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Lettre datée du 25 novembre 2024, adressée à la Présidente du Conseil de sécurité par le Groupe d'experts sur le Soudan du Sud créé en application de la résolution 2206 (2015) du Conseil de sécurité

Les membres du Groupe d'experts sur le Soudan du Sud créé en application de la résolution 2206 (2015) du Conseil de sécurité, dont le mandat a été prorogé conformément à la résolution 2731 (2024) du Conseil, ont l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint leur rapport d'activité, soumis en application du paragraphe 18 de la résolution 2731 (2024).

Le rapport a été communiqué le 1^{er} novembre 2024 au Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution 2206 (2015), qui l'a examiné le 14 novembre 2024.

Le Groupe d'experts vous serait reconnaissant de bien vouloir porter le texte de la présente lettre et du rapport d'activité à l'attention des membres du Conseil de sécurité et de le faire publier comme document du Conseil.

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Rapport d'activité du Groupe d'experts sur le Soudan du Sud présenté en application de la résolution 2731 (2024)

Résumé

Le Soudan du Sud est un des pays du monde où l'insécurité alimentaire est la plus forte. Près des trois quarts de la population a besoin d'une aide alimentaire, et la famine menace dans plusieurs régions du pays. Le conflit au Soudan a contraint plus de 830 000 personnes à chercher refuge au Soudan du Sud et a fait chuter les recettes pétrolières du Gouvernement de près de 70 %.

Les dirigeants sud-soudanais ont eu du mal à gérer l'aggravation de ces crises et à y faire face. Dans le même temps, le processus politique à Djouba a largement été marqué par des luttes de pouvoir et les efforts déployés pour obtenir des postes et le contrôle de ressources publiques qui s'épuisent. Des inondations sans précédent ont maintenant recouvert jusqu'à 7 à 12 % des terres émergées du pays, rendant l'action humanitaire encore plus difficile.

Le 13 septembre 2024, les dirigeants du Soudan du Sud ont accepté de prolonger de deux ans la durée de la période de transition établie par l'Accord revitalisé sur le règlement du conflit en République du Soudan du Sud de 2018 (accord de paix). Cette décision a fait l'objet d'un consensus, ce qui montre qu'un dialogue politique reste possible à Djouba mais revient aussi à admettre que trop peu d'éléments de l'accord de paix ont été mis en œuvre pour faciliter des élections libres et régulières et ouvrir la voie à la prochaine phase de développement du pays. De manière plus générale, elle montre également que les élites du monde politique et du secteur de la sécurité, qui jouent un rôle central dans le processus de paix, n'ont pour la plupart pas grand-chose à gagner à y mettre fin.

Les chances que des élections démocratiques aient lieu s'évanouissent pendant deux autres années pendant que les élites à Djouba s'agrippent à leurs prérogatives pour ce qui est de désigner la quasi-totalité des titulaires des postes au sein du Gouvernement et dans le secteur de sécurité et d'allouer les ressources publiques. Le Président du Soudan du Sud, Salva Kiir Mayardit, le Mouvement populaire de libération du Soudan (MPLS) et les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple, en particulier, ont tiré parti de ce contrôle pour affaiblir leurs adversaires en encourageant les défections et en modifiant sans cesse la composition de presque toutes les institutions de l'État. Ceux qui ne font pas partie de ce système ont de moins en moins de possibilités d'y entrer.

Dans l'État de l'Équatoria-Central, par exemple, le Gouvernement a pu diviser le Front de salut national en cherchant à obtenir plusieurs défections remarquées. Cela a toutefois eu pour effet d'intensifier le conflit avec les autres éléments du groupe et de faire de la population civile une proie encore plus convoitée, de multiples groupes cherchant maintenant à continuer de mener leurs opérations de manière indépendante.

Le dialogue régional demeure essentiel pour le processus de paix au Soudan du Sud, et l'Initiative Tumaini, menée par le Kenya, a laissé espérer qu'une paix pouvait être négociée avec certains des groupes de l'opposition restants. Les signataires existants de l'accord de paix de 2018 se sont toutefois opposés à la création de tout nouvel accord ou institution, de crainte que la mise en œuvre, déjà très difficile, ne soit davantage entravée.

Les frontières du pays ont également été éprouvées par l'instabilité régionale et plusieurs interventions politiques de haut niveau ont été nécessaires. Un nombre considérable de soldats armés des Forces de défense populaires de l'Ouganda ont été

observés dans au moins trois États du Soudan du Sud, en violation de l'embargo sur les armes et des membres des Forces d'appui rapide du Soudan ont également franchi la frontière septentrionale du Soudan du Sud.

La plus grande partie de la population qui peine à survivre à une situation d'urgence humanitaire grave ne sait pas très bien si les dirigeants du Soudan du Sud peuvent mettre à profit les deux prochaines années pour accomplir ce qu'ils n'ont pas fait les six années précédentes.

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* Les annexes sont distribuées uniquement dans la langue de l'original et n'ont pas été revues par les services d'édition.

I. Contexte

A. Mandat et déplacements

1. Par sa résolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), le Conseil de sécurité a imposé un régime de sanctions visant des personnes et des entités qui participent au conflit au Soudan du Sud et créé un comité des sanctions (Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concernant le Soudan du Sud). Le 1^{er} juillet 2015, le Comité a désigné six personnes devant faire l'objet de sanctions ciblées. Par l'adoption de sa résolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), il a imposé un embargo sur les armes sur le territoire sud-soudanais et ajouté deux personnes à la liste des personnes désignées. Le 30 mai 2024, il a adopté la résolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), dans laquelle il a reconduit le régime de sanctions jusqu'au 31 mai 2025.
2. Par sa résolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), le Conseil de sécurité a également prorogé jusqu'au 1^{er} juillet 2025 le mandat du Groupe d'experts sur le Soudan du Sud chargé de fournir au Comité des informations et des analyses qui l'aideraient dans ses travaux, notamment pour ce qui est de désigner des personnes ou entités qui se livreraient aux activités décrites au paragraphe 7 de la résolution [2206 \(2015\)](#).
3. Le 10 septembre 2024, après avoir consulté le Comité, le Secrétaire général a nommé les cinq membres du Groupe d'experts (voir [S/2024/676](#)).
4. Du fait des retards pris dans la nomination des membres du Groupe d'experts, celui-ci n'a pas pu se rendre au Soudan du Sud avant d'établir le présent rapport en octobre 2024.

B. Coopération avec les organisations internationales et les autres parties prenantes

5. Le Groupe d'experts mène ses travaux indépendamment des organismes et institutions des Nations Unies, mais tient à remercier la Mission des Nations Unies au Soudan du Sud (MINUSS) ainsi que d'autres membres du personnel des Nations Unies, notamment à New York.
6. Avant de rédiger le présent rapport, le Groupe d'experts a demandé à rencontrer des représentants du Gouvernement sud-soudanais et de plusieurs États Membres de la région. Au moment de l'établissement du présent rapport, il n'avait pas été donné suite à ces demandes. Toutefois, grâce à ses vastes réseaux au Soudan du Sud et dans la région, le Groupe d'experts avait pu s'entretenir avec plusieurs membres actuels et anciens du Gouvernement sud-soudanais, de hauts responsables des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple et d'autres composantes du secteur de la sécurité, de hauts représentants des groupes de l'opposition sud-soudanais, des membres de l'Assemblée législative nationale provisoire revitalisée, des journalistes sud-soudanais et des organisations de la société civile, ainsi qu'avec des entreprises menant des activités au Soudan du Sud, des civils et des représentants de groupes armés étrangers présents au Soudan du Sud.
7. Au paragraphe 17 de sa résolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), le Conseil de sécurité a souligné qu'il importait que le Groupe d'experts tienne des consultations avec les États Membres concernés, les organisations internationales, régionales et sous-régionales, ainsi que la MINUSS. Le Groupe d'experts a pu mener des consultations approfondies avec des représentants d'organes et d'organismes des Nations Unies au Soudan du Sud et ailleurs. Il a également consulté la majeure partie des mécanismes de sécurité créés par l'Accord revitalisé sur le règlement du conflit au Soudan du Sud (« accord

de paix »), ainsi que plusieurs institutions multilatérales menant des activités au Soudan du Sud.

8. Le Groupe d'experts a adressé 10 lettres officielles au Gouvernement sud-soudanais, aux États Membres de la région et à d'autres personnes et entités et a reçu une réponse sur le fond avant d'établir le présent rapport. Les réponses reçues par la suite ont été intégrées dans les annexes au présent rapport.

C. Méthode de travail

9. Le présent rapport a été établi en octobre 2024 à l'issue de recherches et d'enquêtes indépendantes menées par le Groupe d'experts, qui a procédé à de nombreux entretiens pour collecter un ensemble d'informations crédibles, obtenues de sources très diverses. Le Groupe d'experts a examiné les documents mis à sa disposition par des personnes, des entités commerciales, des sources confidentielles et le Gouvernement sud-soudanais. Il a délibérément veillé à prendre en considération divers points de vue sur le processus de paix sud-soudanais, notamment ceux de multiples groupes présents dans le Gouvernement provisoire d'union nationale revitalisé et les autres groupes de l'opposition. Il s'est également inspiré de ses activités antérieures, notamment des rapports, publics et confidentiels, précédemment soumis au Conseil de sécurité et au Comité.

10. Le Groupe d'experts a respecté les normes recommandées par le Groupe de travail informel du Conseil de sécurité sur les questions générales relatives aux sanctions dans son rapport de décembre 2006 (S/2006/997). Il a corroboré les informations figurant dans le présent rapport au moyen de sources multiples et indépendantes afin de respecter le critère de preuve exigé.

11. Le Groupe d'experts a mené ses travaux dans la plus grande transparence et a été soucieux de respecter la confidentialité de ses sources si nécessaire. Une source ou un document est dit « confidentiel » uniquement lorsque sa divulgation pourrait mettre la source en danger.

II. Problèmes humanitaires complexes

12. Le Soudan du Sud est confronté à une situation d'urgence humanitaire grave. Aux problèmes qui se sont accumulés pendant des années sur les plans politique et économique et en matière de sécurité se sont ajoutés de sérieux chocs extérieurs, ce qui a conduit à des crises complexes et interminables.

A. Inondations sans précédent

13. Les dirigeants du Soudan du Sud s'apprêtent à déclarer l'état d'urgence dans le pays, les inondations de grande ampleur ayant recouvert jusqu'à 7 à 12 % des terres émergées du pays et, dans les États de l'Unité et de Warrap, par exemple, 30 % des terres¹. Environ 3,3 millions de personnes, dans plus de la moitié des comtés du pays,

¹ Entretien avec un spécialiste du domaine géospatial, octobre 2024. Voir également Centre satellitaire des Nations Unies, imagerie (5-9 octobre 2024) concernant les inondations au Soudan du Sud, disponible à l'adresse suivante : https://unosat.org/static/unosat_filesystem/4002/UNOSAT_A3_Natural_Landscape_FL20220424SD_05Oct_09Oct2024_SouthSudan_Week24.pdf.

devraient être touchées par des inondations en 2024². Les eaux de crue ont inondé ou endommagé des dizaines de milliers d'hectares de terres agricoles ainsi que des centaines d'écoles et de points d'eau et des dizaines d'établissements de santé³. Une personne habitant Djouba, qui s'était récemment rendue dans l'État de Jonglei, d'où étaient originaires ses ancêtres, a qualifié d'« océan » un endroit qui était auparavant une forêt dense⁴.

14. Les inondations ont aggravé les effets d'autres problèmes humanitaires. Plus de 830 000 personnes ayant fui le conflit au Soudan se trouvent au Soudan du Sud, qui accueillait déjà 2,2 millions de personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays⁵. Un grand nombre d'entre elles sont arrivées dans les États les plus touchés par les inondations. Plus de 8 millions de personnes, soit environ 70 % de la population, ont maintenant besoin d'une aide alimentaire⁶ en raison de la flambée des prix des denrées alimentaires et des produits non alimentaires⁷. Le niveau 4 (« urgence ») sur l'échelle d'insécurité alimentaire du Cadre intégré de classification de la sécurité alimentaire persiste dans la plus grande partie du pays⁸.

15. De plus, en octobre 2024, environ 75 % des routes étaient inaccessibles ou difficilement accessibles du fait des inondations ou d'autres obstacles⁹. Cette situation rend très difficile l'action humanitaire et oblige les intervenants humanitaires à avoir recours aux transferts en espèces¹⁰, à des livraisons aériennes coûteuses et à des campagnes de sensibilisation et d'information aux effets limités¹¹. En ce qui concerne les services fournis, la priorité a été donnée aux zones dans lesquelles les acteurs humanitaires avaient déjà accès à des ressources. Des experts locaux ont averti que

² Plan sud-soudanais de préparation et d'intervention en cas d'inondation (juin-décembre 2024) établi par des organisations humanitaires en consultation avec le Gouvernement sud-soudanais, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://fsccluster.org/sites/default/files/South%20Sudan%20Floods%20Preparedness%20and%20Response%2022%20June%202024.pdf>.

³ Voir annexe 2.

⁴ Entretien avec un civil sud-soudanais, octobre 2024.

⁵ Organisation internationale pour les migrations et Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, données sur les mouvements de population du Soudan au Soudan du Sud, au 22 octobre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante :

<https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZTMwNTljNWYtYmVhYi00ZGI2LTgwYzAtN2UyNDZmZTRlNjBkIiwidCI6IjE1ODgyNjJkLTZmItNDNiNC1iZDZlLWJjZTQ5YzhINjE4NiIsImMiOjhh9&pageName=ReportSection95859b8850a76994e6fb&pageName=ReportSection4f5adec6c9d67015bc74>.

⁶ Famine Early Warning System Network, « Food Assistance Outlook Brief », août 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-08/FEWSNET-FAOB-August%202024.pdf>.

⁷ Reach, « Joint Market Monitoring Initiative », septembre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante :

https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH_SSD_Factsheet_JMMI_September-2024.pdf.

⁸ Famine Early Warning System Network, « Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remain widespread as flooding expands », septembre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/september-2024>.

⁹ Voir, par exemple, Logistics Cluster, « South Sudan – Access Constraints Map », disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://www.logcluster.org/en/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024>.

¹⁰ Dans le cadre de tels programmes, les personnes ou communautés ont accès à des espèces plutôt qu'à de la nourriture ou d'autres biens et services.

¹¹ Entretiens avec sept acteurs humanitaires et analystes locaux, octobre 2024.

cela avait abouti à la création d'« îlots »¹² qui pouvaient accentuer les inégalités existantes et laisser pour compte d'autres communautés¹³.

16. Les inondations ont entraîné le déplacement de personnes et de bétail, ajoutant aux fortes tensions intercommunautaires et à des violences infranationales, notamment dans les États de Warrap, de Jongleï, de l'Équatoria-Central et du Haut-Nil¹⁴. Des experts ont prévenu que ces difficultés pourraient s'inscrire dans la durée car, dans des régions où les cycles des cultures et des récoltes ont été définitivement perturbés, il pourrait être impossible de conserver les mêmes modes de vie¹⁵.

B. Effets des inondations exacerbés par une planification et des mesures de protection limités

17. Les dernières inondations en date étaient une conséquence de plus en plus prévisible des changements climatiques dans la région. Au Soudan du Sud, le bassin du Nil et les zones humides du Sud sont reliés à trois systèmes hydrologiques convergents : les affluents occidentaux du Nil ; les débits sortants du lac Victoria ; les écoulements des hauts plateaux éthiopiens. En 2024, comme les précipitations augmentent d'une année sur l'autre en Afrique de l'Est et que les plaines inondables du Soudan du Sud étaient déjà saturées d'eau, le pays a connu des inondations très rarement observées par le passé¹⁶.

18. D'après divers spécialistes, l'étendue et les effets des inondations au Soudan du Sud peuvent également s'expliquer par les effets cumulés du manque de préparation des autorités et de la défaillance d'une grande partie des infrastructures de prévention et d'atténuation des inondations du pays pendant de nombreuses années¹⁷. Plusieurs d'entre eux ont, par exemple, dit craindre que l'existence de quelques systèmes de digue avaient donné de « faux espoirs » à des populations restées dans des zones inondables de l'État de Jongleï et de l'État de l'Unité¹⁸. Dans plusieurs de ces zones,

¹² Entretien avec un spécialiste local des infrastructures, octobre 2024. Voir également annexe 3.

¹³ Entretiens avec un spécialiste local des infrastructures et un responsable public dans l'État de l'Unité, octobre 2024.

