

**Совет Безопасности**

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Письмо Группы экспертов по Демократической Республике Конго от 27 декабря 2024 года на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности

Члены Группы экспертов по Демократической Республике Конго, мандат которой был продлен резолюцией 2738 (2024) Совета Безопасности, имеют честь настоящим препроводить среднесрочный доклад о своей работе, представляемый в соответствии с пунктом 6 указанной резолюции.

Этот доклад был представлен Комитету Совета Безопасности, учрежденному резолюцией 1533 (2004) по Демократической Республике Конго, 29 ноября 2024 года и был рассмотрен Комитетом 27 декабря 2024 года.

Группа будет признательна, если настоящее письмо и указанный доклад будут доведены до сведения членов Совета Безопасности и опубликованы в качестве документа Совета.

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Среднесрочный доклад Группы экспертов по Демократической Республике Конго

Резюме

Непрекращающееся насилие в восточной части Демократической Республики Конго сказывалось на обстановке в плане безопасности и на гуманитарной ситуации. Конфликт продолжал негативно влиять на отношения в регионе.

Целенаправленные наступательные действия в рамках операции «Шуджаа» привели к ослаблению занесенного в санкционный перечень Альянса демократических сил (АДС), вследствие чего он был вынужден переместиться в провинцию Итури и территорию Луберо в Северном Киву. Для преследования групп из состава АДС зона проведения операции «Шуджаа» была расширена за пределы ее официальных границ. АДС ответил на это нападениями на мирных жителей, в результате чего в июне было зарегистрировано рекордно высокое число убитых им гражданских лиц. Несмотря на потери, АДС проявил живучесть, что ставит под сомнение эффективность операции «Шуджаа» в плане снижения угроз для гражданского населения в Демократической Республике Конго.

Военно-политическое движение «Альянс реки Конго» (АРК) и находящееся под санкциями Движение 23 марта (М23) активно преследовали свои экспансионистские цели, стремясь заручиться поддержкой всех вооруженных групп в Итури и Южном Киву. Все больше вооруженных групп открыто или тайно становились на сторону коалиции АРК/М23, что постепенно оказывало влияние на динамику конфликта в восточных провинциях и усложняло ее.

В Северном Киву режим прекращения огня, о котором договорились Демократическая Республика Конго и Руанда, не помешало АРК/М23, при систематической поддержке со стороны Сил обороны Руанды (СОР), добиться значительных территориальных приобретений, в том числе в богатой полезными ископаемыми территории Валикале. Современная военная техника, управляемая главным образом военнослужащими СОР, помогла обеспечить военное господство АРК/М23 в Пти-Нор. Ангола и Совет Безопасности осудили эти действия как нарушающие режим прекращения огня.

АРК/М23 захватили Рубайю, где расположены крупнейшие места добычи колтана в районе Великих озер. АРК/М23 создали параллельные органы управления, контролирующие добычу полезных ископаемых, торговлю минеральным сырьем, его транспортировку и взимание соответствующих налогов. По меньшей мере 150 тонн колтана были нелегально экспортированы в Руанду и смешаны с руандийской продукцией, что привело к крупнейшему на сегодняшний день «загрязнению» цепочек поставок минерального сырья в районе Великих озер.

Демократическая Республика Конго и Руанда договорились об осуществлении плана нейтрализации Демократических сил освобождения Руанды (ДСОР) и разработке плана вывода СОР. Глубокие разногласия и взаимное недоверие по поводу реализации и последовательности выполнения обоих планов помешали заключению всеобъемлющего мирного соглашения под эгидой Анголы, которую Африканский союз назначил посредником. План, предполагающий нейтрализацию ДСОР и перемещение или репатриацию лиц из их состава, вызывает опасения с точки зрения прав человека и гуманитарного права.

В результате ограниченной по своему масштабу наступательной операции Вооруженных сил Демократической Республики Конго (ВСДРК) против ДСОР не был нейтрализован или захвачен ни один высокопоставленный командир. В ответ ДСОР укрепили свою оборону, передислоцировали ключевые позиции и объединились с вооруженными группами «вазалендо». Данная операция выявила ограниченность оперативных возможностей ВСДРК и разногласия внутри их командования, в том числе по вопросу о сотрудничестве с ДСОР. Правительство Демократической Республики Конго продолжало использовать группы «вазалендо» и ДСОР в качестве марионеточных сил в борьбе с АРК/М23 и СОР, несмотря на неоднократные призывы прекратить поддерживать ДСОР.

В Итури вооруженная группа «Заир», состоящая в союзе с АРК/М23, сосредоточила усилия на открытии нового фронта против ВСДРК. Фигуранты санкционного перечня Тома Лубанга Дьило и Ив Кава Панга Мандро сыграли важнейшую роль в мобилизации «Заира» и укреплении сотрудничества с АРК/М23. Группа «Заир» активизировала вербовку, обучив тысячи комбатантов в рамках подготовки к масштабному наступлению в Итури.

В Итури добыча золота по-прежнему велась без контроля со стороны государства, принося вооруженным группам и преступным сообществам не менее 140 млн долл. США в год.

В Южном Киву вывод сил Миссии Организации Объединенных Наций по стабилизации в Демократической Республике Конго в середине 2024 года привел к ухудшению ситуации в области безопасности, что пагубно сказалось на гражданском населении, которое оказалось не защищенным от ущемлений прав человека со стороны государственных сил безопасности и вооруженных субъектов. АРК/М23 расширили свое влияние, привлекая на свою сторону вооруженные группы, действующие в Южном Киву, и заручаясь их поддержкой. АРК/М23 заключили союз с группами «Твирванехо», «Спротивление во имя создания правового государства в Бурунди» и Вооруженными силами «Билозе бишамбуке». Делегация Демократической Республики Конго собрала представителей свыше десяти групп «майи-майи» для подписания пакта о ненападении, чтобы убедить их не вступать в союз с АРК/М23.

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* Приложения распространяются только на том языке, на котором они были представлены, и без официального редактирования.

I. Введение

1. Мандат Группы экспертов по Демократической Республике Конго был продлен Советом Безопасности 27 июня 2024 года в его резолюции [2738 \(2024\)](#). Пять членов Группы экспертов были назначены Генеральным секретарем 19 августа 2024 года ([S/2024/620](#)). Шестой эксперт еще не назначен.

2. Среднесрочный доклад Группы представляется во исполнение пункта 6 резолюции [2738 \(2024\)](#). Группа обменивалась информацией с группами экспертов по Центральноафриканской Республике, Гаити и Южному Судану.

Сотрудничество с Миссией Организации Объединенных Наций по стабилизации в Демократической Республике Конго

3. Группа выражает благодарность Миссии Организации Объединенных Наций по стабилизации в Демократической Республике Конго (МООНСДПК) за поддержку и сотрудничество в отчетный период.

Методология

4. Группа применяла критерии доказательности, рекомендованные Неофициальной рабочей группой Совета Безопасности по общим вопросам, касающимся санкций ([S/2006/997](#)). Она основывала свои выводы на документах и подтверждала информацию, опираясь по меньшей мере на три независимых и надежных источника.

5. Ввиду характера конфликта в Демократической Республике Конго имеется немного документов, содержащих неопровержимые доказательства поставок оружия, вербовки, ответственности командиров за серьезные нарушения прав человека и незаконной эксплуатации природных ресурсов. Поэтому Группа полагалась на свидетельские показания местных жителей, бывших комбатантов и действующих участников вооруженных групп. Группа анализировала также показания экспертов, в том числе показания государственных должностных лиц и военнослужащих из стран района Великих озер и других стран, а также информацию, полученную из источников Организации Объединенных Наций.

6. Настоящий доклад охватывает расследования, проводившиеся вплоть до 8 ноября 2024 года. В связи с ограничениями, лимитирующими количество слов в докладах, Группа приводит некоторые доказательства и выводы в приложениях.

II. Альянс демократических сил в Итури и Северном Киву

A. Операция «Шуджаа»

Относительный успех операции «Шуджаа»

7. Четвертая фаза совместной операции Вооруженных сил Демократической Республики Конго (ВСДПК) и Народных сил обороны Уганды (НСОУ) «Шуджаа» ([S/2022/479](#), пп. 19–21), стартовавшая в ноябре 2023 года с ограниченным успехом, была возобновлена 20 мая 2024 года, и в ее рамках по включенной в санкционный перечень группе «Альянс демократических сил» (АДС) (CDe.001) наносились более интенсивные наземные и воздушные удары, главным образом в районах к западу от трассы RN4¹.

¹ Исследователи и источники в Вооруженных силах Демократической Республики Конго (ВСДПК) и Организации Объединенных Наций.

8. В отличие от предыдущих фаз операции, успех которых носил ограниченный характер, последние действия в ее рамках заметно ослабили АДС, приведя к уничтожению его опорных пунктов, большим потерям в его боевом составе и среди руководства и бегству сотен заложников (S/2024/432, пп. 9–12)². Было убито несколько командиров АДС, в частности Брайда³ и Амиго⁴ (см. приложение 1). Силы АДС были вынуждены постоянно перемещаться, что серьезно снизило их оперативные возможности и нарушило их линии снабжения. Члены группы страдают от голода и болезней⁵.

9. В ответ на повышение интенсивности нападений силы АДС прибегали к своим обычным тактическим приемам: они действовали мобильнее, перемещались, чтобы избегать прямых столкновений и отвлечь внимание от мест расположения основных лагерей, и нападали на гражданских лиц (S/2024/432, пп. 9 и 11). Небольшие лагеря ослабленных и ищущих способы укрепить свои силы и выжить формирований АДС были объединены в несколько мегалагерей, которые были передислоцированы в отдаленные районы (см. пп. 15–17 и приложение 2 ниже).

10. Эти неудачи спровоцировали рост насильственных действий в отношении гражданских лиц со стороны АДС, включая убийства из мести, похищения, мародерство и преднамеренные нападения на медицинских работников и медицинские учреждения (см. пп. 19–22 ниже).

11. Действия в рамках операции «Шуджаа» привели не к снижению угрозы для гражданского населения, а к ее вытеснению дальше на запад, в районы с минимальным уровнем присутствия государственных сил безопасности (S/2022/479, п. 26; S/2023/990, п. 15; и S/2024/432, пп. 9 и 10)⁶. В то время как АДС не совершал нападений на территории Уганды с конца 2023 года (S/2023/990, пп. 17 и 18), нападения в пределах Демократической Республики Конго участились, что вызывает серьезные опасения относительно последствий операции «Шуджаа» для гражданских лиц. Результатом стратегической реорганизации АДС, сыгравшей решающую роль в том, что ему удалось выжить, стало значительное расширение подконтрольной ему территории в Итури и Северном Киву.

Разногласия по поводу операции «Шуджаа»

12. НСОУ периодически проводили воздушные операции без уведомления ВСДРК и в ряде случаев при ведении своих действий выходили за пределы обозначенных зон, что создавало напряженность в отношениях между ВСДРК и НСОУ⁷. 11 августа беспилотный летательный аппарат (БПЛА) НСОУ потерпел крушение вблизи Котони — вне зоны проведения операции «Шуджаа», — при этом ВСДРК не были заблаговременно уведомлены о маршруте его полета, что лишь сильнее подорвало доверие (см. приложение 3).

² Источники в ВСДРК, Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке, исследователи, бывшие заложники и бывшие комбатанты.

³ S/2019/469, п. 24.

⁴ S/2020/482, пп. 36–41; S/2022/479, п. 42; и S/2023/431, пп. 17 и 25.

⁵ Источники в ВСДРК и Организации Объединенных Наций, исследователи, бывшие заложники и бывшие комбатанты.

⁶ Исследователи и источники в гуманитарных организациях, гражданском обществе, Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке.

⁷ Исследователи и источники в ВСДРК, Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке.

13. Кроме того, НСОУ часто переправляли бывших заложников АДС и задержанных лиц из его состава в Уганду, не спеша делиться информацией, что осложняло ведение разведывательной деятельности и судопроизводства в Демократической Республике Конго⁸.

14. Как следствие, ВСДРК медлили с отправкой формирований НСОУ в те районы, где сами ВСДРК не присутствовали, несмотря на ограниченность их собственного вклада в операцию «Шуджаа» (S/2024/432, п. 19)⁹. Что более важно, Демократическая Республика Конго не решалась расширить зону проведения операции «Шуджаа», включив в нее территории к северу от реки Итури, куда недавно был перенесен штаб АДС «Мадина», опасаясь, что у Уганды могут иметься скрытые намерения¹⁰, обусловленные ее историческими интересами в Итури¹¹. Тем не менее в июле была достигнута договоренность о расширении зоны проведения операции «Шуджаа» на запад от трассы RN44 и в район Мангуреджипы, где действует фигурант санкционного перечня Ахмад Махмуд Хасан (псевдоним «Абвакаси») (CDi.040) (см. приложение 4).

В. Изменение географии деятельности и живучесть Альянса демократических сил

15. Начиная с мая лагерь внесенного в санкционный перечень лидера АДС Секи Балуку (CDi.036) и группы, возглавляемой Абвакаси, подвергался мощным наземным и воздушным ударам в рамках операции «Шуджаа». Это вынудило Балуку перенести штаб «Мадина» дальше на север в территорию Мамбаса (провинция Итури), за пределы официальной зоны проведения операции «Шуджаа»¹². По приказу Балуку несколько отдельных лагерей под началом мзеи Мэра и мзеи Ва Кази (псевдоним «Лумиса») (S/2022/479, приложение 5) объединились с «Мадиной»¹³, и многие иждивенцы членов группы и заложники из других лагерей переместились в «Мадину»¹⁴. В июле лагеря командиров Табани, Дефендера и Брайды объединились в целях укрепления безопасности, поскольку они часто подвергались нападениям¹⁵.

16. В настоящее время большинство лагерей АДС располагаются в провинции Итури. Группа Балуку и его лагерь «Мадина» были замечены севернее Лолвы, вдоль трассы Эрингети — Команда, в территории Мамбаса. Объединившиеся группы под командованием Брайды, Табани и Дефендера переместились на запад от линии Ойча — Эрингети (трасса RN4) и действовали в районе Биакато (вдоль трассы RN44)¹⁶.

17. Тем временем с июня 2024 года группа Абвакаси — самая активная группа в составе АДС, ответственная за наибольшее число смертей — двигалась в противоположном направлении, на юго-запад, в сектор Бапере в территории Луберо, стремясь отвлечь внимание военных от «Мадины» и совершая по пути

⁸ Исследователи, источники в ВСДРК и сотрудники судебных органов и разведки.

⁹ Исследователи и источники в Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке.

¹⁰ ВСДРК и источники в разведке.

¹¹ *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 2005, p. 168.

¹² Бывшие комбатанты, бывшие заложники, исследователи и источники в Организации Объединенных Наций и ВСДРК.

¹³ Исследователи и бывшие заложники.

¹⁴ Бывшие заложники, исследователи и источники в ВСДРК и Организации Объединенных Наций.

¹⁵ Там же.

¹⁶ Источники в ВСДРК, Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке, исследователи, бывшие заложники и бывшие комбатанты.

акты возмездия против гражданских лиц¹⁷. В августе 2024 года Абвакаси действовал в окрестностях Мангуреджипы на северо-западе Луберо, подвергаясь преследованию со стороны сил операции «Шуджаа» и вступая в столкновения с местными вооруженными группами (см. пп. 20, 30 и 31 ниже). В сентябре в Мангуреджипе к Абвакаси присоединились несколько подгрупп из лагерей Брайды и Табани во главе с командиром Секой Дади (или Адади)¹⁸.

18. В приложении 5 подробно описаны стратегии выживания и технологические нововведения АДС, такие как использование средств спутниковой связи и попытки оснащать коммерческие БПЛА взрывчатыми веществами.

Нападения на гражданских лиц

19. С июня 2024 года по вине АДС погибло более 650 гражданских лиц¹⁹ в результате нападений в провинциях Северное Киву и Итури (см. приложение 6)²⁰.

20. Сам по себе месяц июнь стал для АДС рекордным по числу жертв: в районе Бени и в территории Луберо было убито более 200 гражданских лиц, главным образом — продвигавшейся на запад группой Абвакаси. В период с 3 по 12 июня группа Абвакаси атаковала свыше 10 населенных пунктов к западу от Бени, в окрестностях Кантина, в результате чего погибло по меньшей мере 150 мирных жителей²¹. 13 июня группа вступила в территорию Луберо, после чего была зафиксирована серия нападений в секторе Бапере, расположенном на границе между территориями Бени и Луберо. В начале августа группа Абвакаси достигла района Нджапанды и Мангуреджипы и обосновалась в окрестностях леса Бандулу в Луберо²². При этом группа Абвакаси оставалась высококомобильной и продолжала убивать гражданских лиц²³.

21. Действуя в схожем ключе, с июня по август Брайда, Дефендер и Табани двигались на северо-запад от Ойчи в сторону Мамове и Биакато, нападая на небольшие деревни и совершая похищения, убийства и казни²⁴. К сентябрю группы Табани и Дефендера переместились на запад от трассы RN44 и Биакато, преследуемые силами операции «Шуджаа». Брайда и Дефендер несут ответственность за большинство убийств в окрестностях Мамове и Беу-Маньямы. В середине августа Брайда был убит вблизи Биакато²⁵.

22. В Ируму и Мамбасе нападения происходили реже, поскольку большая группа Балуку, насчитывающая около 1000 комбатантов и гражданских лиц, ушла на север от реки Итури, за Лолву. Это относительное затишье, вероятно, объяснялось уязвимостью и медленным темпом передвижения группы, обремененной иждивенцами и сосредоточенной на поиске новых мест для лагеря. По-видимому, группа старалась также держаться в тени, чтобы укрыться от внимания сил, участвующих в операции «Шуджаа». Несколько нападений на медицинские учреждения и похищений медицинских работников, совершенных в

¹⁷ Там же.

¹⁸ Источники в ВСДРК и бывшие заложники.

¹⁹ Исследователи и источники в ВСДРК и Организации Объединенных Наций.

²⁰ Исследователи и источники в Организации Объединенных Наций, ВСДРК и разведке.

²¹ Исследователи, источники в Организации Объединенных Наций, конфиденциальные источники и источники в разведке.

²² Исследователи, источники в Организации Объединенных Наций, бывшие заложники и бывшие комбатанты.

²³ Там же.

²⁴ Бывшие заложники, включая очевидцев, и источники в Организации Объединенных Наций и ВСДРК.

²⁵ Источники в ВСДРК и Организации Объединенных Наций, бывшие заложники, бывшие комбатанты и исследователи.

окрестностях Лолвы в конце августа²⁶, свидетельствуют об острейшей необходимости в медицинском обслуживании, поскольку, по сообщениям бывших заложников, группа Балуку понесла тяжелые потери в результате действий в рамках операции «Шуджаа».

Единая структура командования и управления Альянса демократических сил

23. АДС сохранила упорядоченную структуру командования. Хотя подгруппы действовали с определенной долей независимости, все они подчинялись Балуку (см. приложение 7)²⁷.

24. Несмотря на упорные слухи о слабом здоровье Балуку, заложники и захваченные комбатанты сообщали, что он активен и сохраняет жесткий контроль над Абвакаси и другими командирами. Было замечено, что Балуку носит жилет со взрывчаткой, с тем чтобы, по его собственным словам, подорвать себя при попытке захвата. Его преемником назначен его доверенный нынешний заместитель Сека Умару (S/2023/431, п. 17)²⁸.

25. Если спонтанные нападения небольшого масштаба могли совершаться без предварительного одобрения Балуку, то все крупные операции требовали разрешения с его стороны. После каждого нападения ему отправлялись донесения и фотографии для принятия решений и для целей пропаганды²⁹. Данные недавних бесед с бывшими комбатантами и иждивенцами участников АДС подтверждают, что передислокация Абвакаси в Луберо и перемещение других лагерей произошли по приказу Балуку.

С. Участившиеся заявления ДАИШ о принятии на себя ответственности

26. ДАИШ проявляла повышенный интерес к действиям АДС в восточной части Демократической Республики Конго. Начиная с июня 2024 года количество нападений АДС, ответственность за которые взяла на себя ДАИШ, заметно возросло по сравнению с предыдущими месяцами: со 2 июня по конец октября было опубликовано 111 соответствующих заявлений. Период времени между совершением нападений и взятием на себя ответственности значительно сократился: с нескольких дней до 24 часов (в некоторых случаях). Эта тенденция свидетельствует об укреплении сотрудничества между ДАИШ и АДС (S/2022/967, пп. 27 и 28) и о налаживании ими более оперативного и более тесного взаимодействия (см. приложение 8).

²⁶ Исследователи и источники в Организации Объединенных Наций, ВСДРК и гуманитарных организациях.

²⁷ Бывшие заложники, бывшие комбатанты, исследователи и источники в ВСДРК, Миссии Организации Объединенных Наций по стабилизации в Демократической Республике Конго (МООНСДРК) и разведке.

²⁸ Там же.

²⁹ Бывшие заложники.

Д. Контакты с Альянсом реки Конго/Движением 23 марта

27. На протяжении всего 2024 года ходили упорные слухи о возможных контактах между АДС и коалицией Альянса реки Конго и Движения 23 марта (АРК/М23). По мере продвижения АРК/М23 вглубь территории Луберо предложения о сотрудничестве высказывались все настойчивее, хотя АРК/М23 открыто их опровергали (см. приложение 9).

28. Некоторые источники сообщали о контактах между руководством АДС и лицами, которые ранее входили в состав сетей Конголезского объединения за демократию — Кисангани/Движения за освобождение и М23 (S/2013/433, пп. 62–71; и S/2016/466, п. 193) и у которых имеются также связи с АРК³⁰. В марте 2024 года члены Группы встретились с бывшим участником этих сетей, который рассказал, что в феврале он встречался в Кампале с человеком из окружения Корнея Нангаа, а затем и с самим Нангаа, чтобы обсудить потенциальное сотрудничество с АРК. Данный собеседник Группы поддерживал также тесные контакты с семьями Абвакаси и Балуку. По сообщениям источников, близких к АДС, это взаимодействие было частью кампании АРК/М23 по установлению связей с АДС для переговоров о доступе на контролируемые АДС территории.

29. Хотя подробности достигнутых договоренностей по-прежнему неясны, многочисленные источники подтверждают, что АРК/М23 стремились заключить с АДС пакт о ненападении, прося обеспечить безопасный проход, в том числе для новобранцев, следующих из Итури на территорию АРК/М23, и настоятельно призывая АДС нападать только на военнослужащих ВСДРК³¹. Один из бывших комбатантов АДС лично присутствовал на собрании, на котором Балуку заявил о поступившем от АРК/М23 предложении сотрудничества. По сообщениям, Балуку ответил на него отказом, сославшись на недоверие к АРК/М23 и вновь заявив о своем намерении и дальше нападать на «неверных» гражданских лиц.

Е. Зависимость Демократической Республики Конго от «вазалендо» в вопросах безопасности

30. Для восполнения увеличивающихся пробелов в сфере безопасности и защиты от АДС ВСДРК часто прибегали к услугам групп «майи-майи», в частности Народных патриотических сил/Народной армии Кабидона и Союза патриотов за освобождение Конго «генерала» Майяни³² (S/2024/432, приложение 9). Недавно вооруженные группы «вазалендо», такие как «Ндумские силы обороны Конго» (возрожденные) (НОК (в)) фигуранта санкционного перечня Гидона Шимирая Мвиссы (CDi.033), разместились в богатых полезными ископаемыми районах территории Луберо, к примеру в окрестностях Мангуреджипы, под предлогом защиты гражданских лиц от АДС (см. приложение 10). Силы АДС вступали в столкновения с этими вооруженными группами и устраивали на них засады³³.

31. Рост числа этих вооруженных групп, притеснявших население (S/2024/432, пп. 21 и 22), привел к ухудшению обстановки в плане безопасности и

³⁰ Источники в ВСДРК, разведке и службах безопасности, исследователи и человек, встречавшийся с представителями АРК для переговоров об установлении контактов.

³¹ Исследователи и источники в ВСДРК, Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке.

³² Там же.

³³ Источники в гуманитарных организациях, Организации Объединенных Наций, гражданском обществе и разведке, исследователи и опубликованные заявления «Центральноафриканской провинции “Исламского государства”».

спровоцировал напряженность в отношениях с местными жителями, которые потребовали их ухода (см. приложение 11).

32. С учетом продвижения АРК/М23 дальше на север в территории Луберо, присутствия Абвакаси в Мангуреджипе и активного стремления групп «вазалендо», в том числе НОК (в) Гидона, взять этот район под свой контроль развитие конфликта, по всей вероятности, примет дурной оборот.

III. Кризис в Северном Киву, вызванный действиями Альянса реки Конго/Движения 23 мая

A. Использование гуманитарного перемирия, режима прекращения огня и Луандийского процесса в экспансионистских целях

33. 4 июля 2024 года Демократическая Республика Конго и Руанда при посредничестве Соединенных Штатов Америки договорились о двухнедельном³⁴ гуманитарном перемирии в восточной части Демократической Республики Конго³⁵, которое предполагало прекращение боевых действий, добровольное возвращение перемещенных лиц и обеспечение неограниченного гуманитарного доступа к уязвимым группам населения. В отличие от договоренностей о прекращении огня, достигнутых в ноябре и декабре 2023 года (S/2024/432, п. 31 и приложения 20 и 21), это перемирие не предусматривало вывода Сил обороны Руанды (СОР) и не обязывало ВСДРК прекратить сотрудничество с вооруженными группами.

34. Перемирие было продлено в соответствии с соглашением о прекращении огня с 4 августа 2024 года. Оно было подписано Демократической Республикой Конго и Руандой под эгидой Анголы, которую Африканский союз назначил посредником (S/2024/432, приложение 20; и S/2023/431, приложение 20)³⁶. АРК/М23 заявили, что «не обязаны автоматически соблюдать условия» соглашения, поскольку они не входят в число подписавших его сторон (см. приложение 12).

35. Хотя первоначально СОР и ВСДРК временно соблюдали режим прекращения огня (см. пп. 36, 37 и пп. 44–47 ниже), их марионеточные силы — М23 и «вазалендо» вместе с Демократическими силами освобождения Руанды (ДСОР) — вскоре возобновили столкновения³⁷. ВСДРК, «вазалендо», ДСОР, СОР и М23 воспользовались относительным затишьем для усиления своих войск и пополнения запасов оружия (см. пп. 39–43, 48–55 и 80 ниже).

36. С конца апреля 2024 года (S/2024/432) группа М23 при поддержке СОР захватила значительные территории и укрепила контроль над занятыми ею районами (см. пп. 41–47 ниже). Эта тенденция сохранялась, несмотря на перемирие и прекращение огня, что говорит о том, что истинными целями М23 по-

³⁴ Срок действия перемирия был продлен до 3 августа 2024 года.

³⁵ Эйдриенн Уотсон, пресс-секретарь Совета национальной безопасности Соединенных Штатов Америки, Вашингтон (округ Колумбия), 4 июля 2024 года. Доступно по адресу: www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/04/statement-from-nsc-spokesperson-adrienne-watson-welcoming-the-humanitarian-truce-in-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.

³⁶ Министерство иностранных дел Анголы, объявление о прекращении огня в сети X. Доступно по адресу: https://x.com/angola_Mirex/status/1818436276996968860.

³⁷ Исследователи и источники в Демократических силах освобождения Руанды (ДСОР), «вазалендо», АРК/Движении 23 марта (М23) и Организации Объединенных Наций. См. также приложения 17–19 и 45.

прежнему были территориальная экспансия, а также долгосрочная оккупация и эксплуатация завоеванных территорий.

37. В конце октября 2024 года территориальная экспансия М23 и СОР в территории Валикале привела к прямым столкновениям вдоль трассы Мвесо — Пинга с ВСДРК и их союзниками (см. п. 46 ниже). Выполняющая функции посредника Ангола и Совет Безопасности осудили эти действия как нарушающие режим прекращения огня³⁸. На момент подготовки настоящего доклада существовала вероятность широкомасштабного возобновления операций с участием ВСДРК и СОР.

38. Ангола продолжала содействовать переговорам в целях долгосрочного урегулирования конфликта. Несмотря на то что Демократическая Республика Конго и Руанда договорились осуществить план нейтрализации ДСОР и разработать план вывода сил и отмены руандийских оборонительных мер, глубокие разногласия и взаимное недоверие по поводу реализации и последовательности выполнения обоих планов пока что не позволили заключить всеобъемлющее мирное соглашение (см. пп. 48–55 и 67–80 и приложение 13 ниже).

В. Альянс реки Конго/Движение 23 марта и Силы обороны Руанды

Объединение сил и мобилизация Альянса реки Конго/Движения 23 марта

39. Общее военное командование М23 по-прежнему осуществлял «генерал» Султани Макенга (CDi.008), который продолжал получать инструкции и поддержку от СОР и руандийской разведки (см. пп. 49–55 ниже и S/2024/432, п. 36)³⁹. Хотя М23 и военно-политический альянс Корнея Нангаа АРК (S/2024/432, пп. 23–29) продолжали существовать в качестве отдельных структур, их деятельность была тесно взаимосвязана: а) обе организации публиковали совместные сообщения под грифом «АРК/М23»; б) М23 оставалось де-факто военным крылом АРК и с) каждое действие возглавляемого Нангаа АРК по-прежнему требовало разрешения Макенги (S/2024/432, п. 25)⁴⁰.

40. Коалиция АРК/М23 наращивала усилия, направленные на изменение военно-политического ландшафта в Демократической Республике Конго, активно ища поддержки у вооруженных групп в Итури, Северном Киву и Южном Киву, причем весьма успешно (см. пп. 83–97 и 104–106 ниже). Коалиция вновь привлекла к деятельности бывшего политического работника Национального конгресса в защиту народа/М23 Рене Абанди и фигуранта санкционного перечня Жана-Мари Рунигу (CDi.028; S/2022/479, п. 58), которому было поручено привлечь участников своей сети на сторону АРК/М23⁴¹. М23 и АРК систематически проводили собрания на недавно захваченных территориях в целях продвижения своих идей, вербовки новых членов и укрепления параллельных органов управления (S/2024/432, приложение 25)⁴².

³⁸ Министерство иностранных дел Анголы, заявление для прессы, 21 октября 2024 года, доступно по адресу: www.facebook.com/61556720147590/posts/122186129660224004/?mibextid=WC7FNe&rdid=XJXuV8Q5mFx7SEah; и Организация Объединенных Наций, заявление для прессы Совета Безопасности по Демократической Республике Конго, 25 октября 2024 года, доступно по адресу: <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15866.doc.htm>.

³⁹ Источники, близкие к М23, СОР и АРК.

⁴⁰ Там же, исследователи и источники в разведке.

⁴¹ Источники, близкие к М23 и АРК и аудиозапись, имеющаяся в распоряжении Группы.

⁴² Очевидцы и источники в гражданском обществе и Организации Объединенных Наций.

Продолжение учебной подготовки и принудительной вербовки

41. АРК/М23 расширили масштабы вербовки и подготовки административных кадров из числа гражданского населения, а также комбатантов для управления подконтрольными им населенными пунктами (S/2024/432, приложение 5) и укрепления военного потенциала для территориальной экспансии⁴³.

42. С апреля 2024 года АРК/М23 не переставали вести как добровольную, так и принудительную вербовку, в том числе несовершеннолетних (см. приложение 14). Тысячи новобранцев из захваченных АРК/М23 территорий и из соседних провинций (см. пп. 83–97 и 104–106 ниже) проходили подготовку в их военных лагерях. Так, в период с 25 сентября по 31 октября 2024 года было обучено не менее 3000 новобранцев. Еще 2500 человек, в том числе 600 участников итурийской вооруженной группы «Заир», на момент подготовки настоящего доклада находились в процессе обучения (см. приложение 15). 2 октября 2024 года в Чанзу состоялась церемония выпуска 300 офицеров М23, ознаменовавшая собой завершение ими пятимесячной подготовки (S/2024/432, пп. 104–108)⁴⁴. Комбатанты М23 неизменно сообщали о присутствии в Чанзу конголезских офицеров-инструкторов и офицеров-инструкторов НСОУ и СОР.

43. АРК/М23 уделяли все больше внимания подготовке по вопросам идеологии, сбора разведанных, агитации и приемов вербовки (см. приложение 16). Прошедшие обучение новобранцы стратегически направлялись в еще не подконтрольные АРК/М23 районы для сбора разведанных и агитации местного населения (см. пп. 104–106 ниже). Ключевым элементом стратегии, лежащей в основе успешной территориальной экспансии АРК/М23, была вербовка членов других вооруженных групп.

Продолжение территориальной экспансии

44. На южном фронте в Пти-Нор М23 и СОР продвинулись вглубь южной части территории Масиси и 30 апреля захватили места разработки полезных ископаемых в Рубайе, где расположены одни из крупнейших в мире залежей колтана (см. пп. 56–66 ниже). Начиная с мая М23 и СОР проводили все новые наступательные операции, объектами которых были позиции ВСДРК и Миссии Сообщества по вопросам развития стран юга Африки в Демократической Республике Конго (Миссия САДК) вблизи Саке, а также районы, прилегающие к границе Южного Киву, что часто приводило к потерям среди гражданского населения (см. приложение 17)⁴⁵.

45. На северном фронте в Пти-Нор М23 и СОР 27 июня 2024 года захватили имеющий стратегическое значение город Каньябайонга в территории Ручуру (S/2024/432, приложение 29). После этого М23 и СОР продвинулись дальше на север, в южную территорию Луберо, и в течение трех дней захватили участок протяженностью 50 км вдоль трассы Каньябайонга — Касеге. В начале августа М23 и СОР добились также значительных успехов на северо-востоке территории Ручуру, захватив несколько населенных пунктов вдоль трассы Киванджа — Ишаша, в том числе пограничный пункт «Ишаша» на границе с Угандой (см. приложение 18).

⁴³ Комбатанты М23, источники, близкие к АРК/М23, источники в гражданском обществе и Организации Объединенных Наций, местные общественные деятели и очевидцы.

⁴⁴ Бывшие комбатанты М23 и источники в службах безопасности, Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке.

⁴⁵ Очевидцы и источники в ВСДРК, службах безопасности, Организации Объединенных Наций и разведке.

46. На западном фронте, после интенсивных столкновений с вооруженными группами «вазалендо», ДСОР и ВСДРК, в конце октября М23 и СОР значительно продвинулись вперед на линии Калембе — Мпети, захватив несколько населенных пунктов в территории Валикале, которая ранее находилась под исключительным контролем ВСДРК и «вазалендо». Эта территориальная экспансия была расценена как «вопиющее нарушение соглашения о прекращении огня», действующего с августа (см. пп. 33–37 выше и приложение 19)⁴⁶.

47. С апреля по начало ноября 2024 года площадь территории, контролируемой М23 и СОР, увеличилась на 30 процентов (см. приложение 20).

Систематическая поддержка Движения 23 марта со стороны Сил обороны Руанды

48. В центре разногласий между Демократической Республикой Конго и Руандой стоял вопрос об условиях и сроках вывода СОР, что препятствовало заключению мирного соглашения. Правительство Демократической Республики Конго отвергло выдвинутое руандийским правительством условие, согласно которому руандийские войска подлежали выводу только после того, как ВСДРК предпримут целенаправленные действия против ДСОР. Конголезское правительство отказалось также подписать «план нейтрализации ДСОР и вывода СОР», согласованный руководителями разведывательных ведомств обеих стран (см. приложение 13). Ряд официальных лиц Демократической Республики Конго и генералов ВСДРК опасались, что принятие условий Руанды дало бы карт-бланш на дальнейшее присутствие СОР в том случае, если план нейтрализации не сработает.

49. Как следствие, в территориях Ньирагонго, Ручуру и Масиси по-прежнему размещаются по меньшей мере 3000–4000 военнослужащих СОР (S/2024/432, п. 43, и приложение 30)⁴⁷. Кроме того, в конце октября 2024 года войска СОР поддержали продвижение М23 в территорию Валикале⁴⁸. Каждое подразделение М23 действовало под наблюдением и при поддержке сил специального назначения СОР⁴⁹.

50. Осуществление СОР командования целенаправленными операциями и применение ими высокотехнологичных вооружений (см. пп. 51–55 ниже) сыграли решающую роль в захвате новых территорий (см. пп. 44–47 выше). СОР продолжали оказывать систематическую поддержку М23 и де-факто контролировать операции М23 (S/2024/432, п. 45)⁵⁰. В приложении 21 приводятся доказательства вторжений СОР через границу и их стратегических перемещений в Пти-Нор (S/2024/432, пп. 40–54)⁵¹.

