has stated that the embargo permits humanitarian goods to be shipped to Cuba and that it has offered to expedite such requests, United States companies have in certain cases declined to supply vaccines and life-saving medications to WHO when they are procured for Cuba.

Because certain online communication platforms (e.g. Zoom) are in some cases not available in Cuba, Ministry of Public Health officials are unable to access virtual meetings convened by WHO. This also affects other institutions, such as the eight WHO collaborating centres, health institutions in the provinces, and national and international reference centres located in the country.

As a result of the sanctions, financial transactions to and from Cuban banks can be difficult to process.

## **World Intellectual Property Organization**

[Original: English]  
[4 March 2025]

As a result of the embargo, the following circumstances have been observed that pose an obstacle to the advancement of Cuba in the field of intellectual property, and affect its technological, social and economic development.

By restricting access of Cuban citizens to the United States of America, the embargo limits the opportunities for human resources development on American soil. As a result, specialized Cuban professionals may not fully benefit from higher specialization opportunities in the field of intellectual property, especially those available in the United States of America. These include aspects of intellectual property asset management, intellectual property office management, and opportunities to become acquainted with successful experiences in the implementation of technology transfer offices, technology management, intellectual property valuation and intellectual property collateralization.

Visa restrictions hinder the possibility of Cuban intellectual property professionals to participate in WIPO training programmes, meetings and other events in the United States of America.

Increased restrictions on access for Cuban citizens connecting from Internet Protocol addresses in Cuba to platforms and web services supplied, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by United States companies, such as Google Cloud, Zoom and Webex, have restricted the participation of Cuban representatives in many virtual meetings and capacity-building activities organized by WIPO. This restriction prevents authorities and users in Cuba from accessing global public publication platforms such as Espacenet and Latipat-Espacenet (European Patent Office), in the framework of which Cuba actively participates by sharing information.

Poor telecommunication facilities have a negative impact on and obstruct the access of Cuban nationals to WIPO online databases and other digital services. This situation, in particular the online access to global intellectual property databases, including Patentscope (patent information) and the Global Brand Database, is detrimental to the advancement of technological research and other innovation programmes carried out by the Government of Cuba in the field of environmental, medical and life sciences and biotechnologies and nanotechnologies and limits knowledge of the behaviour of brands in potential export markets.

The embargo affects the availability of information technology equipment and software for the performance of administrative operations regarding filing and granting procedures, in particular patent and trademarks search and examination services. Although the country is administratively equipped to perform such functions due to a capillary presence of provincial branches of the Cuban Industrial Property Office, the lack of specialized software critically hinders such performance. External procurement formalities to obtain the required equipment and software are burdensome. This situation continues to cumulatively delay the services rendered by these offices and prevents their expansion. Most importantly, this situation stifles the possibility of taking advantage of the functionalities available under the Industrial Property Administration System of WIPO, since some of the system's operating tools are not freely accessible to users in Cuba. The possibilities of expansion and customization of the system to the needs of Cuban users are seriously compromised.

The extraterritorial effects of the embargo extend to the financial arena as well. Payments from Cuba to WIPO under the WIPO-administered Treaties (the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Madrid System) may be effected in only Euros or Swiss francs to avoid the restrictions imposed by the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control. Likewise, payments from WIPO to the Cuban Industrial Property Office must be made in the same currencies. The cost of these indirect transactions for the purpose of avoiding United States banks amounts to financial losses and discourages the use by Cuban nationals of the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Madrid System.

The financial implications of the embargo extend to the payment of copyright royalties based on the rights granted by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Several national banks cannot receive or send deposits from and to the Cuban collective management society of authors. The exercise of rights based on the said Convention through reciprocal representation agreements between the Cuban and United States collective management societies is not possible.

## **World Meteorological Organization**

[Original: English]  
[12 March 2025]

In the framework of the activities of the Regional Office for the Americas of the World Meteorological Organization and other departments of that Organization, Cuba is often represented in meetings, courses and workshops exchanging of meteorological and hydrological data, and projects covering the Caribbean and

Central America. Except for the impossibility for Cuba to use Zoom for virtual meetings with Regional Association IV members, and the problems inherent in bank transfers for some meeting participants, during the year 2024, the World Meteorological Organization did not encounter any inconvenience or limitation relating to Cuba on regional scientific collaboration.