¹⁴ D'après des informations récentes, dans 80 % des comtés du Soudan du Sud, le risque d'être victime de violences fondées sur le genre est « considérable » et le nombre de cas de violence sexuelle aurait augmenté de 168 % au deuxième trimestre de 2024 par rapport à la même période en 2023. Voir Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, groupe de la protection, « South Sudan: Protection Monitoring Spotlight, July to August 2024 », 25 septembre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-protection-monitoring-spotlight-july-august-2024> ; MINUSS, « Brief on violence affecting civilians, April to June 2024 », 16 octobre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_april_-_june_2024_0.pdf ; Bureau de la coordination des affaires humanitaires, « South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, September 2024 », disponible à l'adresse suivante : www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024.

¹⁵ Entretiens avec des acteurs humanitaires, des climatologues et des représentants des populations locales, octobre 2024.

¹⁶ Informations sur les tendances météorologiques au Soudan du Sud, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts.

¹⁷ Entretiens avec 19 climatologues, des représentants des pouvoirs publics et des représentants d'organismes humanitaires et de populations locales, octobre 2024.

¹⁸ Entretiens avec des acteurs humanitaires, des analystes locaux et un spécialiste des infrastructures, octobre 2024.

des levées construites à la main ont été rapidement submergées par les eaux, ce qui a entraîné de nombreux déplacements¹⁹.

19. De même, malgré les critiques émanant d'écologistes et des experts techniques, des représentants des pouvoirs publics ont fait avancer un projet de dragage très politisé visant à ouvrir les affluents du Nil dans l'État de l'Unité. Ce projet ne s'inscrivait pas dans un plan d'ensemble²⁰. De l'avis de plusieurs experts locaux avec lesquels le Groupe d'experts s'est entretenu, il n'aurait eu que des effets limités ou aurait été « sans effet » jusque-là²¹. D'autres spécialistes ont dit au Groupe d'experts que plusieurs projets de construction de routes et de ponts dans tout le pays avaient bloqué ou perturbé le passage de l'eau, et que de puissantes entreprises de construction routière n'avaient pas tenu compte des études de faisabilité concernant la conception des routes et la résilience face aux inondations, ce qui avait entraîné des destructions et des déplacements²².

20. Les détournements de fonds publics déjà limités et les malversations ont également affaibli la capacité du pays d'atténuer les effets des inondations et d'y faire face. En septembre 2022, par exemple, le Gouvernement a alloué un montant total d'environ 26,7 millions de dollars à un programme national de lutte contre les inondations²³ et a chargé 25 entreprises sud-soudanaises²⁴ de la fourniture, entre autres, de sorgho et de moustiquaires, d'une valeur d'environ 20 millions de dollars²⁵. Cependant, peu de ces ressources ont fini par être remises aux victimes des inondations et plusieurs tonnes d'aide alimentaire auraient été volées²⁶. Nombre des entreprises sous-traitantes n'avaient que peu ou pas d'expérience dans la gestion des aspects logistiques des interventions d'urgence et plusieurs fournisseurs n'ont jamais été payés par le Gouvernement²⁷.

21. En juillet 2024, le Gouvernement a approuvé un plan d'urgence de 76 millions de dollars pour faire face aux inondations²⁸. Toutefois, en octobre 2024, ces fonds

¹⁹ Ibid. Informations corroborées par celles communiquées par des observateurs locaux en septembre et en octobre 2024 ainsi que par des photographies examinées par le Groupe d'experts.

²⁰ Entretiens avec un spécialiste des infrastructures et un coordonnateur de l'action internationale, octobre 2024. Voir également annexes 4 et 5.

²¹ Entretiens avec un écologiste local et trois analystes locaux dans l'État de l'Unité, octobre 2024.

²² Entretien avec un spécialiste des infrastructures participant à l'établissement d'études de faisabilité concernant la construction routière, octobre 2024. Informations corroborées par des messages diffusés dans les médias sociaux, des photographies et des vidéos enregistrées par des représentants des populations locales dans l'État du Bahr el-Ghazal occidental, l'État du Bahr el-Ghazal septentrional et l'État des Lacs. Voir également, par exemple, Eye Radio, « ARC commits to resolving Wau road blockage after heavy rainfall », 24 mai 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/. Voir également S/2024/343.

²³ Eye Radio, « Govt allocates \$16.7m to flood-affected populations », 10 septembre 2022, disponible à l'adresse suivante : www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/ ; déclaration du Cabinet du Président, 30 novembre 2022.

²⁴ Eye Radio, « Govt allocates \$16.7m ».

²⁵ Number One Citizen, « Government procures food for vulnerable flood victims », 2 novembre 2022. Voir également www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/.

²⁶ Informations communiquées par des contrôleurs locaux, février 2023. Voir également *Sudans Post*, « Ex-humanitarian minister Peter Mayen denies walking away with flood victims' emergency funds », 27 novembre 2022.

²⁷ Entretien avec une personne à laquelle le Gouvernement a fait appel, octobre 2022.

²⁸ Bureau de la coordination des affaires humanitaires, exposé au Conseil de sécurité sur le Soudan du Sud, 14 août 2024.

n'avaient pas été débloqués car la grave perturbation des exportations de pétrole du pays continuait de peser sur les finances publiques²⁹.

22. Parallèlement à l'effondrement des recettes publiques et aux coupes sombres faites dans les ressources affectées à l'aide humanitaire, le Gouvernement s'est de plus en plus employé à taxer les fournitures humanitaires³⁰. Les obstacles à l'accès humanitaire, notamment les attaques contre le personnel et les biens humanitaires, les restrictions de circulation et d'autres obstacles bureaucratiques, auraient augmenté de 15 % en 2024 par rapport à 2023³¹. Les transferts en espèces, estimés à plus de 76 millions de dollars en 2024, ont aussi systématiquement perdu jusqu'à la moitié de leur valeur du fait de l'écart spectaculaire entre le taux de change officiel, que les organismes humanitaires sont tenus d'utiliser, et le taux non officiel parallèle dont la plupart des gens et des entreprises se servent pour effectuer des transactions³².

III. Fragmentation du paysage politique et de la situation de sécurité

23. Le 13 septembre 2024, les dirigeants du Soudan du Sud ont accepté de prolonger de deux ans la durée de la période de transition établie par l'accord de paix de 2018, et de reporter à décembre 2026 les premières élections du pays. Cette décision fait suite à une évaluation, réalisée par le Comité permanent de haut niveau chargé de surveiller la mise en œuvre de l'accord de paix. Il est ressorti de l'évaluation que 17 % seulement des dispositions de l'accord avaient été appliquées, et 57 % d'entre elles ne l'avaient pas encore été³³. Le report des élections devenait de plus en plus probable à l'approche de la date du scrutin car seuls des préparatifs rudimentaires avaient été effectués. Le Conseiller à la sécurité nationale auprès du Président a souligné que la période supplémentaire permettrait au Gouvernement « de terminer le recensement, d'enregistrer les partis politiques et de renforcer les règles constitutionnelles »³⁴.

24. La prolongation de la période de gouvernance provisoire du pays a renforcé la fragmentation du paysage politique et de la situation de sécurité. Les structures de pouvoir très centralisées de la période de transition ont permis aux principaux signataires de l'accord de paix, en particulier au Président du Soudan du Sud, Salva Kiir Mayardit, de contrôler la quasi-totalité des postes politiques et des postes liés à la sécurité du pays, notamment au Parlement et dans les institutions infranationales. La période de transition se prolongeant, de nombreux opposants ont perdu de leur

²⁹ Entretiens avec un coordonnateur de l'action internationale et un haut fonctionnaire jouant un rôle dans les mesures prises pour faire face aux inondations, octobre 2024.

³⁰ *Wall Street Journal*, « South Sudan's Economic Crisis Is So Bad It's Taxing Its Only Lifeline », 8 octobre 2024.

³¹ Bureau de la coordination des affaires humanitaires, « South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (September 2024) », disponible à l'adresse suivante : www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024.

³² Entretiens avec trois spécialistes des programmes de transferts monétaires, septembre et octobre 2024. Voir également Groupe de travail sur les transferts monétaires, « Cash and Voucher Dashboard, January to August 2024 », disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiMzhhMzkyZWItMDFjZi00OTgyLTgzYWYtMjE5NDhjNTdmMTE3IiwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRiLTU0NGYtNGY2MC1iZGNjLTVIYTQxNmU2ZGM3MCI9ImMiOj9>.

³³ Rapport du Comité permanent de haut niveau, en date du 10 septembre 2024, conservé dans les dossiers du Groupe.

³⁴ *The East African*, « South Sudan delays polls to 2026, extends transitional government », 14 septembre 2024.

force ou se sont sentis obligés de faire dissidence pour tenter de rejoindre les partis dominants au sein du système. Pour le Mouvement populaire de libération du Soudan (MPLS), parti du Président et des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple, cette situation a offert un terrain propice à l'affaiblissement de ses rivaux politiques et militaires, en encourageant les défections, tout en remaniant les postes de haut niveau dans le secteur de la sécurité³⁵.

A. Déstabilisation de l'Équatoria-Central entraînée par la fragmentation du Front de salut national

25. Dans les États de l'Équatoria, le Gouvernement a continué de s'employer avec succès à encourager les officiers supérieurs du Front de salut national et ses combattants à abandonner Thomas Cirillo, le chef du Front de salut national. De ce fait, le Front de salut national s'est morcelé et a été affaibli et le Gouvernement a également pu mettre à contribution les transfuges nouvellement alliés à lui afin que ces forces agissant pour son compte attirent d'autres éléments du Front de salut national. Cette manière de faire rappelle les stratégies que le Gouvernement a employées avec succès dans d'autres parties du pays, notamment dans l'État du Haut-Nil et l'État de l'Unité³⁶. Toutefois, comme dans ces autres cas, une telle campagne a également entraîné une grave détérioration de la situation de sécurité locale.

26. Le Front de salut national s'étant trouvé aux prises avec un nombre croissant de problèmes logistiques et de difficultés liées aux ressources, le Gouvernement a eu de moins en moins de mal à encourager les officiers du Front de salut national à faire défection³⁷. Plusieurs d'entre eux se sont laissé séduire par la promesse d'un poste rémunéré au sein de la police ou des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple, et certains transfuges du Front de salut national ont déjà été intégrés dans des unités des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple dans les comtés de Moundri-Est et de Morobo³⁸.

27. Il semblerait également qu'une bonne partie des fonds alloués à la mise en œuvre de l'accord de paix, mais réaffectés au Ministère du Cabinet ministériel, ait été utilisée pour encourager les défections au sein du Front de salut national³⁹. Après avoir été convoqué par le Parlement, par exemple, le Ministre du Cabinet ministériel, Martin Elia Lomuro, a confirmé qu'un montant de 1 050 000 dollars avait été retiré de manière irrégulière afin de faciliter la « mise en œuvre de la paix » avec les officiers du Front de salut national en avril 2024⁴⁰.

28. Les deux défections récentes les plus remarquées ont été celle de Kennedy Kenyi « Warrior » (dit « le guerrier ») Abdu Lopiong, qui agit maintenant en qualité de force supplétive alliée aux Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple, et celle de John Latio Kenyi Loburong, qui est maintenant à la tête de son propre groupe, les Forces unies de salut national⁴¹. D'après des documents examinés par le Groupe

³⁵ Voir annexes 6 et 7.

³⁶ On trouvera d'autres exemples marquants de cette stratégie dans les rapports [S/2024/343](#), [S/2023/294](#), [S/2022/884](#) et [S/2022/359](#).

³⁷ Voir annexe 8. Entretiens avec Thomas Cirillo, septembre et octobre 2024.

³⁸ Entretiens avec des membres de la population civile locale et des sources confidentielles, septembre et octobre 2024.

³⁹ Voir annexes 9 à 12. Entretiens avec quatre représentants de la société civile et analystes locaux, octobre 2024. Voir également, Eye Radio, « Dr. Lomuro admits to diverting peace funds to special projects », 7 juin 2024 ; *Sudans Post*, « Lomuro claims he was quoted 'out of context' on \$10 million peace funds », 10 juin 2024.

⁴⁰ Voir annexes 9 à 12. Voir également Eye Radio, « Dr. Lomuro admits diverting peace fund ».

⁴¹ Voir annexes 13 à 16.

d'experts, ces deux défections avaient été négociées aux plus hauts niveaux du Gouvernement, y compris par la Présidence et le Ministère du Cabinet ministériel⁴².

29. Le Gouvernement cherche de plus en plus à se servir de certains des transfuges comme de forces supplétives contre les autres éléments du Front de salut national. Dans d'autres cas, ils s'en sont pris les uns aux autres. Les forces placées sous le commandement de Kenyi « le guerrier », par exemple, opéreraient en dehors des structures établies des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple, mais ont été chargées de prendre pour cible des éléments des Forces unies de salut national et du Front de salut national autour de Lainya, dans l'État de l'Équatoria-Central⁴³.

30. Dans un cas, le 9 octobre 2024, au moins 24 personnes, dont 19 civils, ont été tuées et plusieurs blessées à Wonduruba, dans l'État de l'Équatoria-Central, à la suite d'affrontements entre les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple, alliées aux forces placées sous le commandement de Kenyi « le guerrier », et les Forces unies de salut national placées sous le commandement de Loburong⁴⁴. Ces affrontements ont été condamnés par les populations locales, les groupes de la société civile et les autorités de l'État⁴⁵.

31. De plus, les enlèvements et les extorsions se sont fortement multipliés dans certaines parties de l'État de l'Équatoria-Central, notamment dans les comtés de Djouba, de Morobo et de Yei⁴⁶. De nombreuses factions, à court de ressources, ont pris pour cible des civils et des intervenants humanitaires, ce qui a entraîné la suspension de certaines opérations humanitaires dans la région.

32. Le Groupe d'experts s'est entretenu avec sept personnes qui avaient été enlevées, pendant quatre jours pour certaines d'entre elles, et ont affirmé que les éléments du Front de salut national avaient exigé que les employeurs de ces personnes paient des milliers de dollars afin d'obtenir leur libération⁴⁷. Les mêmes personnes ont également affirmé que des unités locales des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple arrêtaient et détenaient arbitrairement des civils soupçonnés d'être des sympathisants du Front de salut national, et exigé jusqu'à 200 000 de livres sud-soudanaises (soit 65 dollars) pour leur libération⁴⁸.

33. Le Front de salut national a perdu plusieurs officiers, mais, sous le commandement de Thomas Cirillo, il a survécu et a reconstitué ses rangs en enlevant

⁴² Entretiens avec cinq représentants de la société civile, octobre 2024. Voir également annexes 13 à 16.

⁴³ Entretiens avec des représentants de populations locales, septembre et octobre 2024. Voir également annexe 16.

⁴⁴ Ibid. Informations corroborées par celles communiquées par des observateurs et contrôleurs sur le terrain, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts. Voir également annexes 18 et 21 à 23. Voir également MINUSS, « UNMISS alarmed by violent attacks in Juba County, calls for investigation and accountability », 11 octobre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-alarmed-violent-attacks-juba-county-calls-investigation-and-accountability>.

⁴⁵ Voir annexes 17 à 20.

⁴⁶ Informations communiquées par des contrôleurs dans l'État de l'Équatoria-Central, en mai et en septembre 2024, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts. Entretiens avec trois représentants de la société civile et d'organismes humanitaires, septembre et octobre 2024. Voir également MINUSS, « Brief on violence affecting civilians ».

⁴⁷ Entretiens avec sept personnes enlevées et un représentant de la communauté locale, octobre 2024.

⁴⁸ Entretiens avec des membres des familles des civils enlevés et des responsables locaux, octobre 2024.

ou recrutant⁴⁹ des personnes. Par ailleurs, plusieurs autres groupes armés locaux se sont rattachés à la marque Front de salut national⁵⁰.

34. Face à cet état de choses, le Gouvernement a intensifié ses opérations militaires dans la région en déployant d'autres transfuges et des forces supplémentaires⁵¹. Plusieurs chefs de comté civils locaux ont également été remplacés par de nouveaux responsables ayant une expérience militaire⁵² et, comme mesure supplémentaire, les opérations militaires des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple dans le sud de l'État de l'Équatoria-Central ont été regroupées sous le commandement de l'officier des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple récemment promu à Yei⁵³. Dans le même temps, le Groupe d'experts a été informé que l'intégration rémunérée d'officiers du Front de salut national ayant fait défection dans les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple qui n'avaient pas touché leur solde depuis des mois a avivé les tensions et affaibli le commandement et le contrôle dans certaines composantes de l'armée⁵⁴.

