

**Security Council**

Distr.: General  
16 December 2024

Original: English

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**Letter dated 16 December 2024 from the Security Council  
Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)  
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith, as agreed among the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), my six-month report on the implementation of the resolution, which covers the period from 20 June to 13 December 2024.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Vanessa **Frazier**  
Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of  
resolution 2231 (2015)



## **Eighteenth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)**

### **I. Introduction**

1. The note by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) sets forth the practical arrangements and procedures for the Council in carrying out tasks related to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly with respect to the provisions specified in paragraphs 2 to 7 of annex B to that resolution.
2. According to the note, the Security Council should select, on an annual basis, one member to serve as its Facilitator for the functions specified therein. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the note, and after consultations among the members of the Council, I was appointed as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for the period ending 31 December 2024 (see S/2024/2).
3. It was also established in the note that the Facilitator should brief the other members of the Security Council on its work and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) every six months, in parallel with the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution.
4. The present report covers the period from 20 June to 13 December 2024.

### **II. Summary of the activities of the Security Council in the “2231 format”**

5. On 24 June 2024, the Security Council was briefed (see S/PV.9666 and SC/15742) by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/471), by me as Facilitator on the work of the Council and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2024/476), and by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on the procurement channel (S/2024/435).
6. On 13 December 2024, the representatives of the Security Council for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) met in the “2231 format” and discussed the findings and recommendations of the eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution (S/2024/896).
7. During the reporting period, a total of 12 notes were circulated within the “2231 format”. In addition, a total of six official communications were sent to Member States and/or the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, and a total of five communications from Member States and/or the Coordinator were received.

### **III. Monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)**

#### **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**

8. During the reporting period, the Joint Commission did not convene. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action coordinator continued to consult with the Plan participants and the United States of America on addressing developments regarding

the Plan of Action, towards the possible return by the United States to the Plan of Action and to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Plan of Action by all.

9. In a letter dated 27 November 2024 (S/2024/862), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland brought forth to the Security Council's attention actions undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran "in violation" of resolution 2231 (2015). They noted the continued growth of its stockpile of high enriched uranium, "over four International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 'significant quantities'", which IAEA defines "as the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded". The representatives also mentioned the enrichment of uranium up to 60 per cent as a "blatant violation of Iran's commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" and referred to the recent installation of "six new cascades of advanced centrifuges", which is "prohibited under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action". As an "enduring concern", they noted the "unmonitored manufacture and storage of thousands of advanced centrifuges", "the removal of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action verification and monitoring arrangements"; and the fact that "Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities that is not implementing modified code 3.1", "a legal obligation that Iran cannot unilaterally suspend or modify". The representatives also shared their concern regarding "public statements made by Iranian officials on Iran's capability to produce nuclear weapons and advocating changes to Iran's so-called nuclear doctrine". Finally, noting that "we are in a critical period on the Iran nuclear file given that Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) will expire in less than one year" and while reiterating their "commitment to a diplomatic solution that prevents Iran from developing a nuclear weapon", the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom stated that they "deem it necessary that Iran's past and present non-compliance be clearly shown to the international community".

10. In a letter dated 2 December (S/2024/874), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran responded to the "unsubstantiated allegations presented in the politically motivated letter" from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (S/2024/862). He referred to his country's actions as "remedial and fully consistent with its legitimate rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", and stated that "these measured, transparent and reversible actions were a direct and legitimate response" to the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018. He also referred to the refusal of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to "implement its sanctions-lifting commitments" on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Transition Day, as well as the more recent extension of sanctions, including the reimposition of sanctions on "Iran Shipping Lines", calling these actions violations of their Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commitments. The Permanent Representative also reiterated that the "Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently upheld its obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement" and regretted that "the E3 ... along with the United States, pushed to table and adopt a censure and politically motivated resolution against Iran" in the recent session of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. He also emphasized "Iran's clear and consistent position" that nuclear weapons have "no place in Iran's defence doctrine" and that "all of its [nuclear] activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes". Finally, the Permanent Representative reaffirmed the "unwavering commitment to diplomacy" of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its interest in a diplomatic solution based on "mutual respect, adherence to international law and the creation of a conducive environment for negotiation".

