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## Carta de fecha 27 de diciembre de 2024 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo

Los miembros del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo, cuyo mandato fue prorrogado en virtud de la resolución [2738 \(2024\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, tienen el honor de transmitir adjunto, de conformidad con el párrafo 6 de esa resolución, el informe de mitad de período sobre su labor.

El informe fue presentado al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [1533 \(2004\)](#) relativa a la República Democrática del Congo el 29 de noviembre de 2024 y fue examinado por el Comité el 27 de diciembre de 2024.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

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## Informe de mitad de período del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo

### *Resumen*

La persistente violencia en el este de la República Democrática del Congo afectó a las condiciones de seguridad y a la situación humanitaria. El conflicto siguió repercutiendo en forma negativa en las relaciones regionales.

Los ataques selectivos de la Operación Shujaa debilitaron a las sancionadas Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas (FDA) y las obligaron a expandirse a la provincia de Ituri y el territorio de Lubero (Kivu del Norte). La Operación Shujaa se extendió más allá de sus fronteras oficiales para perseguir a células de las FDA. En represalia, las FDA lanzaron ataques contra civiles, lo que hizo que en el mes de junio registraran el número más elevado de muertes de civiles. A pesar de sus pérdidas, las FDA demostraron resiliencia, lo cual plantea interrogantes acerca de la eficacia de la Operación Shujaa para reducir las amenazas a la población civil en la República Democrática del Congo.

La Alianza Río Congo (AFC), de carácter político-militar, y el sancionado Movimiento 23 de Marzo (M23) continuaron persiguiendo activamente sus objetivos expansionistas, con el fin de consolidar el apoyo de todos los grupos armados de Ituri y Kivu del Sur. Un número cada vez mayor de grupos armados se alió de forma abierta o encubierta con la coalición AFC/M23, lo que de manera gradual influyó en la dinámica del conflicto en las provincias orientales y generó interconexiones entre sus distintos frentes.

En Kivu del Norte, el alto el fuego acordado entre la República Democrática del Congo y Rwanda no impidió que AFC/M23, con el apoyo sistemático de la Fuerza de Defensa de Rwanda (FDR), lograra importantes conquistas territoriales, en particular en el territorio de Walikale, rico en minerales. La avanzada tecnología militar operada principalmente por la FDR garantizó el dominio militar de AFC/M23 en Petit Nord. Angola y el Consejo de Seguridad condenaron esas acciones como una violación del alto el fuego.

AFC/M23 conquistó Rubaya, donde se encuentra la mayor mina de coltán de la región de los Grandes Lagos. AFC/M23 estableció una administración paralela que se encargó de controlar las actividades mineras, el comercio, el transporte y el cobro de impuestos por los minerales producidos. Al menos 150 toneladas de coltán se exportaron fraudulentamente a Rwanda y se mezclaron con la producción rwandesa, lo que provocó la mayor contaminación de las cadenas de suministro de minerales registrada hasta la fecha en la región de los Grandes Lagos.

La República Democrática del Congo y Rwanda acordaron poner en marcha un plan para neutralizar a las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda (FDLR) y elaborar un plan para la retirada de la FDR. La existencia de profundos desacuerdos y la desconfianza mutua en lo que respecta a la aplicación y la secuencia de ambos planes impidieron la concertación de un acuerdo de paz global bajo la égida de Angola, el facilitador designado por la Unión Africana. El plan destinado a neutralizar, reubicar o repatriar a las FDLR genera preocupaciones relacionadas con los derechos humanos y el derecho humanitario.

Una ofensiva limitada de las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo (FARDC) contra las FDLR no logró neutralizar ni capturar a ningún comandante de alto rango. Como respuesta, las FDLR reforzaron sus defensas, reubicaron posiciones clave y se fusionaron con grupos armados Wazalendo. La operación puso de manifiesto las limitaciones operacionales de las FARDC y las

discordias internas en su estructura de mando, en particular en lo que ataÑe a la cuestión de la colaboración con las FDLR. El Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo siguió confiando en los grupos Wazalendo y en las FDLR como agentes subsidiarios en la lucha contra AFC/M23 y la FDR, a pesar de los reiterados llamamientos para que pusiera fin a su apoyo a las FDLR.

En Ituri, el grupo armado Zaïre, aliado con AFC/M23, concentró sus esfuerzos en la creación de un nuevo frente contra las FARDC. Los sancionados Thomas Lubanga Dyilo e Yves Khawa Pango Mandro desempeñaron un papel fundamental en la movilización de Zaïre y en el fortalecimiento de la colaboración con AFC/M23. Zaïre intensificó el reclutamiento y adiestró a miles de combatientes en preparación para una ofensiva en gran escala en Ituri.

En Ituri continuó la explotación del oro al margen del control del Estado, una actividad que generó al menos 140 millones de dólares anuales para grupos armados y redes delictivas.

En Kivu del Sur, la retirada de la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo (MONUSCO), que tuvo lugar a mediados de 2024, provocó un deterioro de las condiciones de seguridad y afectó a la población civil, que quedó expuesta a abusos contra los derechos humanos por parte de las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado y de agentes armados. AFC/M23 amplió su influencia, llevó a cabo actividades de reclutamiento y movilizó el apoyo de grupos armados activos en Kivu del Sur. AFC/M23 forjó una alianza con Twirwaneho, Resistencia en pro del Estado de Derecho en Burundi y las Fuerzas Armadas “Biloze Bishambuke”. Una delegación de la República Democrática del Congo convocó a una decena de grupos Mai-Mai para firmar un pacto de no agresión, con el objetivo de disuadirlos de alinearse con AFC/M23.

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\* Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial oficial.

## I. Introducción

1. El mandato del Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo fue prorrogado el 27 de junio de 2024 en virtud de la resolución [2738 \(2024\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad. El 19 de agosto de 2024 el Secretario General nombró a cinco miembros del Grupo de Expertos ([S/2024/620](#)). Aún no se ha nombrado al sexto experto.
2. El informe de mitad de período del Grupo se presenta en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 6 de la resolución [2738 \(2024\)](#). El Grupo intercambió información con los grupos de expertos sobre Haití, la República Centroafricana y Sudán del Sur.

### **Cooperación con la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo**

3. El Grupo expresa su gratitud por el apoyo y la colaboración prestados por la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo (MONUSCO) durante el período que abarca el informe.

### **Metodología**

4. El Grupo aplicó las normas probatorias recomendadas por el Grupo de Trabajo Oficioso del Consejo de Seguridad sobre Cuestiones Generales Relativas a las Sanciones ([S/2006/997](#)). El Grupo basó sus conclusiones en documentos y corroboró la información recurriendo como mínimo a tres fuentes independientes y fidedignas.
5. Dada la naturaleza del conflicto en la República Democrática del Congo, se cuenta con pocos documentos que proporcionen pruebas definitivas de transferencias de armas, reclutamiento, responsabilidad de mando por abusos graves contra los derechos humanos y explotación ilícita de los recursos naturales. Por consiguiente, el Grupo se basó en declaraciones de testigos presenciales formuladas por miembros de comunidades locales, excombatientes y miembros activos de grupos armados. El Grupo también ha tenido en cuenta testimonios periciales aportados por funcionarios gubernamentales y oficiales militares de países de la región de los Grandes Lagos y de otros países, así como por fuentes de las Naciones Unidas.
6. El presente informe abarca las investigaciones realizadas hasta el 8 de noviembre de 2024. Debido a las limitaciones relacionadas con la cantidad de palabras, el Grupo incluyó algunas de sus pruebas y conclusiones en los anexos.

## II. Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas en Ituri y Kivu del Norte

### A. Operación Shujaa

#### **Éxito relativo de la Operación Shujaa**

7. La cuarta fase de la Operación Shujaa, emprendida conjuntamente por las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo (FARDC) y las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo de Uganda (FDPU) ([S/2022/479](#), párrs. 19 a 21), que comenzó en noviembre de 2023 y tuvo un éxito limitado, se reinició el 20 de mayo de 2024 e intensificó los asaltos terrestres y aéreos contra el grupo sancionado Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas (FDA) (CDe.001), principalmente al oeste de la carretera RN4<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo (FARDC) y de las Naciones Unidas.

8. A diferencia de las fases anteriores, que tuvieron un éxito limitado, las operaciones recientes han debilitado notablemente a las FDA, ya que han destruido sus bastiones y causado considerables bajas entre sus combatientes y sus líderes, lo que ha facilitado la huida de cientos de rehenes ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 9 a 12)<sup>2</sup>. Murieron varios comandantes de las FDA, entre ellos Braida<sup>3</sup> y Amigo<sup>4</sup> (véase el anexo 1). Las FDA se vieron obligadas a desplazarse en forma constante, lo que ocasionó un grave deterioro de su capacidad operacional y una disrupción de sus cadenas de suministro. El grupo ha sufrido hambruna y enfermedades<sup>5</sup>.

9. En respuesta a la intensificación de los ataques, las FDA recurrieron a sus tácticas habituales: aumentar la movilidad, reubicarse para eludir los enfrentamientos directos y desviar la atención de los campamentos principales, y atacar a civiles ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 9 y 11). Debilitados, y buscando formas de fortalecerse y sobrevivir, los campamentos más pequeños se agruparon para formar mega-campamentos y se trasladaron a zonas remotas (véanse los párrs. 15 a 17 y el anexo 2).

10. Esos contratiempos provocaron un aumento de la violencia de las FDA contra la población civil, que incluyó asesinatos por venganza, secuestros, saqueos y ataques selectivos contra personal médico e instalaciones sanitarias (véanse los párrs. 19 a 22).

11. En lugar de reducir la amenaza para la población civil, la Operación Shujaa ha hecho que esa amenaza se desplazara más hacia el oeste, hacia zonas en que la presencia de las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado es mínima ([S/2022/479](#), párr. 26; [S/2023/990](#), párr. 15; y [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 9 y 10)<sup>6</sup>. En tanto que los ataques de las FDA en territorio ugandés cesaron a finales de 2023 ([S/2023/990](#), párrs. 17 y 18), los ataques dentro de la República Democrática del Congo se han intensificado, lo que plantea graves preocupaciones respecto del impacto de la Operación Shujaa en la población civil. El reposicionamiento estratégico de las FDA, crucial para su supervivencia, generó una importante expansión de su huella territorial en Ituri y Kivu del Norte.

### **Tensiones en torno a la Operación Shujaa**

12. Esporádicamente, las FDPU llevaron a cabo operaciones aéreas sin notificar a las FARDC, y en algunas ocasiones extendieron sus operaciones más allá de las zonas designadas, lo cual ocasionó tensiones entre las FARDC y las FDPU<sup>7</sup>. El 11 de agosto se estrelló cerca de Kotoni, fuera de la zona de operaciones de Shujaa, un dron de las FDPU cuya trayectoria de vuelo no había sido notificada previamente a las FARDC, lo cual erosionó aún más la confianza (véase el anexo 3).

13. Por otra parte, con frecuencia las FDPU trasladaron a detenidos y exrehenes de las FDA a Uganda sin compartir prontamente la información, lo cual complicó los procesos judiciales y de inteligencia en la República Democrática del Congo<sup>8</sup>.

14. Como consecuencia de esa situación, las FARDC retrasaron los despliegues de las FDPU en las zonas que no contaban con una presencia de las FARDC, a pesar de

<sup>2</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC, de las Naciones Unidas y de inteligencia, investigadores, exrehenes y excombatientes.

<sup>3</sup> [S/2019/469](#), párr. 24.

<sup>4</sup> [S/2020/482](#), párrs. 36 a 41; [S/2022/479](#), párr. 42; y [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 17 y 25.

<sup>5</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC y de las Naciones Unidas, investigadores, exrehenes y excombatientes.

<sup>6</sup> Investigadores y fuentes humanitarias, de la sociedad civil, de las Naciones Unidas y de inteligencia.

<sup>7</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las FARDC, de las Naciones Unidas y de inteligencia.

<sup>8</sup> Investigadores, fuentes de las FARDC y funcionarios judiciales y de inteligencia.

la limitada contribución que las propias FARDC aportaban a la Operación Shujaa ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 19)<sup>9</sup>. Lo que es más importante, la República Democrática del Congo dudó en ampliar la zona de operaciones de la Operación Shujaa al norte del río Ituri, donde se encuentra el cuartel general Madina, recientemente trasladado, por temor a que Uganda tuviese una agenda oculta<sup>10</sup> vinculada a sus intereses históricos en Ituri<sup>11</sup>. No obstante, en julio se llegó a un acuerdo para expandir la Operación Shujaa al oeste de la carretera RN44 y a la región de Manguredjipa, donde se mantenía activo el sancionado Ahmad Mahmood Hassan, alias Abwakasi (CDi.040) (véase el anexo 4).

## B. Reconfiguración geográfica y resiliencia de las Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas

15. En mayo, la Operación Shujaa comenzó a llevar a cabo intensos ataques terrestres y aéreos contra el campamento del sancionado líder de las FDA Seka Baluku (CDi.036) y contra el grupo liderado por Abwakasi. Esa situación impulsó a Baluku a trasladar su cuartel general Madina más al norte, al territorio de Mambasa, en la provincia de Ituri, fuera de la zona de operaciones oficial de la Operación Shujaa<sup>12</sup>. Siguiendo órdenes de Baluku, varios campamentos separados dirigidos por Mzee Mayor y Mzee Wa Kazi, alias Lumisa ([S/2022/479](#), anexo 5), se fusionaron con Madina<sup>13</sup>, y muchos familiares y rehenes de otros campamentos fueron trasladados a Madina<sup>14</sup>. En julio, los campamentos de los comandantes Tabani, Defender y Braida se fusionaron para reforzar la seguridad, ya que eran atacados con frecuencia<sup>15</sup>.

16. La mayoría de los campamentos de las FDA están situados ahora en la provincia de Ituri. El grupo de Baluku y su campamento Madina fueron avistados al norte de Lolwa, a lo largo de la carretera Eringeti-Komanda, en el territorio de Mambasa. La constelación de los grupos de Braida, Tabani y Defender se desplazó al oeste del eje Oicha-Eringeti (la carretera RN4) y operaba en torno a Biakato (a lo largo de la carretera RN44)<sup>16</sup>.

17. Entretanto, en junio de 2024 el grupo de Abwakasi —la célula más activa y mortífera de las FDA— comenzó a desplazarse en dirección opuesta, hacia el suroeste, e ingresó en el sector de Bapere del territorio de Lubero, con el objetivo de que la atención militar dejara de estar centrada en Madina, y a lo largo del camino llevó a cabo ataques de venganza contra civiles<sup>17</sup>. En agosto de 2024, Abwakasi, perseguido por la Operación Shujaa, operaba en los alrededores de Manguredjipa, en el noroeste de Lubero, y mantuvo enfrentamientos con grupos armados locales (véanse los párrs. 20, 30 y 31). En septiembre varios subgrupos de los campamentos de Braida y Tabani, dirigidos por el comandante Seka Dadi (o Adadi), se unieron a Abwakasi en Manguredjipa<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas y de inteligencia.

<sup>10</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC y de inteligencia.

<sup>11</sup> *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pág. 168.

<sup>12</sup> Excombatiente, exrehenes, investigadores y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas y de las FARDC.

<sup>13</sup> Investigadores y exrehenes.

<sup>14</sup> Exrehenes, investigadores y fuentes de las FARDC y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC, de inteligencia y de las Naciones Unidas, investigadores, exrehenes y excombatientes.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC y exrehenes.

18. En el anexo 5 se detallan las estrategias de las FDA orientadas a la supervivencia y sus innovaciones tecnológicas, como el uso de comunicaciones por satélite y las pruebas con explosivos adosados a drones comerciales.

#### **Ataques contra civiles**

19. Desde junio de 2024, las FDA han sido responsables de la muerte de más de 650 civiles<sup>19</sup> en ataques que han afectado a las provincias de Kivu del Norte e Ituri (véase el anexo 6)<sup>20</sup>.

20. Junio fue el mes más mortífero de que se tenga registro en cuanto a las acciones de las FDA, ya que más de 200 civiles murieron en la región de Beni y en el territorio de Lubero, principalmente a manos del grupo de Abwakasi, que estaba avanzando hacia el oeste. Entre el 3 y el 12 de junio, el grupo de Abwakasi atacó más de diez localidades situadas al oeste de Beni, en los alrededores de Cantine, y mató a por lo menos 150 civiles<sup>21</sup>. Ya en el territorio de Lubero, a partir del 13 de junio se registraron varios ataques en el sector de Bapere, a lo largo de la frontera entre los territorios de Beni y Lubero. A principios de agosto, el grupo de Abwakasi llegó a la zona de Njapanda y Manguredjipa y se asentó en los alrededores del bosque de Bandulu, en Lubero<sup>22</sup>. Abwakasi mantuvo una gran movilidad y siguió matando a civiles<sup>23</sup>.

21. Siguiendo una tendencia similar, entre junio y agosto Braida, Defender y Tabani se desplazaron hacia el noroeste, desde Oicha hacia Mamove y Biakato, y a lo largo del camino atacaron pequeñas aldeas y llevaron a cabo secuestros, asesinatos y ejecuciones<sup>24</sup>. En septiembre, los grupos de Tabani y Defender ya habían cruzado al oeste de la carretera RN44 y de Biakato, perseguidos por fuerzas de la Operación Shujaa. Braida y Defender fueron responsables de la mayoría de los asesinatos cometidos en los alrededores de Mamove y Beu-Manyama. Braida murió a mediados de agosto cerca de Biakato<sup>25</sup>.

22. En Irumu y Mambasa los ataques fueron menos frecuentes, ya que el numeroso grupo de Baluku, integrado por unos 1.000 combatientes y civiles, se trasladó al norte del río Ituri, más allá de Lolwa. Es probable que esa relativa calma reflejara la vulnerabilidad y la lentitud del grupo, que además de los combatientes incluía a familiares y estaba centrado en la tarea de hallar nuevos emplazamientos para sus campamentos. El grupo también parecía mantener un perfil bajo con el fin de eludir a las fuerzas de la Operación Shujaa. Varios ataques contra centros de salud y secuestros de personal médico cometidos a finales de agosto en los alrededores de Lolwa<sup>26</sup> sugieren que existe una necesidad crítica de atención médica, y exrehenes informaron de que el grupo de Baluku había sufrido numerosas bajas como consecuencia de la Operación Shujaa.

<sup>19</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las FARDC y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>20</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas, de las FARDC y de inteligencia.

<sup>21</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas, confidenciales y de inteligencia.

<sup>22</sup> Investigadores, fuentes de las Naciones Unidas, exrehenes y excombatientes.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Exrehenes, incluidos testigos presenciales, y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas y de las FARDC.

<sup>25</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC y de las Naciones Unidas, exrehenes, excombatientes e investigadores.

<sup>26</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas, de las FARDC y humanitarias.

### **Mando y control unificados de las Fuerzas Democráticas Aliadas**

23. Las FDA mantuvieron una estructura de mando simplificada. Si bien los subgrupos funcionaban con cierto grado de independencia, todos dependían de Baluku (véase el anexo 7)<sup>27</sup>.

24. A pesar de los persistentes rumores sobre los problemas de salud de Baluku, exrehenes y combatientes capturados informaron de que estaba activo y mantenía un firme control sobre Abwakasi y otros comandantes. Se ha visto a Baluku vistiendo un chaleco explosivo con la intención declarada de inmolarse en caso de ser capturado. Su sucesor designado, en quien confía, es su actual adjunto, Seka Umaru ([S/2023/431](#), párr. 17)<sup>28</sup>.

25. Aunque se podían llevar a cabo ataques espontáneos de menor envergadura sin la aprobación previa de Baluku, todas las operaciones importantes requerían su autorización. Después de cada ataque se enviaban a Baluku informes y fotografías que eran utilizados para la adopción de decisiones y para fines de propaganda<sup>29</sup>. Entrevistas recientes con excombatientes de las FDA y familiares han confirmado que el traslado de Abwakasi a Lubero y la reubicación de los demás campamentos se llevaron a cabo por orden de Baluku.

### **C. Aumento del número de reivindicaciones por parte de Dáesh**

26. Dáesh demostró un mayor interés por las actividades de las FDA en el este de la República Democrática del Congo. A partir de junio de 2024 se produjo un notable aumento del número de ataques de las FDA reivindicados por Dáesh en comparación con los meses anteriores, y entre el 2 de junio y finales de octubre se publicaron 111 reivindicaciones. El tiempo transcurrido entre los ataques y la reivindicación de su autoría ha disminuido considerablemente, de varios días a, en algunas ocasiones, 24 horas. Esa tendencia sugiere que la colaboración entre Dáesh y las FDA ([S/2022/967](#), párrs. 27 y 28) ha mejorado y que mantienen una comunicación más rápida y directa (véase el anexo 8).

### **D. Contactos con Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo**

27. A lo largo de 2024 persistieron los rumores sobre posibles contactos entre las FDA y la coalición de la Alianza Río Congo (AFC) y el Movimiento 23 de Marzo (M23). Conforme AFC/M23 se adentraba en Lubero, se intensificaron las especulaciones sobre la cooperación, aunque AFC/M23 lo negó abiertamente (véase el anexo 9).

28. Varias fuentes informaron de que existían contactos entre dirigentes de las FDA y personas que pertenecían a las redes de la ex-Coalición Congoleña para la Democracia-Kisangani, Movimiento de Liberación y del antiguo M23 ([S/2013/433](#), párrs. 62 a 71, y [S/2016/466](#), párr. 193), que también tenían vínculos con la AFC<sup>30</sup>. En marzo de 2024, el Grupo se reunió con un exmiembro de esas redes, quien reveló que en febrero se había reunido en Kampala con un asociado de Corneille Nangaa, y luego con el propio Nangaa, para conversar acerca de una posible colaboración con la AFC.

<sup>27</sup> Exrehenes, excombatientes, investigadores y fuentes de las FARDC, de la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo (MONUSCO) y de inteligencia.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Exrehenes.

<sup>30</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC, de inteligencia y de seguridad, investigadores y un informante que se había reunido con la Alianza Río Congo (AFC) para negociar contactos.

Esa persona también mantenía un estrecho contacto con las familias de Abwakasi y Baluku. Fuentes cercanas a las FDA indicaron que esas interacciones formaban parte de las gestiones emprendidas por AFC/M23 para establecer conexiones con las FDA con el fin de negociar el acceso al territorio controlado por las FDA.

29. Si bien los detalles de los acuerdos no están claros, múltiples fuentes han confirmado que AFC/M23 quería establecer un pacto de no agresión con las FDA, había solicitado un paso seguro —en particular para los reclutas que pasaban desde Ituri hacia el territorio controlado por AFC/M23— y había instado a las FDA a que limitaran los ataques a soldados de las FARDC<sup>31</sup>. Un excombatiente de las FDA fue testigo de que durante una reunión Baluku afirmó que AFC/M23 había formulado una propuesta de colaboración. Al parecer, Baluku se negó, alegando que desconfiaba de AFC/M23, y reafirmó su determinación de seguir atacando a los civiles “infieles”.

#### **E. Dependencia de Wazalendo por parte de la República Democrática del Congo para colmar el vacío en materia de seguridad**

30. Para llenar el creciente vacío en materia de seguridad y defenderse de las FDA, las FARDC recurrieron con frecuencia a grupos Mai-Mai, especialmente las Fuerzas Patrióticas Populares-Ejército del Pueblo de Kabidon y la Unión de Patriotas por la Liberación del Congo del “General” Mayani ([S/2024/432](#), anexo 9)<sup>32</sup>. Recientemente, grupos armados Wazalendo, como Nduma Defensa del Congo-Renovado (NDC-R), del sancionado Guidon Shimiray Mwissa (CDi.033), se desplegaron en zonas ricas en minerales del territorio de Lubero, especialmente en los alrededores de Manguredjipa, con el pretexto de proteger de las FDA a los civiles (véase el anexo 10). Las FDA se han enfrentado a esos grupos armados y les han tendido emboscadas<sup>33</sup>.

31. La proliferación de esos grupos armados, que han cometido abusos contra la población ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 21 y 22), ha generado un aumento de la inseguridad y ha desencadenado tensiones con la población local, que ha pedido que se marcharan (véase el anexo 11).

32. Es probable que la dinámica del conflicto se deteriore debido al avance de AFC/M23 hacia el norte en Lubero, a la presencia de Abwakasi en Manguredjipa y a los activos intentos de los grupos Wazalendo, en particular NDC-R/Guidon, de controlar la zona.

### **III. Crisis de Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo en Kivu del Norte**

#### **A. Explotación de la tregua humanitaria, del alto el fuego y del proceso de Luanda con fines expansionistas**

33. El 4 de julio de 2024, la República Democrática del Congo y Rwanda, con la mediación de los Estados Unidos de América, acordaron una tregua humanitaria de dos semanas<sup>34</sup> en el este de la República Democrática del Congo<sup>35</sup> que exigía la

<sup>31</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las FARDC, de inteligencia y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Fuentes humanitarias, de las Naciones Unidas, de la sociedad civil y de inteligencia, investigadores y reivindicaciones publicadas por la Provincia de África Central del Estado Islámico (ISCAP).

<sup>34</sup> Prorrogada hasta el 3 de agosto de 2024.

<sup>35</sup> Adrienne Watson, Portavoz del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad de los Estados Unidos de América, Washington D. C., 4 de julio de 2024. Puede consultarse en

cesación de las hostilidades, el retorno voluntario de los desplazados y el acceso humanitario sin restricciones a las poblaciones vulnerables. A diferencia de los ceses al fuego de noviembre y diciembre de 2023 ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 31 y anexos 20 y 21), esa tregua no exigía que la Fuerza de Defensa de Rwanda (FDR) se retirara ni que las FARDC se comprometieran a dejar de colaborar con los grupos armados.

34. La tregua fue prorrogada mediante un alto el fuego que entró en vigor el 4 de agosto de 2024. Lo firmaron la República Democrática del Congo y Rwanda bajo los auspicios de Angola, que fue el facilitador designado por la Unión Africana ([S/2024/432](#), anexo 20; y [S/2023/431](#), anexo 20)<sup>36</sup>. AFC/M23 alegó que “no [quedaba] automáticamente obligada por las conclusiones” del acuerdo, ya que no figuraba entre las partes signatarias (véase el anexo 12).

35. Si bien en un comienzo la FDR y las FARDC respetaron temporalmente el alto el fuego (véanse los párrs. 36, 37 y 44 a 47), sus agentes subsidiarios, el M23 y Wazalendo, junto con las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda (FDLR), no tardaron en reanudar los enfrentamientos<sup>37</sup>. Las FARDC, Wazalendo, las FDLR, la FDR y el M23 aprovecharon la relativa calma para reforzar sus contingentes y reponer armamento (véanse los párrs. 39 a 43, 48 a 55 y 80).

36. Desde finales de abril de 2024 ([S/2024/432](#)), el M23, con el apoyo de la FDR, logró importantes avances territoriales y fortaleció su control sobre las zonas ocupadas (véanse los párrs. 41 a 47). Ese patrón se mantuvo a pesar de la tregua y del alto el fuego, lo cual sugiere que el verdadero objetivo del M23 siguió siendo la expansión territorial y la ocupación y explotación a largo plazo de los territorios conquistados.

37. A finales de octubre de 2024, la expansión territorial del M23 y la FDR al territorio de Walikale desencadenó enfrentamientos directos con las FARDC y sus aliados a lo largo de la carretera Mweso-Pinga (véase el párr. 46). El mediador angoleño y el Consejo de Seguridad condenaron esas operaciones como una violación del alto el fuego<sup>38</sup>. En el momento de redactar este informe era probable que las FARDC y la FDR reanudaran las operaciones en gran escala.

38. Angola continuó facilitando las negociaciones con el objetivo de hallar una solución a largo plazo del conflicto. Si bien la República Democrática del Congo y Rwanda acordaron poner en marcha un plan para neutralizar a las FDLR y elaborar un plan para la retirada de las fuerzas y el levantamiento de las medidas defensivas de Rwanda, los profundos desacuerdos y la desconfianza mutua en lo que respecta a la aplicación y la secuencia de ambos planes han impedido hasta ahora la consecución de un acuerdo general de paz (véanse los párrs. 48 a 55 y 67 a 80 y el anexo 13).

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[www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/04/statement-from-nsc-spokesperson-adrienne-watson-welcoming-the-humanitarian-truce-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/04/statement-from-nsc-spokesperson-adrienne-watson-welcoming-the-humanitarian-truce-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/).

<sup>36</sup> Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Angola, anuncio del alto el fuego en X. Puede consultarse en [https://x.com/angola\\_Mirex/status/1818436276996968860](https://x.com/angola_Mirex/status/1818436276996968860).

<sup>37</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda (FDLR), de Wazalendo, de AFC/Movimiento 23 de Marzo y de las Naciones Unidas. Véanse también los anexos 17 a 19 y 45.

<sup>38</sup> Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Angola, comunicado de prensa, 21 de octubre de 2024, puede consultarse en [www.facebook.com/61556720147590/posts/122186129660224004/?mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=XJXuV8Q5mFx7SEah](https://www.facebook.com/61556720147590/posts/122186129660224004/?mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=XJXuV8Q5mFx7SEah); y Naciones Unidas, “Security Council press statement on Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 25 de octubre de 2024, puede consultarse en <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15866.doc.htm>.

## B. Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo y Fuerza de Defensa de Rwanda

### Coalición y movilización de Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo

39. El M23 siguió estando bajo el mando militar general del “General” Sultani Makenga (CDi.008), quien continuó recibiendo instrucciones y apoyo de la FDR y de los servicios de inteligencia de Rwanda (véanse los párrs. 49 a 55 y [S/2024/432](#), párr. 36)<sup>39</sup>. Aunque el M23 y la alianza político-militar AFC de Corneille Nangaa ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 23 a 29) se mantuvieron como entidades separadas, sus actividades estaban interrelacionadas: a) ambos emitieron comunicados conjuntos bajo la denominación “AFC/M23”; b) el M23 siguió siendo la rama militar *de facto* de la AFC y c) la AFC de Nangaa continuó solicitando la aprobación de Makenga para cada acción ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 25)<sup>40</sup>.

40. La coalición AFC/M23 intensificó sus esfuerzos para remodelar el panorama político y militar de la República Democrática del Congo, para lo cual procuró activamente obtener el apoyo de grupos armados de Ituri, Kivu del Norte y Kivu del Sur, con notable éxito (véanse los párrs. 83 a 97 y 104 a 106). La coalición reactivó al ex-cuadro político del Congreso Nacional para la Defensa del Pueblo/M23 René Abandi y al sancionado Jean-Marie Runiga (CDi.028; [S/2022/479](#), párr. 58), a quien se encomendó la tarea de lograr que su red respaldara a AFC/M23<sup>41</sup>. El M23 y la AFC celebraron sistemáticamente reuniones en los territorios recién conquistados con el fin de promover su narrativa, reclutar nuevos miembros y consolidar la administración paralela ([S/2024/432](#), anexo 25)<sup>42</sup>.

### Adiestramiento continuo y reclutamiento forzoso

41. AFC/M23 amplió el reclutamiento y el adiestramiento de cuadros civiles-administrativos y de combatientes con el fin de administrar las localidades que tenía bajo su control ([S/2024/432](#), anexo 5) y de reforzar la capacidad militar para la expansión territorial<sup>43</sup>.

42. Desde abril de 2024, AFC/M23 continuó llevando a cabo actividades de reclutamiento, tanto voluntario como forzoso, que incluyeron el reclutamiento de menores (véase el anexo 14). Miles de nuevos reclutas procedentes de los territorios conquistados por AFC/M23 y de las provincias vecinas (véanse los párrs. 83 a 97 y 104 a 106) fueron adiestrados en campamentos militares de AFC/M23. Por ejemplo, entre el 25 de septiembre y el 31 de octubre de 2024 al menos 3.000 reclutas completaron su adiestramiento. Otros 2.500 —entre ellos 600 pertenecientes al grupo armado Zaïre de Ituri— seguían recibiendo adiestramiento en el momento de redactar este informe (véase el anexo 15). El 2 de octubre de 2024 se llevó a cabo una ceremonia de graduación debido a que 300 oficiales del M23 habían completado cinco meses de adiestramiento en Tchanzu ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 104 a 108)<sup>44</sup>. Según informaron sistemáticamente combatientes del M23, en Tchanzu había oficiales de adiestramiento congoleños, de las FDPU y de la FDR.

43. AFC/M23 centró cada vez más el adiestramiento en aspectos relacionados con la ideología, la recopilación de información de inteligencia, el adoctrinamiento y las tácticas de reclutamiento (véase el anexo 16). Los reclutas que recibieron

<sup>39</sup> Fuentes cercanas al M23, a la FDR y a la AFC.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, investigadores y fuentes de inteligencia.

<sup>41</sup> Fuentes cercanas al M23 y a la AFC, y audio que obra en los archivos del Grupo.

<sup>42</sup> Testigos presenciales y fuentes de la sociedad civil y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>43</sup> Combatientes del M23, fuentes cercanas a AFC/M23, fuentes de la sociedad civil y de las Naciones Unidas, líderes comunitarios y testigos presenciales.

<sup>44</sup> Excombatientes del M23 y fuentes de seguridad, de las Naciones Unidas y de inteligencia.

adiestramiento fueron desplegados estratégicamente en zonas aún no controladas por AFC/M23 con el fin de que recabaran información de inteligencia y adoctrinaran a la población local (véanse los párrs. 104 a 106). El reclutamiento de miembros de otros grupos armados fue un elemento clave en la estrategia de expansión territorial de AFC/M23.

### **Expansión territorial continua**

44. En el frente meridional de Petit Nord, el M23 y la FDR ingresaron en la parte meridional del territorio de Masisi, y el 30 de abril tomaron el control de los yacimientos mineros de Rubaya, que son una de las mayores fuentes de coltán del mundo (véanse los párrs. 56 a 66). A partir de mayo, el M23 y la FDR lanzaron nuevas ofensivas contra posiciones de las FARDC y de la Misión de la Comunidad de África Meridional para el Desarrollo en la República Democrática del Congo (Misión de la SADC) cerca de Sake, así como en zonas cercanas a la frontera con Kivu del Sur, y a menudo causaron bajas civiles (véase el anexo 17)<sup>45</sup>.

45. En el frente septentrional de Petit Nord, el 27 de junio de 2024 el M23 y la FDR capturaron la estratégica localidad de Kanyabayonga, en el territorio de Rutshuru ([S/2024/432](#), anexo 29). Posteriormente, el M23 y la FDR avanzaron más hacia el norte e ingresaron en el sur del territorio de Lubero, conquistando en tres días un tramo de 50 km a lo largo de la carretera Kanyabayonga-Kaseghe. A principios de agosto, el M23 y la FDR también lograron avances considerables en el nordeste del territorio de Rutshuru, donde capturaron varias localidades situadas junto a la carretera Kiwanja-Ishasha, incluido el puesto fronterizo de Ishasha, en la frontera con Uganda (véase el anexo 18).

46. En el frente occidental, tras intensos enfrentamientos con grupos armados Wazalendo, las FDLR y las FARDC, a finales de octubre el M23 y la FDR lograron avances significativos en el eje Kalembe-Mpeti y se apoderaron de varias localidades del territorio de Walikale, que anteriormente estaba bajo control exclusivo de las FARDC y Wazalendo. Esa expansión territorial fue calificada de “violación flagrante del acuerdo de alto el fuego” que rige desde agosto (véanse los párrs. 33 a 37 y el anexo 19)<sup>46</sup>.

47. Desde abril hasta principios de noviembre de 2024, la zona controlada por el M23 y la FDR se incrementó en un 30 % (véase el anexo 20).

### **Apoyo sistemático de la Fuerza de Defensa de Rwanda al Movimiento 23 de Marzo**

48. Las condiciones y el calendario para la retirada de la FDR fueron elementos fundamentales en los desacuerdos entre la República Democrática del Congo y Rwanda, y obstaculizaron la concertación de un acuerdo de paz. El Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo rechazó la condición del Gobierno de Rwanda de que retiraría los efectivos rwandeses solo después de que las FARDC emprendieran acciones selectivas contra las FDLR. También se negó a firmar el “plan para la neutralización de las FDLR y la retirada de la FDR” que había sido acordado por los jefes de inteligencia de ambos países (véase el anexo 13). Varios funcionarios de la República Democrática del Congo y generales de las FARDC temían que, en caso de que el plan de neutralización fracasara, la aceptación de las condiciones planteadas por Rwanda otorgaría carta blanca para que la FDR mantuviera su presencia.