Современная военная техника

51. Группа продолжала фиксировать случаи применения М23 и СОР современных военных технологий и техники (S/2023/990, пп. 31 и 32; и S/2024/432, пп. 46–54). Выявленное присутствие этих военных систем, имеющих центральное значение для боевого превосходства М23 и СОР, служит новым доказательством получения М23 внешней поддержки в нарушение оружейного эмбарго.

⁴⁶ Министерство иностранных дел Анголы, заявление для прессы, 21 октября 2024 года.

⁴⁷ Лица, близкие к АРК, М23 и СОР и источники в разведке.

⁴⁸ Там же. См. также приложение 19.

⁴⁹ Комбатанты М23, лица, близкие к СОР и М23 и источники в разведке.

⁵⁰ Там же, очевидцы и источники в Организации Объединенных Наций.

⁵¹ Фотографии, видеозаписи, свидетельства очевидцев и источники в разведке.

52. 3 мая 2024 года военные позиции, расположенные в густонаселенных районах вдоль линии Саке — Гома, были обстреляны 122-мм неуправляемыми реактивными снарядами, которые используются для нанесения ударов по площади и считаются оружием неизбирательного действия при применении в населенных пунктах, при этом обстрел велся с военных позиций, на которых размещались военнослужащие 93-го и 109-го батальонов СОР, вблизи Карубы (территория Масиси). В результате этого неизбирательного нападения, последовавшего за многими другими, зафиксированными с января 2024 года в том же районе (S/2024/432, пп. 93–98), были убиты и ранены десятки гражданских лиц в перенаселенных поселениях внутренне перемещенных лиц в Мугунге, неподалеку от Гомы (см. приложение 22).

53. 10 и 15 июня 2024 года соответственно силы Миссии САДК в Мубамбиро (см. приложение 23) и совместная позиция ВСДРК и частной военной компании «Конго протекшн» в Каньямахоро (территория Ньирагонго) (см. приложение 24) были обстреляны управляемыми ракетами «Спайк» с увеличенной дальностью действия (всего было выпущено две ракеты). Результаты анализа траектории полета ракет и информации, полученной от очевидцев и источников в военных кругах, разведке и службах безопасности, указывают на то, что обе ракеты были пущены из районов, находящихся под контролем М23 и СОР. Случаи применения данной противотанковой ракеты с двумя вариантами наведения (по лазерному лучу и по проводам) никогда ранее не фиксировались в Демократической Республике Конго, и она не состоит на вооружении ВСДРК.

54. С конца мая по начало августа 2024 года в результате подмены и глушения сигналов в районах, контролируемых М23 и СОР, нарушалась работа Глобальной системы определения местоположения (GPS) и навигационных приборов летательных аппаратов, что неизбирательным образом затрагивало авиарейсы Организации Объединенных Наций и гуманитарные и коммерческие авиарейсы, а также полеты наблюдательных БПЛА⁵². Два комплекса подмены и глушения сигналов располагались на территории Руанды. Третий такой комплекс был обнаружен в Каньябайонге (Северное Киву), вскоре после того, как М23 и СОР установили контроль над этим районом (см. приложение 25). 29 октября 2024 года беспилотник МООНДСРК, пролетавший над зоной активных боевых действий, потерпел крушение из-за активного подавления сигналов GPS. Незадолго до этого АРК/М23 предупредили МООНДСРК о необходимости прекратить использование своих БПЛА (см. приложение 26).

55. 25 октября 2024 года в Карубе (территория Масиси) была замечена система противовоздушной обороны ближнего действия, управляемая СОР (см. приложение 27 и S/2024/432, пп. 47–49). Развертывание систем противовоздушной обороны, а также систем наведения радиоэлектронных помех, позволяющих воспрепятствовать использованию авиасредств или нейтрализовывать их, дает М23 и СОР значительное тактическое преимущество⁵³.

Контроль добычи, транспортировки и экспорта полезных ископаемых и торговли ими в Рубайе со стороны Альянса реки Конго/Движения 23 марта

56. С 30 апреля 2024 года силы АРК/М23 занимают и контролируют город Рубайя и весь расположенный в его окрестностях район разработки полезных ископаемых, где продолжается добыча колтана, олова (касситерита) и марганца

⁵² Очевидцы, источники в разведке, службах безопасности и военных кругах и снимки, имеющиеся в распоряжении Группы.

⁵³ Источники в ВСДРК, службах безопасности, разведке и Организации Объединенных Наций.

(S/2024/432, пункт 138). После недолгого и ограниченного возобновления мероприятий по маркировке минерального сырья в апреле 2024 года 8 мая Инициатива в отношении цепи снабжения оловом вновь приостановила все соответствующие операции в территории Масиси (см. приложение 28).

57. АРК/М23 контролировали центры торговли в Рубайе и Мушаки, а также маршруты транспортировки полезных ископаемых из Рубайи в Руанду⁵⁴, где минеральные ресурсы из Рубайи смешивались с руандийским сырьем⁵⁵. Это самое значительное «загрязнение» цепи снабжения не подлежащими поставке на рынки оловом, танталом и вольфрамом, зарегистрированное в районе Великих озер за последнее десятилетие (см. пп. 64–66 и приложение 29 ниже).

58. АРК/М23 установили монополию на экспорт колтана из Рубайи в Руанду, отдавая предпочтение торговле в больших объемах и взимая крупные налоги. Таким образом, нелегальная добыча полезных ископаемых в Рубайе, торговля ими и их экспорт в Руанду приносили пользу как АРК/М23, так и руандийской экономике (см. приложение 30)⁵⁶.

Осуществление Альянсом реки Конго/Движением 23 марта управления горнодобывающей деятельностью в Рубайе

59. С первых дней оккупации Рубайи Корней Нангаа, выступая публично от имени АРК и М23, призвал присутствующих в данном районе субъектов продолжать добычу полезных ископаемых и торговлю ими (см. приложение 31 и S/2024/432, приложение 81). Общее число старателей, работающих в рудниках Рубайи, практически не изменилось (см. приложение 32)⁵⁷. В то же время АРК/М23 изгнали из Рубайи Шамамбу Баригаруйе Еноха, лидера Кооператива старателей-кустарей Масиси и Коалиции конголезского патриотического сопротивления (ПАРЕКО) (S/2024/432, пп. 138–140)⁵⁸.

60. Структуры АРК/М23 в Мушаки охватили своей организаторской деятельностью все аспекты добычи и транспортировки полезных ископаемых, а также торговли ими, создав подобие государственных органов управления. Они учредили «министерство», отвечающее за разработку минеральных ресурсов в торговой зоне Рубайи⁵⁹. Это «министерство» выдавало старателям и торговцам разрешения с надписью «Демократическая Республика Конго — провинция Северное Киву»⁶⁰. Заявители должны были предоставлять документы, удостоверяющие личность. Старатели и торговцы были вынуждены платить ежегодную пошлину в размере 25 и 250 долл. США соответственно⁶¹. АРК/М23 удвоили

⁵⁴ Субъекты в экономическом секторе и источники в гражданском обществе, Министерстве горнодобывающей промышленности Демократической Республики Конго и службах безопасности.

⁵⁵ Субъекты в экономическом секторе.

⁵⁶ Старатели и торговцы в Рубайе и источники в гражданском обществе и службах безопасности.

⁵⁷ Местные жители, источники в гражданском обществе, старатели, торговцы и исследователи. На разных этапах добычных работ в Рубайе были задействованы около 10 000 человек.

⁵⁸ Там же. Местные жители, источники в гражданском обществе, старатели, торговцы, исследователи и органы управления и надзора в горнодобывающей сфере. Дополнительные изыскания позволили установить, что Шамамба был лидером Коалиции конголезского патриотического сопротивления (группировки «генерала» Махоро), а не Коалиции конголезского патриотического сопротивления/Ударных сил, как указано в предыдущем докладе S/2024/432.

⁵⁹ Комбатанты М23, местные жители, источники в гражданском обществе, исследователи, старатели и торговцы.

⁶⁰ Там же.

⁶¹ Там же.

заработную плату старателей, что убедило большинство из них продолжить работу в Рубайе⁶².

61. Комбатанты М23 несли патрульную службу в городе Рубайя и местах добычи полезных ископаемых, следя за тем, чтобы торговцы и старатели продавали минеральное сырье только конголезским и руандийским торговцам, санкционированным АРК/М23. Нарушение правил, установленных АРК/М23, каралось арестом и заключением под стражу в Мушаки⁶³.

Новый экспортный маршрут из Рубайи в Руанду

62. АРК/М23 контролировали весь маршрут от района разработки полезных ископаемых до границы с Руандой (см. приложение 33). Минеральное сырье из Рубайи переправлялось через Бихамбве, Мушаки и Киролирве в территории Матиси, Кичангу, Кизимбу, Бишушу, Мулимби, Тонго и Каленгеру в территории Ручуру и Кибумбу в территории Ньярагонго⁶⁴.

63. Минеральное сырье выгружалось на стоянке рядом с рынком в Кибумбе и перегружалось на крупнотоннажные грузовые автомобили, которые въезжали в Демократическую Республику Конго из Руанды через Кабухангу, что было также зафиксировано на спутниковых изображениях (см. приложение 34)⁶⁵. АРК/М23 насаждали практику «салонго» (принудительных общественных работ), заставляя местных жителей расширять дороги, соединяющие Кибумбу и Кабухангу, а также Рубайю и Киролирве, чтобы сделать их пригодными для движения грузовиков (см. приложение 35)⁶⁶.

Расчетные объемы продаж минерального сырья и прибыли Альянса реки Конго/Движения 23 марта

64. В Рубайе лица, видевшие, как АРК/М23 перевозят полезные ископаемые, сообщали, что дважды в неделю минеральным сырьем загружались колонны из четырех — пяти автомобилей грузоподъемностью до 5 тонн. С середины мая по конец октября частота и объемы вывоза полезных ископаемых из Рубайи оставались неизменными⁶⁷. Таким образом, АРК/М23 контролировали продажу и транспортировку приблизительно 120 тонн колтана в месяц.

65. АРК/М23 взимали налоги, в том числе в натуральной форме, на продажу и транспортировку минерального сырья. Для колтана и марганца размер налога составлял 7 долл. США за килограмм, а для олова (касситерита) — 4 долл. США за килограмм⁶⁸.

66. В результате АРК/М23 ежемесячно получали не менее 800 000 долл. США от налогообложения добычи колтана в Рубайе и торговли им.

⁶² Местные жители, источники в гражданском обществе, старатели, торговцы и исследователи.

⁶³ Лица, арестованные и заключенные под стражу АРК/М23. 17 сентября 2024 года участники АРК/М23 арестовали восьмерых мотоциклистов, которые перевозили 800 кг колтана из Рубайи, следуя по дороге в Нгунгу и Калехе (Южное Киву), и троих торговцев, заказавших перевозку.

⁶⁴ Источники в гражданском обществе, местные жители и субъекты в экономическом секторе.

⁶⁵ Там же.

⁶⁶ Там же.

⁶⁷ Лица, видевшие автоколонны с минеральным сырьем. В сентябре 2024 года Специальный представитель Генерального секретаря и руководитель МООНСДРК Бинту Кейта консервативно оценила объем колтана, добываемого в Рубайе в месяц, в 100 тонн. См. Sonia Rolley, “UN says Congo rebels generating \$300,000 monthly in seized mining area”, Reuters, 30 September 2024.

⁶⁸ Местные жители, субъекты в экономическом секторе и исследователи.

С. Правительственные марионеточные силы и операции Вооруженных сил Демократической Республики Конго против Демократических сил освобождения Руанды — Боевых сил абакунгузи

Безуспешные операции Вооруженных сил Демократической Республики Конго против Демократических сил освобождения Руанды — Боевых сил абакунгузи

67. После того как в рамках Луандийского процесса правительство Демократической Республики Конго обязалось «нейтрализовать» ДСОР (см. п. 38 выше), в конце сентября 2024 года ВСДРК начали непродолжительное наступление против ДСОР — Боевых сил абакунгузи (БОСА). По приказу президента Демократической Республики Конго Феликса Антуана Чисекеди Чиломбо заместитель начальника штаба ВСДРК по оперативно-разведывательной работе генерал Чико Читамбве⁶⁹ принял на себя общее командование операцией в обход генерал-лейтенанта Фалля Сикабве⁷⁰, командовавшего операциями ВСДРК в Северном и Южном Киву, и губернатора Северного Киву генерал-майора Питера Чиримвами, который известен своими давними связями с ДСОР — БОСА⁷¹.

68. Данные действия были призваны продемонстрировать, что Демократическая Республика Конго реагирует на международное давление, оказываемое с целью заставить ее прекратить поддерживать ДСОР (см. приложение 36). Это давление усилилось после того, как за несколько дней до начала наступления в результате утечки достоянием общественности стала конфиденциальная вербальная нота, подлинность которой была установлена, за подписью руководителя администрации президента. В документе излагалось предложение о переселении в Демократическую Республику Конго шести граждан Руанды, судимых Международным уголовным трибуналом по Руанде за геноцид (см. приложение 37).

69. 23 и 24 сентября формирования сил специального назначения ВСДРК под командованием подполковника Донатьена Бавили⁷² начали наступление на позиции ДСОР — БОСА, в том числе на позиции Разведывательно-диверсионного специального подразделения ВСДРК, в окрестностях Саке, а именно в Шове, Кимоке, Лупанго и Мубамбири. Целью наступления было уничтожение опорных пунктов ДСОР и «нейтрализация» (то есть захват или убийство) «генерал-майора» Нтавукуи Пасифика (псевдоним «Омега Израэль») (CDi.024) и других лидеров ДСОР (S/2024/432, пп. 73–79)⁷³.

70. 25 и 26 сентября 11-я бригада ВСДРК под командованием генерала Папи Лупембе, преследуя цель уничтожить очередную позицию ДСОР, по ошибке атаковала позицию Альянса патриотов за свободное и суверенное Конго (АПССК) в Русайо (территория Ньирагонго)⁷⁴. Этот инцидент возмутил АПССК и другие группы «вазалендо», которые пригрозили уйти с передовой (см. п. 80 ниже).

71. Губернатор Чиримвами передал информацию о планируемых операциях руководству ДСОР — БОСА, поэтому ни один из высокопоставленных

⁶⁹ S/2024/432, приложение 29.

⁷⁰ Источники в разведке, дипломатических кругах и гражданском обществе и представители местных властей.

⁷¹ S/2024/432, п. 72; S/2023/990, п. 36; S/2022/967, приложения 41 и 50; и источники в ВСДРК, Организации Объединенных Наций, ДСОР, «вазалендо» и разведке.

⁷² S/2023/990, приложение 38.

⁷³ Документы, имеющиеся в распоряжении Секретариата.

⁷⁴ Источники в разведке, дипломатических кругах и гражданском обществе и представители местных властей.

командиров не был убит или арестован⁷⁵. Омега и другие лидеры ДСОР бежали в Килиманьоку (территория Ньирагонго) и укрепили там свои позиции⁷⁶.

72. ВСДРК вытеснили некоторые подразделения ДСОР из Мумбамбири и Шове и арестовали нескольких комбатантов ДСОР и АПССК низкого ранга, среди которых было несколько несовершеннолетних. Кроме того, формирования ВСДРК убили 3 и ранили 12 комбатантов и несколько гражданских лиц⁷⁷. Изъятые в ходе операции 22 единицы оружия и 54 259 единиц боеприпасов включали в себя образцы, произведенные в 2021 и 2022 годах, что служит дополнительным подтверждением информации о предоставлении вооружений и материально-технических средств ДСОР и группам «вазалендо» (см. приложение 38; S/2024/432, п. 64; и S/2023/990, п. 39).

73. Операция выявила слабые места ВСДРК в плане ведения боевых действий и принципиальные разногласия внутри их командования по вопросу об отношениях между ВСДРК и ДСОР.

Реакция Демократических сил освобождения Руанды и «вазалендо»

74. Группы «вазалендо», в том числе военное командование коалиции «Добровольцы в защиту родины» (ДЗО), (S/2024/432, пп. 60–65), восприняли план нейтрализовать ДСОР — их союзника в действиях против АРК/М23 и СОР (S/2024/432, пп. 70–72) — как предательство (см. приложение 39). Гидон Шимирай Мвисса, военный командир ДЗО/«вазалендо» (S/2024/432, п. 61), осудил нападение, но призвал ВСДРК и ДЗО/«вазалендо» к единству (см. приложение 40).

75. Опасаясь дальнейших действий со стороны ВСДРК против руководства и баз ДСОР, группы ДСОР и «вазалендо» совместными усилиями укрепили свою оборону. Основная стратегия заключалась в том, чтобы рассредоточить комбатантов ДСОР по подразделениям ДЗО/«вазалендо» и заявить, что ДСОР перестали существовать⁷⁸. Командиры ДСОР дали своим бойцам указания выдавать себя за членов других групп (см. приложение 41)⁷⁹.

76. В официальном письме ДСОР просили выполняющую функции посредника Анголу обеспечить налаживание диалога с Кигали (см. приложение 42). Все большее распространение получало мнение о том, что проблема ДСОР требует более комплексного подхода, не ограничивающегося простым проведением военной операции⁸⁰. Замысел операции в рамках плана нейтрализации ДСОР, утвержденный на уровне экспертов в Луанде 31 октября, предусматривает определение мест расположения сил и средств ДСОР с последующим обменом информацией в целях выявления ДСОР и «отколовшихся от них групп» (фаза 1), за чем следуют операции по нейтрализации и целенаправленные действия против ДСОР (фаза 2), не предполагающие никаких конкретных мероприятий по проведению разъяснительной работы с комбатантами и возможности их добровольной сдачи в плен. Демобилизация, репатриация и реинтеграция комбатантов

⁷⁵ Источники в ДСОР, ВСДРК, службах безопасности и разведке.

⁷⁶ Источники в коалиции «Добровольцы в защиту отечества» (ДЗО), гражданском обществе, ДСОР и ВСДРК.

⁷⁷ Данные опроса Группой захваченных лиц в Гоме и источники в ВСДРК, ДЗО, ДСОР и гражданском обществе.

⁷⁸ Источники в ДСОР, «вазалендо», разведке и гражданском обществе и представители местных властей.

⁷⁹ Там же.

⁸⁰ Источники в дипломатических кругах, Организации Объединенных Наций, «вазалендо», разведке и гражданском обществе и представители местных властей.

ДСОР предусмотрены только на четвертом этапе реализации замысла операции (см. приложение 13)⁸¹.

77. Данный план, предложенный экспертами разведки, вызывает серьезные опасения с точки зрения прав человека и международного гуманитарного права. Термин «нейтрализация» может подразумевать применение чрезмерной силы, включая совершение таких внесудебных действий, как суммарные казни. Формулировка «члены ДСОР» опасна тем, что может повлечь за собой применение коллективных наказаний и преследование связанных с ДСОР гражданских лиц. ВСДРК, «вазалендо», М23 и СОР, которые, как можно предположить, будут участвовать в осуществлении плана, совершали серьезные нарушения прав человека и международного гуманитарного права в схожих условиях (S/2023/431, пп. 56, 66 и 67; и S/2023/990, пп. 55–58). Осуществление плана может также привести к недобровольной репатриации и нарушению принципа невысылки.

Резкая смена курса действий Вооруженных сил Демократической Республики Конго и продолжение использования ими марионеточных сил

78. Для восстановления испорченных отношений с ДЗО/«вазалендо» 27 сентября военные власти Северного Киву пригласили лидеров ДЗО, чтобы выразить им свое сожаление по поводу нападений на ДСОР и АПССК (см. приложение 43). Лидеры ДЗО вновь выразили свое доверие и готовность к сотрудничеству. Как сообщили командиры ВСДРК и лидеры ДЗО, военные власти негласно попросили ДЗО/«вазалендо» заверить ДСОР в том, что их союз остается в силе.

79. Неделю спустя генерал Дьёжанги Нзамбе⁸² приказал подразделениям ВСДРК приостановить боевые действия против ДСОР и ДЗО и восстановить отношения со «всеми дружественными формированиями» (см. приложение 44). Эти распоряжения попали в социальные сети, что дестабилизировало Луандийский процесс (см. приложение 13).

80. Несмотря на обращенные к правительству Демократической Республики Конго неоднократные призывы прекратить поддерживать ДСОР (см. п. 68 выше), не считая короткой операции против ДСОР — БОСА, оно продолжало систематически опираться на ДЗО/«вазалендо» и ДСОР и сотрудничать с ними (S/2024/432, пп. 60–79)⁸³. В приложении 45 приводятся подробные сведения о сотрудничестве между ВСДРК, ДЗО/«вазалендо» и ДСОР, их участии в боевых действиях, а также о вербовочной деятельности и организационной структуре ДЗО/«вазалендо».

IV. Итури

A. Группа «Заир»: организационная структура, мобилизация и союз с Альянсом реки Конго/Движением 23 марта

Организационная структура

81. Группа «Заир» стала именовать себя «Самооборона пострадавших общин Итури» (СПОИ)⁸⁴. Начиная с мая — июня 2024 года она активизировала вербовку (S/2024/432, п. 150) и подготовила тысячи комбатантов (см. п. 83 ниже). Группа «Заир»/СПОИ получила в свое распоряжение военную технику, а также

⁸¹ Конфиденциальный документ.

⁸² Командующий войсками 34-го военного округа в Северном Киву.

⁸³ S/2023/431, пп. 79; и S/2024/432, пп. 60–65.

⁸⁴ S/2022/967, пп. 87–91; S/2024/432, пп. 149–152; и источники из числа бывших участников группы «Заир» и источники в разведке. См. приложения 46–48.

пикапы, оборудованные для ведения боевых действий, и лодки, что повысило их способность проводить операции на озере Альберт⁸⁵. Она расширила свои возможности в плане ведения воздушной разведки за счет использования небольших коммерческих БПЛА⁸⁶.

82. Несмотря на непрекращающиеся попытки позиционировать себя как группу самообороны (S/2022/479, п. 101; и S/2024/432, пп. 149 и 150), группа «Заир» провокационно атаковала своих соперников «Кооператив за развитие Конго»/Союз революционеров в защиту конголезского народа (КОДЕКО/СРЗКН) и все чаще совершала нападения на ВСДРК и Конголезскую национальную полицию⁸⁷.

Вербовка и подготовка членов группы

83. Группа «Заир»/СПОИ начала массовую вербовочную кампанию во всех общинах “G5”⁸⁸ в территориях Джугу, Махаги и Ару (S/2023/990, пп. 76 и 77)⁸⁹. Опытные бывшие лидеры и бойцы Союза конголезских патриотов (СКП)⁹⁰ были вновь мобилизованы⁹¹. Группа «Заир»/СПОИ вела также вербовку в лагерях для внутренне перемещенных лиц по всей провинции Итури⁹². Несколько тысяч бойцов⁹³ прошли подготовку в учебных центрах в Итури, в учебном центре АРК/М23 в Чанзу (S/2024/432, п. 152) и в Уганде⁹⁴.

84. В Итури крупные тренировочные лагеря действовали в Бини (вождество Мамбиса) под руководством командира группы «Заир»/СПОИ Бараки Амоса Маки (см. пп. 98–103 ниже и S/2024/432, пп. 167–170) и в Буа (вождество Бахема Баниваги, близ Чомии) под руководством командира группы «Заир»/СПОИ Мандро Салико⁹⁵. Новобранцы проходили также обучение в Мабанге, Катото, Нзеби, Дего, Берунде и Буа в территории Джугу⁹⁶.

85. Лица, проходившие подготовку в Бини, сообщили, что большинство инструкторов составляли бывшие комбатанты СКП. Они сообщили также о ротации военных инструкторов из Уганды и Руанды⁹⁷. Курс подготовки в Бини длился один месяц⁹⁸ и был посвящен основам тактики ведения боя, маскировке и обращению с оружием. Избранные новобранцы проходили углубленную подготовку по артиллерийскому делу (см. приложение 46). По окончании обучения комбатантам выдавались удостоверения личности, напечатанные в Бини (см. приложение 47). После этого новобранцев отправляли в Берунду для

⁸⁵ Комбатанты «Заира» и источники в разведке и гражданском обществе.

⁸⁶ Комбатанты «Заира» и источники в ВСДРК, Организации Объединенных Наций, разведке и гражданском обществе.

⁸⁷ Источники в Организации Объединенных Наций, гражданском обществе, ВСДРК и разведке.

⁸⁸ Алур, Мамбиса, Ндо-Окебо, Ньяли и Хема.

⁸⁹ Комбатанты группы «Заир» и источники в гражданском обществе и разведке. S/2023/990, п. 76, и приложения 49–50.

⁹⁰ Там же.

⁹¹ Бывшие комбатанты, представители местных властей и источники в разведке, Организации Объединенных Наций и ВСДРК.

⁹² Там же.

⁹³ Там же и комбатанты «Заира».

⁹⁴ Комбатанты «Заира» и источники в ВСДРК, Организации Объединенных Наций, разведке и гражданском обществе.

⁹⁵ Бывшие новобранцы и источники в разведке и гражданском обществе.

⁹⁶ Там же.

⁹⁷ Там же.

⁹⁸ Там же.

получения обмундирования, а затем они возвращались домой в ожидании мобилизационных приказов⁹⁹.

86. В конце сентября тренировочные лагеря в Бини и Буа были атакованы и уничтожены ВСДРК. К тому времени в лагере в Бини уже прошли подготовку более 3000 комбатантов¹⁰⁰.

87. В приложении 48 приводится дополнительная информация о подготовке комбатантов группы «Заир»/СПОИ и Движения народной самообороны Итури (ДНСИ) в учебном центре АРК/М23 в Чанзу.

Цели Альянса реки Конго/Движения 23 марта и группы «Заир» в Итури

88. Группа «Заир»/СПОИ упрочила свой союз с АРК/М23 в рамках подготовки к проведению наступательных операций против ВСДРК в Итури. В преддверии крупномасштабного наступления «Заир»/СПОИ при поддержке АРК/М23 разработала комплексную стратегию, определив районы боевых действий, места развертывания оперативных баз, маршруты подвоза вооружений и порядок переброски войск через озеро Альберт из Уганды¹⁰¹.

89. АРК/М23 не отказались от намерения привлечь на свою сторону все вооруженные группы в Итури (S/2024/432, п. 152). В последние месяцы Нангаа и другие представители АРК/М23 контактировали с лидерами Патриотического фронта сопротивления Итури (ПФСИ) и КОДЕКО/СРЗКН¹⁰². Предлагаемая АРК/М23 концепция развития экономики и примирения в Итури с ее обещанием обеспечить равные экономические возможности для всех, в частности для общин таких маргинализированных народностей как ленду и нгити, была встречена с большим интересом¹⁰³.

90. На момент подготовки настоящего доклада ПФСИ и АРК/М23 вели переговоры¹⁰⁴. Кроме того, АРК связывался с КОДЕКО/СРЗКН, давними противниками группы «Заир», которые обычно рассматриваются как главное препятствие для быстрого захвата Итури АРК/М23. АРК по-прежнему был убежден, что обещание нгити/ПФСИ вступить в союз с ним убедило бы КОДЕКО/СРЗКН, в рядах которого доминирующую роль играют представители ленду, примкнуть к его коалиции¹⁰⁵.

Заключение лидерами, включенными в санкционный перечень, союза с Альянсом реки Конго/Движением 23 марта

91. Ключевую роль в укреплении сотрудничества между АРК/М23 и группой «Заир»/СПОИ сыграли находящиеся под санкциями Тома Лубанга Дьило (CDi.007) и Ив Кава Панга Мандро (CDi.009) (S/2024/432, п. 152)¹⁰⁶. Выступая в качестве «моральных авторитетов» Заира/СПОИ, они содействовали вербовке и обучению комбатантов «Заира» и организовывали их отправку в Чанзу для прохождения подготовки и обратно в Итури. Инносан Каина (псевдоним «Индия

⁹⁹ Там же.

¹⁰⁰ Бывшие комбатанты, представители местных властей и источники в разведке, Организации Объединенных Наций и ВСДРК.

¹⁰¹ Там же, бывшие комбатанты и представители местных властей.

¹⁰² Лидеры двух действующих в Итури вооруженных групп, в том числе КОДЕКО/СРЗКН.

¹⁰³ Там же.

¹⁰⁴ Источники в АРК/М23, разведке и ВСДРК, бывшие комбатанты и представители местных властей.

¹⁰⁵ Источник в КОДЕКО/СРЗКН и источники в разведке.

¹⁰⁶ S/2023/990, п. 76 и 77, и приложения 49 и 50.

Куин») (CDi.004), ныне — влиятельный командир M23, тесно сотрудничал по этим вопросам с Лубангой в Кампале¹⁰⁷.

92. С июля 2024 года все эти трое фигурантов санкционного перечня были замечены в Кампале. В июле Лубанга покинул Итури и поселился в Кампале¹⁰⁸. Там Лубанга по меньшей мере один раз встречался с Корнеем Нангаа¹⁰⁹.

93. Ферма Ива Кавы, расположенная в угандийском округе Хоима в окрестностях озера Альберт, служила опорно-перевалочным пунктом для комбатантов группы «Заир» из Итури, среди которых на момент подготовки настоящего доклада были те, кто вернулся из Чанзу после прохождения подготовки и размещался на угандийской стороне озера Альберт, предположительно — в полной готовности переправиться в Итури¹¹⁰. В июне и июле 2024 года Кава содействовал передаче оружия и боеприпасов комбатантам «Заира»/СПОИ (S/2022/967, п. 88) и организации подготовки в лагере в Берунде¹¹¹.

94. В ответ на запросы Группы о присутствии и недавней деятельности этих включенных в санкционный перечень лиц в Кампале правительство Уганды заявило, что ему неизвестно о том, что они находятся на территории Уганды¹¹².

95. Лидеры группы «Заир» «генерал» Лого Марин¹¹³ и Барака¹¹⁴ (см. пп. 98-103 ниже) также часто ездили в Уганду. Марин обосновался в Кампале, тесно сотрудничая с Лубангой. Он посещал Руанду и Бунагану (Демократическая Республика Конго) для встреч с делегатами АРК/М23¹¹⁵ и содействовал подготовке бойцов «Заира» в Чанзу¹¹⁶.

96. В конце июля 2024 года Лубанга направил в Итури делегатов, задачей которых было примирить ДНСИ и «Заир»/СПОИ, объединить эти две группы¹¹⁷ (S/2022/967, пп. 87–91; и S/2023/431, пп. 113–117) и наладить связи между ними и АРК/М23. Хотя руководители ДНСИ решили сохранить независимость, ДНСИ и «Заир»/СПОИ договорились сообща сотрудничать с АРК/М23. Пресс-секретарь ДНСИ Бенжамен Бахати примкнул к АРК/М23 в Бунагане (см. приложение 49)¹¹⁸.

97. Эти широкомасштабные мероприятия по мобилизации и сотрудничеству с АРК/М23 активизировались с конца августа 2024 года, что, по сообщениям, сопровождалось частыми встречами в различных населенных пунктах Уганды¹¹⁹.

¹⁰⁷ Бывшие комбатанты, представители местных властей и источники в разведке, Организации Объединенных Наций и ВСДРК.

¹⁰⁸ Там же.

¹⁰⁹ Там же.

¹¹⁰ Там же.

¹¹¹ Там же.

¹¹² Ответ правительства Уганды от 1 ноября 2024 года (имеется в распоряжении Секретариата Организации Объединенных Наций). См. также S/2024/432, пп. 55–58.

¹¹³ S/2024/432, п. 152.

¹¹⁴ Там же, пп. 167–170.

¹¹⁵ Бывшие комбатанты, исследователи, представители местных властей и источники в разведке, Организации Объединенных Наций и ВСДРК.

¹¹⁶ Там же.

¹¹⁷ Источники в разведке и лидер вооруженной группы.

¹¹⁸ Источники в Движении народной самообороны Итури, исследователи, бывшие комбатанты, представители местных властей и источники в гражданском обществе, разведке, Организации Объединенных Наций и ВСДРК.

¹¹⁹ Источники в разведке, ВСДРК и Организации Объединенных Наций.

В. Контроль вооруженных групп над добычей золота в Итури

98. В Итури добыча золота по-прежнему велась без контроля со стороны государства (S/2022/967, п. 95 и приложение 64), принося вооруженным группам и преступным сообществам не менее 140 млн долл. США в год¹²⁰. Статистические данные свидетельствуют о значительном расхождении между предполагаемым объемом золота, добытого кустарными и мелкими горными промыслами, и фактически зарегистрированными цифрами. Согласно одному официальному докладу, по оценкам, такие промыслы добывают в Итури 1800 кг золота в год¹²¹. Однако в первом полугодии 2024 года объем добытого и купленного золота, зарегистрированный Службой помощи и содействия кустарным и мелким горным промыслам и Кооперативом торговцев золотом Итури (КООНОРИ)¹²², составил 17 кг и 24 кг соответственно¹²³.

99. Органы горного контроля объясняют расхождение между официальными и зарегистрированными объемами добычи ограниченным доступом на прииски, контролируемые вооруженными группами¹²⁴. Несмотря на то что горнодобывающие кооперативы платили Конголезской национальной полиции и ВСДРК за защиту¹²⁵, большинство мест разработки полезных ископаемых оставались под контролем таких вооруженных групп, как КОДЕКО/СРЗКН и «Заир»/СПОИ в территории Джугу и ПФСИ, Патриотический и интеграционистский фронт Конго и ДНСИ в территории Ируму, причем КОДЕКО/СРЗКН действовал также в территории Махаги (S/2024/432, п. 163; S/2023/990, приложение 50; и S/2022/479, пп. 107–123)¹²⁶.

100. Как следствие, владельцы основных горнодобывающих кооперативов в Итури, все из которых являются акционерами КООНОРИ, платили лидерам вооруженных групп, контролирующим места разработки полезных ископаемых, в том числе Бараке из «Заира»/СПОИ и лидеру вооруженной группы «Фифтисенту» из КОДЕКО, за сохранение своих активов и продолжение деятельности (см. приложение 50)¹²⁷. Платежи вооруженным группам представляют собой деяния, подпадающие под действие санкционных мер.

101. Как сообщалось ранее, Барака, командир группы «Заир»/СПОИ, базирующийся в городе Мабанга (территория Джугу), осуществлял исключительный контроль над всей экономической деятельностью в вождестве Мамбиса (S/2024/432, пп. 167–170; и S/2023/990, приложение 47).

102. Его деятельность, включающая в себя незаконную золотодобычу, налогообложение и взимание сборов на блокпостах, приносила доход в размере приблизительно 1,6 млн долл. США в месяц только от добычи золота. Доходы от взимания незаконных налогов с местных предприятий и сборов на блокпостах увеличивали эту сумму еще приблизительно на 70 000 долл. США в месяц. Эти

¹²⁰ 8 ноября 2024 года цена золота составляла 86 314 долл. США за килограмм.

¹²¹ См. https://minamataconvention.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_action_plan/RDC-NAP-2021-FR.pdf (документ на французском языке).

¹²² Кооператив торговцев золотом Итури (КООНОРИ) — единственный покупатель, предоставляющий отчетность Службе помощи и содействия кустарным и мелким горным промыслам (САЕМАПЕ).

¹²³ Сводные доклады САЕМАПЕ по Итури, 2023 и 2024 годы.

¹²⁴ Там же.

¹²⁵ Официально (через Подразделение охраны учреждений и высокопоставленных лиц) и неофициально.

¹²⁶ Официальные лица Демократической Республики Конго и доклад, имеющийся в распоряжении Секретариата.

¹²⁷ Очевидцы, исследователи, Генеральная горная инспекция и источники в гражданском обществе Организации Объединенных Наций, судебных органах и разведке.

средства, легализуемые через сделки с недвижимостью и коммерческие инвестиции в Мабанге, Ига-Баррьере и Буниа, позволили Бараке упрочить свое влияние как субъекта экономической деятельности в этом районе и как лидера вооруженной группы (см. приложение 51).

103. В соответствии с пунктом 7 g) резолюции 2293 (2016) Совета Безопасности действия Бараки представляют собой нарушение режима санкций в виде незаконной эксплуатации природных ресурсов.

V. Южное Киву

A. Мобилизация Альянса реки Конго/Движения 23 марта

104. Северные территории Южного Киву подвергались обстрелам с позиций М23 и СОР в территории Масиси, а также периодическим вторжениям формирований М23 и СОР в территорию Калехе в Южном Киву, как например в Лумбиши в конце мая 2024 года (см. приложение 52). АРК/М23 продолжали мобилизовывать поддержку со стороны вооруженных групп и местного населения¹²⁸.

105. Фигурант санкционного перечня Бернар Бьямунгу (CDi.038), командир АРК/М23, действующий в окрестностях Саке (S/2024/432, п. 41), сыграл ключевую роль в установлении связей с некоторыми группировками «Райя мутомбоки» и «майи-майи» (Кирикишо), что привело к переходу некоторых их участников на сторону АРК/М23 (см. приложение 53).