## World Tourism Organization

[Original: Spanish]  
[27 February 2025]

The general embargo of the United States of America against Cuba persists, including the restrictions on travel by United States citizens to Cuba, which has a direct impact on the Cuban tourism sector, as well as on the contribution to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Those restrictions are compounded by certain limitations on travel by European citizens to Cuba.

Taking into account the economic crisis that the world has been experiencing since 2020 as a result of the pandemic, the recovery of the Cuban tourism sector has slowed down, in contrast with the resilience shown by the Americas region. If these measures persist, the contribution of tourism to the economic growth and development of Cuba could be further undermined.

According to data from the January 2025 edition of the *World Tourism Barometer*, the performance of the tourism sector worldwide continues to improve. However, the situation of the Cuban tourism sector differs markedly from that of other destinations in the region, with arrivals for 2024 still 48 per cent below 2019 levels (according to preliminary data), whereas the average for the Americas region is 3.5 per cent lower than before the pandemic. Worse still, revenue from international tourism in 2022 (most recent data available) in Cuba was 60 per cent lower than in 2019.

As a result, the current performance of tourism and the post-pandemic recovery of the Cuban sector could be significantly improved if the measures that are so deeply affecting the tourism sector were lifted or eased.

## World Trade Organization

[Original: English]  
[24 March 2025]

The scope and functions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are defined in the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement establishing WTO. The preamble stresses the desirability of arrangements directed at the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade.

The issue referred to in General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) was raised in the annual report submitted by the Government of Cuba on 18 November 2024 to the WTO General Council (WT/L/1206) on the waiver extension granted under a General Council decision of 2021 (WT/L/1128). The waiver was granted to Cuba under a decision of 1996 (WT/L/182) in relation to article XV:6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In its report, Cuba noted that the circumstances justifying the waiver extension had, in its view, continued to worsen.

#### **IV. Replies received from entities and organizations that have received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly**

##### **Common Fund for Commodities**

[Original: English]

[5 March 2025]

In alignment with concerns raised by entities such as the South Centre, the Common Fund for Commodities highlights the severe adverse effects of the economic, commercial and financial embargo by the United States of America against Cuba on the latter's commodity sector and its broader implications for economic development and human rights.

General Assembly resolution [79/7](#) reflects the strong disapproval of the embargo by the international community. This stance is consistent with the principles of fair trade and equitable development that the Common Fund for Commodities upholds. The embargo, particularly reinforced by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, contravenes the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the freedom of international trade – key tenets for the development of commodity-dependent nations. Such unilateral sanctions not only destabilize the Cuban economy but also disrupt global commodity markets, adversely affecting producers and consumers worldwide.

The position of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on human rights validates these concerns. The imposition of economic sanctions for political purposes constitutes a violation of international norms, infringes upon human rights and severely hampers the targeted nation's prospects for development. The extraterritorial application of such sanctions, as exemplified by the Helms-Burton Act, represents a direct breach of established international law, affecting the ability of Cuba to engage in global trade and financial transactions.

The impact of the embargo on Cuba is profound and multifaceted. It restricts the country's access to international markets for its commodities, limits financial transactions essential for trade and discourages potential trading partners due to fears of United States retaliation. These constraints not only impede the economic progress of Cuba but also obstruct its efforts toward sustainable development and poverty alleviation. Despite these challenges, Cuba has made significant strides in sectors such as healthcare, particularly in vaccine development during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. These achievements, realized under the weight of the embargo, underscore the country's potential to contribute meaningfully to global commodity markets, including the pharmaceutical industry, if these restrictions were lifted.

The enforcement of the embargo, coupled with the designation of Cuba as a state Sponsor of terrorism, is incompatible with the principles of a just and lawful international system. Such measures undermine fundamental human rights, including the right to sustainable development, and contradict global efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. The Common Fund for Commodities strongly urges the international community, particularly the nations supporting resolution General Assembly resolution [79/7](#), to work collaboratively towards the removal of these restrictions. It is imperative to recognize the hardships faced by smallholder commodity producers in Cuba and the broader population, who bear the consequences of policies beyond their control. Ending these coercive measures is essential to

ensuring the rightful participation of Cuba in the global commodity market and fostering a more equitable and sustainable international trade system.