<sup>45</sup> Excombatientes y fuentes de las FARDC, de seguridad, de las Naciones Unidas y de inteligencia.

<sup>46</sup> Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Angola, comunicado de prensa, 21 de octubre de 2024.

49. En consecuencia, al menos entre 3.000 y 4.000 efectivos de la FDR han permanecido desplegados en los territorios de Nyiragongo, Rutshuru y Masisi ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 43 y anexo 30)<sup>47</sup>. A finales de octubre de 2024, efectivos de la FDR también apoyaron el avance del M23 en el territorio de Walikale<sup>48</sup>. Todas las unidades del M23 estaban supervisadas y apoyadas por fuerzas especiales de la FDR<sup>49</sup>.

50. El hecho de que la FDR estuviera al mando en operaciones selectivas y en el manejo de armamento de alta tecnología (véanse los párrs. 51 a 55) fue decisivo para la conquista de nuevos territorios (véanse los párrs. 44 a 47). La FDR continuó brindando su apoyo al M23 y ejerciendo el control *de facto* sobre las operaciones del M23 de forma sistemática ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 45)<sup>50</sup>. El anexo 21 aporta pruebas de incursiones fronterizas y desplazamientos estratégicos de la FDR en Petit Nord ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 40 a 54)<sup>51</sup>.

### **Equipo militar avanzado**

51. El Grupo continuó documentando el uso de tecnología y equipo militares avanzados por parte del M23 y la FDR ([S/2023/990](#), párrs. 31 y 32; y [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 46 a 54). La detección de esos sistemas militares, fundamentales para la superioridad del M23 y la FDR en materia de fuerza de combate, proporciona nuevas pruebas de que el M23, en violación del embargo de armas, recibe apoyo externo.

52. El 3 de mayo de 2024 se lanzaron cohetes de 122 mm —armas zonales no guiadas a las que se considera indiscriminadas cuando se las utiliza en zonas pobladas— desde posiciones militares controladas por soldados de los batallones 93º y 109º de la FDR cerca de Karuba, en el territorio de Masisi, contra posiciones militares situadas a lo largo del eje Sake-Goma, una zona densamente poblada. Como consecuencia de ese ataque indiscriminado, que siguió a muchos otros que fueron documentados desde enero de 2024 en la misma zona ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 93 a 98), decenas de civiles resultaron muertos o heridos en los superpoblados asentamientos de desplazados internos situados en Mugunga, cerca de Goma (véase el anexo 22).

53. Los días 10 y 15 de junio de 2024, dos misiles guiados Spike de largo alcance impactaron en la Misión de la SADC en Mubambiro (véase el anexo 23) y en la posición conjunta de las FARDC-Congo Protection en Kanyamahoro, en el territorio de Nyiragongo (véase el anexo 24), respectivamente. El análisis de la trayectoria de los misiles y la información proporcionada por testigos presenciales y fuentes militares, de inteligencia y de seguridad indican que ambos misiles fueron disparados desde zonas controladas por el M23 y la FDR. Ese tipo de misil antitanque, que se caracteriza por sus sistemas de guiado dual (es decir, por láser y por cable), no había sido documentado previamente en la República Democrática del Congo y no forma parte del arsenal de las FARDC.

54. Desde finales de mayo hasta principios de agosto de 2024, la suplantación de señales y las interferencias intencionadas cerca de las zonas controladas por el M23 y la FDR perturbaron los Sistemas de Posicionamiento Global (GPS) y los sistemas de navegación de las aeronaves y afectaron indiscriminadamente a vuelos de las Naciones Unidas, vuelos humanitarios y vuelos comerciales, así como a los drones de vigilancia<sup>52</sup>. Dos sistemas de interferencia intencionada y suplantación de señales estaban situados en territorio de Rwanda. Se detectó un tercer sistema en

<sup>47</sup> Personas cercanas a la AFC, al M23 y a la FDR y fuentes de inteligencia.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* Véase también el anexo 19.

<sup>49</sup> Combatientes del M23, personas cercanas a la FDR y al M23 y fuentes de inteligencia.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, testigos presenciales y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>51</sup> Fotografías, grabaciones de video, relatos de testigos presenciales y fuentes de inteligencia.

<sup>52</sup> Testigos presenciales y fuentes de inteligencia, de seguridad y militares, e imágenes que obran en los archivos del Grupo.

Kanyabayonga (Kivu del Norte) poco después de que el M23 y la FDR tomaron el control de la zona (véase el anexo 25). El 29 de octubre, un dron de la MONUSCO que sobrevolaba una zona de combate activa se vio afectado por una interferencia intencionada del GPS y se estrelló. Poco antes de ese hecho, AFC/M23 había advertido a la MONUSCO de que dejara de utilizar sus drones (véase el anexo 26).

55. El 25 de octubre de 2024 se observó un sistema de defensa aérea de corto alcance operado por la FDR en Karuba, en el territorio de Masisi (véase el anexo 27, y [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 47 a 49). El despliegue de sistemas de defensa aérea de corto alcance y de sistemas de interferencia intencionada y suplantación de señales que pueden inmovilizar o neutralizar activos aéreos ofrece una importante ventaja táctica al M23 y a la FDR ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 49)<sup>53</sup>.

#### **Control de Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo sobre la producción, la comercialización, el transporte y la exportación de minerales de Rubaya**

56. Desde el 30 de abril de 2024, AFC/M23 ocupa y controla la localidad de Rubaya y toda la zona de extracción situada en torno a Rubaya, donde se siguió extrayendo coltán, estaño (casiterita) y manganeso ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 138). Tras una breve y limitada reanudación que tuvo lugar en abril de 2024, el 8 de mayo la Iniciativa sobre la Cadena de Suministro de Estaño volvió a suspender todas las operaciones de etiquetado en el territorio de Masisi (véase el anexo 28).

57. AFC/M23 controlaba los centros de comercialización de Rubaya y Mushaki, así como las rutas de transporte de minerales de Rubaya a Rwanda<sup>54</sup>, donde los minerales de Rubaya se mezclaban con la producción rwandesa<sup>55</sup>. Esto constituye la contaminación más significativa de las cadenas de suministro con minerales “3T” no elegibles—estaño, tántalo y tungsteno—registrada en la región de los Grandes Lagos en la última década (véanse los párrs. 64 a 66 y el anexo 29).

58. AFC/M23 se aseguró el monopolio de la exportación de coltán de Rubaya a Rwanda, priorizó el comercio de gran volumen y cobró considerables impuestos. De ese modo, la extracción y comercialización fraudulentas de minerales de Rubaya y su exportación fraudulenta a Rwanda beneficiaron tanto a AFC/M23 como a la economía rwandesa (véase el anexo 30)<sup>56</sup>.

#### *Administración minera de Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo en Rubaya*

59. Desde los primeros días de la ocupación de Rubaya, Corneille Nangaa, en declaraciones públicas formuladas en nombre de la AFC y del M23, instó a los actores presentes en la zona a proseguir las actividades extractivas y comerciales (véase el anexo 31, y [S/2024/432](#), anexo 81). El número total de excavadores que trabajan en las minas de Rubaya ha permanecido prácticamente invariable (véase el anexo 32)<sup>57</sup>. Sin embargo, AFC/M23 expulsó de Rubaya al líder de la Cooperativa de Mineros Artesanales de Masisi y de la Coalición de Patriotas Congolese, Shamamba Barigaruye Enoch ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 138 a 140)<sup>58</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC, de seguridad, de inteligencia y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>54</sup> Actores económicos y fuentes de la sociedad civil, del Ministerio de Minería de la República Democrática del Congo y de seguridad.

<sup>55</sup> Actores económicos.

<sup>56</sup> Excavadores y comerciantes de Rubaya y fuentes de la sociedad civil y de seguridad.

<sup>57</sup> Habitantes, fuentes de la sociedad civil, excavadores, comerciantes e investigadores. Unas 10.000 personas trabajaban en Rubaya en las distintas fases de la explotación minera.

<sup>58</sup> Habitantes, fuentes de la sociedad civil, excavadores, comerciantes, investigadores y autoridades y reguladores del sector minero. Investigaciones posteriores permitieron determinar que Shamamba era el líder de la Coalición de Patriotas Resistentes Congolese (facción del

60. AFC/M23 con sede en Mushaki organizó todos los aspectos de la producción, comercialización y transporte de minerales, y estableció una administración similar a la de un Estado. Creó un “ministerio” responsable de la explotación de minerales en la zona comercial de Rubaya<sup>59</sup>. Ese “ministerio” otorgó permisos para excavadores y comerciantes, en los que se leía “República Democrática del Congo-Provincia de Kivu del Norte”<sup>60</sup>. Los solicitantes debían presentar documentos de identidad. Los excavadores y los comerciantes estaban obligados a pagar una tasa anual de 25 dólares y 250 dólares, respectivamente<sup>61</sup>. AFC/M23 duplicó los salarios de los excavadores, por lo que la mayoría de los excavadores siguió trabajando en Rubaya<sup>62</sup>.

61. Combatientes del M23 patrullaban la localidad de Rubaya y los yacimientos mineros para asegurarse de que los comerciantes y los excavadores vendiesen minerales únicamente a comerciantes congoleños y rwandeses autorizados por AFC/M23. Las infracciones a las normas impuestas por AFC/M23 se castigaban con el arresto y la detención en Mushaki<sup>63</sup>.

#### *Nueva ruta de exportación de Rubaya a Rwanda*

62. AFC/M23 controlaba toda la ruta desde la zona de extracción hasta la frontera con Rwanda (véase el anexo 33). Los minerales procedentes de Rubaya pasaban por Bihambwe, Mushaki y Kirolirwe, en el territorio de Masisi; Kitshanga, Kizimba, Bishusha, Mulimbi, Tongo y Kalengera, en el territorio de Rutshuru; y Kibumba, en el territorio de Nyiragongo<sup>64</sup>.

63. Los minerales descargados en la zona de aparcamiento situado junto al mercado de Kibumba eran cargados en camiones de gran tonelaje que entraban a la República Democrática del Congo desde Rwanda a través de Kabuhanga, y que fueron captados también en imágenes satelitales (véase el anexo 34)<sup>65</sup>. AFC/M23 impuso el “salongo” (trabajo forzado), y obligó a la población local a ensanchar las carreteras entre Kibumba y Kabuhanga y entre Rubaya y Kirolirwe con el fin de dar cabida al tránsito de camiones (véase el anexo 35)<sup>66</sup>.

#### *Volúmenes estimados de minerales comercializados, y beneficios obtenidos por Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo*

64. En Rubaya, testigos de la existencia de los convoyes de minerales de AFC/M23 informaron de que dos veces por semana se cargaban minerales en convoyes de cuatro a cinco vehículos capaces de transportar hasta cinco toneladas por carga. Desde mediados de mayo hasta finales de octubre, la frecuencia y los volúmenes de minerales que salían de Rubaya fueron constantes<sup>67</sup>. Por consiguiente, AFC/M23

<sup>59</sup> “General” Mahoro), y no de la Coalición de Patriotas Resistentes Congoleños-Fuerza de Choque, como se había señalado en el informe anterior ([S/2024/432](#)).

<sup>60</sup> Combatientes del M23, habitantes, fuentes de la sociedad civil, investigadores, excavadores y comerciantes.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Habitantes, fuentes de la sociedad civil, excavadores, comerciantes e investigadores.

<sup>64</sup> Personas arrestadas y detenidas por AFC/M23. El 17 de septiembre de 2024, en la carretera que lleva a Ngungu y Kalehe (Kivu del Sur), AFC/M23 arrestó a ocho motociclistas que transportaban 800 kg de coltán procedente de Rubaya, y también a tres comerciantes que habían encargado el transporte.

<sup>65</sup> Fuentes de la sociedad civil, habitantes y actores económicos.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Testigos de la existencia de convoyes de minerales. En septiembre de 2024, la Representante Especial del Secretario General en la República Democrática del Congo y Jefa de la MONUSCO, Bintou Keita, ofreció una estimación conservadora de conformidad con la cual en

controlaba la comercialización y el transporte de unas 120 toneladas mensuales de coltán.

65. AFC/M23 cobraba impuestos y recibía pagos en especie por la venta y el transporte de minerales. El impuesto sobre el kilogramo de coltán o manganeso era de 7 dólares, y el impuesto sobre el kilogramo de estaño (casiterita) era de 4 dólares<sup>68</sup>.

66. Por consiguiente, AFC/M23 recaudaba al menos 800.000 dólares mensuales en concepto de impuestos sobre la producción y comercialización de coltán en Rubaya.

### **C. Operaciones de agentes subsidiarios del Gobierno y de las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo contra las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda-Fuerzas Combatientes Abacunguzi**

#### **Operaciones infructuosas de las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo contra las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda-Fuerzas Combatientes Abacunguzi**

67. Después de que en el marco del proceso de Luanda el Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo se comprometió a “neutralizar” a las FDLR (véase el párr. 38), a finales de septiembre de 2024 las FARDC lanzaron una breve ofensiva militar contra las FDLR-Fuerzas Combatientes Abacunguzi (FCA). Siguiendo órdenes del Presidente de la República Democrática del Congo, Félix-Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo, el Jefe de Estado Mayor Adjunto de las FARDC para Operaciones e Inteligencia, General Chiko Tshitambwe<sup>69</sup>, asumió el mando general de las operaciones, pasando por alto al Teniente General Fall Sikabwe<sup>70</sup>, que se desempeñaba como Comandante de Operaciones de las FARDC en Kivu del Norte y Kivu del Sur, y al Gobernador de Kivu del Norte, General de División Peter Cirimwami, conocido por sus vínculos de larga data con las FDLR-FCA<sup>71</sup>.

68. Las operaciones tenían el objetivo de demostrar que la República Democrática del Congo respondía a la presión internacional para que dejara de brindar apoyo a las FDLR (véase el anexo 36). Esa presión se intensificó como consecuencia de que, pocos días antes de la ofensiva, se filtró una nota verbal confidencial autentificada, firmada por el Jefe de Gabinete de la Presidencia. El documento describía a grandes rasgos una propuesta destinada a trasladar a la República Democrática del Congo a seis ciudadanos rwandeses que estaban siendo juzgados por genocidio por el Tribunal Penal Internacional para Rwanda (véase el anexo 37).

69. Los días 23 y 24 de septiembre, Fuerzas Especiales de las FARDC al mando del Teniente Coronel Donatien Bawili<sup>72</sup> lanzaron operaciones cerca de Sake —especialmente en Chove, Kimoka, Lupango y Mubambiro— contra posiciones de las FDLR-FCA, incluida la unidad Comando de Investigación y Acción en Profundidad de las FDLR. La ofensiva tenía como objetivo desmantelar los bastiones de las FDLR y “neutralizar” (es decir, capturar o matar) al comandante militar

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Rubaya se producían 100 toneladas de coltán al mes. Véase Sonia Rolley, “UN says Congo rebels generating \$300,000 monthly in seized mining area”, Reuters, 30 de septiembre de 2024.

<sup>68</sup> Habitantes, actores económicos e investigadores.

<sup>69</sup> [S/2024/432](#), anexo 29.

<sup>70</sup> Fuentes de inteligencia, diplomáticas y de la sociedad civil y autoridades locales.

<sup>71</sup> [S/2024/432](#), párr. 72; [S/2023/990](#), párr. 36; y [S/2022/967](#), anexos 41 y 50, y fuentes de las FARDC, de las Naciones Unidas, de las FDLR, de Wazalendo y de inteligencia.

<sup>72</sup> [S/2023/990](#), anexo 38.

“General de División” Ntawuguka Pacifique, alias Omega Israel (CDi.024), y a otros líderes de las FDLR ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 73 a 79)<sup>73</sup>.

70. Los días 25 y 26 de septiembre, la 11<sup>a</sup> brigada de las FARDC, al mando del general Papi Lupembe, intentó desmantelar otra posición de las FDLR pero atacó por error una posición de la Alianza de Patriotas por un Congo Libre y Soberano (APCLS) en Rusayo, en el territorio de Nyiragongo<sup>74</sup>. Ese incidente provocó el enojo de la APCLS y de otros grupos Wazalendo, que amenazaron con retirarse de la línea del frente (véase el párr. 80).

71. El Gobernador Cirimwami filtró las operaciones planeadas a la cúpula de las FDLR-FCA<sup>75</sup>, por lo que ningún comandante de alto rango resultó muerto ni fue arrestado. Omega y otros líderes de las FDLR huyeron a Kilimanyoka, en el territorio de Nyiragongo, donde reforzaron sus posiciones<sup>76</sup>.

72. Las FARDC desalojaron a algunas unidades de las FDLR de Mubambiro y Shove y detuvieron a varios combatientes de bajo rango de las FDLR y de la APCLS, entre ellos varios menores. Las FARDC también mataron a 3 combatientes ehirieron a 12, así como a varios civiles<sup>77</sup>. Entre las 22 armas y 54.259 cartuchos que se incautaron durante la operación había material fabricado durante 2021 y 2022, lo que corrobora el suministro documentado de armas y logística a las FDLR y a Wazalendo (véase el anexo 38; [S/2024/432](#), párr. 64; y [S/2023/990](#), párr. 39).

73. La operación reveló la existencia de debilidades operacionales de las FARDC y de desacuerdos fundamentales dentro de su estructura de mando en lo que respecta a la relación entre las FARDC y las FDLR.

### **Reacción de las Fuerzas Democráticas de Liberación de Rwanda y de Wazalendo**

74. Los grupos Wazalendo, incluido el mando militar de los Voluntarios por la Defensa de la Patria (VDP) ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 60 a 65), percibieron el plan destinado a neutralizar a las FDLR —sus aliadas en las operaciones contra AFC/M23 y la FDR ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 70 a 72)— como una traición (véase el anexo 39). El comandante militar de VDP/Wazalendo, Guidon Shimiray Mwissa ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 61), condenó el ataque, pero hizo un llamamiento a la unidad entre las FARDC y VDP/Wazalendo (véase el anexo 40).

75. Ante el temor de que las FARDC llevaran a cabo nuevas operaciones contra los líderes y las bases de las FDLR, las FDLR y los grupos Wazalendo reforzaron conjuntamente sus defensas. La estrategia principal consistió en integrar a los combatientes de las FDLR en las unidades de VDP/Wazalendo y afirmar que las FDLR habían desaparecido<sup>78</sup>. Los comandantes de las FDLR dieron instrucciones a los combatientes para que se identificaran como miembros de otros grupos (véase el anexo 41)<sup>79</sup>.

76. En una carta oficial, las FDLR solicitaron al facilitador angoleño que propiciara el diálogo con Kigali (véase el anexo 42). Existía un creciente consenso en el sentido de que la cuestión de las FDLR requería un enfoque más integral que fuera más allá

<sup>73</sup> Documentos archivados en la Secretaría.

<sup>74</sup> Fuentes de inteligencia, diplomáticas y de la sociedad civil, y autoridades locales.

<sup>75</sup> Fuentes de las FDLR, de las FARDC, de seguridad y de inteligencia.

<sup>76</sup> Fuentes de Voluntarios por la Defensa de la Patria (VDP), de la sociedad civil, de las FDLR y de las FARDC.

<sup>77</sup> Entrevistas colectivas con cautivos en Goma, y fuentes de las FARDC, de los VDP, de las FDLR y de la sociedad civil.

<sup>78</sup> Fuentes de las FDLR, de Wazalendo, de inteligencia y de la sociedad civil, y autoridades locales.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

de una mera operación militar<sup>80</sup>. El concepto general de las operaciones para el plan de neutralización de las FDLR, aprobado a nivel de expertos en Luanda el 31 de octubre, prevé la determinación de la posición de las FDLR y su equipo, seguida del intercambio de información para identificar a las FDLR y sus “grupos disidentes” (fase 1), antes de pasar a las operaciones de neutralización y a las acciones selectivas contra las FDLR (fase 2), y deja de lado cualquier medida explícita destinada a sensibilizar a los combatientes y a lograr la rendición voluntaria. La desmovilización, repatriación y reintegración de los combatientes de las FDLR solo está prevista en la fase 4 del concepto general de las operaciones (véase el anexo 13)<sup>81</sup>.

77. El plan propuesto por los expertos en inteligencia plantea inquietudes fundamentales relacionadas con los derechos humanos y el derecho internacional humanitario. El término “neutralización” podría implicar el uso de fuerza excesiva, incluidas acciones extrajudiciales, por ejemplo, ejecuciones sumarias. La formulación “miembros de las FDLR” conlleva riesgos de castigo colectivo y de ataques contra civiles asociados a las FDLR. Las FARDC/Wazalendo, el M23 y la FDR —que es previsible que participen en la ejecución del plan— han cometido violaciones graves de los derechos humanos y del derecho internacional humanitario en contextos similares ([S/2023/431](#), párrs. 56, 66 y 67; y [S/2023/990](#), párrs. 55 a 58). La ejecución del plan también podría dar lugar a repatriaciones involuntarias y a la violación del principio de no devolución.

### **Cambio de actitud de las Fuerzas Armadas de la República Democrática del Congo y continuación del uso de agentes subsidiarios**

78. Con el fin reparar las relaciones con VDP/Wazalendo, el 27 de septiembre las autoridades militares de Kivu del Norte invitaron a los líderes de los VDP a expresar su pesar por los ataques contra las FDLR y la APCLS (véase el anexo 43). Los líderes de los VDP reiteraron su confianza y cooperación. Los comandantes de las FARDC y los líderes de los VDP informaron de que las autoridades militares habían solicitado discretamente a VDP/Wazalendo que reafirmara ante las FDLR que las seguía considerando aliadas.

79. Una semana después, el General Dieugentil Nzambe<sup>82</sup> dio instrucciones a las unidades de las FARDC para que suspendieran las operaciones contra las FDLR y los VDP y restablecieran relaciones con “todas las unidades amigas” (véase el anexo 44). Esas órdenes se filtraron en los medios sociales y tuvieron un efecto desestabilizador en el proceso de Luanda (véase el anexo 13).

80. A pesar de los reiterados llamamientos formulados al Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo para que dejara de brindar apoyo a las FDLR (véase el párr. 68), con excepción de la breve operación contra las FDLR-FCA el Gobierno continuó recurriendo a VDP/Wazalendo y a las FDLR y cooperando con ellos de forma sistemática ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 60 a 79)<sup>83</sup>. El anexo 45 proporciona detalles sobre la cooperación FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR, su participación en los combates y el reclutamiento y organización de VDP/Wazalendo.

<sup>80</sup> Fuentes diplomáticas, de las Naciones Unidas, de Wazalendo, de inteligencia y de la sociedad civil, y autoridades locales.

<sup>81</sup> Documento confidencial.

<sup>82</sup> Comandante de la 34<sup>a</sup> región militar en Kivu del Norte.

<sup>83</sup> [S/2023/431](#), párr. 79; y [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 60 a 65.

## IV. Ituri

### A. Organización, movilización y alianza de Zaïre con Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo

#### Organización

81. Zaïre ha comenzado a autodenominarse “Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l’Ituri (ADCVI)”<sup>84</sup>. Desde mayo-junio de 2024, ha intensificado el reclutamiento ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 150) y ha adiestrado a miles de combatientes (véase el párr. 83). Zaïre/ADCVI adquirió material militar y camionetas y embarcaciones militarizadas, con lo cual incrementó su capacidad para operar en el lago Alberto<sup>85</sup>. Desarrolló la capacidad de vigilancia aérea mediante el despliegue de pequeños drones comerciales<sup>86</sup>.

82. A pesar de su continuo intento de presentarse como un grupo de autodefensa ([S/2022/479](#), párr. 101; y [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 149 y 150), llevó a cabo ataques con fines de provocación contra la agrupación rival Cooperativa para el Desarrollo del Congo/Unión de Revolucionarios para la Defensa del Pueblo Congolés (CODECO/URDPC) e incrementó el número de sus ataques contra las FARDC y la Policía Nacional Congoleña<sup>87</sup>.

#### Reclutamiento y adiestramiento

83. Zaïre/ADCVI lanzó una campaña masiva de reclutamiento en todas las comunidades “G5”<sup>88</sup> en los territorios de Yugu, Mahagi y Aru ([S/2023/990](#), párrs. 76 y 77)<sup>89</sup>. Se movilizó a experimentados exlíderes y excombatientes de la Unión de Patriotas Congolese (UPC)<sup>90, 91</sup>. Zaïre/ADCVI también llevó a cabo actividades de reclutamiento en campamentos de desplazados internos en toda la provincia de Ituri<sup>92</sup>. Varios miles de combatientes<sup>93</sup> fueron adiestrados en centros de adiestramiento en Ituri, en el centro de adiestramiento de AFC/M23 en Tchanzu ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 152) y en Uganda<sup>94</sup>.

84. En Ituri funcionaban grandes campamentos de adiestramiento en Bini, jefatura de Mambisa, bajo el mando del comandante de Zaïre/ADCVI Baraka Amos Maki (véanse los párrs. 98 a 103; y [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 167 a 170), y en Bua, jefatura de Bahema Banywagi, cerca de Tchomia, bajo el mando del comandante de Zaïre/ADCVI Mandro Saliko<sup>95</sup>. También se adiestró a reclutas en Mabanga, Katoto, Nzebi, Dhego, Berunda y Bua, en el territorio de Yugu<sup>96</sup>.

<sup>84</sup> [S/2022/967](#), párrs. 87 a 91; [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 149 a 152; y fuentes ex-Zaïre y de inteligencia. Véanse también los anexos 46 a 48.

<sup>85</sup> Combatientes de Zaïre y fuentes de inteligencia y de la sociedad civil.

<sup>86</sup> Combatientes de Zaïre y fuentes de las FARDC, de las Naciones Unidas, de inteligencia y de la sociedad civil.

<sup>87</sup> Fuentes de las Naciones Unidas, de la sociedad civil, de las FARDC y de inteligencia.

<sup>88</sup> Alur, Hema, Mambisa, Ndo Okebo y Nyali.

<sup>89</sup> Combatientes de Zaïre y fuentes de la sociedad civil y de inteligencia.

<sup>90</sup> [S/2023/990](#), párr. 76 y anexos 49 y 50.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> Excombatientes, autoridades locales y fuentes de inteligencia, de las Naciones Unidas y de las FARDC.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.* y combatientes de Zaïre.

<sup>95</sup> Combatientes de Zaïre y fuentes de las FARDC, de las Naciones Unidas, de inteligencia y de la sociedad civil.

<sup>96</sup> Exreclutas y fuentes de inteligencia y de la sociedad civil.

85. Según información proporcionada por reclutas que recibieron adiestramiento en Bini, la mayoría de los adiestradores eran excombatientes de la UPC. También informaron de que participaban en forma rotativa instructores militares de Uganda y Rwanda<sup>97</sup>. El adiestramiento en Bini duraba un mes<sup>98</sup> y se centraba en tácticas básicas de combate, camuflaje y uso de armamento. Algunos reclutas recibieron adiestramiento avanzado en artillería (véase el anexo 46). Cuando completaban el adiestramiento, los combatientes recibían tarjetas de identificación, impresas en Bini (véase el anexo 47). Posteriormente, los reclutas eran enviados a Berunda, donde recibían sus uniformes, y luego regresaban a sus hogares para esperar las órdenes de movilización<sup>99</sup>.

86. A finales de septiembre, los campamentos de adiestramiento de Bini y Bua fueron atacados y destruidos por las FARDC. Para entonces, en el campamento de Bini ya se había adiestrado a más de 3.000 combatientes<sup>100</sup>.

87. El anexo 48 proporciona información adicional sobre el adiestramiento de combatientes de Zaïre/ADCVI y del Movimiento de Autodefensa Popular de Ituri (MAPI) en el centro de adiestramiento de AFC/M23 en Tchanzu.

#### **Objetivos de Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo y de Zaïre en Ituri**

88. Zaïre/ADCVI reforzó su alianza con AFC/M23 con el objetivo de llevar a cabo operaciones ofensivas contra las FARDC en Ituri. Con el apoyo de AFC/M23, Zaïre/ADCVI elaboró una estrategia global, en la que determinó zonas de operaciones, bases operacionales, rutas de tránsito de armamento y movimientos de efectivos a través del lago Alberto desde Uganda, en previsión de un ataque en gran escala<sup>101</sup>.

89. AFC/M23 mantuvo su intención de sumar a su causa a todos los grupos armados de Ituri ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 152). En los últimos meses, Nangaa y otros representantes de AFC/M23 se han puesto en contacto con dirigentes de la Fuerza de Resistencia Patriótica de Ituri (FRPI) y de CODECO/URDPC<sup>102</sup>. La visión de AFC/M23 en lo que respecta al desarrollo económico y la reconciliación en Ituri, que promete igualdad de oportunidades para todos, en particular en las comunidades marginadas, como los lendu y los ngiti, suscitó un considerable interés<sup>103</sup>.

90. En el momento de redactar este informe, la FRPI y AFC/M23 estaban celebrando negociaciones<sup>104</sup>. La AFC también estableció contactos con CODECO/URDPC, adversarios de larga data de Zaïre a los que generalmente se considera el principal obstáculo para la rápida toma del poder en Ituri por parte de AFC/M23. La AFC seguía confiando en que la promesa de una alianza entre los ngiti y la FRPI convencería a CODECO/URDPC, dominado por los lendus, de unirse a su coalición<sup>105</sup>.

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<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> Excombatientes, autoridades locales y fuentes de inteligencia, de las Naciones Unidas y de las FARDC.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, excombatientes y autoridades locales.

<sup>102</sup> Dos líderes de grupos armados con base en Ituri, entre ellos CODECO/URDPC.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Fuentes de AFC/M23, de inteligencia y de las FARDC, excombatientes y autoridades locales.

<sup>105</sup> Fuente de CODECO/URDPC y fuentes de inteligencia.

## **Líderes sancionados forjan una alianza con Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo**

91. Los sancionados Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (CDi.007) e Yves Khawa Panga Mandro (CDi.009)<sup>106</sup> desempeñaron un papel clave en el fortalecimiento de la colaboración entre AFC/M23 y Zaïre/ADCVI ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 152). Actuando como “autoridades morales” de Zaïre/ADCVI, facilitaron el reclutamiento y el adiestramiento, y organizaron el viaje de los combatientes de Zaïre para que recibieran adiestramiento en Tchanzu y para que se redesplegaran en Ituri. Innocent Kaina, alias India Queen (CDi.004), que es actualmente un influyente comandante del M23, colaboró estrechamente con Lubanga en esas tareas en Kampala<sup>107</sup>.

92. Las tres personas sancionadas han sido vistas en Kampala a partir de julio de 2024. Lubanga se marchó de Ituri en julio y estableció su residencia en Kampala<sup>108</sup>. Al menos en una ocasión, Lubanga se reunió con Corneille Nangaa en Kampala<sup>109</sup>.

93. La granja de Yves Kahwa, en el distrito de Hoima (Uganda), cerca del lago Alberto, sirvió de punto de apoyo y tránsito para los combatientes de Zaïre procedentes de Ituri, algunos de los cuales, a los que se consideraba listos para el combate, cuando se redactó el presente informe habían completado su entrenamiento en Tchanzu y estaban apostados en la orilla ugandesa del lago Alberto esperando para cruzar hacia Ituri<sup>110</sup>. En junio y julio de 2024, Kahwa facilitó la transferencia de armas y municiones a combatientes de Zaïre/ADCVI ([S/2022/967](#), párr. 88) y facilitó actividades de adiestramiento en el campamento de Berunda<sup>111</sup>.

94. En respuesta a las preguntas del Grupo sobre la presencia y las actividades recientes de esas personas sancionadas en Kampala, el Gobierno de Uganda adujo que no tenía conocimiento de su presencia en suelo ugandés<sup>112</sup>.

95. Los dirigentes de Zaïre “General” Logo Marine<sup>113</sup> y Baraka<sup>114</sup> (véanse los párrs. 98 a 103) también viajaron con frecuencia a Uganda. Marine se instaló en Kampala, y colaboró estrechamente con Lubanga. Viajó a Rwanda y a Bunagana (República Democrática del Congo) para reunirse con delegados de AFC/M23<sup>115</sup>, y facilitó el adiestramiento de elementos de Zaïre en Tchanzu<sup>116</sup>.

96. A finales de julio de 2024, Lubanga envió delegados a Ituri para tratar de lograr la reconciliación entre el MAPI y Zaïre/ADCVI, fusionar las dos facciones<sup>117</sup> ([S/2022/967](#), párrs. 87 a 91; y [S/2023/431](#), párrs. 113 a 117) y vincularlas a AFC/M23. Si bien los líderes del MAPI decidieron seguir siendo independientes, el MAPI y Zaïre/ADCVI acordaron colaborar en forma conjunta con AFC/M23. El portavoz del MAPI, Benjamin Bahati, se unió a AFC/M23 en Bunagana (véase el anexo 49)<sup>118</sup>.

<sup>106</sup> [S/2023/990](#), párrs. 76 y 77 y anexos 49 y 50.

<sup>107</sup> Excombatientes, autoridades locales y fuentes de inteligencia, de las Naciones Unidas y de las FARDC.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> Respuesta del Gobierno de Uganda de fecha 1 de noviembre de 2024, archivada en la Secretaría de las Naciones Unidas. Véase también [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 55 a 58.

<sup>113</sup> [S/2024/432](#), párr. 152.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, párrs. 167 a 170.

<sup>115</sup> Excombatientes, investigadores, autoridades locales y fuentes de la sociedad civil, de inteligencia, de las Naciones Unidas y de las FARDC.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>117</sup> Fuentes de inteligencia y líder de grupo armado.

<sup>118</sup> Fuentes del Movimiento de Autodefensa Popular de Ituri (MAPI), investigadores, excombatientes, autoridades locales y fuentes de la sociedad civil, de inteligencia, de las Naciones Unidas y de las FARDC.

97. Esa movilización y colaboración en gran escala con AFC/M23 se aceleró a partir de agosto de 2024, y se informó de la celebración de reuniones frecuentes en diversos lugares de Uganda<sup>119</sup>.

## B. Control de la producción de oro en Ituri por parte de grupos armados

98. En Ituri continuó la explotación del oro al margen del control del Estado ([S/2022/967](#), párr. 95 y anexo 64), una actividad que generó al menos 140 millones de dólares anuales para grupos armados y redes delictivas<sup>120</sup>. Las estadísticas muestran una discrepancia significativa entre la producción estimada de oro derivada de la minería artesanal y en pequeña escala y las cifras reales registradas. Un informe oficial estimó que en Ituri la producción de oro derivada de la minería artesanal y en pequeña escala era de 1.800 kg al año<sup>121</sup>. Sin embargo, en la primera mitad de 2024 el Servicio de Asistencia y Fomento de la Explotación Minera Artesanal y de Pequeña Escala (SAEMAPE) y la Cooperativa de Comerciantes de Oro de Ituri (COONORI)<sup>122</sup> registraron una producción de 17 kg de oro y compras de 24 kg de oro, respectivamente<sup>123</sup>.

99. Las autoridades mineras atribuyeron la discrepancia entre la producción oficial y la producción registrada al carácter limitado del acceso a los yacimientos controlados por los grupos armados<sup>124</sup>. A pesar de que las cooperativas mineras pagaban a la Policía Nacional Congolese y a las FARDC para recibir protección<sup>125</sup>, la mayoría de los yacimientos mineros seguían estando bajo el control de grupos armados, por ejemplo, CODECO/URDPC y Zaïre/ADCVI en el territorio de Yugu y la FRPI, el Frente Patriótico e Integracionista del Congo (FPIC) y el MAPI en el territorio de Irumu, en tanto que CODECO/URDPC también estaba activo en el territorio de Mahagi ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 163; [S/2023/990](#), anexo 50; y [S/2022/479](#), párrs. 107 a 123)<sup>126</sup>.

100. En consecuencia, los propietarios de las principales cooperativas mineras de Ituri, todos ellos accionistas de la COONORI, efectuaban pagos a los líderes de los grupos armados que controlaban los yacimientos mineros, entre ellos Baraka, de Zaïre/ADCVI, y el líder del grupo armado “50 cent”, de la CODECO, para preservar sus bienes y sus actividades (véase el anexo 50)<sup>127</sup>. Los pagos a grupos armados constituyen actos sancionables.

101. Como se informó anteriormente, Baraka, un comandante de Zaïre/ADCVI con base en la localidad de Mabanga, en el territorio de Yugu, ejercía el control exclusivo de todas las actividades económicas desarrolladas en la jefatura de Mambisa ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 167 a 170; y [S/2023/990](#), anexo 47).