B. Médiation avec les groupes de l'opposition dans le cadre de l'Initiative Tumaini menée par le Kenya

35. La fragmentation des groupes de l'opposition a également compliqué les efforts de consolidation de la paix. Le paysage politique et la situation de sécurité en évolution tenaient au moyen d'un nombre croissant d'accords et de processus se chevauchant partiellement.

36. Le 9 mai 2024, des activités de médiation de haut niveau ont été organisées à Nairobi entre le Gouvernement sud-soudanais et certains des groupes de l'opposition qui n'ont pas signé l'accord de paix de 2018. Le Vrai Mouvement populaire de libération du Soudan, dirigé par Pagan Amum, l'Armée/le Front uni du Soudan du Sud, dirigé par Paul Malong Awan (SSi.008), qui fait l'objet de sanctions, et le Mouvement/l'Armée populaire du Soudan du Sud, dirigé par Stephen Buay, comptent parmi les participants à l'Initiative Tumaini – qui signifie « espoir ». Simon Gatwech (SSi.002), qui fait l'objet de sanctions et est membre de la faction Kit-Gwang du Mouvement/de l'Armée populaire de libération du Soudan dans l'opposition (M/APLS dans l'opposition), avait également été invité, mais n'a pas pu faire le

⁴⁹ Voir annexes 24 et 25. Entretiens avec Thomas Cirillo et un représentant de la société civile, octobre 2024 ; voir également MINUSS, « UNMISS gravely concerned by rising abductions in Greater Yei, calls for collective action », 2 août 2024. Voir également une vidéo diffusée par le Front de salut national, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA> ; Commission mixte de suivi et d'évaluation reconstituée, rapport trimestriel sur l'état d'application de l'Accord revitalisé sur le règlement du conflit en République du Soudan du Sud pour la période allant du 1^{er} juillet au 30 septembre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports/254-rjmec-quarterly-report-on-the-status-of-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-from-1st-july-to-30th-september-2024/file>.

⁵⁰ Entretiens avec des représentants de la société civile, octobre 2024. Informations corroborées par des rapports locaux indépendants, examinés par le Groupe d'experts, de juin à septembre 2024, et par des rapports de contrôleurs internationaux, conservés dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts.

⁵¹ Informations communiquées par des observateurs internationaux en mars 2024, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts. Entretiens avec trois représentants de la société civile et Thomas Cirillo, octobre 2024.

⁵² Informations communiquées par des observateurs locaux en août 2024, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts. Entretiens avec un analyste local et un représentant de la société civile, octobre 2024. Voir également *The Dawn*, « Governor Wani urge newly appointed county commissioners to improve security », 7 août 2024.

⁵³ Entretiens avec un analyste local et un représentant de la société civile, octobre 2024.

⁵⁴ Entretiens avec trois représentants de la société civile, octobre 2024. Informations corroborées par les rapports d'observateurs locaux, août 2024, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts.

déplacement depuis l'endroit où il se trouvait au Soudan pour participer aux pourparlers⁵⁵.

37. Mario Loku Thomas Jada, qui, quelques mois auparavant, avait quitté le Front de salut national pour former le Conseil de commandement de la révolution du Front de salut national, était également présent lors des pourparlers. Les autres membres de l'Alliance des mouvements de l'opposition du Soudan du Sud avaient refusé de participer, mentionnant des problèmes de sécurité au Kenya et la méfiance à l'égard du processus. En août 2024, le médiateur en chef de l'initiative Tumaini, Lazaro Sumbeiywo, s'est rendu à Rome pour tenter, en vain, de persuader Thomas Cirillo de participer aux pourparlers⁵⁶.

38. Le 15 juillet 2024, les parties à l'Initiative Tumaini ont paraphé un document de consensus dans lequel étaient définis six « protocoles »⁵⁷. Néanmoins, le lendemain, le Mouvement populaire de libération du Soudan dans l'opposition (MPLS dans l'opposition) a rejeté le document et s'est officiellement retiré des pourparlers⁵⁸.

39. Des responsables du MPLS dans l'opposition ont affirmé que ce retrait s'expliquait par le fait que l'Initiative s'était écartée de sa mission de départ, à savoir être un forum de médiation. Ils ont soutenu que la volonté de faire de l'Initiative un accord à part entière, plutôt que de l'intégrer dans l'accord de paix existant de 2018 constituait une « violation » de l'accord de paix qui « compromettrait » l'application de l'accord⁵⁹.

40. Des représentants du MPLS dans l'opposition se sont dits opposés, par exemple, à la création proposée d'un conseil de direction national qui jouerait le rôle de « garant interne » de l'accord relatif à l'Initiative de Tumaini qui finirait par être établi⁶⁰. Ils ont affirmé qu'un tel organe, dont les décisions ne seraient pas soumises à l'approbation du Cabinet ou du corps législatif sud-soudanais, empiéterait clairement sur les prérogatives des institutions de partage du pouvoir établies par l'accord de paix de 2018. De la même manière, ils ont argué que de nouvelles commissions chargées de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité et du contrôle feraient double emploi avec les attributions des mécanismes de sécurité existants⁶¹.

41. Ces objections font écho aux préoccupations de longue date du MPLS dans l'opposition concernant la primauté de l'accord de paix de 2018, que ses dirigeants défendent car c'est sur celle-ci que reposent un rôle dans le Gouvernement, un certain nombre des postes de commandement dans les forces de sécurité du pays et l'intégration des forces du Mouvement dans une armée nationale unifiée⁶².

42. D'autres personnalités politiques de premier plan à Djouba ont également fait part de préoccupations similaires. Dans un rapport, le Comité permanent de haut niveau, qui contrôle la mise en œuvre de l'accord de paix de 2018 et comprend le Ministre du Cabinet ministériel et le Secrétaire général du MPLS, Peter Lam Booth, a observé que plusieurs des protocoles étaient contraires à l'accord de paix et a

⁵⁵ Entretiens avec Simon Gatwech (SSi.002), mai et juin 2024.

⁵⁶ Entretiens avec Thomas Cirillo, Simon Gatwech (SSi.002) et des membres de l'équipe de médiation, octobre 2024.

⁵⁷ Voir annexe 26.

⁵⁸ Voir annexe 27.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Entretiens avec des membres de l'équipe de la délégation du Gouvernement et d'autres personnalités politiques à Djouba, septembre et octobre 2024. Voir annexe 27.

⁶¹ Voir annexe 27.

⁶² Entretiens avec des parties participant à l'Initiative Tumaini, octobre 2024.

demandé à la délégation du Gouvernement de veiller à ce qu'aucun nouveau mécanisme ou institution ne soit créé⁶³.

43. Cependant, pour les partis de l'opposition participant à l'Initiative Tumaini, la non-application de l'accord de 2018, des réformes relatives à la sécurité qui y sont prévues en particulier, démontre qu'il est nécessaire de mettre en place de nouveaux mécanismes de mise en œuvre plus solides⁶⁴. Un porte-parole de l'un des groupes de l'opposition a dit au Groupe d'experts que, sans mécanismes supplémentaires, l'Initiative pourrait devenir un accord de plus non mis en œuvre. Un autre a dit au Groupe d'experts : « Je ne signerais pas le consensus Tumaini si les mécanismes de contrôle et de mise en œuvre sont supprimés ; je retournerais dans la brousse »⁶⁵. Paul Malong (Ssi.008) a souligné que si un nouvel accord était élaboré et simplement intégré dans l'accord de 2018, qui avait échoué, cela compromettrait l'Initiative de Tumaini⁶⁶.

44. Après une série de consultations, un compromis a été proposé : les éléments de l'accord de paix de 2018 non appliqués ont été ajoutés à une matrice de mise en œuvre pour l'Initiative Tumaini en cours d'élaboration⁶⁷.

IV. Questions régionales

A. Réactions régionales à la prorogation de la période de transition

45. Les États Membres de la région et les organisations régionales continuent de jouer un rôle essentiel pour ce qui est de régler les problèmes au Soudan du Sud, comme le montre clairement le rôle de premier plan du Kenya dans l'Initiative Tumaini. La décision de proroger la période de transition et de reporter les élections de deux autres années a suscité différentes réactions dans la région.

46. Dans une déclaration, le Secrétaire exécutif de l'Autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement (IGAD) a salué la « manière consensuelle » dont la décision avait été prise et a demandé instamment au Gouvernement provisoire d'union nationale de tout faire pour exécuter les tâches fixées dans l'accord de paix qui n'ont pas encore été accomplies afin que les élections puissent avoir lieu aux dates prévues⁶⁸. Il a noté que les élections étaient reportées pour la quatrième fois et qu'un plan d'action concret devait donc maintenant être établi sans tarder.

47. Le Président de la Commission de l'Union africaine a fait une déclaration similaire. Il y a pris note de la décision du Gouvernement de proroger la période de transition, tout en affirmant que des mesures concrètes devaient être prises afin que l'accord de paix soit appliqué dans son intégralité⁶⁹.

⁶³ Ibid. Rapport du Comité permanent de haut niveau, en date du 7 octobre 2024, examiné par le Groupe d'experts.

⁶⁴ Entretiens avec des parties à l'Initiative Tumaini, octobre 2024.

⁶⁵ Entretiens avec une partie à l'Initiative Tumaini, octobre 2024.

⁶⁶ Entretiens avec Paul Malong (Ssi.008), octobre 2024.

⁶⁷ Entretiens avec des parties à l'Initiative Tumaini, octobre 2024.

⁶⁸ IGAD, « IGAD Executive Secretary's Statement on the Extension of South Sudan's Transitional Period and Call for Renewed Efforts in Implementing the Revitalized Peace Agreement », 23 septembre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://igad.int/igad-executive-secretarys-statement-on-the-extension-of-south-sudans-transitional-period-and-call-for-renewed-efforts-in-implementing-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/>.

⁶⁹ Union africaine, « AUC Chairperson statement regarding the extended political transition in South Sudan » », 21 septembre 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240921/chairperson-statement-regarding-extended-political-transition-south-sudan>.

48. Dans une déclaration conjointe, la Mission de l'Union africaine au Soudan du Sud, l'IGAD et la MINUSS ont noté que la période de transition avait dû être prorogée une deuxième fois car « des critères de référence essentiels n'avaient pas été remplis »⁷⁰.

B. Dialogue avec les États de la région

49. Les dirigeants du Soudan du Sud, et le Président en particulier, ont poursuivi un programme de dialogue régional, le conflit au Soudan et les relations du Soudan du Sud avec l'Ouganda se révélant être des points de discussion particulièrement saillants.

50. Comme le groupe d'experts l'a précédemment signalé, le Gouvernement sud-soudanais continue de prendre part aux efforts de médiation concernant le conflit au Soudan, notamment dans le cadre de plusieurs rencontres entre le Président et Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Président du Conseil souverain au Soudan. Les deux dirigeants ont parlé d'un plan commun visant à protéger le passage des exportations de pétrole du Soudan du Sud et à faire face à la crise humanitaire au Soudan, ainsi que de questions de sécurité communes, notamment la criminalité transfrontière⁷¹.

51. Il ressort d'entretiens menés par le Groupe d'experts que, d'un côté, des éléments des Forces d'appui rapide restent présents dans certaines parties de l'État du Bahr el-Ghazal occidental, de l'autre, Djouba maintient des relations fortes avec le Mouvement populaire de libération du Soudan-Nord⁷², les Forces armées soudanaises et les Forces d'appui rapide, notamment en ce qui concerne le passage du pétrole sud-soudanais⁷³.

52. Le 26 mars 2024, Lawrence Korbandy, du Sud-Soudan, un allié proche du Président, a été nommé Envoyé spécial de l'IGAD pour le Soudan, ce qui a alimenté l'espoir que le Soudan du Sud pourrait jouer un rôle de premier plan en aidant à négocier un règlement du conflit au Soudan⁷⁴.

53. Les dirigeants du Soudan du Sud ont également continué d'avoir des échanges avec l'Éthiopie, notamment en ce qui concerne la construction d'infrastructures, des routes par exemple, et un autre itinéraire pour transporter du pétrole sud-soudanais vers Djibouti en passant par l'Éthiopie⁷⁵.

⁷⁰ Voir <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/joint-press-release-aumiss-igad-and-unmiss-note-decision-to-extend-transitional-period-of>.

⁷¹ Déclarations du Cabinet du Président, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts.

⁷² Voir S/2023/922 et S/2024/343.

⁷³ Entretiens avec des observateurs internationaux et locaux, des représentants des autorités locales, des représentants de groupes armés étrangers présents au Soudan du Sud et des civils qui ont eu des contacts avec des éléments des Forces d'appui rapide au Soudan du Sud, mai et octobre 2024.

⁷⁴ IGAD, « IGAD Executive Secretary Announces the Appointment of Hon. Lawrence Korbandy as Special Envoy for Sudan », 26 mars 2024, disponible à l'adresse suivante : <https://igad.int/igad-appoints-hon-lawrence-korbandy-as-special-envoy-for-sudan/>.

⁷⁵ Voir *Sudan Tribune*, « Ethiopia, South Sudan agree to build alternate oil pipeline route », 7 juillet 2024 ; *Eye Radio*, « Ethiopia challenges South Sudan to road construction race », 15 février 2024.

V. Armes

A. Présence des Forces de défense populaires de l'Ouganda sur le territoire sud-soudanais

54. Le Groupe d'experts a constaté que des membres des Forces de défense populaires de l'Ouganda (UPDF) menaient des activités militaires non négligeables dans au moins trois régions du Soudan du Sud. Dans chaque cas, quelques membres au moins des UPDF étaient dotés de matériel militaire létal. Au paragraphe 4 de sa résolution 2428 (2018), récemment renouvelée par la résolution 2731 (2024), le Conseil de sécurité interdit le transfert de matériel militaire létal sur le territoire du Soudan du Sud⁷⁶. De ce fait, la présence des UPDF au Soudan du Sud représente une violation de l'embargo sur les armes.

55. Dans les deux États de l'Équatoria limitrophes de l'Ouganda, plusieurs déploiements semblent être liés à des conflits locaux relatifs à la démarcation de la frontière.

56. En août 2024, par exemple, plusieurs soldats armés des UPDF ont détenu temporairement entre 6 et 12 civils dans le comté de Kajo Kaji, dans l'État de l'Équatoria central, à la suite de tensions locales focalisées sur un projet de construction de routes dont les maîtres d'œuvre étaient protégés par les UPDF. Des soldats ougandais auraient affirmé que ces terres faisaient partie de l'Ouganda⁷⁷. Dans une déclaration faite par la suite, les autorités locales sud-soudanaises ont établi une liste comprenant plus de 100 villages dans le comté de Kajo Kaji sur lesquels, selon elles, les forces ougandaises empièteraient régulièrement⁷⁸.

57. Des soldats armés des UPDF « en [tenue] de combat complète »⁷⁹ auraient également pénétré dans des localités de l'État de l'Équatoria-Oriental « à bord de gros camions »⁸⁰ en juillet 2024. Ils ont été accusés par les populations locales de mener des patrouilles ainsi que de harceler les civils et de les forcer à partir. Des représentants des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple ont affirmé que les UPDF avaient détenu plusieurs de leurs soldats⁸¹. Dans un cas, en juillet, dans l'État de l'Équatoria-Oriental, entre 11 et 21 nationaux sud-soudanais ont été tués par des forces ougandaises puis accusés d'être des braconniers⁸².

58. Le 28 septembre 2024, le chef des forces de défense des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), s'est rendu en Ouganda pour

⁷⁶ Le Groupe d'experts a présenté des informations sur plusieurs violations de ce type dans les rapports S/2020/342, S/2020/1141, S/2019/897 et S/2018/1049.

⁷⁷ Entretiens avec des représentants des autorités locales et de la jeunesse menés par des observateurs, examinés par le Groupe d'experts, août 2024. Informations corroborées par une vidéo obtenue par le Groupe d'experts. Voir également annexe 28. Voir également, Eye Radio, « Uganda provokes another encroachment in Kajo-Keji », 7 août 2024.

⁷⁸ Voir annexe 29.

⁷⁹ Eye Radio, « UPDF rounds up Magwi villagers, threatens them to evacuate – official », 20 août 2024.

⁸⁰ Entretien avec un observateur local dans l'État de l'Équatoria-Oriental, octobre 2024. Voir également Eye Radio, « Ugandan army reportedly encroaches into South Sudan's Magwi », 11 juillet 2024.

