
Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Draft national report pursuant to actions 20 and 21 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Draft report submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Introduction

1. The United Kingdom Government will submit a national report on its progress regarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 2026 Review Conference, to “further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence”, as per the 2010 action plan on nuclear disarmament. We share this draft version with a wide audience to gather feedback to inform our final draft. We will hold a series of consultation sessions throughout 2025, including at the third session of the Preparatory Committee in New York and in the United Kingdom, to engage States Parties, civil society and academia. We encourage readers to provide reflections on the draft through these sessions and bilaterally. Given length restrictions, some topics are only briefly mentioned or are absent from this version but will be covered at length in the final report. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with action 20 of the plan, to make similar reports.

2. In the 55 years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, it has kept the number of States with nuclear weapons to single figures, managed the risk of the spread of dangerous nuclear materials and facilitated the peaceful use of nuclear technology, benefiting people across the world.

3. However, this review cycle takes place in an ever more unstable world. Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine, including its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, are destabilizing international peace and security. Actions by Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to undermine the non-proliferation architecture, while a lack of transparency from some other nuclear-weapon States on the nature and extent of their nuclear programmes threatens international security.

4. The first duty of any responsible Government is the safety of its citizens. As a nuclear-weapon State, the United Kingdom takes its responsibilities seriously. We will retain a credible and effective minimum nuclear deterrent, declared to the defence



of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for as long as the global security situation makes it necessary. Our deterrent remains a vital safeguard for the United Kingdom and its allies and for maintaining global peace and security.

5. However, the United Kingdom remains wholeheartedly committed to its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and this report reaffirms that the United Kingdom shares the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. It notes the reductions that the United Kingdom has made itself and outlines the steps that the United Kingdom is taking to enable disarmament more broadly. It explains the United Kingdom's belief that, to achieve disarmament, the international community must take a step-by-step approach within existing frameworks, continuing its work on transparency, irreversibility and verification and weighing current and future risks, so that States can proceed confidently in ensuring the safety of their people. This explains why the United Kingdom does not believe that it can go further at this time, when it is openly threatened by Russia, among other security challenges.

6. The United Kingdom is proud to play its part in strengthening non-proliferation, through active participation in export controls, capacity-building, supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), championing the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and putting non-proliferation at the heart of its national policy on nuclear endeavours. The United Kingdom continues to engage with arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives at NATO to fortify the alliance's unified stance in the face of increasing challenges to the global arms control architecture. We are alert to the risks that new technologies could pose and look forward to working with the international community to understand and manage them.

7. The United Kingdom has benefited greatly from the peaceful use of nuclear technology, from power generation and decarbonization to advances in healthcare, agriculture, industry and more. Sharing that benefit is central to the covenant of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we are committed to helping countries to use peaceful nuclear technology safely and to their full potential.

8. All States can benefit from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all States have a responsibility to uphold it. The United Kingdom stands ready to play its part and calls upon all States to work together to deliver its aims.

Section 1. Reporting on national measures relating to disarmament

9. The United Kingdom remains committed to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons and to its obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The best way to achieve disarmament is through the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a step-by-step, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, with undiminished security for all. Aligned with our Pillar I efforts, the progress that NATO is making on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is essential to ensuring strategic stability and collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area. There is a greater need than ever for States to work together to create an environment to enable disarmament.

1.1. National security policies, doctrine and activities associated with nuclear weapons

Nuclear deterrence policy and activities associated with nuclear weapons

10. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of NATO security, and the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom contribute significantly to the overall security of the alliance. The purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. We would consider using our nuclear weapons

only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies. The United Kingdom's nuclear weapons are operationally independent, and only the Prime Minister can authorize their use. This ensures that political control is always maintained. We will publish our Strategic Defence Review this year and keep our nuclear posture under continuous review to reflect the evolving international security environment.

11. We are the only nuclear-weapon State to operate a single delivery system, and our stockpile remains the smallest of any nuclear-weapon State. Having considered alternatives, we assessed that just four submarines are needed to ensure that at least one will always be at sea. Our submarines on patrol are at several days' notice to fire, and since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any State. These initiatives lengthen the decision-making timeline and reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation, consistent with action 5 (d) of the 2010 action plan.

12. The United Kingdom will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in line with the 2010 action plan. This does not apply to any State in material breach of their non-proliferation obligations.

13. We reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.

14. Deliberate ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we may use our nuclear weapons enhances our deterrent effect and is compatible with our wider commitment to transparency and in keeping with action 5 (g) of the 2010 action plan.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and France

15. NATO is a defensive alliance whose nuclear capability exists to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of alliance security and fundamental to the overall strategy of NATO: preventing conflict and upholding the principles of democracy and the rule of law. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

16. As the current security situation demands, NATO remains committed to taking all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the alliance's nuclear deterrence mission, including by modernizing its nuclear capabilities, strengthening its nuclear planning capability and adapting as necessary.

17. The United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent is assigned to the defence of NATO to support the collective security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Since declaring our capability to NATO in 1962, the United Kingdom's nuclear forces have made a substantial contribution to maintaining regional stability and reducing proliferation risk. By maintaining our independent nuclear deterrent, alongside the United States and France, we provide NATO with three separate centres of nuclear decision-making that enhance the overall stability of the region. These strengthen deterrence by complicating the decision-making of adversaries and making clear that the costs of an attack on United Kingdom's vital interests will outweigh any gains.