<sup>119</sup> Fuentes de inteligencia, de las FARDC y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>120</sup> El 8 de noviembre de 2024, el precio del kilogramo de oro era de 86.314 dólares.

<sup>121</sup> Véase [https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/national\\_action\\_plan/RDC-NAP-2021-FR.pdf](https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_action_plan/RDC-NAP-2021-FR.pdf) (en francés).

<sup>122</sup> La Cooperativa de Comerciantes de Oro de Ituri (COONORI) es el único comprador que informa al Servicio de Asistencia y Fomento de la Explotación Minera Artesanal y de Pequeña Escala (SAEMAPE).

<sup>123</sup> Informes consolidados del SAEMAPE para Ituri, 2023 y 2024.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> Oficialmente (a través de la Unidad de Protección de Instituciones y Altas Personalidades) y extraoficialmente.

<sup>126</sup> Funcionarios de la República Democrática del Congo e informe archivado en la Secretaría.

<sup>127</sup> Testigos presenciales, investigadores, Inspección General de Minas y fuentes de la sociedad civil, de las Naciones Unidas, del poder judicial y de inteligencia.

102. Sus operaciones incluían la extracción ilegal de oro, el cobro de impuestos y el cobro de tasas en los puestos de control, y generaban ingresos de aproximadamente 1,6 millones de dólares mensuales si se tiene en cuenta solamente la producción de oro. Los ingresos procedentes de los impuestos ilegales a las empresas locales y de las tasas aplicadas en los puestos de control agregaban alrededor de 70.000 dólares a esos ingresos mensuales. Esos fondos, blanqueados a través de inversiones inmobiliarias y comerciales en Mabanga, Iga-Barrière y Bunia, sirvieron para que Baraka consolidara su influencia como actor económico en la zona y como líder del grupo armado (véase el anexo 51).

103. Las acciones de Baraka son compatibles con el delito sancionable de explotación ilícita de recursos naturales previsto en el párrafo 7 g) de la resolución [2293 \(2016\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad.

## V. Kivu del Sur

### A. Movilización de Alianza Río Congo/Movimiento 23 de Marzo

104. Los territorios septentriionales de Kivu del Sur se vieron afectados por bombardeos procedentes de posiciones del M23 y la FDR en el territorio de Masisi y por incursiones esporádicas del M23 y la FDR en el territorio de Kalehe (Kivu del Sur), por ejemplo, en Lumbishi a finales de mayo de 2024 (véase el anexo 52). AFC/M23 siguió movilizando el apoyo de grupos armados y comunidades locales<sup>128</sup>.

105. El sancionado Bernard Byamungu (CDi.038), un comandante de AFC/M23 que operaba en los alrededores de Sake ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 41), fue clave en el establecimiento de vínculos con ciertas facciones de Raia Mutomboki y Mai-Mai Kirikicho, que generó deserciones hacia AFC/M23 (véase el anexo 53).

106. Twirwaneho, que colaboró con AFC/M23<sup>129</sup>, y Resistencia en pro del Estado de Derecho en Burundi (RED Tabara), que recibió apoyo de Rwanda<sup>130</sup>, formaron una alianza de *facto*, y ambos grupos armados se convirtieron en agentes subsidiarios de AFC/M23 ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 179)<sup>131</sup>. Las Fuerzas Armadas “Biloze Bishambuke” (FABB), dirigidas por Ngomanzito, colaboraron en secreto con AFC/M23 a través de sus vínculos con RED Tabara y Twirwaneho ([S/2024/432](#), anexo 106), a pesar de que habían firmado un pacto de no agresión con los grupos Mai-Mai (véase el párr. 109)<sup>132</sup>.

### B. Movilización de Wazalendo

107. La crisis de AFC/M23 desencadenó gestiones destinadas a unir a los grupos Wazalendo de Kivu del Sur ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 175 a 177) bajo un mando único con el objetivo de formar un frente unido contra AFC/M23.

108. A finales de julio y principios de agosto de 2024, Justin Bitakwira, un miembro de la Asamblea Nacional de la República Democrática del Congo conocido por su retórica hostil hacia los tutsi ([S/2023/990](#), anexo 34), y Jules Mulumba, portavoz de los VDP y enlace con las autoridades de la República Democrática del Congo ([S/2024/432](#), párr. 61), organizaron reuniones con representantes de grupos armados.

<sup>128</sup> Investigadores, fuentes de las Naciones Unidas y de seguridad y fuentes cercanas al M23 y a la AFC.

<sup>129</sup> [S/2024/432](#), párr. 188; [S/2023/990](#), párrs. 88 a 90; y [S/2023/431](#), párr. 139.

<sup>130</sup> [S/2024/432](#), párrs. 179 a 181.

<sup>131</sup> Fuentes de la sociedad civil, de las Naciones Unidas, de seguridad y de inteligencia, investigadores y fuentes cercanas a Twirwaneho.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, y fuentes cercanas a grupos Mai-Mai.

También asistieron dos representantes de la fuerza de defensa nacional, conocida como RAD<sup>133</sup>. El objetivo era lograr la reconciliación entre Mai-Mai Yakutumba y las FABB y convencer a los grupos Mai-Mai para que apoyaran a Wazalendo en Kivu del Norte y los disuadieran de unirse a AFC/M23 ([S/2024/432](#), anexo 106). Asistieron una decena de grupos Mai-Mai de los territorios de Fizi, Mwenga y Uvira, entre ellos Mai-Mai Yakutumba, dirigido por el sancionado William Yakutumba (CDi.043), las FABB, dirigidas por Ngomanzito, y las Fuerzas de Patriotas para la Defensa del Congo (FPDC), dirigidas por Ebuela Mtetezi<sup>134</sup>.

109. Las reuniones resolvieron las tensiones y pusieron fin a los enfrentamientos entre Yakutumba y Ngomanzito (véase el párr. 106). Los grupos armados presentes firmaron un pacto de no agresión y se comprometieron a brindar apoyo a las operaciones de las FARDC contra AFC/M23, RED Tabara y Twirwaneho (véase el anexo 54)<sup>135</sup>. La promesa de Bitakwira de integrarse en la RAD impulsó a los grupos a organizarse bajo el mando general de William Yakutumba en cuatro brigadas, de modo que Mai-Mai Makanaki dirigiría las operaciones en Uvira, las FABB en Itombwe, las FPDC del “General” Ebuela Mtetezi en Baraka, y Mai-Mai Yakutumba en Fizi<sup>136</sup>.

110. Las concentraciones en Baraka y Uvira generaron el enojo de la comunidad banyamulenge y de Twirwaneho, que se sintieron amenazados por la gran movilización beligerante (véase el anexo 55). Tras una breve pausa en la violencia, a principios de septiembre se reanudaron los enfrentamientos entre grupos Twirwaneho y Mai-Mai, y a finales de septiembre de 2024 se reanudaron los enfrentamientos entre RED Tabara y una coalición Mai-Mai/Fuerzas de Defensa Nacional de Burundi (véase el anexo 56).

### C. Deterioro de la seguridad después de la retirada de la Misión y abusos por parte de Wazalendo

111. Los incidentes relacionados con la seguridad en que se vieron implicados grupos armados y las FARDC en Kivu del Sur aumentaron desde que la MONUSCO se retiró por completo el 30 de junio de 2024<sup>137</sup>. El hecho de que las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado no pudieron desplegarse ni operar plenamente en las zonas de las que se retiró la MONUSCO dejó a la población civil en una situación más vulnerable ante los ataques y abusos, que incluyeron saqueos, robos, acoso, violencia sexual, asesinatos y extorsión por parte de grupos armados y fuerzas de seguridad del Estado<sup>138</sup>.

112. En Kivu del Sur los grupos armados siguieron aprovechando la crisis de AFC/M23 para removilizarse, consolidar y ampliar el control territorial y explotar los recursos naturales ([S/2024/432](#), párrs. 175 a 177). El redespliegue de efectivos de las FARDC hacia el norte del territorio de Kalehe para combatir a AFC/M23 y a la FDR<sup>139</sup> dejó un vacío de seguridad que fue ocupado rápidamente por grupos armados<sup>140</sup>.

113. En el sur del territorio de Fizi, los combatientes Mai-Mai Yakutumba actuaron como autoridades *de facto* en Baraka y llevaron a cabo detenciones arbitrarias, erigieron puestos de control ilegales y aplicaron impuestos a la población civil, a las

<sup>133</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las FARDC y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>134</sup> [S/2024/432](#), anexo 105.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, y video archivado en la Secretaría.

<sup>136</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> Fuentes de las FARDC, de inteligencia, de seguridad y de las Naciones Unidas.

<sup>140</sup> Investigadores y fuentes de la sociedad civil y de las Naciones Unidas.

organizaciones internacionales y a los agentes humanitarios<sup>141</sup>. En los territorios septentrionales de Kalehe, Kabare y Shabunda, facciones del Movimiento Congolés para la Defensa del Pueblo y de la Integridad Nacional, Mai-Mai y Raia-Mutomboki contribuyeron a la inseguridad erigiendo puestos de control ilegales, atacando a personal de organizaciones no gubernamentales nacionales e internacionales, torturando y secuestrando a civiles, y perpetrando actos de violencia sexual, que constituyen actos sancionables<sup>142</sup>.

## **VI. Recomendaciones**

114. El Grupo formula las siguientes recomendaciones:

### **Al Gobierno de la República Democrática del Congo**

a) Sancionar a las FARDC y a los agentes políticos que colaboren con las FDLR, en particular a las personas responsables de las transferencias de armas y municiones (véanse los párrs. 67, 72 y 78 a 80);

### **A los Gobiernos de la República Democrática del Congo, de Rwanda y de Angola, al Consejo de Seguridad y a la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo**

b) Asegurarse de que las medidas de repatriación, reubicación o detención previstas en el plan de neutralización de las FDLR se apliquen en estricto cumplimiento de las normas jurídicas internacionales (véanse los párrs. 76 y 77);

### **Al Gobierno de Rwanda**

c) Poner fin a las interferencias de las señales de GPS para evitar repercusiones negativas en las operaciones aéreas de carácter civil o humanitario y las operaciones aéreas de las Naciones Unidas en la República Democrática del Congo (véanse los párrs. 54 y 55);

### **A los Gobiernos de Rwanda y de la República Democrática del Congo**

d) Investigar y procesar a las personas y redes implicadas en el contrabando de minerales de Rubaya a Rwanda (véanse los párrs. 57 y 58);

### **Al Gobierno de Uganda**

e) Vigilar a las personas sancionadas en Uganda e informar de sus constataciones al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1533 (2004) relativa a la República Democrática del Congo o al Grupo de Expertos sobre la República Democrática del Congo (véanse los párrs. 91 a 97);

### **A los Gobiernos de Uganda y de la República Democrática del Congo**

f) Facilitar el intercambio oportuno de información entre las FDPU y las FARDC en lo que respecta a la Operación Shujaa y cooperar con la MONUSCO a fin de minimizar el impacto sobre la población civil (véanse los párrs. 11 a 14).

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<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>142</sup> Investigadores, agentes humanitarios y fuentes de la sociedad civil, de seguridad, de las FARDC y de las Naciones Unidas.

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- Annex 4 (para. 14) - Expansion of Operation Shujaa in pursuit of fleeing ADF groups
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- Annex 14 (para. 42) - Forced and voluntary recruitment by AFC/M23
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**Disclaimer:**

The maps in the annexes were originally produced in color. Details may have been lost due to the requirement to publish maps in greyscale.

## Annex 1 (para. 8)

### Killing and arrest of ADF commanders

#### Meurtre et arrestation de commandants de l'ADF

Several recent escapees from ADF captivity, along with arrested ADF collaborators and captured or surrendered combatants, reported that the latest Shujaa operations inflicted heavy losses on ADF forces and positions, including Seka Baluku's Madina camp. Numerous combatants, as well as hostages and dependents, were killed or injured.

##### *ADF commanders killed*

Recently escaped former hostages and former combatants offered insight into the latest developments and reported on the killing of several high-profile commanders.

###### (1) Braida<sup>143</sup> alias Mzee Pasta

Braida was confirmed dead<sup>144</sup> by at least eight former hostages, including two eyewitnesses, i.e. two of Braida's former wives.

One of Braida's wives was with him when he passed away, on 14 August.<sup>145</sup> Sources including UN and FARDC were still reporting on Braida's movements up until that date, which makes it plausible that Braida died on or around 14 August.

Several sources confirmed that Braida was killed near Biakato,<sup>146</sup> while he was leading a smaller group of combatants and dependents towards Madina. According to his former wife who was with him, Braida was killed by friendly fire. He had left the group to go on a reconnaissance mission around their position, and left instructions to his men to shoot and kill anyone who approaches them. When Braida returned, he was mistaken by his men to be an enemy combatant and shot. Braida died of his injuries soon thereafter, in the presence of his wife. Another former hostage who was with this group has witnessed Braida's death and gave an identical account of the circumstances of his killing.

According to the wives of Braida, after his death Seka Baluku gave order for Braida's dependents to be moved to Madina.

###### (2) Amigo

At least four recent escapees confirmed the death of Amigo, who died shortly after Braida. Two of Braida's former wives saw Amigo's body and confirmed his identity.<sup>147</sup> One of these women, who had been abducted by Amigo several years ago, witnessed his death from a fatal head injury caused by an exploding bomb launched by Shujaa forces during an attack. She believes Amigo was over 50 years of age.

The incident occurred as Amigo was leading a group of fighters and Braida's surviving family members to Madina, following orders from Seka Baluku. Braida, who had left earlier with one of his wives, had left his other wives and children at Defender's camp (at this point, Braida's and Tabani's camps had merged; see para. 9 and annex 4). Upon learning of Braida's death, Amigo's group set out for Madina to join the group Braida had been leading at the time of his death. However, they were attacked before linking up with the other group, which was waiting for Amigo's group's arrival. After Amigo's death, the two groups eventually merged, only to be attacked again by Shujaa forces. This second attack scattered the group and allowed several of Braida's wives and dependents to escape. The fate of the remaining members of the traveling group remains unknown.

<sup>143</sup> Also called Twaburani.

<sup>144</sup> His death was also reported by FARDC and UN sources.

<sup>145</sup> She explained that she recalled this date because she saw it displayed on her phone. She was allowed to have a small phone only to use it as a torch. She also carried Braida's phone with her for safekeeping. After Braida's death, the phones were confiscated from her by the combatants.

<sup>146</sup> UN and FARDC sources.

<sup>147</sup> The same two wives who testified about Braida's death. They were both on the journey heading to Madina when these events occurred, and their testimonies are concordant.

(3) Seka Issa Papasi

Seka Issa Papasi was, according to testimonies of former hostages, including his wife, an operational commander in the camp of Tabani. According to Papasi's former wife, he was reporting to commander Seka Dadi, who was under Seka Umaru.<sup>148</sup> One former hostage identified him as the commander who had abducted her.

Seka Papasi had left the camp of Tabani around Biakato, Mambasa territory in Ituri province, and walked with a group of approximately 50 fighters commanded by "Docta" Kavugo,<sup>149</sup> and some dependents. On the way to Manguredjipa, they were attacked by UPDF, and Seka Papasi was killed.<sup>150</sup> Three of Seka Papasi's wives were already in Manguredjipa, sent ahead by Papasi with the assurance that he was going to join them there later. Papasi told his wife that ADF wanted to expand Islam to Lubero territory, and they wanted that in the future all ADF fighters go there for mandatory prayers, as they were going to establish a famous mosque there.

***ADF fighters reported killed by Ugandan authorities, and updates on Meddie Nkalubo and Mulalo***

The government of Uganda also informed the Group, in an official communication dated 1 November 2024 and transmitted to the Group on 5 November, that a number of "top ADF terrorists including Muraaro Segujja, Feza, Musa Kamusi, Boaz, Rubangakene, Abu Yassin, Bagdad, Fazul and Mzee Mubindio have been *put out of action*". The Group was yet unable to independently verify this information.

At the end of 2023, UPDF had reported that high-profiled ADF commanders Meddie Nkalubo<sup>151</sup> alias Punisher, and Mulalo<sup>152</sup> were killed. At the time, the Group reported that it was unable to confirm their deaths (see S/2023/990, para. 15). Since then, both commanders resurfaced in narratives of ADF activities throughout 2024. Meddie Nkalubo is reportedly very active,<sup>153</sup> and would be present in the constellation of groups that moved with Musa Baluku northwards into the Epulu reserve, North of the Mambasa–Lolwa–Komanda axis, as acknowledged by the government of Uganda in its communication dated 1 November 2024.

As for Mulalo, while he was reported alive and active in the first part of 2024, several former hostages and combatants interviewed by the Group recently reported that he was killed around April–May 2024. Reports of his activities seized after this date, suggesting that he is in fact "out of action". However, reliable sources close to ADF claimed that he is alive, although he has been severely injured and was evacuated for medical care. The possibility that the news of his death is used as a cover for him evading detection cannot be excluded. The Group can therefore not confirm his killing.

***ADF commanders arrested***

Toyo Adallah, responsible for resupply in Baluku's Madina camp, was arrested on 7 July 2024. The Ugandan government reported<sup>154</sup> that in fact Toyo surrendered, as he was facing a death sentence by ADF for having committed adultery.<sup>155</sup> At the time of his surrender, Toyo was on mission in Bahaha, Mambasa territory, to pick up supplies for Madina camp.<sup>156</sup> Toyo was taken by UPDF to Uganda, where is currently held.

<sup>148</sup> Several sources confirmed that Tabani, Seka Umaru, and Seka Dadi were together in the camps that merged around July 2024.

<sup>149</sup> Several sources, including FARDC intelligence and former hostages who escaped from the area of Manguredjipa confirmed that a group that joined Abwakassi were under the command of Dr. Kavugo. Dr. Kavugo was with Tabani before, towards Mamove - Biakato. Because of the attacks by Operation Shujaa, they crossed westwards of the RN44 on 18 September – an exchange of fire between Shujaa and Kavugo's group was confirmed by FARDC sources. Dr. Kavugo crossed with a few dependants and reached Abwakasi.

<sup>150</sup> According to Seka Papasi's wife.

<sup>151</sup> See S/2023/431, paras. 32 and 38.

<sup>152</sup> See S/2021/560, annex 4.

<sup>153</sup> Former hostages and former combatants interviewed by the Group, FARDC, UN sources, and intelligence sources.

<sup>154</sup> Official communication by the Government of Uganda, dated 1 November 2024, transmitted to the Group of experts on 5 November 2024.

<sup>155</sup> The fact that he was sought by ADF for having committed adultery was confirmed by former ADF combatants.

<sup>156</sup> Former combatants.

The Group inquired with the Ugandan government about the arrest, on 18 May 2024, of an ADF commander known as Anywari Al Iraq, or AA, an alleged IED expert hailing from the Busia district in Eastern Uganda. The capture of Anywari Al Iraq was reported in Ugandan media<sup>157</sup> and attributed to a successful Shujaa operation, which also led to the seizing of several items, including:

- One sub-machine gun (SMG)
- 45 rounds of ammunition
- Three walkie-talkies
- One propellant charge
- An assortment of improvised explosive device (IED) making materials

The only image of the seized materiel was of an SMG:



Source: UPDF

Images of the captured commander:



Source: UPDF

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<sup>157</sup> <https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-shujaa/operation-shujaa-adf-ied-expert-captured/> (last accessed on 14 November 2024).

The above image was accompanied by the following caption: “The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), in the ongoing operation, codenamed “Operation Shujaa”, today apprehended a commander of the Allied Democratic Forces terrorist group known as Anywari Al Iraq, also referred to as AA”.<sup>158</sup>

The government of Uganda did not provide any information about the arrest of this individual. Instead, it informed the Group of the arrest of ADF operatives Yakut Musana and Abdul Rashid Kyoto aka Njovu, without providing any further details.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Official communication by the Government of Uganda, dated 1 November 2024, transmitted to the Group of experts on 5 November 2024.

## Annex 2 (para. 9)


### Movement of ADF camps and commanders

#### Mouvement des camps et des commandants de l'ADF

##### *ADF territorial configuration prior to launching Phase IV of Operation Shujaa (May 2024)*

Prior to the launching of phase IV of Operation Shujaa on 20 May 2024, ADF groups were operating in the northern part of Beni territory and in the southern Irumu territory of Ituri province, attacking civilians and attempting to avoid contact with security forces. ADF cells were particularly active in the “death triangle” north of Beni and Mavivi, along the RN4 around Oicha, and in the Mbau-Kamango area (S/2024/432, paras. 9-11).

ADF cells were dispersed across five major areas, as illustrated below, with Seka Baluku positioned west of Butani hill; Mzee Meya, Rafiki and Lumisa in the area of Mont Hoyo Reserve; Tabani, Braida (NW of Eirngeti) and Defender<sup>160</sup> (around Mayi-Moya, SW of Eirngeti) were separate, although within a day’s walking distance from each other. Abwakasi was further south, moving around in the Mavivi-Oicha-Mangina area.



Map indicating the position of main ADF groups and their area of influence (in green) until May 2024. The area of interest of Operation Shujaa phase 4 is indicated in blue.

Map Data: Google, ©2023 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Map provided with annotations by a confidential source.

<sup>160</sup> See S/2015/19, annexes 4 and 9, and S/2023/990, annex 12.

***Impact of Shujaa operations on ADF's territorial configuration (May-July 2024)***

Operation Shujaa targeted these camps with both aerial and ground operations.<sup>161</sup> Due to the heightened military pressure, ADF groups – weakened and with their positions compromised – were compelled to move. High mobility has always been their survival strategy ([S/2023/990](#), para. 15).<sup>162</sup>

ADF cells began moving along three main axes:<sup>163</sup>

- (1) **Madina camp of Musa Baluku**, absorbing an increased number of dependents and hostages, began moving north, along the Erigeti – Komanda axis into Mambasa territory of Ituri Province, advancing north of Lolwa. Mzee Meya Sebagala's group, called to offer combat support and protection to Madina, began moving from the area north of Erigeti.
- (2) West of the Oicha-Erigeti axis (west of RN4), moving towards Biakato (situated along the RN44) the loose constellation of the cells led by **Braida, Tabani, and Kasibante aka Defender were also in westward movement**. According to former hostages, their camps were at about one day walking distance apart, not too far in case they needed combat support one from the other. Witnesses reported frequent visits and exchanges between these camps.
- (3) Towards the end of May and early June, **Abwakasi** began an aggressive push south-west towards Lubero territory, crossing Bapere sector towards the Bandulu forest area, passing through Kambau and Manguredjipa. Sources indicated that Abwakasi's intention was to drive the attention of Shujaa operation away from Baluku's Madina camp,<sup>164</sup> which was moving north, in the opposite direction. Other witnesses<sup>165</sup> reported an additional intention to scout new territories for ADF in Lubero.

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
<sup>161</sup> FARDC, UN sources, intelligence sources, researchers, former hostages and former ADF combatants.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Former hostages who escaped from Abwakasi's camp near Manguredjipa.



Map depicting the position of main ADF groups and their area of influence (in gray) in July 2024. Map provided with annotations by a confidential source.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

#### *Merging into fewer mega-camps since July 2024*

As camps were in movement throughout May-June along the three axes (see above), relocating under Shujaa pressure, by July they began converging into a few mega-camps. This was a highly unusual configuration for ADF.

The six camps merged into three mega-camps: (1) Madina of Seka Baluku, (2) the constellation of Tabani-Braida-Defender groups, and (3) Abwakasi's camp in Lubero.

##### (1) Madina camp, commanded by Seka Baluku

Madina, the main camp led by Seka Baluku, traditionally housed ADF's core leadership and most dependents. Although it has been displaced multiple times in the past, Madina camp only relocated entirely when it was under serious threat. Since May-June, Madina absorbed a lot more civilians from other camps, with former hostages and combatants reporting the presence of over 1,000 individuals, including at least 200 fighters.<sup>166</sup>

Mzee Mayor and Lumisa have merged into Madina to offer protection and combat support and were moving along with Baluku.

<sup>166</sup> Confirmed by UN and FARDC sources.

As of July 15, Madina was seen moving north of the RN4 near Lolwa, fleeing a UPDF airstrike, moving into Mambasa territory,<sup>167</sup> with ADF incursions and attacks on civilians reported in the area since July 2024.<sup>168</sup>

By the end of August – early September, Baluku's camp was reported some 30 km north of Lolwa.<sup>169</sup>

According to FARDC and former hostages interviewed by the Group, Baluku's intention was to find refuge in Epulu forest inside the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, a densely forested area with difficult access and without FARDC and UPDF presence, and outside the officially agreed area of Shujaa operations.

#### (2) Tabani – Braida – Defender camp, under general command of Seka Umaru

Former hostages and combatants from the camps of Braida, Tabani and Defender have consistently reported that the three camps have merged by latest July 2024. The commanders decided to merge their camps as each of these camps had been badly affected by the Shujaa attacks, lost many combatants, and were vulnerable to further attacks. Seka Umaru, Baluku's trusted deputy, was commander of the merged camp, which at the time of the merger was located around Biakato. Due to the large number of dependents in the newly merged camp, former hostages reported that the decision was made, on Baluku's orders, to move some of the dependents to Madina (mainly wives and children of commanders, and young girls who had to be married). It is during such a voyage towards Madina that Braida and Amigo were killed, in August (see above annex 1).

Since then, former hostages reported that this merged mega camp was hit at least once by Shujaa operations and changed its location at least once.<sup>170</sup> Since August-September, Defender allegedly moved again with a smaller group of fighters, west of Biakato.<sup>171</sup>

Small detachments from the Tabani-Braida-Defender camp traveled to Manguredjipa to join Abwakasi's group. While some dependents moved towards Madina, three hostages reported overhearing that the combatants accompanying the civilians planned to return from Madina and join Abwakasi in Manguredjipa. At least three recently escaped hostages indicated they were en route to Manguredjipa in a group led by Seka Dadi, who succeeded Braida after his death. One hostage escaped from Manguredjipa on September 29, confirming that at least part of the group arrived there. FARDC confirmed Seka Dadi's presence with Abwakasi, as they clashed with this group on 23 September near Manguredjipa.

Hostages from Tabani's camp also reported that Tabani ordered a group to travel to Manguredjipa, led by commanders Docta Kavugo and Seka Papasi—the latter was killed during the journey, while Docta Kavugo reportedly lost his way.

#### (3) Abwakasi's group in Lubero

From July onwards, Abwakasi has been operating in Bapere sector in Lubero territory, where he was joined by other smaller group detachments from the camps of Braida and Tabani (see above). Alongside Abwakasi, the presence of commanders Chalamanda<sup>172</sup> and Seka Dadi<sup>173</sup> was reported.<sup>174</sup>

Abwakasi's presence in the area was reported until the time of drafting this report, where he continued exploiting and destabilizing the forested areas west of Manguredjipa, which likely provided essential resources for the group's survival.

<sup>167</sup> FARDC, intelligence sources, UN sources, researchers, former hostages and combatants.

<sup>168</sup> FARDC, civil society, and UN sources.

<sup>169</sup> Idem.

<sup>170</sup> Former hostages who were present in the camp.

<sup>171</sup> Former hostage, and UN source.

<sup>172</sup> S/2021/560, annexes 18 and 20, and S/2023/990, annex 12.

<sup>173</sup> Commander who replaced Braida.

<sup>174</sup> FARDC, security sources, UN sources, former hostages and combatants.



Map depicting the area of operations of the Abwakasi cell in Bapere sector, Lubero territory, highlighted in red.

Map provided and annotated by a confidential source.

Map Data: Google, ©2023 **Landsat/Copernicus**, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

#### **Territorial configuration in October-November 2024**

The territorial configuration did not change significantly since July-September. Hostages who recently escaped from the various camps continued reporting the same general locations. In early November, the ADF groups north of Lolwa – Baluku’s enlarged group – were conducting incursions including further east of Komanda, along the Komanda-Luna axis, impacting the area inhabited by the Ngiti, and clashing with the FRPI group defending the territory.<sup>175</sup> This suggests that ADF sub-groups continue scouting new territories to establish camps, restore supply networks, and evade Shujaa operations.

ADF presence continued being reported west of Biakato. Abwakasi’s group was still in the Bapere sector in Lubero territory, including along the border Mambasa territory. In the recent weeks, there has been a temporary lull in attacks against civilians.

The Ugandan government reported to the Group that, as on 1 November 2024, ADF was “separated into two major groups, due to the heightened military pressure”, without this having impacted the group’s command structure:

- One group is headed northwards into Epulu Game Reserve, north of the Komanda-Lolwa-Mambasa road. The “top ADF commanders in this area include Musa Baluku, Hood Lukwago, Mzee Mayor Sebagala and Meddie Nkablubo, among others.”
- The second group is headed westwards into Tshopo Province, west of the Mambasa-Biakato-Beni-Butembo “highways”. The “top ADF commanders in this area are Abu Waquas [Abwakasi, n.n.], Chalamanda, Sheikh Hadad and Mzee Jamal.”

The Ugandan government further stressed in its letter that the “Joint Forces continued to monitor these movements and maintain pursuit in order to neutralize them and consolidate achievements”.<sup>176</sup>

<sup>175</sup> UN and FARDC sources.

<sup>176</sup> Letter dated 1 November 2024 by the Ugandan government in response to the inquiries of the Group.

**Annex 3 (para. 12)****UPDF drone crash on 11 August 2024 outside Shujaa operational area raising tensions****Crash d'un drone de l'UPDF le 11 août 2024 à l'extérieur de la zone opérationnelle de Shujaa provoquant des tensions**

On the evening of 11 August 2024, a military drone with Ugandan flag markings crashed on a hill in Bwisabuni village, Djugu territory, about 10 kilometers southeast of Bunia. FARDC retrieved the drone, claiming that the flight recorder and some other technical parts were allegedly taken by local armed elements who first discovered the wreckage.<sup>177</sup>

Pictures of the wreckage received from UN source:



Images of the wreckage taken at the crash site on 11 August 2024. Provided by military expert source.

Based on the images of the wreckage and reports written by military experts, that the Group obtained confidential copies of, the drone was identified as the **HERMES 900 Starliner, manufactured by ELBIT SYSTEM**.<sup>178</sup>

The drone has an endurance of over 30 hours and can fly at a maximum altitude of 30,000 feet (9,100 meters). Its main mission includes reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications relay. The cost of this drone ranges between \$6.8 million and \$8.8 million.<sup>179</sup>

#### Technical Specifications:

- Wingspan: 15 meters
- Weight: 970 kg
- Payload capacity: 300 kg
- Payload options: Electro-optical/infrared sensors, synthetic aperture radar, communications, electronic intelligence, electronic warfare, hyperspectral sensors.

<sup>177</sup> FARDC sources

<sup>178</sup> <https://aviationsmilitaires.net/v3/kb/aircraft/show/2716/elbit-hermes>

<sup>179</sup> Military expert sources citing the specialized journal *Jane's*.

The HERMES 900 is a medium-sized, multi-payload drone with medium altitude and long endurance, succeeding the HERMES 450 series—one of the most widely used military drones globally. It is configured for tactical, operational, or strategic observation missions.



Source: AviationsMilitaires.net<sup>180</sup>

Example image of a HERMES 900

A source with access to FARDC and UPDF high command, with direct knowledge of the matter, reported that UPDF acknowledged ownership of the drone, and that the crash sparked significant frustration from FARDC officials. The source claimed that UPDF's explanation for the drone's presence, claiming it was intended for operations in Komanda, was vague and inconsistent. The fact that the drone crashed at night raised further concerns about its intended mission. The FARDC expressed strong discontent with the UPDF's lack of advance notification, emphasizing that UPDF should follow the example set by MONUSCO, which consistently informs FARDC prior to launching drones in Congolese airspace. FARDC intelligence sources claimed that the UPDF surveillance drone violated Congolese airspace in an area not covered by the Shujaa Operation. Several high ranking FARDC officers voiced their suspicion that the drone has been conducting reconnaissance in Djugu territory due to ongoing security issues near Lake Albert, claiming previous sightings of a similar drone flying over Congolese airspace in the area of Tchomia. This could not be confirmed by the Group.

This incident has highlighted ongoing issues regarding coordination and communication between the two forces.

Despite unofficially claiming a serious breach of Congolese airspace represented by the incident, the Group is unaware of any official complaint filed by the Congolese authorities with the Government of Uganda.

<sup>180</sup> [https://aviationsmilitaires.net/media-thumbnails/1920/pictures/800px-Hermes\\_900.jpg.webp](https://aviationsmilitaires.net/media-thumbnails/1920/pictures/800px-Hermes_900.jpg.webp)

**Annex 4 (para. 14)****Expansion of Operation Shujaa in pursuit of fleeing ADF groups****L'extension de l'opération Shujaa à la poursuite des groupes d'ADF en fuite**

The fourth phase of Operation Shujaa began in November 2023 ([S/2024/432](#), annexes 1 and 2). While it was initially slow and unsuccessful, it was relaunched on 20 May 2024, when it finally gained momentum, prompted by a shift in strategy to address the ADF's increased mobility and expanding presence. While earlier phases were confined to regions near the Uganda-DRC border and RN4, the latest phase expanded west of RN4, covering critical areas near the border of North Kivu and Ituri provinces. This new reach aimed to target prominent ADF leaders and groups, including Abwakasi, Braida, Defender, Tabani and Mzee Meya. Madina, the ADF's headquarters, remained outside Shujaa's boundaries – mainly due to DRC's concerns about a deeper Ugandan military presence in Ituri (see para. 14). Despite this exclusion, the intensified pressure from Shujaa operations has pushed the ADF to relocate its groups further north and south-west (see paras. 15-18, and above).<sup>181</sup> This new territorial configuration suggests ADF's intention to regroup in areas outside the official Shujaa zone, north of Ituri river (Baluku) and western-Lubero (Abwakassi).


In response to the ADF's geographical shifts from June to August 2024, the operational boundaries of Shujaa have extended unofficially, on an ad hoc basis. Ground and air operations forced ADF units to spread across new locations, using major routes like Mambasa-Komanda (RN4) and Mambasa-Mangina (RN44) for mobility. A UPDF base was established in Manguredjipa in mid-July, to launch operations targeting the newly relocated Abwakasi group, and regular operations were conducted east and west of RN44 near Biakato, targeting the Tabani-Braida-Defender group constellation.<sup>182</sup>

A comparison of the two maps below illustrates the ad-hoc extension of Shujaa's area of operations, from May-June onwards, in response to ADF's mobility. The maps also illustrate that Baluku's Madina camp remained outside the officially designated area of operations.

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<sup>181</sup> FARDC, intelligence sources, UN sources, and researchers.


<sup>182</sup> Idem.



Map 1: depicting in light blue, the Shujaa Operation's officially agreed area of intervention, during the period from November 2023 to June 2024

Map Data: Google, ©2023 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Map 2: depicting, in light blue, the Shujaa Operation's officially agreed area of intervention, and in dark blue the ad hoc extensions in pursuit of the Abwakasi and Tabani-Braida-Defender groups, during the period from June to August 2024

Map Data: Google, ©2023 **Landsat/Copernicus**, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Maps provided and annotated by confidential source

Tensions and negotiations continued, even at the time of writing, regarding the extension of Shujaa's area of operations north of Ituri river, to pursue Baluku's relocated Madina camp. Confidential security sources reported that discussions were advancing, and that President Tshisekedi's visit to Uganda on 30 October 2024, on the invitation of President Museveni, also included discussions about the extension of Shujaa.

At the time of writing, the Group did not yet have official confirmation on the outcome of these negotiations. In its letter addressed to the Group on 1 November 2024, the Government of Uganda noted that "Uganda continues to engage the DRC on the designation of new areas of joint operations in relation to the [ADF] group's location and movements."

## Annex 5 (para. 18)

### **ADF's technological advancements**

#### **Avancées technologiques de l'ADF**

Although ADF were significantly affected by Shujaa attacks, they have found ways of compensating for their diminished capacities operations through reliance on technology.

##### *Use of drones*

Accounts from detained ADF collaborators, captured and surrendered combatants, and former hostages confirm that each ADF camp was equipped with small drones,<sup>183</sup> primarily used for surveillance to scout new locations and targets, and to avoid threats.<sup>184</sup> Drones were reported by eyewitnesses in the camps of Baluku, Tabani, Braida, Abwakasi, and Defender. Baluku and Braida had at least four drones each.<sup>185</sup> At least eight drones were supplied from Kampala, with support from Da'esh.<sup>186</sup>

##### *Fabrication of drone-born IEDs*

On 11 August 2024, ADF carried out an attempted drone-born IED attack on an FARDC position in Malyajama, approximately 30 km northwest of Beni. However, the device failed to detonate.