⁸¹ Ibid. Voir également annexe 30 ; Radio Tamazuji, « South Sudan tells Uganda to free detained soldiers », 21 juillet 2024.

⁸² Entretien avec un observateur local dans l'État de l'Équatoria-Oriental, octobre 2024. Informations corroborées par celles communiquées par des observateurs internationaux, examinées par le Groupe d'experts, août 2024. Voir également, Eye Radio, « Ugandan wildlife rangers allegedly killed 21 S. Sudanese poachers », 23 juillet 2024, et Number One Citizen, « Budi murder: Lobong, ministers to face MPs », 30 juillet 2024.

rencontrer son homologue des UPDF, le général Muhoozi Kainerugaba⁸³. Dans un communiqué de presse, les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple ont noté que les parties avaient convenu que les « UPDF cesse[raient] d’empiéter sur les territoires sud-soudanais »⁸⁴.

59. Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004) fait l’objet d’une interdiction de voyager depuis le 1^{er} juillet 2015, comme suite au régime des sanctions établi par le Conseil de sécurité dans sa résolution 2206 (2015). Aucune demande de dérogation n’a été soumise conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 11 de la résolution 2206 (2015), et le voyage qu’il a effectué représente donc une violation de l’interdiction de voyager.

60. Parallèlement aux tensions transfrontalières dans les États de l’Équatoria, des déploiements non négligeables des UPDF ont été constatés par le Groupe d’experts en juillet et août 2024 dans l’État du Bahr el-Ghazal occidental dans le cadre d’opérations conjointes avec les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple et le Service national de sécurité⁸⁵.

61. Le Groupe d’experts a recueilli le témoignage de diverses sources dans la région. Plusieurs d’entre elles ont également décrit les aéronefs et les hélicoptères qui avaient été utilisés pour le déploiement des forces et du matériel ougandais⁸⁶. Ces témoignages ont en partie été corroborés par des photographies examinées par le Groupe d’experts, qui a identifié au moins un aéronef immatriculé en Ouganda, un avion-cargo Lockheed L-100 Hercules, qui était souvent utilisé dans la zone au moment du déploiement⁸⁷.

62. Certaines des opérations de sécurité menées conjointement par l’Ouganda et le Soudan du Sud auraient ciblé des éléments de l’Armée de résistance du Seigneur opérant dans les régions frontalières de la République centrafricaine, du Soudan du Sud et du Soudan⁸⁸.

63. Après que le déploiement a été critiqué au niveau local et qu’il a été noté avec préoccupation que des forces avaient été embarquées dans un conflit avec des éléments des Forces d’appui rapide soudanaises qui avaient également été observées dans la zone, des sources du secteur de la sécurité sud-soudanais ont indiqué que le Service national de sécurité avait dissuadé les UPDF d’établir une présence plus permanente dans la zone⁸⁹.

⁸³ Voir annexes 31 et 32.

⁸⁴ Voir annexe 31.

⁸⁵ Entretiens avec trois observateurs locaux et un agent du secteur de la sécurité, octobre 2024. Voir également, *Sudans Post*, « Lawmaker says Kiir’s office involved in Ugandan army encroachment », 2 septembre 2024 ; Radio Tamazuj, « Questions over presence of Ugandan soldiers in Raja », 16 août 2024.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Voir annexe 33.

⁸⁸ Entretiens avec des observateurs internationaux et locaux et un agent du secteur de la sécurité dans l’État du Bahr el-Ghazal occidental, octobre 2024. Voir également un message des UPDF posté dans les médias sociaux le 20 août 2024, disponible à l’adresse suivante : https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213.

⁸⁹ Entretiens avec deux observateurs locaux et un agent du secteur de la sécurité, octobre 2024.

B. Achat de véhicules militaires

64. Le 13 août 2024, une entreprise privée située en dehors du Soudan du Sud a annoncé qu'elle avait « conclu un accord pour fournir des véhicules à l'armée du Soudan du Sud » en vue de répondre à ses « besoins opérationnels »⁹⁰.

65. Le 19 août 2024, un porte-parole des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple a cependant démenti cette affirmation⁹¹. Les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple ont confirmé que l'entreprise avait rencontré leur directeur général chargé des achats, mais uniquement pour une évaluation générale des capacités de l'entreprise. Dans leur démenti, les Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple ont noté qu'elles étaient « toujours visées par un embargo sur les armes », ce qui porte à croire que les dispositions relatives à l'embargo sur les armes établi par la résolution 2428 (2018) du Conseil de sécurité et récemment renouvelé par la résolution 2731 (2024) pouvaient s'appliquer aux véhicules qu'il était proposé de fournir. Le Groupe d'experts a déjà fait état de véhicules blindés de transport de troupes achetés en violation de l'embargo sur les armes⁹².

66. Les « véhicules militaires » sont soumis à l'embargo sur les armes établi par le paragraphe 4 de la résolution 2428 (2018) du Conseil de sécurité, mais, conformément au paragraphe 5 f), cette mesure peut ne pas être appliquée sous réserve de l'approbation préalable du Comité. Le paragraphe 2 de la résolution 2683 (2023) du Conseil, récemment réaffirmé par le paragraphe 1 de la résolution 2731 (2024), autorise également l'importation de matériel militaire « non létal » ne devant servir « qu'à appuyer la mise en œuvre des dispositions de l'accord de paix », sans qu'il ne soit nécessaire de soumettre de demande de dérogation ou de notification au Comité.

67. Faisant suite de manière constructive à la demande de renseignements du Groupe d'experts, l'entreprise a déclaré ne pas avoir discuté de la fourniture de véhicules de l'une quelconque des catégories soumises à l'embargo sur les armes et que, en tout état de cause, elle avait « décidé de ne pas poursuivre les discussions »⁹³.

C. Achat d'armes par les groupes de l'opposition

68. Le Groupe d'experts continue d'enquêter sur les efforts que les groupes de l'opposition font pour se procurer des armes en violation de l'embargo sur les armes, notamment les efforts déployés par Abraham Chol Keech et Peter Biar Ajak, ressortissants sud-soudanais inculpés en mars 2024 aux États-Unis d'Amérique d'entente en vue d'acheter des armes dans l'intention de fomenter un coup au Soudan du Sud⁹⁴. Ces deux personnes auraient cherché à se procurer diverses armes, notamment des systèmes portables de défense antiaérienne FIM-92 « Stinger »⁹⁵ et des grenades M-67⁹⁶, et se seraient renseignées sur les systèmes d'armes antichars FGM-148 Javelin. D'après des documents judiciaires⁹⁷, « le défendeur a demandé à plusieurs reprises ... que lui soient fournis des systèmes de missiles Stinger – pour mettre hors service les hélicoptères militaires sud-soudanais. ... De même, il a

⁹⁰ Déclarations publiques faites par l'entreprise, puis révisées ou supprimées, conservées dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts. Confirmé également par une correspondance avec l'entreprise.

⁹¹ Voir annexe 34.

⁹² Voir S/2024/343, S/2023/294 et S/2022/359.

⁹³ Correspondance du Groupe d'experts avec l'entreprise.

⁹⁴ Voir S/2024/343.

⁹⁵ Plus précisément, cinq systèmes portables de défense antiaérienne.

⁹⁶ Voir annexe 35.

⁹⁷ Voir https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al_azdce-24-00394_0022.0.pdf.

également [déclaré] avoir besoin d'armes antichars pour mettre hors service les 13 à 15 chars en état de marche au Soudan du Sud ». Cela montre que les capacités blindées et aériennes des Forces sud-soudanaises de défense du peuple sont un sujet de préoccupation particulière.

VI. Ressources financières et naturelles

A. Perturbation persistante des exportations de pétrole

69. Le 25 septembre 2024, le Ministre sud-soudanais des finances et de la planification, Marial Dongrin Ater, a présenté le budget pour l'exercice 2024/25 à l'Assemblée législative nationale provisoire du Soudan du Sud⁹⁸. Il a rappelé la rupture de l'oléoduc transportant le mélange Dar de pétrole brut à Port-Soudan (Soudan) qui avait eu lieu en février 2024⁹⁹ et à la suite de laquelle les exportations de pétrole brut du Soudan du Sud ont considérablement diminué, passant d'environ 150 000 barils par jour à seulement 45 000 barils par jour. Compte tenu de la place centrale qu'occupent les exportations de pétrole dans l'économie du pays, le Ministre a souligné que « la perturbation persistante de la production et de l'exportation de pétrole brut est une question de sécurité nationale »¹⁰⁰.

70. Le 20 octobre 2024, une délégation de responsables sud-soudanais s'est rendue à Port-Soudan pour rencontrer le Président du Conseil souverain au Soudan, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, et d'autres responsables, afin de parler de l'action menée pour réparer l'oléoduc¹⁰¹. Les responsables soudanais ont dit à la délégation sud-soudanaise qui avait fait le déplacement que les préparatifs nécessaires à la reprise des exportations de pétrole brut sud-soudanais avaient été effectués. Plusieurs spécialistes ont confirmé au Groupe d'experts que les réparations techniques avaient probablement été faites, mais ont noté que la vidange complète de l'oléoduc réparé pourrait prendre un peu plus de temps, de même que la reprise de la pleine production dans les champs pétrolifères du Haut-Nil, où plusieurs sous-traitants avaient été démobilisés¹⁰².

71. Toutefois, la recherche d'un accord politique concernant le partage, entre les parties au conflit au Soudan, des recettes tirées de la reprise de toute exportation de pétrole constitue un plus gros obstacle¹⁰³. Il ressort des entretiens menés par le Groupe d'experts que les Forces armées soudanaises ont cherché à renégocier les droits dont le Soudan du Sud doit s'acquitter pour l'utilisation de l'oléoduc et d'autres infrastructures pétrolières. Dans le même temps, des représentants des Forces d'appui

⁹⁸ Discours sur le budget pour l'année fiscale 2024/2025, en date du 25 septembre 2024, conservé dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts. Le budget a été présenté tardivement, car l'année financière 2024/25 a commencé le 1^{er} juillet 2024. En octobre 2024, la deuxième lecture du budget n'avait pas encore eu lieu.

⁹⁹ Voir [S/2023/922](#) et [S/2024/343](#).

¹⁰⁰ Discours sur le budget pour l'année fiscale 2024/2025, en date du 25 septembre 2024, conservé dans les dossiers du Groupe d'experts.

¹⁰¹ Déclaration du Cabinet du Président du Soudan du Sud.

¹⁰² Entretiens avec des représentants des pouvoirs publics sud-soudanais et soudanais et des acteurs de l'industrie pétrolière sud-soudanaise, septembre et octobre 2024. Au moment de l'établissement du présent rapport, en octobre 2024, les exportations n'avaient pas repris.

¹⁰³ Voir [S/2023/922](#)

rapide ont exigé une part des recettes tirées de toute reprise des exportations de pétrole¹⁰⁴.

72. La perturbation persistante des exportations de pétrole depuis le Soudan du Sud a poussé le Gouvernement à envisager d'autres voies d'exportation, notamment la construction d'un nouvel oléoduc vers Djibouti¹⁰⁵. Des efforts ont également été faits pour diversifier l'assiette des recettes publiques du Soudan du Sud. L'extraction de l'or, en particulier, est considérée comme une priorité par les pouvoirs publics, tant au niveau national que local¹⁰⁶.

B. Recettes pétrolières de plus en plus disputées à Djouba

73. En l'absence d'exportations de mélange Dar, le petit nombre de cargaisons (une ou deux)¹⁰⁷ de mélange Nil que le Gouvernement peut encore mettre sur le marché chaque mois est de plus en plus disputé¹⁰⁸. La procédure officielle de mise aux enchères est utilisée pour fixer le prix des cargaisons de pétrole, mais souvent des personnes au sein du Cabinet du Président décident à quelles entreprises celles-ci finiront par être attribuées¹⁰⁹.

74. Le produit du mélange du Nil est généralement alloué au programme « pétrole contre routes », dont la mise en œuvre est principalement confiée à une société contrôlée par un des envoyés spéciaux du Président¹¹⁰. Les membres du Parlement sud-soudanais et plusieurs ministères ont toutefois demandé instamment que ces paiements soient suspendus et que la préférence soit donnée aux salaires et aux autres dépenses publiques essentielles¹¹¹. Les négociants internationaux en matières premières ont également continué à payer par anticipation, plusieurs mois à l'avance, les futures cargaisons de pétrole brut¹¹².

75. Dans le même temps, plusieurs entreprises sud-soudanaises se sont vu attribuer le contrôle de cargaisons de pétrole et ont tenté de les vendre sur le marché, tout en conservant le produit de la vente comme paiement de biens et services fournis au Gouvernement¹¹³. Une de ces entreprises disant être une entreprise de construction est gérée par deux personnes qui travaillaient auparavant avec une société facilitant

¹⁰⁴ Entretiens avec des représentants des pouvoirs publics sud-soudanais et soudanais et des acteurs de l'industrie pétrolière sud-soudanaise, septembre et octobre 2024. Le budget 2024/25 du Soudan du Sud repose sur l'hypothèse que des droits d'un montant de 52 millions de dollars environ seront versés au Soudan.

¹⁰⁵ Entretiens avec des représentants des pouvoirs publics et des acteurs de l'industrie pétrolière, octobre 2024. Voir également Eye Radio, « Sudan makes preparations to export South Sudan crude oil », 21 octobre 2024.

¹⁰⁶ Entretiens avec des représentants des pouvoirs publics et de la société civile. Voir également *Number One Citizen Daily*, « Kapoeta gold rush: South Sudan's silent trade that fuels inequality », 7 septembre 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Une cargaison de pétrole brut représente environ 600 000 barils.

¹⁰⁸ Entretiens avec des personnes connaissant l'industrie pétrolière du Soudan du Sud, septembre et octobre 2024.

¹⁰⁹ Entretiens avec des représentants des pouvoirs publics et des acteurs du secteur privé ; informations corroborées par des documents examinés par le Groupe d'experts, septembre et octobre 2024.

¹¹⁰ Voir S/2024/343.

¹¹¹ Entretiens avec des représentants du secteur privé et de la société civile, septembre et octobre 2024. Voir également, par exemple, *Number One Citizen Daily*, « MP proposes suspension of Oil for roads project fund », 5 septembre 2024.

¹¹² Entretiens avec des personnes connaissant l'industrie pétrolière du Soudan du Sud, septembre et octobre 2024.

¹¹³ Ibid.

l'importation de véhicules blindés de transport de troupes au Sud-Soudan¹¹⁴. Une autre entreprise de ce type est gérée par l'ancien Directeur exécutif du Cabinet du Président. Ni l'une ni l'autre n'apparaît dans la liste des soumissionnaires approuvés pour le pétrole sud-soudanais. Une cargaison de pétrole attribuée à la seconde lui a par la suite été retirée pour cette raison¹¹⁵.

76. L'article 4.8.1.10 de l'accord de paix sud-soudanais et la section 6.2 de la loi relative à la gestion des recettes pétrolières, prévoient que tout paiement lié au pétrole doit être effectué par virement sur un compte unique réservé aux recettes pétrolières et n'autorisent pas les acheteurs à verser des fonds directement à des sociétés privées contre du pétrole attribué par le Gouvernement¹¹⁶.

77. Les incidences économiques de la baisse des recettes pétrolières ne sont que partiellement prises en compte dans le budget 2024/25 du Soudan du Sud¹¹⁷. Le montant total des recettes publiques qui y sont prévues s'élève à 2 600 milliards de livres sud-soudanaises alors que les dépenses inscrites au budget s'élèvent à 4 100 milliards de livres sud-soudanaises. Ainsi près de la moitié des dépenses prévues ne seront pas couvertes si les exportations de pétrole ne reprennent pas pleinement. Plus d'un tiers du budget total est affecté au paiement des salaires, y compris les arriérés, 70 % environ des salaires étant versés au secteur de la sécurité. Le budget reste également fortement axé sur les institutions qui emploient les personnes prenant part au processus de paix, le montant des ressources affectées au Parlement représentant près du triple de celui de l'ensemble des ressources allouées au secteur de la santé¹¹⁸.

VII. Conclusion

78. Les dirigeants du Soudan du Sud sont aux prises avec de multiples problèmes qui s'aggravent. Ils se sont créés certains d'entre eux et d'autres résultent de sérieux chocs extérieurs. Un appui régional et international soutenu sera nécessaire afin que de véritables progrès soient faits dans la mise en œuvre des réformes requises pour que la population retrouve confiance dans son gouvernement tout en facilitant l'aide humanitaire et le développement durable.