18. The nuclear arrangements of NATO have always been fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with its nuclear-weapon States maintaining absolute control and custody of their nuclear weapons at all times. These arrangements have been in place within NATO since before the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. The alliance has remained committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the only credible path to nuclear disarmament and is committed to the preservation, universalization and full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

19. The United Kingdom continues to work closely with the United States and France on nuclear matters. United Kingdom and United States nuclear defence cooperation is underpinned by the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement. The United Kingdom signed the Teutates Treaty with France in 2010, which underpins United Kingdom-France cooperation and information-sharing on the safety and security of nuclear weapons, stockpile certification, and countering nuclear or radiological terrorism. Our nuclear cooperation with NATO, the United States and France is fully in line with our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

1.2. Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification

20. Pursuing disarmament needs to encompass the political, military, legal, institutional, technical and other elements that give States confidence that they can maintain their security and that a world without nuclear weapons will be more stable and secure. This cannot be done unilaterally or in a single leap; it requires incremental, mutually reinforcing steps with the active participation of the entire international community. The current security environment does not allow for the United Kingdom to disarm unilaterally now, but we are working on a range of disarmament measures, including transparency, irreversibility and verification, to make progress where possible and ensure that the United Kingdom is ready for such a time.

United Nations disarmament machinery

21. The United Kingdom is an active participant in the United Nations disarmament machinery, including in the First Committee of the United Nations, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as well as supporting ad hoc discussions in the Security Council on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and disarmament-related issues. The United Kingdom also strongly supports the Pact for the Future, adopted by world leaders in September 2024, which contains the first multilateral recommitment to nuclear disarmament in over a decade.

22. Other examples of the United Kingdom's active role include our participation in the Group of Government Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues pursuant to General Assembly resolution [74/50](#) in 2022 and 2023, and acting as Western Europe and Others Vice-Chair for the United Nations Disarmament Commission's 2024 session.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

23. The United Kingdom has not carried out any nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions since 1991. We played a central role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, were one of the first States to sign it in 1996 and completed ratification in 1998.

24. The United Kingdom views the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its entry into force as a vital part of the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom continues to be a vocal campaigner, including by regularly lobbying States to sign and ratify. We welcome all recent ratifications of the Treaty.

25. The United Kingdom is one of the largest financial contributors to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, providing £4.5 million annually as well as extensive technical and administrative support. The United Kingdom maintains the United Kingdom National

Data Centre and hosts thirteen facilities spread throughout the globe, which support the International Monitoring System.

Fissile material cut-off treaty

26. The United Kingdom has maintained a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices since 1995. In 1998, the United Kingdom declared the total size of its fissile material stocks and voluntarily placed all fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards. This material continues to be liable for inspection by IAEA. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the United Kingdom has been conducted under international safeguards. However, the United Kingdom retains the right to resume such activities outside safeguards, under the terms of the United Kingdom's voluntary offer agreement with IAEA, until agreement is reached on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

27. The United Kingdom has set out publicly that nuclear disarmament requires a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that bans the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This will need a cross-regional collective effort, and the United Kingdom continues to press for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the Conference on Disarmament and is working actively with other nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to explore ways to move forward.

Verification

28. An effective verification regime is essential for States to be confident that others have eliminated their nuclear weapons and are meeting treaty obligations, and that any attempt to reverse elimination or retain a threshold nuclear weapon capability would be detected and prevented. Such a regime must not reveal sensitive or proliferative information.

29. The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of national and international verification research for over two decades, both domestically and in collaboration with a diverse group of other countries. More broadly, the United Kingdom will continue to support international initiatives to achieve wide-ranging technical goals and build trust among the international community. For example, this includes playing an active role in initiatives such as the United Nations group of government experts on nuclear disarmament verification, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with Norway, Sweden and the United States.

30. As part of the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership, the United Kingdom hosted the first-ever multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise (LETTERPRESS) in 2017 and concluded its latest exercise (TYPEWRITER) in late 2024. In the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, our experts have co-chaired working groups in each of the partnership's three phases, as well as drafting working papers and supporting exercises.

Irreversibility

31. Irreversibility is vital to nuclear disarmament, but there is no common definition or unified understanding of the principle. The United Kingdom and Norway presented a working paper at the 2022 Review Conference that sought to provide a definition or understanding in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United Kingdom continues to fund a series of civil society projects to hold irreversibility dialogues to foster global participation in the irreversibility debate and pave the way for future irreversibility efforts. In these discussions, we have found that achieving and

maintaining irreversibility requires combining legal, political, technical and social/normative elements. We should continue to study with partners what a framework should encompass so that we have the necessary tools to ensure effective and sustainable irreversibility when we can disarm.

Risk reduction

32. Nuclear-weapon States have a responsibility to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict, and the United Kingdom has a strong record on risk reduction measures. These include: not targeting our missiles at any State since 1994; the creation of the P5 Process; a robust defence nuclear safety and security framework; strategic discussions with countries to improve communication and mutual understanding; and risk reduction agreements. The United Kingdom welcomes the role that non-nuclear-weapon States can play in supporting risk reduction through engagement on security challenges.