106. Группа «Твирванехо», сотрудничавшая с АРК/М23¹²⁹, и группа «Сопrotивление во имя создания правового государства в Бурунди» (РЕД-Табара), получавшая поддержку от Руанды¹³⁰, де-факто заключили союз, и теперь обе эти вооруженные группы стали марионеточными силами АРК/М23 (S/2024/432, п. 179)¹³¹. Вооруженные силы «Билозе бишамбуке» (ВСББ), возглавляемые Нгоманзито, тайно взаимодействовали с АРК/М23 через связи с РЕД-Табара и «Твирванехо» (S/2024/432, приложение 106), несмотря на подписание пакта о ненападении с группами «майи-майи» (см. п. 109 ниже)¹³².

B. Мобилизация «вазалендо»

107. Кризис, вызванный действиями АРК/М23, положил начало попыткам объединить группы «вазалендо» в Южном Киву (S/2024/432, пп. 175–177) под одним командованием, чтобы они выступили единым фронтом против АРК/М23.

108. В конце июля и начале августа 2024 года Жюстен Битаквира, член Национальной ассамблеи Демократической Республики Конго, известный своими высказываниями против тутси (S/2023/990, приложение 34), и Жюль Мулумба, пресс-секретарь ДЗО, выступающий в роли связующего звена с властями Демократической Республики Конго, организовали встречи с представителями вооруженных групп (S/2024/432, п. 61). На них присутствовали также два представителя сил национальной обороны, известных как РАД¹³³. Цель заключалась в том,

¹²⁸ Исследователи, источники в Организации Объединенных Наций и службах безопасности и источники, близкие к М23 и АРК.

¹²⁹ S/2024/432, п. 188; S/2023/990, пп. 88–90; и S/2023/431, п. 139.

¹³⁰ S/2024/432, пп. 179–181.

¹³¹ Источники в гражданском обществе, Организации Объединенных Наций, службах безопасности и разведке, исследователи и источники, близкие к «Твирванехо».

¹³² Там же и источники, близкие к группам «майи-майи».

¹³³ Исследователи и источники в ВСДРК и Организации Объединенных Наций.

чтобы примирить группы «майи-майи» (Якутумба) и ВСББ и убедить группы «майи-майи» поддержать «вазалендо» в Северном Киву и не присоединяться к АРК/М23 (S/2024/432, приложение 106). Во встречах приняли участие более десяти групп «майи-майи» из территорий Физи, Мвенга и Увира, в том числе группа «майи-майи» (Якутумба), возглавляемая находящимся под санкциями Уильямом Якутумбой (CDi.043), ВСББ под руководством Нгоманзито и Патриотические силы в защиту Конго (ПСЗК) во главе с Эбуэлой Мтетези¹³⁴.

109. Эти встречи позволили снять напряженность и прекратить столкновения между группами Якутумбы и Нгоманзито (см. п. 106 выше). Присутствовавшие вооруженные группы подписали пакт о ненападении и обязались поддерживать действия ВСДРК против АРК/М23, РЕД-Табара и «Твирванехо» (см. приложение 54)¹³⁵. Обещание Битаквиры присоединиться к РАД побудило данные группы объединиться в четыре бригады под общим командованием Уильяма Якутумбы, при этом «майи-майи» (Маканаки) должны были действовать в Увира, ВСББ — в Итомбве, ПСЗК «генерала» Эбуэлы Мтетези — в Бараке, а «майи-майи» (Якутумба) — в Физи¹³⁶.

110. Собрания в Бараке и Увира возмутили общину баньямуленге и «Твирванехо», которые увидели угрозу в этой масштабной враждебной мобилизации (см. приложение 55). После непродолжительно затишья, в период которого насильственные действия не велись, столкновения между «Твирванехо» и группами «майи-майи» возобновились в начале сентября, а между РЕД-Табара и коалицией «майи-майи»/Сил национальной обороны Бурунди — в конце сентября 2024 года (см. приложение 56).

С. Ухудшение обстановки в плане безопасности после вывода сил Миссии и злоупотребления со стороны «вазалендо»

111. После полного вывода сил МООНСДРК 30 июня 2024 года число инцидентов в сфере безопасности с участием вооруженных групп и ВСДРК в Южном Киву увеличилось¹³⁷. В силу неспособности государственных сил безопасности обеспечить полное развертывание или вести действия в районах, покинутых МООНСДРК, увеличилась уязвимость гражданского населения перед лицом нападений и злоупотреблений, включая мародерство, грабежи, преследования, сексуальное насилие, убийства и вымогательство со стороны вооруженных групп и государственных сил безопасности¹³⁸.

112. Вооруженные группы в Южном Киву продолжали пользоваться критической ситуацией, сложившейся в результате действий АРК/М23, для новой мобилизации, упрочения и расширения территориального контроля и эксплуатации природных ресурсов (S/2024/432, пп. 175–177). В связи с переброской войск ВСДРК в северную территорию Калехе для борьбы с АРК/М23 и СОР¹³⁹ в сфере безопасности образовался вакуум, который быстро заполнили вооруженные группы¹⁴⁰.

113. В расположенной на юге территории Физи комбатанты «майи-майи» (Якутумба) действовали как де-факто власти в Бараке, производя произвольные

¹³⁴ S/2024/432, приложение 105.

¹³⁵ Там же и видеозапись, имеющаяся в распоряжении Секретариата.

¹³⁶ Исследователи и источники в Организации Объединенных Наций.

¹³⁷ Там же.

¹³⁸ Там же.

¹³⁹ Источники в ВСДРК, разведке, службах безопасности и Организации Объединенных Наций.

¹⁴⁰ Исследователи и источники в гражданском обществе и Организации Объединенных Наций.

аресты, возводя незаконные блокпосты и облагая налогами гражданское население и международные организации и/или гуманитарные структуры¹⁴¹. В северных территориях Калехе, Кабаре и Шабунда группы «Конголезское движение в защиту народа и национальной целостности», «майи-майи» и «Райя мутомбоки» способствовали ухудшению обстановки в плане безопасности, устанавливая незаконные блокпосты, нападая на сотрудников международных и национальных неправительственных организаций, пытая и похищая гражданских лиц, а также совершая акты сексуального насилия, что представляет собой деяния, подпадающие под действие санкционных мер¹⁴².

VI. Рекомендации

114. Группа выносит следующие рекомендации, адресованные:

Правительству Демократической Республики Конго

а) применить санкции против лиц из состава ВДСРК и политических деятелей, сотрудничающих с ДСОР, в том числе против лиц, ответственных за передачу оружия и боеприпасов (см. пп. 67, 72 и 78–80 выше);

Правительствам Демократической Республики Конго, Руанды и Анголы, Совету Безопасности и Миссии Организации Объединенных Наций по стабилизации в Демократической Республике Конго

б) проследить за тем, чтобы меры по репатриации, переселению или аресту, предусмотренные в плане нейтрализации ДСОР, осуществлялись в строгом соответствии с международными правовыми стандартами (см. пп. 76 и 77 выше);

Правительству Руанды

с) прекратить создавать помехи для сигналов GPS во избежание неблагоприятных последствий для гражданских и гуманитарных воздушных операций и воздушных операций Организации Объединенных Наций в Демократической Республике Конго (см. пп. 54 и 55 выше);

Правительствам Руанды и Демократической Республики Конго

д) расследовать деятельность лиц и сетей, причастных к контрабанде полезных ископаемых из Рубайи в Руанду, и привлекать их к суду (см. пп. 57 и 58 выше);

Правительству Уганды

е) отслеживать лиц, внесенных в санкционный перечень Комитета Совета Безопасности, учрежденного резолюцией 1533 (2004) по Демократической Республике Конго, и/или Группы экспертов по Демократической Республике Конго, на территории Уганды и сообщать о результатах Комитету по санкциям/Группе экспертов (см. пп. 91–97 выше);

¹⁴¹ Там же.

¹⁴² Исследователи, гуманитарные организации и источники в гражданском обществе, службах безопасности, ВДСРК и Организации Объединенных Наций.

Правительствам Уганды и Демократической Республики Конго

f) способствовать своевременному обмену информацией, имеющей отношение к операции «Шуджаа», между НСОУ и ВСДРК и сотрудничать с МООНСДРК, чтобы сводить к минимуму негативные последствия для гражданского населения (см. пп. 11–14 выше).

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- Annex 1 (para. 8) - Killing and arrest of ADF commanders
- Annex 2 (para. 9) - Movement of ADF camps and commanders
- Annex 3 (para. 12) - UPDF drone crash on 11 August 2024 outside Shujaa operational area raising tensions
- Annex 4 (para. 14) - Expansion of Operation Shujaa in pursuit of fleeing ADF groups
- Annex 5 (para. 18) - ADF's technological advancements
- Annex 6 (paras. 19-22) - Attacks on the civilian population
- Annex 7 (para. 23) - ADF unified command and control
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- Annex 9 (para. 27) - AFC/M23 communique denying rumors of collaboration with ADF
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- Annex 11 (para. 31) - Tensions between local communities and Wazalendo armed groups in Lubero territory
- Annex 12 (para. 34) - AFC communique of 1 August 2024
- Annex 13 (para. 38) - Additional information on the negotiations for the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of the RDF troops, conflicting positions and the Luanda process
- Annex 14 (para. 42) - Forced and voluntary recruitment by AFC/M23
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- Annex 16 (para. 43) - Military and tactical training, ideology and indoctrination
- Annex 17 (para. 44) - M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Southern Front (southern Masisi territory and Nyiragongo territory)
- Annex 18 (para. 45) - M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Northern Front (Rutshuru and southern Lubero territories)
- Annex 19 (para. 46) - M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Western Front (northern Masisi and Walikale territories)
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- Annex 21 (para. 50) - Illustrations of RDF continued presence and support to M23
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- Annex 23 (para. 53) - Guided anti-tank missile in Mubambiro
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- Annex 28 (para. 56) - Update on mineral traceability
- Annex 29 (para. 57) - Illustrations of documented breaches of mineral traceability
- Annex 30 (para. 58) - AFC/M23 monopoly over coltan production and trade in Rubaya benefitting smuggle to Rwanda
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- Annex 36 (para. 68) - Calls to end support to, and collaboration with armed groups, including the FDLR
- Annex 37 (para. 68) - Note Verbale signed by the Presidency's Chief of Staff to relocate to the DRC six Rwandan nationals tried for genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
- Annex 38 (para. 72) - Seized weapons and ammunition during FARDC operation against FDLR
- Annex 39 (para. 74) - APCLS communique seeking clarification on those responsible for the FARDC attacks on its positions in Rusayo

- Annex 40 (para. 74) - Communiqué of Guidon Shimiray Mwissa following the FARDC mistaken attack on APCLS
- Annex 41 (para. 75) - Examples of FDLR survival strategy
- Annex 42 (para. 76) - Letter of Byiringiro Victor, FDLR “president”, to the Angolan facilitator
- Annex 43 (para. 78) - Meeting between FARDC and VDP Leaders on 27 September 2024
- Annex 44 (para. 79) - Telegram issuing instructions to suspend attacks against the FDLR
- Annex 45 (para. 80) - Additional details on the FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR cooperation, their engagement in fighting, and VDP/Wazalendo recruitment and organization
- Annex 46 (para. 85) - Zaïre/ADCVI Recruits in training at Bini
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- Annex 48 (para. 87) - Training of Zaïre/ADCVI and MAPI combatants at the AFC/M23 training center in Tchanzu
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- Annex 50 (para. 100) - Illegal taxes levied by CODECO/URDPC
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- Annex 54 (para. 109) - Armed group leaders signing the non-aggression pact in Baraka
- Annex 55 (para. 110) - Communiqués of Twirwaneho
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Disclaimer:

The maps in the annexes were originally produced in color. Details may have been lost due to the requirement to publish maps in greyscale.

Annex 1 (para. 8)

Killing and arrest of ADF commanders

Meurtre et arrestation de commandants de l'ADF

Several recent escapees from ADF captivity, along with arrested ADF collaborators and captured or surrendered combatants, reported that the latest Shujaa operations inflicted heavy losses on ADF forces and positions, including Seka Baluku's Madina camp. Numerous combatants, as well as hostages and dependents, were killed or injured.

ADF commanders killed

Recently escaped former hostages and former combatants offered insight into the latest developments and reported on the killing of several high-profile commanders.

(1) Braidia¹⁴³ alias Mzee Pasta

Braidia was confirmed dead¹⁴⁴ by at least eight former hostages, including two eyewitnesses, i.e. two of Braidia's former wives.

One of Braidia's wives was with him when he passed away, on 14 August.¹⁴⁵ Sources including UN and FARDC were still reporting on Braidia's movements up until that date, which makes it plausible that Braidia died on or around 14 August.

Several sources confirmed that Braidia was killed near Biakato,¹⁴⁶ while he was leading a smaller group of combatants and dependents towards Madina. According to his former wife who was with him, Braidia was killed by friendly fire. He had left the group to go on a reconnaissance mission around their position, and left instructions to his men to shoot and kill anyone who approaches them. When Braidia returned, he was mistaken by his men to be an enemy combatant and shot. Braidia died of his injuries soon thereafter, in the presence of his wife. Another former hostage who was with this group has witnessed Braidia's death and gave an identical account of the circumstances of his killing.

According to the wives of Braidia, after his death Seka Baluku gave order for Braidia's dependents to be moved to Madina.

(2) Amigo

At least four recent escapees confirmed the death of Amigo, who died shortly after Braidia. Two of Braidia's former wives saw Amigo's body and confirmed his identity.¹⁴⁷ One of these women, who had been abducted by Amigo several years ago, witnessed his death from a fatal head injury caused by an exploding bomb launched by Shujaa forces during an attack. She believes Amigo was over 50 years of age.

The incident occurred as Amigo was leading a group of fighters and Braidia's surviving family members to Madina, following orders from Seka Baluku. Braidia, who had left earlier with one of his wives, had left his other wives and children at Defender's camp (at this point, Braidia's and Tabani's camps had merged; see para. 9 and annex 4). Upon learning of Braidia's death, Amigo's group set out for Madina to join the group Braidia had been leading at the time of his death. However, they were attacked before linking up with the other group, which was waiting for Amigo's group's arrival. After Amigo's death, the two groups eventually merged, only to be attacked again by Shujaa forces. This second attack scattered the group and allowed several of Braidia's wives and dependents to escape. The fate of the remaining members of the traveling group remains unknown.

¹⁴³ Also called Twaburani.

¹⁴⁴ His death was also reported by FARDC and UN sources.

¹⁴⁵ She explained that she recalled this date because she saw it displayed on her phone. She was allowed to have a small phone only to use it as a torch. She also carried Braidia's phone with her for safekeeping. After Braidia's death, the phones were confiscated from her by the combatants.

¹⁴⁶ UN and FARDC sources.

¹⁴⁷ The same two wives who testified about Braidia's death. They were both on the journey heading to Madina when these events occurred, and their testimonies are concordant.

(3) Seka Issa Papasi

Seka Issa Papasi was, according to testimonies of former hostages, including his wife, an operational commander in the camp of Tabani. According to Papasi's former wife, he was reporting to commander Seka Dadi, who was under Seka Umaru.¹⁴⁸ One former hostage identified him as the commander who had abducted her.

Seka Papasi had left the camp of Tabani around Biakato, Mambasa territory in Ituri province, and walked with a group of approximately 50 fighters commanded by "Docta" Kavugo,¹⁴⁹ and some dependents. On the way to Manguredjipa, they were attacked by UPDF, and Seka Papasi was killed.¹⁵⁰ Three of Seka Papasi's wives were already in Manguredjipa, sent ahead by Papasi with the assurance that he was going to join them there later. Papasi told his wife that ADF wanted to expand Islam to Lubero territory, and they wanted that in the future all ADF fighters go there for mandatory prayers, as they were going to establish a famous mosque there.

ADF fighters reported killed by Ugandan authorities, and updates on Meddie Nkalubo and Mulalo

The government of Uganda also informed the Group, in an official communication dated 1 November 2024 and transmitted to the Group on 5 November, that a number of "top ADF terrorists including Muraaro Segujja, Feza, Musa Kamusi, Boaz, Rubangakene, Abu Yassin, Bagdad, Fazul and Mzee Mubindio have been *put out of action*". The Group was yet unable to independently verify this information.

At the end of 2023, UPDF had reported that high-profiled ADF commanders Meddie Nkalubo¹⁵¹ alias Punisher, and Mulalo¹⁵² were killed. At the time, the Group reported that it was unable to confirm their deaths (see S/2023/990, para. 15). Since then, both commanders resurfaced in narratives of ADF activities throughout 2024. Meddie Nkalubo is reportedly very active,¹⁵³ and would be present in the constellation of groups that moved with Musa Baluku northwards into the Epulu reserve, North of the Mambasa–Lolwa–Komanda axis, as acknowledged by the government of Uganda in its communication dated 1 November 2024.

As for Mulalo, while he was reported alive and active in the first part of 2024, several former hostages and combatants interviewed by the Group recently reported that he was killed around April-May 2024. Reports of his activities seized after this date, suggesting that he is in fact "out of action". However, reliable sources close to ADF claimed that he is alive, although he has been severely injured and was evacuated for medical care. The possibility that the news of his death is used as a cover for him evading detection cannot be excluded. The Group can therefore not confirm his killing.

ADF commanders arrested

Toyo Adallah, responsible for resupply in Baluku's Madina camp, was arrested on 7 July 2024. The Ugandan government reported¹⁵⁴ that in fact Toyo surrendered, as he was facing a death sentence by ADF for having committed adultery.¹⁵⁵ At the time of his surrender, Toyo was on mission in Bahaha, Mambasa territory, to pick up supplies for Madina camp.¹⁵⁶ Toyo was taken by UPDF to Uganda, where is currently held.

¹⁴⁸ Several sources confirmed that Tabani, Seka Umaru, and Seka Dadi were together in the camps that merged around July 2024.

¹⁴⁹ Several sources, including FARDC intelligence and former hostages who escaped from the area of Manguredjipa confirmed that a group that joined Abwakasi were under the command of Dr. Kavugo. Dr. Kavugo was with Tabani before, towards Mamove-Biakato. Because of the attacks by Operation Shujaa, they crossed westwards of the RN44 on 18 September – an exchange of fire between Shujaa and Kavugo's group was confirmed by FARDC sources. Dr. Kavugo crossed with a few dependants and reached Abwakasi.

¹⁵⁰ According to Seka Papasi's wife.

¹⁵¹ See S/2023/431, paras. 32 and 38.

¹⁵² See S/2021/560, annex 4.

¹⁵³ Former hostages and former combatants interviewed by the Group, FARDC, UN sources, and intelligence sources.

¹⁵⁴ Official communication by the Government of Uganda, dated 1 November 2024, transmitted to the Group of experts on 5 November 2024.

¹⁵⁵ The fact that he was sought by ADF for having committed adultery was confirmed by former ADF combatants.

¹⁵⁶ Former combatants.

The Group inquired with the Ugandan government about the arrest, on 18 May 2024, of an ADF commander known as Anywari Al Iraq, or AA, an alleged IED expert hailing from the Busia district in Eastern Uganda. The capture of Anywari Al Iraq was reported in Ugandan media¹⁵⁷ and attributed to a successful Shujaa operation, which also led to the seizing of several items, including:

- One sub-machine gun (SMG)
- 45 rounds of ammunition
- Three walkie-talkies
- One propellant charge
- An assortment of improvised explosive device (IED) making materials

The only image of the seized materiel was of an SMG:



Source: UPDF

Images of the captured commander:



Source: UPDF

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.updf.go.ug/operation-shujaa/operation-shujaa-adf-ied-expert-captured/> (last accessed on 14 November 2024).

The above image was accompanied by the following caption: “The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), in the ongoing operation, codenamed “Operation Shujaa”, today apprehended a commander of the Allied Democratic Forces terrorist group known as Anywari Al Iraq, also referred to as AA”.¹⁵⁸

The government of Uganda did not provide any information about the arrest of this individual. Instead, it informed the Group of the arrest of ADF operatives Yakut Musana and Abdul Rashid Kyoto aka Njovu, without providing any further details.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Official communication by the Government of Uganda, dated 1 November 2024, transmitted to the Group of experts on 5 November 2024.

Annex 2 (para. 9)


Movement of ADF camps and commanders

Mouvement des camps et des commandants de l'ADF

ADF territorial configuration prior to launching Phase IV of Operation Shujaa (May 2024)

Prior to the launching of phase IV of Operation Shujaa on 20 May 2024, ADF groups were operating in the northern part of Beni territory and in the southern Irumu territory of Ituri province, attacking civilians and attempting to avoid contact with security forces. ADF cells were particularly active in the “death triangle” north of Beni and Mavivi, along the RN4 around Oicha, and in the Mbau-Kamango area (S/2024/432, paras. 9-11).

ADF cells were dispersed across five major areas, as illustrated below, with Seka Baluku positioned west of Butani hill; Mzee Meya, Rafiki and Lumisa in the area of Mont Hoyo Reserve; Tabani, Braida (NW of Eringeti) and Defender¹⁶⁰ (around Mayi-Moya, SW of Eirngeti) were separate, although within a day’s walking distance from each other. Abwakasi was further south, moving around in the Mavivi-Oicha-Mangina area.



Map indicating the position of main ADF groups and their area of influence (in green) until May 2024. The area of interest of Operation Shujaa phase 4 is indicated in blue.

Map Data: Google, ©2023 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Map provided with annotations by a confidential source.

¹⁶⁰ See S/2015/19, annexes 4 and 9, and S/2023/990, annex 12.

Impact of Shujaa operations on ADF's territorial configuration (May-July 2024)

Operation Shujaa targeted these camps with both aerial and ground operations.¹⁶¹ Due to the heightened military pressure, ADF groups – weakened and with their positions compromised – were compelled to move. High mobility has always been their survival strategy (S/2023/990, para. 15).¹⁶²

ADF cells began moving along three main axes:¹⁶³

- (1) **Madina camp of Musa Baluku**, absorbing an increased number of dependents and hostages, began moving north, along the Eringeti – Komanda axis into Mambasa territory of Ituri Province, advancing north of Lolwa. Mzee Meya Sebagala's group, called to offer combat support and protection to Madina, began moving from the area north of Eringeti.
- (2) West of the Oicha-Eringeti axis (west of RN4), moving towards Biakato (situated along the RN44) the loose constellation of the cells led by **Braida, Tabani, and Kasibante aka Defender were also in westward movement**. According to former hostages, their camps were at about one day walking distance apart, not too far in case they needed combat support one from the other. Witnesses reported frequent visits and exchanges between these camps.
- (3) Towards the end of May and early June, **Abwakasi** began an aggressive push south-west towards Lubero territory, crossing Bapere sector towards the Bandulu forest area, passing through Kambau and Manguredjipa. Sources indicated that Abwakasi's intention was to drive the attention of Shujaa operation away from Baluku's Madina camp,¹⁶⁴ which was moving north, in the opposite direction. Other witnesses¹⁶⁵ reported an additional intention to scout new territories for ADF in Lubero.


¹⁶¹ FARDC, UN sources, intelligence sources, researchers, former hostages and former ADF combatants.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Former hostages who escaped from Abwakasi's camp near Manguredjipa.



Map depicting the position of main ADF groups and their area of influence (in gray) in July 2024. Map provided with annotations by a confidential source.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Merging into fewer mega-camps since July 2024

As camps were in movement throughout May-June along the three axes (see above), relocating under Shujaa pressure, by July they began converging into a few mega-camps. This was a highly unusual configuration for ADF.

The six camps merged into three mega-camps: (1) Madina of Seka Baluku, (2) the constellation of Tabani-Braida-Defender groups, and (3) Abwakasi's camp in Lubero.

(1) Madina camp, commanded by Seka Baluku

Madina, the main camp led by Seka Baluku, traditionally housed ADF's core leadership and most dependents. Although it has been displaced multiple times in the past, Madina camp only relocated entirely when it was under serious threat. Since May-June, Madina absorbed a lot more civilians from other camps, with former hostages and combatants reporting the presence of over 1,000 individuals, including at least 200 fighters.¹⁶⁶

Mzee Mayor and Lumisa have merged into Madina to offer protection and combat support and were moving along with Baluku.

¹⁶⁶ Confirmed by UN and FARDC sources.

As of July 15, Madina was seen moving north of the RN4 near Lolwa, fleeing a UPDF airstrike, moving into Mambasa territory,¹⁶⁷ with ADF incursions and attacks on civilians reported in the area since July 2024.¹⁶⁸

By the end of August – early September, Baluku’s camp was reported some 30 km north of Lolwa.¹⁶⁹

According to FARDC and former hostages interviewed by the Group, Baluku’s intention was to find refuge in Epulu forest inside the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, a densely forested area with difficult access and without FARDC and UPDF presence, and outside the officially agreed area of Shujaa operations.

(2) Tabani – Braidia – Defender camp, under general command of Seka Umaru

Former hostages and combatants from the camps of Braidia, Tabani and Defender have consistently reported that the three camps have merged by latest July 2024. The commanders decided to merge their camps as each of these camps had been badly affected by the Shujaa attacks, lost many combatants, and were vulnerable to further attacks. Seka Umaru, Baluku’s trusted deputy, was commander of the merged camp, which at the time of the merger was located around Biakato. Due to the large number of dependents in the newly merged camp, former hostages reported that the decision was made, on Baluku’s orders, to move some of the dependents to Madina (mainly wives and children of commanders, and young girls who had to be married). It is during such a voyage towards Madina that Braidia and Amigo were killed, in August (see above annex 1).

Since then, former hostages reported that this merged mega camp was hit at least once by Shujaa operations and changed its location at least once.¹⁷⁰ Since August-September, Defender allegedly moved again with a smaller group of fighters, west of Biakato.¹⁷¹

Small detachments from the Tabani-Braidia-Defender camp traveled to Manguredjipa to join Abwakasi’s group. While some dependents moved towards Madina, three hostages reported overhearing that the combatants accompanying the civilians planned to return from Madina and join Abwakasi in Manguredjipa. At least three recently escaped hostages indicated they were en route to Manguredjipa in a group led by Seka Dadi, who succeeded Braidia after his death. One hostage escaped from Manguredjipa on September 29, confirming that at least part of the group arrived there. FARDC confirmed Seka Dadi’s presence with Abwakasi, as they clashed with this group on 23 September near Manguredjipa.

Hostages from Tabani’s camp also reported that Tabani ordered a group to travel to Manguredjipa, led by commanders Docta Kavugo and Seka Papasi—the latter was killed during the journey, while Docta Kavugo reportedly lost his way.

(3) Abwakasi’s group in Lubero

From July onwards, Abwakasi has been operating in Bapere sector in Lubero territory, where he was joined by other smaller group detachments from the camps of Braidia and Tabani (see above). Alongside Abwakasi, the presence of commanders Chalamanda¹⁷² and Seka Dadi¹⁷³ was reported.¹⁷⁴

Abwakasi’s presence in the area was reported until the time of drafting this report, where he continued exploiting and destabilizing the forested areas west of Manguredjipa, which likely provided essential resources for the group’s survival.

¹⁶⁷ FARDC, intelligence sources, UN sources, researchers, former hostages and combatants.

¹⁶⁸ FARDC, civil society, and UN sources.

¹⁶⁹ Idem.

¹⁷⁰ Former hostages who were present in the camp.

¹⁷¹ Former hostage, and UN source.

¹⁷² S/2021/560, annexes 18 and 20, and S/2023/990, annex 12.

¹⁷³ Commander who replaced Braidia.

¹⁷⁴ FARDC, security sources, UN sources, former hostages and combatants.



Map depicting the area of operations of the Abwakasi cell in Bapere sector, Lubero territory, highlighted in red.
Map provided and annotated by a confidential source.

Map Data: Google, ©2023 **Landsat/Copernicus**, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Territorial configuration in October-November 2024

The territorial configuration did not change significantly since July-September. Hostages who recently escaped from the various camps continued reporting the same general locations. In early November, the ADF groups north of Lolwa – Baluku’s enlarged group – were conducting incursions including further east of Komanda, along the Komanda-Luna axis, impacting the area inhabited by the Ngiti, and clashing with the FRPI group defending the territory.¹⁷⁵ This suggests that ADF sub-groups continue scouting new territories to establish camps, restore supply networks, and evade Shujaa operations.

ADF presence continued being reported west of Biakato. Abwakasi’s group was still in the Bapere sector in Lubero territory, including along the border Mambasa territory. In the recent weeks, there has been a temporary lull in attacks against civilians.

The Ugandan government reported to the Group that, as on 1 November 2024, ADF was “separated into two major groups, due to the heightened military pressure”, without this having impacted the group’s command structure:

- One group is headed northwards into Epulu Game Reserve, north of the Komanda-Lolwa-Mambasa road. The “top ADF commanders in this area include Musa Baluku, Hood Lukwago, Mzee Mayor Sebagala and Meddie Nkablubo, among others.”
- The second group is headed westwards into Tshopo Province, west of the Mambasa-Biakato-Beni-Butembo “highways”. The “top ADF commanders in this area are Abu Waquas [Abwakasi, n.n.], Chalamanda, Sheikh Hadad and Mzee Jamal.”

The Ugandan government further stressed in its letter that the “Joint Forces continued to monitor these movements and maintain pursuit in order to neutralize them and consolidate achievements”.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ UN and FARDC sources.

¹⁷⁶ Letter dated 1 November 2024 by the Ugandan government in response to the inquiries of the Group.

Annex 3 (para. 12)

UPDF drone crash on 11 August 2024 outside Shujaa operational area raising tensions

Crash d'un drone de l'UPDF le 11 août 2024 à l'extérieur de la zone opérationnelle de Shujaa provoquant des tensions

On the evening of 11 August 2024, a military drone with Ugandan flag markings crashed on a hill in Bwisabuni village, Djugu territory, about 10 kilometers southeast of Bunia. FARDC retrieved the drone, claiming that the flight recorder and some other technical parts were allegedly taken by local armed elements who first discovered the wreckage.¹⁷⁷

Pictures of the wreckage received from UN source:



Images of the wreckage taken at the crash site on 11 August 2024. Provided by military expert source.

Based on the images of the wreckage and reports written by military experts, that the Group obtained confidential copies of, the drone was identified as the **HERMES 900 Starliner, manufactured by ELBIT SYSTEM.**¹⁷⁸

The drone has an endurance of over 30 hours and can fly at a maximum altitude of 30,000 feet (9,100 meters). Its main mission includes reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications relay. The cost of this drone ranges between \$6.8 million and \$8.8 million.¹⁷⁹

Technical Specifications:

- Wingspan: 15 meters
- Weight: 970 kg
- Payload capacity: 300 kg
- Payload options: Electro-optical/infrared sensors, synthetic aperture radar, communications, electronic intelligence, electronic warfare, hyperspectral sensors.

¹⁷⁷ FARDC sources

¹⁷⁸ <https://aviationsmilitaires.net/v3/kb/aircraft/show/2716/elbit-hermes>

¹⁷⁹ Military expert sources citing the specialized journal *Jane's*.

The HERMES 900 is a medium-sized, multi-payload drone with medium altitude and long endurance, succeeding the HERMES 450 series—one of the most widely used military drones globally. It is configured for tactical, operational, or strategic observation missions.



Source: AviationsMilitaires.net¹⁸⁰

Example image of a HERMES 900

A source with access to FARDC and UPDF high command, with direct knowledge of the matter, reported that UPDF acknowledged ownership of the drone, and that the crash sparked significant frustration from FARDC officials. The source claimed that UPDF's explanation for the drone's presence, claiming it was intended for operations in Komanda, was vague and inconsistent. The fact that the drone crashed at night raised further concerns about its intended mission. The FARDC expressed strong discontent with the UPDF's lack of advance notification, emphasizing that UPDF should follow the example set by MONUSCO, which consistently informs FARDC prior to launching drones in Congolese airspace. FARDC intelligence sources claimed that the UPDF surveillance drone violated Congolese airspace in an area not covered by the Shujaa Operation. Several high ranking FARDC officers voiced their suspicion that the drone has been conducting reconnaissance in Djugu territory due to ongoing security issues near Lake Albert, claiming previous sightings of a similar drone flying over Congolese airspace in the area of Tchomia. This could not be confirmed by the Group.

This incident has highlighted ongoing issues regarding coordination and communication between the two forces.

Despite unofficially claiming a serious breach of Congolese airspace represented by the incident, the Group is unaware of any official complaint filed by the Congolese authorities with the Government of Uganda.

¹⁸⁰ https://aviationsmilitaires.net/media/thumbnails/1920/pictures/800px-Hermes_900.jpg.webp

Annex 4 (para. 14)**Expansion of Operation Shujaa in pursuit of fleeing ADF groups****L'extension de l'opération Shujaa à la poursuite des groupes d'ADF en fuite**


The fourth phase of Operation Shujaa began in November 2023 (S/2024/432, annexes 1 and 2). While it was initially slow and unsuccessful, it was relaunched on 20 May 2024, when it finally gained momentum, prompted by a shift in strategy to address the ADF's increased mobility and expanding presence. While earlier phases were confined to regions near the Uganda-DRC border and RN4, the latest phase expanded west of RN4, covering critical areas near the border of North Kivu and Ituri provinces. This new reach aimed to target prominent ADF leaders and groups, including Abwakasi, Braida, Defender, Tabani and Mzee Meya. Madina, the ADF's headquarters, remained outside Shujaa's boundaries – mainly due to DRC's concerns about a deeper Ugandan military presence in Ituri (see para. 14). Despite this exclusion, the intensified pressure from Shujaa operations has pushed the ADF to relocate its groups further north and south-west (see paras. 15-18, and above).¹⁸¹ This new territorial configuration suggests ADF's intention to regroup in areas outside the official Shujaa zone, north of Ituri river (Baluku) and western-Lubero (Abwakasi).

In response to the ADF's geographical shifts from June to August 2024, the operational boundaries of Shujaa have extended unofficially, on an ad hoc basis. Ground and air operations forced ADF units to spread across new locations, using major routes like Mambasa-Komanda (RN4) and Mambasa-Mangina (RN44) for mobility. A UPDF base was established in Manguredjipa in mid-July, to launch operations targeting the newly relocated Abwakasi group, and regular operations were conducted east and west of RN44 near Biakato, targeting the Tabani-Braida-Defender group constellation.¹⁸²

A comparison of the two maps below illustrates the ad-hoc extension of Shujaa's area of operations, from May-June onwards, in response to ADF's mobility. The maps also illustrate that Baluku's Madina camp remained outside the officially designated area of operations.

¹⁸¹ FARDC, intelligence sources, UN sources, and researchers.


¹⁸² Idem.



Map 1: depicting in light blue, the Shujaa Operation’s officially agreed area of intervention, during the period from November 2023 to June 2024

Map Data: Google, ©2023 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Map 2: depicting, in light blue, the Shujaa Operation's officially agreed area of intervention, and in dark blue the ad hoc extensions in pursuit of the Abwakasi and Tabani-Braida-Defender groups, during the period from June to August 2024

Map Data: Google, ©2023 **Landsat/Copernicus**, Imagery Date: 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Maps provided and annotated by confidential source

Tensions and negotiations continued, even at the time of writing, regarding the extension of Shujaa's area of operations north of Ituri river, to pursue Baluku's relocated Madina camp. Confidential security sources reported that discussions were advancing, and that President Tshisekedi's visit to Uganda on 30 October 2024, on the invitation of President Museveni, also included discussions about the extension of Shujaa.

At the time of writing, the Group did not yet have official confirmation on the outcome of these negotiations. In its letter addressed to the Group on 1 November 2024, the Government of Uganda noted that "Uganda continues to engage the DRC on the designation of new areas of joint operations in relation to the [ADF] group's location and movements."

Annex 5 (para. 18)**ADF's technological advancements****Avancées technologiques de l'ADF**

Although ADF were significantly affected by Shujaa attacks, they have found ways of compensating for their diminished capacities operations through reliance on technology.

Use of drones

Accounts from detained ADF collaborators, captured and surrendered combatants, and former hostages confirm that each ADF camp was equipped with small drones,¹⁸³ primarily used for surveillance to scout new locations and targets, and to avoid threats.¹⁸⁴ Drones were reported by eyewitnesses in the camps of Baluku, Tabani, Braida, Abwakasi, and Defender. Baluku and Braida had at least four drones each.¹⁸⁵ At least eight drones were supplied from Kampala, with support from Da'esh.¹⁸⁶

Fabrication of drone-born IEDs

On 11 August 2024, ADF carried out an attempted drone-born IED attack on an FARDC position in Malyajama, approximately 30 km northwest of Beni. However, the device failed to detonate.



Images of the improvised IED dropped by the drone, received from security sources

According to several sources, Da'esh, who supplied at least eight drones to ADF, also assisted ADF with the know-how to construct the drone-borne bomb.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ Quadcopter surveillance drones.