## **International Civil Defence Organization**

[Original: English]

[20 March 2025]

For more than 60 years, the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed on Cuba has made it difficult for the International Civil Defence Organization to fulfil its mandate of assisting its member States, such as Cuba, in emergency preparedness and capacity-building for responding to natural and human-made disasters.

These restrictive measures hinder the full implementation of the International Civil Defence Organization's educational programmes for the civil defence of Cuba, thereby reducing the level of training for specialists and weakening the country's capacity for disaster prevention and response.

The economic, trade and financial measures imposed against Cuba threaten the well-being of its population. In addition to their economic repercussions, they have a profoundly destructive human and social impact. The embargo has affected entire generations of Cubans, depriving them of the right to live in an environment free from external pressures that limit their opportunities.

The international community has repeatedly expressed its rejection of this policy, urging the lifting of these measures, which only worsen the living conditions of Cuban citizens. Cuba has repeatedly demonstrated its resilience, but it cannot fully advance while this economic aggression persists.

The reinclusion of Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism further exacerbates the egregious consequences of the embargo, adding another layer of restrictions that intensify economic hardship and international financial isolation.

We strongly urge the elimination of these unilateral coercive measures, as well as the removal of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

## **Inter-Parliamentary Union**

[Original: English]

[20 February 2025]

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) upholds the provisions of the IPU resolution adopted at the 104th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held in Jakarta on 20 October 2000, entitled "Are embargoes and economic sanctions still ethically acceptable, do they still work, and are they suited to achieving their purpose in an ever more globalised world?" In accordance with that resolution, IPU reiterates that "unilateral sanctions inflict unwarranted suffering on the people of the countries concerned" and reaffirms its opposition to "the adoption, by a State or groups of States, of laws or other measures with extraterritorial effect which are aimed at obliging third party States or their nationals to apply economic sanctions adopted by it". IPU has a long-standing position against unilateral sanctions that have a negative impact on innocent populations.

In line with the IPU resolution entitled "The role of parliament in respecting the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States", adopted at the 136th IPU Assembly, held in Dhaka on 5 April 2017, IPU underscores that "the people of each country have the inalienable right to determine their own political future, and

freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, in accordance with international law”.

In prior years, the IPU has applauded attempts by Cuba and the United States to normalize their relations through dialogue. We strongly hope that dialogue will be given pride of place to resolve the outstanding matter of the inclusion of Cuba on the United States’ list of countries sponsoring terrorist activities. IPU believes that parliamentary diplomacy can also serve as a tool to foster cooperation and is hopeful that the economic, commercial and financial embargo against Cuba can finally be lifted through diplomatic means.

IPU reaffirms its support for the end of the embargo and expresses its sympathy with the Cuban people, who continue to suffer from its effects.

## **South Centre**

[Original: Spanish]  
[6 March 2025]

The South Centre joins the international community in condemning the unilateral coercive measures imposed by the United States of America, which impinge on the principles of self-determination and international cooperation.

It already did so publicly in January 2025, in its statement on the inclusion of Cuba on the list of country sponsors of terrorism by the Administration of President Donald Trump: “This arbitrary and illegal decision, coupled with the more than 60-year-old embargo, contributes to the worsening of the crisis affecting the Cuban people (...) It is the economic, commercial and financial blockade that does the most damage to the Cuban society. The South Centre joins the voices of the international community in strongly rejecting this arbitrary and unjust measure.”

The blockade, a policy that has been in force for more than six decades, continued to have devastating effects on the economy and the quality of life of Cubans in 2024.

One of the most immediate and tangible effects of the blockade is the chronic scarcity of basic products, such as foodstuffs and medicine, which hits the most vulnerable people particularly hard. Owing to the blockade, the Cuban economy is faced with a severe lack of access to international markets, which limits the country’s ability to acquire essential products for the day-to-day lives of its citizens.