VII. Recommandations

79. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concernant le Soudan du Sud encourage le Gouvernement sud-soudanais à :

a) tout faire pour faciliter la fourniture d'une aide humanitaire en éliminant les obstacles bureaucratiques, en empêchant les attaques contre les acteurs humanitaires et leurs ressources et en facilitant la libre circulation dans toutes les régions, notamment le long du Nil ;

b) tout faire pour allouer l'ensemble des ressources nécessaires pour mener à bonne fin la formation et le déploiement des Forces unifiées nécessaires restantes, harmoniser sa structure de commandement et prévenir de nouvelles défections au cours de la période de transition ;

¹¹⁴ Voir [S/2024/343](#) et annexe 36.

¹¹⁵ Voir annexe 36.

¹¹⁶ Voir également annexe 37.

¹¹⁷ Budget pour l'année financière 2024/25, tel que présenté au Parlement le 25 septembre 2024.

¹¹⁸ Voir également annexe 38.

c) publier de nouveau régulièrement des rapports sur la commercialisation du pétrole, conformément au chapitre 9 de la loi sur la gestion des recettes pétrolières du Soudan du Sud¹¹⁹, ainsi que d'autres documents budgétaires, y compris les rapports trimestriels sur les dépenses, comme suite à la reprise éventuelle des exportations de pétrole (mélange Dar).

80. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité encourage le Gouvernement ougandais à se prévaloir des dérogations prévues dans les résolutions [2206 \(2015\)](#) et [2428 \(2018\)](#) du Conseil de sécurité, qui les a récemment renouvelées par sa résolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), si celui-ci envisage de transférer du matériel militaire légal vers le territoire du Soudan du Sud et facilite le voyage de personnes visées par les mesures restrictives établies par ces résolutions.

81. Le Groupe d'experts recommande que le Comité envisage d'élaborer une notice d'aide à l'application concernant l'embargo sur les armes dans laquelle figureraient des informations complémentaires, également à l'intention du Gouvernement sud-soudanais et des fournisseurs potentiels, sur les termes « matériel militaire non légal » et qui ne devraient servir « qu'à appuyer la mise en œuvre des dispositions de l'accord de paix », en particulier en ce qui concerne les véhicules utilisés par l'armée et la police.

¹¹⁹ Voir annexe 37.

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Annex 1: List of abbreviations

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NASU	National Salvation United Forces
NSS	National Security Service
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

Annex 2: Partial data on flood-related impacts

The following is representative data of the impact of flooding. It does not capture the full extent of the impacts.

Reported displacement:¹²⁰

- About 271,000 displaced by floods across South Sudan as of mid-October
- Jonglei – Tens of thousands reported displaced in Pochalla, Ayod, Twic East, Uror, Fangak in September
- Northern Bahr el Ghazal – almost 155,000 people impacted across four counties in September
- More than 6,000 flood-displaced households identified in Unity state in September
- In parts of Upper Nile, figures of flood and conflict displaced people revised to nearly 20,000 in September

Impact on schools:

- 127 schools reported damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024¹²¹
- In Unity, 65 schools submerged due to floods, affecting 20,214 students¹²²

Impact on health facilities:

- 29 health facilities damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024¹²³
- 58 health facilities submerged in five counties, and nearly 90 others inaccessible¹²⁴

Impact on water points:

- 103 water points rendered unusable in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024¹²⁵

Impact on agriculture and farmlands:

- 53,100 farmers and cattle keepers lost crops and livestock in September¹²⁶
- In Mayendit County, Unity State, about 4,275 hectares of farmland submerged as of mid-September¹²⁷
- In Jur River in Western Bahr el Ghazal, more than 150,000 acres of farmland were destroyed¹²⁸

¹²⁰ UN OCHA, South Sudan: Floods Snapshot (as of 18 October 2024), available from: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-floods-snapshot-18-october-2024> and UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 4 (As of 18 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-4-18-september-2024>

¹²³ UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

¹²⁴ WHO, Severe flooding compounds health crisis in South Sudan, 21 October 2024: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/severe-flooding-compounds-health-crisis-south-sudan>

¹²⁵ UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 3 (as of 12 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-3-12-september-2024>

¹²⁸ Ibid.

Annex 3: Images of flooding at Bentiu IDP camp and Rubkona airfield





Image depicts the airstrip in Rubkona, the UNMISS Internally Displaced Persons camp, and the UNMISS base, all in Unity State, surrounded by water. Image date 28 October 2024.

Source: Planet Labs PBC

Annex 4: Press statement on waterway dredging, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 8 June 2022




screening of the project sites there after develop TORs for the conduct of the ESIA and any relevant studies. Following the development of the TORs, a tender for the conduct of the ESIA will be advertised and Environmental Firms or Individual consultants will bid and those vetted and deemed qualified by the ministry will be awarded the contracts to conduct the assessments and studies. They will then submit their reports to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry for review and endorsement. If the report(s) concludes that the projects have no, minimal or severe environmental or social impacts, with recommended mitigation measures in place, then a letter of no Objection will be issued and the project will commence.


Therefore since the above process has not commenced, any dredging of the rivers is illegal.

On the resumption of the Jonglei Canal to drain the Sudd Wetland to mitigate floods, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry will not approve the resumption or completion of the Canal because of the Ecosystems services that Sudd provides to our nation, the region and the world.

Finally rest assured that such projects are not the remit of a single ministry and that's why as a cross-cutting ministry with the mandate of protecting and conserving our environment, no project with such a magnitude without the clearance of the ministry is to be implemented.




Annex 5: Image of waterways in Unity State




Source: Planet Labs PBC. Image date 28 October 2024

Partial river clearing operations were conducted downstream (north) on the Bahr el Ghazal River, which flows past Bentiu town in Unity State. However, the accumulation of vegetation upstream, near the low-lying bridge, has blocked water flow into the dredged sections of the river.

Annex 6: Republican orders reshuffling senior SSPDF command positions, October 2024





SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES
Chief of Defence Forces

RSS/SSPDF/CDF/10/2024/115

10th October, 2024

Lt. Gen Malual Majok Chengkuach
 A/CDF for Administration, Personnel & Finance
 SSPDF GHQs-Bilpham, Juba

Ref: Republican Order No: RSS/RO/J/13/2024 and RSS/RO/J/14/2024

Reference to the Republican Order No: 13/2024 and 14/2024 for the reshuffling deployment and transfer of officers within the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) here attached and has come in to force with immediate effect.

1. Maj. Gen. Lual Wek Guem transferred from Tiger Division to 1st Infantry Division as Commander
2. Maj. Gen. Abraham Gum Makuac transferred from 1st Infantry Division to Tiger Division as Commander

Hence this is referred to you esteem office for implementation and circulation to all units with immediate reception of this today.

Best regards

Signed 10/10/2024

Gen. Santino Deng Wol Chok
 Chief of Defence Forces
 SSPDF GHQS, Bilpham - Juba



Copies Furnished:

- File



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
The President

RSS/RO/J/13/2024


7th October 2024

TRANSFER OF AN OFFICER FROM THE TIGER DIVISION OF THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) TO THE GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS OF THE SSPDF.

Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 27(1) of the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act, 2009, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF do hereby **Transfer Maj. Gen. Lual Wek Guem Maroidit from being the Commander of Tiger Division of the SSPDF to the General Head Quarters of the SSPDF.**

Signed under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba, this Seventh Day of the Month of October in the Year 2024.

**Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President,
Commander -In- Chief of the SSPDF,
Republic of South Sudan,
Juba.**



**Annex 7: Statement by former Director General of the Internal Security Bureau,
10 October 2024**

10th October, 2024

**Subject: Letter of Appreciation to H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President and C-In-C of SSPDF and all other Organized Forces,
Republic of South Sudan**

First and foremost, I would like to appreciate H.E. the President for the opportunity and the trust he bestowed upon me during my thirteen (13) years of service as the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB).

Your Excellency, it was an honour to serve under your Comradeship in one of the most sensitive and important institutions in the country. It was through your guidance and directives, that I was able to deliver and achieve some of the assigned tasks within the Service. I have cherished every moment of it.

Secondly, H.E. the President is a mentor and one of the role models who, without his unwavering support, I would not have succeeded in the Service during my tenure.

Despite my little disappointment following my recent appointment to the Gubernatorial position as Governor of Warrap State, its subsequent revocation and the ensuing rumours flying around, I want to assure the public that I am one of those cadres trained, tested, committed and loyal to the Revolution. I will never deviate from the line of the Revolution. One of the basic principles of the cadres of the Revolution is that a cadre is the first to attack and the last to withdraw. We are still at the phase of being attacked as a Revolution and therefore I will be the last to withdraw.

Lastly, allow me to reiterate to your top echelon, my sincere gratitude and steadfastness in supporting your able leadership.

Kind Regards,

 10/10/2024

Gen. Akol Koof Kuc,
Former DG of ISB and also Former Governor-Designate of Warrap State

Annex 8: Partial list of known defections from the National Salvation Front (NAS)

In May 2023, operational commander John Latio Kenyi Loburong defected from NAS to government.

In February 2024, Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong defected to government.

In May 2024, nine commissioned and non-commissioned NAS officers defected and joined the SSPDF in Yei.¹²⁹

In August 2024, forces under the command of former NAS zonal commander, Emmanuel Salah Juma, deployed under the command of the SSPDF to Dollo Payam in Central Equatoria.¹³⁰


On 9 September, Asiki Samson, a former SPLA-IO and SSNMC commander who later joined NAS, split from NAS and offered to join the SSPDF in Morobo in southern Central Equatoria.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Reports from field observers in Yei, obtained by the Panel. May 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, NAS officers denounce rebellion, 7 May 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/05/07/nas-officers-denounce-rebellion/>

¹³⁰ Field report by international monitors, obtained by the Panel, August 2024. See also, South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 1,500 NAS soldiers join SSPDF in Kudra, Central Equatoria, 17 August 2024: https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view_clip_email/779593/56/0

¹³¹ Reports from local observers, September 2024. Interview with Thomas Cirillo, October 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, Morobo receives NAS defectors, 25 September 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/09/25/morobo-receives-nas-defectors/>

Annex 9: Parliamentary summons letter, 29 May 2024




For the purpose of this meeting, the following TNLA's specialized Committees and representatives of relevant institutions and Mechanisms shall be invited:

1. Public Accounts Committee (PAC), (four members)
2. Finance and Planning Committee (FPC), (Four members)
3. Governance Assurance, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (GAME), (four members)
4. National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC), (two Members)
5. National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), (two members)
6. Judicial Reform Committee (JRC), (two members)

The meeting shall take place on:
Date: Monday, 3rd June, 2024
Time: 3:00 Pm
Venue: TNLA's Blue Room

Best Regards



Rt. Hon Oyet Nathaniel Pierino
First Deputy Speaker
TNLA/RSS/Juba

- Cc: Rt. Hon Speaker
- Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Administration and Finance
- Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Welfare
- Cc: Clerk
- Cc: Legal Advisor
- Cc: NCRC, NCAC, JRC
- CC: TNLA's PAC, GAME, Finance and Planning.
- Cc: File

Annex 10: Summary Report on the payment of \$10 million to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 6 June 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
First Deputy Speaker**

Date: 6th June 2024

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE TNLA LEADERSHIP WITH THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CABINET AFFAIRS AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF SOUTH SUDAN ON THE PAYMENT OF USD 10,000,000 (SSP: 15,322,939,000) TO THE MINISTRY OF CABINET AFFAIRS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIORITY PROVISION OF THE R-ARCSS AND THE ROADMAP SPECIAL PROJECTS

INTRODUCTION

1. The TNLA received petition from the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms in late April 2024 regarding controversial payments of USD 10,000,000 allocated to NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc.
2. The TNLA made consultations with relevant institutions including the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Bank of South Sudan etc on the credibility of the petition and the report of payments.
3. The TNLA obtained a letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject: "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects".
4. The letter from the Ministry of Finance and Planning indicated that the fund in question was to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Special Projects of the Roadmap. Attached to the letter was a document of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs outlining allocations to the following beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms:



Page 1 of 5

Email: nla1stdeputyspeaker@gmail.com | Telephone: +211 (0) 920 085 551

S/No	Institutions	Total amount in USD	Total amount in SSP
1.	National Constitutional Amendment Committee	1,871,340	1,871,340,000
2.	Constitutional Making Process (10% the of budget)	3,583,887.73	3,583,887,725
3.	National Human Right Council	1,052,000	1,052,000,000
4.	Judicial Reform Committee	999,380	999,380,000
5.	2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears	1,000,000	1,000,000,000
6.	Popularization of the Agreement on the Roadmap (R-ARCSS)	945,871.57	945,871,575

AUTHORITY AND MANDATE

5. Pursuant to TCRSS, 2011 (as amended), Article 82 (1) (3), and the TNLA Conduct of Business Regulations, 2011 (Amended 2021), Regulations; 8(1)(c)(d), 133, 134 & 135, the TNLA leadership involving relevant Specialized Committees of Public Accounts (PAC), Finance and Economic Planning, Government Assurances, Monitoring and Evaluation (GAME) convened a meeting on 29th May 2024 and summoned the Ministers of Cabinet Affairs, Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan to clarify and resolved the matter of payments to the relevant institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanism; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. The representatives of these beneficiary Institutions and mechanisms were also invited.

FINDINGS

The outcome of the meeting of the First Summon which was attended by the Ministers of Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, representatives of the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC, and the Second Summon for the Minister of Cabinet affairs which was attended also by representatives of the aforementioned beneficiary institutions and the Minister of Cabinet Affairs were as follows:

- 1) **Confirmation** by the Ministry of Finance and Planning of the letter of the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
- 2) **Confirmation** by the Bank of South Sudan of receipt of the letter from the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to the Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects' SSP Account (General Secretariat) 00269122001036.
- 3) **Confirmation** that, on the 8th April 2024, an equivalent of SSP 15,322,939,000 was deposited in SSP Account No. 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939
- 4) **Confirmation that** on 16th April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-



- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.2423
- 5) **Confirmation that** on 23rd April 2024 , the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.5358
 - 6) **Confirmation that** on 13th May 2024 , the Bank of South Sudan received authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 to transfer the amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No. 00269121269233
 - 7) **Confirmation that** from date 13th – 31st May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawals) occurred on the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs- Special Project Account totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83
 - 8) **Confirmation that** as of 31st May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account-00269121269233 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02, roughly equivalent to USD 5,627,281.95
 - 9) **The Minister of Cabinet Affairs stated that:**
 - a. An equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000 was paid to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Accounts on 8th April 2024.
 - b. The purpose of the fund was for the facilitation of the activities of NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. outlined in the document attached to the payment request Referenced: MF&P/RSS//20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject; "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
 - c. Payments (withdrawals) from the Account Number 00269122001036, done on dates 16th and 23rd April 2024 were made for the following additional projects that **were not** included in the attached documents in (b) above:
 - a) NAS peace implementation (USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.2423)
 - b) Phase II of Security Arrangement under the office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security, Hon. Tut Gatluak Manime (USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.5358)
 - c) The unspecified amount of payment for the **9BR** Special projects
 - d) The Minister of Cabinet Affairs denied knowledge of the several transactions (withdrawals) that occurred on the Account 00269121269233, between dates 13th - 31st May 2024, totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
 - d. The attached document to the payment request of 2nd April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet communicated to the Ministry of Finance.
 - e. Finally, the Minister confirmed the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Account No. 00269121269233 was SSP 8,879,850,921.02



- 10) **The TNLA observes** that, the fund in question meant to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Roadmap special projects was first deposited in the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-00269122001036 instead of the Ministry's Account 00269212279231 as per the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 2nd April 2024. However TNLA cannot fault the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs since currency was changed from USD to SSP.
- 11) **The TNLA also observes** that, two transactions (withdrawals) were carried out by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs on the fund, under the Account- 00269122001036 on date 16th April 2024 and 23rd April 2024.
- 12) **The TNLA further observes** that, the balance of the fund SSP 10,460,570,724.85 was then moved from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Account (General Secretariat)-00269122001036 to the Ministry's Account for Special Projects SSP Account 00269121269233. The fund was already less by at least SSP 4,862,368,276.
- 13) **The TNLA is concerned** of the following:
- Despite the fund amounting to **USD 10,000,000** in its equivalent in **SSP 15,322,939,000** was transferred to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Account on 8th April 2024 and was to be paid to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc, some of these institutions and mechanisms were either partially paid their money or not at all.
 - The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs introduced payments for additional projects namely; NAS, High Level Committee (Office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security) and the **9BR** Special Projects against the funds meant for NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC, Popularization of the R-ARCSS Roadmap and payment of 2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears and these payments were done in full and as a matter of priority.
 - The Payments in (b) above has deviated from the purpose for which the fund was requested and paid by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in their letter dated 2nd April 2024, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1 contravening the Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011
 - The attached document to the payment request of 2nd April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs communicated to the Ministry of Finance has total amount approximated USD 17,000,000 of which payments approximated USD 8,000,000 was expected from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. In light of this discrepancies of total amounts on documents not consistent with total amount of SSP: 15,322,939,000 requested and paid, therefore, the new claims of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs could not have been approved and authorized for payment by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
 - The changes claimed by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs on the attached document to the payment request of 2nd April 2024 which reduced payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. was done without the resolution of the Council of Ministers hence this was unilateral and personal discretion of the Minister of Cabinet Affairs.