¹⁸⁴ Intelligence sources, FARDC, UN, researchers, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

¹⁸⁵ Former hostages and former combatants from Baluku and Braida's camps.

¹⁸⁶ Two former combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.


¹⁸⁷ Two former combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.

Sources confirmed that Meddie Nkalubo alias Punisher (S/2023/431, para. 38) constructed the drone-borne IED and had carried out at least one successful test before the failed bomb attempt on FARDC.¹⁸⁸

Although the ADF does not yet appear to have fully perfected the technology, the development of drone-borne IEDs poses a significant new threat in the theater of operations. According to accounts from former hostages and ex-combatants, these devices were intended for use against FARDC forces. Additionally, the same sources reported the ongoing fabrication of IEDs in each camp, indicating that threat from both conventional and drone-borne IEDs remains elevated, as the group continues to enhance its capabilities.¹⁸⁹

Use of computers and satellite communications

ADF also used satellite communications to evade possible detection through usage of cellphone data. Witnesses reported the use of ‘Starlink’,¹⁹⁰ a satellite-based internet system enabled by a small satellite dish.¹⁹¹ Eyewitnesses – former hostages and former combatants – described the equipment as consisting of a small rectangular plate and a compact box, closely matching the specifications of a Starlink device (see image below).



Example image of a portable STARLINK device¹⁹²
Source: STARLINK

The availability of Starlink likely enhanced communication between camp commanders and with their networks outside the DRC, particularly ISCAP (see annex 8 above). Former ADF combatants indicated that Seka Baluku, Mzee Pierro, and Punisher (Meddie Nkalubo) used such a device, indicating that Madina camp was equipped with at least one such device. One former combatant who knew Meddie Nkalubo reported that the latter obtained a Starlink device approximately 9 months ago.¹⁹³

Former hostages and combatants also referred to the commanders in each camp using laptops, solar batteries, walkie-talkies (“Motorolas”) and cell phones.

¹⁸⁸ Ex-combatants, intelligence source, UN sources.

¹⁸⁹ Researchers, intelligence sources, FARDC, UN sources, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

¹⁹⁰ Researchers, intelligence sources, FARDC, ex-hostages and ex-combatants.

¹⁹¹ <https://www.starlink.com/specifications>

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Using as reference November 2024.

Annex 6 (paras. 19-22)

Attacks on the civilian population

Attaques contre la population civile

Despite the relative success of Operation Shujaa in eliminating key ADF commanders and dismantling some camps, ADF attacks on civilians have continued and even intensified. ADF adopted a survival-oriented approach, relying on opportunistic ambushes or attacks on roads, small villages and farmers (S/2023/990, para. 15), for looting, kidnapping, revenge, and fulfilling the jihadist aim of killing ‘kafir’ (non-Muslim infidels).

Between 1 June and 5 November 2024, MONUSCO documented over 650 civilian deaths¹⁹⁴ across at least 124 ADF-attributed incidents.¹⁹⁵ The violence affected the broader Beni region, northwestern Lubero (primarily the Bapere sector) in North Kivu, and southern Ituri, particularly in Mambasa and Irumu territories.

June 2024 marked the deadliest month on record for ADF-perpetrated civilian killings, with over 200 deaths reported across Beni, Lubero, and southern Ituri.¹⁹⁶ The area around Cantine locality¹⁹⁷ west of Beni and the area of Manguredjipa were especially hard-hit (see below), prompting significant population displacement.¹⁹⁸

Massacres by Abwakasi’s group in Beni and Lubero territories since June 2024

Between 3 and 12 June, Abwakasi’s group attacked at least 10 localities, killing over 150 civilians as it was advancing westwards through Beni territory, moving away from the Shuja operations. During all these attacks, Abwakasi’s group also looted property, burned houses and destroyed vehicles and health centers.¹⁹⁹ In particular:

- On 3 June, Abwakasi’s group crossed the RN44 road and attacked Ngwaba village, killing three civilians.
- On the same day, the group advanced further south-west towards Mashao (or Masau) village, where it killed at least 18 civilians.
- On 5 June, the group attacked the villages of Kabwiki²⁰⁰ and Keme, where at least eight civilians were killed.
- On 7 June, Abwakasi’s group advanced further, attacking Masala (10 km southwest of Cantine) and two other nearby settlements.²⁰¹ ADF erected roadblocks along the main road connecting the three localities, pretended to be Wazalendo armed elements to gain the trust of the locals, and then proceeded to kill civilians trapped between the roadblocks. Women and children accompanying ADF fighters also participated in the attack. DRC authorities and local sources reported having found 41 bodies in the aftermath of the attack, in the village of Masala and in the neighboring villages of Mahihi and Keme.²⁰²
- On 9 June, Abwakasi’s group raided the village of Makusa, killing at least four civilians.
- On 10 and 11 June, they attacked two other localities, Pandose and Masango, killing at least four civilians.
- On 12 June, they massacred over 40 civilians in Mayikengo village.²⁰³

¹⁹⁴ Of which 190 documented in Ituri, in the territories of Mambasa and Irumu), and 462 in North Kivu, including Lubero and Beni territories, and Butembo. This figure includes only verified incidents, so the actual number is likely significantly higher. Another international organization operating in the area documented over 700 killings.

¹⁹⁵ Of these, 68 incidents were recorded in Mambasa and Irumu territories of Ituri, and 56 in Lubero and Beni territories, as well as the area of Butembo.

¹⁹⁶ Humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, UN and intelligence sources.

¹⁹⁷ Cantine is an important agricultural and mining zone in the Grand Nord, a region that has not been impacted by ADF activities in the recent years.

¹⁹⁸ Humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers, UN and intelligence sources.

¹⁹⁹ UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, security and intelligence sources, researchers.

²⁰⁰ Also referred to as Kabweke.


²⁰¹ UN, security, intelligence sources, and researchers.

²⁰² FADRC, humanitarian and UN sources. See also <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/death-toll-rises-41-attack-eastern-congo-villages-2024-06-09/>.

²⁰³ See also <https://www.fapa.info/en/deadly-rebel-attack-in-eastern-dr-congo-claims-30-lives/>.

As the Abwakasi group advanced into the Bapere sector of Lubero territory, near the border between Beni and Lubero, reports of deadly attacks on civilians began emerging from 13 June onward:

- On 18 June, an unconfirmed number of civilians were killed at Mabiti village, while Da'esh claimed that 11 Christians were beheaded.²⁰⁴
- The following day, at least 10 civilians were killed in a village 5km further from south of Mabiti, with Da'esh claiming to have killed 20 individuals.²⁰⁵
- On 21 June, ADF attacked Kyanganda, in northern Lubero territory, killing at least 14 civilians and burning civilian houses.²⁰⁶ Photographs depict the bodies of at least 10 people lying on the side of the road, their arms bound behind their backs, with apparent gunshot wounds to their heads.²⁰⁷ Da'esh claimed that at least 40 civilians were killed during this attack,²⁰⁸ but the Group of Experts could not confirm this number.²⁰⁹



Map depicting the movements of Abwakasi's group from Beni territory towards Lubero and the villages it attacked along the way, from 3 to 18 June. UN source

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Landsat/Copernicus, © 2024 Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 2 September 2021

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Between end of July and early August, ADF (Abwakasi's group) continued its operations in western Lubero, focusing on Njiapanda and Manguredjipa. Since early June 2024, Abwakasi's group killed at least 361 individuals,²¹⁰ with the majority of incidents being claimed by Da'esh (see below annex 8).

Various sources confirmed that this sequence of attacks was perpetrated by the group led by Abwakasi, accompanied by commander Chalamanda.²¹¹ Once the group arrived in the area of Manguredjipa, it settled around Bandulu forest and continued sporadic attacks on civilians and engaged in clashes with FARDC and armed groups (see para. 30).

²⁰⁴ UN, civil society and intelligence sources. The claim published by Da'esh is reproduced in annex 2 of this report.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ UN, civil society and intelligence sources.

²⁰⁷ Images received from intelligence source, on file with the Secretariat.

²⁰⁸ Claim published by Da'esh, reproduced in annex 2 of this report.

²⁰⁹ On 29 June, Da'esh published an album of nine photos depicting victims and the aftermath of the attack on Kyanganda, perpetrated on 21 June. The publication is on file with the Secretariat.

²¹⁰ Documented by the UN.

²¹¹ Former hostages and combatants, UN source, FARDC sources, Ugandan government.

The attacks perpetrated by Abwakasi's group were distinguished by the extreme brutality of the killings. Occasionally they also employed an atypical *modus operandi*. For example, during the attacks in the first half of June, including in Masala on 7 June, ADF relied more extensively than usual on firearms.²¹² Some combatants disguised themselves as a Wazalendo armed group that came to combat ADF, while others reportedly wore previously stolen FARDC uniforms. During the attacks on Masala and Mayikengo, Abwakasi's group cut off the roads leading into the villages, asked the village chief to gather all the locals and opened fire on the civilians. Women and children who came along with Abwakasi's group also participated in the killings.²¹³ The increased use of firearms during these attacks was probably due to a recent restock in supplies – notably, the ammunition used was traced back to FARDC supplies stolen in late May by another ADF attack against FARDC military trucks.²¹⁴

The attacks recorded are in line with ADF's established strategy of retaliating against civilians in response to military operations against the group (S/2024/432, para. 9). However, Abwakasi's attacks most likely served as a tactic to divert attention away from other ADF bases that were threatened, such as Madina (S/2024/432, para. 11) allowing Baluku greater freedom of movement. During this same period, significantly less attacks were recorded in Irumu, where Baluku's group was moving north towards Lolwa.²¹⁵

In addition, the absence of FARDC in the affected areas may also have contributed to the elevated death toll, as ADF encountered no resistance on its path.

Attacks by other ADF groups in north-western Beni territory

While Abwakasi was leading the push into Lubero, the constellation of Braida-Tabani-Defender groups were active west of the RN4 road (northwest of Beni), heading towards and eventually crossing west of Biakato (see above annex 2).

Braida's group was responsible for most of the violent attacks perpetrated by ADF in the north-western part of Beni territory, involving killings and kidnappings, notably in the Mamove – Beu Manyama area in the first half of August 2024.²¹⁶ Braida's group was notably responsible for the killing of civilians in the villages of Bayeti and Mukoni, as well as other nearby villages, on 9 and 10 August, respectively.²¹⁷ More than 20 civilians were reported killed during these attacks.²¹⁸

From mid-August to September, this group was continuously being tracked and attacked by Shujaa. After the death of Braida in mid-August (see annex 1), the group was temporarily scattered but continued operating in the north-western area of Beni.²¹⁹

Attacks in Mambasa and Irumu territories in Ituri

The main camp of Seka Baluku, moving north into Mambasa, kept a relatively low profile. According to testimonies, it suffered severe losses and was suffering a shortage of supplies. In addition, its movement was burdened by the very high number of civilian dependents travelling along (see above annex 2).

Generally, this group has focused on conducting attacks to resupply, with a pattern of looting health centers and abducting medical staff – likely to treat the group's ailing members.²²⁰

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ UN, civil society, intelligence and confidential sources.

²¹⁴ UN sources.

²¹⁵ Idem

²¹⁶ UN sources, FARDC, intelligence sources, former hostages and combatants.

²¹⁷ UN and humanitarian sources.

²¹⁸ Idem.

²¹⁹ UN sources, former hostages who escaped from this group.

²²⁰ UN sources, FARDC, former hostages and former combatants.

Annex 7 (para. 23)

ADF unified command and control

Commandement et contrôle unifiés de l'ADF

While ADF sub-groups functioned with a degree of decentralization, they continued to depend on a centralized command and control framework. Former hostages and former combatants confirmed that Baluku was still the decision-maker, deciding on major operations, receiving reports from other commanders, deciding on punishments, distributing resources, including hostages. These sources mentioned that although some smaller operations or attacks may not have required prior authorization by Baluku, he had to be informed of everything. Every commander was sending photographs of the results of their operations – evidence of killings, of pillaged goods and hostages taken – to Baluku.

ADF core leadership

Baluku designated Seka Umaru as his successor, in the event of his death. Mzee Pierro, based in Madina, was Baluku's deputy in charge of operations. Mzee Kayira, another senior commander based in Madina, was in charge of ADF logistics and finance. All other commanders reported to them or directly to Baluku.²²¹

The Group found no evidence to suggest that Abwakasi's group has achieved independence from Seka Baluku. Recent interviews with former ADF combatants and former hostages suggest that Abwakasi relocated to the Bapere Sector with Baluku's consent.

The Ugandan government reported to the Group that, as on 1 November 2024, ADF was "separated into two (02) major groups, due to the heightened military pressure", without this having impacted the group's command structure.

²²¹ Former combatants, former hostages, intelligence sources, UN sources, FARDC, researchers.

Annex 8 (para. 26)**Da'esh amplifying claims and propaganda****Da'esh amplifie ses revendications et sa propagande***Sharp increase in Da'esh claims for attacks suggesting improved collaboration*

The sharp rise in ADF attacks since June 2024 was accompanied by a corresponding increase in claims by Da'esh through its Central Africa Province (ISCAP).²²² Between 2 June and 29 June, Da'esh issued 32 claims, followed by an additional 79 claims from July through October 2024. This brings the total to 111 claims made between June and October, including special editions and regular reports in Da'esh's weekly *an-Nabā'* editorial (see below).

Given that MONUSCO recorded at least 124 ADF-attributed incidents between 1 June and 5 November 2024 (see annex 6 above), not including clashes with FARDC and armed groups, of which MONUSCO documented at least 19 during the same period. Da'esh's publications cover approximately 89% of these documented incidents.²²³

Additionally, the time taken by Da'esh to claim responsibility for ADF attacks has also decreased, from several days to sometimes 24 hours after the attacks. At times several attacks were claimed for the same day, from various locations in the DRC (see below list of claims), suggesting that communication about attacks by various ADF groups operating in Ituri and in North Kivu was centralized.

The above trends suggest a closer collaboration between Da'esh and ADF.

List of claims for ADF attacks published by Da'esh since June 2024

<i>Date</i>	<i>Translated text of the claim</i>
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted a vehicle of infidel Christians along the road between the villages of Tchabi and Kamango in the Beni area last Thursday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 Christians, one of whom was a member of the Congolese army."
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian that was on a motorcycle near the village of Kainama in the Beni area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in this death and the burning of the motorcycle."
June 2, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner along the Kainama village road in the Beni area yesterday, and executed him."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Mangina in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them."
June 4, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mashua in the Beni area, killing upwards of 19 Christians while others fled, then they attacked in the same village positions of a local allied militia to the Congolese army with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, then the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses and captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions."
June 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Sesa in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them."
June 5, 2024	"Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Kabwiki in the Beni area, killing 8 Christians and causing others to flee, and then the mujahideen captured some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions."

²²² Intelligence and security sources, researchers.

²²³ In comparison, analytical data available for the month of January 2023 from an intelligence source shows that only 5% of ADF attacks documented were claimed by Da'esh. According to another comparative analysis conducted by a confidential security source, covering the period from January 2023 to end of May 2024, there has been a steady increase in claims since December 2023, reaching a new peak by May 2024.

June 6, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them.”
June 6, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Masala in the Beni area, killing more than 60 Christians, and took an officer and a soldier from the Congolese army as prisoner and killed them with automatic weapons, and the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses and trading centers, and captured some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions.”
June 10, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a Christian village north of the town of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, killing 3 Christians with automatic weapons, and capturing some of their possessions, and burning down a number of their houses before returning to their positions safely.”
June 10, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Makusa in the Beni area yesterday, killing 7 of them with automatic weapons, in addition to burning down a number of their houses and 3 motorcycles, and then they returned to their positions safely.”
June 11, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 Christians prisoner near the village of Cantine in the Beni area yesterday, and executed them.”
June 12, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Malya in the Ituri area, killing 10 Christians while causing others to flee, and the mujahideen burned down a number of their houses and captured some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely.”
June 12, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Mabanga and 4 other villages in its environs in the Beni area with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and the mujahideen burned down a number of houses and captured some of their possessions.”
June 14, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Masungu in the Beni area the day before yesterday, capturing and killing 6 Christians while others fled.”
June 14, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mikengo in the Beni area the day before yesterday, killing more than 45 Christians while others fled, and the mujahideen captured some of their possessions and burned down a number of their houses and trading centers, and then returned to their positions safely.”
June 16, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Lumbo Lumbo in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed him.”
June 19, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabaeti in the Lubero area of eastern Congo yesterday, killing 11 Christians and capturing some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely.”
June 19, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Asefu in the Lubero area, killing more than 20 Christians, in addition to burning down a number of houses and trading centers and capturing some of their possessions, and then they returned to their positions safely.”
June 20, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Asefu in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of 2 elements and the capture and execution of 2 others.”
June 20, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Bamandi in the Ituri area, taking 18 Christians prisoner and killing 4 others with automatic weapons, the mujahideen also captured some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely.”
June 20, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol allied to the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Najiapanda in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of several of them.”
June 20, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Najiapanda in the Lubero area, targeting them with automatic weapons, resulting in the the killing of two elements.”
June 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Samboko in the Ituri are last Wednesday with automatic weapons, resulting in the wounding of many of them while the rest fled, and the mujahideen burned down the barracks and then returned safely to their positions.”
June 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Kyanganda in the Lubero area yesterday, killing upwards of 40 Christians and two elements of an allied militia to the Congolese army, and the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian homes and trading centers, and captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions.”
June 24, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Ofai in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them.”
June 25, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday, and executed them.”

June 26, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a number of infidel Christians that were traveling on motorcycles between Butembo and Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday, targeting them with automatic weapons, causing them to flee and the burning of 4 motorcycles.”
June 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the town of Kiri and a number of villages surrounding it in the Lubero area yesterday, killing more than 35 Christians, among them elements from an allied militia to the Congolese army, and the mujahideen burned down more than 30 Christian homes, 7 trading centers, and 3 motorcycles, and captured some of their possessions, and then safely returned to their positions.”
June 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured one infidel Christian in the village of Idohu in the Ituri area, and executed him.”
June 29, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Kambau in the Lubero area yesterday, and killed 10 Christians, and burned down a number of houses and trading centers, and they captured some of their possessions, and then returned safely to their positions.”
June 29, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Kambau in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of a number of them and others fled, and they [the mujahideen] burned down the barracks.”
July 4, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Masenge in the Lubero area yesterday, clashing with an allied militia to the Congolese army with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and wounding of others, while others fled, and they [the mujahideen] burned down their positions, then the mujahideen attacked the Christians in the village, killing one, and capturing another, and burned down some of their possessions.”
July 9, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentration of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bayanga in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and others fleeing.”
July 11, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate ambushed a foot patrol of the Congolese army and an allied militia in the village of Masenge in the Lubero area, where they detonated an IED upon them and targeted them with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of upwards of 15 soldiers, while 2 soldiers were taken prisoner and others fled. The mujahideen then captured a rifle and ammunition and then returned safely to their positions.”
July 11, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army and an allied militia in the village of Biambi in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 elements and wounding of two others.”
July 13, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted two infidel Christians in the village of Mukundi in the Beni area last Saturday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths.”
July 15, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Njiapanda in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a soldier and the wounding of two others while others fled, and the mujahideen captured weapons and equipment and then attacked the village, capturing and killing 3 Christians. Additionally, they clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army that was trying to enter [the village] with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 3 of them, and then the mujahideen returned safely to their positions.”
July 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Idohu in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them.”
July 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian that was riding a motorcycle along the road between the villages of Ndimu and Idohu in the Ituri area yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him and burning his bike.”
July 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabya in the Lubero area, capturing and executing 5 Christians.”
July 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Kyanganda in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and then the mujahideen burned down several Christian houses.”
July 19, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Mayba in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing, and the capture of equipment and burned the concentrations. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village and captured and executed 19 Christians and burned down a number of houses and trading centers. And then they returned to their positions safely.”
July 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted elements of the Congolese army and Christians that were on motorcycles near the village of Mahala in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths and the burning of their motorcycles and the capture of a rifle.”

July 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 2 infidel Christians near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region, executing them.”
July 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 6 infidel Christians near the village of Otombere in the Ituri region, executing them.”
July 23, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint patrol of the Crusader Ugandan and Congolese armies near the village of Muhuyo in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of a number of them.”
July 24, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Ombole in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of at least 15 Christians and the burning of a number of houses and trading centers and motorcycles. Then the mujahideen attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the same village with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing and the capture of equipment and the burning of their bases.”
July 25, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Beu-manyama in the Ituri area yesterday, capturing and executing more than 30 Christians, in addition to burning down a number of houses and motorcycles before returning to their positions safely.”
July 26, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri region the day before yesterday, and executed them.”
July 26, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Ombole in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed them.”
July 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the villages of Mangumbu, Mweya, and Nzakya in the Beni area last Wednesday, killing upwards of 24 Christians.”
July 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabunda in the Lubero area yesterday, killing 7 Christians while others fled, and the mujahideen burned down a number of houses, trading centers, and motorcycles, and then returned safely to their positions.”
July 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a local militia allied to the Congolese army in the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and the capture of his rifle, while others fled, then the mujahideen attacked the barracks with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, while they captured equipment and burned down the barracks.”
July 29, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of a local militia allied to the Congolese army that was trying to advance on the mujahideen’s positions near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 8 elements and the others fleeing, and the capture of a rifle.”
July 30, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan army that was trying to advance on the mujahideen’s positions near the village of Mukasili in the Ituri area last Thursday with medium and light weapons, resulting in the deaths and wounding of more than 15 elements and the fleeing of the rest and the capture of various equipment.”
July 30, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mabino in the Lubero area, killing 11 Christians and capturing 2 others, capturing some of their positions, and then they returned to their positions safely.”
July 30, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 12 Christians near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday, executing them, and capturing some of their positions, and then returning to their positions safely.”
Aug 1, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate captured 2 infidel Christians near the village of Idohu in the Ituri area, killing them.”
Aug 2, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies near the village of Mambi in the Beni area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a soldier and the wounding of others.”
Aug 6, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Minamaymbu in the Lubero area, capturing and killing 10 Christians and returning to their positions safely.”
Aug 6, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese army and a local allied militia near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death and wounding of 6 elements while others fled, and the capture of equipment.”
Aug 6, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked positions of a local militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and the mujahideen burned down positions and captured two rifles and equipment.”
Aug. 6, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Etembu in the Lubero area yesterday, capturing and killing 4 Christians.”
Aug 8, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday, capturing and killing 4 Christians.”

Aug 8, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 Christians prisoner near the village of Bandulu in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, and executed them.”
Aug 9, 2024	An Naba 455: “Additionally, an exclusive source told Al Naba that soldiers of the Caliphate took 4 Christians prisoner and executed them on July 30 in the village of Mwayna in the Lubero area.”
Aug 10, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of a local militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Mbalimbanguwa in the Tshopo area with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 3 elements (of the militia), while others fled, and the capture of a rifle. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians inside the village, killing two among them with automatic weapons, causing others to flee. The mujahideen then burned down more than 50 houses before returning to their positions safely.”
Aug 12, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Biakato in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, causing them to flee, and they captured a rifle and equipment.”
Aug 15, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with automatic weapons with a foot patrol of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army that was trying to advance towards the Mujahideen’s positions near the village of Isange in the Lubero area, resulting in the deaths and wounding of 7 elements and others fleeing, and the capture of two rifles and equipment.” Also 5 photos released
Aug 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army along the road between Mambasa and Komanda in the Ituri area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing and the capture of a mortar and ammunition.”
Aug 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 5 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndimu in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them.”
Aug 17, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of a militia allied to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of one of them and others fleeing, then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village, also causing them to flee, and they then burned down more than 150 homes.”
Aug 18, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of a militia allied to the Congolese army near the village of Ndimu in the Ituri region last Thursday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of 3 elements and the wounding of others.”
Aug. 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Bahaha in the Ituri region the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the fleeing of the rest. Then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village, killing 7 among them with automatic weapons, then burning down a church, government institutions, and more than 50 homes and 15 motorcycles, and then they returned to their positions safely.” One photo published in An Naba 458
Aug 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Bududia in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, killing upwards of 11 Christians, capturing some of their possessions before returning safely to their positions.”
Aug. 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked a barracks of an allied militia to the Crusader Congolese army in the village of Pumuzika in the Tshopo area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the wounding of others and they captured two rifles and equipment.”
Aug 29, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 10 infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Bududia in the Lubero area yesterday, and executed them.”
Aug 30, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the village of Makuru in the Lubero area yesterday, killing upwards of 8 Christians and the capture of 3 others, in addition to burning down more than 10 houses and then they returned safely to their positions.”
Sept 6, 2024	An Naba 459: (Only relevant section translated): “And in the Ituri region, an exclusive source told Al Naba that soldiers of the Caliphate on Sept 2, attacked the village of Bandikila between the towns of Mambasa and Komanda, taking 25 Christians prisoner, and executing 3 among them.” One photo also released showing the dead bodies of two of the hostages.
September 7, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Idoho in the Ituri region, and subsequently executed them.”
September 13, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked infidel Christians in the village of Ngereza in the Ituri area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a Christian.”
September 13, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Isange in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, killing 5 Christians.”
Sept 13, 2024	An-Naba 460: “An exclusive source told Al Naba that on Aug. 29, 2024, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies near the village of Katiran in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, killing one while others fled.” One photo also released
September 19, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner in the village of Bandembese in the Ituri area yesterday, killing him.”

September 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Bandulu in the Lubero area yesterday, killing 5 Christians.”
September 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him.”
September 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Mididi in the Lubero area with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and others fleeing, then the mujahideen attacked Christians in the village and killed 3 of them, and then burned down a number of their houses and trading centers.”
September 21, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a patrol of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Mangurijiba in the Lubero area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and others fleeing, the capture of a rifle and equipment.”
Sept. 23, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of Crusader Congolese army in the village of Tolitoli in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element and the wounding of others and the burning of the concentrations, additionally the mujahideen burned down a number of Christian houses in the village.” 7 photos released
Sept. 25, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted several infidel Christians that were on a motorbike near the village of Mahala in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of a Christian and the wounding of two others and others fleeing, and the burning of motorcycles.”
Sept. 25, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Mambelenga in the Ituri region, executing them with automatic weapons.”
Sept. 25, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian near the village of Tolitoli in Ituri the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him. Then the mujahideen attacked a barracks of the Congolese army in the village with automatic weapons, resulting in their fleeing.”
Sept 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a joint foot patrol of the Congolese and Ugandan armies that were attempting to advance on the mujahideen’s positions near the village of Mangurujiba in the Lubero area the day before yesterday, with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 4 soldiers from the Ugandan army and one from the Congolese army and the wounding of others, while the rest fled and they [the mujahideen] captured weapons and equipment.”
Sept. 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted two elements from the Congolese militia near the village of Lolwa in the Iruri region yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in their deaths.”
Sept. 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner from the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him.”
Sept. 30, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked concentrations of an allied militia to the Congolese army in the village of Bilulu in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the death of an element [of the militia] and the wounding of others while others fled and they [the mujahideen] captured rifles and equipment. Then, the mujahideen attacked Christians inside the village, killing 14 among them and capturing 5 others and capturing some of their possessions, then they returned safely to their positions.”
Oct. 1, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted members of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri area the day before yesterday with automatic weapons, killing one.” Photo released in An-Naba’ 463, Oct 4, 2024
Oct. 1, 2024	Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an infidel Christian on a motorcycle along the road near Mambelenga in the Ituri region yesterday with automatic weapons, killing him and burning his motorcycle.” Photo released in An-Naba’ 463, Oct 4, 2024
October 5, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Otombere in the ituri region the day before yesterday, killing 3 Christians and burning down 3 houses.”
October 5, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 15 Christians prisoner near the village of Abitinku in the Ituri region the day before yesterday, and executed them.”
October 12, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took an infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Lolwa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed him.”
October 15, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted an officer in the Crusader Ugandan intelligence and two Christians in the village of Munguna in the Bugiri area the day before yesterday with pistol shots, resulting in their deaths.”
October 19, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate clashed with a foot patrol of the Crusader Congolese army near the village of Isange in the Lubero area yesterday with automatic weapons, resulting in the deaths of 2 soldiers and the others fleeing.”
October 20, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took two infidel Christians prisoner from the village of Mambelenga in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them.”
Oct 24, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate targeted elements of an allied militia to the Congolese army near the village of Monge in the Ituri area with automatic weapons, killing one.”

Oct 24, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took one infidel Christian prisoner near the village of Mungamba in the Ituri area, killing him.”
Oct 26, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Ndalya in the Ituri area yesterday, and executed them.”
Oct 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 3 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Sesa in the Ituri region yesterday, and executed them.”
Oct 27, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Bandimbese in Ituri, and executed them.”
Oct 28, 2024	“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate took 2 infidel Christians prisoner near the village of Bandimbese in Ituri, and executed them.”

Claims and translations received from confidential researcher

Enhanced propaganda through Da’esh editorials and weekly reports

The increased interest from Da’esh in ADF activities was also reflected by the increase in coverage dedicated to DRC in newsletters and special edition publications. Few examples from June 2024:

In the 21 June 2024 edition of the weekly digital newsletter *an-Nabā’* (#448) contained a three-page special editorial as well as an infographic regarding the “Jihad in the Congo”. On the “Operations by the Soldiers of the Caliphate in the Congo over 70 days,” Da’esh reported that between 10 April and 19 June 2024, ADF conducted 82 operations, killing and wounding over 470 individuals.²²⁴

The editorial expressed Da’esh’s ideological justification for ongoing violence in its Central Africa Province. It presented its actions as part of a religious duty to wage war against non-Muslims (“Christians”) in the region. The text criticized what it perceived as Western media bias, asserting that violence against African Christians receives less attention than incidents affecting Western Christians. It attributed this disparity to racial discrimination and claims that this neglect helps obscure Da’esh expansion in Africa, while downplaying the difficulties faced by international forces in combating the group’s activities.

Da’esh criticized the Congolese government for seeking external military support, including from Uganda and United Nations forces, which it claims have failed to protect Christian communities from violence. Additionally, the text argues that the Islamic State continues to expand and establish control, despite attempts by regional governments and international actors to suppress them: “The Christians and their allies are still warning each other about the soldiers of Islam exploiting any vacuum that results from the fighting between Congolese forces and militias in eastern Congo, as every enemy they fight is easier for them to combat than the Islamic State imposing control over the region. The alliance between the Congolese government and the Ugandan and Rwandan forces, despite their long history of hostility, is only an example of this.”²²⁵

The message reiterated the group’s commitment to continue violent operations, including raids and attacks, as part of their ultimate goal of establishing Islamic governance in the region. It suggests that only conversion to Islam or paying the jizyah (a tax imposed on non-Muslims) will bring security to local populations. The passage concludes with a threat that, without submission, the violence will persist, framing this path as divinely sanctioned.

To enhance the spread of propaganda for ADF, *Serah-al-Khilafah’*, a media unit aligned with Da’esh, produced an animated video based on the *an-Nabā’* (#448) report about ADF’s operations in eastern DRC.²²⁶

The 27 June 2024 edition of *an-Nabā’* included “exclusive” reports on ISCPAP activities the week prior. It highlighted attacks “on Christian villages and the killing of Christians” in Lubero and Ituri in the DRC, stating that “over 70 Christians were killed and captured, including elements from Congolese army and militias, in continuous attacks by soldiers of the Caliphate in Eastern Congo”. In addition to providing details about the attacks, it also featured photographs of burning houses after attacks on Kianganda in Lubero, and Bamandi in Ituri.²²⁷

²²⁴ Full text of the newsletter on file with the Secretariat.

²²⁵ Text and translation by SITE Intelligence Group.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Full text of the newsletter on file with the Secretariat.

Annex 9 (para. 27)

AFC/M23 communique denying allegations of collaboration with ADF

Communiqué de l'AFC/M23 démentant les rumeurs de collaboration avec l'ADF

On August 25, 2024, an AFC communiqué - later deemed fake by AFC - claimed that a non-aggression and collaboration pact had been established between 'ADF Nalu' and AFC/M23. According to this alleged agreement, ADF would cease attacks on civilians and focus solely on FARDC and Wazalendo forces, facilitating M23's advance. In return for financial and military support, ADF would receive 70% of Beni's cacao revenues for ten years, contingent on M23 securing control of the area. Below is a copy of the communiqué deemed fake by AFC/M23:



Published on [AFC's X account](#)

Annex 10 (para. 30)

FARDC reliance on Wazalendo groups to defend against ADF including deployment of NDC-R of Guidon in Lubero**Les FARDC s'appuient sur des groupes Wazalendo pour se défendre contre les ADF y compris le déploiement du NDC-R de Guidon dans le Lubero**

NDC-R Guidon forces have deployed in the Bapere sector of Lubero territory, claiming their presence aims to protect civilians from ADF attacks.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
LES VOLONTAIRES POUR LA DEFENSE DE LA PATRIE
RESEAU DES PATRIOTES RESISTANTS CONGOLAIS
NDUMA POUR LA DEFENSE DU CONGO RENOVE
COORDINATION

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N°031/RPRC/GSM DU 27 JUILLET 2024

Dénonciation d'un plan diabolique contre les patriotes résistants dans le LUBERO

Prenant en témoin l'opinion nationale et internationale, sur ce qui se passe dans le secteur de BAPERRE en territoire de LUBERO contre les VDP, les gens doivent retenir ce qui suit :

1. Depuis bientôt trois mois, les ADF/MTN voudraient faire expansion dans LUBERO, TSHOPO et WALIKALE via le secteur de BAPERRE, malheureusement, avec l'appui de certains fils du coin ;
2. C'est grâce à la puissance de feu des patriotes résistants du NDC-Rénové, sous conduite du Lt Gen Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA Comd des VDP, que ces terroristes et leurs alliés n'ont pas abouti à leur mission. Plus de 12 enfants ont été libéré de mains de l'ennemi et 5 terroristes ADF/MTN capturés. Après leur audition, beaucoup de choses ont été révélées sur le plan de l'ennemi et les noms de leurs collaborateurs ;
3. Dans notre communiqué de presse n°030/RPRC/GSM du 27 juillet 2024, nous avons informé le public sur l'existence d'un groupe de gens, originaires du secteur de BAPERRE qui collaborent avec les ADF/MTN afin de leur faciliter l'expansion dans le LUBERO, TSHOPO et WALIKALE. Le réseau est vaste et certains noms ont été cité ;
4. Depuis un temps, ces collaborateurs des ADF/MTN se sont distingués par des sorties médiatiques de diabolisation des patriotes résistants VDP du NDC-Rénové qui constituent un sérieux blocage à la réalisation de leur plan d'expansion ;
5. Voulant éliminer physiquement notre Comd. Des opérations dans la zone, dans la nuit du mardi 13 au mercredi 14 Aout 2024, le même groupe de jeunes (collaborateurs des ADF/MTN) qui avait tué deux éléments FARDC et fuir avec leurs armes a organisé un raid dans l'habitation du Col AROBASE, deux patriotes ont perdu la vie, parmi eux un membre de famille élargie du Lt Gén. Guidon SHIMIRAY MWISSA.

Le NDC-Rénové dénonce avec la toute dernière énergie cet autre cas d'attaque contre ses combattants par les collaborateurs des terroristes ADF/MTN, ceci ne doit pas rester impunis car les auteurs (matériels et moraux) sont très bien connus.


A la justice de diligenter des enquêtes, afin de punir les auteurs de ces actes ignobles.

Le NDC-Rénové réaffirme sa détermination de poursuivre sa mission de défendre l'intégrité du territoire national et faire échec à l'agression étrangère sous toutes ses formes.

Ne Jamais trahir le Congo

La patrie ou la mort.

Fait à PINGA, Le 14 Août 2024
 POUR LE RESEAU DES PATRIOTES RESISTANTS CONGOLAIS
Ms Marcellin SHIMIRAY MWISSA
 Porte-Parole



Document provided by confidential civil society source.