Images of the improvised IED dropped by the drone, received from security sources

According to several sources, Da'esh, who supplied at least eight drones to ADF, also assisted ADF with the know-how to construct the drone-borne bomb.<sup>187</sup>

<sup>183</sup> Quadcopter surveillance drones.

<sup>184</sup> Intelligence sources, FARDC, UN, researchers, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

<sup>185</sup> Former hostages and former combatants from Baluku and Braida's camps.

<sup>186</sup> Two former combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.


<sup>187</sup> Two former combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.

Sources confirmed that Meddie Nkalubo alias Punisher (S/2023/431, para. 38) constructed the drone-borne IED and had carried out at least one successful test before the failed bomb attempt on FARDC.<sup>188</sup>

Although the ADF does not yet appear to have fully perfected the technology, the development of drone-borne IEDs poses a significant new threat in the theater of operations. According to accounts from former hostages and ex-combatants, these devices were intended for use against FARDC forces. Additionally, the same sources reported the ongoing fabrication of IEDs in each camp, indicating that threat from both conventional and drone-borne IEDs remains elevated, as the group continues to enhance its capabilities.<sup>189</sup>

#### *Use of computers and satellite communications*

ADF also used satellite communications to evade possible detection through usage of cellphone data. Witnesses reported the use of ‘Starlink’,<sup>190</sup> a satellite-based internet system enabled by a small satellite dish.<sup>191</sup> Eyewitnesses – former hostages and former combatants – described the equipment as consisting of a small rectangular plate and a compact box, closely matching the specifications of a Starlink device (see image below).



Example image of a portable STARLINK device<sup>192</sup>  
Source: STARLINK

The availability of Starlink likely enhanced communication between camp commanders and with their networks outside the DRC, particularly ISCAP (see annex 8 above). Former ADF combatants indicated that Seka Baluku, Mzee Pierro, and Punisher (Meddie Nkalubo) used such a device, indicating that Madina camp was equipped with at least one such device. One former combatant who knew Meddie Nkalubo reported that the latter obtained a Starlink device approximately 9 months ago.<sup>193</sup>

Former hostages and combatants also referred to the commanders in each camp using laptops, solar batteries, walkie-talkies (“Motorolas”) and cell phones.

<sup>188</sup> Ex-combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.

<sup>189</sup> Researchers, intelligence sources, FARDC, UN sources, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

<sup>190</sup> Researchers, intelligence sources, FARDC, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

<sup>191</sup> <https://www.starlink.com/specifications>

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Using as reference November 2024.

## Annex 6 (paras. 19-22)

### Attacks on the civilian population

#### Attaques contre la population civile

Despite the relative success of Operation Shujaa in eliminating key ADF commanders and dismantling some camps, ADF attacks on civilians have continued and even intensified. ADF adopted a survival-oriented approach, relying on opportunistic ambushes or attacks on roads, small villages and farmers (S/2023/990, para. 15), for looting, kidnapping, revenge, and fulfilling the jihadist aim of killing ‘kafir’ (non-Muslim infidels).

Between 1 June and 5 November 2024, MONUSCO documented over 650 civilian deaths<sup>194</sup> across at least 124 ADF-attributed incidents.<sup>195</sup> The violence affected the broader Beni region, northwestern Lubero (primarily the Bapere sector) in North Kivu, and southern Ituri, particularly in Mambasa and Irumu territories.

June 2024 marked the deadliest month on record for ADF-perpetrated civilian killings, with over 200 deaths reported across Beni, Lubero, and southern Ituri.<sup>196</sup> The area around Cantine locality<sup>197</sup> west of Beni and the area of Manguredjipa were especially hard-hit (see below), prompting significant population displacement.<sup>198</sup>

#### *Massacres by Abwakasi's group in Beni and Lubero territories since June 2024*

Between 3 and 12 June, Abwakasi's group attacked at least 10 localities, killing over 150 civilians as it was advancing westwards through Beni territory, moving away from the Shuja operations. During all these attacks, Abwakasi's group also looted property, burned houses and destroyed vehicles and health centers.<sup>199</sup> In particular:

- On 3 June, Abwakasi's group crossed the RN44 road and attacked Ngwaba village, killing three civilians.
- On the same day, the group advanced further south-west towards Mashao (or Masau) village, where it killed at least 18 civilians.
- On 5 June, the group attacked the villages of Kabwiki<sup>200</sup> and Keme, where at least eight civilians were killed.
- On 7 June, Abwakasi's group advanced further, attacking Masala (10 km southwest of Cantine) and two other nearby settlements.<sup>201</sup> ADF erected roadblocks along the main road connecting the three localities, pretended to be Wazalendo armed elements to gain the trust of the locals, and then proceeded to kill civilians trapped between the roadblocks. Women and children accompanying ADF fighters also participated in the attack. DRC authorities and local sources reported having found 41 bodies in the aftermath of the attack, in the village of Masala and in the neighboring villages of Mahihi and Keme.<sup>202</sup>
- On 9 June, Abwakasi's group raided the village of Makusa, killing at least four civilians.
- On 10 and 11 June, they attacked two other localities, Pandose and Masango, killing at least four civilians.
- On 12 June, they massacred over 40 civilians in Mayikengo village.<sup>203</sup>

<sup>194</sup> Of which 190 documented in Ituri, in the territories of Mambasa and Irumu), and 462 in North Kivu, including Lubero and Beni territories, and Butembo. This figure includes only verified incidents, so the actual number is likely significantly higher. Another international organization operating in the area documented over 700 killings.

<sup>195</sup> Of these, 68 incidents were recorded in Mambasa and Irumu territories of Ituri, and 56 in Lubero and Beni territories, as well as the area of Butembo.

<sup>196</sup> Humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, UN and intelligence sources.

<sup>197</sup> Cantine is an important agricultural and mining zone in the Grand Nord, a region that has not been impacted by ADF activities in the recent years.

<sup>198</sup> Humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, UN and intelligence sources.

<sup>199</sup> UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, security and intelligence sources, researchers.

<sup>200</sup> Also referred to as Kabweke.


<sup>201</sup> UN, security, intelligence sources, and researchers.

<sup>202</sup> FADRC, humanitarian and UN sources. See also <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/death-toll-rises-41-attack-eastern-congo-villages-2024-06-09/>.

<sup>203</sup> See also <https://www.faapa.info/en/deadly-rebel-attack-in-eastern-dr-congo-claims-30-lives/>.

As the Abwakasi group advanced into the Bapere sector of Lubero territory, near the border between Beni and Lubero, reports of deadly attacks on civilians began emerging from 13 June onward:

- On 18 June, an unconfirmed number of civilians were killed at Mabiti village, while Da'esh claimed that 11 Christians were beheaded.<sup>204</sup>
- The following day, at least 10 civilians were killed in a village 5km further from south of Mabiti, with Da'esh claiming to have killed 20 individuals.<sup>205</sup>
- On 21 June, ADF attacked Kyanganda, in northern Lubero territory, killing at least 14 civilians and burning civilian houses.<sup>206</sup> Photographs depict the bodies of at least 10 people lying on the side of the road, their arms bound behind their backs, with apparent gunshot wounds to their heads.<sup>207</sup> Da'esh claimed that at least 40 civilians were killed during this attack,<sup>208</sup> but the Group of Experts could not confirm this number.<sup>209</sup>



Map depicting the movements of Abwakasi's group from Beni territory towards Lubero and the villages it attacked along the way, from 3 to 18 June. UN source

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Landsat/Copernicus, © 2024 Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 2 September 2021

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Between end of July and early August, ADF (Abwakasi's group) continued its operations in western Lubero, focusing on Njiapanda and Manguredjipa. Since early June 2024, Abwakasi's group killed at least 361 individuals,<sup>210</sup> with the majority of incidents being claimed by Da'esh (see below annex 8).

Various sources confirmed that this sequence of attacks was perpetrated by the group led by Abwakasi, accompanied by commander Chalamanda.<sup>211</sup> Once the group arrived in the area of Manguredjipa, it settled around Bandulu forest and continued sporadic attacks on civilians and engaged in clashes with FARDC and armed groups (see para. 30).

<sup>204</sup> UN, civil society and intelligence sources. The claim published by Da'esh is reproduced in annex 2 of this report.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> UN, civil society and intelligence sources.

<sup>207</sup> Images received from intelligence source, on file with the Secretariat.

<sup>208</sup> Claim published by Da'esh, reproduced in annex 2 of this report.

<sup>209</sup> On 29 June, Da'esh published an album of nine photos depicting victims and the aftermath of the attack on Kyanganda, perpetrated on 21 June. The publication is on file with the Secretariat.

<sup>210</sup> Documented by the UN.

<sup>211</sup> Former hostages and combatants, UN source, FARDC sources, Ugandan government.

The attacks perpetrated by Abwakasi's group were distinguished by the extreme brutality of the killings. Occasionally they also employed an atypical *modus operandi*. For example, during the attacks in the first half of June, including in Masala on 7 June, ADF relied more extensively than usual on firearms.<sup>212</sup> Some combatants disguised themselves as a Wazalendo armed group that came to combat ADF, while others reportedly wore previously stolen FARDC uniforms. During the attacks on Masala and Mayikengo, Abwakasi's group cut off the roads leading into the villages, asked the village chief to gather all the locals and opened fire on the civilians. Women and children who came along with Abwakasi's group also participated in the killings.<sup>213</sup> The increased use of firearms during these attacks was probably due to a recent restock in supplies – notably, the ammunition used was traced back to FARDC supplies stolen in late May by another ADF attack against FARDC military trucks.<sup>214</sup>

The attacks recorded are in line with ADF's established strategy of retaliating against civilians in response to military operations against the group ([S/2024/432](#), para. 9). However, Abwakasi's attacks most likely served as a tactic to divert attention away from other ADF bases that were threatened, such as Madina ([S/2024/432](#), para. 11) allowing Baluku greater freedom of movement. During this same period, significantly less attacks were recorded in Irumu, where Baluku's group was moving north towards Lolwa.<sup>215</sup>

In addition, the absence of FARDC in the affected areas may also have contributed to the elevated death toll, as ADF encountered no resistance on its path.

#### ***Attacks by other ADF groups in north-western Beni territory***

While Abwakasi was leading the push into Lubero, the constellation of Braida-Tabani-Defender groups were active west of the RN4 road (northwest of Beni), heading towards and eventually crossing west of Biakato (see above annex 2).

Braida's group was responsible for most of the violent attacks perpetrated by ADF in the north-western part of Beni territory, involving killings and kidnappings, notably in the Mamove – Beu Manyama area in the first half of August 2024.<sup>216</sup> Braida's group was notably responsible for the killing of civilians in the villages of Bayeti and Mukoni, as well as other nearby villages, on 9 and 10 August, respectively.<sup>217</sup> More than 20 civilians were reported killed during these attacks.<sup>218</sup>

From mid-August to September, this group was continuously being tracked and attacked by Shujaa. After the death of Braida in mid-August (see annex 1), the group was temporarily scattered but continued operating in the north-western area of Beni.<sup>219</sup>

#### ***Attacks in Mambasa and Irumu territories in Ituri***

The main camp of Seka Baluku, moving north into Mambasa, kept a relatively low profile. According to testimonies, it suffered severe losses and was suffering a shortage of supplies. In addition, its movement was burdened by the very high number of civilian dependents travelling along (see above annex 2).

Generally, this group has focused on conducting attacks to resupply, with a pattern of looting health centers and abducting medical staff – likely to treat the group's ailing members.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> UN, civil society, intelligence and confidential sources.

<sup>214</sup> UN sources.

<sup>215</sup> Idem

<sup>216</sup> UN sources, FARDC, intelligence sources, former hostages and combatants.

<sup>217</sup> UN and humanitarian sources.

<sup>218</sup> Idem.

<sup>219</sup> UN sources, former hostages who escaped from this group.

<sup>220</sup> UN sources, FARDC, former hostages and former combatants.

## Annex 7 (para. 23)

### **ADF unified command and control**

#### **Commandement et contrôle unifiés de l'ADF**

While ADF sub-groups functioned with a degree of decentralization, they continued to depend on a centralized command and control framework. Former hostages and former combatants confirmed that Baluku was still the decision-maker, deciding on major operations, receiving reports from other commanders, deciding on punishments, distributing resources, including hostages. These sources mentioned that although some smaller operations or attacks may not have required prior authorization by Baluku, he had to be informed of everything. Every commander was sending photographs of the results of their operations – evidence of killings, of pillaged goods and hostages taken – to Baluku.

#### *ADF core leadership*

Baluku designated Seka Umaru as his successor, in the event of his death. Mzee Pierro, based in Madina, was Baluku's deputy in charge of operations. Mzee Kayira, another senior commander based in Madina, was in charge of ADF logistics and finance. All other commanders reported to them or directly to Baluku.<sup>221</sup>

The Group found no evidence to suggest that Abwakasi's group has achieved independence from Seka Baluku. Recent interviews with former ADF combatants and former hostages suggest that Abwakasi relocated to the Bapere Sector with Baluku's consent.

The Ugandan government reported to the Group that, as on 1 November 2024, ADF was "separated into two (02) major groups, due to the heightened military pressure", without this having impacted the group's command structure.

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<sup>221</sup> Former combatants, former hostages, intelligence sources, UN sources, FARDC, researchers.

## Annex 8 (para. 26)

### **Da'esh amplifying claims and propaganda**

#### **Da'esh amplifie ses revendications et sa propagande**

*Sharp increase in Da'esh claims for attacks suggesting improved collaboration*

The sharp rise in ADF attacks since June 2024 was accompanied by a corresponding increase in claims by Da'esh through its Central Africa Province (ISCAP).<sup>222</sup> Between 2 June and 29 June, Da'esh issued 32 claims, followed by an additional 79 claims from July through October 2024. This brings the total to 111 claims made between June and October, including special editions and regular reports in Da'esh's weekly *an-Nabā'* editorial (see below).

Given that MONUSCO recorded at least 124 ADF-attributed incidents between 1 June and 5 November 2024 (see annex 6 above), not including clashes with FARDC and armed groups, of which MONUSCO documented at least 19 during the same period. Da'esh's publications cover approximately 89% of these documented incidents.<sup>223</sup>

Additionally, the time taken by Da'esh to claim responsibility for ADF attacks has also decreased, from several days to sometimes 24 hours after the attacks. At times several attacks were claimed for the same day, from various locations in the DRC (see below list of claims), suggesting that communication about attacks by various ADF groups operating in Ituri and in North Kivu was centralized.

The above trends suggest a closer collaboration between Da'esh and ADF.

*List of claims for ADF attacks published by Da'esh since June 2024*

Date	Translated text of the claim
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted a vehicle of infidel Christians along the road between the villages of Tchabi and Kamango in the Beni area last Thursday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 Christians, one of whom was a member of the Congolese army."
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian that was on a motorcycle near the village of Kainama in the Beni area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in this death and the burning of the motorcycle."
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner along the Kainama village road in the Beni area yesterday, and executed him."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Mangina in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mashua in the Beni area, killing upwards of 19 Christians while others fled, then they attacked in the same village positions of a local allied militia to the Congolese army with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, then the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses and captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions."
June 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Sesa in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
June 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Kabwiki in the Beni area, killing 8 Christians and causing others to flee, and then the mujahideen captured some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions."

<sup>222</sup> Intelligence and security sources, researchers.

<sup>223</sup> In comparison, analytical data available for the month of January 2023 from an intelligence source shows that only 5% of ADF attacks documented were claimed by Da'esh. According to another comparative analysis conducted by a confidential security source, covering the period from January 2023 to end of May 2024, there has been a steady increase in claims since December 2023, reaching a new peak by May 2024.

June 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them."
June 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Masala in the Beni area, killing more than 60 Christians, and took an officer and a soldier from the Congolese army as prisoner and killed them with automatic weapons, and the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses and trading centers, and captured some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions."
June 10, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a Christian village north of the town of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, killing 3 Christians with automatic weapons, and capturing some of their possessions, and burning down a number of their houses before returning to their positions safely."
June 10, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Makusa in the Beni area yesterday, killing 7 of them with automatic weapons, in addition to burning down a number of their houses and 3 motorcycles, and then they returned to their positions safely."
June 11, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 Christians prisoner near the village of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them."
June 12, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Malya in the Ituri area, killing 10 Christians while causing others to flee, and the mujahideen burned down a number of their houses and captured some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 12, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Mabanga and 4 other villages in its environs in the Beni area with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and the mujahideen burned down a number of houses and captured some of their possessions."
June 14, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Masungu in the Beni area the day before yesterday, capturing and killing 6 Christians while others fled."
June 14, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mikengo in the Beni area the day before yesterday, killing more than 45 Christians while others fled, and the mujahideen captured some of their possessions and burned down a number of their houses and trading centers, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 16, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Lumbo Lumbo in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed him."
June 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabaeti in the Lubero area of eastern Congo yesterday, killing 11 Christians and capturing some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Asefu in the Lubero area, killing more than 20 Christians, in addition to burning down a number of houses and trading centers and capturing some of their possessions, and then they returned to their positions safely."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Asefu in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of 2 elements and the capture and execution of 2 others."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Bamandi in the Ituri area, taking 18 Christians prisoner and killing 4 others with automatic weapons, the mujahideen also captured some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol allied to the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Najiapanda in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of several of them."
June 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Najiapanda in the Lubero area, targeting them with automatic weapons, resulting in the killing of two elements."
June 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Samboko in the Ituri area last Wednesday with automatic weapons, resulting in the wounding of many of them while the rest fled, and the mujahideen burned down the barracks and then returned safely to their positions."
June 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Kyanganda in the Lubero area yesterday, killing upwards of 40 Christians and two elements of an allied militia to the Congolese army, and the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian homes and trading centers, and captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions."
June 24, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Ofai in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
June 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday, and executed them."

June 26, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a number of infidel Christians that were traveling on motorcycles between Butembo and Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday, targeting them with automatic weapons, causing them to flee and the burning of 4 motorcycles."
June 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the town of Kiri and a number of villages surrounding it in the Lubero area yesterday, killing more than 35 Christians, among them elements from an allied militia to the Congolese army, and the mujahideen burned down more than 30 Christian homes, 7 trading centers, and 3 motorcycles, and captured some of their possessions, and then safely returned to their positions."
June 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured one infidel Christian in the village of Idohu in the Ituri area, and executed him."
June 29, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Kambau in the Lubero area yesterday, and killed 10 Christians, and burned down a number of houses and trading centers, and they captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions."
June 29, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Kambau in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of a number of them and others fled, and they [the mujahideen] burned down the barracks."
July 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Masenge in the Lubero area yesterday, clashing with an allied militia to the Congolese army with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and wounding of others, while others fled, and they [the mujahideen] burned down their positions, then the mujahideen attacked the Christians in the village, killing one, and capturing another, and burned down some of their possessions."
July 9, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentration of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bayanga in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and others fleeing."
July 11, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a foot patrol of the Congolese army and an allied militia in the village of Masenge in the Lubero area, where they detonated an IED upon them and targeted them with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of upwards of 15 soldiers, while 2 soldiers were taken prisoner and others fled. The mujahideen then captured a rifle and ammunition and then returned safely to their positions."
July 11, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army and an allied militia in the village of Biambi in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 elements and wounding of two others."
July 13, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted two infidel Christians in the village of Mukundi in the Beni area last Saturday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths."
July 15, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a soldier and the wounding of two others while others fled, and the mujahideen captured weapons and equipment and then attacked the village, capturing and killing 3 Christians. Additionally, they clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army that was trying to enter [the village] with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 3 of them, and then the mujahideen returned safely to their positions."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Idohu in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian that was riding a motorcycle along the road between the villages of Ndimo and Idohu in the Ituri area yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him and burning his bike."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabya in the Lubero area, capturing and executing 5 Christians."
July 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Kyanganda in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and then the mujahideen burned down several Christian houses."
July 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Mayba in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing, and the capture of equipment and burned the concentrations. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village and captured and executed 19 Christians and burned down a number of houses and trading centers. And then they returned to their positions safely."
July 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted elements of the Congolese army and Christians that were on motorcycles near the village of Mahala in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths and the burning of their motorcycles and the capture of a rifle."

July 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 2 infidel Christians near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region, executing them."
July 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 6 infidel Christians near the village of Otombere in the Ituri region, executing them."
July 23, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint patrol of the Crusader Ugandan and Congolese armies near the village of Muhuyo in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of a number of them."
July 24, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Ombole in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of at least 15 Christians and the burning of a number of houses and trading centers and motorcycles. Then the mujahideen attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the same village with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing and the capture of equipment and the burning of their bases."
July 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Beu-manyama in the Ituri area yesterday, capturing and executing more than 30 Christians, in addition to burning down a number of houses and motorcycles before returning to their positions safely."
July 26, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region the day before yesterday, and executed them."
July 26, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Ombole in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed them."
July 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the villages of Mangumbu, Mweya, and Nzakya in the Beni area last Wednesday, killing upwards of 24 Christians."
July 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabunda in the Lubero area yesterday, killing 7 Christians while others fled, and the mujahideen burned down a number of houses, trading centers, and motorcycles, and then returned safely to their positions."
July 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a local militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and the capture of his rifle, while others fled, then the mujahideen attacked the barracks with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, while they captured equipment and burned down the barracks."
July 29, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of a local militia allied to the Congolese army that was trying to advance on the mujahideen's positions near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 8 elements and the others fleeing, and the capture of a rifle."
July 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan army that was trying to advance on the mujahideen's positions near the village of Mukasili in the Ituri area last Thursday with medium and light weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of more than 15 elements and the fleeing of the rest and the capture of various equipment."
July 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabino in the Lubero area, killing 11 Christians and capturing 2 others, capturing some of their positions, and then they returned to their positions safely."
July 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 12 Christians near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday, executing them, and capturing some of their positions, and then returning to their positions safely."
Aug 1, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 2 infidel Christians near the village of Idohu in the Ituri area, killing them."
Aug 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies near the village of Mambi in the Beni area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a soldier and the wounding of others."
Aug 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Minamaymbu in the Lubero area, capturing and killing 10 Christians and returning to their positions safely."
Aug 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army and a local allied militia near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of 6 elements while others fled, and the capture of equipment."
Aug 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked positions of a local militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and the mujahideen burned down positions and captured two rifles and equipment."
Aug. 6, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Etembu in the Lubero area yesterday, capturing and killing 4 Christians."
Aug 8, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday, capturing and killing 4 Christians."

Aug 8, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 Christians prisoner near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed them."
Aug 9, 2024	An Naba 455: "Additionally, an exclusive source told Al Naba that soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 Christians prisoner and executed them on July 30 in the village of Mwayna in the Lubero area."
Aug 10, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of a local militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Mbalimbanguwa in the Tshopo area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 3 elements (of the militia), while others fled, and the capture of a rifle. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians inside the village, killing two among them with automatic weapons, causing others to flee. The mujahideen then burned down more than 50 houses before returning to their positions safely."
Aug 12, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Biakato in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and they captured a rifle and equipment."
Aug 15, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with automatic weapons with a foot patrol of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army that was trying to advance towards the Mujahideen's positions near the village of Isange in the Lubero area, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 7 elements and others fleeing, and the capture of two rifles and equipment." Also 5 photos released
Aug 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army along the road between Mambasa and Komanda in the Ituri area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing and the capture of a mortar and ammunition."
Aug 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 5 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndimo in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
Aug 17, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of one of them and others fleeing, then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village, also causing them to flee, and they then burned down more than 150 homes."
Aug 18, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of a militia allied to the Congolese army near the village of Ndimo in the Ituri region last Thursday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of 3 elements and the wounding of others."
Aug. 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bahaha in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the fleeing of the rest. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village, killing 7 among them with automatic weapons, then burning down a church, government institutions, and more than 50 homes and 15 motorcycles, and then they returned to their positions safely." One photo published in An Naba 458
Aug 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Bududia in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, killing upwards of 11 Christians, capturing some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions."
Aug. 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Pumuzika in the Tshopo area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the wounding of others and they captured two rifles and equipment."
Aug 29, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 10 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Bududia in the Lubero area yesterday, and executed them."
Aug 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Makuru in the Lubero area yesterday, killing upwards of 8 Christians and the capture of 3 others, in addition to burning down more than 10 houses and then they returned safely to their positions."
Sept 6, 2024	An Naba 459: (Only relevant section translated): "And in the Ituri region, an exclusive source told Al Naba that soldiers of the Caliphate on Sept 2, attacked the village of Bandikila between the towns of Mambasa and Komanda, taking 25 Christians prisoner, and executing 3 among them." One photo also released showing the dead bodies of two of the hostages.
September 7, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prison near the village of Idoho in the Ituri region, and subsequently executed them."
September 13, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Ngereza in the Ituri area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a Christian."
September 13, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Isange in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, killing 5 Christians."
Sept 13, 2024	An-Naba 460: "An exclusive source told Al Naba that on Aug. 29, 2024, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies near the village of Katiran in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, killing one while others fled." One photo also released
September 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner in the village of Bandembese in the Ituri area yesterday, killing him."

September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday, killing 5 Christians."
September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prison near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Mididi in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and others fleeing, then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village and killed 3 of them, and then burned down a number of their houses and trading centers."
September 21, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a patrol of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Mangurijiba in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and others fleeing, the capture of a rifle and equipment."
Sept. 23, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of Crusader Congolese army in the village of Tolitoli in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the wounding of others and the burning of the concentrations, additionally the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses in the village." 7 photos released
Sept. 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted several infidel Christians that were on a motorbike near the village of Mahala in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a Christian and the wounding of two others and others fleeing, and the burning of motorcycles."
Sept. 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Mambelenga in the Ituri region, executing them with automatic weapons."
Sept. 25, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian near the village of Tolitoli in Ituri the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him. Then the mujahideen attacked a barracks of the Congolese army in the village with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing."
Sept 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies that were attempting to advance on the mujahideen's positions near the village of Mangurijiba in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 4 soldiers from the Ugandan army and one from the Congolese army and the wounding of others, while the rest fled and they [the mujahideen] captured weapons and equipment."
Sept. 27, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted two elements from the Congolese militia near the village of Lolwa in the Iruri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths."
Sept. 28, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
Sept. 30, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Bilulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and the wounding of others while others fled and they [the mujahideen] captured rifles and equipment. Then, the mujahideen attacked Christians inside the village, killing 14 among them and capturing 5 others and capturing some of their possessions, then they returned safely to their positions."
Oct. 1, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted members of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, killing one." Photo released in An-Naba' 463, Oct 4, 2024
Oct. 1, 2024	Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian on a motorcycle along the road near Mambelenga in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him and burning his motorcycle." Photo released in An-Naba' 463, Oct 4, 2024
October 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Otombere in the ituri region the day before yesterday, killing 3 Christians and burning down 3 houses."
October 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 15 Christians prisoner near the village of Abitinku in the Ituri region the day before yesterday, and executed them."
October 12, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
October 15, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an officer in the Crusader Ugandan intelligence and two Christians in the village of Munguna in the Bugiri area the day before yesterday with pistol shots, resulting in their deaths."
October 19, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 soldiers and the others fleeing."
October 20, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Mambelenga in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
Oct 24, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted elements of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Monge in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, killing one."

Oct 24, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took one infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Mungamba in the Ituri area, killing him.”
Oct 26, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them.”
Oct 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Sesa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed them.”
Oct 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Bandimbese in Ituri, and executed them.”
Oct 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Bandimbese in Ituri, and executed them.”

Claims and translations received from confidential researcher

#### ***Enhanced propaganda through Da’esh editorials and weekly reports***

The increased interest from Da’esh in ADF activities was also reflected by the increase in coverage dedicated to DRC in newsletters and special edition publications. Few examples from June 2024:

In the 21 June 2024 edition of the weekly digital newsletter *an-Nabā’* (#448) contained a three-page special editorial as well as an infographic regarding the “Jihad in the Congo”. On the “Operations by the Soldiers of the Caliphate in the Congo over 70 days,” Da’esh reported that between 10 April and 19 June 2024, ADF conducted 82 operations, killing and wounding over 470 individuals.<sup>224</sup>

The editorial expressed Da’esh’s ideological justification for ongoing violence in its Central Africa Province. It presented its actions as part of a religious duty to wage war against non-Muslims (“Christians”) in the region. The text criticized what it perceived as Western media bias, asserting that violence against African Christians receives less attention than incidents affecting Western Christians. It attributed this disparity to racial discrimination and claims that this neglect helps obscure Da’esh expansion in Africa, while downplaying the difficulties faced by international forces in combating the group’s activities.

Da’esh criticized the Congolese government for seeking external military support, including from Uganda and United Nations forces, which it claims have failed to protect Christian communities from violence. Additionally, the text argues that the Islamic State continues to expand and establish control, despite attempts by regional governments and international actors to suppress them: “The Christians and their allies are still warning each other about the soldiers of Islam exploiting any vacuum that results from the fighting between Congolese forces and militias in eastern Congo, as every enemy they fight is easier for them to combat than the Islamic State imposing control over the region. The alliance between the Congolese government and the Ugandan and Rwandan forces, despite their long history of hostility, is only an example of this.”<sup>225</sup>

The message reiterated the group’s commitment to continue violent operations, including raids and attacks, as part of their ultimate goal of establishing Islamic governance in the region. It suggests that only conversion to Islam or paying the jizyah (a tax imposed on non-Muslims) will bring security to local populations. The passage concludes with a threat that, without submission, the violence will persist, framing this path as divinely sanctioned.

To enhance the spread of propaganda for ADF, *Serah-al-Khilafah*, a media unit aligned with Da’esh, produced an animated video based on the *an-Nabā’* (#448) report about ADF’s operations in eastern DRC.<sup>226</sup>

The 27 June 2024 edition of *an-Nabā’* included “exclusive” reports on ISCPAP activities the week prior. It highlighted attacks “on Christian villages and the killing of Christians” in Lubero and Ituri in the DRC, stating that “over 70 christians were killed and captured, including elements from Congolese army and militias, in continuous attacks by soldiers of the Caliphate in Eastern Congo”. In addition to providing details about the attacks, it also featured photographs of burning houses after attacks on Kianganda in Lubero, and Bamandi in Ituri.<sup>227</sup>

<sup>224</sup> Full text of the newsletter on file with the Secretariat.

<sup>225</sup> Text and translation by SITE Intelligence Group.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Full text of the newsletter on file with the Secretariat.

**Annex 9 (para. 27)****AFC/M23 communique denying allegations of collaboration with ADF****Communiqué de l'AFC/M23 démentant les rumeurs de collaboration avec l'ADF**

On August 25, 2024, an AFC communiqué - later deemed fake by AFC - claimed that a non-aggression and collaboration pact had been established between 'ADF Nalu' and AFC/M23. According to this alleged agreement, ADF would cease attacks on civilians and focus solely on FARDC and Wazalendo forces, facilitating M23's advance. In return for financial and military support, ADF would receive 70% of Beni's cacao revenues for ten years, contingent on M23 securing control of the area. Below is a copy of the communiqué deemed fake by AFC/M23:



Published on [AFC's X account](#)

**Annex 10 (para. 30)****FARDC reliance on Wazalendo groups to defend against ADF including deployment of NDC-R of Guidon in Lubero****Les FARDC s'appuient sur des groupes Wazalendo pour se défendre contre les ADF y compris le déploiement du NDC-R de Guidon dans le Lubero**

NDC-R Guidon forces have deployed in the Bapere sector of Lubero territory, claiming their presence aims to protect civilians from ADF attacks.

**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N°031/RPRC/GSM DU 27 JUILLET 2024****Dénonciation d'un plan diabolique contre les patriotes résistants dans le LUBERO**

Prenant en témoin l'opinion nationale et internationale, sur ce qui se passe dans le secteur de BAPERE en territoire de LUBERO contre les VDP, les gens doivent retenir ce qui suit :

1. Depuis bientôt trois mois, les ADF/MTN voudraient faire expansion dans LUBERO, TSHOPO et WALIKALE via le secteur de BAPERE, malheureusement, avec l'appui de certains fils du coin ;
2. C'est grâce à la puissance de feu des patriotes résistants du NDC-Rénové, sous conduite du Lt Gen Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA Comd des VDP, que ces terroristes et leurs alliés n'ont pas abouti à leur mission. Plus de 12 enfants ont été libéré de mains de l'ennemi et 5 terroristes ADF/MTN capturés. Après leur audition, beaucoup de choses ont été révélées sur le plan de l'ennemi et les noms de leurs collaborateurs ;
3. Dans notre communiqué de presse n°030/RPRC/GSM du 27 juillet 2024, nous avons informé le public sur l'existence d'un groupe de gens, originaires du secteur de BAPERE qui collaborent avec les ADF/MTN afin de leur faciliter l'expansion dans le LUBERO, TSHOPO et WALIKALE. Le réseau est vaste et certains noms ont été cité ;
4. Depuis un temps, ces collaborateurs des ADF/MTN se sont distingués par des sorties médiatiques de diabolisation des patriotes résistants VDP du NDC-Rénové qui constituent un sérieux blocage à la réalisation de leur plan d'expansion ;
5. Voulant éliminer physiquement notre Comd. Des opérations dans la zone, dans la nuit du mardi 13 au mercredi 14 Aout 2024, le même groupe de jeunes (collaborateurs des ADF/MTN) qui avait tué deux éléments FARDC et fuit avec leurs armes a organisé un raid dans l'habitation du Col AROBASE, deux patriotes ont perdu la vie, parmi eux un membre de famille élargie du Lt Gén. Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA.


Le NDC-Rénové dénonce avec la toute dernière énergie cet autre cas d'attaque contre ses combattants par les collaborateurs des terroristes ADF/MTN, ceci ne doit pas rester impunis car les auteurs (matériels et moraux) sont très bien connus.

A la justice de diligenter des enquêtes, afin de punir les auteurs de ces actes ignobles.

Le NDC-Rénové réaffirme sa détermination de poursuivre sa mission de défendre l'intégrité du territoire national et faire échec à l'agression étrangère sous toutes ses formes.

Ne Jamais trahir le Congo

La patrie ou la mort.



Document provided by confidential civil society source.

Many armed groups were encouraged by FARDC to deploy in the region, to fill the security void due to the absence of FARDC deployments, including due to a significant number of troops having been sent to Petit Nord, to fight against M23/RDF. For example, on 12 June 2024, as ADF was advancing towards the locality of Kambau (Lubero territory), the FARDC sector chief responsible for the area requested urgent reinforcements, deplored that the ADF were advancing

towards the locality and there were no security forces present in the area, besides a few elements of “general” Mayani’s UPLC.<sup>228</sup>



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO  
PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU  
TERRITOIRE DE LUBERO  
SECTEUR DES BAPERE



De : CHEF SECTEUR DES BAPERE  
A : AT. LUBERO  
RPT : - GROUPRO/GOMA  
- CONS PRINC INTERIEUR & SECURIT/GOMA  
- COMD REGIMENT FARDC/RWENDA  
- CPTER-LUBERO

**TEXTE ET SIGNATURE N°5072/1/Rte/SEC-BAP/2024**

HVS & VS SIGNALER PRESENCE ADF EN TERR LUBERO LOC MAGOGO (-) HIER 11/06/2024 ENEMI AVOIR TRANVERSER RIV. BIENA ET SE SITUE A CE MOMENT A 1H30 DU VILLAGE MOKELE SECTEUR DE BAPERE(-) VOIR CARTE EN ANNEXE (-) ICI PAS DE FORCES POUR LE CONTRER(-) SAUF QUELQUES ELEMENTS DE L’UPLC GEN MAYANI(-) SOLlicitons RENFORT URGENT FARDC POUR PARRER AU PIRE ET CONTENIR AVANCER ENEMI VERS AGGLOMERATIONS OU DEPLACES DE GUERRE SE TROUVENT CONCENTRER (-) A KAMBAU POUR LE MOMENT ON COMpte DEJA + DE 5000 PERSONNERS VENANT DE TOUTES DIRECTIONS(-) CE DEPLACES COMPOSER FEMMES ENFANTS ET VIEILLARDS AVOIR BESOIN DE L’ASSISTANCE URGENTE(-) SUIS PRESENTEMENT SUR PLACE SUIVRE DE PRES SITUATION (-) PLUS RIEN A VOS ORDRE(-) (-)




FAIT A KAMBAU, le 12/06/2024  
LE CHEF DE SECTEUR DES BAPERE

MACAIRE SIVIKUNULA MWENDIWA

Document received from confidential security source


<sup>228</sup> Confidential telegram dated 12 June 2024, issued in Kambau. Copy of the telegram is on file with the Secretariat.