- f) In light of the above transactions (withdrawals), there is prima facie case of misappropriation of funds SSP: 15,322,939,000 (USD 10,000,000, @ bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939)

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

In light of the above facts, the TNLA hereby directs the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs as follows:

1. To pay in full, all allocations due to the beneficiary institutions and peace implementation mechanisms as requested by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and paid by the Ministry of Finance.
2. To pay without further delay allocations due to the beneficiary institutions; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC etc.
3. Adhere to the principles of Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011 including ensuring no diversion/misappropriation of funds once approved and paid to the spending agencies by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
4. The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs has no authority to unilaterally divert funds meant for the aforementioned institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms as this contravenes Financial Regulations and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011
5. Decisions to allocate and pay funds to the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms was taken in the Council of Ministers meeting, the TNLA expects any change in the payment affecting the amount due the institutions and Mechanisms should be by a resolution of the Council of Ministers' meeting.
6. The Ministry of Finance and Planning to pay directly every spending agency through official Account rather than through a third party Institution. This shall ensure proper auditing and accountability by spending agencies as per the Constitution and the relevant laws.

Sign.....

Rt. Hon Oyet Nathaniel Pier
First Deputy Speaker
TNLA/RSS/Juba



Annex 11: Talking points for Deputy Speaker of Parliament, 3 May 2024

03-May-2024

Talking Points

The Ministry of Finance and Planning has done an allocation of USD: 30,000,000.00 to some relevant institutions and Mechanisms as directed by them. The equivalent was allocated in SSP as of which the Ministry of Cabinet received an amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 in equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00

1. On the 02nd April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received Authorization Letter from the Ministry of Finance & Planning to Deposit the amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 to the SSP Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036.
2. On the 8th April 2024, an equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00 was deposited in SSP Account No: 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the Bank buying rate of SSP/USD: 1532.2939.
3. On 16th April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 1,050,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415.00 - (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank Official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.2423
4. On 23rd April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 2,000,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600.00- (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.5358
5. On 13th May 2024., the Bank of South Sudan received another Authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 to transfer the Amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No:00269121269233.
6. From date 13th - 31st May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawal) occurred at the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs – Special Project Account Totalling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
7. As of 31st May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs A/C No: 00269121269233 is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02

Kind Regards

Annex 12: Authorization of transfer of \$10 million toward ‘Special Projects’ under Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 2 April 2024

MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING
1st Undersecretary of Finance

REF: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1.

Date: April 2, 2024

Hon. Governor,
Bank of South Sudan
RSS-Juba

Subject: Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from account number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects

Dear Hon. Governor,

Reference to the above mentioned subject, we write to authorize the Bank of South Sudan to transfer the sum of USD 10,000,000 (Only Ten Million United States Dollar) from account (00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects account below. Being funds required to facilitate the implementation the priority provisions and special projects.

Account Name: Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects
Bank Name: Bank of South Sudan
Account Number: 00269212279231

Please accept the assurances of our highest regards.



Maual Tap Dieu
1st Undersecretary of Finance




Dheh Mayuol Tong
Director General of Accounts

Cc: Hon. Minister of Finance & Planning
Cc: Hon. Deputy Minister of Finance & Planning
Cc: Director of Expenditure
Cc: File.

Annex 13: John Latio Kenyi Loburong's defection, 14 May 2023



Chief of the SSPDF and all other Organized Forces, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Secretary General of High-Level Standing Committee for the implementation of the revitalized Agreement as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor.

5. Appoint Honourable Kawunda John Mogga as the NAS Chief negotiator and the Team Leader of the negotiations with the membership of the following:
 - (i) Major General Pitiya Yoane Suma. CDR Amadi and Dollo Area Command.
 - (ii) Brigadier General Kasbash John Darius-Secretary and CDR for Office Affairs and Dem Records.
 - (iii) Brigadier General Bingo Apolo Valentino-Commissioner Wonduruba Payam.
 - (iv) Brigadier General Alex Lomeling Martin. Coordinator and Finance Officer, Aru, Uganda.


6. Direct all NAS forces to allow unhindered and safe return of refugees from the neighbouring countries, and the internally displaced, to their areas of origin in order for them to engage in livelihood activities to alleviate hunger and poverty without any disturbance.

Issued under my hand and Seal of NAS today the 14th 05/2024 in the NAS Headquarters.



Signed [Signature]
General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Annex 14: Roadmap of negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and the Government of South Sudan



1. Introduction

General John Kenyi Latio, commonly known as Kenyi Lo-Burong, of NAS has taken a courageous decision opening talks directly with General Salva Kiir Mayardit, The President of the Republic of South Sudan. The decision came after several months of thought and consultation with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga in the United States of America, both of whom hail from the same constituency.

These thoughts and consultation focused on the untold suffering of the citizens in the war thorn areas specially and South Sudan in general. As a result General Kenyi Loburong and his brothers decided to have dialogue which triggered the government to send a delegation to meet with the delegation of General Kenyi Lo-burong, in Nairobi, Kenya. The objective is to understand the reasons which led to rebellion of General Kenyi Lo-Burong and his forces, their grievances and how to achieve genuine peace.

2. Background to the conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the National Salvation Front (NAS).

- 2.1 The current Government-NAS conflict has its roots as early as the 1960s. Everyone knows that the Any-anya-1 war was started by elders and leaders of Equatoria region and especially Poculum heroes like Aggrey Jaden and many others. Most of our elders and leaders joined the Any-anya-1 rebellion and continued struggling until the Addis Ababa agreement was signed of 1972. Thereafter, our people were side-lined and the movement was high jacked by Maulana Abel Allier and General Joseph Lagu Yanga and other Political Parties and Allies. As a result, most of the founders of the Any-anya-1 Movement found themselves out of the military and the government of the then Southern Sudan all together.
- 2.2 This political manipulation which occurred during the integration of the Any-anya-1 Forces was intended to marginalize those who fight and instead dominate the system by others with no compensation done to the war affected areas and to the fighters. A good number of the fighters were recruited as road laborers and forest guards and the heroes were not recognised up to now, especially a leader like Aggrey Jaden Wani.
- 2.3 It was thought that the Arab Policy of divide and rule applied on the leaders of the then Government of South Sudan. But, history repeated itself again as everyone knows that during the SPLA/M struggle, able Men, Women and Youth of the Pöjulu people and other Communities of Greater Equatoria joined only to be mistreated in the movement.



- 2.4 Our people stood firm by supporting the movement physically, politically and militarily, making the SPLA/M strong enough and was able to control most of the areas till it gained independence of South Sudan. The Independence of South Sudan created hope that all our people will enjoy the fruits of the struggle. But to our surprise, the contrary became true and the situation became worse than during the Arab regime. The people of Greater Equatoria, especially the Pöjulu who are known to be strong and brave politically and militarily, were purposely marginalized as follows:
- (i) Most of our leaders who were leading the movement were undeployed, side-lined, demoted, targeted, manhandled and eliminated by the same SPLM/A system which they fought for and supported wholeheartedly. The intention was to reduce their strength, demoralize and frustrate them so that they do not participate in the governance of the independent South Sudan which they died for.
 - (ii) Our brave men who were in the struggle were then not considered during the integration into the military and the government in the eve of the CPA-2005 simply because they were from certain ethnic background. Most of them were said to be unfit, no unit and were stripped off their ranks just to demoralize them in order to abundant military. This was done in mid-2005 by late General Salva Mathok-gendit and as a result most of them find their ways to their villages.
 - (iii) Those who survived the process were intentionally deployed to the far end of South Sudan like Upper Nile, Unity and Bahr-el-Ghazal areas with their departure orders verbally stated as 'mission of no return'. Indeed, three quarters of them, if not all, died. Their orphans and widows are undergoing untold sufferings, left to be taken over by their colleagues.
 - (iv) General Kenyi lo-Burong who was a roaring lion and great fighter controlling Central Equatoria, especially Greater Juba and most parts of Yei, remained unpromoted. Yet, even Former President Bashir knew him very well. Despite all of that, he did not give up and continued to sacrifice himself for the sake of the struggle of the people of South Sudan for independence.
 - (v) General Kenyi lo-Burong was later promoted to the rank of 2nd Lt by General Abu John when he was the Governor of Equatoria. He felt unrecognized and discouraged and went to his village. Later, General Ladu Gore convinced him to return and promoted him to the rank of colonel and made him in charge of his forces in Luri. He was attacked in Luri and in his residence in Hai-Tarawa in Juba. Even then, he was captured and then



taken to prison in Yei where he spent years and again demoted to the rank of 1st Lt and deployed to Mogiri.

- (vi) Again, he was transferred and deployed to Police, where he was demoted to the rank of warrant officer. All these grievances forced him and those who went through the same treatment to demand justice, equality and freedom through the barrel of gun. So, when Dr. Riek Machar rebelled most of us joined his rebellion with the hope of getting their rights and liberating ourselves from the bad ideology of mischief, marginalization and domination by our fellow countrymen.
 - (vii) In SPLA-IO the same tactics of mischief, marginalization and domination by fellow South Sudanese was even worse. Killing, nepotism, tribalism and disregard of our military commanders by the entire leadership of the SPLM/A-IO was rampant. Logistics were only supplied to Upper Nile and hence Equatorians were left helpless struggling to arm ourselves. They carried assassinations attempts some of which succeeded and that angered us to have our own movement.
 - (viii) In view of the SPLM/A-IO treatment, General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to form his own movement, which he deliberating decided not to disclose its name or declare its commencement. When suddenly General Thomas Cirillo Swaka rebelled and declared his movement on 6th March, 2017, he immediately engaged General Kenyi Lo-Burong to be the military wing of his movement, the National Salvation Front (NAS). It was not until 28th July, 2017, when General Kenyi Lo-Burong, who had already decided to form his own movement, accepted and announced joining NAS as the military wing.
 - (ix) Unfortunate, General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, who joined us in the bush has a hidden agenda and was not sincere to General Kenyi Lo-Burong. We discovered that he has no sincere political agenda for the welfare of the people of South Sudan and our own concerns. He clearly displays tribalism, nepotism and no care for the issues of the movement.
- 2.5 Therefore, General Kenyi Lo-Burong has taken the decision for genuine and wholistic peace in South Sudan by engaging in direct peace talks with President Salva Kiir Mayardit who he respects as a true SPLM/A separatist leader. It has become clear that there is no future in tribalism, nepotism and marginalization of a people in their own country.
- (i) General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to join our brothers in good heart for peace so that so we together can give a massive support to our President and our elder Dr. Martin



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Elia Lomuro in a move to open a new chapter of peace, reconciliation and development in our country instead of following leaders who are selfish and continue to cause destruction in the country.

- (iii) If general Thomas want to continue with war, he should form his own force but not using us as his tools to achieve his own selfish intension of wanting to gain big position in the government because we are tired of this game. In this regard we hope the government will negotiate with us in good faith so that we create a very strong alliance to defeat Dr. Riek Machar in the upcoming contested general election, in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit.

2.6 You have all witnessed the destruction of properties, loss of lives, displacement of people and the suffering of the civil population in the war affected areas. All these requires social services to be fixed in the country. What does this call for? That calls for honest and genuine peace and security so that the government can speed up the process of reconciliation and development. Hence, for genuine peace and security the NAS under the leadership of the General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand the following:

- (i) Cessation of hostilities, ceasefire, separation and demonization of forces in their areas of control.
- (ii) Integration of our forces into all the Security Sectors i.e., SSPDF, National Security and other Organized Forces. The NAS, under General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand for the confirmation of all ranks of its forces without compromise.
- (iii) The process of integration, disarmament, demotion and demobilization should be handled in a dignified manner to avoid internal dispute between different forces which will be integrated together as one national force.
- (iv) Most importantly, guarantee for the safety of our leadership and forces before, during and after the negotiation period in the town of negotiations to avoid the unnecessary danger.
- (v) Although the peace talks are direct between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and General Kenyi Lo-Burong, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor on the side of the government and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga on the NAS side, we demand the Government of Uganda to be the over-all witness and guarantor as it is in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.



5

Elia Lomuro

- (i) Based on our experience, we demand that our forces be integrated, trained and deployed in areas under NAS control until the end of the election period so that we support the democratic elections to defend our interest as well as the interest of the government in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit to defeat the SPLM/A-IO leader Dr. Riek Machar Teny.
- (ii) SPLA-IO battalion under the command of General John Mabie Gar should be relocated from Morobo county, Panyame Payam, because they are committing atrocities against the civilian population in those areas. They continue to loot civilian properties, murder, violently rape women and girls, and occupying civilian homes and social amenities causing displacement of inhabitants of the area to the refugees' camp, scaring returnees and inflicting more suffering to the civilians
- (iii) All deployed SSPDF forces in civilian populated areas and social amenities should be redeployed to their previous designated military garrisons to pave way for returnees and displace persons to come back and secondly for our forces to have free movement in the process of assembling such that they are able to prepare themselves early enough to participate in upcoming general election.
- (iv) The areas are as follows: In Yei County they are Morsak, kejiko, Ombasi, Goja and Tokori. In Lainya County they are Kon-kat, Rejonga, America Ansarat and Mongiling. In Morobo county they are Bura, Panyana, Udabi and other parts of Kaju-keji. Also, Mundari, Amadi, Maridi and parts of eastern Juba County.
- (v) Any confiscated property of those who rebelled and those who ran to the refugee's camp should be returned back to their owners without hindrance. This is a very vital step towards reconciliation and healing so that all will gain trust and believe in a meaningful agreement.
- (vi) Representation of NAS political Cadres in all levels of the government: National, State and County levels in order to work for federalism as a means of permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan.
- (vii) Destroyed and targeted business men with fear of losing their lives and freedom of movement should be compensated and those who currently reside outside the country whose licenses were confiscated be returned to them so that they start business afresh in secure environment without any interference.



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- (viii) Government should evacuate **Mundari** and **Dinka Bor** cattle herder in Central Equatorial and take them back to their place to allow quick return of the refugees and displaced persons who are purely farmer to start cultivation in a peaceful environment.
- (ix) We demand the Government to reconsider Wonduruba as a county of its own in order to avoid further political dispute between the citizens of Lainya County and the Bari Community. Rokon should also be given a county of its own so that no one is not kept hostage by others in the so call Juba County because they are all equal citizens of South Sudan. They also deserve the same right like any other citizen of South Sudan so that everybody enjoy equal rights.
- (x) For the duration of the peace talks, the leadership of the NAS should be given the responsibility for their logistics to avoid the challenges being encountered by the current process of cantonment, training and deployment of the R-ARCSS forces.
- (xi) Our fallen comrades who fought tirelessly during the two civil wars deserves to be recognized and honored by including their names in historical statutes, such as Schools, Roads and other monuments, structures and Institutions in consultations with the Pojulu Community leadership.
- (xii) We demand that the Government of South Sudan build a mausoleum in the name of Pojulu people. Further, we demand upgrading of the historic Loka Secondary School into a University and the promised Dr. Samson Kwaje memorial agriculture institute be constructed in a memory of Aggrey Jaden, Dr Samson Kwaje Lukare and my other fallen heroes in Pojulu land.
- (xiii) The President through the Ministry of Humanitarian Affair and SSRRC should bring more Non-governmental Organisations, National NGOs and other organizations to provide services and other life support assistance to the war affected areas including destroyed social amenities. The Government should grant special sponsorship and scholarship for the benefit of those whose education was interrupted by the conflict.
- (xiv) In this regard, the President, through Dr. Marin Elia Lomurö who is our only trustworthy elder, should believe that we shall remain loyal to him and support him for permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan and make sure he becomes more powerful.