33. Alongside established multilateral engagement channels, the United Kingdom holds strategic discussions with a range of countries to improve communication and mutual understanding of nuclear doctrine and build trust as part of our commitment to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. An additional objective of this kind of dialogue is to strengthen global understanding around the drivers of risk. The United Kingdom also works with academics, government, and military representatives across the Indo-Pacific region to increase understanding of regional security issues and to identify additional mechanisms to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in the future.

1.3. Transparency and confidence-building measures

Transparency

34. As part of our responsibilities, nuclear-weapon States should identify actions to increase transparency in a way that improves understanding and trust, without creating proliferation or national security risks. Transparency is important to build trust and understanding.

35. The United Kingdom is transparent about its deterrent. We will continue to publish our overall stockpile limit of 260 and to undertake work on transparency, including encouraging States to openly discuss their nuclear capabilities and policies in line with this core principle of disarmament. We also engage in strategic dialogues with the P5, allies and partners to build confidence and transparency around security ambitions, vital interests and military doctrine.

36. The United Kingdom's work on transparency during the eleventh review cycle has included:

- Publication of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper (2024), which sets out, for the first time, what it takes to deliver the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. This is the fullest account of the defence nuclear enterprise that the United Kingdom has ever provided.
- Discussions with nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on strategic risk reduction, to develop our collective understanding – including via participation in Sweden's initiative on reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.
- Hosting round tables and strategic dialogues with a range of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to develop greater trust, confidence and transparency between States in relation to nuclear weapons and foster a more self-reflective and constructive global dialogue on progressing nuclear disarmament.

- Regular consultation with non-governmental organizations, civil society and academia on our nuclear deterrent and regular updates to Parliament (see the next subsection below).

37. As part of our continued commitment to transparency, the United Kingdom will hold sessions with Non-Proliferation Treaty States Parties on this draft national report in due course. These efforts demonstrate how important transparency is to the United Kingdom and show its continued commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to working with nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Engagement with Parliament, civil society, academia and non-governmental organizations

38. Consultation with non-governmental organizations, civil society, academia and Parliament is an important contribution to the United Kingdom's commitment to transparency and the 2010 action plan.

39. We welcome dialogue with diverse experts and invite ambitious ideas to enhance dialogue between civil society and government. The United Kingdom funds several projects through our Counter-Proliferation Programme Fund (£4 million in the financial year 2024/25) to explore how to defend and strengthen international counter-proliferation architecture and increase international action against the most acute proliferation threats. We also host a range of workshops and conferences at Wilton Park, an executive agency of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, including on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and irreversibility. In 2024, as in previous years, senior United Kingdom officials from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero briefed civil society groups and answered questions at virtual round tables convened by the British Red Cross.

40. United Kingdom parliamentary scrutiny enhances the United Kingdom's defence nuclear programme, and we engage regularly via parliamentary questions, Select Committee inquiries, debates and correspondence. We arrange additional engagement to help parliamentarians to understand United Kingdom deterrence and disarmament policy and the rationale for government decisions and to foster dialogue. This includes the progress of defence nuclear enterprise programmes, on which the most recent report was published on 8 March 2023.

The P5 Process

41. The five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and implement our obligations under it. The P5 Process, established by the United Kingdom in 2009, remains an important channel through which nuclear-weapon States discuss the Non-Proliferation Treaty's implementation and progress towards disarmament. While Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric limits progress in this forum, the United Kingdom is, as indicated in the section above, completely committed to continuing risk reduction dialogue. We have attended several meetings since February 2022, most recently in December 2024. Nuclear-weapon States have a duty to discuss risk reduction, and we urge Russia to continue its participation and to do so meaningfully and honestly.

42. These exchanges are not a substitute for substantive high-level bilateral dialogues nor are they a format for negotiating substantive, binding risk reduction mechanisms. We remain ready to engage in substantive exchanges among the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and misinterpretation and to continue to fulfil our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Section 2. Reporting on national measures relating to non-proliferation

43. The Non-Proliferation Treaty's non-proliferation architecture has kept the number of States possessing nuclear weapons to single figures while its safeguards, security and export controls enable the world to safely access and benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

44. But we must remain vigilant. First, malign States undermine our collective achievements and weaken existing mechanisms. Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine (in contravention of the Budapest Memorandum), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear policy and Iran's ever-developing nuclear programme are significant challenges. China's continued nuclear expansion undermines the non-proliferation norm. Second, new technologies present significant opportunities for growth and development but bring new risks, and we must look ahead to ensure that they do not undermine safeguards. We will continue to call out and address these challenges to protect the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the benefits that it brings to all.

45. The United Kingdom is proud to play its part in strengthening non-proliferation, through active participation in export controls, capacity-building, championing the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and putting non-proliferation at the heart of its national policy on nuclear endeavours.