Further evidence of the presence of armed groups in Lubero territory with the acquiescence of local authorities and FARDC:




Document received from confidential civil society source

Evidence of “VDP” deployment in the area of Butembo under the pretext of fighting ADF:




Document received from confidential civil society source

Document informing of the intent to establish a new “VDP” position in the Valese Vunkutu Chefferie



Document received from confidential civil society source

Token issued by the FPP-AP to access fields in the vicinity of BIAKATO, denoting not only the presence of this armed group but also its predation of the local population:



Document received from confidential civil society source

## **Annex 11 (para. 31)**

### **Tensions between local communities and Wazalendo armed groups in Lubero territory**

### **Tensions entre les communautés locales et les groupes armés du Wazalendo dans le territoire de Lubero**

The deployment of Wazalendo armed groups in North Kivu and Ituri under the pretext of fighting against ADF – notably of NDC-R of Guidon in Lubero (see annex 10 above) - has generated tensions with local communities. Local leaders have grown increasingly frustrated, urging the withdrawal of these armed groups, citing their ineffectiveness against ADF and M23 threats, and the exploitation of the local population.

Tensions have been further fueled by incidents such as an armed raid on 24 July 2024 on the Bodhodhea mining site, attributed to NDC-R Guidon, and an alleged attack on local NDC-R Commander Arobaz on 14 August 2024. These events have led to heightened calls for an increased FARDC presence.

On 17 August 2024, the *Conseil de la Jeunesse Bhele/Piri* in the Bapere Sector issued a communiqué (see copy of the communiqué below) addressing earlier statements from the NDC-R faction led by Guidon, including one dated 27 July 2024 (see Annex 10 above).

The communiqué demanded the departure of all Wazalendo groups from the Bapere Sector, particularly along the Butembo-Manguredjipa axis, accusing them of collaborating with the ADF. Additionally, it accused Vianney Misinge Arobaz of the NDC-R of pillaging the local population and committing acts of torture.

The communiqué outlined several demands:

- Immediate withdrawal of Arobaz and his allies from the Bapere Sector, citing their lack of positive contributions.
- An end to intimidation of *groupement* chiefs and traditional leaders (*gardiens de coutume*).
- A cessation of the arbitrary imprisonment of local youth defending the population against the ADF/MTN.
- An end to extortion, including the collection of monthly taxes from displaced civilians.
- Avoid spreading tribal hatred between the Bhele/Piri and Nyanga communities.
- Avoid spreading false claims concerning efforts to track ADF attackers and to liberate hostages.

The communiqué also accused the NDC-R spokesperson, Marcellin Senkuku N'Kuba, of disseminating misinformation through public statements. It firmly denied allegations that local youth had attacked NDC-R positions on 13 and 14 August 2024.

See copy of the Bapere Youth council communiqué below:

REPUBLICHE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO  
PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU  
TERRITOIRE DE LUBERO  
ASSOCIATION CULTURELLE NTUA ANDE NGUBA  
CONSEIL DE LA JEUNESSE BHÉLE/PIRI



**COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE N°002/JB/CAB/SECT BAP/NK /DU 17/08/2024**

Dénonciation des allégations mensongères du Mouvement NDC Rénové dans son communiqué de presse référence N°031/RPRC/GSM du 27 juillet 2024 et celui du 16 août 2024.

Alors que le Secteur de Bapere en particulier et l'axe Butembo-Manguredjipa en général traversent une situation critique en raison des incursions répétitives des ADF/MTN et des atrocités commises par Monsieur VIANNEY MISINGE AROBAZ et ses alliés, le Conseil de la jeunesse Bhele/Piri informe l'opinion locale et nationale que Monsieur VIANNEY MISINGE AROBAZ du NDC Rénové et ses alliés continuent à se distinguer par le pillage des biens de la population et les tortures de celle-ci, malgré plusieurs alertes demandant leur départ du Secteur de Bapere.

Le Conseil de la Jeunesse BHÉLE/Piri condamne cette énième provocation du porte-parole du NDC Rénové contenue dans son communiqué de presse du 16/08/2024, qui accuse encore une fois de plus les fils du territoire d'être en connivence avec les égoreurs ADF/MTN.

Face à cette situation qui continue à dégénérer, le Conseil de la jeunesse BHÉLE/Piri réitere :

1. Le retrait sans condition de Monsieur VIANNEY MISINGE AROBAZ et ses alliés du secteur de Bapere, puisque ces derniers n'ont aucune importance sur terrain.
2. L'arrêt des actes d'intimidation envers les chefs des groupements et les gardiens des coutumes du Secteur de Bapere.
3. Eviter l'emprisonnement des jeunes autochtones qui se défendent contre les égoreurs ADF/MTN.
4. Cesser la perception de jetons mensuels auprès de la population en fuite.
5. Eviter de mettre ses actes mafieux dans le terrain de haine tribale entre la communauté BHÉLE/Piri et Nyanga.
6. Eviter des scénarios mensongers jouant dans la traque des égoreurs ADF/MTN et la libération des otages.

Le Conseil de la Jeunesse BHÉLE/Piri met en garde Me Marcellin SHENKUKU N'KUBA, porte parole du NDC-R, dans ses communiqués intempestifs sans fondement ni enquête. Nous lui rappelons que les fils du territoire ne sont ni impliqués ni responsables dans l'attaque contre leur position de FATUA dans la nuit du 13 au 14 août 2024; c'était une altercation privée entre eux, résultant d'une ivresse habituelle.

Cependant, le Conseil de la jeunesse BHÉLE/Piri accorde sa confiance au COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE N°01/003/CAB/PP/24 du porte-parole du Gouverneur militaire du Nord Kivu du 12 août 2024 concernant le retrait sans condition des tout les WAZALENDU dans les zones non occupées par le M23/RDF.

Si aucune action n'est entreprise, le Conseil de la Jeunesse BHÉLE/Piri projette une marche pacifique demandant le départ de tous les faux Wazelendo se constituant en pisteurs des égoreurs ADF/MTN dans le secteur de Bapere, en particulier et dans l'axe Butembo-Manguredjipa en général.



Document received from confidential civil society source

**Annex 12 (para. 34)****AFC communiqué of 1 August 2024****Communiqué de l'AFC du 1er août 2024****OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 1<sup>st</sup>, 2024**

1. The Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/M23 has followed the latest developments aimed at achieving peace within the framework of the Luanda process. The AFC/M23 wishes to congratulate all the actors for their endless work towards a peaceful resolution of the multifaceted crisis in the East Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
2. The AFC/M23 hereby emphasise that it is not automatically bound by the conclusions of meetings to which it has not attended. The AFC/M23 notes that the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government have become accustomed to using the various truces and cessations of hostilities to reorganise themselves and continue ethnic cleansing, attacking the martyred population and our forces as their defenders.
3. Nevertheless, the AFC/M23 wishes to remind everyone that, as of March 7th, 2023, it declared a unilateral ceasefire to give a chance to find a peaceful solution to the crisis within the framework of regional processes. Since then, the AFC/M23 has only been responding to the attacks by the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government, within the grounds of legitimate self-defence and to protect threatened civilian populations. The AFC/M23 is therefore ready to respond positively to a change in the posture of the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government.
4. The AFC/M23 reiterates that the only way to achieve a peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict is through direct political dialogue with the Kinshasa Government, which addresses the root causes of the recurring conflicts in the Eastern DRC. The Regional Peace Processes offer an ideal framework that must be utilised without any delay to prevent further suffering for our populations.

Bunagana, August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2024.



**Annex 13 (para. 38)****Additional information on the negotiations for the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of the RDF troops, conflicting positions and the Luanda process****Informations complémentaires sur les négociations pour la neutralisation des FDLR et le désengagement des troupes RDF, les positions conflictuelles et le processus de Luanda**

- In its last report ([S/2024/432](#), annex 30), the Group provided the details of a first ministerial meeting on the security and peace situation in eastern DRC held in Luanda on 21 March 2024. During that meeting, participants proposed concrete commitments to the heads of state of the DRC and Rwanda, amongst others:
  - cessation of hostilities, including a supervised ceasefire, accompanied by a process of disengagement of forces (point 2);
  - the DRC delegation committed to present a plan to neutralize the FDLR accompanied by a program of action (point 3);
  - following the implementation of this plan to neutralize the FDLR, the Rwandan delegation committed to review the measures and arrangement adopted to ensure its defence and security (point 4).
- During the same meeting, Rwanda and the DRC also voiced dissents over the cessation of hostilities. For the DRC delegation, the disengagement of forces (point 2) implied the withdrawal of RDF from the DRC territory. For the Rwandan delegation, however, the cessation of hostilities implied a supervised ceasefire between FARDC and the M23, followed by a process of disengagement of forces.
- Since the March 2024 meeting, amid continued military operations by both FARDC and RDF, negotiations continued, aiming at resolving the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda, under the facilitation of the Angolan mediator. The operationalization of the FDLR neutralization plan and the elaboration of a plan for the disengagement of forces were at the heart of the negotiations.
- On 30 July 2024, following a second ministerial meeting in Luanda, the Angolan presidency announced a new cease-fire due to start on 4 August, and agreed upon by the Rwandan and Congolese governments under the aegis of the Angolan mediator (see also [S/2024/432](#), annexes 20-21). Another outcome of that ministerial meeting in Luanda was the engagement of Rwanda and the DRC to further elaborate the above-mentioned FDLR neutralization plan, and plan for the forces' disengagement. The Angolan mediator provided a document (titled “Harmonisation of the DRC’s proposed plan and Republic of Rwanda’s response to the Neutralisation of the FDLR on Congolese territory”) in which the DRC’s “Plan for the neutralization of the FDLR”<sup>229</sup> and related observations by Rwanda were harmonized. The Facilitator’s harmonization document attempted to (i) bridge the view points of the DRC and Rwanda; (ii) generate a consensual perspective on the plan, program of action, and process of the neutralization of the FDLR; (iii) assist Rwanda and the DRC in coming up with concrete and clear strategies for the neutralization of the FDLR; (iv) and sustain the dialogue process under the leadership and mediation of the Angolan Presidency. The Facilitator’s document served as the working document for next negotiations (see below).

**Facilitator’s harmonization document – main elements (non-exhaustive list):**

- Elements relative to differing positions between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, and recommendations, as elaborated in the Facilitator’s harmonization document:<sup>230</sup>
  - “While both governments agree and are committed to the neutralization of the FDLR, they do not share the same views on the levels of threat posed by the FDLR to both nations’ security and the FDLR’s ongoing destructive capacity on both countries’ good and harmonious relationships”;

<sup>229</sup> Submitted by the DRC government to the Facilitator on 26 April 2024.

<sup>230</sup> Non-exhaustive.

- “The plan for the neutralization of the FDLR as presented by the DRC Government does not include a clear action plan with chronogram of timelines and clear lines of responsibility for such neutralization”; this “creates the uncertainties that are underlying sources of tensions, violence in Eastern DRC, and continuous deterioration of the relationships and trust between the DRC and Rwanda”;
- “The primary goal of neutralizing the FDLR is an important first step towards improving the worsening security environment in Eastern DRC”.
- Bridging the viewpoints of the DRC and Republic of Rwanda as elaborated in the Facilitator’s harmonization document:<sup>231</sup>
  - Both the DRC and Rwanda “share the determination to neutralize the FDLR”;
  - “Both the DRC and Rwanda agree that the FDLR is a shared source of destabilization of both nations, as well as the regular recurrence of violence and conflict in Eastern DRC”;
- Assistance towards concrete steps for neutralizing the FDLR as elaborated in the Facilitator’s harmonization document<sup>232</sup>:
  - The DRC Government ought to take leadership and ownership as the primary responsible entity on the neutralization of the FDLR and its affiliates – including FOCA, CNRD and RUD-Urunana – from its territory in Eastern DRC. These efforts include:
    - (a) Lead in the organization and establishment of a Joint Task Force to locate FDLR elements and affiliates;
    - (b) Scrutinize and process all FDLR members and linked groups in secured cantonments, including disarmament and neutralizing of the military chain of command and networks of FDLR and affiliates;
    - (c) Under the mediation of the Facilitator, reach an immediate cessation of hostilities agreement in Eastern DRC, including the repatriation of the FDLR from the DRC;
    - (d) Under the supervision of the Facilitator, the DRC and Rwanda commit to providing a joint framework with Partner support drawing from the existing ad-hoc verification mechanism for monitoring and verification of the implementation of neutralizing the FDLR and its affiliates;
    - (e) The governments of the DRC and Rwanda commit to neutralizing the FDLR and its affiliates, networks and military chains of command in good faith and with goodwill, in accordance with the 2013 Nairobi Declaration;
    - (f) The governments of the DRC and Rwanda are further committed, with the cooperation of partners, to speedily embark on the neutralization of FDLR and strengthening confidence-building measures as the conditions for restoring good relations;
    - The Republic of Rwanda will support the efforts to neutralize the FDLR in a secondary capacity in the aforementioned tasks.
- At the July ministerial meeting, Rwanda, the DRC and Angola instructed their intelligence experts<sup>233</sup> to meet on 7 August 2024 to further elaborate the Facilitator’s proposal on the neutralization of the FDLR, but also to elaborate a plan for the disengagement of forces on the ground. The report of the intelligence experts (“Plan harmonisé pour la neutralisation des FDLR et le disengagement des forces (levée des mesures défensives du Rwanda)”) would then serve as the basis for discussions during the ministerial meeting planned in August (see below). The intelligence officers from the DRC, Rwanda and Angola did convene in Luanda from 7 to 9 August to negotiate a proposal to be discussed at the third ministerial meeting late August 2024.

<sup>231</sup> Non-exhaustive.

<sup>232</sup> Non-exhaustive.

<sup>233</sup> Major-General Christian Ndaywel Okura (DRC), Ambassador Matias Bertino Matondo (Angola) and Brigadier-General Jean Paul Nyirubutama (Rwanda).

- The third ministerial meeting on 20-21 August 2024 concluded without reaching an agreement.
- The intelligence officers met again in Rubavu, Rwanda, and on 31 August 2024 agreed on the harmonization plan.

Intelligence experts' harmonization plan – main elements (non-exhaustive list):

- The plan proposed by the intelligence experts is subdivided into 6 objectives/goals, i.e. (i) analysis of the level of threat of the FDLR; (ii) neutralization of the FDLR; (iii) disengagement of the forces/lifting of defensive measures put in place by Rwanda; (iv) evaluation; (v) DDR process; and (vi) building trust and a climate of calm.
- For each of these objectives/goals, the plan foresees (i) a series of activities and actions; (ii) a timeframe; (iii) the entity/entities and/or individuals in charge; and (iv) the supervisor(s).
- The plan foresees that the disengagement of the Rwandan forces and lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda starts after the start of execution of the targeted actions against the FDLR.
- The plan also foresees that the execution of the disengagement of the Rwandan forces and lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda would cover a specific time-period.
- At the fourth ministerial meeting in Luanda on 14 September 2024, the DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Thérèse Wagner, rejected the harmonization plan for the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces (lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures) submitted by the intelligence experts. Diplomatic, intelligence, FARDC and UN sources reported that the proposed timeline – which did not foresee that the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of RDF troops would take place simultaneously – was one of the main reasons for rejecting the proposal. On the other hand, it must be underlined that the operations against the FDLR late September 2024 (see paras. 67-80) were carried out – albeit without major successes – while RDF were still massively deployed on the DRC territory.
- On 24 September 2024, at the UN General Assembly in New York, the President of Angola Joao Lourenco declared that “in order to consolidate the gains made, a proposal for a peace agreement has been put on the table by the Republic of Angola, involving the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda, the terms of which are being discussed by the parties at ministerial level, with the prospect of them reaching an understanding with each other that will justify the convocation of a summit meeting to seal the signing of the definitive peace agreement (...).”<sup>234</sup> The following day, President Tshisekedi demanded “the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan troops (...)” and stated that “while recent diplomatic initiatives, such as the Luanda talks, are encouraging, they must not obscure the urgency of this essential action”.<sup>235</sup> President Tshisekedi thus implicitly rejected the conditionality of RDF withdrawal in light of FDLR neutralization. In his statement at the General Assembly, Rwandan Ambassador Ernest Rwamucyo did not address the conflict in the DRC or the Luanda process.<sup>236</sup>
- On 12 October 2024, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the DRC and Rwanda met again in Luanda. They agreed to resume expert consultations scheduled to take place in Luanda on 30 October 2024, to elaborate a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a harmonized plan to neutralize FDLR (see paras. 76-77).
- The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the FDLR neutralization plan, approved at expert level in Luanda on 31 October, foresees identifying the positioning of FDLR and their equipment, followed by information sharing to identify FDLR and its “dissident groups” (Phase 1), before moving to neutralization operations and targeted actions against FDLR (Phase 2), bypassing any explicit steps for sensitization of combatants and voluntary surrender. The demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of FDLR combatants is foreseen only in Phase 4 of the CONOPS. This CONOPS approved at expert level was to be discussed late November 2024 at the fifth ministerial meeting.

<sup>234</sup> [ao\\_en.pdf \(un.org\)](#)

<sup>235</sup> [cd\\_fr.pdf \(un.org\)](#)

<sup>236</sup> [FINAL-RWANDA NATIONAL STATEMENT FOR UNGA 79.pdf](#)

## Annex 14 (para. 42)

### Forced and voluntary recruitment by AFC/M23

### Recrutement forcé et volontaire par le AFC/M23

In its final report ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 37, 100-108, and annex 65), the Group documented a consolidation of M23's military capacity through extensive recruitment efforts, including of children, across North Kivu, Uganda, and Rwanda. During the current reporting period, recruitment efforts in AFC/M23-controlled territories continued, particularly in newly conquered areas such as Rubaya, the broader Masisi territory, Kanyabayonga, as well as in South Kivu and Ituri. Thousands of new recruits were enrolled in military training from April to October 2024 (see annex below).

The Group collected additional evidence of AFC/M23 recruitment abroad, notably in refugee camps in Rwanda ([S/2024/432](#), para. 103).<sup>237</sup> For example, a surrendered M23 combatant who had been forcefully recruited in April 2024, reported that he knew twelve young men recruited from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda who attended the military training in Tchanzu between May-August 2024 (see annex 15).

AFC/M23 recruited thousands of civilians using the following methods:<sup>238</sup> (i) abduction and forced recruitment (see below); (ii) deceptive financial promises and/or promises for work; (iii) voluntary recruitments through systematically organized awareness-raising campaigns through local leaders, public meetings in newly conquered areas (see example below in ‘Recruitment in Rubaya’) and radio-transmissions.<sup>239</sup>

The Group obtained new evidence of systematic, and often forced, recruitments in the territories conquered by AFC/M23. Several surrendered or captured ex-M23 combatants reported that they had been abducted by AFC/M23. Others reported that they had been enlisted by local chiefs after AFC/M23 compelled these local chiefs to select men from their respective localities for recruitment. This systematic increase in AFC/M23 recruitment efforts has also been confirmed by community leaders, civil society sources, humanitarian actors, UN sources and individuals close to M23.

The following cases documented by the Group are illustrative of the well-organized, systematic, and often coerced recruitment:

- Several former M23 combatants interviewed by the Group reported that most of the recruits trained in Tchanzu had been abducted by AFC/M23 prior to their forced enrollment in military training. Others were enticed by M23 with deceptive financial promises (see also [S/2024/432](#), para. 101). All M23 combatants interviewed by the Group reported that they had never been paid. AFC/M23 declared to new recruits and trainees that they would be paid for service only after the “liberation” of the DRC.

#### *Recruitment in Rubaya*

- In early May 2024, shortly after AFC/M23 took control of Rubaya, the AFC/M23 leadership instructed the town manager of Rubaya to enlist at least 10 young men from each street for AFC/M23. The town manager, in turn, requested each neighborhood chief (“Nyumbakumi”) to identify 10 recruits from their area. While some civilians volunteered, many were coerced or felt they had no choice, fearing reprisals against themselves and their families. The following day, the neighborhood chiefs, accompanied by M23 combatants, gathered the new recruits and brought them to Rubaya’s stadium, where they were presented to the crowd. The recruits were informed they would be fighting to ‘retake’ the country. One young man, recruited that day, reported that a total of 180 men were enlisted that day.<sup>240</sup> The recruits were then loaded into two trucks and transported to Tchanzu via Mushaki, Kitchanga, Mulimbi and Rutshuru, where all 180 recruits were enrolled in training (see annex below).

The presence of 180 recruits from Rubaya was confirmed by M23 combatants who completed their training in September 2024 (see annex below), together with recruits that arrived from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda.

<sup>237</sup> M23 combatants, UN sources, sources close to AFC/M23 and intelligence sources.

<sup>238</sup> M23 combatants, UN sources, sources close to AFC/M23, intelligence sources, civil society, and researchers.

<sup>239</sup> AFC/M23 launched a new radio transmitting from Bunagana on 3 June 2024.

<sup>240</sup> Other sources refer to 300 recruits.

Additional recruitment drives, including forced recruitment and abductions, were reported in Rubaya in July and August 2024.<sup>241</sup>

*Video of recruitment in Rubaya*

The Group also received a 12-minute video footage<sup>242</sup> of the public gathering at the stadium in Rubaya in early May (referred to by several former recruits interviewed by the Group – see above). The video depicts a massive crowd being animated by sanctioned individual “general” Bernard Byamungu ([CDi.038](#) and [S/2024/432](#), para. 41) who requested recruits to step forward, to join the army in order to “fight for self-defense”, and to participate in “politico-military training”.

Below: screenshots from the video of the gathering at Rubaya stadium, depicting “General” Bernard Byamungu speaking to the crowd, the new recruits paraded before the crowd, then loaded onto trucks that transported them for training in Tchangu.



Screenshot from video depicting “General” Bernard Byamungu addressing the crowd at Rubaya stadium.  
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member

Below: English translation of “General” Byamungu’s speech in the video<sup>243</sup> (original in Swahili)

---  
“General” Byamungu: Is it possible to achieve development without peace?  
Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: So, we must start with peace, and then we can think about development.  
Now, I want to ask all of you something important for our security, our peace, and our progress. To achieve this,  
we need everyone’s effort, don’t we?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: How many of you want us to advance all the way to Kinshasa?  
Audience: All of us!

“General” Byamungu: Are you all ready?  
Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Thank you. So, young people, how many of you are still strong and ready to join the army,  
in self-defense, or in a political-military framework, so we can combine our efforts and help the AFC movement  
advance?

Where are you? Raise your hands!

(Several hands go up)

“General” Byamungu: Are you all ready?

<sup>241</sup> UN sources, former AFC/M23 recruits, security sources.

<sup>242</sup> Video provided by an armed group combatant.

<sup>243</sup> Unofficial translation by the Group.

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready to join the army?  
Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready for self-defense?  
Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready for the political-military framework?  
Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: My brothers, together with our combined efforts, we can go very far. Do you understand me?  
Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: I’m only asking for 10 young people who can show they’re ready to join the army.  
Don’t you want to? Or do you want us to stay in insecurity?  
Audience: No!

“General” Byamungu: Where are the young people ready to join the army?  
*(One by one, people start stepping forward)*  
“General” Byamungu: Come, line up here.  
*(Several young people come forward and line up)*

“General” Byamungu: Welcome, welcome, my brothers. Unity is strength. Come, my brothers, so we can free our country, to liberate our country from the hands of the invaders. Tshisekedi has turned the country into his own farm, so welcome, my brothers. Unity is the strength that will free the country. Keep coming, my brothers. I want to tell you one more thing, my brothers, I have a question. Is the destruction of the road from Goma to Rubaya because of Paul Kagame?  
Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: Going hungry here, being beaten, being forced to pay taxes—is this also Kagame’s fault?  
Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: It’s due to the poor governance of Mr. Tshisekedi. And young women who want to join, come forward too. I can see there is great joy in your hearts.

-

Unidentified officer (*speaking as the trucks with the recruits are driving away*):  
You can see the young people are happy to go for training and later come back to protect us. The vehicles are no longer enough to hold them all.



Screenshot from video depicting recruits lining up before the crowd at Rubaya stadium

Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member



Screenshot from video depicting recruits lining up after the meeting at Rubaya stadium

Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member



Screenshot from video depicting recruits loaded into trucks in Rubaya, taken for training in Tchanzu

Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member

#### *Forced recruitment from Tchengerero*

- In April 2024, AFC/M23 arrested 22 civilians in Tchengerero and brought them to an AFC/M23 position in Runyoni, where they were subjected to forced heavy labor for several days. Thereafter, a truck belonging to AFC/M23 brought the 22 civilians to a detention facility in Rutshuru. After one week of detention, they were brought to a training center in Rutshuru, and trained by AFC/M23.

#### *Abduction from the Banyabwisha community in Tongo*

- In May 2024, 6 men from the Banyabwisha community were abducted by M23 combatants in Tongo. M23 combatants accused the Banyabwisha of being FDLR combatants and obliged them to get on motorcycles that brought them to Tchanzu for training. The abducted Banyabwisha reported that they had no choice as they would have been killed if they refused to join AFC/M23.

**Annex 15 (para. 42)****AFC/M23 military and paramilitary trainings****Entraînements militaires et paramilitaires du AFC/M23**

M23 and AFC increased recruitment and training efforts for both civil-administrative cadres – including police,<sup>244</sup> intelligence services, and political leaders – and combatants, the former to ensure the administration of the localities under AFC/M23 control ([S/2024/432](#), annex 5), and the latter to consolidate military capacity in view of extending territorial control.<sup>245</sup>

New AFC/M23 recruits were trained primarily at the movement's main military base in Tchanzu, but also in other AFC/M23 training centers and bases, including in Rutshuru (Birere neighbourhood), Bwito, Bwiza, Kiwanja and Nyongera. Imagery clearly shows a significant expansion of the Tchanzu training facility (see below). M23 combatants also received refresher courses in Rutshuru. Refresher courses were often organized prior to a planned military operation.

Recently surrendered and captured M23 combatants reported that “Colonel” Léon Kanyamibwa still commanded military training in Thanzu ([S/2024/432](#), para. 39) and was seconded by “Colonel” Moïse Byinshi and “Captain” Ernest Sebagenzi. M23 combatants consistently reported the presence of Congolese, UPDF and RDF training officers in Tchanzu. Many AFC/M23 leaders were present during, or visited, the training bases, including Sultani Makenga, Imani Nzenze, Bahati Erasto, Lawrence Kanyuka, Gacheri Erasto, Bahati Erasto, Ernest Sebagenzi, Willy Ngoma, “Colonel” Moïse Byinshi, and Mirindi.<sup>246</sup>

The Group documented the following information regarding several trainings and closing ceremonies in AFC/M23 military bases and training centers:

- From 6 to 21 April 2024, a leadership training took place in Nyongera, north-east of Kiwanja.<sup>247</sup> M23 combatants reported that there were about 700 trainees from different countries. The courses focused on training future AFC/M23 leaders (“cadres”) and was called “Dignity Intake 004”. The promotion of these future M23 cadres was presented as “the foundation to restore the dignity of all Congolese and the DRC”. Trainees were provided with theoretical and practical courses.
- On 1 July 2024, a new training started in Nyongera for around 500 new recruits.
- From 7 to 18 April 2024, another military training took place in Tchanzu. The training encompassed training of intelligence leaders, self-defense and military training. M23 combatants reported that about 400 trainees were present. Both theoretical and practical courses were provided, including “handling weaponry”, “infractions”, “information management”, “M23 ideology”.
- On 2 October 2024, a closing ceremony was held in Tchanzu<sup>248</sup> for 300 young M23 officers. Among the 300 officers trained, 20 originated from the Zaïre and MAPI armed groups in Ituri. The training of officers lasted 5 months. Three trainees died during the training.
- Between 25 September and 31 October 2024, at least 3,000 recruits completed their 5-months training in Tchanzu. On 31 October 2024, an additional 2,500 recruits were still in the process of being trained by AFC/M23. Amongst the latter 2,500 recruits, 600 came from the Zaïre armed group in Ituri. This was also confirmed by one high-profile Zaïre insider, a Zaïre combatant that participated in the training, surrendered and captured M23 combatants, and intelligence sources.

<sup>244</sup> From May 2024 onwards, new recruits wearing PNC-like uniforms were spotted in Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Bunagana.

<sup>245</sup> M23 combatants, sources close to M23, civil society, community leaders, eyewitnesses, UN sources and sources close to AFC/M23 leadership.

<sup>246</sup> Ex-M23 combatants, sources close to M23 and UN sources.

<sup>247</sup> -1.141638° - 29.437617°

<sup>248</sup> -1.334472° - 29.531933°

- M23 combatants who completed their training in September 2024 reported that trainees in Tchanzu were divided into “regiments” of 250 recruits each. Among one of the regiments trained there were 180 recruits who had been recruited in Rubaya (see annex 14 above) together with recruits that arrived from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda.
- The training encompassed several theoretical courses, including on “military rules”, “weapons management”, the “art of war” and “ideology”. After the theoretical introduction, new recruits received practical training, including on “war tactics”, “engagement rules” and “bush tactics”. Sultani Makenga attended at least one of the pass-out ceremonies of the two first “regiments”, in early September 2024.
- Refresher courses were organized amongst others in Rutshuru, quartier Birere.



Screenshots of videos showing military training in Nyongera on 23 September (picture 1) and 10 September 2024 (picture 2) received from confidential security source

**Annex 16** (para. 43)**AFC/M23 military and tactical training, ideology and indoctrination****Formation militaire et tactique, idéologie et endoctrinement de l'AFC/M23**

An increasing number of M23 combatants described the focus, during training, on theoretical courses including ideological persuasion, intelligence gathering, recruitment tactics and history of the DRC. Groups of recruits, amongst others a group of 25 recruits from South Kivu, received only theoretical courses and were thereafter redeployed to their areas of origin and tasked to provide intelligence from these localities and persuade local armed groups and individuals to join AFC/M23.

The Group obtained a copy of a notebook with handwritten notes taken by a trainee, listing the theoretical courses and the names of the trainers during a training provided in April in Nyongera:

1. Elements of Congo history (« Elements d'histoire du Congo ») by “professor” A. Kimanuka and “Colonel” Ernest Sebagenzi
2. DRC administrative organization: DRC institutions, democracy support commissions and security concept, constituent elements and human resources (« Organization administrative de la RDC: les institutions de la RDC, les commissions d'appui à la démocratie et notion de sécurité, éléments constitutifs et ressources humaines ») by “professor” Jeanot Munkeke
3. History of the Twirwaneho struggle (« Histoire de lutte des Twirwaneho») by “professor” John Mbananayo
4. Mobilization: mobilization techniques, mobilization channels, target analysis, mobilization stages/processes, quality of frameworks, types of communication, mass mobilization, communication and awareness-raising, organization and mobilization, commitment and participation, monitoring and evaluation. (« Mobilisation: techniques de mobilisation, canaux de mobilisation, analyse des cibles, étapes/processus de mobilisation, qualité des cadres, formes de communication, mobilisation des masses, communication et sensibilisation, organisation et mobilisation, engagement et participation, suivi et évaluation ») by Freddy Ngirabakunzi and Pascal Iradukunda
5. Weapons: AKM/SMG (« Silaha AKM/SMG ») by “Colonel” Kanyamibwa
6. Patriotism and Congolese identity (« Patriotisme et identité congolaise») by “professor” Babu Amaini
7. History of M23/ARC (« Histoire du M23/ARC ») by “professor” Munyaneza Bosco
8. Political philosophy of the AFC/M23/ARC revolution (« Philosophie politique de la révolution AFC/M23/ARC») by “professor” Benjamin Mbonimpa
9. The role of women and youth in the revolution (« Le rôle de la femme et la jeunesse dans la révolution ») by « Major » Claudine
10. War principles: tactics, training & battle drills (« Notion sur la guerre: tactique, formation & exercices de combat) by “Colonel” Kanyamibwa
11. The elements of leadership and revolutionary principles (« Les éléments du leadership et les principes révolutionnaires) by “professor” Désiré Rwigema Rukomera
12. The 8 pillars to reach any goal (« Les 8 piliers pour atteindre n'importe quel objectif », by “professor” Pascal Kasentre Uzamukunda

## Annex 17 (para. 44)

### M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Southern Front (southern Masisi territory and Nyiragongo territory)

#### Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le Front Sud (sud des territoires de Masisi et territoire de Nyiragongo)

Since the Group's last report, the area around Goma, from Sake through Kibumba remained tense and was marked by (i) shelling by both FARDC and M23/RDF, (ii) continued M23/RDF threats to South Kivu (see para. 104), and (iii) major AFC/M23 territorial advances, as illustrated by the events below.

##### *Sake area and southern Masisi territory – non-exhaustive list*

- On 30 April 2024, M23 took control of the mining sites of Rubaya in southern Masisi territory, one of the world's largest coltan mines (see also paras. 56-66)
- On 3 May 2024, RDF shelling impacted four different locations within IDP settlements<sup>249</sup> located in the Mugunga neighborhood of Goma, along the RN2 road between Goma and Sake, causing civilian casualties.<sup>250</sup> Details of the RDF shelling and preceding FARDC shelling are provided in annex 22.
- On 30 May 2024, M23 and RDF launched mortar attacks on FARDC and SAMIDIRC positions in Mubambiyo. One SAMIDRC soldier was killed, 13 injured and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) were destroyed, as also confirmed in a communiqué issued by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the following day (see communiqué below).
- On 18 June 2024, two M23/RDF projectiles landed in Mubambiyo and triggered SAMIDRC response, which started shelling towards M23/RDF positions in the hills overlooking Sake area.
- On 25 June 2024, M23/RDF mortar attacks on SAMIDRC positions resulted in two SAMIDRC soldiers killed, 20 injured and some material damage, as also confirmed in a communiqué issued by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the following day (see communiqué below). The Group notes that prior to M23/RDF retaliation, SAMIDRC had initiated artillery fire towards M23/RDF positions southwest of Sake, and reportedly fired 135 projectiles.
- On 27 June 2024, there were other artillery exchanges around Sake. On that same day, M23/RDF took control of Remeka, south-west from Sake and Ngungu, in southern Masisi territory and close to the South Kivu border.
- On 15 July 2024, M23/RDF<sup>251</sup> artillery shelling has hit the town of Bweremana, resulting in civilian casualties.
- On 3-4 September 2024, after almost two months of relative calm, clashes in the southern front close to South Kivu resumed, when Wazalendo armed groups together with FDLR launched attacks to recuperate Ndumba hill (12 kilometers southwest of Sake) from M23/RDF. Ndumba hill remained under M23/RDF control, however.
- One week later, the Wazalendo/FDLR coalition supported by FARDC artillery succeeded to recuperate Ndumba hill. Reports refer to artillery shelling by both sides.
- On 14 and 18 October 2024, M23/RDF and FARDC exchanged fire around Sake.

<sup>249</sup> Lushagala, Zone 14, 8 ième CEPAC and CBCA Rego. The Group did investigations in Lushagala and 8ième CEPAC IDP camps.

<sup>250</sup> The Group did not (yet) obtain access to the sixth unexploded shell.

<sup>251</sup> The Group recalls that in its final report, it established the de facto control and direction of RDF over M23 operations (S/2024/432, paras. 40-45).

*Kibumba area – non-exhaustive list*

- On 15 June 2024, after almost three months of relative calm in the Kibumba area, north of Goma, hostilities resumed when an anti-tank missile hit a joint defensive position of FARDC and the private military company Congo Protection ([S/2023/990](#), paras. 47-51) in Kanyamahoro, few kilometers south of Kibumba. Two FARDC soldiers and one Congo Protection staff were killed on the spot, while a second Congo Protection staff died in the aftermath of the event.<sup>252</sup> Several other FARDC and Congo Protection staff were wounded. Further details are provided in annex 23.
- On 24 June 2024, M23/RDF fired three mortars towards FARDC positions on Kanyabuki hill, west of Kanyamahoro.
- The period under review was characterized by continuous reports of M23 and RDF reinforcements in the Kibumba area (see also annex 17-18).

**MEDIA STATEMENT**

**DATE:** Friday, 31 May 2024

**EMBARGO:** For Immediate use

**SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE ENCOUNTER WITH M23 (AFC)  
AT SAKE IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), confirms that on Thursday, 30 May 2024, the SANDF members came into contact with M23 at Sake, in the battle ensued between M23 and our forces. 13 members were injured and one was fatally wounded. All the injured members were evacuated to Goma Hospital and are recuperating.