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
- (xv) The NAS under the leadership of General Kenyi Lo-burong submit these demands for negotiations in good faith and in the spirit of peace. May God bless our President, our country the Republic of South Sudan and our people



General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)
Chairman and Commander-in-chief

Cc

- President Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and SG of the HLSC for R-ARCSS implementation.
- Honourable Kawunda John Mogga-NAS Chief Negotiator and Team Leader.
- File

Annex 15: Negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and President Salva Kiir, 19 May 2023

basis of the roadmap you sent him. As soon as you make the declaration, as per the copy attached to the roadmap, negotiation will commence.

Further, His Excellency the President has appointed Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, as the Mediator and Guarantor for the peace negotiations between him and you. In due course, a team will be set-up to assist Dr. Lomurö with the negotiation process.


To this end General Kenyi-Loburong, please accept the gratitude of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and of the entire Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for accepting peace and joining the R-TGoNU. We look forward to seeing you and your forces amidst our national security sector and government. Again, thank you for accepting peace and please accept the assurance of our highest consideration.

Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin
Minister for Presidential Affairs,
R-TGoNU, The Republic of South Sudan.

Cc:

- Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.
- Bishop Elias Taban, The Bishop of Presbyterian Church of South Sudan

Annex 16: Partial Integration List of Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong’s forces into the SSPDF, 2 February 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
The President

RSS/RD/J/33/2024 2nd February 2024

INTEGRATION OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF FORMER NAS SOLDIERS FROM LAINYA COUNTY OF CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE, INTO VARIOUS RANKS IN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE’S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF).

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act, 2009 (Amendment) Act, 2022, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF, do hereby integrate and Commission **Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of Former NAS Soldiers from Lainya County of Central Equatoria State, into Various Ranks in the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF)** as hereunder:

S/NO	Rank	Name in Full
1.	Brigadier	Kenned Kenyi Abdu Lopiong
2.	Lt. Colonel	Peter Jima Oliver Loboton
3.	Lt. Colonel	Peter-Lomoro Lotigo Kurispino
4.	Lt. Colonel	Kabash John Dario
5.	Major	Charles Wani Michael
6.	1 st Lieutenant	James Lusuku John Lokule
7.	1 st Lieutenant	Joseph Liwa Eily Duku

The President 

8.	1 st Lieutenant	Kenyl John Martin
9.	1 st Lieutenant	Moses Hakim Pasquale
10.	1 st Lieutenant	Charles Nicola Julu
11.	2 nd Lieutenant	Isaac Malish Confucius Luate
12.	2 nd Lieutenant	Cosmos Alakai Live Martin
13.	2 nd Lieutenant	Gatwech Guol Garang Long
14.	2 nd Lieutenant	Charles Lubanga Paskal Lowate
15.	2 nd Lieutenant	John Salimba Emmanuel
16.	2 nd Lieutenant	Angelo Lemi Bullen
17.	2 nd Lieutenant	James Kenyl Joseph
18.	2 nd Lieutenant	Kuch Abut Maker Madoldit
19.	2 nd Lieutenant	Atem Malong Atem Maluk
20.	R/SM	Peter Lubang Charles
21.	R/SM	Robert Bida Martin Wani
22.	R/SM	Both Nyang Deng Padiet
23.	R/SM	Dominic Bittenson Lawyer
24.	R/SM	Sallah Isaac Mick
25.	R/SM	Kenyl John Emmanuel
26.	R/SM	Stephen Wujugu Stanley
27.	R/SM	Joha Luka Samuel
28.	R/SM	Charles Lujang Mathew
29.	S/M	Morris Malesh Lora Sebit
30.	S/M	Peter Data Justin Davis


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
The President

54.	Pvt	James Yap Diet Yuot
55.	Pvt	Justin Bidal Alex
56.	Pvt	David Loputu Lizira
57.	Pvt	David Lado Jacob
58.	Pvt	Samuel Lokudu Gore
59.	Pvt	Essien Oliver Taban
60.	Pvt	Lomom Wilson Steven
61.	Pvt	Denis Bidal Steven
62.	Pvt	Emmanuel Lukudu James

Issued under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba,
this Second-Day of the Month of February in the Year 2024.




Salva Kiir Mayardit,
President,
Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF,
Republic of South Sudan,
Juba.




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The President

Annex 17: Press statement by the Central Equatoria State Government, 10 October 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION



OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

For immediate Release October 10, 2024

Press Statement on the Tragic Massacre of Youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq).

On October 09, 2024 the Government of Central Equatoria learnt with shock the horrific massacre of 10 youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam, and 9 others in Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) of Ganji Payam Juba County the victims lost their lives in an absurd act of violence and cowardice targeting innocent civilians on Wednesday night, preliminary reports indicate that the attack took place when armed individuals targeted the youth and shoot at them while others were hacked by machetes and murdered in cold blood.



The Government of Central Equatoria State expresses its deepest sorrow and condemnation over the horrific massacre, this heinous act which occurred is a grave violation of rights and a threat to peace and stability of the people of Central Equatoria and South Sudan as a whole and will not go unabated.

The state government, in collaboration with national authorities and security forces, will work together in conducting investigations to identify those responsible for this barbaric act and hence assure the public that swift and decisive action will be taken to ensure justice and peace will prevail accordingly.

The Central Equatoria State Government under the leadership of the Governor, HE. Gen. Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani, extends its deepest condolences to the families of the victims. Our thoughts and prayers are with the entire people of Wonduruba, Kulipapa (Ganji Payam) and the state at large as it grieves this profound loss, equally the state Government reaffirms its commitment to ensuring a peaceful and secure conditions for all its citizens warranting that violence in any form will not be tolerated.

May the souls of the deceased rest in eternal peace, and may we find strength and unity in this time of sorrow.

Hon. Gerald Francis,
Minister of Peacebuilding and Acting Minister of Information and Communication
Central Equatoria State/Juba



Ministries Road, West of State Secretariat – CES

Annex 18: Reaction from the Pujulu community in Juba, 14 October 2024



Date: 14-10-2024

Subject: Condemnation on the Killings of the Twenty-one (21) and Wounding of Four (4) Innocent Civilians in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Jebel Iraq at Ganyi Payam.

Pujulu Community is mourning the brutal murdering of over twenty-one (21) innocent civilians and wounding of four (4) in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and road travelers at Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) Ganji Payam in Juba County, in Central Equatoria State and on the 9th of October 2024 immediately after the returned of Governor from Wonduruba.

During the visit of H. E. Governor Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani and accompanying delegations to Lainya and Wonduruba respectively, Governor has stressed a clear message for durable peace prospect to the citizens and assured them on the President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit efforts in engaging the holdout oppositions through Tumaini peace initiative currently taking place in Nairobi Kenya. Also, H.E. Governor echoed publically to the citizens of Lainya County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam on the general Amnesty declared by our President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit in 2017 in Yei which still holding up to now as way of restoring peace in the State.

H.E. Governor left Wonduruba on the 8th of October 2024 and immediately on the next day Wednesday on the 9th of October 2024 Government Forces, from the Ground Unit including Bridger Gen. Kennedy Kenyi Abdu popularly known as "Kenyi Warrior", clashed around Wonduruba Administrative Payam with the holdout rebels groups under John Kenyi Lotio popularly known as "Kenyi Loburong". In the fight Officers belonging to the ground forces at Jebel Iraq were killed in that joint operations. Casualties on the rebel side are unknow to us. As a result of receiving the sad news of their killed officers in those operations on the same date the 9th of October 2024 at 02:00 pm, Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa reacted massively by; arresting, torturing and massacring the motorists and travelers from Juba to Lainya and vice-versa killing eleven (11) travelers.

Page 1 of 2

Only four bodies of civilians were recovered through the efforts from Lainya County and Juba County Commissioners and four bodies were handed over to the grieved families but the rest were not found their where-about. Then at 04:00 pm the Ground Unit elements took seven motorcycles of those killed victims each bike carrying three armed officers backed by one Toyota Land Crusher pickup full with armed SSPDF officers moving to Wonduruba very fast via Lainya and the convoy was seen by the civilians in Lainya. Upon their arrivals to Wonduruba at night the same Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa carried out systematic house to house arrests, handcuffed and dragged those unarmed civilians to the road side and all were executed through shootings while others hacked by the machetes on the road side killing ten (10) civilians and wounded four (4) who are under treatment in Yei.

The entire Pojulu Community was outraged and saddened by such barbaric and illegitimate actions committed by the Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa. Totally and Heartily, Pojulu Community everywhere strongly expressed their greatest disappointments over the grossly execution of the unarmed civilians who were massacred in cold blood at Jebel Iraq in Juba County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam.

Therefore, we call our State and national governments to uphold to the constitution and take serious measures to bring the culprits to the book. On the other hand, Pojulu Community leaderships argue everyone to remain calm and not to take law into their own hands as we pursue justice to prevail through the State and National Government to investigate and bring all the culprits to face the law.

Also, Pojulu Community argues the State and national governments to provide security to allow the grieved families to search for the missing bodies in Jebel Iraq for decent burial. Finally, on the behalf of the Pojulu Community we would like to extend our deepest heartbroken sympathies and condolences to the families of those massacred innocent souls and their forcefully departure.

May Almighty God and Our Lord Jesus Christ consoles the entire Pojulu Community and South Sudanese for these un-wanted deaths.


Yours in grief




Mr. Lole Laila Lole
D/Chairman of Pojulu Community
Juba, South Sudan




Annex 19: Reaction from the Wonduruba Community Association in Juba, 12 October, 2024



Annex 20: Reaction from the Central Equatoria State Youth Union, 10 October, 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
YOUTH UNION
United Youth for Sustainable Development



CHAIRPERSON

Date: 10. 10. 2024

#PRESS RELEASE#

CONDEMNATION ON THE KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN JEBEL IRAQ AND WONDURUBA ADMINISTRATIVE AREA PAYAM

On behalf of *Central Equatoria State Youth* we want to express our profound condemnation of the recent acts of violence that have resulted in the tragic loss of innocent civilian lives killed by cowardice act of terror.


The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is a violation of fundamental Human rights and International Humanitarian Law. Such actions are not only morally reprehensible but also constitute war crimes against humanity under the Geneva Conventions.

The ongoing violence in our state has inflicted unimaginable suffering on countless families, leaving communities shattered and lives forever altered. There is absolutely no justification for attacks that deliberately target innocent individuals, and it is imperative that government should hold accountable those who perpetrate such heinous acts

The protection of civilian lives must be a priority for all parties involved in any conflict. As members of these state, we have a collective responsibility to advocate for peace and to ensure that the voices of the youth and innocent people are heard. We must call for an immediate investigation and the perpetrators must face the full force of law.

Therefore, we call upon our leaders in the state and representative of international community to take a firm stand against the killing of innocent civilians and to advocate for measures that protect human life and promote peace.

###END##



Tel: +211 926 666 939 | +211 982 380 000
Email: cesyouthunion@gmail.com
CES Youth Training Center - Hai Neem, Juba - South Sudan.

Annex 21: Photographs of victims of killings in Wondoruba, Central Equatoria State

Images widely circulated in South Sudan, and corroborated by representatives from civil society organizations and members of the local Pujulu community. Injuries indicate victims were tied and shot or hacked to death by blunt instruments, including possibly machetes¹³²



¹³² Interview with a medical professional, October 2024

Annex 22: Press release by the National Salvation United Forces, 10 October 2024



**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
National Salvation United Forces; Hope General Headquarters
South Sudan**

Ref: nasu/osp/02/024

Date: 10/10/2024

For Immediate Press Release

In their continuing offensive against the National Salvation United Forces (NASU), which started September 5, 2024, the SSPDF and the allied Militia of Dr. Martin Elias Lomuro on October 7 pulled out from Mile 58 Juba Lainya road to attack our bases in wonduruba and Lainya counties for the 4th time in row. On the same day they proceeded to open a base at Logoko, in logwerle boma close to our locations.

At around 4 pm while the Governor of Central Equatoria State was addressing the people in Wonduruba centre, the hungry SSPDF and their militia rolled out and attack us at our base. Our gallant forces fought back in defense and forced them to retreat to their base in Logoko leaving behind one dead and several others injured. Wednesday October 8, 2024 early morning they again attack us. This time our forces fought hitting hard, killing 7 at the spot, over ran their newly established base, and burn down 1 land cruiser vehicle which was rushing reinforcement to the besiege forces. Finally the force was defeated and the remnants flee to Wonduruba town in panic. Five of them died in hospital meaning a total 13 traitors have been eliminated while none was killed or injured on our side.

At around 10 pm, 3 motor bikes, a fighter tank, and truck arrived wonduruba centre from Lainya town to collect those who are injured. They decided to launch a revenge attacks on innocent civilian who had gathered to mourn a dead family member. The mourners were rounded up and the youth were picked, some were collected from their rooms while sleeping tied up and were either shot or hacked by machetes. 10 innocent youth were killed in cold blood, with reasons that they are either related to General Kenyi Loburong or a member of his clan. If John Kenyi is a rebel, then his family members are all rebels as well?

This is what the Mathiang Anyoor fighters are encouraged to do by the clan government in J1 after defeat. Kenyi Warrior is implementing this strategy in

Wonduruba and Lainya counties because earlier he called our command and told us that he has been instructed by CDF, Dr Martin, Ambrose, and Gen Toy to clear us from these areas in 6 months. Why can't they face us instead of killing the innocent people who they claim to protect.

NASU leadership, urges the people of South Sudan to condemn this heinous crime perpetuated by the failed government in Juba. We call upon the Human right organizations, The Troika, peace monitors to investigate these atrocities done to the innocent people of wonduruba and to call for the release of those who are innocently being detained for simply being people from the area. The NASU forces remains committed to seeking for a durable peace for the well-being of all South Sudanese people.

Thank,

Maj Gen. Paul Gideon Subiran
Spokesperson
NASU



Annex 23: NAS press release concerning defections, 13 October 2024



SOUTH SUDAN
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/ Army
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
General Headquarters

Ref: NAS/OSM/12

13th October, 2024.

FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE

The Leadership of National Salvation Front (NAS) is very much appalled by the horrendous mass murder of innocent civilians in Wonduruba Payam, Juba County, Central Equatoria State, by the South Sudan Defense Force (SSPDF) allied militia, commanded by Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (aka Kenyi Warrior) and funded by Cabinet Minister Martin Elia Lomuro.

On 8th October, the SSPDF and militia under Brig. Kenyi Warrior massacred ten (10) innocent boys who were arrested while participating in a funeral occasion. This came as a revenge for the defeat of the SSPDF and their militia by forces under Gen. Kenyi John Loburon. The SSPDF out of frustration turned against the innocent civilians as a result executing ten (10) young boys in cold blood.


Following this outrageous massacre, the Leadership of NAS would like therefore to state the following;

- 01- NAS condemns in the strongest terms possible the mass murder and mafia-style cold blood execution of these innocent boys by the SSPDF and their allied militia under the command of Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (Kenyi Warrior).
- 02- NAS holds the commander of SSPDF in Lainya, the militia commander Brig. Kenyi Warrior, the militia funder Dr. Martin Elia and coordinator Mr. John Lomeling Kaunda (an American citizen) as aiders and accomplices of this heinous crime.
- 03- NAS cautions the people of South Sudan on complacency towards the existence of the illegal and unconstitutional tribal regime of Salva Kiir that relishes to loot, displace, rape and kill the people of South Sudan.

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

- 04- The Leadership of NAS appeals to the youth, especially those who are being targeted, to join the ranks of NAS and resist the brutality of the regime and its militia or else form vigilante groups to defend their villages from the marauding SSPDF and the murderous militia.
- 05- NAS calls on civil society and International Human Rights Organization to pursue the case against the murderers of these innocent people and their accomplices to ensure that the criminals are brought to justice
- 06- NAS Leadership appeals to Community members to reject the evil plans by the regime of Salva Kiir and its agents of planting seeds of hatred and disunity among the communities while they continue to rule over weak and divided communities. Community members and Leaders therefore, need to exercise maximum restraint as they work to contain this situation.
- 07- NAS Leadership stands in solidarity with the Pojulu community and the people of Wonduruba, sends its condolences to the families of those who have lost their dears ones and pray that the souls of these innocent boys' rest in Eternal peace.