11. In a letter dated 3 December 2024 (S/2024/878) in response to the letter from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (S/2024/862), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation stated that his country considers the letter “another attempt” to “mislead the Security Council” and to “divert its attention from their own record of grave violations of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”. The letter, in his view, also shows “their deliberate course towards the escalation concerning the Iranian nuclear programme” with the “blatant disregard of the root causes of the current situation”. The Permanent Representative reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “remains the most thoroughly and closely verified State among the Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency” and called it “particularly revealing” that the letter was circulated shortly after the visit of the Director General of IAEA to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the “productive outcomes” of which “were highlighted” by the Agency’s November report (GOV/2024/61). He stated that the “spreading of baseless allegations” by France, Germany and the United Kingdom “might hinder the ongoing professional cooperation between IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran” and that “it is even more obvious than ever that the claims of France, Germany and the United Kingdom about their alleged commitment to diplomacy are hollow”. The Permanent Representative also added that the Russian Federation “remains convinced that resolution 2231 (2015) remains in force and reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and that they “are hopeful that ... the vast majority of the Member States will continue demonstrating their interest in constructive progress towards the full implementation of the resolution”.

12. In response to S/2024/874 and S/2024/878, and further to their letter of 27 November 2024 (S/2024/862), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, in a letter dated 6 December (S/2024/886) addressed “the claims made by Iran and Russia”, respectively. They noted that the E3 “have sought to uphold diplomacy at every opportunity despite the United States withdrawal and Iran’s severe non-compliance with its Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action commitments since 2019”. The E3 mentioned they “triggered” the dispute resolution mechanism, “in response to Iran’s violation of its commitments” and “in full accordance with paragraph 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”. They referred to their decision to “not lift sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes ..., in full accordance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and with Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, taken on the basis of “Iran’s significant non-compliance ... allowing the E3 to treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in whole or in part”. In response to the Islamic Republic of Iran, they pointed out that “sanctions introduced by the European Union and the United Kingdom in the second half of 2024” are “entirely separate from and therefore fully consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, adding that they had announced “significant measures should Iran transfer ballistic missiles to Russia”. They also stated that paragraph 30 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action “allows the E3 to impose sanctions on entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions ... if they violate E3 laws and regulations”. The E3 reiterated their commitment “to a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue”, adding that the Islamic Republic of Iran “twice refused to seize a critical opportunity” which “would have returned the United States to the deal and brought Iran back into full compliance with its commitments” and that they are determined “to use all diplomatic tools to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using snapback if necessary”.

13. In response to S/2024/886, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a letter dated 9 December 2024 (S/2024/891) “categorically” rejected “the claims ... regarding Iran’s alleged non-compliance with its commitments

under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and reiterated that “the root cause of the current situation surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action stems from the United States’ unilateral withdrawal in May 2018 and the subsequent failure of the E3/European Union to fulfil their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015)”. He also stated that the E3’s invocation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dispute resolution mechanism was “not considered an act of good faith but a politicized manoeuvre aimed at deflecting from their own non-compliance”. With regard to the E3’s refusal to lift sanctions on Transition Day in October 2023 and their imposition of new sanctions in 2024, the Permanent Representative repeated that this “constitute[s] another clear violation of their commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, called the claim by the E3 that “these sanctions are ‘entirely separate’ from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” as “legally and factually baseless”, and stated that “paragraph 30 exclusively pertains to activities directly linked to sanction-lifting obligations and offers no justification for unilateral or politically motivated measures that violate the core commitments of the agreement”. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that “Iran remains committed to engaging in good faith and exploring all avenues of diplomacy to address shared challenges”, but that a “sustainable diplomatic solution can only be achieved through mutual respect, strict adherence to international law and full commitment to the principles of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and that “any threats to invoke the so-called ‘snapback’ are counterproductive and will provoke a firm response from Iran”.

14. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in a letter dated 10 December 2024 (S/2024/894), also responded to the letter from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom dated 6 December (S/2024/886). He stated that “it is deeply worrying that, contrary to their claims, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, instead of looking for a diplomatic solution, continue to put forward biased accusations and threats that can only escalate tensions around the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)”, and he called their “claims that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ‘allowed’ these States to cease performing their commitments under the Plan” far from the truth, while underscoring that “France, Germany, the United Kingdom as well as the United States, rather than the Islamic Republic of Iran” are “the true cause-and-effect relation concerning the current situation around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”. He also stated that “the references of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to allegedly having triggered the dispute resolution mechanism in accordance with paragraph 36 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action are baseless in light of the spirit and the letter of the Plan”. With regard to “the possibility of using the ‘snapback’ mechanism”, the Permanent Representative stated that “many reasons that made it impossible for the United States to trigger this mechanism back in 2020 remain relevant for France, Germany and the United Kingdom as well, as these States joined the United States in violating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015), and therefore deprived themselves of the right to use the instruments envisaged by the Plan”, and he referred to their legal analysis that was circulated as an official document to the Security Council on 20 August 2020 (S/2020/816). Finally, he reiterated that the Russian Federation “reaffirms its unwavering commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and “encourage[d] all constructively engaged Member States to contribute to constructive progress towards the full implementation of the resolution”.

15. In line with paragraph 4 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Security Council requested the Director General of IAEA to provide regular updates to the Council on the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and to report at any time on any issue

of concern directly affecting the fulfilment of those commitments, the Director General submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors, and to the Council, ad hoc reports on 28 June 2024 (GOV/INF/2024/9), 28 November 2024 (GOV/INF/2024/16) and 6 December 2024 (GOV/INF/2024/17) and regular reports on 29 August 2024 (GOV/2024/41) (S/2024/867) and 19 November 2024 (GOV/2024/61) (S/2024/877) on the Agency's verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015).

16. The 19 November (GOV/2024/61), 29 August (GOV/2024/41) and 27 May (GOV/2024/26) regular reports also noted that the Agency's verification and monitoring has been seriously affected by the cessation of the Islamic Republic of Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The situation has been exacerbated by the subsequent decision to remove all of the Agency's Plan of Action-related surveillance and monitoring equipment and by the Islamic Republic of Iran's decision to stop provisionally applying the Additional Protocol. As such, the Agency has "lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC [uranium ore concentrate]" (GOV/2024/41). The Director General had "requested Iran to reverse its decision to withdraw the designations" of "several experienced Agency inspectors (GOV/2024/41). This measure, "while formally permitted by the NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] Safeguards Agreement, was exercised by Iran in a manner that directly and seriously affects the Agency's ... activities". In the November report (GOV/2024/61), the Director General welcomed "Iran's decision to consider the acceptance of the designation of four additional experienced inspectors". The November report also reflected on the high-level meetings between the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran that took place on 14 November in Tehran. The report stated that "the production and accumulation of high enriched uranium by Iran ... adds to the Agency's concerns". During these meetings the "possibility of Iran not further expanding its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 was discussed, including technical verification measures necessary for the Agency to confirm this, if implemented".

17. The 28 June 2024 ad hoc report (GOV/INF/2024/9) stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had informed the Agency, in a letter dated 13 June 2024, that it intended to start operating and installing additional centrifuges at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) and at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz. The 28 November 2024 ad hoc report (GOV/INF/2024/16) stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had informed the Agency, in letters dated 26 and 27 November 2024, that it intended to "start the commissioning and operation of" the "18 cascades of IR-2m centrifuges" at FEP in Natanz, and that it "intended to feed natural or depleted UF<sub>6</sub> into the eight IR-6 cascades installed in Unit 1 ... in order to produce UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235" at FFEP, respectively. Regarding FFEP, the Islamic Republic of Iran had informed the Agency on 13 June 2024 that it "intended to start to install, operate and feed eight IR-6 cascades in Unit 1". As of 5 December 2024, the Agency verified that two of these IR-6 cascades were being fed with natural UF<sub>6</sub> for the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5 per cent U-235 (see GOV/INF/2024/17). With regard to Unit 2, on 5 December 2024 the Agency also "verified that Iran had started feeding UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 into the two IR-6 cascades ... for the purpose of producing UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 60% U-235" (GOV/INF/2024/17, para. 7). On 3 December 2024, the Agency reported that "the effect of this change would be to significantly increase the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 60% at FFEP to over 34 kg of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> per month (GOV/INF/2024/17, para. 5). The Agency also reported that it "has evaluated the impact of these changes on the required frequency and intensity of its safeguards measures at FFEP, ... to enable the Agency to provide timely and