Meanwhile two Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) were damaged during the engagement.

Once all other information involving our members have been verified an update will be communicated and the family of the deceased member will be informed.

**ENDS.**

**Issued by:** South African National Defence Force  
(**Defence Headquarters**)

**Enquiries:** Siphiwe Dlamini  
(**Head of Communication**)  
083 410 1257

Statement on AFC/M23 attacks on SAMIDRC Camp in Sake on 31 May 2024, received from confidential SADC source.

<sup>252</sup> Security and FARDC sources, confidential reports and eyewitness accounts.



**the sandf**

Department:  
Defence  
**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

**MEDIA STATEMENT**

**DATE:** Wednesday, 26 June 2024

**EMBARGO:** For Immediate use

**SUBJECT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE CONFIRMS THE MORTAR ATTACK ON ONE OF OUR BASES IN SAKE, IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), confirms the mortar attack on one of our bases in Sake, in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 25 June 2024, which resulted in two fatalities and twenty injured. Four members who were critically injured have been hospitalized, whilst the rest who suffered minor injuries are expected to be discharged soon.

Families of the two members who lost their lives have been informed and all procedures to bring their mortal remains are in process. The names of the deceased will be communicated in due course.

**ENDS.**

**Issued by:** South African National Defence Force  
(**Defence Headquarters**)

**Enquiries:** Siphiwe Dlamini  
(**Head of Communication**)

Statement on mortar attacks on SAMIDRC on 25 June 2024, received from confidential SADC source.

**Annex 18** (para. 45)**M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Northern Front (Rutshuru and southern Lubero territories)****Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le front nord (territoires de Rutshuru et du sud de Lubero)***Southern Lubero – non-exhaustive list*

- In its last report, the Group reported that “the risk of M23 and RDF taking Kanyabayonga, entering Lubero territory and pushing further south along the Sake-Minova road remained high” ([S/2024/432](#), para. 34).
- On 27 June 2024, M23/RDF launched attacks from various fronts<sup>253</sup> and captured the strategic town of Kanyabayonga, Rutshuru territory, where FARDC had retreated to, with most of its military supplies, when RDF and M23 took control of Rwindi in March 2024 ([S/2024/432](#), annex 29). After intense fighting, FARDC troops commanded by General-Major Chico Tshitabwe ([S/2024/432](#), para. 80) and supported by the FDLR and Wazalendo armed groups withdrew northwards from Kanyabayonga leaving behind important weapon and ammunition stockpiles which were subsequently seized by M23 combatants.<sup>254</sup>
- Following the capture of Kanyabayonga, M23/RDF moved further north towards the southern parts of Lubero territory and took control of Kirumba, Kaseghe and surrounding areas on 30 June 2024. In only three days, M23/RDF conquered a stretch of 50 kilometers along the Kanyabayonga-Kaseghe road. In the meantime, FARDC controlled the RN2 axis until south Matembe, and relocated its headquarters to Lubero center. FARDC reinforcements were sent from Beni territory to Lubero center. Following M23/RDF take-over of Kanyabayonga, Wazalendo armed groups (in particular FPP-AP) and FDLR also withdrew to their traditional areas of influence in south-west and west Lubero territory. In early July, additional FARDC reinforcements arrived from Goma, Kisangani and Kananga.
- In early July 2024, AFC/M23 officially installed mayors (“bourgemestres”) in Kanyabayonga (on 7 July) and two newly conquered locations in southern Lubero (Kirumba on 3 July and Kaina on 5 July). AFC/M23 also organized meetings in Kanyabayonga aiming at sensitizing the local population for the AFC/M23 cause, further installing its parallel administration and encouraging new recruitments.
- M23/RDF operations in southern Lubero resumed on 19 August 2024 when it sought to strengthen its position in the south-western area of Lake Edward, in particular in Kamandi-Lac (east of Kirumba) where FARDC naval forces were still based. If taken, Kamandi-Lac would provide M23 increased access to Lake Edward. While FARDC maintained their control over Kamandi-Lac, on 26 August 2024 M23/RDF took control of Kivubo, east of Kirumba and along the route leading to Kamandi-Lac.
- On 3 November 2024, M23/RDF took control of Kamandi-gîte in the vicinity of Kamandi-Lac. Civil society sources reported that the M23 occupied the primary school “Vowisha”, where it installed its political bureau after having destroyed various classrooms.<sup>255</sup>

*Rutshuru territory – non-exhaustive list*

- From 2-4 August 2024, M23/RDF took control of several localities in north-eastern Rutshuru territory. On 2 August, it conquered Kiseguro. On 3 August, it took Nyamilima and continued towards Ishasha, the border post between Uganda and the DRC, that it conquered on 4 August. AFC/M23 soon began installing a parallel administration in these newly conquered localities. The Group notes that FARDC had already withdrawn from that area several months earlier, thus this territorial expansion did not involve armed confrontations. However, other state actors – police (PNC) and intelligence (ANR) – still present at the Ishasha border post in early August, were compelled to flee to Uganda following M23’s take-over of the area.

<sup>253</sup> Notably from Layi Layi near Kimaka (15 km SW Kanyabayonga), Butalongola (10km S of Kanyabayonga) as well as from Rwindi. UN, FARDC and civil society sources. Confidential document.

<sup>254</sup> FARDC and security sources. Sources close to M23 and RDF.

<sup>255</sup> Images on file with the Group

- On 7 August 2024, M23/RDF also conquered the port of Nyakakoma on the shores of Lake Edward, forcing the FARDC naval forces to flee.
- On 2 September 2024, following clashes between M23/RDF and Wazalendo/FDLR, M23 took control of Butare in Tongo area.
- Mid-September 2024, M23/RDF took control of Mashango, east of Kitchanga, known to be a CMC-FDP stronghold. One week later, M23/RDF took control of Marangara, east of Tongo, a known FDLR and CMC-FDP stronghold.

**Annex 19** (para. 46)

**M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Western Front (northern Masisi and Walikale territories)**

**Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le front occidental (territoires du nord de Masisi et de Walikale)**


- On 10 July 2024, M23/RDF took control of Nyange, 26 kilometers north-west of Kitchanga, resulting in large population displacements. M23/RDF also made advances towards Bibwe, Bweru and Lwama, north- west of Kitchanga, in July 2024.
- Between 19 and 25 August, M23/RDF took control of Lukopfu (8 kilometers sout-east of Masisi center), Karambi (15 kilometers southwest of Masisi center), Kaniro (11 kilometers southwest of Masisi center) and Kisuma bridge (10 kilometers southwest of Masisi center). Wazalendo armed groups repelled several M23/RDF attacks.
- On 20 October 2024, M23/RDF took control over Kalembe on the border between Masisi and Walikale territories. However, the Wazalendo (NDC-R Guidon and APCLS) pushed M23/RDF back on 21 October.
- On 23 October 2024, M23/RDF conquered Kalembe again and maintained its control over Kalembe.
- On 26-27 October 2024, after several days of intense clashes with the Wazalendo-FDLR-FARDC coalition, M23/RDF made significant advances on the Kalembe-Mpeti axis in Walikale, and took control of several localities including Malemo, Minjenje, Mpeti, Katobi. The series of clashes between M23/RDF and the Wazalendo/FARDC coalition triggered important population displacements towards Mutongo, and directly threatened Pinga. FARDC immediately sent reinforcements to Pinga. Multiple sources reported the important presence of RDF troops on the ground (see annexes 19 and 21).
- On 23 October 2024, M23/RDF conquered Kahira, 19 kilometers north-east of Masisi center, thus putting pressure on Masisi center, believed to be another M23 target.

## Annex 20 (para. 47)

### M23 and RDF's area of operations: evolution


#### Évolution de la zone d'opérations des M23 et RDF

- M23 and RDF's area of operations and presence in April 2024



Map reflecting the positions on 8 April 2024, received from confidential source


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Maps reflecting the positions on 15 April 2024, received from confidential source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

- M23 and RDF's area of operations and presence in **July 2024**:



Maps reflecting the positions on **10 July 2024**, received from confidential source


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Map reflecting the positions in **July 2024**, received from confidential source

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Image Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 1 January 2021  
 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement  
 or acceptance by the United Nations


- M23 and RDF's area of operations late October 2024:



Map reflecting the positions on 28 October 2024, received from confidential source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

- Evolution of M23 and RDF's area of operations from **November 2022** to **November 2024**:



Maps received from confidential source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

## Annex 21 (para. 50)

### Illustrations of RDF continued presence and support to M23

#### Illustration de la présence et soutien continu des RDF au M23

- Regarding the presence of RDF soldiers on DRC territory, see also:

- [S/2022/967](#), paras. 47-51 and annexes 29-32.
- [S/2023/431](#), paras. 54-61 and annexes 28-35.
- [S/2023/990](#), paras. 29-30 and annex 17.
- [S/2024/432](#), paras. 34, 40-45, 46-54, and annexes 22, 27, 28, 29 and 42.

The Group continued to obtain evidence – authenticated photographs, drone footage, video recordings, testimony and intelligence – confirming systematic border incursions by RDF and presence in Petit Nord. During the period under review, RDF positioned itself at the frontlines, operated high-tech weaponry, and directly engaged in combat (see also [S/2024/432](#), para. 40).

Former AFC/M23 recruits interviewed by the Group in Goma and in Beni all confirmed the presence of RDF soldiers, referring to them as the “Friendly Force”. They explained that this English term was generically used by everyone when referring to them. The former recruits were consistent in their description of them as highly trained and disciplined Rwandan special forces who were there to train and support M23, and that regular M23 soldiers were not allowed to interact with them. The “Friendly Force” soldiers moved around in military trucks, were equipped with full and high-tech military gear, and mostly led special military operations.

The following cases are illustrative of the systematic, well-organized, presence of RDF in support to AFC/M23. The list below is non-exhaustive, as the Group has additional files – imagery and documents – with evidence of RDF presence in other locations and on additional dates. Annexes 52-55 provides details of RDF handling of high-tech weaponry in Karuba (Masisi territory), Sake area, and Kanyamahoro (Nyiragongo territory).

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Kiwanja and Nyongera**

Imagery from 21 May, 8 and 11 June 2024, 22 July, and 2 August 2024, showed soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and uniforms similar to standard RDF-issued equipment sitting in the back of trucks and vehicles. Security and intelligence sources, as well as civil society sources and eyewitnesses identified the uniformed men as RDF soldiers.



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 21 May 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 8 June 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshots of video recorded in Kiwanja on 11 June 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 22 July 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 2 August 2024 received from confidential source

Imagery of 11 August 2024 shows RDF troop transports in Nyongera, north-east of Kiwanja. The presence of RDF in and around Nyongera, including at AFC/M23 training camp (annex 15) has been confirmed by eyewitnesses, civil society sources and intelligence sources.



Screenshot of video received from confidential source

- **RDF soldiers' presence in and around Kalembe**

- Late October 2024, M23 and RDF made significant advances on the Kalembe-Mpeti axis, and seized new localities in Walikale territory. Multiple sources – including eyewitnesses, intelligence sources, sources close to M23 and RDF, civil society sources and FDLR/Wazalendo combatants – reported the concentrated presence of RDF soldiers in the area. While the Wazalendo and FDLR were able to push back the M23/RDF from Kalembe on 21 October 2023, sources reported that M23 took back control two days later, when RDF reinforcements had arrived (see annexes 17-19).

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Kitchanga**

- Multiple sources reported that RDF had a key position in Kitchanga, in the Kahe neighbourhood, on the Nyangutu hill. According to information obtained by the Group, Brigadier-General Déo Rusanganya, present in Kitchanga,<sup>256</sup> was commanding the RDF in the area.

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Kibumba and Buhumba**

From June to early November 2024, civil society sources, local authorities, AFC/M23 sources, eyewitnesses and intelligence sources reported the continuous and repeated movements and presence of RDF soldiers in and around Kibumba and Buhumba. RDF troops and RDF vehicles arrived from the Rwandan side of the border and entered the DRC through Kabuhunga, south of Kibumba, and other border crossings in Kibumba/Buhumba, as was also previously reported [S/2024/432](#), annex 28). RDF troops entering through Kabuhunga and other border crossings in Kibumba/Buhumba reinforced troops, including in Kanyamahoro, passing through Katale, Ruthsru territory.

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Rumangabo**

Aerial footage shot on 2 September 2024 shows a column of soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment, marching from Rumangabo towards the north, in the direction of Rutshuru town. Civil society, eyewitnesses and security sources reported the presence of RDF in and around Rumangabo.



Screenshot of video recorded in Rumangabo on 2 September 2024 received from confidential source

<sup>256</sup> M23 combatants and security sources.

## Annex 22 (para. 52)

### RDF indiscriminate shelling of Mugunga with 122mm rockets, 3 May 2024

#### Bombardement aveugle de Mugunga par les RDF avec des roquettes de 122 mm, 3 mai 2024

In the morning of 3 May 2024, shelling with six rockets fired from the hills behind Sake impacted four different locations within IDP settlements<sup>257</sup> located in the Mugunga neighborhood of Goma, situated along the RN2 road between Goma and Sake. Five out of six shells exploded in and around the IDP camps without causing civilian casualties.<sup>258</sup> Only the explosion at the “8<sup>ème</sup> CEPAC” IDP settlement caused heavy casualties and material damage to civilian infrastructure.<sup>259</sup>

The shelling resulted in at least 17 civilians killed<sup>260</sup> and 35 injured, the majority of them women and children.<sup>261</sup> The DRC Government announced a final death toll of 35 civilians. The Group was unable to corroborate this number, as there are no official records or reliable testimonies to account for the 35 victims. The official memorial ceremony and the burial of 35 individuals took place on 15 May 2024, among suspicions voiced that the DRC government inflated the number of victims and that the 35 coffins presented were not in fact all victims of the bombing. The Group noted that two names appeared twice on the crosses accompanying the coffins, with different dates of death. This may point to irregularities in the process of accounting for the victims, and the number put forward by the Government remains unverified.

#### *122 mm rockets fired by RDF*

The Group confirmed that the explosions were caused by 122 mm rockets (see below for details on the 122 mm rockets remnants recovered at Lushagala IDP camp). The Mugunga neighbourhood had already been shelled with 122 mm rockets in February and April 2024, as documented in the Group’s final report ([S/2024/432](#), annex 42).

The 122 mm rockets were fired from military positions near Karuba in Masisi territory, from the hills overlooking Sake, north-west from Mugunga, an area controlled exclusively by RDF and M23 at the time of the incident (see below for details on the M23/RDF identified firing positions and estimated locations of impact below).<sup>262</sup>

The Group established that the portable single tube 122 mm rocket launchers (“Grad-P”) were operated by RDF soldiers.<sup>263</sup> Multiple elements support this conclusion. *Firstly*, the presence of RDF at the military positions north-west of Mugunga prior to and at the time of the incident was confirmed ([S/2024/432](#), annexes 39 and 42). *Secondly*, RDF possessed man-portable single-tube rocket launchers and 122 mm rockets ([S/2024/432](#), annex 42). *Thirdly*, the presence of a 122 mm rocket launcher at RDF positions northwest of Sake and near Karuba was documented earlier. It was also documented that RDF had used 122 mm rocket launchers in previous months during operations supporting M23 ([S/2024/432](#), annexes 39 and 42). *Fourthly*, the use of 122 mm rockets requires significant military expertise and extensive dedicated training.<sup>264</sup> While RDF has the technical ability and expertise to use 122 mm rockets, it is doubtful that M23 possesses sufficient expertise to handle alone this weapon system, despite having benefited from military training ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 35-39).<sup>265</sup> *Fifthly*, 24 hours prior to the attack, an individual close to RDF and M23 alerted the Group that RDF planned to attack Mugunga and Kibati. After the attack, RDF commanders acknowledged to the source that RDF had conducted the attack. *Sixth*, the Group was informed that following the attack, RDF leadership in Kigali instructed the RDF units (belonging to the 93<sup>th</sup> and 109<sup>th</sup> battalions) deployed on the ground to avoid targeting IDP camps.

<sup>257</sup> Lushagala, Zone 14, 8 ième CEPAC and CBCA Rego. The Group did investigations in Lushagala and 8ieme CEPAC IDP camps.

<sup>258</sup> The Group did not (yet) obtain access to the sixth unexploded shell.

<sup>259</sup> Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, intelligence and security sources. Group’s visit of Mugunga IDP sites on 25 June 2024.

<sup>260</sup> Nine deaths confirmed by medical sources; eight by community leaders and researchers.

<sup>261</sup> Medical, UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers and community leaders.

<sup>262</sup> Based on analysis of the trajectory of the incoming rockets and information provided by eyewitnesses, security, military and intelligence sources, community leaders, UN sources and confidential documents.

<sup>263</sup> Security and intelligence sources, sources close to RDF and M23.

<sup>264</sup> Military experts, security and UN sources.

<sup>265</sup> M23 ex-combatants, UN and intelligence sources. Confidential reports.

While the US and DRC Governments attributed the attack to the RDF and M23,<sup>266</sup> M23 and AFC leaders, as well as the Rwandan government, denied responsibility for the Mugunga attack (see the AFC communiqué on the Mugunga attack below).<sup>267</sup>

#### *FARDC positions close to IDP settlements*

Between 9 and 10 am on 3 May, prior to the RDF shelling of the IDP settlements in Mugunga, the FARDC had fired rockets towards RDF and M23 military positions on the Ngumba and Vunano hills in the area of Mushaki and Karuba, north-west of Sake.<sup>268</sup> Despite repeated warnings by humanitarian actors and MONUSCO against the positioning of artillery near or in populated areas (S/2024/432, para. 97),<sup>269</sup> FARDC units commanded by General Papi Lupembe (see also para. 70) fired shells from two separate multi-barrel-rocket launchers mounted on trucks, from two distinct artillery positions<sup>270</sup> located close to the IDP settlements impacted by the shelling (see details on the FARDC artillery positions under the heading below “*FARDC artillery positions near IDP settlements*”).<sup>271</sup> One FARDC artillery position was located at the Mugunga cemetery (Cimetière ‘Chemin du ciel’), at less than 500 m from the impact location of the RDF that killed civilians at the “8ème CEPAC” IDP site.<sup>272</sup> Another artillery position was identified at approximately two kilometers north-east of the Lushagala IDP settlement (see map below).<sup>273</sup>

The Mugunga shelling was likely a retaliatory action aimed at neutralizing the FARDC artillery positions, in response to FARDC/FDNB artillery firing.<sup>274</sup> While the impact on the IDP settlement was likely due to a targeting error, it does not exclude an element of planning by RDF with acceptance of significant collateral damage, as explained below.

#### *122 mm rockets as area-weapons are inherently indiscriminate*

A portable single tube 122 mm rocket launcher (“Grad-P”) is a type of artillery rocket system designed for area saturation rather than pinpoint accuracy. These rockets lack precision-guided technology, meaning they are typically fired in volleys that cover a broad area, rather than being aimed at specific targets with high accuracy. They are therefore highly effective against troop concentrations, enemy positions, or defensive lines. This area-effect capability inherently makes them “indiscriminate” when used near civilian populations, as the rockets impact within a broad zone rather than a specific target. Moreover, 122 mm rockets have an extensive fragmentation effect, intended to increase the weapon’s lethality and impact, causing damage not only from the explosion itself but also from the pieces of metal and other materials that fly outward, posing significant risks to personnel, equipment, and structures within the vicinity of the blast. This feature makes 122 mm rockets particularly dangerous in densely populated areas, as the fragments can injure or kill individuals far from the actual impact point of the explosion.<sup>275</sup>

In conclusion, 122mm rockets are by design area-effect weapons unsuitable for precise targeting. They cannot be accurately directed at a specific military target, rendering them indiscriminate when used in populated areas.

For this reason, under international humanitarian law the use of 122mm rockets in urban or civilian-dense environments is deemed as indiscriminate, as they are likely to cause unintended harm to civilians and infrastructure.

#### *FARDC artillery positions near IDP settlements*

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<sup>266</sup> Press Statement of US Department of State and communiqué of the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also SADC communiqué.

<sup>267</sup> Messages sent by M23 officers, Bertrand Bisimwa on X and press release of the Republic of Rwanda.

<sup>268</sup> Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, intelligence and security sources.

<sup>269</sup> Humanitarian and UN sources. Group of Expert meetings with FARDC, SAMIDRC and security sources.

<sup>270</sup> FARDC and security sources, IDP camp leaders.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid. UN sources. Group’s visit of Mugunga IDP sites on 25 June 2024.

<sup>272</sup> Group visit of Mugunga IDP camps on 25 June 2024, eyewitnesses, and confidential reports.

<sup>273</sup> I.e. at Nzulo and at approximately 2km east of the Lushagala IDP camp. Confidential and UN sources.

<sup>274</sup> Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, security and intelligence sources, confidential reports. The Group notes that it had been informed on the RDF planned operation to attack Mugunga and Kibati (see above).

<sup>275</sup> Military expert sources.

FARDC artillery nearby civilian settlements pose great risks for civilians due to predictable retaliatory attacks by the opposing side (see also [S/2024/432](#), paras. 97-98).

After the 3 May attack, humanitarian actors and IDP camp leaders renewed their appeal to cease the use of explosive weapons near populated areas. In the immediate aftermath of the shelling, the angered IDP population of Mugunga demonstrated against the FARDC, demanding them to remove artillery from the vicinity of the IDP settlements. The demonstration was also followed by explicit calls addressed to Military Governor Cirimwami to prevent the presence of artillery and of armed FARDC and Wazalendo near and within the IDP settlements.<sup>276</sup> FARDC artillery located near the IDP settlements have been removed following the 3 May incident, but IDPs reported to the Group that mobile artillery positions were occasionally still placed too close to the civilian settlements.<sup>277</sup>

#### **122 mm rockets remnants recovered at Lushagala IDP camp:**

The Group collected imagery recorded on 3 May 2024 at Lushagala and CEPAC IDP camps showing remnants of 122 mm rockets. Security, military, and UN sources, as well as ammunition experts, assessed that the employed weapon system was a Grad-P Complex (GPC) 122 mm tripod-mounted single barrel portable launcher. This weapon system was already documented by the Group. This system has a range of 25 to 30 kilometers.

See image below depicting the remnants of the 122 mm rocket:



Screenshots from video received on 3 May 2024 filmed by eyewitnesses in Lushagala IDP camp


<sup>276</sup> Interviews with IDPs and community leaders in Mugunga.

<sup>277</sup> Ibid.



Pictures received from confidential civil society and UN sources

- RDF firing positions and estimated locations of impact:



Maps and schematic overviews received from confidential sources

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, ©2024 Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Military, security, UN and intelligence sources identified the following positions as possible firing positions, all within the area controlled by RDF and M23:

- RDF ridgeline position north of Karuba; 1°33'31.36"S / 28°59'27.93"E where presence of 122mm rockets was documented ([S/2024/432](#), annex 42)
- Point 1800: 1°34'14" S / 29°01'34" E; or 1°34'45.51"S / 29° 2'10.00"E
- Kimoka: 1°33'07" S / 29°03'08" E
- Point 2120: 1°33'0.34" S / 29°02'21"

- AFC communiqué on the Mugunga attack:



### **COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL DU 3 MAI 2024**

Les crimes perpétrés ce vendredi matin à Goma par les troupes de Tshisekedi ne resteront pas impunis.

1. L'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) condamne fermement toutes les attaques contre des civils et des infrastructures civiles, surtout le bombardement de la ville et des camps de déplacés de guerre, qui a tué et blessé plusieurs congolais à Mugunga, dans la ville de Goma ce vendredi 3 mai 2024.
2. L'AFC rappelle que les attaques contre des civils et des infrastructures civiles sont interdites par le droit international humanitaire et de ce fait condamnées et punissables par la loi.
3. Il est à noter que chaque fois que l'offensive des forces négatives du régime de Kinshasa essuie un revers cuisant face à nos forces sur le champ de bataille, elles tournent leurs canons contre les populations civiles. C'est le cas notamment à Kibumba, Kibirizi, Mweso, Karuba, Mushaki, Kiorigrwe ainsi que dans plusieurs autres entités. Et cette tactique est devenue une habitude.
4. L'AFC met en garde le régime de Monsieur Tshisekedi contre tout agissement criminel envers les civils et s'engage à défendre la population contre toute autre menace terroriste à l'avenir de la part du régime de TSHISEKEDI.
5. L'AFC demande instamment au régime de Kinshasa de démilitariser toute la ville de Goma comme le réclame la population meurtrie depuis plusieurs mois par les actions criminelles de la coalition des forces négatives du régime de Kinshasa.
6. Le positionnement de l'artillerie lourde au milieu des populations civiles et dans les camps des déplacés est un crime de guerre qui vise à se servir de la population civile comme bouclier humain. Ces armes doivent être délocalisées afin de mettre la population hors de tout danger.
7. L'AFC demande à la population de la ville de Goma de rester mobiliser pour mettre fin aux actions criminelles de régime décadent de Monsieur Tshisekedi qui sera bientôt mis aux arrêts et traduit devant des juridictions compétentes pour répondre de ses exactions contre des innocents.

Fait à Bunagana, le 3 mai 2024



Document received from confidential M23 sources

- FARDC artillery positions on 3 May relative to shelling impact locations:



Schematic overview received from confidential UN source  
Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

## Annex 23 (para. 53)

### Guided anti-tank missile in Mubambiro

#### Missile guidé à Mubambiro

- On 10 June 2024, an armoured vehicle belonging to the Malawi contingent of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) was hit in Mubambiro. Whereas FARDC and SADC positions in Mubambiro had been repeatedly hit by mortar fire in preceding months ([S/2024/432](#), annex 40), excerpts from video footage of the shelling, both in flight and on impact, show that this time SAMIDRC was hit by an anti-tank guided missile.
- The imagery below shows the location of the SAMIDRC camp and hit SAMIDIRC armoured vehicle (picture 1), and the explosion of the guided missile (picture 2):



Image received from confidential UN source  
Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

- The imagery below shows the remnants of the missile recovered in Mubambiro proving the wire-guided capability. See also annex x below for additional information on this type of missiles.



Image received from confidential UN source

## Annex 24 (para. 53)

### Guided missile in Kanyamahoro

#### Missile guidé à Kanyamahoro

- On 15 June 2024, after almost three months of relative calm in the Kibumba area, north of Goma, hostilities resumed when another anti-tank missile hit a joint defensive position of FARDC and the private military company Congo Protection ([S/2023/990](#), paras. 47-51) in Kanyamahoro, few kilometers south of Kibumba. Two FARDC soldiers and one Congo Protection staff were killed on the spot, while a second Congo Protection staff died in the aftermath of the event.<sup>278</sup> Several other FARDC and Congo Protection staff were wounded.
- Imagery showing the location of the FARDC-Congo protection position and the location of the explosion of the guided missile:



Image received from confidential UN source  
 Map Data: Google, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, Imagery Date: 5 August 2019

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

<sup>278</sup> PMC and FARDC sources, confidential reports and eyewitness accounts.


- Imagery of the remnants of the missiles recovered in Mubambiro proving the wire-guided capability





Imagery received from UN and confidential security sources

- Schematic overview of the Spike-Extended Range (ER) guided missiles:



Source: [The most advanced anti-tank complex “Spike” \(topwar.ru\)](http://The most advanced anti-tank complex ‘Spike’ (topwar.ru))

The Group notes that: (1) this weapon system is new (markings show manufacture in 2021) and expensive; (2) the transport of this system, as well as its storage, is complicated and sensitive; (3) the supply of this weapon system is reserved for states; and (4) the use of the missile system requires extensive training. It is therefore highly unlikely that (i) local armed groups or the FDLR possess and/or use this type of weapon system, or (ii) that M23 could have handled this system without external support.

Several M23 combatants reported that sanctioned individual Bernard Byamungu ([CDi.038](#)) was responsible for the anti-tank missiles in the areas around Sake ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 36 and 41).

The Group is working on tracing the origin of these missiles.

## Annex 25 (para. 54)

### Spoofing and jamming of GPS systems in and around M23/RDF controlled areas

### Espionnage et brouillage des systèmes GPS dans les zones contrôlées par le M23 et RDF et aux alentours

Since late May 2024, while operating in and around M23/RDF controlled areas, the Global Positioning Systems (GPS) of different types of assets –UN military and civilian aircraft, MONUSCO surveillance drone, FARDC surveillance drones, humanitarian and commercial aircrafts, and different types of GPS devices – were impacted by jamming and spoofing attacks.<sup>279</sup>

Spoofing attacks result in the GPS receiver computing erroneous location or time; jamming attacks overpower GPS signals so that a GPS receiver can no longer operate. Jamming and spoofing can therefore be used to interfere with, and counteract, potential military attacks (for example by armed drones or attack helicopters) or aerial observations (for example by surveillance drones or aircraft).

The Group notes that jamming and spoofing carry significant risks as systems heavily dependent on GPS systems, including civilian and humanitarian aircrafts, may suddenly lose navigation capabilities and/or deviate from their intended course. According to information received by the Group, on several occasions since late May 2024, pilots of non-military aircraft were compelled to take manual control after suffering spoofing and jamming attacks while flying in the affected areas.

Spoofing and jamming attacks have been documented in areas around Goma, Kibumba, Sake, Kitchanga, Kanyabayonga and Bukavu (see map below).<sup>280</sup> The attack around Kanyabayonga was first documented early July 2024,<sup>281</sup> few days after M23 captured the town.

#### *Jamming and spoofing systems operated from DRC and Rwandan territories*

Three jamming and spoofing systems responsible for the signal interference described above were identified by location. One spoofing system was positioned on a hill in Gisenyi, in Rwanda, less than three kilometers from the DRC border.<sup>282</sup> Another system was detected at 500 meters from Kamembe airport in Rwanda, east of Bukavu, DRC.<sup>283</sup> A third system was detected in Kanyabayonga, on DRC territory.<sup>284</sup> Sources close to RDF and M23 informed the Group that RDF and M23 were at the origin of the jamming and spoofing.

The Group found no evidence of spoofing and jamming systems deployed by the FARDC, SAMIDRC, FDNB or private military companies.<sup>285</sup>

<sup>279</sup> Eyewitnesses, intelligence, security and military sources, imagery on file with the Group.

<sup>280</sup> Eyewitnesses, intelligence, security and military sources, confidential document and imagery on file with the Group.

<sup>281</sup> Eyewitness and imagery on file with the Group.

<sup>282</sup> 1°40'20.7"S 29°16'32.2"E (-1.672647° 29.275780°). Confirmed also by Military, security and UN sources

<sup>283</sup> -2.473400° 28.906000°;

<sup>284</sup> -0.682558° 29.182317°

<sup>285</sup> Interviews with SAMIDRC, PMC, FARDC, military and intelligence sources. Confidential report.

- Map showing the areas affected by jamming and spoofing



Map received from UN source. Red circles indicate areas affected by signal interference  
Map Data: Google, ©2024 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 1 January 2021

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

**Annex 26 (para. 54)****Jamming and subsequent crash of a MONUSCO surveillance drone****Brouillage et crash d'un drone de surveillance de la MONUSCO**


On 29 October 2024, MONUSCO lost contact with one surveillance drone that was conducting a reconnaissance mission in the area of Mpeti and Pinga, Walikale territory. While flying over Mpeti, the GPS system was affected by a jamming attack. The drone crashed close to Kikuvo, 15 kilometers from Kirumba, southwest of Lake Edward.

Picture of the crashed surveillance drone:



Picture published and shared on social media channels on 29 October 2024, provided by confidential source

Map showing the itinerary of the surveillance drone from the moment the system was jammed. The drone drifted from Mpeti/Pinga, where the GPS system was jammed and hacked, until it crashed the near Kivuvo:



Annotated map received from confidential UN source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Few hours before the crash, Lawrence Kanyuka – the M23 political spokesperson and AFC communication focal point ([S/2024/432](#), para. 27) – called on MONUSCO to stop using its drones and end its collaboration with “forces condemned by the UN for genocide and crimes against humanity”.

**NON HAINE LA VIOLENCE**  
NON HAINE LA VIOLENCE  
NON HAINE LA VIOLENCE

**Lawrence KANYUKA**

@LawrenceKanyuka

Nous appelons la MONUSCO à cesser l'utilisation de ses drones et à mettre fin à sa collaboration avec les forces condamnées par les Nations Unies pour génocide et crimes contre l'humanité. Ces forces coalisées du régime de Kinshasa ont volé plus de 50 vaches, tué deux gardiens et blessé deux autres ce mardi 29/10/2024 aux environs de 1h00 à Karungi Kwa Koki. Elle doit, au contraire, s'engager en faveur d'une résolution pacifique du conflit en cours. La non-assistance à personne en danger est condamnable.

8:19 AM · 29 oct. 2024 · 7 127 vues

Message published by Lawrence Kanyuka on [X](#)

## Annex 27 (para. 55)

### SHORAD system spotted in Karuba

#### Système SHORAD repéré à Karuba

The SHORAD system was spotted on 25 October, in Karuba ( $1^{\circ}34'21.18''$  S –  $28^{\circ}59'28.14''$  E), 6 kilometers west from Sake. The soldiers operating the SHORAD system are equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment (picture 3). Analysis of the imagery shows that the SHORAD system has characteristics virtually identical to the Norinco Type 92 Yitian TL-6 ([S/2024/432](#), annex 33).



Screenshots of video received from confidential security source

The Group notes that, even if it was confirmed that the SHORAD system and/or the vehicle were of Chinese manufacture, this does not mean that the material was transferred in violation of the sanctions regime. Rather, if confirmed, it would imply that the materiel was diverted from its intended legal end-use.

The Group sent a request for information to the Government of Rwanda on 29 October 2024 regarding the diversion of military materiel from its intended legal and end-user and/or end-use, including with regards to the SHORAD system.

Since the Group's last report, intelligence, civil society and security sources reported the observation of other SHORAD systems in (1) Kamulima ( $-1.142574^{\circ}$   $29.443923^{\circ}$ ) in April 2024; (2) Kahunga ( $-1.108805^{\circ}$   $29.393574^{\circ}$ ) in May 2024 (see also [S/2024/432](#), annex 23); and (3) Kitchanga ( $-1.247193^{\circ}$   $29.057567^{\circ}$ ) in May 2024; and (4) Rubaya ( $-1.543651^{\circ}$   $28.873837^{\circ}$ ) in May 2024. The three systems that were present on the ground as reported earlier ([S/2024/432](#), annex 34) have thus been mobile.

On 15 November 2024, at least 3 SHORAD systems were present in Petit Nord, namely in Kibumba (1), Kitchanga (1) and Karuba (1).

## Annex 28 (para. 56)

### Update on mineral traceability

#### Mise à jour sur la traçabilité minière

AFC/M23 takeover of mining areas in Rubaya spurred concerns among downstream industry actors on the risks of minerals from the eastern part of the DRC fueling the ongoing conflict.

On 8 May 2024, the former DRC Ministry of Mines issued an official communiqué, accusing M23 of levying illegal taxes on coltan and cassiterite traded to Rwanda. The communiqué also claimed that traders associated with M23 were transporting untagged minerals from Rubaya to Mushaki, and then on to Rwanda, passing through M23-controlled territory.

On 17 May 2024, the president of the North Kivu mining chamber, Ms. Yvette Mwanza, announced that members of the chamber would stop sourcing minerals from all of Masisi territory, turning to those extracted in Walikale and Lubero territories instead, to avoid financing M23 occupation of Rubaya.<sup>286</sup> From May to September 2024, production recorded by the North Kivu mining division dropped to 10.7 tons from mining sites in Walikale,<sup>287</sup> whereas during the same time AFC/M23 produced at least 150 tons per month in Rubaya.

#### *Responsible Minerals Initiative suspension of ITSCI*

On 5 July 2024, the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 141, 147 and 148 and annex 87) suspended ITSCI as a recognized upstream system in the DRC until at least January 2026.<sup>288</sup> According to the RMI communiqué, this decision resulted from a series of shortcomings relating to traceability in the DRC, which remained unaddressed by ITSCI. RMI criticized ITSCI for not providing sufficient responses to questions about risk management of conflict escalation impacting mineral trade in the DRC and Rwanda, which would not serve its mission of supporting regulatory compliance and responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAAs).

Consequently, RMI's members and smelters in the Great Lakes Region that rely exclusively on ITSCI's due diligence certification, did no longer meet the requirements to qualify for RMI's Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (RMAP).