Many armed groups were encouraged by FARDC to deploy in the region, to fill the security void due to the absence of FARDC deployments, including due to a significant number of troops having been sent to Petit Nord, to fight against M23/RDF. For example, on 12 June 2024, as ADF was advancing towards the locality of Kambau (Lubero territory), the FARDC sector chief responsible for the area requested urgent reinforcements, deploring that the ADF were advancing

towards the locality and there were no security forces present in the area, besides a few elements of “general” Mayani’s UPLC.²²⁸



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO



PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU

TERRITOIRE DE LUBERO

SECTEUR DES BAPERÉ

De : CHEF SECTEUR DES BAPERÉ

A : AT. LUBERO

RPT : - GROUPE/GOMA

- CONS PRINC INTERIEUR & SECURIT/GOMA
- COMD REGIMENT FARDC/RWENDA
- CPTER-LUBERO

TEXTE ET SIGNATURE N°5072/1/Rte/SEC-BAP/2024

HVS & VS SIGNALER PRESENCE ADF EN TERR LUBERO LOC MAGOGO (-) HIER 11/06/2024 ENEMI AVOIR TRANVERSER RIV. BIENA ET SE SITUE A CE MOMENT A 1H30 DU VILLAGE MOKELE SECTEUR DE BAPERÉ(-) VOIR CARTE EN ANNEXE (-) ICI PAS DE FORCES POUR LE CONTRER(-) SAUF QUELQUES ELEMENTS DE L'UPLC GEN MAYANI(-) SOLLICITONS RENFORT URGENT FARDC POUR PARRER AU PIRE ET CONTENIR AVANCER ENEMI VERS AGGLOMERATIONS OU DEPLACES DE GUERRE SE TROUVENT CONCENTRER (-) A KAMBAU POUR LE MOMENT ON COMPTE DEJA + DE 5000 PERSONNERS VENANT DE TOUTES DIRECTIONS(-) CE DEPLACES COMPOSER FEMMES ENFANTS ET VIEILLARDS AVOIR BESOIN DE L'ASSISTANCE URGENTE(-) SUIS PRESEMENTENT SUR PLACE SUIVRE DE PRES SITUATION (-) PLUS RIEN A VOS ORDRE(-) (-)



FAIT A KAMBAU, le 12/06/2024

LE CHEF DE SECTEUR DES BAPERÉ

MACAIRE SIVIKUNULA MWENDIVWA

Document received from confidential security source


²²⁸ Confidential telegram dated 12 June 2024, issued in Kambau. Copy of the telegram is on file with the Secretariat.

Further evidence of the presence of armed groups in Lubero territory with the acquiescence of local authorities and FARDC:



Document received from confidential civil society source

Evidence of “VDP” deployment in the area of Butembo under the pretext of fighting ADF:



Document received from confidential civil society source

Document informing of the intent to establish a new “VDP” position in the Valse Vunkutu Chefferie

Republique Démocratique du Congo
PATRIOTES WAZALENDO VICTIMES DES MASSACRES
 « P.A.V.I.M. »

LOI N° 23/14 Col. 14 du 03 Juin 2023 / Art. 68, alinea
 1er et Art. 64 alinea 1ers de la Constitution

RESERVE ARMEE POUR LA DEFENCE (R.A.D.) DE LA
 REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

N° 02...MINDEF/NK/RDC/PAVIM/PRES/NSG/202...4

Transmis copie pour information à (aux) :

- Chef de la Chefferie / Secteur de
 ...V.A.L.E.S...VUNKUTU
- Commandant FARDC en place ;
- Commandant P.N.C en place ;
- Chef de Poste de l'ANR en place ;
- ✓ Président de la Société Civile en place
- Chef Coutumier où sera érigée la
 position.

Objet : Information sur l'ouverture d'une
 position des volontaires pour la
 défense de la patrie V.D.P en sigle

Monsieur le Chef de village,
 Localité/agglomération


Nous, patriotes Victimes des
 Massacres en sigle P.A.V.I.M, nous avons l'honneur de venir auprès de votre
 personnalité pour vous présenter l'objet ci - haut émergé :

En effet dans le cadre de contribuer
 à la pacification et la stabilisation de la R.D.C en général, plus particulièrement la
 patrie EST, dans la (province du Nord - Kivu - Ituri....), nous vous informons qu'en
 date du...../...../20.....nous allons procéder à l'implantation d'une nouvelle
 position àqui renfermera des jeunes volontaires pour la défense de la
 patrie et la liste de ces militaires (WAZALENDO) vous sera remise pour éviter toute
 dérapage dans la Communauté.

Tout en vous souhaitant une bonne
 lecture Monsieur, nous vous réitérons notre ferme détermination de barre la route à
 tous les ennemis et ainsi que ses collaborateurs.


Veuillez agréer Monsieur
 l'expression de nos sentiments patriotiques.

Pour le Mouvement P.A.V.I.M,
 Fait à Butembo, le 3.../10/2024


NGABO SHAHANZWA Guy
 Président

Document received from confidential civil society source

Token issued by the FPP-AP to access fields in the vicinity of BIAKATO, denoting not only the presence of this armed group but also its predation of the local population:



Document received from confidential civil society source

Annex 11 (para. 31)**Tensions between local communities and Wazalendo armed groups in Lubero territory****Tensions entre les communautés locales et les groupes armés du Wazalendo dans le territoire de Lubero**

The deployment of Wazalendo armed groups in North Kivu and Ituri under the pretext of fighting against ADF – notably of NDC-R of Guidon in Lubero (see annex 10 above) - has generated tensions with local communities. Local leaders have grown increasingly frustrated, urging the withdrawal of these armed groups, citing their ineffectiveness against ADF and M23 threats, and the exploitation of the local population.

Tensions have been further fueled by incidents such as an armed raid on 24 July 2024 on the Bodhodhea mining site, attributed to NDC-R Guidon, and an alleged attack on local NDC-R Commander Arobaz on 14 August 2024. These events have led to heightened calls for an increased FARDC presence.

On 17 August 2024, the *Conseil de la Jeunesse Bhele/Piri* in the Bapere Sector issued a communiqué (see copy of the communiqué below) addressing earlier statements from the NDC-R faction led by Guidon, including one dated 27 July 2024 (see Annex 10 above).


The communiqué demanded the departure of all Wazalendo groups from the Bapere Sector, particularly along the Butembo-Manguredjipa axis, accusing them of collaborating with the ADF. Additionally, it accused Vianney Misinge Arobaz of the NDC-R of pillaging the local population and committing acts of torture.

The communiqué outlined several demands:

- Immediate withdrawal of Arobaz and his allies from the Bapere Sector, citing their lack of positive contributions.
- An end to intimidation of *groupement* chiefs and traditional leaders (*gardiens de coutume*).
- A cessation of the arbitrary imprisonment of local youth defending the population against the ADF/MTN.
- An end to extortion, including the collection of monthly taxes from displaced civilians.
- Avoid spreading tribal hatred between the Bhele/Piri and Nyanga communities.
- Avoid spreading false claims concerning efforts to track ADF attackers and to liberate hostages.

The communiqué also accused the NDC-R spokesperson, Marcelin Senkuku N’Kuba, of disseminating misinformation through public statements. It firmly denied allegations that local youth had attacked NDC-R positions on 13 and 14 August 2024.

See copy of the Bapere Youth council communiqué below:



Document received from confidential civil society source

Annex 12 (para. 34)

AFC communiqué of 1 August 2024

Communiqué de l'AFC du 1er août 2024



OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 1st, 2024

1. The Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/M23 has followed the latest developments aimed at achieving peace within the framework of the Luanda process. The AFC/M23 wishes to congratulate all the actors for their endless work towards a peaceful resolution of the multifaceted crisis in the East Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
2. The AFC/M23 hereby emphasise that it is not automatically bound by the conclusions of meetings to which it has not attended. The AFC/M23 notes that the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government have become accustomed to using the various truces and cessations of hostilities to reorganise themselves and continue ethnic cleansing, attacking the martyred population and our forces as their defenders.
3. Nevertheless, the AFC/M23 wishes to remind everyone that, as of March 7th, 2023, it declared a unilateral ceasefire to give a chance to find a peaceful solution to the crisis within the framework of regional processes. Since then, the AFC/M23 has only been responding to the attacks by the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government, within the grounds of legitimate self-defence and to protect threatened civilian populations. The AFC/M23 is therefore ready to respond positively to a change in the posture of the coalition forces of the Kinshasa Government.
4. The AFC/M23 reiterates that the only way to achieve a peaceful resolution of the ongoing conflict is through direct political dialogue with the Kinshasa Government, which addresses the root causes of the recurring conflicts in the Eastern DRC. The Regional Peace Processes offer an ideal framework that must be utilised without any delay to prevent further suffering for our populations.

Bunagana, August 1st, 2024.



For Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)

Lawrence KANYUKA
Communication Focal-Point



Document received from confidential AFC/M23 source

Annex 13 (para. 38)

Additional information on the negotiations for the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of the RDF troops, conflicting positions and the Luanda process**Informations complémentaires sur les négociations pour la neutralisation des FDLR et le désengagement des troupes RDF, les positions conflictuelles et le processus de Luanda**

- In its last report (S/2024/432, annex 30), the Group provided the details of a first ministerial meeting on the security and peace situation in eastern DRC held in Luanda on 21 March 2024. During that meeting, participants proposed concrete commitments to the heads of state of the DRC and Rwanda, amongst others:
 - cessation of hostilities, including a supervised ceasefire, accompanied by a process of disengagement of forces (point 2);
 - the DRC delegation committed to present a plan to neutralize the FDLR accompanied by a program of action (point 3);
 - following the implementation of this plan to neutralize the FDLR, the Rwandan delegation committed to review the measures and arrangement adopted to ensure its defence and security (point 4).
- During the same meeting, Rwanda and the DRC also voiced dissents over the cessation of hostilities. For the DRC delegation, the disengagement of forces (point 2) implied the withdrawal of RDF from the DRC territory. For the Rwandan delegation, however, the cessation of hostilities implied a supervised ceasefire between FARDC and the M23, followed by a process of disengagement of forces.
- Since the March 2024 meeting, amid continued military operations by both FARDC and RDF, negotiations continued, aiming at resolving the conflict between the DRC and Rwanda, under the facilitation of the Angolan mediator. The operationalization of the FDLR neutralization plan and the elaboration of a plan for the disengagement of forces were at the heart of the negotiations.
- On 30 July 2024, following a second ministerial meeting in Luanda, the Angolan presidency announced a new cease-fire due to start on 4 August, and agreed upon by the Rwandan and Congolese governments under the aegis of the Angolan mediator (see also S/2024/432, annexes 20-21). Another outcome of that ministerial meeting in Luanda was the engagement of Rwanda and the DRC to further elaborate the above-mentioned FDLR neutralization plan, and plan for the forces' disengagement. The Angolan mediator provided a document (titled "Harmonisation of the DRC's proposed plan and Republic of Rwanda's response to the Neutralisation of the FDLR on Congolese territory") in which the DRC's "Plan for the neutralization of the FDLR"²²⁹ and related observations by Rwanda were harmonized. The Facilitator's harmonization document attempted to (i) bridge the view points of the DRC and Rwanda; (ii) generate a consensual perspective on the plan, program of action, and process of the neutralization of the FDLR; (iii) assist Rwanda and the DRC in coming up with concrete and clear strategies for the neutralization of the FDLR; (iv) and sustain the dialogue process under the leadership and mediation of the Angolan Presidency. The Facilitator's document served as the working document for next negotiations (see below).

Facilitator's harmonization document – main elements (non-exhaustive list):

- Elements relative to differing positions between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, and recommendations, as elaborated in the Facilitator's harmonization document:²³⁰
 - "While both governments agree and are committed to the neutralization of the FDLR, they do not share the same views on the levels of threat posed by the FDLR to both nations' security and the FDLR's ongoing destructive capacity on both countries' good and harmonious relationships";

²²⁹ Submitted by the DRC government to the Facilitator on 26 April 2024.

²³⁰ Non-exhaustive.

- “The plan for the neutralization of the FDLR as presented by the DRC Government does not include a clear action plan with chronogram of timelines and clear lines of responsibility for such neutralization”; this “creates the uncertainties that are underlying sources of tensions, violence in Eastern DRC, and continuous deterioration of the relationships and trust between the DRC and Rwanda”;
 - “The primary goal of neutralizing the FDLR is an important first step towards improving the worsening security environment in Eastern DRC”.
- Bridging the viewpoints of the DRC and Republic of Rwanda as elaborated in the Facilitator’s harmonization document:²³¹
 - Both the DRC and Rwanda “share the determination to neutralize the FDLR”;
 - “Both the DRC and Rwanda agree that the FDLR is a shared source of destabilization of both nations, as well as the regular recurrence of violence and conflict in Eastern DRC”;
 - Assistance towards concrete steps for neutralizing the FDLR as elaborated in the Facilitator’s harmonization document²³²:
 - The DRC Government ought to take leadership and ownership as the primary responsible entity on the neutralization of the FDLR and its affiliates – including FOCA, CNRD and RUD-Urunana – from its territory in Eastern DRC. These efforts include:
 - (a) Lead in the organization and establishment of a Joint Task Force to locate FDLR elements and affiliates;
 - (b) Scrutinize and process all FDLR members and linked groups in secured cantonments, including disarmament and neutralizing of the military chain of command and networks of FDLR and affiliates;
 - (c) Under the mediation of the Facilitator, reach an immediate cessation of hostilities agreement in Eastern DRC, including the repatriation of the FDLR from the DRC;
 - (d) Under the supervision of the Facilitator, the DRC and Rwanda commit to providing a joint framework with Partner support drawing from the existing ad-hoc verification mechanism for monitoring and verification of the implementation of neutralizing the FDLR and its affiliates;
 - (e) The governments of the DRC and Rwanda commit to neutralizing the FDLR and its affiliates, networks and military chains of command in good faith and with goodwill, in accordance with the 2013 Nairobi Declaration;
 - (f) The governments of the DRC and Rwanda are further committed, with the cooperation of partners, to speedily embark on the neutralization of FDLR and strengthening confidence-building measures as the conditions for restoring good relations;
 - The Republic of Rwanda will support the efforts to neutralize the FDLR in a secondary capacity in the aforementioned tasks.
- At the July ministerial meeting, Rwanda, the DRC and Angola instructed their intelligence experts²³³ to meet on 7 August 2024 to further elaborate the Facilitator’s proposal on the neutralization of the FDLR, but also to elaborate a plan for the disengagement of forces on the ground. The report of the intelligence experts (“Plan harmonisée pour la neutralization des FDLR et le disengagement des forces (levée des mesures defensives du Rwanda)”) would then serve as the basis for discussions during the ministerial meeting planned in August (see below). The intelligence officers from the DRC, Rwanda and Angola did convene in Luanda from 7 to 9 August to negotiate a proposal to be discussed at the third ministerial meeting late August 2024.

²³¹ Non-exhaustive.

²³² Non-exhaustive.

²³³ Major-General Christian Ndaywel Okura (DRC), Ambassador Matias Bertino Matondo (Angola) and Brigadier-General Jean Paul Nyirubutama (Rwanda).

- The third ministerial meeting on 20-21 August 2024 concluded without reaching an agreement.
- The intelligence officers met again in Rubavu, Rwanda, and on 31 August 2024 agreed on the harmonization plan.

Intelligence experts' harmonization plan – main elements (non-exhaustive list):

- The plan proposed by the intelligence experts is subdivided into 6 objectives/goals, i.e. (i) analysis of the level of threat of the FDLR; (ii) neutralization of the FDLR; (iii) disengagement of the forces/lifting of defensive measures put in place by Rwanda; (iv) evaluation; (v) DDR process; and (vi) building trust and a climate of calm.
 - For each of these objectives/goals, the plan foresees (i) a series of activities and actions; (ii) a timeframe; (iii) the entity/entities and/or individuals in charge; and (iv) the supervisor(s).
 - The plan foresees that the disengagement of the Rwandan forces and lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda starts after the start of execution of the targeted actions against the FDLR.
 - The plan also foresees that the execution of the disengagement of the Rwandan forces and lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda would cover a specific time-period.
- At the fourth ministerial meeting in Luanda on 14 September 2024, the DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Thérèse Wagner, rejected the harmonization plan for the neutralization of the FDLR and the disengagement of forces (lifting of Rwanda's defensive measures) submitted by the intelligence experts. Diplomatic, intelligence, FARDC and UN sources reported that the proposed timeline – which did not foresee that the neutralization of the FDLR and disengagement of RDF troops would take place simultaneously – was one of the main reasons for rejecting the proposal. On the other hand, it must be underlined that the operations against the FDLR late September 2024 (see paras. 67-80) were carried out – albeit without major successes – while RDF were still massively deployed on the DRC territory.
 - On 24 September 2024, at the UN General Assembly in New York, the President of Angola Joao Lourenco declared that “in order to consolidate the gains made, a proposal for a peace agreement has been put on the table by the Republic of Angola, involving the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda, the terms of which are being discussed by the parties at ministerial level, with the prospect of them reaching an understanding with each other that will justify the convocation of a summit meeting to seal the signing of the definitive peace agreement (...)”.²³⁴ The following day, President Tshisekedi demanded “the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Rwandan troops (...)” and stated that “while recent diplomatic initiatives, such as the Luanda talks, are encouraging, they must not obscure the urgency of this essential action”.²³⁵ President Tshisekedi thus implicitly rejected the conditionality of RDF withdrawal in light of FDLR neutralization. In his statement at the General Assembly, Rwandan Ambassador Ernest Rwamucyo did not address the conflict in the DRC or the Luanda process.²³⁶
 - On 12 October 2024, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the DRC and Rwanda met again in Luanda. They agreed to resume expert consultations scheduled to take place in Luanda on 30 October 2024, to elaborate a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a harmonized plan to neutralize FDLR (see paras. 76-77).
 - The Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the FDLR neutralization plan, approved at expert level in Luanda on 31 October, foresees identifying the positioning of FDLR and their equipment, followed by information sharing to identify FDLR and its “dissident groups” (Phase 1), before moving to neutralization operations and targeted actions against FDLR (Phase 2), bypassing any explicit steps for sensitization of combatants and voluntary surrender. The demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of FDLR combatants is foreseen only in Phase 4 of the CONOPS. This CONOPS approved at expert level was to be discussed late November 2024 at the fifth ministerial meeting.

²³⁴ [ao_en.pdf \(un.org\)](#)

²³⁵ [cd_fr.pdf \(un.org\)](#)

²³⁶ [FINAL-RWANDA NATIONAL STATEMENT FOR UNGA 79.pdf](#)

Annex 14 (para. 42)

Forced and voluntary recruitment by AFC/M23

Recrutement forcé et volontaire par le AFC/M23

In its final report (S/2024/432, paras. 37, 100-108, and annex 65), the Group documented a consolidation of M23's military capacity through extensive recruitment efforts, including of children, across North Kivu, Uganda, and Rwanda. During the current reporting period, recruitment efforts in AFC/M23-controlled territories continued, particularly in newly conquered areas such as Rubaya, the broader Masisi territory, Kanyabayonga, as well as in South Kivu and Ituri. Thousands of new recruits were enrolled in military training from April to October 2024 (see annex below).

The Group collected additional evidence of AFC/M23 recruitment abroad, notably in refugee camps in Rwanda (S/2024/432, para. 103).²³⁷ For example, a surrendered M23 combatant who had been forcefully recruited in April 2024, reported that he knew twelve young men recruited from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda who attended the military training in Tchanzu between May-August 2024 (see annex 15).

AFC/M23 recruited thousands of civilians using the following methods:²³⁸ (i) abduction and forced recruitment (see below); (ii) deceptive financial promises and/or promises for work; (iii) voluntary recruitments through systematically organized awareness-raising campaigns through local leaders, public meetings in newly conquered areas (see example below in 'Recruitment in Rubaya') and radio-transmissions.²³⁹

The Group obtained new evidence of systematic, and often forced, recruitments in the territories conquered by AFC/M23. Several surrendered or captured ex-M23 combatants reported that they had been abducted by AFC/M23. Others reported that they had been enlisted by local chiefs after AFC/M23 compelled these local chiefs to select men from their respective localities for recruitment. This systematic increase in AFC/M23 recruitment efforts has also been confirmed by community leaders, civil society sources, humanitarian actors, UN sources and individuals close to M23.

The following cases documented by the Group are illustrative of the well-organized, systematic, and often coerced recruitment:

- Several former M23 combatants interviewed by the Group reported that most of the recruits trained in Tchanzu had been abducted by AFC/M23 prior to their forced enrollment in military training. Others were enticed by M23 with deceptive financial promises (see also S/2024/432, para. 101). All M23 combatants interviewed by the Group reported that they had never been paid. AFC/M23 declared to new recruits and trainees that they would be paid for service only after the "liberation" of the DRC.

Recruitment in Rubaya

- In early May 2024, shortly after AFC/M23 took control of Rubaya, the AFC/M23 leadership instructed the town manager of Rubaya to enlist at least 10 young men from each street for AFC/M23. The town manager, in turn, requested each neighborhood chief ("Nyumbakumi") to identify 10 recruits from their area. While some civilians volunteered, many were coerced or felt they had no choice, fearing reprisals against themselves and their families. The following day, the neighborhood chiefs, accompanied by M23 combatants, gathered the new recruits and brought them to Rubaya's stadium, where they were presented to the crowd. The recruits were informed they would be fighting to 'retake' the country. One young man, recruited that day, reported that a total of 180 men were enlisted that day.²⁴⁰ The recruits were then loaded into two trucks and transported to Tchanzu via Mushaki, Kitchanga, Mulimbi and Rutshuru, where all 180 recruits were enrolled in training (see annex below).

The presence of 180 recruits from Rubaya was confirmed by M23 combatants who completed their training in September 2024 (see annex below), together with recruits that arrived from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda.

²³⁷ M23 combatants, UN sources, sources close to AFC/M23 and intelligence sources.

²³⁸ M23 combatants, UN sources, sources close to AFC/M23, intelligence sources, civil society, and researchers.

²³⁹ AFC/M23 launched a new radio transmitting from Bunagana on 3 June 2024.

²⁴⁰ Other sources refer to 300 recruits.

Additional recruitment drives, including forced recruitment and abductions, were reported in Rubaya in July and August 2024.²⁴¹

Video of recruitment in Rubaya

The Group also received a 12-minute video footage²⁴² of the public gathering at the stadium in Rubaya in early May (referred to by several former recruits interviewed by the Group – see above). The video depicts a massive crowd being animated by sanctioned individual “general” Bernard Byamungu (CDi.038 and S/2024/432, para. 41) who requested recruits to step forward, to join the army in order to “fight for self-defense”, and to participate in “politico-military training”.

Below: screenshots from the video of the gathering at Rubaya stadium, depicting “General” Bernard Byamungu speaking to the crowd, the new recruits paraded before the crowd, then loaded onto trucks that transported them for training in Tchanzu.



Screenshot from video depicting “General” Bernard Byamungu addressing the crowd at Rubaya stadium.
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member

Below: English translation of “General” Byamungu’s speech in the video²⁴³ (original in Swahili)

“General” Byamungu: Is it possible to achieve development without peace?

Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: So, we must start with peace, and then we can think about development. Now, I want to ask all of you something important for our security, our peace, and our progress. To achieve this, we need everyone’s effort, don’t we?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: How many of you want us to advance all the way to Kinshasa?

Audience: All of us!

“General” Byamungu: Are you all ready?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Thank you. So, young people, how many of you are still strong and ready to join the army, in self-defense, or in a political-military framework, so we can combine our efforts and help the AFC movement advance?

Where are you? Raise your hands!

(Several hands go up)

“General” Byamungu: Are you all ready?

²⁴¹ UN sources, former AFC/M23 recruits, security sources.

²⁴² Video provided by an armed group combatant.

²⁴³ Unofficial translation by the Group.

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready to join the army?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready for self-defense?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: Are you ready for the political-military framework?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: My brothers, together with our combined efforts, we can go very far. Do you understand me?

Audience: Yes!

“General” Byamungu: I’m only asking for 10 young people who can show they’re ready to join the army. Don’t you want to? Or do you want us to stay in insecurity?

Audience: No!

“General” Byamungu: Where are the young people ready to join the army?

(One by one, people start stepping forward)

“General” Byamungu: Come, line up here.

(Several young people come forward and line up)

“General” Byamungu: Welcome, welcome, my brothers. Unity is strength. Come, my brothers, so we can free our country, to liberate our country from the hands of the invaders. Tshisekedi has turned the country into his own farm, so welcome, my brothers. Unity is the strength that will free the country. Keep coming, my brothers. I want to tell you one more thing, my brothers, I have a question. Is the destruction of the road from Goma to Rubaya because of Paul Kagame?

Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: Going hungry here, being beaten, being forced to pay taxes—is this also Kagame’s fault?

Audience: No.

“General” Byamungu: It’s due to the poor governance of Mr. Tshisekedi. And young women who want to join, come forward too. I can see there is great joy in your hearts.

-

Unidentified officer *(speaking as the trucks with the recruits are driving away)*:

You can see the young people are happy to go for training and later come back to protect us. The vehicles are no longer enough to hold them all.



Screenshot from video depicting recruits lining up before the crowd at Rubaya stadium
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member



Screenshot from video depicting recruits lining up after the meeting at Rubaya stadium
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member



Screenshot from video depicting recruits loaded into trucks in Rubaya, taken for training in Tchanzu
Source: video provided by a confidential armed group member

Forced recruitment from Tchengerero

- In April 2024, AFC/M23 arrested 22 civilians in Tchengerero and brought them to an AFC/M23 position in Runyoni, where they were subjected to forced heavy labor for several days. Thereafter, a truck belonging to AFC/M23 brought the 22 civilians to a detention facility in Rutshuru. After one week of detention, they were brought to a training center in Rutshuru, and trained by AFC/M23.

Abduction from the Banyabwisha community in Tongo

- In May 2024, 6 men from the Banyabwisha community were abducted by M23 combatants in Tongo. M23 combatants accused the Banyabwisha of being FDLR combatants and obliged them to get on motorcycles that brought them to Tchanzu for training. The abducted Banyabwisha reported that they had no choice as they would have been killed if they refused to join AFC/M23.

Annex 15 (para. 42)**AFC/M23 military and paramilitary trainings****Entraînements militaires et paramilitaires du AFC/M23**

M23 and AFC increased recruitment and training efforts for both civil-administrative cadres – including police,²⁴⁴ intelligence services, and political leaders – and combatants, the former to ensure the administration of the localities under AFC/M23 control (S/2024/432, annex 5), and the latter to consolidate military capacity in view of extending territorial control.²⁴⁵

New AFC/M23 recruits were trained primarily at the movement’s main military base in Tchanzu, but also in other AFC/M23 training centers and bases, including in Rutshuru (Birere neighbourhood), Bwito, Bwiza, Kiwanja and Nyongera. Imagery clearly shows a significant expansion of the Tchanzu training facility (see below). M23 combatants also received refresher courses in Rutshuru. Refresher courses were often organized prior to a planned military operation.

Recently surrendered and captured M23 combatants reported that “Colonel” Léon Kanyamibwa still commanded military training in Thanzu (S/2024/432, para. 39) and was seconded by “Colonel” Moïse Byinshi and “Captain” Ernest Sebagenzi. M23 combatants consistently reported the presence of Congolese, UPDF and RDF training officers in Tchanzu. Many AFC/M23 leaders were present during, or visited, the training bases, including Sultani Makenga, Imani Nzenze, Bahati Erasto, Lawrence Kanyuka, Gacheri Erasto, Bahati Erasto, Ernest Sebagenzi, Willy Ngoma, “Colonel” Moïse Byinshi, and Mirindi.²⁴⁶

The Group documented the following information regarding several trainings and closing ceremonies in AFC/M23 military bases and training centers:

- From 6 to 21 April 2024, a leadership training took place in Nyongera, north-east of Kiwanja.²⁴⁷ M23 combatants reported that there were about 700 trainees from different countries. The courses focused on training future AFC/M23 leaders (“cadres”) and was called “Dignity Intake 004”. The promotion of these future M23 cadres was presented as “the foundation to restore the dignity of all Congolese and the DRC”. Trainees were provided with theoretical and practical courses.
- On 1 July 2024, a new training started in Nyongera for around 500 new recruits.
- From 7 to 18 April 2024, another military training took place in Tchanzu. The training encompassed training of intelligence leaders, self-defense and military training. M23 combatants reported that about 400 trainees were present. Both theoretical and practical courses were provided, including “handling weaponry”, “infractions”, “information management”, “M23 ideology”.
- On 2 October 2024, a closing ceremony was held in Tchanzu²⁴⁸ for 300 young M23 officers. Among the 300 officers trained, 20 originated from the Zaïre and MAPI armed groups in Ituri. The training of officers lasted 5 months. Three trainees died during the training.
- Between 25 September and 31 October 2024, at least 3,000 recruits completed their 5-months training in Tchanzu. On 31 October 2024, an additional 2,500 recruits were still in the process of being trained by AFC/M23. Amongst the latter 2,500 recruits, 600 came from the Zaïre armed group in Ituri. This was also confirmed by one high-profile Zaïre insider, a Zaïre combatant that participated in the training, surrendered and captured M23 combatants, and intelligence sources.

²⁴⁴ From May 2024 onwards, new recruits wearing PNC-like uniforms were spotted in Rutshuru, Kiwanja and Bunagana.

²⁴⁵ M23 combatants, sources close to M23, civil society, community leaders, eyewitnesses, UN sources and sources close to AFC/M23 leadership.

²⁴⁶ Ex-M23 combatants, sources close to M23 and UN sources.

²⁴⁷ -1.141638° - 29.437617°

²⁴⁸ -1.334472° - 29.531933°

- M23 combatants who completed their training in September 2024 reported that trainees in Tchanzu were divided into “regiments” of 250 recruits each. Among one of the regiments trained there were 180 recruits who had been recruited in Rubaya (see annex 14 above) together with recruits that arrived from Mahama refugee camp in Rwanda.
- The training encompassed several theoretical courses, including on “military rules”, “weapons management”, the “art of war” and “ideology”. After the theoretical introduction, new recruits received practical training, including on “war tactics”, “engagement rules” and “bush tactics”. Sultani Makenga attended at least one of the pass-out ceremonies of the two first “regiments”, in early September 2024.
- Refresher courses were organized amongst others in Rutshuru, quartier Birere.



Screenshots of videos showing military training in Nyongera on 23 September (picture 1) and 10 September 2024 (picture 2) received from confidential security source

Annex 16 (para. 43)**AFC/M23 military and tactical training, ideology and indoctrination****Formation militaire et tactique, idéologie et endoctrinement de l'AFC/M23**

An increasing number of M23 combatants described the focus, during training, on theoretical courses including ideological persuasion, intelligence gathering, recruitment tactics and history of the DRC. Groups of recruits, amongst others a group of 25 recruits from South Kivu, received only theoretical courses and were thereafter redeployed to their areas of origin and tasked to provide intelligence from these localities and persuade local armed groups and individuals to join AFC/M23.

The Group obtained a copy of a notebook with handwritten notes taken by a trainee, listing the theoretical courses and the names of the trainers during a training provided in April in Nyongera:

1. Elements of Congo history (« Elements d'histoire du Congo ») by “professor” A. Kimanuka and “Colonel” Ernest Sebagenzi
2. DRC administrative organization: DRC institutions, democracy support commissions and security concept, constituent elements and human resources (« Organization administrative de la RDC: les institutions de la RDC, les commissions d'appui à la démocratie et notion de sécurité, éléments constitutifs et ressources humaines ») by “professor” Jeanot Munkeke
3. History of the Twirwaneho struggle (« Histoire de lutte des Twirwaneho») by “professor” John Mbananayo
4. Mobilization: mobilization techniques, mobilization channels, target analysis, mobilization stages/processes, quality of frameworks, types of communication, mass mobilization, communication and awareness-raising, organization and mobilization, commitment and participation, monitoring and evaluation. (« Mobilisation: techniques de mobilisation, canaux de mobilisation, analyse des cibles, étapes/processus de mobilisation, qualité des cadres, formes de communication, mobilisation des masses, communication et sensibilisation, organisation et mobilisation, engagement et participation, suivi et évaluation ») by Freddy Ngirabakunzi and Pascal Iradukunda
5. Weapons: AKM/SMG (« Silaha AKM/SMG ») by “Colonel” Kanyamibwa
6. Patriotism and Congolese identity (« Patriotisme et identité congolaise») by “professor” Babu Amaini
7. History of M23/ARC (« Histoire du M23/ARC ») by “professor” Munyaneza Bosco
8. Political philosophy of the AFC/M23/ARC revolution (« Philosophie politique de la révolution AFC/M23/ARC») by “professor” Benjamin Mbonimpa
9. The role of women and youth in the revolution (« Le rôle de la femme et la jeunesse dans la révolution ») by « Major » Claudine
10. War principles: tactics, training & battle drills (« Notion sur la guerre: tactique, formation & exercices de combat) by “Colonel” Kanyamibwa
11. The elements of leadership and revolutionary principles (« Les éléments du leadership et les principes révolutionnaires) by “professor” Désiré Rwigema Rukomera
12. The 8 pillars to reach any goal (« Les 8 piliers pour atteindre n'importe quel objectif », by “professor” Pascal Kasentre Uzamukunda

Annex 17 (para. 44)

M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Southern Front (southern Masisi territory and Nyiragongo territory)

Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le Front Sud (sud des territoires de Masisi et territoire de Nyiragongo)

Since the Group's last report, the area around Goma, from Sake through Kibumba remained tense and was marked by (i) shelling by both FARDC and M23/RDF, (ii) continued M23/RDF threats to South Kivu (see para. 104), and (iii) major AFC/M23 territorial advances, as illustrated by the events below.

Sake area and southern Masisi territory – non-exhaustive list

- On 30 April 2024, M23 took control of the mining sites of Rubaya in southern Masisi territory, one of the world's largest coltan mines (see also paras. 56-66)
- On 3 May 2024, RDF shelling impacted four different locations within IDP settlements²⁴⁹ located in the Mugunga neighborhood of Goma, along the RN2 road between Goma and Sake, causing civilian casualties.²⁵⁰ Details of the RDF shelling and preceding FARDC shelling are provided in annex 22.
- On 30 May 2024, M23 and RDF launched mortar attacks on FARDC and SAMIDIRC positions in Mubambiro. One SAMIDIRC soldier was killed, 13 injured and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) were destroyed, as also confirmed in a communiqué issued by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the following day (see communiqué below).
- On 18 June 2024, two M23/RDF projectiles landed in Mubambiro and triggered SAMIDIRC response, which started shelling towards M23/RDF positions in the hills overlooking Sake area.
- On 25 June 2024, M23/RDF mortar attacks on SAMIDIRC positions resulted in two SAMIDIRC soldiers killed, 20 injured and some material damage, as also confirmed in a communiqué issued by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) the following day (see communiqué below). The Group notes that prior to M23/RDF retaliation, SAMIDIRC had initiated artillery fire towards M23/RDF positions southwest of Sake, and reportedly fired 135 projectiles.
- On 27 June 2024, there were other artillery exchanges around Sake. On that same day, M23/RDF took control of Remeka, south-west from Sake and Ngungu, in southern Masisi territory and close to the South Kivu border.
- On 15 July 2024, M23/RDF²⁵¹ artillery shelling has hit the town of Bweremana, resulting in civilian casualties.
- On 3-4 September 2024, after almost two months of relative calm, clashes in the southern front close to South Kivu resumed, when Wazalendo armed groups together with FDLR launched attacks to recuperate Ndumba hill (12 kilometers southwest of Sake) from M23/RDF. Ndumba hill remained under M23/RDF control, however.
- One week later, the Wazalendo/FDLR coalition supported by FARDC artillery succeeded to recuperate Ndumba hill. Reports refer to artillery shelling by both sides.
- On 14 and 18 October 2024, M23/RDF and FARDC exchanged fire around Sake.

²⁴⁹ Lushagala, Zone 14, 8 ième CEPAC and CBCA Rego. The Group did investigations in Lushagala and 8ieme CEPAC IDP camps.

²⁵⁰ The Group did not (yet) obtain access to the sixth unexploded shell.

²⁵¹ The Group recalls that in its final report, it established the de facto control and direction of RDF over M23 operations (S/2024/432, paras. 40-45).

Kibumba area – non-exhaustive list

- On 15 June 2024, after almost three months of relative calm in the Kibumba area, north of Goma, hostilities resumed when an anti-tank missile hit a joint defensive position of FARDC and the private military company Congo Protection (S/2023/990, paras. 47-51) in Kanyamahoro, few kilometers south of Kibumba. Two FARDC soldiers and one Congo Protection staff were killed on the spot, while a second Congo Protection staff died in the aftermath of the event.²⁵² Several other FARDC and Congo Protection staff were wounded. Further details are provided in annex 23.
- On 24 June 2024, M23/RDF fired three mortars towards FARDC positions on Kanyabuki hill, west of Kanyamahoro.
- The period under review was characterized by continuous reports of M23 and RDF reinforcements in the Kibumba area (see also annex 17-18).



Statement on AFC/M23 attacks on SAMIDRC Camp in Sake on 31 May 2024, received from confidential SADC source.