2.1. Safeguards

United Kingdom safeguards

46. For the past four years, the Office for Nuclear Regulation has continued to successfully operate the United Kingdom State system of accountancy for and control of nuclear material, regulating safeguards in the United Kingdom through accountancy and system inspections, desktop assessments and measures to address non-compliance. IAEA continues to conduct independent inspections and verification activities in the United Kingdom as agreed under our bilateral voluntary offer agreement. IAEA confirmed that the United Kingdom continues to meet its obligations, raised no significant issues and gave positive feedback on the United Kingdom's system of accountancy for and control of nuclear material.

International implementation of safeguards

47. The Non-Proliferation Treaty requires non-nuclear-weapon States to enter into agreements with IAEA for the application of safeguards on all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities. We consider that a comprehensive safeguards agreement plus an additional protocol, or where relevant a modified small quantities protocol, should be treated as the universal verification standard in line with action 25 of the 2010 action plan. In this context, the United Kingdom welcomes the entry into force of additional protocols in Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Timor Leste and the adoption of modified small quantities protocols in Fiji, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Namibia, Nauru, Sierra Leone, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Tuvalu. We take every opportunity to call upon all States that have not yet done so to bring an additional protocol or modified small quantities protocol into force as soon as possible, in line with actions 28 and 31 of the 2010 action plan, and have provided direct support to States interested in doing so.

Strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

48. The United Kingdom supports the continued efforts of IAEA to strengthen the international safeguards system, including through the United Kingdom Safeguards Support Programme. This work supports actions 22 and 26 of the 2010 action plan.

49. From 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2025, the United Kingdom Safeguards Support Programme provided over £6 million of in-kind and financial contributions to over 35 tasks within the Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification of the IAEA Department of Safeguards.

Cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion under AUKUS

50. The AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States supports Australia's acquisition of a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability. This programme is fully in line with partners' international obligations.

51. The AUKUS partners' commitment to setting the highest non-proliferation standard is unwavering, and the United Kingdom continues to work alongside Australia and the United States to this end. Our aim remains to set a strong precedent for the acquisition of naval nuclear propulsion, which enables IAEA to continue to meet its technical objectives and makes it harder for any State to use naval nuclear propulsion as cover for an illicit nuclear weapons programme.

2.2. Export controls*United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)*

52. The United Kingdom continues to promote full implementation by all States of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). As Vice-Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), we work with States and international organizations, such as IAEA and the Group of Seven's Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to monitor and assist implementation. We also support efforts to increase Committee outreach and development of key resources, such as voluntary technical guidelines. Our support helps States to meet their obligations under the resolution, including by supporting their ability to implement laws and regulations governing nuclear activities.

Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee

53. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is important in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. The United Kingdom applies national export controls to transfers of nuclear and nuclear-related material, dual-use material, equipment, software and technology for peaceful purposes and adheres to the guidelines agreed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The United Kingdom licenses a relevant export only if it accords with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the United Kingdom's commitments to the Zangger Committee. The United Kingdom recognizes the right of parties to access nuclear items for peaceful purposes and would only refuse an export licence application if the intended transfer would be inconsistent with its export licensing criteria.

54. The United Kingdom provides standing secretarial support to Zangger Committee meetings and regular technical expertise to the Nuclear Suppliers Group through its Technical Experts Group and participates fully in the Nuclear Suppliers Group's information exchange groups. The United Kingdom shares best practices and national experience in implementing the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines through meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Consultative Group.

Government-to-Government assurances and international outreach

55. The United Kingdom uses Government-to-Government assurances to establish assurances for the export of certain nuclear-related items from the United Kingdom. Recipient parties must confirm that nuclear items will be used for peaceful, civil purposes, otherwise the United Kingdom will not issue an export licence.

56. The United Kingdom ran a successful industry training seminar in May 2024 for entities involved in nuclear exports. The seminar was well attended, with around 80 industry representatives. Industry learned the processes that the United Kingdom Government follows to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and how this is connected to international obligations such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Industry feedback confirmed that they found the outreach valuable and that it substantially improved their understanding of the subject and of the role that they can play in upholding high non-proliferation standards.

Nuclear cooperation agreements

57. Nuclear cooperation agreements are legally binding international treaties that provide a high-level framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including non-proliferation assurances, nuclear safeguards and security. Nuclear cooperation agreements have an important part to play in encouraging cooperation between partner countries because they promote high standards of safety, security, safeguards and non-proliferation while creating a framework for cooperation.

58. The United Kingdom regularly reviews the content of nuclear cooperation agreements signed by the United Kingdom and negotiates amendments as needed to ensure that they reflect a strong commitment to non-proliferation and remain aligned to international guidelines and best practices, particularly those set by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This is crucial to ensure that the United Kingdom meets its non-proliferation obligations. We actively consider new nuclear cooperation agreements with other partners where one would be mutually beneficial.

59. We updated our guidance for United Kingdom nuclear entities in February 2024, detailing the reporting requirements to ensure compliance with our nuclear cooperation agreements and other safeguard obligations, as well as the import and export requirements for certain nuclear-related items.

2.3. Nuclear security

60. The United Kingdom is proud to be a world leader on nuclear security, demonstrating its commitment and sharing its expertise through funding programmatic activity, proactively participating in international diplomatic efforts and supporting IAEA. This is particularly important as new technologies emerge. The highest standard of nuclear security must be considered for all nuclear applications.