The Group notes that the majority of economic actors mostly rely on ITSCI's certification to meet their due diligence obligations; they do not conduct independent quality controls to comply with the globally accepted international standards.<sup>289</sup>

On 8 July 2024, the United States issued a statement of concern about the illicit trade and exploitation of certain minerals - including artisanal and semi-industrially mined gold and tantalum – contributing to the ongoing conflict. The statement also pointed out that “minerals directly or indirectly benefit armed groups and move out of the country through Rwanda and to Uganda before moving to major refining and processing countries”. The statement pointed at “flawed industry-managed traceability initiatives on the ground in the DRC and Rwanda” among the risks of contamination of the mineral supply chain with minerals ineligible for trade.<sup>290</sup>

<sup>286</sup> <https://www.radiookapi.net/2024/05/17/actualite/societe/des-entreprises-boycottent-les-minerais-provenant-des-zones-occupees>.

<sup>287</sup> North Kivu Mining Division. Production was of 4237kg in May, 2230 kg in June, 2162kg in July and 2078kg in August.

<sup>288</sup> The statement can be consulted at <https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/news/rmi-update-on-itsci-recognition-and-great-lakes-region-due-diligence/>.

<sup>289</sup> OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

<sup>290</sup> <https://www.state.gov/statement-of-concern-related-to-certain-minerals-supply-chains-from-rwanda-and-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-contributing-to-the-ongoing-conflict/>.

**ITSCI press release of 8 May 2024**

PRESS RELEASE  
May 2024

**Suspension of ITSCI activities in Masisi territory following the presence of non-state armed group M23 in Rubaya town**

On Tuesday 30<sup>th</sup> April, the security situation deteriorated in North Kivu, DRC, with the M23 non-state armed group taking control over new areas, including the trading town of Rubaya.

This led to immediate halt to ITSCI activities and immediate evacuation of the area by ITSCI teams and state services. So far, there is no major impact reported on the security in Masisi town and Goma town.

Following the resumption of ITSCI activities in Masisi announced in April, all stakeholders, including provincial authorities, state services, companies, and civil society continued to implement risk mitigation measures, with ongoing support from ITSCI. This progressed well until the M23 arrived in Rubaya town and its surrounding area.

Working in high risk and conflicted areas present unique challenges, as shown in the situation in North Kivu which continues to evolve rapidly. Our OECD-aligned programme adapts to the reality on the ground while the safety of our staff is a topmost priority.

We continue to monitor the security situation very closely in communication with local authorities and security forces. Actions in recent weeks led by authorities, state services, and security forces, with support from ITSCI, have shown positive commitment and examples of multi-stakeholder approach to risk mitigation. This work will continue as soon as the situation allows.

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Press release also available on [ITSCI website](#)

## Ministry of Mines official communiqué of 8 May 2024



MINISTÈRE DES MINES

*La Ministre***COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL**

Les périmètres de l'ancien Permis d'Exploitation 4731, retiré par l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 00222/CAB/MINES/01/2023 du 14 juin 2023, sont désormais dans le domaine de l'Etat.

Une exploitation minière artisanale illicite continuait à se réaliser sur des sites miniers dans ces périmètres par les populations locales et les autochtones de Rubaya et ses environs. Les minerais extraits de ces sites, acheminés à Goma, n'étaient pas vendus parce que non tagués par le système de traçabilité à cause de leur origine illicite.

Pour contourner cette difficulté, les vendeurs de ces minerais prenaient une autre trajectoire Rubaya – Mushake (où le M23 avait, pour besoin de la cause, érigé un grand entrepôt) et de Mushake vers le Rwanda ou l'Ouganda pour traitement et exportation. Curieusement ces mêmes minerais, issus de l'exploitation illicite avec ses effets collatéraux une fois au Rwanda ou ailleurs, sont tagués et vendus normalement à l'international comme si dans ces pays il existait des blanchisseries des minerais de sang.

Informée de cette situation, la Ministre des Mines de la République Démocratique du Congo a autorisé à une Coopérative minière de la place de s'installer sur les sites exploités artisanalement dans les périmètres de l'ancien PE 4731, afin de fédérer tous les exploitants artisanaux présents avec l'assistance et sous l'encadrement du SAEMAPE et de la Division des Mines du Nord-Kivu, en vue rétablir la traçabilité des flux des matières et canaliser toute la production dans le circuit officiel de commercialisation avec l'aide des entités de traitement régulièrement agréées et ce, en attendant les dispositions spécifiques à prendre sur ce gisement.

Une fois au courant de cette démarche, le Rwanda via son préposé le M23, a intensifié des attaques contre Rubaya, aujourd'hui sous le contrôle de l'armée rwandaise.

Aussitôt établi dans cet espace, le M23 y a tenu une grande réunion avec tous les creuseurs et négociants, les autorisant à poursuivre l'exploitation artisanale. Ils achètent les minerais produits, les entreposent dans leurs grands dépôts de Mushake avant de les acheminer au Rwanda.

A cet effet, ils instaurent une taxe unique de 3.000\$/Tonne de Coltan et 2.000\$/Tonne de cassitérite et le paiement se fait à Kigali après-vente. Par ailleurs, ils ont saisi tous les minerais destinés aux comptoirs congolais et les ont orientés vers Rwanda.

Les informations en ma possession renseignent que le M23 a intensifié l'exploitation minière, y compris par les femmes enceintes et les enfants dans les sites miniers de Rubaya. Le Rwanda a opté pour une stratégie de diversion consistant à sursoir à l'exportation des produits miniers, de peur d'enregistrer une hausse des statistiques d'exportation à la suite de l'occupation de Rubaya. Les minerais exploités sont donc entreposés pour leur exportation ultérieure.

*lark*

(Suile)

Nonobstant cette manœuvre de diversion, il appert que les minerais de la filière des 3T exportés par le Rwanda proviennent de la fraude, de la contrebande, de l'exploitation illicite et des crimes perpétrés dans la partie Est de la République agressée par le Rwanda et le M23 et leurs attaques suivent la Direction des sites miniers. Le Rwanda exporte les minerais de sang, en violation des toutes les dispositions internationales et régionales en la matière.

Aussi, le Ministère des Mines de la RDC voudrait-il rappeler que le processus de la création de la CIRGL a été lancé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, dans le contexte des conflits armés dans la Région des Grands Lacs africains. Le Conseil de Sécurité avait alors reconnu la gravité de la situation en RDC et l'a même qualifiée de **menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationales et pour la Région**.

Le Ministère des Mines RDC attend de ses partenaires – Les Nations Unies et la CIRGL notamment – une affirmation sans ambages de l'engagement de tous les acteurs, y compris les consommateurs finaux des produits miniers, pour un approvisionnement sain et responsable en substances minérales et, partant, qu'un embargo soit décrété à l'encontre du Rwanda.

Cette option a l'avantage de freiner le financement des conflits par les minerais ; restaurer la confiance des parties prenantes ; protéger les intérêts économiques légitimes de l'Etat ; atténuer les violations des droits de l'homme par les groupes armés ainsi que les armées étrangères et rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 08 MAY 2024

Antoinette N'SAMBA KALAMABAYI



## Annex 29 (para. 57)

### Illustrations of documented breaches of mineral traceability

### Illustrations de violations documentées de la traçabilité des minéraux

Illicit trading has been reported by the Group since at least 2012, highlighting ongoing challenges in ensuring traceability,<sup>291</sup> and suggesting that efforts to improve supply chain transparency have been insufficient and/or ineffective. Yet, no previous violation reached the magnitude of the current 150 tons of coltan smuggled monthly from Rubaya to Rwanda.

The cases presented below provide specific examples of illicit trading of tin, tantalum, and tungsten (3Ts) minerals documented by the Group since 2013, excluding cases involving gold. The case studies reveal breaches in traceability across different years, from smuggling, illegal mining, and cross-site smuggling to the illegal sale of mineral tags.

Common issues that persist to this day, based on the case studies listed below:

- **Patterns of illicit mineral trading**, whereby minerals are traded illegally across borders, like the smuggling of coltan from the DRC to Rwanda (case 1) or cross-site smuggling (case 4).
- **Oversight issues**, whereby authorities or corporations knowingly or unknowingly allowed traceability violations. For example, illegal tagging by companies or falsifying origins with tags on the black market (cases 2 and 3).
- **Failures in traceability systems**: where the established traceability systems (like ITSCI tags) were manipulated, falsified, or ignored (cases 3 and 4).
- **Armed group involvement**: armed groups controlling mining areas or supply chains, such as Raia Mutomboki (case 2) or APCLS and PARECO groups (case 4).

#### 1. CIMIEX, AD Trade International and Union Mines smuggling of white coltan from the DRC to Rwanda (2013-2014)

- **Summary**: The Group reported on two companies based in Rwanda involved in the smuggling of white coltan from the DRC to Rwanda, under false origins (as if it was of Rwandan origin). Although the cooperation of the Rwandan authorities and a local smelter allowed to detect the fraud, the case reveals cross-border smuggling weaknesses in the system.<sup>292</sup>
- **Documented violations**:
  - In December 2013, “CIMIEX is purported to have supplied 10 tons of ‘white coltan’ to AD Trade International (exporter).” To determine whether the minerals had been smuggled from the DRC, the Government of Rwanda had compared them to samples from the mining sites that had been “fingerprinted” as part of Rwanda’s traceability efforts. The Government of Rwanda told the Group that, for the CIMIEX minerals, the field (mine) samples and the consignment (suspect) samples did “not appear to be plausibly similar”.<sup>293</sup> This thus implies that the white coltan sold by CIMIEX was smuggled from the DRC.
  - In December 2013, “Union Mines provided 1.8 tons of ‘white coltan’ to Phoenix Metals (exporter/comptoir)”. Phoenix Metals’ own testing showed that the consignment sample contained two types of coltan. The company’s test found that 80 per cent of the sample was made up of black coltan of the kind mined in Rwanda and that 20 per

<sup>291</sup> S/2024/432, paras. 138 and 145-147; S/2023/990, paras. 59-62; S/2023/431, paras 91-97; S/2022/479, para 78, annex 46; S/2021/560, paras 67, 69; S/2020/1283, paras. 42-44; S/2020/482, paras. 102-107; S/2019/469, paras. 149-164; S/2018/531, paras. 136-146; S/2017/1091, paras. 46-47; S/2016/466, para. 119; S/2015/19, paras. 114, 119, 158, 164, 165, 168, 170.

<sup>292</sup> S/2015/19, paras 174-177.

<sup>293</sup> S/2015/19, para. 175.

cent was made up of white coltan, which was not found in Rwanda; yet it was available in the DRC.<sup>294</sup> Phoenix Metals told the Group that it had not purchased the minerals because of doubts about their origin<sup>295</sup>

## 2. Illegal mining by armed groups and sale of mineral tags in Rwanda (2014-2015)

- **Summary:** The case documented in 2015 reveals illegal mining and trade practices with the involvement of an armed group (Raia Mutomboki, operating in South Kivu). Cassiterite and other 3T minerals originating from South Kivu were smuggled to Rwanda.<sup>296</sup> According to the Group, mineral tags were misused and sold on the black market, with the complicity of Rwandan companies and tagging agents of the Geology and Mines Department of the Rwandan Ministry of Mines, who signed the mine site logbooks.<sup>297</sup>
- **Documented violations:**
  - From November 2014 to May 2015, 126,228.5 kg of cassiterite sourced from areas under Raia Mutomboki control had flown to Kavumu airport, near Bukavu.
  - In 2015, the Group reported that cassiterite and other 3T minerals originating from Lulingu and other areas of South Kivu Province were transported across Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River to Rwanda. The Group also documented an attempt to smuggle 77 bags with a total of 4,425 kg of coltan during the night of 2-3 March 2015, using the Bukavu road to the Ruzizi River, downplayed by the FARDC intervention.<sup>298</sup>
  - In June, July and August 2015, the Group documented the sale of 12 mineral tracing tags and associated paperwork on the black market by three Rwandan companies: RF&GM, Africa Multibusiness Line and Société minière du Kanama (SOMIKA). The documentation included tags, copies of mine site logbooks, ministerial orders attributing mineral research licenses to the three companies and administrative documents allowing employees to transport the minerals.<sup>299</sup>

## 3. Illegal tagging of minerals from non-certified sources (2017)

- **Summary:** The documented cases reveal issues of illegal tagging (through sale of tags on black market) of non-certified minerals originating from North Kivu, as well as the contamination of the supply chain due to armed group activity.<sup>300</sup> Illegal mining of tin, tungsten, and tantalum continued, including in protected areas in the DRC such as the Virunga National Park, revealing lack/failure of oversight and traceability.
- **Documented violations:**
  - The Group reported that in the trading centre of Ndjingala, in Mubi and Walikale town (Walikale territory, North Kivu), tags were sold on the black market, allowing minerals sourced from the non-validated site of Bisie (see S/2014/42, para. 206, annexes 79 and 83) and Mpafu/Nyakoba to permeate the legal chain of custody. Tags could be purchased for about \$3 per 50 kg bag of minerals, or \$500 per 10 tons.<sup>301</sup>

<sup>294</sup> S/2015/19, para. 176.

<sup>295</sup> S/2015/19, annex 49.

<sup>296</sup> S/2015/797, para 53-59.

<sup>297</sup> S/2015/797, para. 60.

<sup>298</sup> S/2015/797, para 57-58.

<sup>299</sup> S/2015/797, para 59 and annexes 13 to 15.

<sup>300</sup> S/2017/672, para. 77-86 and 93-98.

<sup>301</sup> S/2017/672, para. 77-86.

- The Group documented that tagging of minerals from the mining sites of Rubonga in Masisi territory and Kalay Boeing in Walikale territory continued. This was the case after ITRI Ltd suspended these sites due to the proven presence of armed groups there.<sup>302</sup>

#### **4. Cross-site mineral smuggling (2019-2024)**

- **Summary:** The documented cases reveal patterns of cross-site smuggling of coltan in Masisi and Rubaya, illicit tagging practices, armed group involvement, and intentional misrepresentation of the origin of minerals manipulating the loopholes of the ITSCI tagging system.<sup>303</sup>
- **Documented violations:**
  - Throughout 2019 and early 2020, coltan produced at Kamatale site in Masisi territory were transported untagged to Ngungu, Masisi territory, where the coltan was tagged in a depot belonging to the Société aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (SAKIMA SA). Also, between January and October 2019 minerals extracted under the control of APCLS, Nyatura FDDH and Nyatura Matata armed groups were tagged in Ngungu as local production. Minerals tagged in Ngungu were then sold to the Coopérative des artisanaux miniers du Congo (CDMC).
  - The Group reported extensive cross-site smuggling of coltan from the PE4731 exploited by the Société Minière de Bisunzu SARL (SMB) in Rubaya to adjacent validated but non-productive sites in the PE76, again through Ngungu.<sup>304</sup> Most of the smuggling was orchestrated by COOPERAMMA, then under the executive leadership of Shamamba Enoch. The smuggling was financed by the then COOPERAMMA “president” Robert Habinshuti Seninga.<sup>305</sup>
  - In 2023 and early 2024, Rubaya area was occupied by PARECO armed group. This resulted in minerals extracted in Rubaya being ineligible for trade. Yet minerals continued to be extracted and smuggled untagged.<sup>306</sup> Despite consecutive suspensions, ITSCI continued to tag Rubaya minerals from the PE76 permit, claiming that only PE4731 was under armed group control, and ignoring several accounts of cross-site smuggling from PE4731 to PE76.<sup>307</sup> UN sources and the Group estimated that in 2023, 400 tons of coltan from PE4731 in Rubaya were smuggled into the legal supply chain through PE76.<sup>308</sup> In 2024, the Group reported on 36 tons of untagged coltan extracted in Rubaya while the tagging system was suspended at that time, and thus not eligible for trade.<sup>309</sup>

<sup>302</sup> [S/2017/672](#), para. 93-98.

<sup>303</sup> [S/2020/482](#), paras 97, 99.

<sup>304</sup> [S/2020/482](#), paras 102, 103; [S/2021/560](#), paras 67, 69.

<sup>305</sup> [S/2022/479](#), para 78, annex 46; [S/2021/560](#), paras 67, 69.

<sup>306</sup> [S/2024/432](#), para. 141 and annex 83.

<sup>307</sup> [S/2023/431](#), paras 91-97; [S/2023/990](#), paras. 59-62; [S/2024/432](#), paras. 138 and 145-147.

<sup>308</sup> Unpublished UN report.

<sup>309</sup> [S/2024/432](#), para. 141 and annex 83.

**Annex 30 (para. 58)****AFC/M23 monopoly over coltan production and trade in Rubaya directly benefitting smuggle to Rwanda****Le monopole de l'AFC/M23 sur la production et le commerce du coltan à Rubaya profite directement à la contrebande vers le Rwanda**

Although AFC/M23-approved traders had little profit margin per kilo of coltan purchased, they still benefitted from their trade monopoly and the high volumes of minerals sold.

According to economic actors, civil society representatives, and officials from the DRC's Ministry of Mines and security services, AFC/M23's decision to launch an attack and seize control of Rubaya in late April 2024 was primarily motivated by a strategic need to monopolize the only viable route for mineral evacuation. This move would ensure that AFC/M23 maintained exclusive control over this critical supply chain. Furthermore, these sources reported that AFC/M23 sought to make Rwanda the sole transit market for these minerals, thereby securing a continuous flow of coltan from Rubaya to Rwanda.<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Economic actors, civil society, DRC Ministry of Mines, security sources.

**Annex 31 (para. 59)**

**AFC/M23 communique on 07 May 2024**

**Communiqué AFC/M23 du 07 mai 2024**



*Le Coordonnateur*

**DÉCISION N°001/COORDO/AFC/2024 PORTANT INTERDICTION D'IMMIXTION DES MEMBRES, CADRES ET PERSONNEL POLITIQUE ET MILITAIRE DE L'ALLIANCE FLEUVE CONGO DANS L'EXPLOITATION ET LA COMMERCIALISATION DES SUBSTANCES MINÉRALES IDENTIFIÉES DANS LES TERRITOIRES LIBÉRÉS**

**Le Coordonnateur de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC),**

- Vu la Constitution telle que modifiée et complétée à ce jour par la Loi N°11/002 du 20 janvier 2011 en son article 64 alinéa premier ;
- Vu l'Acte Constitutif de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), spécialement en son article 3 alinéa 3 ;
- Vu le procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil de l'AFC du 15/12/2023 portant désignation du Coordonnateur de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo ;
- Considérant les conclusions de l'Atelier de Consolidation des Actes fondateurs du Conseil de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo du 20/12/2023 ;
- Considérant que l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) mène une révolution constitutionnelle (Article 64, alinéa premier) conforme aux lois en vigueur en République Démocratique du Congo, et aux conventions internationales notamment celles relatives à la protection des droits de l'homme ;
- Considérant les conclusions de la réunion du Conseil de l'Alliance du 28 mars 2024 relative au maintien de la discipline de corps pendant la lutte de libération jusqu'à la victoire finale par la conquête de tout le territoire national dans ses neuf (9) frontières constitutionnelles ;
- Considérant que la lutte de libération n'a pas pour objectif la recherche du gain personnel ni l'enrichissement illicite mais elle tient principalement à : (1) créer un État de droit et rétablir la normalité démocratique en République Démocratique du Congo ; (2) lutter contre toutes les antivaleurs ainsi que toute sorte de prédatation et (3) favoriser le vivre-ensemble entre congolais ;

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "JF", is placed at the end of the list of considerations.

- Dans le souci d'imprimer **dorénavant** le changement pour lequel l'on se bat contre **l'arbitraire** et de prévenir tout abus pouvant affecter négativement les activités économiques ;
- Considérant la nécessité pour les opérateurs économiques de poursuivre normalement leurs activités dans le strict respect de la loi ;
- Vu l'urgence et la nécessité ;
- Le **Coordonnateur Militaire** entendu dans ses avis et considérations ;

**DECIDE :**

**Article 1<sup>er</sup>** : Il est strictement interdit à tous les membres, cadres et personnel politique de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) ainsi qu'à tous les officiers et éléments de l'Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise (ARC), de s'immiscer et/ou d'être mêlés, de quelle que manière que ce soit, dans les activités d'exploitation et de commercialisation de toutes les substances minérales identifiées dans les territoires libérés.

**Article 2** : Les opérateurs économiques remplissant toutes les conditions exigées par la législation et la réglementation en vigueur, sont encouragés, à poursuivre leurs activités normalement dans le strict respect de la loi.

**Article 3** : Tout accès des enfants mineurs aux sites d'exploitation minière sur les territoires libérés est strictement interdit.

**Article 4** : Les différents organes de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution de la présente décision qui sort ses effets à la date de sa signature.

  
Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO



Rutshuru, le 07 mai 2024

E-mail: alliancefleuve@dc@gmail.com, Tél : +244 71 682 4304, www.alliancefleuvecongo.org



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Statement published on Lawrence Kanyuka's social media account  
<https://x.com/LawrenceKanyuka/status/1786749943488606544/photo/1>

**Annex 32 (para. 59)**

**Selected pictures of ongoing mining in Rubaya in October 2024**

**Images des opérations minières à Rubaya en octobre 2024**



Images provided by confidential Rubaya dwellers

## Annex 33 (para. 62)

### Mineral transport route from Rubaya to Rwanda

### Route de transport des minerais de Rubaya au Rwanda

The map below highlights the transit route (blue) of minerals from Rubaya mining area (in red) through Rubaya, Bihamwe, Mushaki and Kirolirwe in Masisi territory, as well as through Kitshanga, Kizimba, Bishusha, Mulimbi, Tongo and Kalengera in Rutshuru territory, Kibumba, Kasizi and Buhumba in Nyiragongo territory, and Kabuhanga in Rwanda.

### Itinerary of AFC/M23 mineral convoys from Rubaya to Rwanda



October 2024 Group of Experts elaboration on Openstreetmap™ base map

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

**Annex 34 (para. 63)**

**Border crossings from Kibumba area into Rwanda**

**Postes de frontière entre Kibumba et le Rwanda**

The following satellite pictures show the border crossing points from Kibumba (Kasizi and Buhumba), DRC, to Rwanda, used for the trafficking of minerals.

**Crossing point 1 from Kasizi (DRC) to Kabuhanga (Rwanda)**



Planet™ satellite image on 05 October 2024, annotated by the Group of Experts

The highlighted area points to the road on the DRC side which was widened to allow for heavy truck traffic to Rwanda.

On a Google Earth image dating from July 2023 (see below), this road is smaller and not suitable for truck transit. Eyewitnesses reported that works were engaged by AFC/M23 to make this road crossing to Rwanda suitable for truck traffic. The works were completed by September 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Maps Data: Google, ©2024 **Airbus**, CNES/Airbus, Imagery Date: 1 November 2024. Image of the Kasizi – Kabuhanga border crossing in July 2023. The road highlighted in the image above does not appear on this image.

Eyewitnesses confirmed that in 2023 the road was only suitable for pedestrian and motorbike traffic.


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

**Annex 35 (para. 63)**

**Loaded trucks leaving Kibumba parking on 26 September 2024**

**Camions chargés en train de quitter le parking de Kibumba le 26 septembre 2024**

Planet™ satellite image taken on 26 September 2024 of Kibumba market, showing heavy duty trucks at the loading area of the parking lot in Kibumba. This picture corroborates eyewitnesses accounts of minerals being regularly offloaded at the exact same location from vehicles coming from Rubaya, and then loaded onto heavy duty trucks that trafficked the minerals across the border to Rwanda.



Planet™ satellite image on 26 September 2024, annotated by the Group of Experts

**Annex 36** (para. 68)**Calls to end support to, and collaboration with armed groups, including the FDLR****Appels à mettre fin au soutien et à la collaboration avec les groupes armés, y compris les FDLR*****Security Council Press Statement on Democratic Republic of Congo***

In its press statement issued on 25 October 2024, available [online](#), the members of the Security Council “called on both parties to fully cooperate with Angola in order to speed up the finalization and implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of foreign forces. They urged the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to engage in the process in good faith and to seize the opportunity to conclude a lasting, peaceful solution to the protracted conflict in the region.”

The members of the Security Council also “reiterated their condemnation of all armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including M23, ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) and FDLR. They further condemned foreign military support provided to M23 and any other armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They demanded the cessation of such support and the immediate withdrawal of any such external party from the Democratic Republic of the Congo territory. They also condemned support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the FDLR and demanded the cessation of such support.”

***African Union Communiqué of the 1222nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 15 July 2024, on the role of mediation and reconciliation in conflict resolution in eastern DRC.***

In its communiqué, available [online](#), the African Union expressed “grave concern over the increasing intensity of M23 attacks, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which have worsened the security insecurity and the suffering of civilian in the eastern DRC”, and demanded these armed groups, including the FDLR, “to immediately and unconditionally cease their attacks and reiterates the call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all armed groups, from the eastern DRC, in line with the Communiqué of the Mini-Summit of Luanda of 23 November 2022.”

***US Government Press Statement on the violation of the Ceasefire in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo***

In a statement issued on 8 November 2024, the US reiterated its “longstanding call on the Government of DRC to stop collaboration with the US and UN-sanctioned Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group, and take immediate steps to demobilize it.”

# Violation of the Ceasefire in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

PRESS STATEMENT

MATTHEW MILLER, DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON

NOVEMBER 8, 2024

The United States is gravely concerned by the ceasefire violations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since October 20 by the Rwandan-backed, U.S.- and UN-sanctioned M23 armed group. M23 must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from its positions in Walikale territory, North Kivu Province. We reiterate our longstanding call for Rwanda to immediately withdraw all Rwanda Defense Force personnel and equipment from the DRC, including its surface-to-air missile systems, and to cease GPS disruptions. We also reiterate our longstanding call on the Government of DRC to stop collaboration with the U.S.- and UN-sanctioned Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group and take immediate steps to demobilize it.

The Luanda Process led by Angolan President João Lourenço has made important progress, including the operationalization of the Angola-led Reinforced Verification Mechanism, the technical-expert-level agreement on a plan for the FDLR armed group, and the disengagement of uninvited foreign forces from the DRC. We call on all parties to abide by their commitments under the Luanda Process. All states should respect each other's sovereignty, protect all civilians, and hold those responsible for human rights abuses accountable.



Source: US Government, available [online](#)

## *Statements issued by the Government of France*

- In February 2024, France called on all armed groups to end the violence, and explicitly condemned the FARDC's collaboration with the FDLR, stating that "in accordance with their commitments, the armed forces of the DRC must cease all collaboration with the FDLR, the militia movement that committed the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994."
- More recently, on 25 October 2024, France reiterated its full support for the Luanda process to find a lasting solution to the conflict and called on the parties to implement without delay the commitments made within this framework, referring to the DRC's engagement to neutralize the FDLR and thus cease its collaboration with this sanctioned armed group.

# République démocratique du Congo - du pays (20 février 2024)

Partager   

La France est très préoccupée par la situation dans l'Est du Congo, dans le Nord Kivu et en particulier autour de Goma et de Saké. Les atteintes à l'intégrité territoriale de la RDC et la situation des populations civiles sont inadmissibles. La France condamne la poursuite des offensives du M23 avec le soutien du Rwanda, et la présence des forces rwandaises sur le territoire congolais.

Le M23 doit cesser le combat immédiatement, et se retirer de toutes les zones qu'il occupe, conformément aux décisions prises dans le cadre du processus de Luanda. Nous appelons le Rwanda à cesser tout soutien au M23 et à se retirer du territoire congolais. La France appelle l'ensemble des groupes armés à mettre un terme aux violences. Conformément à leurs engagements, les forces armées de RDC doivent cesser toute collaboration avec les FDLR, mouvement issu des milices ayant commis le génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994.

La France réitère son plein soutien aux processus régionaux de médiation pour trouver une solution négociée au conflit.

Source: French government. Statement available [online](#)

# République Démocratique du Congo - Reprise des combats à l'Est du pays (25 octobre 2024)

Partager   

La France condamne la poursuite des offensives du M23. Le cessez le feu en cours, négocié dans le cadre du processus de Luanda, doit être strictement respecté. La France réitère son plein soutien au processus de Luanda pour trouver une solution durable au conflit. Elle appelle les parties à mettre en œuvre sans tarder les engagements pris dans ce cadre.

La France réaffirme son attachement à l'intégrité territoriale et à la souveraineté de la RDC. Alors que la crise actuelle entraîne de graves conséquences humanitaires, la France appelle l'ensemble des groupes armés à mettre un terme aux violences pour permettre aux opérations onusiennes et aux organisations humanitaires de mener à bien leurs activités et leurs activités. La protection des populations civiles et la réponse à leurs immenses besoins en dépendent.

## République démocratique du Congo

- Présentation de la République démocratique du Congo
- Relations bilatérales
- Événements
  - République Démocratique du Congo combats à l'Est du pays [25.10.24]
  - Grands Lacs – La France salue le cessez le feu RDC (31.07.24)

Source: French government. Statement available [online](#)

**Annex 37 (para. 68)**

**Note Verbale signed by the Presidency's Chief of Staff to relocate to the DRC six Rwandan nationals tried for genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda**

**Note Verbale signée par le chef de cabinet de la Présidence pour relocaliser en RDC six nationaux rwandais jugés pour génocide par le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda**



Document provided to the Group by confidential source

## Annex 38 (para. 72)

### Seized weapons and ammunition during FARDC operation against FDLR

#### Armes et munitions saisies lors de l'opération FARDC contre les FDLR

During the operations against the FDLR on 23-24 September at Chove, Kimoka, Lupango and Mubambiro, and inadvertently against APCLS on 25-26 September 2024 in Rusayo, the FARDC recovered the following weaponry, that the Group was able to inspect in Goma:

- 22 assault rifles
- RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher
- RP-46 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG)
- 5,4259 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39 mm, 7.63 x 39 mm, 7.62 x 54R mm)
- 30 mm HE Round IO-30 (VOG-17) for Automatic Grenade Launcher AGS-17
- 40 x 46mm M406 type LV grenades
- OGV-7V 40mm
- (ОГ-7В) grenades
- 40 mm Ogi-7MA High Explosive Fragmentation Rocket
- 40 mm PG-9P propellant charge
- 40 mm Rocket propelling charge
- PG-9 propellant charge

Some of the seized materiel was produced recently, i.e. in 2020, 2021 and 2022.

The Group conducted investigations on the possible origin of this weaponry, and sent official communications to various governments, requesting information relevant to the identification and tracing of this weaponry.

Following tracing requests sent to the Republic of Bulgaria, the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria provided the following information:


- It confirmed that the OG-7V 40 mm rocket (**#1 below**) and 40 mm rocket propellant charge (**#2 below**) were of Bulgarian production, exported in 2022 to the DRC Ministry of Defense, following notification to the UN Security Council Committee.
- It confirmed that the PG-9P propellant charges (**#3 below**) are of Bulgarian production, part of a set PG 9V with serial number 2-18-(11). The entire produced quantity was exported in 2018 to the Ministry of Defence of Rwanda as importer and end-user.
- It confirmed that the entire produced quantity (10,000 pieces) of 40mm Ogi-7MA High Explosive Fragmentation Rockets with serial number 10-03-22 (**#4 below**) was exported in 2022 to the DRC Ministry of Defense following notification to the UN Security Council Committee. The FARDC were the agreed end-user.

The Group is working on tracing the origins of the seized weapons and ammunition, to elucidate how FDLR and APCLS obtained the equipment.

#1 -OG-7V 40 mm rocket




#2 - 40 mm rocket propellant charges:



## #3 - PG-9P propellant charges



## #4- 40 mm OGi-7MA rockets:




Photos taken by the Group

**Annex 39 (para. 74)**

**APCLS communiqué seeking clarification on those responsible for the FARDC attacks on its positions in Rusayo**

**Communiqué de l'APCLS demandant des éclaircissements sur les responsables des attaques des FARDC contre ses positions à Rusayo**



**COMMUNIQUE N°021/CAB-GEN/APCLS/SEPT/2024.**

Alliance du Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain, APCLS en sigle, informe que :


1. C'est avec regret qu'avons appris, ce ~~26 mai~~ <sup>Sept</sup> 2024 à 4h30 qu'une de nos positions de RUSAYO a été attaquée par les éléments du General PAPY, Commandant 11<sup>ème</sup> Brigade des FARDC.
2. L'APCLS déplore les dégâts collatéraux dont matériels et humains causés par cette attaque et demande que la justice soit faite.
3. L'APCLS demande d'éclairer l'origine de l'ordre de cette attaque sur nos positions surtout que nous sommes en défensive contre l'ennemi qui vise la ville de Goma comme cible à conquérir.
4. L'APCLS se réserve le droit de répliquer à toutes éventuelles provocations anti patriotiques d'où qu'elles viennent .



Fait à Nyabiondo, le 26 Septembre 2024

Pour l'APCLS

BUINGO KARAIRI janvier




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Document provided to the Group by a confidential member of the APCLS armed group

**Annex 40 (para. 74)****Communiqué of Guidon Shimiray Mwissa following the FARDC mistaken attack on APCLS****Communiqué de Guidon Shimiray Mwissa à la suite de l'attaque erronée des FARDC contre l'APCLS**

Lt.-General Guidon condemned the FARDC's attack on the APCLS in Rusayo, emphasizing that the FARDC and VDP shared a mission to defend the integrity of the national territory. He called on all Congolese to unite against the perceived aggression by M23 and RDF, warning that this division risked the fragmentation of the country. He urged the VDP to uphold patriotic discipline and avoid actions that might aid the enemy, while also encouraging the FARDC to demonstrate professionalism in recognition of the VDP's commitment to national defense.



Document provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources

**Annex 41** (para. 75)**Examples of FDLR survival strategy****Exemples de la stratégie de survie des FDLR**

- **FDLR embedded within VDP/Wazalendo units**

Fearing new FARDC operations against FDLR leadership and bases, FDLR and Wazalendo groups jointly reinforced their defenses. Their main strategy was to embed FDLR combatants within VDP/Wazalendo units active in Rutshuru, Masisi and Nyiragongo territories, and claim that FDLR had vanished. This phenomenon was not new. Since the consolidation of the Wazalendo coalition, key FDLR commanders were re-affected to command existing or newly created VDP/Wazalendo groups, such as commander Defender to FDDP, and Kambuzi to APCLS ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 66 and 112, annexes 60 and 67).<sup>311</sup>

FDLR combatants captured during the 23-24 September operations reported that they were instructed to identify as members of other Wazalendo armed groups. The Group of experts also witnessed an exchange over the phone between a 17-year-old captured FDLR combatant and FDLR commander Fidel Sebagenzi, ([S/2024/432](#), para. 72 and annex 51) during which Sebagenzi instructed the minor to deny his FDLR membership.

- **FDLR CRAP unit providing close protection to FDLR leadership**

“Major-General” Omega, alongside 79 other FDLR commanders, mobilized FDLR’s special unit, CRAP, for their close protection ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 75-77).<sup>312</sup>

- **The FDLR leadership relocated to safer areas<sup>313</sup>**
- **FDLR patrols**

FDLR also organized discreet patrols in Rusayo and Sake areas to safeguard their dependents in various IDP camps around Goma.<sup>314</sup>

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<sup>311</sup> Wazalendo and FDLR commanders and combatants, FARDC sources and researchers.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.

<sup>313</sup> FDLR and Wazalendo sources, UN sources.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

**Annex 42 (para. 76)****Letter of Byiringiro Victor, FDLR “president”, to the Angolan facilitator****Lettre de Byiringiro Victor, “président” des FDLR, au facilitateur angolais**

Dès leur création, les FDLR militent pour que les conditions politiques, sociales, économiques et surtout sécuritaires rassurent tous les rwandais et favorisent le retour des réfugiés dans leur pays dans la dignité. C'est pour cette raison qu'elles n'ont cessé d'appeler le régime de Kigali au dialogue avec l'opposition en vue de résoudre pacifiquement le problème rwandais et, ainsi, contribuer au retour d'une paix durable dans la Région.

Dans cette optique, les FDLR ont entrepris plusieurs initiatives dont le désarmement et le cantonnement volontaires de leurs combattants à KAMINA en 2001, le désarmement et le cantonnement volontaires de leurs combattants à KANYABAYONGA, à WALUNGU et à KISANGANI en 2014 devant la Communauté Internationale sous le parrainage de la SADC.

Malheureusement la bonne volonté des FDLR de s'inscrire dans la logique de la paix a toujours buté sur un mur de préjugés insensés et d'incompréhension érigé à la faveur du régime de Kigali qui refuse mordicus le dialogue avec son opposition.