²⁵² Security and FARDC sources, confidential reports and eyewitness accounts.



the sandf

Department:
Defence
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA STATEMENT

DATE: Wednesday, 26 June 2024

EMBARGO: For Immediate use

SUBJECT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE CONFIRMS THE MORTAR ATTACK ON ONE OF OUR BASES IN SAKE, IN THE EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), confirms the mortar attack on one of our bases in Sake, in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 25 June 2024, which resulted in two fatalities and twenty injured. Four members who were critically injured have been hospitalized, whilst the rest who suffered minor injuries are expected to be discharged soon.

Families of the two members who lost their lives have been informed and all procedures to bring their mortal remains are in process. The names of the deceased will be communicated in due course.

ENDS.

Issued by: South African National Defence Force
(Defence Headquarters)

Enquiries: Sphiwe Dlamini
(Head of Communication)

Statement on mortar attacks on SAMIDRC on 25 June 2024, received from confidential SADC source.

Annex 18 (para. 45)**M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Northern Front (Rutshuru and southern Lubero territories)****Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le front nord (territoires de Rutshuru et du sud de Lubero)***Southern Lubero – non-exhaustive list*

- In its last report, the Group reported that “the risk of M23 and RDF taking Kanyabayonga, entering Lubero territory and pushing further south along the Sake-Minova road remained high” (S/2024/432, para. 34).
- On 27 June 2024, M23/RDF launched attacks from various fronts²⁵³ and captured the strategic town of Kanyabayonga, Rutshuru territory, where FARDC had retreated to, with most of its military supplies, when RDF and M23 took control of Rwindi in March 2024 (S/2024/432, annex 29). After intense fighting, FARDC troops commanded by General-Major Chico Tshitabwe (S/2024/432, para. 80) and supported by the FDLR and Wazalendo armed groups withdrew northwards from Kanyabayonga leaving behind important weapon and ammunition stockpiles which were subsequently seized by M23 combatants.²⁵⁴
- Following the capture of Kanyabayonga, M23/RDF moved further north towards the southern parts of Lubero territory and took control of Kirumba, Kaseghe and surrounding areas on 30 June 2024. In only three days, M23/RDF conquered a stretch of 50 kilometers along the Kanyabayonga-Kaseghe road. In the meantime, FARDC controlled the RN2 axis until south Matembe, and relocated its headquarters to Lubero center. FARDC reinforcements were sent from Beni territory to Lubero center. Following M23/RDF take-over of Kanyabayonga, Wazalendo armed groups (in particular FPP-AP) and FDLR also withdrew to their traditional areas of influence in south-west and west Lubero territory. In early July, additional FARDC reinforcements arrived from Goma, Kisangani and Kananga.
- In early July 2024, AFC/M23 officially installed mayors (“bourgemestres”) in Kanyabayonga (on 7 July) and two newly conquered locations in southern Lubero (Kirumba on 3 July and Kaina on 5 July). AFC/M23 also organized meetings in Kanyabayonga aiming at sensitizing the local population for the AFC/M23 cause, further installing its parallel administration and encouraging new recruitments.
- M23/RDF operations in southern Lubero resumed on 19 August 2024 when it sought to strengthen its position in the south-western area of Lake Edward, in particular in Kamandi-Lac (east of Kirumba) where FARDC naval forces were still based. If taken, Kamandi-Lac would provide M23 increased access to Lake Edward. While FARDC maintained their control over Kamandi-Lac, on 26 August 2024 M23/RDF took control of Kivuvo, east of Kirumba and along the route leading to Kamandi-Lac.
- On 3 November 2024, M23/RDF took control of Kamandi-gîte in the vicinity of Kamandi-Lac. Civil society sources reported that the M23 occupied the primary school “Vowisha”, where it installed its political bureau after having destroyed various classrooms.²⁵⁵

Rutshuru territory – non-exhaustive list

- From 2-4 August 2024, M23/RDF took control of several localities in north-eastern Rutshuru territory. On 2 August, it conquered Kiseguro. On 3 August, it took Nyamilima and continued towards Ishasha, the border post between Uganda and the DRC, that it conquered on 4 August. AFC/M23 soon began installing a parallel administration in these newly conquered localities. The Group notes that FARDC had already withdrawn from that area several months earlier, thus this territorial expansion did not involve armed confrontations. However, other state actors – police (PNC) and intelligence (ANR) – still present at the Ishasha border post in early August, were compelled to flee to Uganda following M23's take-over of the area.

²⁵³ Notably from Layi Layi near Kimaka (15 km SW Kanyabayonga), Butalongola (10km S of Kanyabayonga) as well as from Rwindi. UN, FARDC and civil society sources. Confidential document.

²⁵⁴ FARDC and security sources. Sources close to M23 and RDF.

²⁵⁵ Images on file with the Group

- On 7 August 2024, M23/RDF also conquered the port of Nyakakoma on the shores of Lake Edward, forcing the FARDC naval forces to flee.
- On 2 September 2024, following clashes between M23/RDF and Wazalendo/FDLR, M23 took control of Butare in Tongo area.
- Mid-September 2024, M23/RDF took control of Mashango, east of Kitchanga, known to be a CMC-FDP stronghold. One week later, M23/RDF took control of Marangara, east of Tongo, a known FDLR and CMC-FDP stronghold.

Annex 19 (para. 46)

M23 and RDF's area of operations on the Western Front (northern Masisi and Walikale territories)

Zone d'opérations du M23 et des RDF sur le front occidental (territoires du nord de Masisi et de Walikale)


- On 10 July 2024, M23/RDF took control of Nyange, 26 kilometers north-west of Kitchanga, resulting in large population displacements. M23/RDF also made advances towards Bibwe, Bweru and Lwama, north-west of Kitchanga, in July 2024.
- Between 19 and 25 August, M23/RDF took control of Lukopfu (8 kilometers south-east of Masisi center), Karambi (15 kilometers southwest of Masisi center), Kaniro (11 kilometers southwest of Masisi center) and Kisuma bridge (10 kilometers southwest of Masisi center). Wazalendo armed groups repelled several M23/RDF attacks.
- On 20 October 2024, M23/RDF took control over Kalembe on the border between Masisi and Walikale territories. However, the Wazalendo (NDC-R Guidon and APCLS) pushed M23/RDF back on 21 October.
- On 23 October 2024, M23/RDF conquered Kalembe again and maintained its control over Kalembe.
- On 26-27 October 2024, after several days of intense clashes with the Wazalendo-FDLR-FARDC coalition, M23/RDF made significant advances on the Kalembe-Mpeti axis in Walikale, and took control of several localities including Malemo, Minjenje, Mpeti, Katobi. The series of clashes between M23/RDF and the Wazalendo/FARDC coalition triggered important population displacements towards Mutongo, and directly threatened Pinga. FARDC immediately sent reinforcements to Pinga. Multiple sources reported the important presence of RDF troops on the ground (see annexes 19 and 21).
- On 23 October 2024, M23/RDF conquered Kahira, 19 kilometers north-east of Masisi center, thus putting pressure on Masisi center, believed to be another M23 target.

Annex 20 (para. 47)

M23 and RDF's area of operations: evolution


Évolution de la zone d'opérations des M23 et RDF

- M23 and RDF's area of operations and presence in April 2024



Map reflecting the positions on 8 April 2024, received from confidential source


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Maps reflecting the positions on 15 April 2024, received from confidential source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

- M23 and RDF's area of operations and presence in **July 2024**:



Maps reflecting the positions on **10 July 2024**, received from confidential source


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Map reflecting the positions in **July 2024**, received from confidential source

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Image Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 1 January 2021
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations


- M23 and RDF's area of operations late **October 2024**:



Map reflecting the positions on 28 **October 2024**, received from confidential source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

- Evolution of M23 and RDF's area of operations from **November 2022** to **November 2024**:



Maps received from confidential source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 21 (para. 50)

Illustrations of RDF continued presence and support to M23

Illustration de la présence et soutien continus des RDF au M23

- **Regarding the presence of RDF soldiers on DRC territory, see also:**
 - [S/2022/967](#), paras. 47-51 and annexes 29-32.
 - [S/2023/431](#), paras. 54-61 and annexes 28-35.
 - [S/2023/990](#), paras. 29-30 and annex 17.
 - [S/2024/432](#), paras. 34, 40-45, 46-54, and annexes 22, 27, 28, 29 and 42.

The Group continued to obtain evidence – authenticated photographs, drone footage, video recordings, testimony and intelligence – confirming systematic border incursions by RDF and presence in Petit Nord. During the period under review, RDF positioned itself at the frontlines, operated high-tech weaponry, and directly engaged in combat (see also [S/2024/432](#), para. 40).

Former AFC/M23 recruits interviewed by the Group in Goma and in Beni all confirmed the presence of RDF soldiers, referring to them as the “Friendly Force”. They explained that this English term was generically used by everyone when referring to them. The former recruits were consistent in their description of them as highly trained and disciplined Rwandan special forces who were there to train and support M23, and that regular M23 soldiers were not allowed to interact with them. The “Friendly Force” soldiers moved around in military trucks, were equipped with full and high-tech military gear, and mostly led special military operations.

The following cases are illustrative of the systematic, well-organized, presence of RDF in support to AFC/M23. The list below is non-exhaustive, as the Group has additional files – imagery and documents – with evidence of RDF presence in other locations and on additional dates. Annexes 52-55 provides details of RDF handling of high-tech weaponry in Karuba (Masisi territory), Sake area, and Kanyamahoro (Nyiragongo territory).

- **RDF soldiers’ presence in Kiwanja and Nyongera**

Imagery from 21 May, 8 and 11 June 2024, 22 July, and 2 August 2024, showed soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and uniforms similar to standard RDF-issued equipment sitting in the back of trucks and vehicles. Security and intelligence sources, as well as civil society sources and eyewitnesses identified the uniformed men as RDF soldiers.



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 21 May 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 8 June 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshots of video recorded in Kiwanja on 11 June 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 22 July 2024 received from confidential source



Screenshot of video recorded in Kiwanja on 2 August 2024 received from confidential source

Imagery of 11 August 2024 shows RDF troop transports in Nyongera, north-east of Kiwanja. The presence of RDF in and around Nyongera, including at AFC/M23 training camp (annex 15) has been confirmed by eyewitnesses, civil society sources and intelligence sources.



Screenshot of video received from confidential source

- **RDF soldiers' presence in and around Kalembe**

- Late October 2024, M23 and RDF made significant advances on the Kalembe-Mpeti axis, and seized new localities in Walikale territory. Multiple sources – including eyewitnesses, intelligence sources, sources close to M23 and RDF, civil society sources and FDLR/Wazalendo combatants – reported the concentrated presence of RDF soldiers in the area. While the Wazalendo and FDLR were able to push back the M23/RDF from Kalembe on 21 October 2023, sources reported that M23 took back control two days later, when RDF reinforcements had arrived (see annexes 17-19).

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Kitchanga**

- Multiple sources reported that RDF had a key position in Kitchanga, in the Kahe neighbourhood, on the Nyangutu hill. According to information obtained by the Group, Brigadier-General Déo Rusanganya, present in Kitchanga, was commanding the RDF in the area.²⁵⁶

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Kibumba and Buhumba**

From June to early November 2024, civil society sources, local authorities, AFC/M23 sources, eyewitnesses and intelligence sources reported the continuous and repeated movements and presence of RDF soldiers in and around Kibumba and Buhumba. RDF troops and RDF vehicles arrived from the Rwandan side of the border and entered the DRC through Kabuhunga, south of Kibumba, and other border crossings in Kibumba/Buhumba, as was also previously reported [S/2024/432](#), annex 28). RDF troops entering through Kabuhunga and other border crossings in Kibumba/Buhumba reinforced troops, including in Kanyamahoro, passing through Katale, Ruthuru territory.

- **RDF soldiers' presence in Rumangabo**

Aerial footage shot on 2 September 2024 shows a column of soldiers in uniforms equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment, marching from Rumangabo towards the north, in the direction of Rutshuru town. Civil society, eyewitnesses and security sources reported the presence of RDF in and around Rumangabo.



Screenshot of video recorded in Rumangabo on 2 September 2024 received from confidential source

²⁵⁶ M23 combatants and security sources.

Annex 22 (para. 52)**RDF indiscriminate shelling of Mugunga with 122mm rockets, 3 May 2024****Bombardement aveugle de Mugunga par les RDF avec des roquettes de 122 mm, 3 mai 2024**

In the morning of 3 May 2024, shelling with six rockets fired from the hills behind Sake impacted four different locations within IDP settlements²⁵⁷ located in the Mugunga neighborhood of Goma, situated along the RN2 road between Goma and Sake. Five out of six shells exploded in and around the IDP camps without causing civilian casualties.²⁵⁸ Only the explosion at the “8^{ème} CEPAC” IDP settlement caused heavy casualties and material damage to civilian infrastructure.²⁵⁹

The shelling resulted in at least 17 civilians killed²⁶⁰ and 35 injured, the majority of them women and children.²⁶¹ The DRC Government announced a final death toll of 35 civilians. The Group was unable to corroborate this number, as there are no official records or reliable testimonies to account for the 35 victims. The official memorial ceremony and the burial of 35 individuals took place on 15 May 2024, among suspicions voiced that the DRC government inflated the number of victims and that the 35 coffins presented were not in fact all victims of the bombing. The Group noted that two names appeared twice on the crosses accompanying the coffins, with different dates of death. This may point to irregularities in the process of accounting for the victims, and the number put forward by the Government remains unverified.

122 mm rockets fired by RDF

The Group confirmed that the explosions were caused by 122 mm rockets (see below for details on the 122 mm rockets remnants recovered at Lushagala IDP camp). The Mugunga neighbourhood had already been shelled with 122 mm rockets in February and April 2024, as documented in the Group’s final report (S/2024/432, annex 42).

The 122 mm rockets were fired from military positions near Karuba in Masisi territory, from the hills overlooking Sake, north-west from Mugunga, an area controlled exclusively by RDF and M23 at the time of the incident (see below for details on the M23/RDF identified firing positions and estimated locations of impact below).²⁶²

The Group established that the portable single tube 122 mm rocket launchers (“Grad-P”) were operated by RDF soldiers.²⁶³ Multiple elements support this conclusion. *Firstly*, the presence of RDF at the military positions north-west of Mugunga prior to and at the time of the incident was confirmed (S/2024/432, annexes 39 and 42). *Secondly*, RDF possessed man-portable single-tube rocket launchers and 122 mm rockets (S/2024/432, annex 42). *Thirdly*, the presence of a 122 mm rocket launcher at RDF positions northwest of Sake and near Karuba was documented earlier. It was also documented that RDF had used 122 mm rocket launchers in previous months during operations supporting M23 (S/2024/432, annexes 39 and 42). *Fourthly*, the use of 122 mm rockets requires significant military expertise and extensive dedicated training.²⁶⁴ While RDF has the technical ability and expertise to use 122 mm rockets, it is doubtful that M23 possesses sufficient expertise to handle alone this weapon system, despite having benefited from military training (S/2024/432, paras. 35-39).²⁶⁵ *Fifthly*, 24 hours prior to the attack, an individual close to RDF and M23 alerted the Group that RDF planned to attack Mugunga and Kibati. After the attack, RDF commanders acknowledged to the source that RDF had conducted the attack. *Sixth*, the Group was informed that following the attack, RDF leadership in Kigali instructed the RDF units (belonging to the 93th and 109th battalions) deployed on the ground to avoid targeting IDP camps.

²⁵⁷ Lushagala, Zone 14, 8 ième CEPAC and CBCA Rego. The Group did investigations in Lushagala and 8ieme CEPAC IDP camps.

²⁵⁸ The Group did not (yet) obtain access to the sixth unexploded shell.

²⁵⁹ Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, intelligence and security sources. Group’s visit of Mugunga IDP sites on 25 June 2024.

²⁶⁰ Nine deaths confirmed by medical sources; eight by community leaders and researchers.

²⁶¹ Medical, UN and humanitarian sources, civil society, researchers and community leaders.

²⁶² Based on analysis of the trajectory of the incoming rockets and information provided by eyewitnesses, security, military and intelligence sources, community leaders, UN sources and confidential documents.

²⁶³ Security and intelligence sources, sources close to RDF and M23.

²⁶⁴ Military experts, security and UN sources.

²⁶⁵ M23 ex-combatants, UN and intelligence sources. Confidential reports.

While the US and DRC Governments attributed the attack to the RDF and M23,²⁶⁶ M23 and AFC leaders, as well as the Rwandan government, denied responsibility for the Mugunga attack (see the AFC communiqué on the Mugunga attack below).²⁶⁷

FARDC positions close to IDP settlements

Between 9 and 10 am on 3 May, prior to the RDF shelling of the IDP settlements in Mugunga, the FARDC had fired rockets towards RDF and M23 military positions on the Ngumba and Vunano hills in the area of Mushaki and Karuba, north-west of Sake.²⁶⁸ Despite repeated warnings by humanitarian actors and MONUSCO against the positioning of artillery near or in populated areas (S/2024/432, para. 97),²⁶⁹ FARDC units commanded by General Papi Lupembe (see also para. 70) fired shells from two separate multi-barrel-rocket launchers mounted on trucks, from two distinct artillery positions²⁷⁰ located close to the IDP settlements impacted by the shelling (see details on the FARDC artillery positions under the heading below “*FARDC artillery positions near IDP settlements*”).²⁷¹ One FARDC artillery position was located at the Mugunga cemetery (Cimetière ‘Chemin du ciel’), at less than 500 m from the impact location of the RDF that killed civilians at the “8^{ème} CEPAC” IDP site.²⁷² Another artillery position was identified at approximately two kilometers north-east of the Lushagala IDP settlement (see map below).²⁷³

The Mugunga shelling was likely a retaliatory action aimed at neutralizing the FARDC artillery positions, in response to FARDC/FDNB artillery firing.²⁷⁴ While the impact on the IDP settlement was likely due to a targeting error, it does not exclude an element of planning by RDF with acceptance of significant collateral damage, as explained below.

122 mm rockets as area-weapons are inherently indiscriminate

A portable single tube 122 mm rocket launcher (“Grad-P”) is a type of artillery rocket system designed for area saturation rather than pinpoint accuracy. These rockets lack precision-guided technology, meaning they are typically fired in volleys that cover a broad area, rather than being aimed at specific targets with high accuracy. They are therefore highly effective against troop concentrations, enemy positions, or defensive lines. This area-effect capability inherently makes them “indiscriminate” when used near civilian populations, as the rockets impact within a broad zone rather than a specific target. Moreover, 122 mm rockets have an extensive fragmentation effect, intended to increase the weapon’s lethality and impact, causing damage not only from the explosion itself but also from the pieces of metal and other materials that fly outward, posing significant risks to personnel, equipment, and structures within the vicinity of the blast. This feature makes 122 mm rockets particularly dangerous in densely populated areas, as the fragments can injure or kill individuals far from the actual impact point of the explosion.²⁷⁵

In conclusion, 122mm rockets are by design area-effect weapons unsuitable for precise targeting. They cannot be accurately directed at a specific military target, rendering them indiscriminate when used in populated areas.

For this reason, under international humanitarian law the use of 122mm rockets in urban or civilian-dense environments is deemed as indiscriminate, as they are likely to cause unintended harm to civilians and infrastructure.

FARDC artillery positions near IDP settlements

²⁶⁶ Press Statement of US Department of State and communiqué of the DRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also SADC communiqué.

²⁶⁷ Messages sent by M23 officers, Bertrand Bisimwa on X and press release of the Republic of Rwanda.

²⁶⁸ Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, intelligence and security sources.

²⁶⁹ Humanitarian and UN sources. Group of Expert meetings with FARDC, SAMIDRC and security sources.

²⁷⁰ FARDC and security sources, IDP camp leaders.

²⁷¹ Ibid. UN sources. Group’s visit of Mugunga IDP sites on 25 June 2024.

²⁷² Group visit of Mugunga IDP camps on 25 June 2024, eyewitnesses, and confidential reports.

²⁷³ I.e. at Nzulo and at approximately 2km east of the Lushagala IDP camp. Confidential and UN sources.

²⁷⁴ Eyewitnesses, IDP camp leaders, UN, security and intelligence sources, confidential reports. The Group notes that it had been informed on the RDF planned operation to attack Mugunga and Kibati (see above).

²⁷⁵ Military expert sources.

FARDC artillery nearby civilian settlements pose great risks for civilians due to predictable retaliatory attacks by the opposing side (see also [S/2024/432](#), paras. 97-98).

After the 3 May attack, humanitarian actors and IDP camp leaders renewed their appeal to cease the use of explosive weapons near populated areas. In the immediate aftermath of the shelling, the angered IDP population of Mugunga demonstrated against the FARDC, demanding them to remove artillery from the vicinity of the IDP settlements. The demonstration was also followed by explicit calls addressed to Military Governor Cirimwami to prevent the presence of artillery and of armed FARDC and Wazalendo near and within the IDP settlements.²⁷⁶ FARDC artillery located near the IDP settlements have been removed following the 3 May incident, but IDPs reported to the Group that mobile artillery positions were occasionally still placed too close to the civilian settlements.²⁷⁷

122 mm rockets remnants recovered at Lushagala IDP camp:

The Group collected imagery recorded on 3 May 2024 at Lushagala and CEPAC IDP camps showing remnants of 122 mm rockets. Security, military, and UN sources, as well as ammunition experts, assessed that the employed weapon system was a Grad-P Complex (GPC) 122 mm tripod-mounted single barrel portable launcher. This weapon system was already documented by the Group. This system has a range of 25 to 30 kilometers.

See image below depicting the remnants of the 122 mm rocket:



Screenshots from video received on 3 May 2024 filmed by eyewitnesses in Lushagala IDP camp


²⁷⁶ Interviews with IDPs and community leaders in Mugunga.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.



Pictures received from confidential civil society and UN sources

- RDF firing positions and estimated locations of impact:



Maps and schematic overviews received from confidential sources

Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, ©2024 Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Military, security, UN and intelligence sources identified the following positions as possible firing positions, all within the area controlled by RDF and M23:

- RDF ridgeline position north of Karuba; 1°33'31.36"S / 28°59'27.93"E where presence of 122mm rockets was documented ([S/2024/432](#), annex 42)
- Point 1800: 1°34'14" S / 29°01'34" E; or 1°34'45.51"S / 29° 2'10.00"E
- Kimoka: 1°33'07" S / 29°03'08" E
- Point 2120: 1°33'0.34" S / 29°02'21"

- AFC communiqué on the Mugunga attack:



Alliance Fleuve Congo
Peuple Uni, Digne et Prospère

COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL DU 3 MAI 2024

Les crimes perpétrés ce vendredi matin à Goma par les troupes de Tshisekedi ne resteront pas impunis.

1. L'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) condamne fermement toutes les attaques contre des civils et des infrastructures civiles, surtout le bombardement de la ville et des camps de déplacés de guerre, qui a tué et blessé plusieurs congolais à Mugunga, dans la ville de Goma ce vendredi 3 mai 2024.
2. L'AFC rappelle que les attaques contre des civils et des infrastructures civiles sont interdites par le droit international humanitaire et de ce fait condamnées et punissables par la loi.
3. Il est à noter que chaque fois que l'offensive des forces négatives du régime de Kinshasa essuie un revers cuisant face à nos forces sur le champ de bataille, elles tournent leurs canons contre les populations civiles. C'est le cas notamment à Kibumba, Kibirizi, Mweso, Karuba, Mushaki, Kirorigrwe ainsi que dans plusieurs autres entités. Et cette tactique est devenue une habitude.
4. L'AFC met en garde le régime de Monsieur Tshisekedi contre tout agissement criminel envers les civils et s'engage à défendre la population contre toute autre menace terroriste à l'avenir de la part du régime de TSHISEKEDI.
5. L'AFC demande instamment au régime de Kinshasa de démilitariser toute la ville de Goma comme le réclame la population meurtrie depuis plusieurs mois par les actions criminelles de la coalition des forces négatives du régime de Kinshasa.
6. Le positionnement de l'artillerie lourde au milieu des populations civiles et dans les camps des déplacés est un crime de guerre qui vise à se servir de la population civile comme bouclier humain. Ces armes doivent être délocalisées afin de mettre la population hors de tout danger.
7. L'AFC demande à la population de la ville de Goma de rester mobiliser pour mettre fin aux actions criminelles de régime décadent de Monsieur Tshisekedi qui sera bientôt mis aux arrêts et traduit devant des juridictions compétentes pour répondre de ses exactions contre des innocents.

Fait à Bunagana, le 3 mai 2024

Pour l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)



Lawrence KANYUKA
Point-Focal Communication



E-mail : alliancefleuvecongo@gmail.com

Téléphone : +243 899 411 093

Document received from confidential M23 sources

- FARDC artillery positions on 3 May relative to shelling impact locations:



Schematic overview received from confidential UN source
Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 23 (para. 53)**Guided anti-tank missile in Mubambiro****Missile guidé à Mubambiro**

- On 10 June 2024, an armoured vehicle belonging to the Malawi contingent of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) was hit in Mubambiro. Whereas FARDC and SADC positions in Mubambiro had been repeatedly hit by mortar fire in preceding months (S/2024/432, annex 40), excerpts from video footage of the shelling, both in flight and on impact, show that this time SAMIDRC was hit by an anti-tank guided missile.
- The imagery below shows the location of the SAMIDRC camp and hit SAMIDIRC armoured vehicle (picture 1), and the explosion of the guided missile (picture 2):



Image received from confidential UN source
Map Data: Google, ©2024 Airbus, Imagery Date: 22 July 2023

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

- The imagery below shows the remnants of the missile recovered in Mubambiro proving the wire-guided capability. See also annex x below for additional information on this type of missiles.



Image received from confidential UN source

Annex 24 (para. 53)

Guided missile in Kanyamahoro

Missile guidé à Kanyamahoro

- On 15 June 2024, after almost three months of relative calm in the Kibumba area, north of Goma, hostilities resumed when another anti-tank missile hit a joint defensive position of FARDC and the private military company Congo Protection (S/2023/990, paras. 47-51) in Kanyamahoro, few kilometers south of Kibumba. Two FARDC soldiers and one Congo Protection staff were killed on the spot, while a second Congo Protection staff died in the aftermath of the event.²⁷⁸ Several other FARDC and Congo Protection staff were wounded.
- Imagery showing the location of the FARDC-Congo protection position and the location of the explosion of the guided missile:



Image received from confidential UN source
Map Data: Google, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, Imagery Date: 5 August 2019

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

²⁷⁸ PMC and FARDC sources, confidential reports and eyewitness accounts.


- Imagery of the remnants of the missiles recovered in Mubambiro proving the wire-guided capability





Imagery received from UN and confidential security sources

- Schematic overview of the Spike-Extended Range (ER) guided missiles:



Source: [The most advanced anti-tank complex “Spike” \(topwar.ru\)](https://topwar.ru)

The Group notes that: (1) this weapon system is new (markings show manufacture in 2021) and expensive; (2) the transport of this system, as well as its storage, is complicated and sensitive; (3) the supply of this weapon system is reserved for states; and (4) the use of the missile system requires extensive training. It is therefore highly unlikely that (i) local armed groups or the FDLR possess and/or use this type of weapon system, or (ii) that M23 could have handled this system without external support.

Several M23 combatants reported that sanctioned individual Bernard Byamungu ([CDi.038](#)) was responsible for the anti-tank missiles in the areas around Sake ([S/2024/432](#), paras. 36 and 41).

The Group is working on tracing the origin of these missiles.

Annex 25 (para. 54)

Spoofing and jamming of GPS systems in and around M23/RDF controlled areas

Espionnage et brouillage des systèmes GPS dans les zones contrôlées par le M23 et RDF et aux alentours

Since late May 2024, while operating in and around M23/RDF controlled areas, the Global Positioning Systems (GPS) of different types of assets – UN military and civilian aircraft, MONUSCO surveillance drone, FARDC surveillance drones, humanitarian and commercial aircrafts, and different types of GPS devices – were impacted by jamming and spoofing attacks.²⁷⁹

Spoofing attacks result in the GPS receiver computing erroneous location or time; jamming attacks overpower GPS signals so that a GPS receiver can no longer operate. Jamming and spoofing can therefore be used to interfere with, and counteract, potential military attacks (for example by armed drones or attack helicopters) or aerial observations (for example by surveillance drones or aircraft).

The Group notes that jamming and spoofing carry significant risks as systems heavily dependent on GPS systems, including civilian and humanitarian aircrafts, may suddenly lose navigation capabilities and/or deviate from their intended course. According to information received by the Group, on several occasions since late May 2024, pilots of non-military aircraft were compelled to take manual control after suffering spoofing and jamming attacks while flying in the affected areas.

Spoofing and jamming attacks have been documented in areas around Goma, Kibumba, Sake, Kitchanga, Kanyabayonga and Bukavu (see map below).²⁸⁰ The attack around Kanyabayonga was first documented early July 2024,²⁸¹ few days after M23 captured the town.

Jamming and spoofing systems operated from DRC and Rwandan territories

Three jamming and spoofing systems responsible for the signal interference described above were identified by location. One spoofing system was positioned on a hill in Gisenyi, in Rwanda, less than three kilometers from the DRC border.²⁸² Another system was detected at 500 meters from Kamembe airport in Rwanda, east of Bukavu, DRC.²⁸³ A third system was detected in Kanyabayonga, on DRC territory.²⁸⁴ Sources close to RDF and M23 informed the Group that RDF and M23 were at the origin of the jamming and spoofing.

The Group found no evidence of spoofing and jamming systems deployed by the FARDC, SAMIDRC, FDNB or private military companies.²⁸⁵

²⁷⁹ Eyewitnesses, intelligence, security and military sources, imagery on file with the Group.

²⁸⁰ Eyewitnesses, intelligence, security and military sources, confidential document and imagery on file with the Group.

²⁸¹ Eyewitness and imagery on file with the Group.


²⁸² 1°40'20.7"S 29°16'32.2"E (-1.672647° 29.275780°). Confirmed also by Military, security and UN sources

²⁸³ -2.473400° 28.906008°;

²⁸⁴ -0.682558° 29.182317°

²⁸⁵ Interviews with SAMIDRC, PMC, FARDC, military and intelligence sources. Confidential report.

- Map showing the areas affected by jamming and spoofing



Map received from UN source. Red circles indicate areas affected by signal interference
Map Data: Google, ©2024 Landsat/Copernicus, Imagery Date: 1 January 2021

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 26 (para. 54)**Jamming and subsequent crash of a MONUSCO surveillance drone****Brouillage et crash d'un drone de surveillance de la MONUSCO**


On 29 October 2024, MONUSCO lost contact with one surveillance drone that was conducting a reconnaissance mission in the area of Mpeti and Pinga, Walikale territory. While flying over Mpeti, the GPS system was affected by a jamming attack. The drone crashed close to Kikuvo, 15 kilometers from Kirumba, southwest of Lake Edward.

Picture of the crashed surveillance drone:



Picture published and shared on social media channels on 29 October 2024, provided by confidential source


Map showing the itinerary of the surveillance drone from the moment the system was jammed. The drone drifted from Mpeti/Pinga, where the GPS system was jammed and hacked, until it crashed the near Kivuvo:



Annotated map received from confidential UN source

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Few hours before the crash, Lawrence Kanyuka – the M23 political spokesperson and AFC communication focal point (S/2024/432, para. 27) – called on MONUSCO to stop using its drones and end its collaboration with “forces condemned by the UN for genocide and crimes against humanity”.



Message published by Lawrence Kanyuka on [X](#)

Annex 27 (para. 55)

SHORAD system spotted in Karuba

Système SHORAD repéré a Karuba

The SHORAD system was spotted on 25 October, in Karuba (1°34'21.18" S – 28°59'28.14" E), 6 kilometers west from Sake. The soldiers operating the SHORAD system are equipped with weaponry and backpacks similar to standard RDF-issued equipment (picture 3). Analysis of the imagery shows that the SHORAD system has characteristics virtually identical to the Norinco Type 92 Yitian TL-6 ([S/2024/432](#), annex 33).



Screenshots of video received from confidential security source

The Group notes that, even if it was confirmed that the SHORAD system and/or the vehicle were of Chinese manufacture, this does not mean that the material was transferred in violation of the sanctions regime. Rather, if confirmed, it would imply that the materiel was diverted from its intended legal end-use

The Group sent a request for information to the Government of Rwanda on 29 October 2024 regarding the diversion of military materiel from its intended legal and end-user and/or end-use, including with regards to the SHORAD system.

Since the Group's last report, intelligence, civil society and security sources reported the observation of other SHORAD systems in (1) Kamulima (-1.142574° 29.443923°) in April 2024; (2) Kahunga (-1.108805° 29.393574°) in May 2024 (see also [S/2024/432](#), annex 23); and (3) Kitchanga (-1.247193° 29.057567°) in May 2024; and (4) Rubaya (-1.543651° 28.873837°) in May 2024. The three systems that were present on the ground as reported earlier ([S/2024/432](#), annex 34) have thus been mobile.

On 15 November 2024, at least 3 SHORAD systems were present in Petit Nord, namely in Kibumba (1), Kitchanga (1) and Karuba (1).

Annex 28 (para. 56)**Update on mineral traceability****Mise à jour sur la traçabilité minière**

AFC/M23 takeover of mining areas in Rubaya spurred concerns among downstream industry actors on the risks of minerals from the eastern part of the DRC fueling the ongoing conflict.

On 8 May 2024, the former DRC Ministry of Mines issued an official communiqué, accusing M23 of levying illegal taxes on coltan and cassiterite traded to Rwanda. The communiqué also claimed that traders associated with M23 were transporting untaxed minerals from Rubaya to Mushaki, and then on to Rwanda, passing through M23-controlled territory.

On 17 May 2024, the president of the North Kivu mining chamber, Ms. Yvette Mwanza, announced that members of the chamber would stop sourcing minerals from all of Masisi territory, turning to those extracted in Walikale and Lubero territories instead, to avoid financing M23 occupation of Rubaya.²⁸⁶ From May to September 2024, production recorded by the North Kivu mining division dropped to 10.7 tons from mining sites in Walikale,²⁸⁷ whereas during the same time AFC/M23 produced at least 150 tons per month in Rubaya.

Responsible Minerals Initiative suspension of ITSCI

On 5 July 2024, the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) (S/2024/432, paras. 141, 147 and 148 and annex 87) suspended ITSCI as a recognized upstream system in the DRC until at least January 2026.²⁸⁸ According to the RMI communiqué, this decision resulted from a series of shortcomings relating to traceability in the DRC, which remained unaddressed by ITSCI. RMI criticized ITSCI for not providing sufficient responses to questions about risk management of conflict escalation impacting mineral trade in the DRC and Rwanda, which would not serve its mission of supporting regulatory compliance and responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CAHRAs).

Consequently, RMI's members and smelters in the Great Lakes Region that rely exclusively on ITSCI's due diligence certification, did no longer meet the requirements to qualify for RMI's Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (RMAP).

The Group notes that the majority of economic actors mostly rely on ITSCI's certification to meet their due diligence obligations; they do not conduct independent quality controls to comply with the globally accepted international standards.²⁸⁹

On 8 July 2024, the United States issued a statement of concern about the illicit trade and exploitation of certain minerals - including artisanal and semi-industrially mined gold and tantalum – contributing to the ongoing conflict. The statement also pointed out that “minerals directly or indirectly benefit armed groups and move out of the country through Rwanda and to Uganda before moving to major refining and processing countries”. The statement pointed at “flawed industry-managed traceability initiatives on the ground in the DRC and Rwanda” among the risks of contamination of the mineral supply chain with minerals ineligible for trade.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁶ <https://www.radiookapi.net/2024/05/17/actualite/societe/des-entreprises-boycottent-les-minerais-provenant-des-zones-occupees>.

²⁸⁷ North Kivu Mining Division. Production was of 4237kg in May, 2230 kg in June, 2162kg in July and 2078kg in August.

²⁸⁸ The statement can be consulted at <https://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/news/rmi-update-on-itsci-recognition-and-great-lakes-region-due-diligence/>.

²⁸⁹ OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.

²⁹⁰ <https://www.state.gov/statement-of-concern-related-to-certain-minerals-supply-chains-from-rwanda-and-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-contributing-to-the-ongoing-conflict/>.



PRESS RELEASE
May 2024

Suspension of ITSCI activities in Masisi territory following the presence of non-state armed group M23 in Rubaya town

On Tuesday 30th April, the security situation deteriorated in North Kivu, DRC, with the M23 non-state armed group taking control over new areas, including the trading town of Rubaya.

This led to immediate halt to ITSCI activities and immediate evacuation of the area by ITSCI teams and state services. So far, there is no major impact reported on the security in Masisi town and Goma town.

Following the resumption of ITSCI activities in Masisi announced in April, all stakeholders, including provincial authorities, state services, companies, and civil society continued to implement risk mitigation measures, with ongoing support from ITSCI. This progressed well until the M23 arrived in Rubaya town and its surrounding area.