Sharing best practice in civil nuclear security

61. The United Kingdom is actively engaged in international forums to share best practice, including IAEA conferences, the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, the Group of Seven's Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and the International Symposium on Insider Threat Mitigation. Through the United Kingdom's Global Nuclear Security Programme, we provide support and assistance to countries looking to develop and enhance their civil nuclear security. The United Kingdom's own legislation on civil nuclear security, and the security objectives which the Office for Nuclear Regulation requires industry to meet, fully reflect INFCIRC/225.

Universalization of conventions

62. The United Kingdom was a key player in the 2022 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The United Kingdom also used this opportunity to deposit an updated report on article 14 of the Convention that publishes all the relevant laws and regulations that implement the Amendment to the Convention.

63. The United Kingdom ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2009, in line with action 45 of the 2010 action plan. We encourage all States to sign and ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest opportunity.

Support for IAEA

64. The United Kingdom was one of the most active countries at the fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security of IAEA from 20 to 24 May 2024 with regard to ministerial attendance and the funding of side events and speakers. We were disappointed that consensus on a ministerial declaration was blocked by Iran, which was a missed opportunity to demonstrate united commitment to nuclear security.

65. The United Kingdom is the second largest Member State contributor to the IAEA extrabudgetary Nuclear Security Fund, donating over £10 million since 2020. We will continue to urge further Member States to financially contribute to the Nuclear Security Fund and to call for a greater share of the IAEA regular budget to be allocated to its nuclear security activities.

2.4. Nuclear-weapon-free zones*Existing zones*

66. The United Kingdom has signed and ratified protocols to all nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties open for signature, giving legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk), which supports action 9 of the 2010 action plan. We also support the parallel political declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia concerning that country's nuclear-weapon-free status.

67. The United Kingdom stands ready to sign and ratify the revised Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, with a statement aligned with our national negative security assurance that does not undermine the objectives and principles of the Treaty. We appreciate and support the renewed focus of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on this and will work collaboratively with ASEAN to allow the signature and ratification of the Protocol soon.

Treaty of Tlatelolco

68. The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits the use or possession of nuclear weapons by Latin American and Caribbean States and prohibits other countries from storing and deploying nuclear weapons on their territories. The United Kingdom is a signatory to the two Additional Protocols to the Treaty.

69. We are concluding a new bilateral safeguards agreement with IAEA for the United Kingdom's overseas territories within the zone of application under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will reflect updates that have been made to the comprehensive safeguards agreement and modified small quantities protocol. We are working closely

with our overseas territories to confirm the practical arrangements required to enable the successful implementation of these safeguards agreements.

Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction

70. As one of the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, the United Kingdom recognizes its responsibilities and remains fully committed to a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. The United Kingdom is pleased to have attended all Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction conferences as an observer and welcomes the work of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction to address all weapons of mass destruction threats in the region, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The United Kingdom is committed to working with partners towards realizing this vision and remains prepared to actively support and facilitate renewed regional dialogue aimed at bridging the differing views in the region on arrangements for a Conference that is as set out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2010 action plan.

71. For a zone to be fully effective in enhancing regional and international security, it must be achieved with the consensus of all States in the region. Our long-held view is that the creation of this zone, and all other future zones, should be in line with the principles and guidelines agreed by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999: established by arrangements freely arrived at by States of the region.

2.5. Compliance and other related issues/concerns

Iran

72. Iran has been producing 60 per cent highly enriched uranium since 2021, for which there is no credible civilian justification. Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is a United Kingdom priority. Iran must comply with its nuclear-related obligations and commitments, including United Nations Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement. The United Kingdom, with E3 partners, has provided Iran with numerous opportunities to return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), and Iran refused a deal in 2022 after two rounds of negotiations. The United Kingdom remains committed to securing a diplomatic solution but will consider using all available levers to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, including triggering snapback. This would reimpose all United Nations Security Council resolutions and sanctions lifted under the 2015 deal.

73. The United Kingdom supports the mandate of IAEA to provide professional, impartial and robust verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear programme. We deeply regret Iran's steps to significantly reduce IAEA access and oversight from 23 February 2021 and urge Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency, including on all issues related to its separate safeguards investigation. The United Kingdom continues to emphasize the importance of the independence and technical expertise of the Agency, via the joint tabling of five Board of Governors resolutions since 2020 that have passed with majority support. This highlights shared international concern regarding Iran's lack of cooperation with IAEA.

74. The United Kingdom remains concerned about Iran's ballistic missiles and its destabilizing transfer of missiles to armed groups in the region and, recently, to Russia. These escalations highlight the grave threat that Iran poses to global and regional security. On this basis, on JCPoA "Transition Day" on 18 October 2023, the United Kingdom, alongside E3 partners, did not lift certain sanctions on Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes that were due to be lifted under the terms of the JCPoA. This was a proportionate and legitimate response to years of Iranian

non-compliance with its JCPoA commitments. This decision is reversible should Iran fully implement its JCPoA commitments.

Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine

75. Russia has a blatant disregard for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international nuclear non-proliferation architecture. Putin's invasion of Ukraine was a gross breach of international law. Again and again, we have seen Russia ignore and flout international norms. Their irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signalling are yet another example of this behaviour. They are designed to intimidate and deter us. They will not.