technically credible assurances that the facility is not being misused to produce uranium of an enrichment level higher than that declared by Iran, and that there is no diversion of declared nuclear material” (GOV/INF/2024/17, para. 9). The Agency further stated that “pending the implementation of these necessary additional safeguards measures”, “Iran has agreed to implement temporary additional safeguards activities at the facility” (GOV/INF/2024/17, para. 6). The Agency also stated that it had “determined and shared with Iran the changes required to the intensity of its inspection activities at FFEP following the commissioning of the cascades in Unit 1” (GOV/INF/2024/16, para. 3). Regarding FEP, the Islamic Republic of Iran had informed the Agency on 13 June 2024 that, in Hall A1000, it “intended to start to feed UF6 into 15 more of the already installed IR-2m and IR-4 cascades” and “to proceed with the installation of another 18 IR-2m cascades” (GOV/INF/2024/9, para. 4), which has now been completed, as verified by the Agency on 23 November (GOV/INF/2024/16, para. 5). Regarding PFEP, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Agency on 13 June 2024 that it “intended to start to feed UF6 into the cascades already installed, and to install and operate one new IR-6 cascade” (GOV/INF/2024/9, para. 6). The Agency had verified that, in Hall A1000, the Islamic Republic of Iran “was feeding depleted UF6” into cascades of IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges.

18. Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium, the Agency noted that since 16 February 2021, it has not been able to verify “the stockpile precisely on any given day”, having “to rely instead on a small proportion of the total being based on Iran’s estimates”. Based on information provided by the country, the Agency has estimated that as of 26 October 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6,604.4 kg – an increase of 852.6 kg since the August 2024 report – and is comprised of 5,807.2 kg of uranium in the form of UF6; 615.8 kg of uranium in the form of uranium oxide and other intermediate products; 44.3 kg of uranium in fuel assemblies, plates and rods; 4.4 kg of uranium in targets; and 132.7 kg of uranium in liquid and solid scrap.

19. Pursuant to annex B of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the following restrictions applied for five and eight years, respectively, from the date of adoption of the Plan of Action (18 October 2015): arms-related transfers (paras. 5 and 6 (b)) and the travel ban (para. 6 (e)), until 18 October 2020; and the ballistic missile-related provisions (paras. 3 and 4) and assets freeze (para. 6 (c) and (d)), until 18 October 2023 (see also [S/2023/989](#), para. 41).

#### **IV. Procurement channel approval, notifications, and exemptions**

20. During the reporting period, no new proposals for the supply of items, material, equipment, goods and technology set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 were submitted to the Security Council.

21. Since Implementation Day, a total of 52 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), have been submitted to the Security Council by five Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To date, of the 52 proposals that have been processed, 37 have been approved, 5 were not approved and 10 were withdrawn. On average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in 50 calendar days. After the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Plan of Action, the procurement channel continues to function, and the Joint Commission continues to stand ready to review proposals.

22. According to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), certain nuclear-related activities do not require approval but do require a notification to the Security Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. In this regard, during the reporting period, four notifications were submitted to the Council in relation to the transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of equipment and technology covered by annex B, section 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1, intended for light water reactors.

23. No notifications were submitted to the Security Council related to the necessary modification of the two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, and no notifications were submitted to the Council related to the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design.

24. On 5 December 2024, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group transmitted to me the Group's eighteenth six-month report of the Joint Commission ([S/2024/880](#)) in accordance with paragraph 6.10 of annex IV to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

## V. Transparency, outreach and guidance

25. As the Security Council's Facilitator, I am increasingly aware of the challenging environment the "2231 format" is facing. However, I remain deeply committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as endorsed by the Council in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

26. As the Facilitator, I continue to focus on facilitating, strengthening and promoting the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), including advocating for the full utilization of the procurement channel. I urge all Member States to continue to engage in dialogue and to acknowledge the importance of the Plan of Action as a multilateral agreement in nuclear non-proliferation.

27. Outreach activities by the Secretariat, as mandated by the note mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present report ([S/2016/44](#)), continue to foster awareness of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The website on the resolution, also managed and regularly updated by the Secretariat through the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, continues to provide relevant and updated information.

28. In drafting the present report, numerous bilateral consultations with Member States and their representatives were held, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to discuss issues relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In my role as Facilitator, I continue to advocate for the Security Council's collective responses to international peace and security issues.

29. In conclusion, I would also like to encourage the international community to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which calls upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to fully support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.