Working in high risk and conflicted areas present unique challenges, as shown in the situation in North Kivu which continues to evolve rapidly. Our OECD-aligned programme adapts to the reality on the ground while the safety of our staff is a topmost priority.

We continue to monitor the security situation very closely in communication with local authorities and security forces. Actions in recent weeks led by authorities, state services, and security forces, with support from ITSCI, have shown positive commitment and examples of multi-stakeholder approach to risk mitigation. This work will continue as soon as the situation allows.

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Press release also available on [ITSCI website](#)

Ministry of Mines official communiqué of 8 May 2024



MINISTÈRE DES MINES

*La Ministre***COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL**

Les périmètres de l'ancien Permis d'Exploitation 4731, retiré par l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 00222/CAB/MINES/01/2023 du 14 juin 2023, sont désormais dans le domaine de l'Etat.

Une exploitation minière artisanale illicite continuait à se réaliser sur des sites miniers dans ces périmètres par les populations locales et les autochtones de Rubaya et ses environs. Les minerais extraits de ces sites, acheminés à Goma, n'étaient pas vendus parce que non tagués par le système de traçabilité à cause de leur origine illicite.

Pour contourner cette difficulté, les vendeurs de ces minerais prenaient une autre trajectoire Rubaya – Mushake (où le M23 avait, pour besoin de la cause, érigé un grand entrepôt) et de Mushake vers le Rwanda ou l'Ouganda pour traitement et exportation. Curieusement ces mêmes minerais, issus de l'exploitation illicite avec ses effets collatéraux une fois au Rwanda ou ailleurs, sont tagués et vendus normalement à l'international comme si dans ces pays il existait des blanchisseries des minerais de sang.

Informée de cette situation, la Ministre des Mines de la République Démocratique du Congo a autorisé à une Coopérative minière de la place de s'installer sur les sites exploités artisanalement dans les périmètres de l'ancien PE 4731, afin de fédérer tous les exploitants artisanaux présents avec l'assistance et sous l'encadrement du SAEMAPE et de la Division des Mines du Nord-Kivu, en vue rétablir la traçabilité des flux des matières et canaliser toute la production dans le circuit officiel de commercialisation avec l'aide des entités de traitement régulièrement agréées et ce, en attendant les dispositions spécifiques à prendre sur ce gisement.

Une fois au courant de cette démarche, le Rwanda via son préposé le M23, a intensifié des attaques contre Rubaya, aujourd'hui sous le contrôle de l'armée rwandaise.

Aussitôt établi dans cet espace, le M23 y a tenu une grande réunion avec tous les creuseurs et négociants, les autorisant à poursuivre l'exploitation artisanale. Ils achètent les minerais produits, les entreposent dans leurs grands dépôts de Mushake avant de les acheminer au Rwanda.

A cet effet, ils instaurent une taxe unique de 3.000\$/Tonne de Coltan et 2.000\$/Tonne de cassitérite et le paiement se fait à Kigali après-vente. Par ailleurs, ils ont saisi tous les minerais destinés aux comptoirs congolais et les ont orientés vers Rwanda.

Les informations en ma possession renseignent que le M23 a intensifié l'exploitation minière, y compris par les femmes enceintes et les enfants dans les sites miniers de Rubaya. Le Rwanda a opté pour une stratégie de diversion consistant à sursoir à l'exportation des produits miniers, de peur d'enregistrer une hausse des statistiques d'exportation à la suite de l'occupation de Rubaya. Les minerais exploités sont donc entreposés pour leur exportation ultérieure.



(Suite)

Nonobstant cette manœuvre de diversion, il appert que les minerais de la filière des 3T exportés par le Rwanda proviennent de la fraude, de la contrebande, de l'exploitation illicite et des crimes perpétrés dans la partie Est de la République agressive par le Rwanda et le M23 et leurs attaques suivent la Direction des sites miniers. Le Rwanda exporte les minerais de sang, en violation des toutes les dispositions internationales et régionales en la matière.


Aussi, le Ministère des Mines de la RDC voudrait-il rappeler que le processus de la création de la CIRGL a été lancé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, dans le contexte des conflits armés dans la Région des Grands Lacs africains. Le Conseil de Sécurité avait alors reconnu la gravité de la situation en RDC et l'a même qualifiée de **menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationales et pour la Région**.

Le Ministère des Mines RDC attend de ses partenaires – Les Nations Unies et la CIRGL notamment – une affirmation sans ambages de l'engagement de tous les acteurs, y compris les consommateurs finaux des produits miniers, pour un approvisionnement sain et responsable en substances minérales et, partant, qu'un embargo soit décrété à l'encontre du Rwanda.

Cette option a l'avantage de freiner le financement des conflits par les minerais ; restaurer la confiance des parties prenantes ; protéger les intérêts économiques légitimes de l'Etat ; atténuer les violations des droits de l'homme par les groupes armés ainsi que les armées étrangères et rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 08 MAY 2024

Antoinette N'SAMBA KALAMABAYI



Annex 29 (para. 57)

Illustrations of documented breaches of mineral traceability**Illustrations de violations documentées de la traçabilité des minéraux**

Illicit trading has been reported by the Group since at least 2012, highlighting ongoing challenges in ensuring traceability,²⁹¹ and suggesting that efforts to improve supply chain transparency have been insufficient and/or ineffective. Yet, no previous violation reached the magnitude of the current 150 tons of coltan smuggled monthly from Rubaya to Rwanda.

The cases presented below provide specific examples of illicit trading of tin, tantalum, and tungsten (3Ts) minerals documented by the Group since 2013, excluding cases involving gold. The case studies reveal breaches in traceability across different years, from smuggling, illegal mining, and cross-site smuggling to the illegal sale of mineral tags.

Common issues that persist to this day, based on the case studies listed below:

- **Patterns of illicit mineral trading**, whereby minerals are traded illegally across borders, like the smuggling of coltan from the DRC to Rwanda (case 1) or cross-site smuggling (case 4).
- **Oversight issues**, whereby authorities or corporations knowingly or unknowingly allowed traceability violations. For example, illegal tagging by companies or falsifying origins with tags on the black market (cases 2 and 3).
- **Failures in traceability systems**: where the established traceability systems (like ITSCI tags) were manipulated, falsified, or ignored (cases 3 and 4).
- **Armed group involvement**: armed groups controlling mining areas or supply chains, such as Raia Mutomboki (case 2) or APCLS and PARECO groups (case 4).

1. **CIMIEX, AD Trade International and Union Mines smuggling of white coltan from the DRC to Rwanda (2013-2014)**

- **Summary**: The Group reported on two companies based in Rwanda involved in the smuggling of white coltan from the DRC to Rwanda, under false origins (as if it was of Rwandan origin). Although the cooperation of the Rwandan authorities and a local smelter allowed to detect the fraud, the case reveals cross-border smuggling weaknesses in the system.²⁹²
- **Documented violations**:
 - In December 2013, “CIMIEX is purported to have supplied 10 tons of ‘white coltan’ to AD Trade International (exporter).” To determine whether the minerals had been smuggled from the DRC, the Government of Rwanda had compared them to samples from the mining sites that had been “fingerprinted” as part of Rwanda’s traceability efforts. The Government of Rwanda told the Group that, for the CIMIEX minerals, the field (mine) samples and the consignment (suspect) samples did “not appear to be plausibly similar”.²⁹³ This thus implies that the white coltan sold by CIMIEX was smuggled from the DRC.
 - In December 2013, “Union Mines provided 1.8 tons of ‘white coltan’ to Phoenix Metals (exporter/comptoir)”. Phoenix Metals’ own testing showed that the consignment sample contained two types of coltan. The company’s test found that 80 per cent of the sample was made up of black coltan of the kind mined in Rwanda and that 20 per

²⁹¹ S/2024/432, paras. 138 and 145-147; S/2023/990, paras. 59-62; S/2023/431, paras 91-97; S/2022/479, para 78, annex 46; S/2021/560, paras 67, 69; S/2020/1283, paras. 42-44; S/2020/482, paras. 102-107; S/2019/469, paras. 149-164; S/2018/531, paras. 136-146; S/2017/1091, paras. 46-47; S/2016/466, para. 119; S/2015/19, paras. 114, 119, 158, 164, 165, 168, 170.

²⁹² S/2015/19, paras 174-177.

²⁹³ S/2015/19, para. 175.

cent was made up of white coltan, which was not found in Rwanda; yet it was available in the DRC.²⁹⁴ Phoenix Metals told the Group that it had not purchased the minerals because of doubts about their origin.²⁹⁵

2. Illegal mining by armed groups and sale of mineral tags in Rwanda (2014-2015)

- **Summary:** The case documented in 2015 reveals illegal mining and trade practices with the involvement of an armed group (Raia Mutomboki, operating in South Kivu). Cassiterite and other 3T minerals originating from South Kivu were smuggled to Rwanda.²⁹⁶ According to the Group, mineral tags were misused and sold on the black market, with the complicity of Rwandan companies and tagging agents of the Geology and Mines Department of the Rwandan Ministry of Mines, who signed the mine site logbooks.²⁹⁷
- **Documented violations:**
 - From November 2014 to May 2015, 126,228.5 kg of cassiterite sourced from areas under Raia Mutomboki control had flown to Kavumu airport, near Bukavu.
 - In 2015, the Group reported that cassiterite and other 3T minerals originating from Lulingu and other areas of South Kivu Province were transported across Lake Kivu and the Ruzizi River to Rwanda. The Group also documented an attempt to smuggle 77 bags with a total of 4,425 kg of coltan during the night of 2-3 March 2015, using the Bukavu road to the Ruzizi River, downplayed by the FARDC intervention.²⁹⁸
 - In June, July and August 2015, the Group documented the sale of 12 mineral tracing tags and associated paperwork on the black market by three Rwandan companies: RF&GM, Africa Multibusiness Line and Société minière du Kanama (SOMIKA). The documentation included tags, copies of mine site logbooks, ministerial orders attributing mineral research licenses to the three companies and administrative documents allowing employees to transport the minerals.²⁹⁹

3. Illegal tagging of minerals from non-certified sources (2017)

- **Summary:** The documented cases reveal issues of illegal tagging (through sale of tags on black market) of non-certified minerals originating from North Kivu, as well as the contamination of the supply chain due to armed group activity.³⁰⁰ Illegal mining of tin, tungsten, and tantalum continued, including in protected areas in the DRC such as the Virunga National Park, revealing lack/failure of oversight and traceability.
- **Documented violations:**
 - The Group reported that in the trading centre of Ndjingala, in Mubi and Walikale town (Walikale territory, North Kivu), tags were sold on the black market, allowing minerals sourced from the non-validated site of Bisie (see [S/2014/42](#), para. 206, annexes 79 and 83) and Mpafu/Nyakoba to permeate the legal chain of custody. Tags could be purchased for about \$3 per 50 kg bag of minerals, or \$500 per 10 tons.³⁰¹

²⁹⁴ [S/2015/19](#), para. 176.

²⁹⁵ [S/2015/19](#), annex 49.

²⁹⁶ [S/2015/797](#), para 53-59.

²⁹⁷ [S/2015/797](#), para. 60.

²⁹⁸ [S/2015/797](#), para 57-58.

²⁹⁹ [S/2015/797](#), para 59 and annexes 13 to 15.

³⁰⁰ [S/2017/672](#), para. 77-86 and 93-98.

³⁰¹ [S/2017/672](#), para. 77-86.

- The Group documented that tagging of minerals from the mining sites of Rubonga in Masisi territory and Kalay Boeing in Walikale territory continued. This was the case after ITRI Ltd suspended these sites due to the proven presence of armed groups there.³⁰²

4. Cross-site mineral smuggling (2019-2024)

- **Summary:** The documented cases reveal patterns of cross-site smuggling of coltan in Masisi and Rubaya, illicit tagging practices, armed group involvement, and intentional misrepresentation of the origin of minerals manipulating the loopholes of the ITSCI tagging system.³⁰³
- **Documented violations:**
 - Throughout 2019 and early 2020, coltan produced at Kamatale site in Masisi territory were transported untagged to Ngungu, Masisi territory, where the coltan was tagged in a depot belonging to the Société aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema (SAKIMA SA). Also, between January and October 2019 minerals extracted under the control of APCLS, Nyatura FDDH and Nyatura Matata armed groups were tagged in Ngungu as local production. Minerals tagged in Ngungu were then sold to the Coopérative des artisanaux miniers du Congo (CDMC).
 - The Group reported extensive cross-site smuggling of coltan from the PE4731 exploited by the Société Minière de Bisunzu SARL (SMB) in Rubaya to adjacent validated but non-productive sites in the PE76, again through Ngungu.³⁰⁴ Most of the smuggling was orchestrated by COOPERAMMA, then under the executive leadership of Shamamba Enoch. The smuggling was financed by the then COOPERAMMA “president” Robert Habinshuti Seninga.³⁰⁵
 - In 2023 and early 2024, Rubaya area was occupied by PARECO armed group. This resulted in minerals extracted in Rubaya being ineligible for trade. Yet minerals continued to be extracted and smuggled untagged.³⁰⁶ Despite consecutive suspensions, ITSCI continued to tag Rubaya minerals from the PE76 permit, claiming that only PE4731 was under armed group control, and ignoring several accounts of cross-site smuggling from PE4731 to PE76.³⁰⁷ UN sources and the Group estimated that in 2023, 400 tons of coltan from PE4731 in Rubaya were smuggled into the legal supply chain through PE76.³⁰⁸ In 2024, the Group reported on 36 tons of untagged coltan extracted in Rubaya while the tagging system was suspended at that time, and thus not eligible for trade.³⁰⁹

³⁰² S/2017/672, para. 93-98.

³⁰³ S/2020/482, paras 97, 99.

³⁰⁴ S/2020/482, paras 102, 103; S/2021/560, paras 67, 69.

³⁰⁵ S/2022/479, para 78, annex 46; S/2021/560, paras 67, 69.

³⁰⁶ S/2024/432, para. 141 and annex 83.

³⁰⁷ S/2023/431, paras 91-97; S/2023/990, paras. 59-62; S/2024/432, paras. 138 and 145-147.

³⁰⁸ Unpublished UN report.

³⁰⁹ S/2024/432, para. 141 and annex 83.

Annex 30 (para. 58)**AFC/M23 monopoly over coltan production and trade in Rubaya directly benefitting smuggle to Rwanda****Le monopole de l'AFC/M23 sur la production et le commerce du coltan à Rubaya profite directement à la contrebande vers le Rwanda**

Although AFC/M23-approved traders had little profit margin per kilo of coltan purchased, they still benefitted from their trade monopoly and the high volumes of minerals sold.

According to economic actors, civil society representatives, and officials from the DRC's Ministry of Mines and security services, AFC/M23's decision to launch an attack and seize control of Rubaya in late April 2024 was primarily motivated by a strategic need to monopolize the only viable route for mineral evacuation. This move would ensure that AFC/M23 maintained exclusive control over this critical supply chain. Furthermore, these sources reported that AFC/M23 sought to make Rwanda the sole transit market for these minerals, thereby securing a continuous flow of coltan from Rubaya to Rwanda.³¹⁰

³¹⁰ Economic actors, civil society, DRC Ministry of Mines, security sources.

Annex 31 (para. 59)

AFC/M23 communique on 07 May 2024

Communiqué AFC/M23 du 07 mai 2024



Alliance Fleuve Congo
Peuple Uni, Digne et Prospère

Le Coordonnateur

DÉCISION N°001/COORDO/AFC/2024 PORTANT INTERDICTION D'IMMIXTION DES MEMBRES, CADRES ET PERSONNEL POLITIQUE ET MILITAIRE DE L'ALLIANCE FLEUVE CONGO DANS L'EXPLOITATION ET LA COMMERCIALISATION DES SUBSTANCES MINÉRALES IDENTIFIÉES DANS LES TERRITOIRES LIBÉRÉS

Le Coordonnateur de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC),

- Vu la Constitution telle que modifiée et complétée à ce jour par la Loi N°11/002 du 20 janvier 2011 en son article 64 alinéa premier ;
- Vu l'Acte Constitutif de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), spécialement en son article 3 alinéa 3 ;
- Vu le procès-verbal de la réunion du Conseil de l'AFC du 15/12/2023 portant désignation du Coordonnateur de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo ;
- Considérant les conclusions de l'Atelier de Consolidation des Actes fondateurs du Conseil de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo du 20/12/2023 ;
- Considérant que l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) mène une révolution constitutionnelle (Article 64, alinéa premier) conforme aux lois en vigueur en République Démocratique du Congo, et aux conventions internationales notamment celles relatives à la protection des droits de l'homme ;
- Considérant les conclusions de la réunion du Conseil de l'Alliance du 28 mars 2024 relative au maintien de la discipline de corps pendant la lutte de libération jusqu'à la victoire finale par la conquête de tout le territoire national dans ses neuf (9) frontières constitutionnelles ;
- Considérant que la lutte de libération n'a pas pour objectif la recherche du gain personnel ni l'enrichissement illicite mais elle tient principalement à : (1) créer un État de droit et rétablir la normalité démocratique en République Démocratique du Congo ; (2) lutter contre toutes les antivaleurs ainsi que toute sorte de prédation et (3) favoriser le vivre-ensemble entre congolais ;

- Dans le souci d'imprimer **dorénavant** le changement pour lequel l'on se bat contre l'**arbitraire** et de prévenir tout abus pouvant affecter négativement les activités économiques ;
- Considérant la nécessité pour les opérateurs économiques de poursuivre normalement leurs activités dans le strict respect de la loi ;
- Vu l'urgence et la nécessité ;
- Le **Coordonnateur Militaire** entendu dans ses avis et considérations ;


DECIDE :

Article 1^{er} : Il est strictement interdit à tous les membres, cadres et personnel politique de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) ainsi qu'à tous les officiers et éléments de l'Armée Révolutionnaire Congolaise (ARC), **de s'immiscer et/ou d'être mêlés, de quelle que manière que ce soit, dans les activités d'exploitation et de commercialisation de toutes les substances minérales identifiées dans les territoires libérés.**

Article 2 : Les opérateurs économiques remplissant toutes les conditions exigées par la législation et la réglementation en vigueur, sont encouragés, à poursuivre leurs activités normalement dans le strict respect de la loi.

Article 3 : **Tout accès des enfants mineurs aux sites d'exploitation minière sur les territoires libérés est strictement interdit.**

Article 4 : Les différents organes de l'Alliance Fleuve Congo sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution de la présente décision qui sort ses effets à la date de sa signature.


Corneille NANGAA YOBELUO



Rutshuru, le 07 mai 2024

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Annex 32 (para. 59)

Selected pictures of ongoing mining in Rubaya in October 2024

Images des opérations minières à Rubaya en octobre 2024



Images provided by confidential Rubaya dwellers

Annex 33 (para. 62)

Mineral transport route from Rubaya to Rwanda

Route de transport des minerais de Rubaya au Rwanda

The map below highlights the transit route (blue) of minerals from Rubaya mining area (in red) through Rubaya, Bihambwe, Mushaki and Kiroliirwe in Masisi territory, as well as through Kitshanga, Kizimba, Bishusha, Mulimbi, Tongo and Kalengera in Rutshuru territory, Kibumba, Kasizi and Buhumba in Nyiragongo territory, and Kabuhanga in Rwanda.

Itinerary of AFC/M23 mineral convoys from Rubaya to Rwanda



October 2024 Group of Experts elaboration on Openstreetmap™ base map

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 34 (para. 63)

Border crossings from Kibumba area into Rwanda

Postes de frontière entre Kibumba et le Rwanda

The following satellite pictures show the border crossing points from Kibumba (Kasizi and Buhumba), DRC, to Rwanda, used for the trafficking of minerals.

Crossing point 1 from Kasizi (DRC) to Kabuhanga (Rwanda)



Planet™ satellite image on 05 October 2024, annotated by the Group of Experts

The highlighted area points to the road on the DRC side which was widened to allow for heavy truck traffic to Rwanda.

On a Google Earth image dating from July 2023 (see below), this road is smaller and not suitable for truck transit.

Eyewitnesses reported that works were engaged by AFC/M23 to make this road crossing to Rwanda suitable for truck traffic. The works were completed by September 2024.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations



Maps Data: Google, ©2024 **Airbus**, CNES/Airbus, Imagery Date: 1 November 2024. Image of the Kasizi – Kabuhanga border crossing in July 2023. The road highlighted in the image above does not appear on this image. Eyewitnesses confirmed that in 2023 the road was only suitable for pedestrian and motorbike traffic.


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 35 (para. 63)

Loaded trucks leaving Kibumba parking on 26 September 2024

Camions chargés en train de quitter le parking de Kibumba le 26 septembre 2024

Planet™ satellite image taken on 26 September 2024 of Kibumba market, showing heavy duty trucks at the loading area of the parking lot in Kibumba. This picture corroborates eyewitnesses accounts of minerals being regularly offloaded at the exact same location from vehicles coming from Rubaya, and then loaded onto heavy duty trucks that trafficked the minerals across the border to Rwanda.



Planet™ satellite image on 26 September 2024, annotated by the Group of Experts

Annex 36 (para. 68)**Calls to end support to, and collaboration with armed groups, including the FDLR****Appels à mettre fin au soutien et à la collaboration avec les groupes armés, y compris les FDLR*****Security Council Press Statement on Democratic Republic of Congo***

In its press statement issued on 25 October 2024, available [online](#), the members of the Security Council “called on both parties to fully cooperate with Angola in order to speed up the finalization and implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of foreign forces. They urged the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to engage in the process in good faith and to seize the opportunity to conclude a lasting, peaceful solution to the protracted conflict in the region.”

The members of the Security Council also “reiterated their condemnation of all armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including M23, ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) and FDLR. They further condemned foreign military support provided to M23 and any other armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They demanded the cessation of such support and the immediate withdrawal of any such external party from the Democratic Republic of the Congo territory. They also condemned support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the FDLR and demanded the cessation of such support.”

African Union Communiqué of the 1222nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held on 15 July 2024, on the role of mediation and reconciliation in conflict resolution in eastern DRC.

In its communiqué, available [online](#), the African Union expressed “grave concern over the increasing intensity of M23 attacks, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which have worsened the security insecurity and the suffering of civilian in the eastern DRC”, and demanded these armed groups, including the FDLR, “to immediately and unconditionally cease their attacks and reiterates the call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all armed groups, from the eastern DRC, in line with the Communiqué of the Mini-Summit of Luanda of 23 November 2022.”

US Government Press Statement on the violation of the Ceasefire in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

In a statement issued on 8 November 2024, the US reiterated its “longstanding call on the Government of DRC to stop collaboration with the US and UN-sanctioned Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group, and take immediate steps to demobilize it.”

Violation of the Ceasefire in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

PRESS STATEMENT

MATTHEW MILLER, DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON

NOVEMBER 8, 2024

The United States is gravely concerned by the ceasefire violations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since October 20 by the Rwandan-backed, U.S.- and UN-sanctioned M23 armed group. M23 must immediately cease hostilities and withdraw from its positions in Walikale territory, North Kivu Province. We reiterate our longstanding call for Rwanda to immediately withdraw all Rwanda Defense Force personnel and equipment from the DRC, including its surface-to-air missile systems, and to cease GPS disruptions. We also reiterate our longstanding call on the Government of DRC to stop collaboration with the U.S.- and UN-sanctioned Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) armed group and take immediate steps to demobilize it.

The Luanda Process led by Angolan President João Lourenço has made important progress, including the operationalization of the Angola-led Reinforced Verification Mechanism, the technical-expert-level agreement on a plan for the FDLR armed group, and the disengagement of uninvited foreign forces from the DRC. We call on all parties to abide by their commitments under the Luanda Process. All states should respect each other's sovereignty, protect all civilians, and hold those responsible for human rights abuses accountable.



Source: US Government, available [online](#)

Statements issued by the Government of France

- In February 2024, France called on all armed groups to end the violence, and explicitly condemned the FARDC's collaboration with the FDLR, stating that "in accordance with their commitments, the armed forces of the DRC must cease all collaboration with the FDLR, the militia movement that committed the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994."
- More recently, on 25 October 2024, France reiterated its full support for the Luanda process to find a lasting solution to the conflict and called on the parties to implement without delay the commitments made within this framework, referring to the DRC's engagement to neutralize the FDLR and thus cease its collaboration with this sanctioned armed group.

République démocratique du Congo – du pays (20 février 2024)

Partager   

La France est très préoccupée par la situation dans l'Est du Congo, dans le Nord Kivu et en particulier autour de Goma et de Saké. Les atteintes à l'intégrité territoriale de la RDC et la situation des populations civiles sont inadmissibles. La France condamne la poursuite des offensives du M23 avec le soutien du Rwanda, et la présence des forces rwandaises sur le territoire congolais.

Le M23 doit cesser le combat immédiatement, et se retirer de toutes les zones qu'il occupe, conformément aux décisions prises dans le cadre du processus de Luanda. Nous appelons le Rwanda à cesser tout soutien au M23 et à se retirer du territoire congolais. La France appelle l'ensemble des groupes armés à mettre un terme aux violences. Conformément à leurs engagements, les forces armées de RDC doivent cesser toute collaboration avec les FDLR, mouvement issu des milices ayant commis le génocide perpétré contre les Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994.

La France réitère son plein soutien aux processus régionaux de médiation pour trouver une solution négociée au conflit.






Source: French government. Statement available [online](#)

République Démocratique du Congo - Reprise des combats à l'Est du pays (25 octobre 2024)

Partager   

La France condamne la poursuite des offensives du M23. Le cessez le feu en cours, négocié dans le cadre du processus de Luanda, doit être strictement respecté. La France réitère son plein soutien au processus de Luanda pour trouver une solution durable au conflit. Elle appelle les parties à mettre en œuvre sans tarder les engagements pris dans ce cadre.

La France réaffirme son attachement à l'intégrité territoriale et à la souveraineté de la RDC. Alors que la crise actuelle entraîne de graves conséquences humanitaires, la France appelle l'ensemble des groupes armés à mettre un terme aux violences pour permettre aux opérations onusiennes et aux organisations humanitaires de mener à bien leurs activités. La protection des populations civiles et la réponse à leurs immenses besoins en dépendent.

République démocratique du Congo	
	Présentation de la République démocratique du Congo
	Relations bilatérales
	Événements
	République Démocratique du Congo combats à l'Est du pays (25.10.24)
	Grands Lacs - La France salue le cessez le feu RDC (31.07.24)

Source: French government. Statement available [online](#)

Annex 37 (para. 68)

Note Verbale signed by the Presidency's Chief of Staff to relocate to the DRC six Rwandan nationals tried for genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Note Verbale signée par le chef de cabinet de la Présidence pour relocaliser en RDC six nationaux rwandais jugés pour génocide par le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda



Document provided to the Group by confidential source

Annex 38 (para. 72)**Seized weapons and ammunition during FARDC operation against FDLR****Armes et munitions saisies lors de l'opération FARDC contre les FDLR**

During the operations against the FDLR on 23-24 September at Chove, Kimoka, Lupango and Mubambiro, and inadvertently against APCLS on 25-26 September 2024 in Rusayo, the FARDC recovered the following weaponry, that the Group was able to inspect in Goma:

- 22 assault rifles
- RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher
- RP-46 General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG)
- 5,4259 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39 mm, 7.63 x 39 mm, 7.62 x 54R mm)
- 30 mm HE Round IO-30 (VOG-17) for Automatic Grenade Launcher AGS-17
- 40 x 46mm M406 type LV grenades
- OGV-7V 40mm
- (OG-7B) grenades
- 40 mm Ogi-7MA High Explosive Fragmentation Rocket
- 40 mm PG-9P propellant charge
- 40 mm Rocket propelling charge
- PG-9 propellant charge

Some of the seized materiel was produced recently, i.e. in 2020, 2021 and 2022.

The Group conducted investigations on the possible origin of this weaponry, and sent official communications to various governments, requesting information relevant to the identification and tracing of this weaponry.

Following tracing requests sent to the Republic of Bulgaria, the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria provided the following information:


- It confirmed that the OG-7V 40 mm rocket (**#1 below**) and 40 mm rocket propellant charge (**#2 below**) were of Bulgarian production, exported in 2022 to the DRC Ministry of Defense, following notification to the UN Security Council Committee.
- It confirmed that the PG-9P propellant charges (**#3 below**) are of Bulgarian production, part of a set PG 9V with serial number 2-18-(11). The entire produced quantity was exported in 2018 to the Ministry of Defence of Rwanda as importer and end-user.
- It confirmed that the entire produced quantity (10,000 pieces) of 40mm Ogi-7MA High Explosive Fragmentation Rockets with serial number 10-03-22 (**#4 below**) was exported in 2022 to the DRC Ministry of Defense following notification to the UN Security Council Committee. The FARDC were the agreed end-user.

The Group is working on tracing the origins of the seized weapons and ammunition, to elucidate how FDLR and APCLS obtained the equipment.

#1 -OG-7V 40 mm rocket




#2 - 40 mm rocket propellant charges:



#3 - PG-9P propellant charges



#4- 40 mm OGi-7MA rockets:



Photos taken by the Group

Annex 39 (para. 74)

APCLS communiqué seeking clarification on those responsible for the FARDC attacks on its positions in Rusayo

Communiqué de l'APCLS demandant des éclaircissements sur les responsables des attaques des FARDC contre ses positions a Rusayo

REPUBLICQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
Alliance du Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain
« APCLS en sigle »
E-mail : apclsalliance@gmail.com , Site : www.apclsjkarabu.org
Tel : +243 (0) 811713135, 814893355,



COMMUNIQUE N°021/CAB-GEN/APCLS/SEPT/2024.

Alliance du Peuple pour un Congo Libre et Souverain, APCLS en sigle, informe que :

1. C'est avec regret qu'avons appris, ce 26^{sept} 2024 à 4h30 qu'une de nos positions de RUSAYO a été attaquée par les éléments du General PAPY, Commandant 11^{ème} Brigade des FARDC.
2. L'APCLS déplore les dégâts collatéraux dont matériels et humains causés par cette attaque et demande que la justice soit faite.
3. L'APCLS demande d'éclairer l'origine de l'ordre de cette attaque sur nos positions surtout que nous sommes en défensive contre l'ennemi qui vise la ville de Goma comme cible à conquérir.
4. L'APCLS se réserve le droit de répliquer à toutes éventuelles provocations anti patriotiques d'où qu'elles viennent .

Fait à Nyabiondo, le 26 Septembre 2024

Pour l'APCLS
Gen. **BUINGO KARAIRI janvier**
[Signature]
Comd en Chef et Président de l'APCLS



1

Document provided to the Group by a confidential member of the APCLS armed group

Annex 40 (para. 74)

Communiqué of Guidon Shimiray Mwissa following the FARDC mistaken attack on APCLS**Communiqué de Guidon Shimiray Mwissa à la suite de l'attaque erronée des FARDC contre l'APCLS**

Lt.-General Guidon condemned the FARDC's attack on the APCLS in Rusayo, emphasizing that the FARDC and VDP shared a mission to defend the integrity of the national territory. He called on all Congolese to unite against the perceived aggression by M23 and RDF, warning that this division risked the fragmentation of the country. He urged the VDP to uphold patriotic discipline and avoid actions that might aid the enemy, while also encouraging the FARDC to demonstrate professionalism in recognition of the VDP's commitment to national defense.



Document provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources

Annex 41 (para. 75)

Examples of FDLR survival strategy

Exemples de la stratégie de survie des FDLR

- **FDLR embedded within VDP/Wazalendo units**

Fearing new FARDC operations against FDLR leadership and bases, FDLR and Wazalendo groups jointly reinforced their defenses. Their main strategy was to embed FDLR combatants within VDP/Wazalendo units active in Rutshuru, Masisi and Nyiragongo territories, and claim that FDLR had vanished. This phenomenon was not new. Since the consolidation of the Wazalendo coalition, key FDLR commanders were re-affected to command existing or newly created VDP/Wazalendo groups, such as commander Defender to FDDP, and Kambuzi to APCLS (S/2024/432, paras. 66 and 112, annexes 60 and 67).³¹¹

FDLR combatants captured during the 23-24 September operations reported that they were instructed to identify as members of other Wazalendo armed groups. The Group of experts also witnessed an exchange over the phone between a 17-year-old captured FDLR combatant and FDLR commander Fidel Sebangenzi, (S/2024/432, para. 72 and annex 51) during which Sebangenzi instructed the minor to deny his FDLR membership.

- **FDLR CRAP unit providing close protection to FDLR leadership**

“Major-General” Omega, alongside 79 other FDLR commanders, mobilized FDLR’s special unit, CRAP, for their close protection (S/2024/432, paras. 75-77).³¹²

- **The FDLR leadership relocated to safer areas³¹³**

- **FDLR patrols**

FDLR also organized discreet patrols in Rusayo and Sake areas to safeguard their dependents in various IDP camps around Goma.³¹⁴

³¹¹ Wazalendo and FDLR commanders and combatants, FARDC sources and researchers.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ FDLR and Wazalendo sources, UN sources.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

Annex 42 (para. 76)

Letter of Byiringiro Victor, FDLR “president”, to the Angolan facilitator

Lettre de Byiringiro Victor, “président” des FDLR, au facilitateur angolais



BUREAU DU PRESIDENT / IBIRO BYA PEREZIDA / OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

*Le 22 Octobre 2024
 No 021/001/020*

A Son Excellence le Président João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço
 Président de la République d'Angola et Médiateur entre la RDC
 et le Rwanda
 Luanda
 ANGOLA

CPI :

A Son Excellence:
 - Mr le Président des USA
 - Mr le Président de la Fédération de Russie
 - Mr le Président de la France
 - Mr le Premier Ministre du Royaume Uni
 - Mr le Président de la RDC
 - Mr le Président du Rwanda
 - Mme la Présidente de la République Unie de Tanzanie
 - Mr le Président du Burundi
 - Mr le Président de la République Sud Africaine
 - Mr le Secrétaire Général de l'ONU
 - Mr le Secrétaire Général de l'UA
 - Mr le Secrétaire Général de la SADC

OBJET : Contribution des FDLR pour ramener la paix dans la Région.

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR en sigle, saluent votre choix par l'Union Africaine comme Médiateur entre la République Démocratique du Congo et le Rwanda en guerre. Elles comptent sur votre sagesse et votre engagement pour aider la Région des Grands Lacs Africains à retrouver une paix durable.

A titre de rappel, les FDLR sont une Organisation politico-militaire créée en 2000 par nécessité de légitime défense des réfugiés hutu rwandais abandonnés à leur triste sort menacés d'extermination par l'armée du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR-INKOTANYI) au pouvoir à Kigali, et qui les pourchasse encore depuis la destruction sauvage de leurs camps à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo en 1996.

Dès leur création, les FDLR militent pour que les conditions politiques, sociales, économiques et surtout sécuritaires rassurent tous les rwandais et favorisent le retour des réfugiés dans leur pays dans la dignité. C'est pour cette raison qu'elles n'ont cessé d'appeler le régime de Kigali au dialogue avec l'opposition en vue de résoudre pacifiquement le problème rwandais et, ainsi, contribuer au retour d'une paix durable dans la Région.

Dans cette optique, les FDLR ont entrepris plusieurs initiatives dont le désarmement et le cantonnement volontaires de leurs combattants à KAMINA en 2001, le désarmement et le cantonnement volontaires de leurs combattants à KANYABAYONGA, à WALUNGU et à KISANGANI en 2014 devant la Communauté Internationale sous le parrainage de la SADC.

Malheureusement la bonne volonté des FDLR de s'inscrire dans la logique de la paix a toujours buté sur un mur de préjugés insensés et d'incompréhension érigé à la faveur du régime de Kigali qui refuse mordicus le dialogue avec son opposition.

Les FDLR estiment que le problème rwandais est d'essence politique et prônent la voie de négociations à la place des armes pour le résoudre.

C'est pourquoi elles ont l'insigne honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir user de votre position et de votre influence dans la Région pour amener le régime de Kigali à dialoguer avec son opposition afin de ramener une paix durable dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains en général et à l'Est de la RDC en particulier.

Espérant une bonne compréhension à notre doléance, nous vous prions d'agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Président, l'expression de notre haute considération.

BYIRINGIRO Victor

Lieutenant Général



Président ai des FDLR.

Document received from confidential VDP sources

Annex 43 (para. 78)**Meeting between FARDC and VDP Leaders on 27 September 2024****Réunion organisée entre les FARDC et les Commandants VDP le 27 septembre 2024**

To repair strained relations with the VDP/Wazalendo, the North Kivu military authorities - including Governor Cirimwami, General Fall Sikabwe and General Dieugentil Alengbia Nzembe - met with VDP leaders, including representatives from APCLS, on 27 September. The military authorities expressed regret over the recent attacks on FDLR and APCLS, referring to them as an “incident” and acknowledging the losses suffered by these groups. They emphasized the successful Wazalendo-FARDC cooperation and reiterated that M23/RDF was their only common enemy. VDP leaders vowed renewed trust and cooperation. FARDC commanders and VDP leaders reported that military authorities discreetly requested the VDP/Wazalendo to reassure FDLR that it was still considered as their ally.