76. We are also deeply concerned by the increasing risk to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine caused by Russia's illegal war.

77. In March 2022, Russia illegally seized the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and continues to occupy and control the plant. IAEA maintains a continuous presence at Ukraine's nuclear power plants, and as of 31 January 2025, the IAEA Director General had reported on the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine 264 times since Russia's invasion. These reports have exposed the threat to nuclear safety and security posed by Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, including degradation of the fabric of the site, lack of maintenance plans, boron leaks, fragile supply chains, insufficient and underqualified staffing, a reduction in water supply to the cooling ponds due to the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, and disruption to the electricity supply to the plant through Russia's attacks on nearby infrastructure.

78. IAEA has also reported that Russia's renewed attacks on Ukraine's increasingly fragile energy grid further endanger nuclear safety. No nuclear power plant is designed to cope with such instability in the electricity grid. In the context of Russia's conduct in Ukraine, the United Kingdom supports the Director General's "seven pillars for nuclear safety and security" and "five principles for protecting the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant".

79. The United Kingdom prioritizes support to Ukraine in responding to Russia's illegal invasion and maintains pressure on Russia to cease actions that threaten nuclear safety and security in the region. The United Kingdom has supported eight successful resolutions relating to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine in IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference meetings since the invasion. With United Kingdom support, Ukraine was voted in as a member of the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2023.

80. The United Kingdom has provided support to Ukraine to maintain and improve nuclear material security bilaterally and through partners, such as IAEA, since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. This has totalled £12 million and includes support to enhance border detection capabilities, physical protection at sites, and training on the detection and safe recovery of material out of regulatory control. It also includes funding via the Nuclear Security Fund for physical security enhancements, equipment for nuclear sites across Ukraine and an IAEA-led mental health initiative in the country.

81. The United Kingdom will continue to call upon Russia to restore nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. The only way to truly ensure nuclear safety and security in Ukraine is for Russia to withdraw from Ukraine's sovereign territory and end the war.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

82. We regret that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not undertaken meaningful steps to denuclearize. Instead, the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea, emboldened by Russia, continues to progress its nuclear programme with the stated aim of further strengthening the foundation for producing weapons-grade materials.

83. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes violates numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United Kingdom actively works to ensure the comprehensive implementation of all United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and any violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must be met with a firm and resolute response from the international community.

84. The United Kingdom welcomes the commitment of IAEA to playing an essential verification role in any agreement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme and encourages the return of IAEA inspectors to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should a deal be reached.

Syria

85. We were deeply concerned by the Assad regime's continued non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, specifically its construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor at Deir ez-Zor and its failure to provide IAEA with necessary design information, constituting non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. We welcomed the ongoing efforts of IAEA on that matter, as demonstrated by Director General Grossi's visit to Damascus and the two technical visits of IAEA in 2024, and urge the interim authorities to rectify the failings of the old regime and return Syria to a state of compliance.

2.6. Other contributions to nuclear weapons non-proliferation

Group of Seven's Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

86. The United Kingdom contributes significantly to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which improves the security of nuclear and radiological materials through weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programmes. The United Kingdom has contributed over £10 million to support nuclear security in Ukraine. These efforts have helped Ukraine to manage conflict-related risks, such as repairing the damage wrought by Russian forces during their occupation of the Chernobyl exclusion zone, and helped Ukraine to develop its capacity to maintain and enhance nuclear and radiological material security. In addition, in 2024, the United Kingdom led advocacy for States to strengthen transport security and to embed a culture of nuclear security.

Academic Technology Approval Scheme

87. The Academic Technology Approval Scheme is a crucial tool in preventing the intangible transfer of technology from academia to advanced conventional weapons programmes, weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. It applies to international students and researchers (bar those from exempt nationalities) who are subject to United Kingdom immigration control and wish to do postgraduate study or research in certain sensitive subjects.

88. These measures are supported by one of the most robust export control regimes in the world. The Government rigorously assesses all export licences against strict criteria and has worked with academia to provide updated guidance on export controls that is more specific to their needs.

United Nations

89. The United Nations plays a vital role in upholding and advancing international non-proliferation norms, including through Office for Disarmament Affairs institutional support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The United Kingdom supports the United Nations efforts and takes an active role in promoting non-proliferation on the United Nations Security Council.

90. This includes regular calls for Security Council action in response to Democratic People's Republic of Korea violations of sanctions and implemented resolutions to constrain its nuclear ambitions; participating in United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (on Iran) meetings and sharing written reports on Iranian compliance with resolution 2231 (2015), as well as our active role in the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the mission on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). We deeply regretted the abolishment of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in 2024. The United Kingdom supports efforts to strengthen implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), including nominating United Kingdom experts to serve on the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Since 2022, the United Kingdom has regularly drawn attention to the state of nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, especially at Zaporizhzhia, including supporting calls for Council resolutions and voting in favour of the General Assembly resolution on this subject in 2024.

Section 3. Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

91. The United Kingdom has greatly benefited from the peaceful use of nuclear technology and is ready to share its experience so other countries benefit as well.