This is coupled with the financial isolation experienced by Cuba, due to the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States, which prohibit international banks from conducting transactions with Cuban entities. Consequently, Cuba cannot have access to international credit markets, which makes it very difficult for it to obtain foreign investment and renovate its infrastructure. Cuba is deprived of access to technologies that would enable it to improve and expand its productive capacity and advance towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

In 2024, the blockade continued to have dire economic consequences. Inflation reached concerning levels, making even the most basic consumer items more expensive. Local production capacity declined, and Cubans’ purchasing power fell alarmingly. Although the Government has adopted measures to alleviate these effects, such as the relaxation of some domestic policies and the development of the private sector in certain areas, the restrictions imposed by the blockade continue to be the main obstacle to the substantial improvement of economic conditions. State-owned enterprises and private entrepreneurs are compelled to operate in an environment marked by a lack of inputs and high uncertainty caused by the blockade.

As pointed out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, in his address to the United Nations in New York on 30 October 2024: “The blockade against Cuba is an economic, financial and commercial war and qualifies as a crime of genocide. It is a flagrant, massive and systematic violation of the human rights of our people. It is the most encompassing, comprehensive and longest-standing system of unilateral coercive measures ever applied against any country.”

Later on in his statement, the Minister indicated, as a recent example, that in the previous year, more 300,000 European citizens who had visited Cuba were denied expedited electronic visas through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) service. This is an intimidating and unjust measure that results in a decrease in the number of tourists wanting to visit Cuba. The United States is seeking, by any means, to hinder the economic recovery of Cuba by striking tourism, a major source of revenue.

The inclusion of Cuba on the United States Department of State’s unilateral list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism, the possibility of bringing action in United States courts under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, sanctions or threats of sanctions against shipping, transport, insurance or reinsurance companies involved in the supply of fuel to Cuba, intense and meticulous interference with Cuban financial transactions and the consequent obstacles to the supply of top-quality resources, and the fact that the country continues to be included in other unilateral lists are the most severe measures in the legal framework of the blockade.

The blockade continues to be a flagrant violation of the sovereign rights of the Cuban people, a policy that persists without any justification, well into the twenty-first century. In the past year, this measure has continued to have a negative impact on the economy of the island, compounding the hardships faced by the Cuban population, limiting access to essential goods, medicines and technologies and hindering the country’s prospects for development and prosperity. Despite international calls for it to be lifted, the Government of the United States is maintaining this aggressive measure.

In addition to its economic consequences, the blockade has a profoundly destructive human and social dimension. It has affected generations of Cubans, denying them the right to live in an environment free from external pressures that limit their opportunities.

The international community has repeatedly expressed its rejection of this policy, calling for the lifting of sanctions that only worsen the living conditions of the Cuban people. Cuba has demonstrated its resilience time and again, but it cannot advance fully as long as this economic aggression persists.

The international community must maintain and increase its pressure on the Government of the United States to respect the sovereignty and rights of Cuba, recognizing that these illegal, hostile measures of isolation are not leading anywhere – they are only perpetuating unnecessary and unjust suffering. Given their territorial effects, these measures also affect other nations that wish to do business with, invest in or have cultural, technological or scientific interactions with Cuba.

In effect, the Government of the United States is applying its laws extraterritorially, disregarding the legitimate interests of third countries in investing and developing normal economic and commercial relations with Cuba. It has inflicted persecution on any business and its staff establishing or simply proposing to establish economic, commercial or scientific and technical relations with Cuba.

There is no sector of the Cuban economy that has not been affected by the extraterritorial effects of this policy.

Despite this adverse situation, Cuba has continued to demonstrate its firm commitment to international solidarity, though its active participation in South-South cooperation, which has enabled it to collaborate with other countries in developing solutions to global challenges.

The South Centre reaffirms that the continuation of the blockade for more than six decades and the recent reinclusion of Cuba on the list of State sponsors of terrorism are totally incompatible with an international system based on international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the fundamental principles of respect for the sovereignty of States and international cooperation. These actions are not only a clear and flagrant violation of fundamental human rights, such as the right to development, but also an obstacle to the peaceful coexistence of nations. The negative effects of these measures are obvious and constitute inadmissible obstacles to the right of Cuba to determine its own destiny and meet even the most basic needs of its population.

The continuance of these unilateral coercive measures against Cuba highlights the urgent need for their removal, as they not only disregard the sovereign rights of peoples, but also prevent the full realization of human rights and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals established by the international community. It is therefore essential to promote a global system based on cooperation, mutual respect and the fulfilment of fundamental rights, in order to progress towards a more just and equitable world.

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