According to VDP and Wazalendo sources, during the meeting VDP leaders requested the FARDC to release arrested combatants, rehabilitate occupied positions, provide financial and logistical assistance for the funerals of the killed combatants and for the medical care for the wounded combatants.

In a video, the FARDC Spokesperson General Guillaume Ndjike states that the meeting served to “remove equivocation in relation to the incidents that happened”. Referring to the operations against FDLR and APCLS, he confirmed that it was indeed only ‘an incident’ reassuring the population that relations between the Wazalendo and the FARDC were progressing very well, and that they were all facing only one enemy, the M23/RDF.

In another video filmed during the meeting, one of the VDP leaders stated the following: “we did not separate ourselves from the FARDC, the FARDC are our parents, it is an incident which took place and we have just been received by the general Fall who received us well and who says to us that we have only one enemy which is the M23. We ask the population to be calm as the problem which there was between the parent and the child has just been decanted.”



Picture of the audience at the meeting
Picture provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources



Picture of the FARDC Spokesperson General Ndjike (on the far right) with several VDP Commanders
Picture provided to the Group by confidential VDP sources

Annex 44 (para. 79)

Cable issuing instructions to suspend attacks against the FDLR

Télégramme donnant des instructions pour suspendre les attaques contre les FDLR

The cable was signed on 3 October 2024 by FARDC Colonel Jean-Claude Ndambo Mandjumba, commander of the 23e Brigade. However, FARDC sources reported that the cable was issued upon instruction of General Dieugentil Alengbia, Commander of the 34th Military Region in North Kivu.


Au Comd 3409 REGT

TELEGRAMME

URGENT **GROUPE - DATE - HEURE**
01 16 30 8 oct 24

DE : COMD 23BDE RR
POUR : U (TOUTES) 23BDE RR & 3409REGT
INFO : CHEF EMFT & COMD OPS N-S-K
 COMD 34RGN MIL & COMD TAFOC NK
SEC : N° 0112 / 148 / EM 23BDE RR / S3-OPS/24

REF 00 N°089/TAFOK NK/J35/2024 RELATIF (-) TRAQUE FDLR (-)
 VOUS SIGNALE (-) SUR ORDRE VERBAL COMD 34RGN MIL (-) APRES
 REUNION C.C.C.O DU 27 SEP 24 (-) DES RECEPTION PRESENT MSG
 (-) POURSUITE TRAQUE CONTRE FDLR ET VDP ETRE SUSPENDU
 JUSQU'A NOUVEL ORDRE (-) PAR AILLEURS (-) VOUS INSTR (-)
 GARDER VOS POSN EN DEF FERME (-) ETRE PRET EN TOUTES
 EVENTUALITES (-) EN OUTRE (-) RESTAURER BONNE
 COLLABORATION AVEC TOUTES UNITES AMIES (-) EVITER
 PROVOCATION DE TIR (-) AVEC VDP ET AUTRES (-) INTERDICTION
 FORMELLE (-) DEPLACEMENT MIL DEVOIR SE FAIRE EN BINOME (-)
 TRINOME ET SECTION (-) FAIRE LARGE DIFFUSION AUX MIL SOUS
 VOS ORDRES (-) SANCTIONS SEVERES ETRE RESERVER AUX
 RECALCITRANTS (-) ACK (-) N


NDAMBO MANDJUMBA JEAN-CLAUDE
COL DEM
COMD 23BDE RR & COMD AXE OPS RUSAYO PNVI

Document provided by confidential FARDC source

Annex 45 (para. 80)**Additional details on the FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR cooperation, their engagement in fighting, and VDP/Wazalendo recruitment and organization****Informations complémentaires sur la coopération FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo-FDLR, leur engagement dans les combats, ainsi que le recrutement et l'organisation de VDP/Wazalendo***Examples of FDLR and VDP/Wazalendo operations during the period of the ceasefire:*

While initially FARDC and RDF temporarily upheld the 4 August ceasefire (paras. 35-37), their proxies, AFC/M23 and Wazalendo with FDLR soon resumed clashes. The list below provides some illustrations of clashes between FDLR/Wazalendo/VDP and AFC/M23 in Rutshuru, Masisi, Nyiragongo and Walikale territories. This list is non-exhaustive.

- On 19 August, in Katwa and Kikuvo, north-east of Kanyabayonga, Rutshuru territory, AFC/M23 clashed with Mai-Mai Yira, reportedly resulting in two AFC/M23 being killed and in one Mai-Mai injury. AFC/M23 took control of the village the following day, despite the ceasefire.
- On 21 August, in Misinga, close to Mweso, Masisi territory, AFC/M23 clashed with APCLS, NDC-R/Guidon, CMC-FDP and FDLR-FOCA combatants. Three M23 combatants and one CMC-FDP combatant were killed in combat, and two civilians were injured.
- On 15 September 2024, in Kasasa, near Kikuku, Rutshuru territory, M23 combatants clashed with the CMC-FPAP combatants. This resulted in one M23 combatant being killed and one CMC-FPAP being injured.
- On 23 September 2024, in Nyangué, Masisi territory, M23 combatants clashed with CMC-FDP and APCLS combatants. Seven civilians were killed during the clashes.
- On 24 September in Kaliba, M23 combatants clashed with CMC-FPAP combatants. This resulted in one CMC-FPAP combatant being wounded.
- On 26 September 2024 in Bigogwe, AFC/M23 clashed with CMC-FDP combatants.
- Annexes 17- 19 provide additional illustrations of clashes including VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR combatants. The Group notes that RDF troops provided support to M23 in several operations against the VDP/Wazalendo and FDLR, as detailed in annexes 17-27.

Additional elements on FARDC-VDP/Wazalendo cooperation:

The Government of the DRC continued to systematically use North Kivu armed groups, including the sanctioned FDLR, to fight M23 and RDF (S/2024/432, paras. 60-80). The office of the Governor of North Kivu, Major-General Peter Cirimwami, coordinated the operations (paras. 67 and 71; S/2024/432, para. 63).

Colonel Sekololo, acting on behalf of General Cirimwami, was responsible for the transfer of resources, weapons, ammunition, and uniforms to the VDP/Wazalendo. For example, early August 2024, ammunition and other military equipment were delivered to APCLS in Loashi and Nyabiодо, Masisi territory.³¹⁵ An FDLR combatant also confirmed regular food deliveries to FDLR positions around Sake.

Additional elements on the VDP command, recruitment and training, with FDLR involvement:

VDP command and control remained unchanged (S/2024/432, para. 61). VDP leaders also took advantage of the relative calm after the 4 August ceasefire to recruit and train combatants, to compensate for their losses suffered in combat against the AFC/M23 and RDF. Former and active combatants, including new recruits, told the Group that they decided to join VDP/Wazalendo ranks to escape forced AFC/M23 recruitment, to avoid being killed by AFC/M23, and to defend the territorial integrity of the DRC.

³¹⁵ VDP, civil society, FARDC sources and local authorities.

FDLR instructors provided military training to CMC-FDP and APCLS elements around Rusayo and Shove. The training focused on combat technics, refreshing courses, human rights and international humanitarian law.

Newly recruited combatants were trained in Rusinga, Mushwago, Rwankuba, Nyabitega, Kiseкуро and Nyamilima under the command of “Colonel” Manirakiza Julien Ngurinzira and “Colonel” Mashango. In Bukombo groupement, since June 2024, “Colonel Innocent Ukwishatse” was the main trainer to CMC-FDP combatants.

PARECO-FF leadership informed the Group of the creation of a new VDP coalition, known as the *Coalition des Mouvements des patriotes pour la défense de la Nation* (CMPDN). This new coalition envisaged a united armed movement with a centralised command for all VDP members. At the time of drafting, none of the major armed groups - such as APCLS, CMC-FDP or NDC-R - had joined the new coalition.

Annex 46 (para. 85)

Zaire/ADCVI Recruits in training at Bini

Recrues Zaire/ADCVI en formation a Bini







Screenshots from video footage depicting the military training in Bini, provided by a confidential armed group source

Annex 47 (para. 85)

“ADCVI” identification cards delivered to combatants following their training

Carte d'identité “ADCVI” délivrée aux combattants après leur formation

Note the following details on the documents depicted below:

- Name of the armed group: “Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l'Ituri”
- Issue date: 4 July 2024.
- Order number (n° d'ordre): this card indicates number 0945, indicating that there were at a minimum 945 cards already issued by 4 July 2024.
- The individual, Michel Ndjaza Ivava, was the “Responsable provincial de ADCVI”.
- The address, ‘Telega’, is an IDP camp. The individual admitted living in the Telega IDP camp and being an internally displaced person. His “carte d'assistance humanitaire” below is proof of this status. The individual also admitted being the president of the youth in Telega IDP camp, ensuring the defense of the camp in case of an attack. This corroborates reporting and testimonies about presence of armed combatants inside IDP settlements, and ongoing recruitment in these IDP settlements.
- The card demonstrates a high level of organization within the “ADCVI” group.
- The individual was a former member of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC).





Pictures taken by GoE of documentation seized by FARDC from ACDVI combatant

Annex 48 (para. 87)

Training of Zaïre/ADCVI and MAPI combatants at the AFC/M23 training center in Tchanzu

Formation des combatants de Zaïre/ADCVI et de MAPI dans le camp AFC/M23 a Tchanzu

AFC/M23 intensified efforts to recruit combatants from Ituri Province. The Group received credible testimonies on various networks targeting new recruits, as well as former UPC combatants.³¹⁶

Sources reported that Zaïre leaders, including Logo Marine, remained actively involved in the recruitment networks to reinforce the ranks of the AFC/M23 (S/2024/432, para. 152). The new recruits transited through Uganda, and entered AFC/M23-controlled territory at Bunagana. From there, they were taken to Tchanzu.³¹⁷

Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, the former spokesperson of MAPI, pledged allegiance to the AFC/M23 and went to Bunagana, taking at least 100 MAPI combatants with him. In July-August 2024, he was seen in Bunagana, from where he had sent videos to his network, acknowledging his defection to AFC/M23. He also attended training in Tchanzu. Recently, Bahati returned to Ituri to recruit for AFC/M23.

By October 2024, over 1,000 combatants from Ituri have completed training in Tchanzu. Few of these combatants joined AFC/M23 in combat in North Kivu, while others either returned to Ituri to train combatants locally, or remained on stand-by in Uganda.

³¹⁶ Zaïre insider, FARDC, UN, and intelligence sources.

Annex 49 (para. 96)

Former MAPI spokesperson Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, who joined AFC/M23 in Bunagana

Benjamin Bahati Londjiringa, ancien porte-parole de MAPI qui a rejoint le AFC/M23 a Bunagana



Le porte-parole de la milice MAPI/
ZAÏRE qui opère en Ituri s'est
rendu officiellement à l'AFC-M23
à partir de Bunagana.

La collaboration entre AFC-M23/
UDPF/CODECO /ZAÏRE continue
de s'élargir.

08:18

Photo circulating on Ituri-based social media groups, provided by confidential armed group source

Annex 50 (para. 100)

Illegal taxes levied by CODECO/URDPC

Taxation illégale par CODECO/URDPC

As of 1 October 2024, CODECO/URDPC leadership in Nyangarayi issued a series of taxes on civilians and businesses in the 13 groupements in the Banyali Kilo sector of Djugu territory under its control.³¹⁸

Shop owners were imposed a weekly fee of \$17.54, while artisanal mining sites owners had to pay between \$35 to \$73.68 per week. Additionally, the local population was subjected to a daily tax of \$0.35 per capita (males only),³¹⁹ which, based on the 5,455 male residents of Nyangarayi area alone, yielded an estimated \$1,900 daily to CODECO.³²⁰ The CODECO commander collecting these payments was known as “Colonel” “50 Cent”. Commander “50 cent” also imposed ad hoc contributions of 100,000Fc (\$35) to each village under the pretext of “extraordinary contributions” (*salongo*).

From June to October 2024, CODECO/URDPC took over several mining sites in Banyali Kilo groupement of Djugu territory, which were previously controlled by Zaïre commander Pharaon Fidele Babala (S/2023/990, annex 47 and 50), including the site of Lodjo. During that time, the mining cooperative belonging to a well-known Bunia based businessman active in the public works sector, paid money to CODECO/URDPC to protect its assets and operations in Lodjo.

Proof of tax payment to CODECO/URDPC commander “50 Cent” in Nyangarayi, on 1 October 2024



Picture provided to the Group by confidential civil society sources

³¹⁸ Residents of Banyali Kilo villages, civil society, researchers.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Population estimated by Medair in September 2023, <https://ehtools.org/uploads/brochures/1358.pdf>.

Annex 51 (para. 102)**Baraka Maki's illicit economic activities and money laundering****Activités économiques illégales de Baraka Maki et son blanchiment d'argent**

Baraka Maki was the richest and more influential of all Zaïre/ADCVI commanders, especially after the setback of Pharaon Fidele Babala (S/2023/990, annex 47 and 50), who lost control of Lodjo mining area to CODECO/URDPC in June 2024.³²¹

Baraka operated 4 to 6 mechanical excavators ("pokle") for the mining of gold on the Lalo site on the Shari river in Mambisa chefferie. Mining continued to yield 5 kg of gold weekly to Baraka (S/2024/432, paras. 167–170), valued at \$405,000 (\$1.6 million monthly) at current prices.³²²

Map of the Lalo mining site exploited by Baraka Maki

Map Data: Google, ©2024 CNES/Airbus, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, Imagery Date: 1 November 2024.

Map annotated by the Group

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Baraka Maki also continued to receive monthly payments averaging \$2,000 from at least five mining cooperatives active in Djugu territory, or \$10,000 per month, to protect their mining activities.

He also imposed illegal taxation of \$3.5 per week to two hundred small business owners in Mabanga area, yielding \$2,900 monthly, and controlled payments of \$0.07 per each transit at 50 illegal checkpoints in Djugu territory, averaging \$57,000 per month.³²³ Illegal taxation generated an estimated monthly cash flow of \$70,000.

Baraka Maki laundered the proceedings of illegal taxation through the purchase of real estate and commercial activities in Mabanga, Iga Barrière, and Bunia.³²⁴

³²¹ Residents of villages in Mambisa chefferie, civil society, Inspection generale des mines, researchers, MONUSCO, judiciary and intelligence sources.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Journalists, civil society, MONUSCO, Bunia residents, judiciary and intelligence sources.

Annex 52 (para. 104)

Illustrations of clashes between M23/RDF and FARDC at the border between South Kivu and North Kivu, and M23 incursions into Northern Kalehe territory

Illustrations des affrontements entre le M23/RDF et les FARDC à la frontière entre le Sud-Kivu et le Nord-Kivu, et des incursions du M23 dans le territoire des Kalehe.

During the period under review, shelling originating from M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory towards the border with South Kivu, as well as M23/RDF territorial advancements towards the northern territories of South Kivu, impacted security in the area. To prevent AFC/M23 territorial advancements towards South Kivu, FARDC reinforced its positions in the northern part of Kalehe territory.

- Late April and early May 2024, frequent detonations of heavy artillery in and around Minova, in South Kivu, caused panic among the populations (S/2024/432, para. 32 and annex 62).
- On 27-28 April 2024, M23/RDF advances towards Bitonga, west of Minova, led to displacements of the civilian population.
- On 7 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling towards Buhavu chiefdom, near Minova in Kalehe territory, South Kivu, resulted in eight civilians being killed and five wounded.
- On 13 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling originating from Ndumba hill, Masisi territory, resulted in at least five bombs impacting Buhavu chiefdom, near Minova in Kalehe territory, South Kivu. This resulted in three civilians being killed and several others being wounded. The shelling also led to displacements of the civilian population.
- On 22-23 May 2024, M23/RDF shelling towards Minova resulted in civilians being wounded. The shelling also caused panic amongst the civilian population. The shelling, as well as clashes between the FARDC/Wazalendo and M23 resulted in civilians fleeing to Minova.
- After several weeks of relative calm, clashes between M23/RDF and FARDC in the vicinity of the South Kivu border resumed late June. FARDC and M23 both engaged in artillery shelling which impacted northern parts of Kalehe territory. On 26 June, FARDC from its positions in Lumbishi, Kalehe territory, shelled M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory. M23/RDF returned fire. Two days later, FARDC shelled M23/RDF positions in Masisi territory, and M23/RDF shelled Minova, triggering new civilian displacements. Shelling by M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory and FARDC positioned in Minova, Kalehe territory, continued until the start of the humanitarian truce on 4 July 2024.
- Despite the ceasefire, on 29 August FARDC positioned in Lumbishi and M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory, close to the North Kivu-South Kivu border, resumed shelling.
- On 12 September 2024, FARDC positioned in Minova and M23/RDF positioned in Masisi territory, close to the North Kivu-South Kivu border, exchanged fire. Regular shelling continued until late September 2024.

The Group also documented sporadic M23/RDF incursions into Kalehe territory in South Kivu, such as in Lumbishi in late May 2024. For example, on 24 May, M23 combatants arrived in Lumbishi, south-west of Minova. After attacking FARDC and Wazalendo positions on the Lumbishi-Shange axis, north-east of Numbi, they retreated to Masisi territory, North Kivu.

Annex 53 (para. 105)

Illustrations of defections to AFC/M23

Illustrations de défections à l'AFC/M23

In July 2024, fifty Mai Mai Kirikicho combatants defected to AFC/M23 following a meeting with AFC/M23 representatives in Ziralo, Kalehe.³²⁵ Eyewitnesses and sources close to Kirikicho reported that the defectors regularly travelled between Ziralo and Kalehe territory and Ngungu, Masisi territory, to meet with Bernard Byamungu and other M23 commanders. The Group notes that Mai-Mai leader “General Kirikicho”, a close relative of Bernard Byamungu, did not adhere to AFC/M23.³²⁶ At time of drafting, his group was still an ally of the Government ([S/2024/432](#), annex 99).

AFC/M23 also intensified mobilization in Shabunda territory. In late May 2024, 25 cadres of Raia Mutomboki factions were picked up by Rwandan vehicles at the Ruzizi border and transported to Rutshuru for training in ideological persuasion and intelligence gathering. After four weeks of training, these recruits were sent back to northern South Kivu to promote the AFC/M23 cause among local armed groups and collect intelligence.³²⁷

One Raia Mutomboki cadre interviewed by the Group reported that he had first been contacted by AFC/M23 in March 2024. Two months later, he was again contacted by AFC/M23 and requested to select 25 individuals close to armed groups active in Shabunda, Kabare, Kalehe and Walungu territories. The interviewee recruited 20 young men and 5 young women. He reported to have seen Makenga, Bernard Byamungu and Bertrand Bisimwa during the training in Rutshuru.

³²⁵ Researchers, UN, security sources, sources close to M23 and AFC, documents on file with Secretariat.

³²⁶ Researchers, civil society and Mai-Mai sources.

³²⁷ Eyewitnesses, security sources, researchers, RM cadre.

Annex 54 (para. 109)

Armed group leaders signing the non-aggression pact in Baraka

Signature du pacte de non-agression par les chefs de groupes armés à Baraka



Photograph of several armed group leaders present at the meeting in Baraka
Photograph received from a armed group combatant (confidential source), annotated by the source



Photograph of Justin Bitakwira (left) and Ebuela Kibekila (right), also known as Mutetezi, at the meeting in Baraka
Photograph received from a confidential armed group combatant



Photograph of sanctioned individual William Yakutumba reading the communiqué signed by armed group leaders at the meeting in Baraka

Photo received by the Group from a confidential armed group combatant

Speech of Yakutumba, 30 July 2024, transcribed by the Group of Experts:

French transcript [English translation below]:

“Tous les congolais ont droit à la paix et la sécurité tant au niveau national qu’internationale. Vu l’article 63 de la Constitution de la RDC qui stipule que tout congolais a le droit et le devoir sacré de défendre le pays et son intégrité territoriale face à une menace et une agression extérieure. Etant donné que l’union fait la force, mais cette union doit être basée sur l’amour, la confiance et la concorde pour le bien-être de tous les congolais. Le patriotisme, en tant qu’esprit qui anime les nationalistes pour défendre d’abord la patrie jusqu’au sacrifice suprême. Etant donné qu’on a plus à gagner en étant uni qu’en étant divisé, et que se faire mutuellement la guerre ne nous profite en rien. Bien au contraire cela nous fragilise et nous fait reculer de beaucoup de siècles pour la promotion de la paix et l’art du développement. S’inscrivant dans les démarches du chef de l’état, commandant suprême des FARDC, PNC et garant de la nation. Consistant à rétablir la paix et la sécurité à l’est de la RDC, nous, patriotes d’un mouvement engagé dans un processus de paix gracieux, CNPCC, FABB, FPDC, CPRC, PDC, FPDCC, MPRC, AFPDC, MPDAC, FAL, Groupe autochtone pygmée, CNPR, FPL, MPDC (...) FPDPC, MDP, Groupe des jeunes dans les Hauts Plateaux (...) déclarons la fin des incompréhensions et des hostilités entre nous ainsi que tout acte de violence entre nous signataires du présent acte de non-agression. Nous nous engageons à ne jamais pactiser avec l’ennemi de notre pays, notamment les RED Tabara, Twirwaneho et RDF/M23/AFC. Ni de près, ni de loin, au contraire, nous nous engageons à leur bloquer la route au côté des FARDC. Et a tout agresseur et auteur de troubles de la paix au Sud Kivu, et en particulier la RDC en générale. A cet effet, nous jurons devant Dieu et le peuple congolais, que chacun de nous s’engage à respecter cet acte de non-agression entre signataire. Fait a Baraka, le 30 juillet 2024. »

English translation:

“All Congolese have the right to peace and security, both nationally and internationally. In view of article 63 of the DRC Constitution, which stipulates that every Congolese has the sacred right and duty to defend the country and its territorial integrity in the face of external threat and aggression. Unity is strength, but this union must be based on love, trust and harmony, for the well-being of all Congolese. Patriotism, as the spirit that drives nationalists to defend their homeland first and foremost, to the point of supreme sacrifice. Given that we have more to gain by being united than by being divided, and that waging war on each other benefits us in no way. On the contrary, it weakens us and sets us back many centuries in the promotion of peace and the art of development. In keeping with the approach of the Head of State, supreme commander of the FARDC, PNC and guarantor of the nation. Consistent with restoring peace and security in eastern DRC, we, patriots of a movement engaged in a gracious peace process, CNPCC, FABB, FPDC, CPRC, PDC, FPDCC, MPRC, AFPDC, MPDAC, FAL, Groupe autochtone pygmée, CNPR, FPL, MPDC (...) FPDPC, MDP, Groupe des jeunes dans les Hauts Plateaux (...) declare the end of misunderstandings and hostilities between us, as well as all acts of violence between us signatories of the present act of non-aggression. We pledge never to pact with the enemy of our country, in particular the RED Tabara, Twirwaneho and RDF/M23/AFC. Neither near nor far, on the contrary, we pledge to block their path alongside the FARDC. And to all aggressors and perpetrators of disturbances of the peace in South Kivu, and the DRC in general. To this end, we swear before God and the Congolese people, that each of us undertakes to respect this act of non-aggression between signatories. Signed in Baraka, July 30, 2024.

Annex 55 (para. 110)

Communiqués of Twirwaneho

Communiqués des Twirwaneho

Communiqué of 8 September 2024



**MESSAGE D'ALERTE SUR L'IMMINENCE DES ATTAQUES MAI-MAI ET ALLIÉS CONTRE
LES VILLAGES BANYAMULENGE DE MINEMBWE**

1. Le groupe d'autodéfense civile Twirwaneho tient à lancer un alerte sur d'intenses mouvements des groupes armés soutenus par l'Etat, dont les MAI-MAI (Wazalendo) et alliés, aux alentours de Minembwe.
2. Ces forces coalisées impliquées depuis 2017 dans la campagne de nettoyage des Banyamulenge ont érigé leur base opérationnelle à Bikarakara, une localité à portée de tirs des villages périphériques de Minembwe où ils se préparent pour lancer une offensive de grande envergure contre les civils dont la plupart sont des déplacés internes.
3. Cette énième mobilisation qui intervient après plus de dix mois d'une accalmie relative s'inscrit dans la lignée du plan élaboré à Baraka, lors d'un colloque qui a réuni en juillet dernier, les différents chefs MAI-MAI sous la direction de Bitakwira Justin, élu d'Uvira. A cette occasion, La population Banyamulenge a été désigné comme l'ennemi commun contre lequel tous les MAI-MAI du Sud-Kivu (Babembe, Bafuliru et Banyindu) doivent orienter leurs assauts meurtriers;
4. Des informations crédibles font état de l'approvisionnement de ces forces coalisées en logistiques militaires par la 34e brigade d'intervention rapide des FARDC basée à Minembwe. Le S2 de ladite brigade, le Major Donat ressortissant de la communauté Babembe, étant chargé de l'exécution de cette mission;
5. Il sied de rappeler que les localités peuplées par les Banyamulenge autour de Minembwe centre restent les seules entités des Hauts-Plateaux de Fizi qui échappent encore au contrôle des MAI-MAI; d'autres villages éloignés ayant été ravagés par ces bourreaux, sous le regard complice des FARDC;
6. Twirwaneho qui s'attend à ce que ces forces coalisées passent à l'action à tout moment, demande au gouvernement d'exercer un contrôle strict de ses réservistes wazalendo anti-Banyamulenge dans cette contrée et à prendre des mesures rigoureuses pour empêcher ces attaques;
7. Twirwaneho réitère son engagement à protéger les civils d'éventuels massacres et adhère sans réserve au principe d'autodéfense civile contre toute force représentant une menace existentielle pour la communauté Banyamulenge, comme pour d'autres communautés vivant dans les Hauts-Plateaux de Fizi, Mwenga et Uvira.

Fait à Minembwe, Ce 07/09/2024

Kamasa Ndakize Welcome

Coordinateur

Communiqué available on Twirwaneho's [X account](#)

- In this communiqué of 8 September 2024, Twirwaneho warns of intense movements by state-backed armed groups, including Mai-Mai (Wazalendo) and allies, around Minembwe. Twirwaneho reports that these coalition forces have been involved in the Banyamulenge cleansing campaign since 2017, and that they have set up their operational base in Bikarakara, near Minembwe, where they are preparing to launch a large-scale offensive against civilians.
- According to Twirwaneho, this mobilization is in line with the plan drawn up in Baraka in July 2024 by Justin Bitakwira and various Mai-Mai chiefs. Twirwaneho denounces that on this occasion, the Banyamulenge population was designated as the common enemy against which all Mai-Mai in South Kivu must direct their murderous assaults. Twirwaneho also reports that the 34th FARDC rapid intervention brigade based in Minembwe is supplying these coalition forces with military logistics. According to the statement, Twirwaneho expects the coalition forces to move into action at any moment.

Communiqué of 17 August 2024

- Several weeks earlier, Twirwaneho had issued another communiqué denouncing the persecution and threat of genocide against the Banyamulenge population of Minembwe by the FARDC's 34th reaction brigade. The communiqué listed numerous acts of serious human rights violations which it described as “genocidal” against the Banyamulenge civilians of Minembwe, by FARDC units. Through this communiqué, Twirwaneho launched an urgent appeal to the DRC government, and asks the government to distance itself from the commander of the 34th brigade.



Alerte concernant la persécution et la menace de génocide contre la population de Banyamulenge de Minembwe Par la 34^{ème} Brigade de réaction rapide des FARDC.

1. Le groupe d'autodéfense civile Twirwaneho tient à alerter l'opinion, tant nationale qu'internationale, que depuis la semaine du 17 juin 2024, la 34^{ème} Brigade d'intervention rapide des FARDC dirigée par le Colonel Lwambo Jean-Pierre, fait peser une menace de génocide contre les Banyamulenge, dans le centre de Minembwe et ses environs,
2. La première alerte a été donnée par les chefs coutumiers et les opérateurs économiques contre lesquels des actes de maltraitance, de tracasserie, d'arrestation arbitraires et de pillages des biens et marchandises sont orientés de manière particulière;
3. En effet, du 20 juin au 15 août 2024, il a été recensé un nombre d'actes de violations graves de droits humains à caractère génocidaire contre les civils Banyamulenge de Minembwe, par les unités FARDC, qui y sont pourtant affectées pour sécuriser la population et ses biens. Les principaux actes de persécution de la population recensés dans le haut plateau de Minembwe au cours de la période ci-haut mentionnée sont repris comme suit:
 - Le 20 Juin: arrestation d'une femme, Mme Murorwa Chantal accusée faussement de disposer des effets militaires, et ce dans le but de créer la Psychose au sein de la population de Minembwe;
 - Le 29 Juin : une ambuscade a été tendue par les hommes du colonel Lwambo J. Pierre qui ont dépouillé les paysans venant de leurs champs, perturbant ainsi les travaux champêtres,
 - Le 30 Juillet : les usagers du marché local de Minembwe ont été terrorisés par des militaires qui se sont livrés à des pillages, ont roué de coups les civils et ont fait usage d'armes à feu. Le même jour, les

les activités commerciales à Minembwe, l'élimination physique des personnes (Banyamulenge) sur les quelles il dispose des informations fiables et l'arrestation de tous les chefs de village et autres leaders de la communauté Banyamulenge. Il a promis à ses visiteurs que dans si peu de jour il va exécuter (tuer) un policier et un motar qu'il n'a pas précisé l'identité. Le commandant de la 34^{ème} brigade de réaction rapide basée à Minembwe s'est présenté à ses visiteurs comme un « génocidaire » que Minembwe devra pouvoir découvrir incessamment, tout en précisant qu'il est doté des moyens de l'Etat pour mener à bien sa mission, y compris des armes lourdes dont la détonation pourra provoquer des avortements des femmes enceintes,

6. Twirwaneho met en garde le Col. Lwambo J. Pierre contre toute attaque contre les civils contre lesquels il ne cache pas sa haine et ses sentiments discriminatoires à base ethnique. Twirwaneho est prêt à répondre à toute tentative de génocide annoncé par le Col Lwambo et promet qu'il n'attendra pas qu'un nouveau massacre soit perpétré sur le sol de Minembwe avant d'agir;

7. Twirwaneho lance pour la énième fois un appel urgent au gouvernement congolais. Il demande instamment que ce dernier se démarque clairement du criminel Colonel LWAMBO J. Pierre et le condamne publiquement et sans équivoque. Il est impératif d'agir avant qu'il ne soit trop tard.

8. Le Groupe d'Autodéfense Civile Twirwaneho réitère son engagement à protéger les civils d'éventuels massacres et adhère sans réserve au principe d'autodéfense civile contre toute force représentant une menace existentielle pour la communauté Banyamulenge et d'autres communautés qui exercent les activités économiques à Minembwe.

Fait à Minembwe, ce 17/08/2024

Welcome Ndakize Kamasa
Coordinateur

Excerpts of the communiqué available on Twirwaneho's [X account](#)

Annex 56 (para. 110)**Illustrations of clashes between Twirwaneho and Mai-Mai groups, and between RED Tabara and Mai-Mai/FDNB coalition****Illustrations d'affrontements entre les groupes Twirwaneho et Mai-Mai, et entre RED Tabara et la coalition Mai-Mai/FDNB**

- Clashes involving Twirwaneho
 - On 22 June 2024, Twirwaneho combatants clashed with Mai-Mai combatants in Bibangwa and Bijojo, Bafulero chefferie, Uvira territory.
 - On 13 July 2024, Mai-Mai combatants clashed with Twirwaneho combatants in Kigoma groupement, Uvira territory.
 - Late August-early September 2024, clashes between Mai-Mai groups and Twirwaneho resumed. On 30 August, Twirwaneho clashed with Mai-Mai combatants in Mutunda, south-east of Minembwe. During clashes, at least seven civilians were injured. Thereupon, combatants of Mai-Mai Yakutumba set up a new camp in Rugezi, 25 kilometers south-east of Minembwe and close to one of Twirwaneho's camps, in Kabingo.
 - Mid-September 2024, Twirwaneho launched several attacks against the FARDC around Minembwe.
 - On 23 October 2024, FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants attacked positions of Twirwaneho and RED Tabara in Kipupu, Itombwe sector, Mwenga territory. Several civilians were killed and wounded during the fighting.
- Clashes involving RED Tabara
 - On 23 September 2024, FDNB troops, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and CNRD combatants jointly attacked RED Tabara positions in Kipombo and Kipupu, Mwenga territory. Two days later, RED Tabara issued a communiqué, reporting intense fighting between its combatants and the FDNB and its allies. According to RED Tabara, FDNB suffered heavy casualties, with 20 FDNB soldiers killed and many others injured (see below). The Group could not confirm this claim.
 - Five days later, on 25 September 2024, new fighting broke out in Ruhangarika, Itombwe sector, between RED Tabara and FDNB and allied armed groups. Several FDNB and Mai-Mai combatants were reportedly killed and wounded during the clashes.
 - On 20 October 2024, RED Tabara combatants clashed with FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants in Kipombo, Itombwe sector. Several FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba were reportedly killed. These clashes triggered operations of FDNB and allies against RED Tabara positions in Hewa Bora forest in Fizi territory and in Itombwe, Mwenga territory. On 26 October 2024, RED Tabara issued a new communiqué (see below) claiming that 45 FDNB and allies were killed during fighting. UN sources reported that details provided in the RED Tabara communiqué, such as the reported number of FDNB killed, were incorrect.
 - On 23 October 2024, FDNB soldiers and Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants attacked positions of Twirwaneho and RED Tabara in Kipupu, Itombwe sector, Mwenga territory. Several civilians were killed and wounded during the fighting.
 - On 24 October 2024, RED Tabara combatants attacked Mai-Mai Yakutumba positions close to Tubangwa, north-west of Minembwe. Several Mai-Mai combatants as well as RED Tabara combatants were killed.

Sources: Researchers, Mai-Mai source, sources close to Twirwaneho and UN sources.

Republika y'Uburundi
Umuhari Uharanira Iteka n'Itekane
(RED-TABARA)



République du Burundi
Résistance pour un Etat de Droit
(RED-TABARA)

PRESS RELEASE

There has been intense fighting for several days between RED-Tabara fighters and the Burundi National Defence Forces (FDB), and its allies, including the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Wazalendo Yakutumba and other armed groups.

These violent clashes are taking place in the localities of Kipombo and Kipupu in the Itombwe groupement. It is clear that the FDLR from Kirembwe are the most combative, unlike the Burundian FDB soldiers, who show no motivation to fight and seem to have left the initiative to the FDLR. The FDB suffered heavy casualties, losing more than twenty soldiers and countless of others injured.

This deplorable situation should be a wake-up call to the Burundian army, and a reminder that its soldiers are the children of our motherland who have sworn an oath to defend the nation, and that they must not be used to shield a regime that kills, pillages and starves the people.

September 25, 2024

For the RED-TABARA

Patrick NAHIMANA
Military Spokesperson

Email : red.tabara@gmail.com

"... un régime de droit, pour que l'homme ne soit pas contraint, en suprême recours, à la révolte contre la tyrannie et l'oppression" (Préambule de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme)

Communiqué available on RED Tabara's [X account](#)

Republika y'Uburundi
Umuhari Uharanira Iteka n'Itekane
(RED-TABARA)



République du Burundi
Résistance pour un Etat de Droit
(RED-TABARA)

PRESS RELEASE

For a week and a half, violent fighting has pitted the RED-Tabara Movement against the Burundian army (FDNB) supported by Mayi Mayi groups, in the Itombwe area, more precisely in the localities of Kaberukwa, Ngumiyano and Ibaciro. Forty-five (45) Burundian soldiers and their allies lost their lives, including the deputy commander of the FDNB operational contingent deployed in South Kivu with headquarters in Minembwe, Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Nyandwi from Camp Mabanda. Thirty-two seriously injured Burundian soldiers were evacuated to Bujumbura to the place commonly known as Guantanamo.

RED-Tabara deplores once again having to fight compatriots who are victims of the same fascist regime of the CNDD-FDD. We remind the Burundian army that it has the choice to refuse to serve one of the worst barbaric regime of our time.

RED-Tabara's resistance will not weaken as long as the CNDD-FDD regime does not agree to sit at the table for sincere and inclusive negotiations to define the conditions for organizing democratic, free, inclusive and transparent elections with all political parties.

October 26, 2024

For the RED-TABARA

Patrick NAHIMANA
Military Spokesperson

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"... un régime de droit, pour que l'homme ne soit pas contraint, en suprême recours, à la révolte contre la tyrannie et l'oppression" (Préambule de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'Homme)

Communiqué available on RED Tabara's [X account](#)