3.1 Promoting peaceful uses

Forthcoming civil nuclear projects

92. The establishment of Great British Nuclear puts the United Kingdom in the lead for the deployment of the next generation of nuclear reactors in Europe. The United Kingdom has ambition for nuclear deployment and is moving ahead with intentions to complete Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C and deploy small modular reactors as well as making research and development investment in advanced modular reactors and fusion energy. With these renewed ambitions, and as the oldest commercial nuclear energy State, the United Kingdom will continue to play a leading role in international civil nuclear development.

Advanced nuclear technologies

93. Advanced nuclear technologies could play a key role in the United Kingdom's future energy mix as we transition to net zero in 2050 and support our energy security.

94. We are proud to support United Kingdom small modular reactor vendors, such as Rolls-Royce SMR, in exporting to responsible nuclear nations and believe that this design could be well suited for deployment across the European continent.

95. The United Kingdom is working with like-minded partners and looking for areas to collaborate to develop the enabling environment for safe and secure advanced modular reactor deployment and unlock the full benefits of small modular reactors.

The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero published guidance for advanced modular reactors to enter the Generic Design Assessment, the first stage of the United Kingdom's nuclear regulatory process, fulfilling our Energy White Paper commitment to open Generic Design Assessment to small modular reactors.

Nuclear Fuel Fund

96. The Nuclear Fuel Fund was launched in 2023. Through this, we have invested over £35 million, match-funded by industry, to establish new domestic fuel capabilities which can fuel the reactors of today and advanced reactors of the future. Funding was awarded to nine projects.

United Kingdom high-assay low-enriched uranium programme

97. In late 2023, the United Kingdom announced up to £300 million for the establishment of a domestic high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) supply chain, as a reaffirmation of our commitment to develop full HALEU front-end fuel cycle capabilities in the United Kingdom by the early 2030s.

Skills

98. The Government published the National Nuclear Strategic Plan for Skills in May 2024, setting out targeted action that the United Kingdom will take to ensure that it has the required skills to support the United Kingdom's nuclear ambitions. Work has already begun.

Sharing United Kingdom experience and expertise

99. The United Kingdom takes an active leadership role across a number of multilateral organizations and varied initiatives including, but not limited to, IAEA, the Nuclear Energy Association, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Group of Seven and other ad hoc groupings of like-minded countries where developing issues arise on peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

100. We regularly support United Kingdom nuclear professionals in engaging with these expert groups and forums and encourage United Kingdom academic institutions to participate in multilateral networks that facilitate international cooperation on peaceful uses. For example, the United Kingdom's National Nuclear Laboratory and the Institute for Global Food Security were both designated as IAEA Collaborating Centres in 2020. The partnership of IAEA with the National Nuclear Laboratory will develop nuclear fuels and technologies of the future, while collaboration with the Institute for Global Food Security will advance the global food security agenda, using nuclear analytical techniques to detect the contamination and adulteration of feeds and food. This work supports actions 48 and 49 of the 2010 action plan.

Expanding access to peaceful uses

101. The United Kingdom is committed to supporting countries, especially non-nuclear-weapon States, in benefiting from the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and expanding access to these technologies. Nuclear energy and technologies play key roles in tackling global challenges, from treating diseases such as cancer and addressing food insecurity to mitigating climate change.

102. Launched at the tenth Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in 2022, the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses is a joint initiative with the United Kingdom Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and the United States Department of State. This initiative originated from a series of meetings hosted by Wilton Park in

2019–2021 to understand where the opportunities and challenges are for developing countries in accessing the benefits of peaceful uses.

103. The Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses aims to increase awareness of, improve access to and promote acceptance of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, especially their role in achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses also addresses the barriers that prevent countries from using them, such as misconceptions about nuclear technology. This work is aimed at complementing and amplifying the efforts of IAEA in areas such as health, agriculture and water security.

Climate change

104. The United Kingdom was the first country to endorse the Net Zero Nuclear initiative, recognizing the instrumental impact that it would have at the twenty-eighth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2023. The United Kingdom was also a key player in the group that brought 25 nations together to pledge to treble nuclear electricity generation between 2020 and 2050 to achieve net zero and carbon neutrality.

105. The United Kingdom participated in the Nuclear Energy Agency's first edition of the Roadmaps to New Nuclear ministerial conference in September 2023. The meeting convened energy ministers from 20 countries committing to work together and alongside industry to expand the role of nuclear energy in pathways to net zero. We signed two joint communiqués in which Governments and industry highlighted the need for nuclear energy to meet global energy challenges and agreed on several guiding principles to increase momentum in their nuclear new-build projects.

106. In September 2024, the United Kingdom participated in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency's second Roadmaps to New Nuclear conference. The United Kingdom signed a government communiqué pledging to cooperate to advance new nuclear deployment.

3.2 Technical assistance through the International Atomic Energy Agency to its member States

107. The United Kingdom strongly supports the nuclear applications and technical cooperation efforts of IAEA. The technical cooperation programme provides necessary support to enable countries to benefit from the use of nuclear technologies in a safe, secure and effective way.

108. It is important that IAEA has certainty of funding. We pay our Technical Cooperation Fund contributions in full and on time every year and encourage others to do the same. Since 2023, the United Kingdom's contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund each year has been over £4 million.