Les FDLR estiment que le problème rwandais est d'essence politique et prônent la voie de négociations à la place des armes pour le résoudre.

C'est pourquoi elles ont l'insigne honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir user de votre position et de votre influence dans la Région pour amener le régime de Kigali à dialoguer avec son opposition afin de ramener une paix durable dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains en général et à l'Est de la RDC en particulier.

Espérant une bonne compréhension à notre doléance, nous vous prions d'agréeer, Excellence Monsieur le Président, l'expression de notre haute considération.

BYIRINGIRO Victor

Lieutenant Général



Président à la des FDLR.

Document received from confidential VDP sources

**Annex 43 (para. 78)****Meeting between FARDC and VDP Leaders on 27 September 2024****Réunion organisée entre les FARDC et les Commandants VDP le 27 septembre 2024**

To repair strained relations with the VDP/Wazalendo, the North Kivu military authorities - including Governor Cirimwami, General Fall Sikabwe and General Dieugentil Alengbia Nzembe - met with VDP leaders, including representatives from APCLS, on 27 September. The military authorities expressed regret over the recent attacks on FDLR and APCLS, referring to them as an “incident” and acknowledging the losses suffered by these groups. They emphasized the successful Wazalendo-FARDC cooperation and reiterated that M23/RDF was their only common enemy. VDP leaders vowed renewed trust and cooperation. FARDC commanders and VDP leaders reported that military authorities discreetly requested the VDP/Wazalendo to reassure FDLR that it was still considered as their ally.

According to VDP and Wazalendo sources, during the meeting VDP leaders requested the FARDC to release arrested combatants, rehabilitate occupied positions, provide financial and logistical assistance for the funerals of the killed combatants and for the medical care for the wounded combatants.

In a video, the FARDC Spokesperson General Guillaume Ndjike states that the meeting served to “remove equivocation in relation to the incidents that happened”. Referring to the operations against FDLR and APCLS, he confirmed that it was indeed only ‘an incident’ reassuring the population that relations between the Wazalendo and the FARDC were progressing very well, and that they were all facing only one enemy, the M23/RDF.

In another video filmed during the meeting, one of the VDP leaders stated the following: “we did not separate ourselves from the FARDC, the FARDC are our parents, it is an incident which took place and we have just been received by the general Fall who received us well and who says to us that we have only one enemy which is the M23. We ask the population to be calm as the problem which there was between the parent and the child has just been decanted.”



Picture of the audience at the meeting


Picture provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources



Picture of the FARDC Spokesperson General Ndjike (on the far right) with several VDP Commanders  
Picture provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources

**Annex 44 (para. 79)****Cable issuing instructions to suspend attacks against the FDLR****Télégramme donnant des instructions pour suspendre les attaques contre les FDLR**

The cable was signed on 3 October 2024 by FARDC Colonel Jean-Claude Ndambo Mandjumba, commander of the 23e Brigade. However, FARDC sources reported that the cable was issued upon instruction of General Dieugentil Alengbia, Commander of the 34<sup>th</sup> Military Region in North Kivu.



Document provided by confidential FARDC source

**Annex 45** (para. 80)**Additional details on the FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR cooperation, their engagement in fighting, and VDP/Wazalendo recruitment and organization****Informations complémentaires sur la coopération FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR, leur engagement dans les combats, ainsi que le recrutement et l'organisation de VDP/Wazalendo*****Examples of FDLR and VDP/Wazalendo operations during the period of the ceasefire:***

While initially FARDC and RDF temporarily upheld the 4 August ceasefire (paras. 35-37), their proxies, AFC/M23 and Wazalendo with FDLR soon resumed clashes. The list below provides some illustrations of clashes between FDLR/Wazalendo/VDP and AFC/M23 in Rutshuru, Masisi, Nyiragongo and Walikale territories. This list is non-exhaustive.

- On 19 August, in Katwa and Kikuvo, north-east of Kanyabayonga, Rutshuru territory, AFC/M23 clashed with Mai-Mai Yira, reportedly resulting in two AFC/M23 being killed and in one Mai-Mai injury. AFC/M23 took control of the village the following day, despite the ceasefire.
- On 21 August, in Misinga, close to Mweso, Masisi territory, AFC/M23 clashed with APCLS, NDC-R/Guidon, CMC-FDP and FDLR-FOCA combatants. Three M23 combatants and one CMC-FDP combatant were killed in combat, and two civilians were injured.
- On 15 September 2024, in Kasasa, near Kikuku, Rutshuru territory, M23 combatants clashed with the CMC-FPAP combatants. This resulted in one M23 combatant being killed and one CMC-FPAP being injured.
- On 23 September 2024, in Nyangue, Masisi territory, M23 combatants clashed with CMC-FDP and APCLS combatants. Seven civilians were killed during the clashes.
- On 24 September in Kaliba, M23 combatants clashed with CMC-FPAP combatants. This resulted in one CMC-FPAP combatant being wounded.
- On 26 September 2024 in Bigogwe, AFC/M23 clashed with CMC-FDP combatants.
- Annexes 17- 19 provide additional illustrations of clashes including VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR combatants. The Group notes that RDF troops provided support to M23 in several operations against the VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR, as detailed in annexes 17-27.

***Additional elements on FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo cooperation:***

The Government of the DRC continued to systematically use North Kivu armed groups, including the sanctioned FDLR, to fight M23 and RDF ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 60-80). The office of the Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Peter Cirimwami, coordinated the operations (paras. 67 and 71; [S/2024/432](#), para. 63).

Colonel Sekololo, acting on behalf of General Cirimwami, was responsible for the transfer of resources, weapons, ammunition, and uniforms to the VDP/Wazalendo. For example, early August 2024, ammunition and other military equipment were delivered to APCLS in Loashi and Nyabiodo, Masisi territory.<sup>315</sup> An FDLR combatant also confirmed regular food deliveries to FDLR positions around Sake.

***Additional elements on the VDP command, recruitment and training, with FDLR involvement:***

VDP command and control remained unchanged ([S/2024/432](#), para. 61). VDP leaders also took advantage of the relative calm after the 4 August ceasefire to recruit and train combatants, to compensate for their losses suffered in combat against the AFC/M23 and RDF. Former and active combatants, including new recruits, told the Group that they decided to join VDP/Wazalendo ranks to escape forced AFC/M23 recruitment, to avoid being killed by AFC/M23, and to defend the territorial integrity of the DRC.

<sup>315</sup> VDP, civil society, FARDC sources and local authorities.

FDLR instructors provided military training to CMC-FDP and APCLS elements around Rusayo and Shove. The training focused on combat technics, refreshing courses, human rights and international humanitarian law.

Newly recruited combatants were trained in Rusinga, Mushwago, Rwankuba, Nyabitega, Kiseguro and Nyamilima under the command of “Colonel” Manirakiza Julien Ngurinzira and “Colonel” Mashango. In Bukombo groupement, since June 2024, “Colonel Innocent Ukwishatse” was the main trainer to CMC-FDP combatants.

PARECO-FF leadership informed the Group of the creation of a new VDP coalition, known as the *Coalition des Mouvements des patriotes pour la défense de la Nation* (CMPDN). This new coalition envisaged a united armed movement with a centralised command for all VDP members. At the time of drafting, none of the major armed groups - such as APCLS, CMC-FDP or NDC-R - had joined the new coalition.

**Annex 46** (para. 85)

**Zaïre/ADCVI Recruits in training at Bini**

**Recrues Zaïre/ADCVI en formation à Bini**





ActionDirector



ActionDirector



ActionDirector

Screenshots from video footage depicting the military training in Bini, provided by a confidential armed group source

**Annex 47 (para. 85)****“ADCVI” identification cards delivered to combatants following their training****Carte d'identité “ADCVI” délivrée aux combattants après leur formation**

Note the following details on the documents depicted below:

- Name of the armed group: “Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l’Ituri”
- Issue date: 4 July 2024.
- Order number (n° d’ordre): this card indicates number 0945, indicating that there were at a minimum 945 cards already issued by 4 July 2024.
- The individual, Michel Ndjaza Ivara, was the “Responsable provincial de ADCVI”.
- The address, ‘Telega’, is an IDP camp. The individual admitted living in the Telega IDP camp and being an internally displaced person. His “carte d’assistance humanitaire” below is proof of this status. The individual also admitted being the president of the youth in Telega IDP camp, ensuring the defense of the camp in case of an attack. This corroborates reporting and testimonies about presence of armed combatants inside IDP settlements, and ongoing recruitment in these IDP settlements.
- The card demonstrates a high level of organization within the “ADCVI” group.
- The individual was a former member of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC).





Pictures taken by GoE of documentation seized by FARDC from ACDVI combatant

**Annex 48** (para. 87)**Training of Zaïre/ADCVI and MAPI combatants at the AFC/M23 training center in Tchanzu****Formation des combattants de Zaïre/ADCVI et de MAPI dans le camp AFC/M23 à Tchanzu**

AFC/M23 intensified efforts to recruit combatants from Ituri Province. The Group received credible testimonies on various networks targeting new recruits, as well as former UPC combatants.<sup>316</sup>

Sources reported that Zaïre leaders, including Logo Marine, remained actively involved in the recruitment networks to reinforce the ranks of the AFC/M23 ([S/2024/432](#), para. 152). The new recruits transited through Uganda, and entered AFC/M23-controlled territory at Bunagana. From there, they were taken to Tchanzu.<sup>317</sup>

Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, the former spokesperson of MAPI, pledged allegiance to the AFC/M23 and went to Bunagana, taking at least 100 MAPI combatants with him. In July-August 2024, he was seen in Bunagana, from where he had sent videos to his network, acknowledging his defection to AFC/M23. He also attended training in Tchanzu. Recently, Bahati returned to Ituri to recruit for AFC/M23.

By October 2024, over 1,000 combatants from Ituri have completed training in Tchanzu. Few of these combatants joined AFC/M23 in combat in North Kivu, while others either returned to Ituri to train combatants locally, or remained on stand-by in Uganda.

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<sup>316</sup> Zaïre insider, FARDC, UN, and intelligence sources.

**Annex 49** (para. 96)

**Former MAPI spokesperson Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, who joined AFC/M23 in Bunagana**

**Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, ancien porte-parole de MAPI qui a rejoint le AFC/M23 à Bunagana**



Le porte-parole de la milice MAPI/  
ZAÏRE qui opère en Ituri s'est  
rendu officiellement à l'AFC-M23  
à partir de Bunagana.

La collaboration entre AFC-M23/  
UDPF/CODECO /ZAÏRE continue  
de s'élargir.

08:18

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Photo circulating on Ituri-based social media groups, provided by confidential armed group source

## Annex 50 (para. 100)

### Illegal taxes levied by CODECO/URDPC

#### Taxation illégale par CODECO/URDPC

As of 1 October 2024, CODECO/URDPC leadership in Nyangarayi issued a series of taxes on civilians and businesses in the 13 groupements in the Banyali Kilo sector of Djugu territory under its control.<sup>318</sup>

Shop owners were imposed a weekly fee of \$17.54, while artisanal mining sites owners had to pay between \$35 to \$73.68 per week. Additionally, the local population was subjected to a daily tax of \$0.35 per capita (males only),<sup>319</sup> which, based on the 5,455 male residents of Nyangarayi area alone, yielded an estimated \$1,900 daily to CODECO.<sup>320</sup> The CODECO commander collecting these payments was known as “Colonel” “50 Cent”. Commander “50 cent” also imposed ad hoc contributions of 100,000Fc (\$35) to each village under the pretext of “extraordinary contributions” (*salongo*).

From June to October 2024, CODECO/URDPC took over several mining sites in Banyali Kilo groupement of Djugu territory, which were previously controlled by Zaïre commander Pharaon Fidele Babala (S/2023/990, annex 47 and 50), including the site of Lodjo. During that time, the mining cooperative belonging to a well-known Bunia based businessman active in the public works sector, paid money to CODECO/URDPC to protect its assets and operations in Lodjo.

#### Proof of tax payment to CODECO/URDPC commander “50 Cent” in Nyangarayi, on 1 October 2024



Picture provided to the Group by confidential civil society sources

<sup>318</sup> Residents of Banyali Kilo villages, civil society, researchers.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid.

<sup>320</sup> Population estimated by Medair in September 2023, <https://ehtools.org/uploads/brochures/1358.pdf>.

**Annex 51 (para. 102)****Baraka Maki's illicit economic activities and money laundering****Activités économiques illégales de Baraka Maki et son blanchiment d'argent**

Baraka Maki was the richest and more influent of all Zaïre/ADCVI commanders, especially after the setback of Pharaon Fidele Babala ([S/2023/990](#), annex 47 and 50), who lost control of Lodjo mining area to CODECO/URDPC in June 2024.<sup>321</sup>

Baraka operated 4 to 6 mechanical excavators (“pokle”) for the mining of gold on the Lalo site on the Shari river in Mambisa chefferie. Mining continued to yield 5 kg of gold weekly to Baraka ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 167–170), valued at \$405,000 (\$1.6 million monthly) at current prices.<sup>322</sup>

**Map of the Lalo mining site exploited by Baraka Maki**

Map Data: Google, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 1 November 2024.

Map annotated by the Group

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Baraka Maki also continued to receive monthly payments averaging \$2,000 from at least five mining cooperatives active in Djugu territory, or \$10,000 per month, to protect their mining activities.

He also imposed illegal taxation of \$3.5 per week to two hundred small business owners in Mabanga area, yielding \$2,900 monthly, and controlled payments of \$0.07 per each transit at 50 illegal checkpoints in Djugu territory, averaging \$57,000 per month.<sup>323</sup> Illegal taxation generated an estimated monthly cash flow of \$70,000.

Baraka Maki laundered the proceedings of illegal taxation through the purchase of real estate and commercial activities in Mabanga, Iga Barrière, and Bunia.<sup>324</sup>

<sup>321</sup> Residents of villages in Mambisa chefferie, civil society, Inspection generale des mines, researchers, MONUSCO, judiciary and intelligence sources.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid.

<sup>324</sup> Journalists, civil society, MONUSCO, Bunia residents, judiciary and intelligence sources.

## Annex 52 (para. 104)

### **Illustrations of clashes between M23/RDF and FARDC at the border between South Kivu and North Kivu, and M23 incursions into Northern Kalehe territory**

### **Illustrations des affrontements entre le M23/RDF et les FARDC à la frontière entre le Sud-Kivu et le Nord-Kivu, et des incursions du M23 dans le territoire des Kalehe.**

During the period under review, shelling originating from M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory towards the border with South Kivu, as well as M23/RDF territorial advancements towards the northern territories of South Kivu, impacted security in the area. To prevent AFC/M23 territorial advancements towards South Kivu, FARDC reinforced its positions in the northern part of Kalehe territory.

- Late April and early May 2024, frequent detonations of heavy artillery in and around Minova, in South Kivu, caused panic among the populations ([S/2024/432](#), para. 32 and annex 62).
- On 27-28 April 2024, M23/RDF advances towards Bitonga, west of Minova, led to displacements of the civilian population.
- On 7 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling towards Buhavu chiefdom, near Minova in Kalehe territory, South Kivu, resulted in eight civilians being killed and five wounded.
- On 13 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling originating from Ndumba hill, Masisi territory, resulted in at least five bombs impacting Buhavu chiefdom, near Minova in Kalehe territory, South Kivu. This resulted in three civilians being killed and several others being wounded. The shelling also led to displacements of the civilian population.
- On 22-23 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling towards Minova resulted in civilians being wounded. The shelling also caused panic amongst the civilian population. The shelling, as well as clashes between the FARDC/Wazalendo and M23 resulted in civilians fleeing to Minova.
- After several weeks of relative calm, clashes between M23/RDF and FARDC in the vicinity of the South Kivu border resumed late June. FARDC and M23 both engaged in artillery shelling which impacted northern parts of Kalehe territory. On 26 June, FARDC from its positions in Lumbishi, Kalehe territory, shelled M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory. M23/RDF returned fire. Two days later, FARDC shelled M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory, and M23/RDF shelled Minova, triggering new civilian displacements. Shelling by M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory and FARDC positioned in Minova, Kalehe territory, continued until the start of the humanitarian truce on 4 July 2024.
- Despite the ceasefire, on 29 August FARDC positioned in Lumbishi and M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory, close to the North Kivu-South Kivu border, resumed shelling.
- On 12 September 2024, FARDC positioned in Minova and M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory, close to the North Kivu-South Kivu border, exchanged fire. Regular shelling continued until late September 2024.

The Group also documented sporadic M23/RDF incursions into Kalehe territory in South Kivu, such as in Lumbishi in late May 2024. For example, on 24 May, M23 combatants arrived in Lumbishi, south-west of Minova. After attacking FARDC and Wazalendo positions on the Lumbishi-Shange axis, north-east of Numbi, they retreated to Masisi territory, North Kivu.

## Annex 53 (para. 105)

### Illustrations of defections to AFC/M23

### Illustrations de déféctions à l'AFC/M23

In July 2024, fifty Mai Mai Kirikicho combatants defected to AFC/M23 following a meeting with AFC/M23 representatives in Ziralo, Kalehe.<sup>325</sup> Eyewitnesses and sources close to Kirikicho reported that the defectors regularly travelled between Ziralo and Kalehe territory and Ngungu, Masisi territory, to meet with Bernard Byamungu and other M23 commanders. The Group notes that Mai-Mai leader “General Kirikicho”, a close relative of Bernard Byamungu, did not adhere to AFC/M23.<sup>326</sup> At time of drafting, his group was still an ally of the Government ([S/2024/432](#), annex 99).

AFC/M23 also intensified mobilization in Shabunda territory. In late May 2024, 25 cadres of Raia Mutomboki factions were picked up by Rwandan vehicles at the Ruzizi border and transported to Rutshuru for training in ideological persuasion and intelligence gathering. After four weeks of training, these recruits were sent back to northern South Kivu to promote the AFC/M23 cause among local armed groups and collect intelligence.<sup>327</sup>

One Raia Mutomboki cadre interviewed by the Group reported that he had first been contacted by AFC/M23 in March 2024. Two months later, he was again contacted by AFC/M23 and requested to select 25 individuals close to armed groups active in Shabunda, Kabare, Kalehe and Walungu territories. The interviewee recruited 20 young men and 5 young women. He reported to have seen Makenga, Bernard Byamungu and Bertrand Bisimwa during the training in Rutshuru.

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<sup>325</sup> Researchers, UN, security sources, sources close to M23 and AFC, documents on file with Secretariat.

<sup>326</sup> Researchers, civil society and Mai-Mai sources.

<sup>327</sup> Eyewitnesses, security sources, researchers, RM cadre.

**Annex 54** (para. 109)**Armed group leaders signing the non-aggression pact in Baraka****Signature du pacte de non-agression par les chefs de groupes armés à Baraka**

Photograph of several armed group leaders present at the meeting in Baraka  
Photograph received from a armed group combatant (confidential source), annotated by the source



Photograph of Justin Bitakwira (left) and Ebuela Kibekila (right), also known as Mutetezi, at the meeting in Baraka  
Photograph received from a confidential armed group combatant



Photograph of sanctioned individual William Yakutumba reading the communiqué signed by armed group leaders at the meeting in Baraka

Photo received by the Group from a confidential armed group combatant

**Speech of Yakutumba, 30 July 2024, transcribed by the Group of Experts:**

**French transcript [English translation below]:**

“Tous les congolais ont droit à la paix et la sécurité tant au niveau national qu’internationale. Vu l’article 63 de la Constitution de la RDC qui stipule que tout congolais a le droit et le devoir sacré de défendre le pays et son intégrité territoriale face à une menace et une agression extérieure. Etant donné que l’union fait la force, mais cette union doit être basée sur l’amour, la confiance et la concorde pour le bien-être de tous les congolais. Le patriotisme, en tant qu’esprit qui anime les nationalistes pour défendre d’abord la patrie jusqu’au sacrifice suprême. Etant donné qu’on a plus à gagner en étant uni qu’en étant divisé, et que se faire mutuellement la guerre ne nous profite en rien. Bien au contraire cela nous fragilise et nous fait reculer de beaucoup de siècles pour la promotion de la paix et l’art du développement. S’inscrivant dans les démarches du chef de l’état, commandant suprême des FARDC, PNC et garant de la nation. Consistant à rétablir la paix et la sécurité à l’est de la RDC, nous, patriotes d’un mouvement engagé dans un processus de paix gracieux, CNPCC, FABB, FPDC, CPRC, PDC, FPDCC, MPRC, AFPDC, MPDAC, FAL, Groupe autochtone pygmée, CNPR, FPL, MPDC (...) FPDPC, MDP, Groupe des jeunes dans les Hauts Plateaux (...) déclarons la fin des incompréhensions et des hostilités entre nous ainsi que tout acte de violence entre nous signataires du présent acte de non-agression. Nous nous engageons à ne jamais pactiser avec l’ennemi de notre pays, notamment les RED Tabara, Twirwaneho et RDF/M23/AFC. Ni de près, ni de loin, au contraire, nous nous engageons à leur bloquer la route au côté des FARDC. Et à tout agresseur et auteur de troubles de la paix au Sud Kivu, et en particulier la RDC en générale. A cet effet, nous jurons devant Dieu et le peuple congolais, que chacun de nous s’engage à respecter cet acte de non-agression entre signataire. Fait à Baraka, le 30 juillet 2024. »

**English translation:**

"All Congolese have the right to peace and security, both nationally and internationally. In view of article 63 of the DRC Constitution, which stipulates that every Congolese has the sacred right and duty to defend the country and its territorial integrity in the face of external threat and aggression. Unity is strength, but this union must be based on love, trust and harmony, for the well-being of all Congolese. Patriotism, as the spirit that drives nationalists to defend their homeland first and foremost, to the point of supreme sacrifice. Given that we have more to gain by being united than by being divided, and that waging war on each other benefits us in no way. On the contrary, it weakens us and sets us back many centuries in the promotion of peace and the art of development. In keeping with the approach of the Head of State, supreme commander of the FARDC, PNC and guarantor of the nation. Consistent with restoring peace and security in eastern DRC, we, patriots of a movement engaged in a gracious peace process, CNPCC, FABB, FPDC, CPRC, PDC, FPDCC, MPRC, AFPDC, MPDAC, FAL, Groupe autochtone pygmée, CNPR, FPL, MPDC (...) FPDPC, MDP, Groupe des jeunes dans les Hauts Plateaux (...) declare the end of misunderstandings and hostilities between us, as well as all acts of violence between us signatories of the present act of non-aggression. We pledge never to pact with the enemy of our country, in particular the RED Tabara, Twirwaneho and RDF/M23/AFC. Neither near nor far, on the contrary, we pledge to block their path alongside the FARDC. And to all aggressors and perpetrators of disturbances of the peace in South Kivu, and the DRC in general. To this end, we swear before God and the Congolese people, that each of us undertakes to respect this act of non-aggression between signatories. Signed in Baraka, July 30, 2024.

**Annex 55** (para. 110)

**Communiqués of Twirwaneho**

**Communiqués des Twirwaneho**

*Communiqué of 8 September 2024*



**MESSAGE D'ALERTE SUR L'IMMINENCE DES ATTAQUES MAI-MAI ET ALLIÉS CONTRE  
LES VILLAGES BANYAMULENGE DE MINEMBWE**

1. Le groupe d'autodéfense civile Twirwaneho tient à lancer un alerte sur d'intenses mouvements des groupes armés soutenus par l'Etat, dont les MAI-MAI (Wazalendo) et alliés, aux alentours de Minembwe.
2. Ces forces coalisées impliquées depuis 2017 dans la campagne de nettoyage des Banyamulenge ont érigé leur base opérationnelle à Bikarakara, une localité à portée de tirs des villages périphériques de Minembwe où ils se préparent pour lancer une offensive de grande envergure contre les civils dont la plupart sont des déplacés internes.
3. Cette énième mobilisation qui intervient après plus de dix mois d'une accalmie relative s'inscrit dans la lignée du plan élaboré à Baraka, lors d'un colloque qui a réuni en juillet dernier, les différents chefs MAI-MAI sous la direction de Bitakwira Justin, élu d'Uvira. A cette occasion, La population Banyamulenge a été désigné comme l'ennemi commun contre lequel tous les MAI-MAI du Sud-Kivu (Babembe, Bafuliru et Banyindu) doivent orienter leurs assauts meurtriers;
4. Des informations crédibles font état de l'approvisionnement de ces forces coalisées en logistiques militaires par la 34e brigade d'intervention rapide des FARDC basée à Minembwe. Le S2 de ladite brigade, le Major Donat ressortissant de la communauté Babembe, étant chargé de l'exécution de cette mission;
5. Il sied de rappeler que les localités peuplées par les Banyamulenge autour de Minembwe centre restent les seules entités des Hauts-Plateaux de Fizi qui échappent encore au contrôle des MAI-MAI; d'autres villages éloignés ayant été ravagés par ces bourreaux, sous le regard complice des FARDC;
6. Twirwaneho qui s'attend à ce que ces forces coalisées passent à l'action à tout moment, demande au gouvernement d'exercer un contrôle strict de ses réservistes wazalendo anti-Banyamulenge dans cette contrée et à prendre des mesures rigoureuses pour empêcher ces attaques;
7. Twirwaneho réitère son engagement à protéger les civils d'éventuels massacres et adhère sans réserve au principe d'autodéfense civile contre toute force représentant une menace existentielle pour la communauté Banyamulenge, comme pour d'autres communautés vivant dans les Hauts-Plateaux de Fizi, Mwenga et Uvira.

Fait à Minembwe, Ce 07/09/2024

Kamasa Ndakize Welcome

Coordinateur

Communiqué available on Twirwaneho's [X account](#)

- In this communiqué of 8 September 2024, Twirwaneho warns of intense movements by state-backed armed groups, including Mai-Mai (Wazalendo) and allies, around Minembwe. Twirwaneho reports that these coalition forces have been involved in the Banyamulenge cleansing campaign since 2017, and that they have set up their operational base in Bikarakara, near Minembwe, where they are preparing to launch a large-scale offensive against civilians.
- According to Twirwaneho, this mobilization is in line with the plan drawn up in Baraka in July 2024 by Justin Bitakwira and various Mai-Mai chiefs. Twirwaneho denounces that on this occasion, the Banyamulenge population was designated as the common enemy against which all Mai-Mai in South Kivu must direct their murderous assaults. Twirwaneho also reports that the 34th FARDC rapid intervention brigade based in Minembwe is supplying these coalition forces with military logistics. According to the statement, Twirwaneho expects the coalition forces to move into action at any moment.

### *Communiqué of 17 August 2024*

- Several weeks earlier, Twirwaneho had issued another communiqué denouncing the persecution and threat of genocide against the Banyamulenge population of Minembwe by the FARDC's 34th reaction brigade. The communiqué listed numerous acts of serious human rights violations which it described as "genocidal" against the Banyamulenge civilians of Minembwe, by FARDC units. Through this communiqué, Twirwaneho launched an urgent appeal to the DRC government, and asks the government to distance itself from the commander of the 34th brigade.



Alerte concernant la persécution et la menace de génocide contre la population de Banyamulenge de Minembwe Par la 34 eme Brigade de réaction rapide des FARDC.

1. Le groupe d'autodéfense civile Twirwaneho tient à alerter l'opinion, tant nationale qu'internationale, que depuis la semaine du 17 juin 2024, la 34e Brigade d'intervention rapide des FARDC dirigée par le Colonel Lwambo Jean-Pierre, fait peser une menace de génocide contre les Banyamulenge, dans le centre de Minembwe et ses environs,

2. La première alerte a été donnée par les chefs coutumiers et les opérateurs économiques contre lesquels des actes de maltraitance, de tracasserie, d'arrestation arbitraires et de pillages des biens et marchandises sont orientés de manière particulière;

3. En effet, du 20 juin au 15 août 2024, il a été recensé un nombre d'actes de violations graves de droits humains à caractère génocidaire contre les civils Banyamulenge de Minembwe, par les unités FARDC, qui y sont pourtant affectées pour sécuriser la population et ses biens. Les principaux actes de persécution de la population recensés dans le haut plateau de Minembwe au cours de la période ci-haut mentionnée sont repris comme suit:

- Le 20 Juin: arrestation d'une femme, Mme Murorwa Chantal accusée faussement de disposer des effets militaires, et ce dans le but de créer la Psychose au sein de la population de Minembwe;
- Le 29 Juin : une ambuscade a été tendue par les hommes du colonel Lwambo J. Pierre qui ont dépolillé les paysans venant de leurs champs, perturbant ainsi les travaux champêtres,
- Le 30 Juillet : les usagers du marché local de Minembwe ont été terrorisés par des militaires qui se sont livrés à des pillages, ont roué de coups les civils et ont fait usage d'armes à feu. Le même jour, les

les activités commerciales à Minembwe, l'élimination physique des personnes (Banyamulenge) sur lesquelles il dispose des informations fiables et l'arrestation de tous les chefs de village et autres leaders de la communauté Banyamulenge. Il a promis à ses visiteurs que dans si peu de jour il va exécuter (tuer) un policier et un motar qu'il n'a pas précisé l'identité. Le commandant de la 34e brigade de réaction rapide basée à Minembwe s'est présenté à ses visiteurs comme un « génocidaire » que Minembwe devra pouvoir découvrir incessamment, tout en précisant qu'il est doté des moyens de l'Etat pour mener à bien sa mission, y compris des armes lourdes dont la détonation pourra provoquer des avortements des femmes enceintes,

6. Twirwaneho met en garde le Col. Lwambo J. Pierre contre toute attaque contre les civils contre lesquels il ne cache pas sa haine et ses sentiments discriminatoires à base ethnique. Twirwaneho est prêt à répondre à toute tentative de génocide annoncé par le Col Lwambo et promet qu'il n'attendra pas qu'un nouveau massacre soit perpétré sur le sol de Minembwe avant d'agir;

7. Twirwaneho lance pour la énième fois un appel urgent au gouvernement congolais. Il demande instamment que ce dernier se démarque clairement du criminel Colonel LWAMBO J. Pierre et le condamne publiquement et sans équivoque. Il est impératif d'agir avant qu'il ne soit trop tard.

8. Le Groupe d'Autodéfense Civile Twirwaneho réitère son engagement à protéger les civils d'éventuels massacres et adhère sans réserve au principe d'autodéfense civile contre toute force représentant une menace existentielle pour la communauté Banyamulenge et d'autres communautés qui exercent les activités économiques à Minembwe.

Fait à Minembwe, ce 17/08/2024

Welcome Ndakize Kamasa  
Coordinateur

Excerpts of the communiqué available on Twirwaneho's [X account](#)

**Annex 56** (para. 110)

**Illustrations of clashes between Twirwaneho and Mai-Mai groups, and between RED Tabara and Mai-Mai/FDNB coalition**

**Illustrations d'affrontements entre les groupes Twirwaneho et Mai-Mai, et entre RED Tabara et la coalition Mai-Mai/FDNB**

- Clashes involving Twirwaneho
  - On 22 June 2024, Twirwaneho combatants clashed with Mai-Mai combatants in Bibangwa and Bijojo, Bafulero chefferie, Uvira territory.
  - On 13 July 2024, Mai-Mai combatants clashed with Twirwaneho combatants in Kigoma groupement, Uvira territory.
  - Late August-early September 2024, clashes between Mai-Mai groups and Twirwaneho resumed. On 30 August, Twirwaneho clashed with Mai-Mai combatants in Mutunda, south-east of Minembwe. During clashes, at least seven civilians were injured. Thereupon, combatants of Mai-Mai Yakutumba set up a new camp in Rugezi, 25 kilometers south-east of Minembwe and close to one of Twirwaneho's camps, in Kabingo.
  - Mid-September 2024, Twirwaneho launched several attacks against the FARDC around Minembwe.
  - On 23 October 2024, FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants attacked positions of Twirwaneho and RED Tabara in Kipupu, Itombwe sector, Mwenga territory. Several civilians were killed and wounded during the fighting.
- Clashes involving RED Tabara
  - On 23 September 2024, FDNB troops, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and CNRD combatants jointly attacked RED Tabara positions in Kipombo and Kipupu, Mwenga territory. Two days later, RED Tabara issued a communiqué, reporting intense fighting between its combatants and the FDNB and its allies. According to RED Tabara, FDNB suffered heavy casualties, with 20 FDNB soldiers killed and many others injured (see below). The Group could not confirm this claim.
  - Five days later, on 25 September 2024, new fighting broke out in Ruhangarika, Itombwe sector, between RED Tabara and FDNB and allied armed groups. Several FDNB and Mai-Mai combatants were reportedly killed and wounded during the clashes.
  - On 20 October 2024, RED Tabara combatants clashed with FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants in Kipombo, Itombwe sector. Several FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba were reportedly killed. These clashes triggered operations of FDNB and allies against RED Tabara positions in Hewa Bora forest in Fizi territory and in Itombwe, Mwenga territory. On 26 October 2024, RED Tabara issued a new communiqué (see below) claiming that 45 FDNB and allies were killed during fighting. UN sources reported that details provided in the RED Tabara communiqué, such as the reported number of FDNB killed, were incorrect.
  - On 23 October 2024, FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants attacked positions of Twirwaneho and RED Tabara in Kipupu, Itombwe sector, Mwenga territory. Several civilians were killed and wounded during the fighting.
  - On 24 October 2024, RED Tabara combatants attacked Mai-Mai Yakutumba positions close to Tubangwa, north-west of Minembwe. Several Mai-Mai combatants as well as RED Tabara combatants were killed.

Sources: Researchers, Mai-Mai source, sources close to Twirwaneho and UN sources.

Republika y'Uburundi  
Umuhamari Uharanira Iteka n'ltekane  
(RED-TABARA)



République du Burundi  
Résistance pour un Etat de Droit  
(RED-TABARA)

## PRESS RELEASE

There has been intense fighting for several days between RED-Tabara fighters and the Burundi National Defence Forces (FDNB), and its allies, including the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Wazalendo Yakutumba and other armed groups.

These violent clashes are taking place in the localities of Kipombo and Kipupu in the Itombwe groupement. It is clear that the FDLR from Kirembwe are the most combative, unlike the Burundian FDNB soldiers, who show no motivation to fight and seem to have left the initiative to the FDLR. The FDNB suffered heavy casualties, losing more than twenty soldiers and countless of others injured.

This deplorable situation should be a wake-up call to the Burundian army, and a reminder that its soldiers are the children of our motherland who have sworn an oath to defend the nation, and that they must not be used to shield a regime that kills, pillages and starves the people.

September 25, 2024

**For the RED-TABARA**

**Patrick NAHIMANA**  
**Military Spokesperson**

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Email : red.tabara@gmail.com  
"... un régime de droit, pour que l'homme ne soit pas contraint, en suprême recours, à la révolte contre la tyrannie et l'oppression" (Préambule de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme)

1

Communiqué available on RED Tabara's [X account](#)

Republika y'Uburundi  
Umuhamari Uharanira Iteka n'Itekane  
(RED-TABARA)



République du Burundi  
Résistance pour un Etat de Droit  
(RED-TABARA)

#### PRESS RELEASE

For a week and a half, violent fighting has pitted the RED-Tabara Movement against the Burundian army (FDNB) supported by Mayi Mayi groups, in the Itombwe area, more precisely in the localities of Kaberukwa, Ngumiyano and Ibaciyo. Forty-five (45) Burundian soldiers and their allies lost their lives, including the deputy commander of the FDNB operational contingent deployed in South Kivu with headquarters in Minembwe, Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Nyandwi from Camp Mabanda. Thirty-two seriously injured Burundian soldiers were evacuated to Bujumbura to the place commonly known as Guantanamo.

RED-Tabara deplores once again having to fight compatriots who are victims of the same fascist regime of the CNDD-FDD. We remind the Burundian army that it has the choice to refuse to serve one of the worst barbaric regime of our time.

RED-Tabara's resistance will not weaken as long as the CNDD-FDD regime does not agree to sit at the table for sincere and inclusive negotiations to define the conditions for organizing democratic, free, inclusive and transparent elections with all political parties.

October 26, 2024

For the RED-TABARA

Patrick NAHIMANA  
Military Spokesperson

Email : red.tabara@gmail.com

"... un régime de droit, pour que l'homme ne soit pas contraint, en suprême recours, à la révolte contre la tyrannie et l'oppression" (Préambule de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme)

1

Communiqué available on RED Tabara's [X account](#)