109. The United Kingdom's extrabudgetary contributions to the technical cooperation programme are used to continue to expand access to peaceful uses and primarily benefit those countries which most need support. Since 2022, the United Kingdom is proud to have contributed nearly £5 million in extrabudgetary contributions in addition to our yearly contribution to assist a range of projects.

110. We continue to provide technical expertise and access to our world-leading research institutes to assist the research and development work of IAEA. United Kingdom institutions are engaged in nearly 30 coordinated research projects covering environmental issues, water resources, human health, medical research, food and agriculture.

3.3 Civil nuclear safety and civil nuclear liability

Civil nuclear safety

111. The United Kingdom is committed to achieving high nuclear safety standards and meeting our obligations as a Contracting Party to international nuclear safety instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The United Kingdom routinely invites inward international peer reviews for nuclear safety, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service and the Operational Safety Review Team, to enhance its own safety framework and to share learning and best practices with international parties.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission

112. Nuclear safety is at the heart of the United Kingdom's civil nuclear policy and international engagement. The United Kingdom's commitment to continuous improvement in nuclear safety is demonstrated by actively engaging in IAEA peer review processes, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service missions.

113. The Integrated Regulatory Review Service is a comprehensive peer review of a State's regulatory infrastructure for safety against IAEA safety standards, carried out by a team of international experts. In January 2024, the United Kingdom hosted an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service follow-up mission. The Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission team leader stated that "the United Kingdom has made continuous improvements since the Integrated Regulatory Review Service 2019 mission to the highest standards of nuclear and radiation safety". In keeping with the approach of Integrated Regulatory Review Service peer reviews, the mission team provided new recommendations and suggestions for Government and regulators to enhance the United Kingdom's safety framework. We are working to address these findings and will update IAEA at the next Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission.

Operational Safety Review mission

114. From 2 to 19 October 2023, EDF Energy hosted an Operational Safety Review mission at Heysham 2 nuclear power station. The team identified 8 recommendations and 11 suggestions, as well 9 good practices.

Convention on Nuclear Safety and Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management

115. The United Kingdom is a Contracting Party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. These Conventions establish fundamental safety principles and drive safety standards globally.

116. The United Kingdom participated in the sixth and seventh review meetings of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, in May 2018 and July 2022. Through the peer review process, the United Kingdom country group commended the United Kingdom's waste hierarchy characterization as an area of "good performance", the Convention's highest possible accolade. The United Kingdom was also awarded 1 of 13 good practices on "applying a decommissioning mindset".

117. The United Kingdom participated in the ninth review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in March 2023, which published its report explaining how the United Kingdom complies with its obligations under the articles of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Civil nuclear liability

118. The United Kingdom is a Contracting Party to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention) and the Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Brussels Supplementary Convention). These are implemented domestically in the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. On 1 January 2022, the 2004 Protocols to amend the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention came into force in the United Kingdom. The Nuclear Installations Act 1965 was prospectively amended by the Nuclear Installations (Liability for Damages) Order 2016.

Emergency preparedness and response

119. The United Kingdom is committed to providing the necessary reassurance to the global public that the United Kingdom and other States use nuclear technologies responsibly and commit to ensuring public safety.

120. The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 and the Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Amendment) Regulations 2019 were made in March 2019. Both sets of regulations require all hazards capable of causing a radiation emergency at a licensed nuclear site or in civil nuclear transport (by road, rail and inland waterway) to be identified, their consequences assessed, and commensurate emergency arrangements put in place.

121. The United Kingdom is also a Party to several international agreements which demonstrate commitment to providing assistance to other States in the event of nuclear accidents and emergencies. These include the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, which commits the United Kingdom to sharing information with the international community in the event of a nuclear or radiological accident within United Kingdom jurisdiction which may have an impact on other States, and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, under which the United Kingdom has agreed to notify IAEA of assistance which might be provided in the case of an accident in another country.

3.4 Other related issues*Generation IV International Forum*

122. The United Kingdom is a member of the Generation IV International Forum, which is a multilateral intergovernmental organization focused on carrying out the research and development needed to establish the feasibility and performance capabilities of the next generation of nuclear energy systems. Other members of the Generation IV International Forum include the United States, Japan, France and South Korea.

123. Six reactor technologies have been selected for further research and development by the Generation IV International Forum. They are gas-cooled fast reactors, lead-cooled fast reactors, molten salt reactors, supercritical water-cooled reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors and very high temperature reactors. These are fourth-generation nuclear systems that can be safely licensed, built and operated, providing affordable and reliable energy. These systems will address key issues such as nuclear safety, waste management, non-proliferation and public perception. The United Kingdom has chosen to participate in the very high temperature reactor and sodium-cooled fast reactor Generation IV International Forum system groups. All collaboration under this agreement will be for peaceful purposes, adhering to non-proliferation goals and international obligations.

124. Membership provides access to cutting-edge research and development in advanced nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors and advanced modular

reactors. By leveraging international expertise and collaborating on projects, the United Kingdom can enhance its nuclear capacity, ensure energy security and drive innovation. This alignment with the Generation IV International Forum's objectives supports the goals of expanding nuclear capacity, promoting economic growth and achieving net zero goals.