Suba Samuel Manase
Spokesperson,
National Salvation Front, NAS



Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

**Annex 24: Appointment of Commissioners to the NAS Federal Civil Authority,
7 September 2024**



SOUTH SUDAN

Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/Army

General Headquarters

Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 7 September 2024

Subject: Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority.

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(2) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

Constitutional Order No. 10/07/09//2024

- (1) Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority, as provided on the list of Compatriots below:

NAMES	PORTFOLIO
1. Mr. Felix Charles Ali Bilal	Commissioner for Federal Governance Affairs
2. Amb. Lado Gubek	Commissioner for International Relations
3. Amb. Daniel Lee	Commissioner for Information, Mass Communication and Cultural Affairs
4. Mr. Turjuman Ramadan	Commissioner for Legal Affairs and Human Rights
5. Mr. Bosco Otim Mario	Commissioner for Finance and Resource Mobilisation
6. Mr. Robert Samson Lugga	Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs
7. Dr Wani Lolik	Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
8. Mrs. Vera Mahdi	Commissioner for Health

NAS

NAMES	PORTFOLIO
9. Dr Lokuowe Gordon	Commissioner for Education, Social Welfare and Gender
10. Dr Peter Pitya	Commissioner for Infrastructure and Physical Planning

These appointments come into effect from 7th Day of September 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on these appointments in recognition of your diligence and commitments to work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.



Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief
National Salvation Front (NAS).

NAS

Annex 25: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority, 4 May 2024



SOUTH SUDAN

Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People
National Salvation Front/Army

General Headquarters

Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 14th May 2024.

Subject: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(1) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

Constitutional Order No. 07/14/05/2024

- (1) The appointment of Compatriot **Isaac Ajiba Ochang**, as the Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority.

This appointment comes into effect from 14th Day of May 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on this appointment in recognition of your diligence and commitment to the work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.

Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief
National Salvation Front (NAS).



NAS

facilitation required to ensure that the NIOC performs its functions and duties; and

6.1.14 The NIOC shall provide monthly reports to the NLC, the TNLA and the Tumaini Initiative on the progress in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

6.2 External Guarantors / Observers

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders agree to the formation of the High-Level Panel of Heads of State and Government which shall be composed of Heads of State and Government from the region, and Partners and Friends of South Sudan, whose core roles and responsibilities shall be:

6.2.1 To steward, monitor and oversee the implementation of all measures, processes, and activities specified in the Tumaini Consensus, in liaison with the National Leadership Council;

6.2.2 To receive and consider reports regarding implementation of the Tumaini Consensus from the Tumaini Initiative;

6.2.3 To organize, in coordination with the Tumaini Initiative, high-level visits to South Sudan to assess the progress of the implementation of this and other related protocols from the Tumaini Consensus;

Handwritten notes and signatures:
 SBR, PJ, NB, PER, G.L.B., M.H., P.A.G.

6.2.4 To review briefs and reports and to engage with the East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union (AU), Troika, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Community of Sant'Egidio, and Friends of South Sudan, as well as other regional and international bodies and partners on the process of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.2.5 To advise and recommend actions to be taken for the proper and timely implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

6.2.6 To convene Quarterly meetings, or on a need basis, between the Tumaini Initiative and the National Leadership Council to appraise the progress of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

Handwritten notes and signatures:
 PER, SBR, PJ, NB, G.L.B., M.H., P.A.G.

List of People to Initial the Tumaini Consensus Protocols - 15 July 2024

Name	Representative Organization	Initial
Hon. Amb. Alberto Mathon	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, Head of Delegation	A/H
Gen. Pagan Amos Okoth	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman, Real-SPLM	[Signature]
Gen. Paul Maling Awan	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan United Front/Army	[Signature]
Gen. Stephen Bury Nduyay	South Sudan United National Alliance (SSUNA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan People's Movement / Army	SBR
Gen. Mario Loku Thomas Jada	National Salvation Front - Revolutionary Command Council, Chairman and C-in-C	[Signature]
Dr Pauline Riak	Academia	PER
Patrick Godi	Youth	P.A.G.
Bridget Nagonoro	Women	N.B.
Geoffrey Lou Duke	Civil Society	G.L.B.
Bishop Moses Deng	Faith Based	[Signature]
Sheikh Jaraleth Khams	Faith Based	[Signature]
Gov. Kasf Aguer Kurl	People's Coalition for Civil Action	[Signature]
Lt. Gen. Lazaro Surebelywa (Rtd)	Chief Mediator	[Signature]
Amb. Dr. Mohamed Ali Guyo	Deputy Chief Mediator	[Signature]
Amb. Ismail Wain	IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, Co-Mediator	[Signature]
Paolo Impaglizzo	Community of Sant'Egidio, Co-Mediator	PJ
Dr. A. Korir Sing'et	UJK, State Department of Foreign Affairs, Principal Secretary	

Handwritten notes and signatures:
 G.L.B., PJ, PER, P.A.G.

Annex 26: Tumaini protocols, 15 July 2024

HIGH LEVEL MEDIATION "TUMAINI INITIATIVE" FOR SOUTH SUDAN

Tumaini Initiative



TUMAINI CONSENSUS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN

PROTOCOLS FOR INITIALING

Nairobi, 15 July 2024

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, GAD, PS, N.B., PER, P.A.G., and others.

Preamble

WHEREAS H.E General Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President of the Republic of South Sudan requested his brother, H.E Dr. William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya to mediate between the Government and South Sudan Opposition Groups;

WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of Kenya accepted to facilitate the mediation of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan through the High-Level Mediation "Tumaini Initiative" for South Sudan that took place in Nairobi, Kenya;

AWARE that the Tumaini Consensus resolves the conflict between the Revitalized-Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU), South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) and other opposition groups, to achieve inclusive peace in the Republic of South Sudan, and that the ongoing, pending programs in Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and newly established programs in the Tumaini Consensus, shall provide the framework for peacebuilding and democratization in South Sudan;

RECALLING and RECOGNISING previous and current agreements, consensus and understandings to cease violence, pursue peaceful resolutions of conflicts, and the commitments to build a stable, peaceful, united and prosperous South Sudan;

MINDFUL of the devastation, distraction and disruption of lives and livelihoods, loss of lives and property, and other damages that have occurred as a result of past and current conflicts and the continued suffering of communities, families and individuals that still suffer the effects of the conflicts and natural calamities;

ACKNOWLEDGING the efforts, commitments, and progress made by the leadership, partners, friends and the people of South Sudan to

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, GAD, PS, N.B., PER, P.A.G., and others.

achieve peace, build a better country and secure a future for the coming generations;

CONSCIOUS that much still remains to be done in order to heal the wounds of the past, ensure reconciliation, consolidate peace, restore stability, and put in place developmental programs, and strengthen systems of governance to ensure advancement and growth;

CONVINCED that consolidation of peace and effective pursuit of growth and advancement of South Sudan is only possible where the diversity of the people in and outside South Sudan, are recognized and brought together in an all-inclusive process of nation-building;

PERSUADED that the envisaged reforms, democratic transition, and changes towards a better South Sudan shall be achieved through a comprehensive and all-inclusive Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS;

MINDFUL of the importance of confidence and trust-building measures, implementation modalities, and other steps for guaranteeing commitment and realization of peace;

RECOGNIZING the importance of gender parity and empowerment in all spaces and committed to promote intergenerational considerations, the Parties commit to ensure representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

FURTHER COMMITTED to the Tumaini Initiative, resolution of the conflict, and the consolidation of durable peace in South Sudan; and

COGNIZANT that Federal system is a popular demand of the people of South Sudan and the constitution shall be drafted based on Federal arrangements and structures.

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Statement of Purpose

The Tumaini (Hope) Initiative acknowledges that the protracted political conflicts in South Sudan have compromised the wellbeing of the citizens of South Sudan. The future of current and coming generations is bleak if efforts to achieve and protect sustainable peace fail.

Recognizing that past agreements to end conflicts and sustain peace have not registered adequate success, the Tumaini Initiative now presents an opportunity to build consensus among the Parties and Stakeholders.

The aim of this consensus is to attain sustainable peace and democracy by implementing agreed interim programs. The roadmap to sustainable peace in the Republic of South Sudan comprises, *inter alia*, a Permanent Constitution making process with self-executing mechanisms, which addresses root causes of conflicts, and will provide the means for inclusive development and provision of services to all citizens in all corners of South Sudan.

This roadmap comprises several elements:

First Trust and Confidence Building measures are required among all Parties and Stakeholders. Some undertakings from previous agreements were not completed because not everyone kept the promise. This Framework presents strong mechanisms for building trust and confidence so as to implement agreed programs and collectively make a Permanent Constitution for South Sudan and secure sustainable peace.

Second the urgent need for enhanced civilian protection and support to humanitarian efforts. There are many citizens in need of relief assistance because of floods, droughts, and displacement by violent conflicts. All Parties and Stakeholders have a moral obligation and duty to mobilize resources to address the

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humanitarian crises and natural calamities.

Third the need for establishing an inclusive government and firming the basis for responsibility sharing. Politics of inclusion and sharing responsibilities hold the key to peace building and good governance.

Fourth fostering ceasefire, undertaking security arrangements and reforms. The Parties and Stakeholders recognize that the integration of the various armed groups is key to addressing political instability.

Fifth implementing economic recovery programs and institutional reforms to manage public resources will be prioritized to realize the dividends of peace and development.

Sixth implementing programs for resolving community conflicts and land related disputes to achieve sustainable peace, security and stability.

Seventh national healing, truth, and reconciliation programs to be undertaken throughout the country to heal the wounds inflicted by the conflicts among our people in order to restore the broken social fabric.

Eighth the Permanent Constitution Making Process as part of this consensus will consider past and present challenges, provide a strong and inclusive foundation for stability, wellbeing of citizens, sustainable development and build a society founded on democratic values, rights and freedoms.

Ninth the Tumaini Initiative in coordination with the Parties, Stakeholders and development partners will convene a donor conference to mobilize technical and financial resources for peace building, post-conflict reconstruction of war affected areas from the region and the international community.

The Tumaini Initiative shall guarantee **PERMANENT PEACE, STABILITY, and SHARED PROSPERITY**.

Protocol for Including - Tumaini Consensus
SBR P.M. P.K. P.J. G.D. N.B. M.M. P.A.G.

NOW THEREFORE, we the negotiating Parties and Stakeholders of the Tumaini Initiative convened in Nairobi, Kenya, resolve as follows:

1. General Principles

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders agree and commit to the following general principles that shall guide the interpretation and implementation of the commitments under the Tumaini Consensus:

- 1.1 Respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan and its people demonstrated through a people-centered and inclusive Permanent Constitution Making Process;
- 1.2 Enhanced civilian protection and secured access to emergency humanitarian and other assistance particularly to vulnerable population including displaced persons, returnees and refugees;
- 1.3 Commitment to a genuine national healing and reconciliation and the building of enduring trust and confidence in South Sudanese society founded on the principles of justice, equality, human dignity, and the advancement of societal welfare;
- 1.4 Strict adherence to constitutional guarantees for equitable representation of all South Sudanese in public institutions and particularly to achieve representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

Protocol for Including - Tumaini Consensus
SBR P.M. P.K. P.J. G.D. N.B. M.M. P.A.G.

1.5 Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement for the people of South Sudan, as shall be regulated by law;

1.6 Protection of press freedoms and widening of civic and political space in the country, as shall be regulated by law;

1.7 Strengthen commitment to sustaining cessation of hostilities and permanent ceasefire during the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and beyond;

1.8 Mutual commitment to the Tumaini Consensus, its principles, and structures, including agreement on its guarantors and measures to assure implementation, processes, and timelines;

1.9 Mutual respect and tolerance, respect for opinions, transparency, respect for the rule of law, accountability, the unfettered access to relevant information and commitment to building of consensus;

1.10 Enhance the decentralized system of government during the transitional period and expedite the process of constitution-making to realize the popular demand of the people of South Sudan to establish a federal system of government; and

1.11 Parliament shall enact enabling laws and amend existing laws to be in conformity with the Tumaini Consensus and Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 (as amended).

Protocol for Including - Tumaini Consensus
SBR P.M. P.K. P.J. G.D. N.B. M.M. P.A.G.

2. Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Support

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders reiterate their commitment to creating an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable communities, humanitarian workers and individuals in South Sudan.

The Parties and Stakeholders agree as follows to:

- 2.1 Commit to the facilitation and provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need of such assistance as a result of previous and current conflicts, natural disasters and other factors;
- 2.2 Strengthen the safeguard measures to returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their families, the reinstatement of their properties in accordance with their constitutional rights and applicable legislations, rules and regulations and full reintegration to their communities or residence of their choice;
- 2.3 Establish, continue and enhance Quick Impact Programs and service delivery targeting vulnerable groups affected by conflict and natural disasters including children, orphans, women, widows, persons with special needs, and war-wounded; and
- 2.4 Establish and allocate adequate resources to the Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) and appoint a credible management for the Fund to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

Protocol for Including - Tumaini Consensus
SBR P.M. P.K. P.J. G.D. N.B. M.M. P.A.G.

3. Protocol on Trust and Confidence-Building Measures

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders, as a gesture of their commitment to the Tumaini Initiative, create a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS that will lead to the adoption of a Permanent Constitution for the Republic of South Sudan, agree to the immediate implementation of the following measures after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus:

- 3.1 Release all the political detainees and prisoners of war (POWs) and dismiss all the cases and charges on persons accused as a result of politically motivated factors;
- 3.2 Expedite the repeal of Sections 54, 55 and 57 of the National Security Act 2014 so as to conform with the provisions of the Constitution, R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus before the commencement of the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 3.3 Refrain from arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions;
- 3.4 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee the freedom of movement of political leaders, in and outside South Sudan;
- 3.5 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of association and assembly of all persons in South Sudan, in conformity with the Constitution and the law;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

(Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G)

- 3.6 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of expression of all persons in South Sudan, including freedom of the media, and equal access for all to the State Media;
- 3.7 The Parties and Stakeholders or their representatives in the Tumaini Initiative, shall make a confidence-building visit to Juba, South Sudan to hold joint public forums, to publicize, and to commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.8 The Government leadership or their representatives, shall make a confidence-building visit to Nairobi, Kenya to support and commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.9 The Government shall protect property rights and guarantee security of property and assets of the Government, groups, and individuals in South Sudan, irrespective of their political affiliations;
- 3.10 The Tumaini Initiative to convene a National Leadership retreat inside South Sudan after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus for sensitization and confidence building; and
- 3.11 National Prayers for peace shall be organized and held by the religious leaders after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus in Juba, the States and the Administrative Areas.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

(Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G)

4. Protocol on Permanent Ceasefire, Security Arrangements and Reforms

THAT the Parties recommit to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) (2017), and commit to a permanent ceasefire agreement that shall be agreed in the Tumaini Consensus. The Parties commit to the reform and reorganization of the Security Sector in order to create unified professional national forces that include the Armed Opposition Groups.

THAT to achieve unification of forces, all the mechanisms below shall be reconstituted to ensure inclusion of the Armed Opposition Groups. The defections of security elements or forces shall not be allowed during the Transitional Period and all Armed Forces shall remain under their respective command pending their unification. The Officers from Tumaini Parties shall be included in the existing Unified Command.

4.1 Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC)

- 4.1.1 A Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC) shall be established to conduct reforms by overseeing, directing and supervising the security sector reform during the Transitional Period;
- 4.1.2 The SSROC shall be headed by a neutral and competent South Sudanese security / military expert who shall be vetted by the National Leadership Council (NLC);
- 4.1.3 The SSROC shall be further composed of the following:

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

(Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G)

- 4.1.3.1 Representatives of the Parties and Stakeholders signatory to Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS
- 4.1.3.2 South Sudanese military and security experts
- 4.1.3.3 South Sudanese eminent personalities / academics
- 4.1.3.4 Regional and international experts

4.1.4 The Mandate of the SSROC shall be to:

- 4.1.4.1 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of all security forces, organization, screening, training, unification, deployment and provision of logistics in cantonment sites, barracks and movement of forces as per Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) program, including among others;
- 4.1.4.2 Oversee the disarmament and ending of private militias through the JDSB and create political space that promotes peace, national unity, equal opportunity and democratic processes to address underlying issues that drive conflicts;
- 4.1.4.3 Oversee and ensure the deployment of Armed forces across the country and at the borders to maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan;
- 4.1.4.4 Oversee the simultaneous general disarmament, and destruction of the arms collected from civilians using the unified security forces across the country;
- 4.1.4.5 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of forces, organization, screening, training, unification and deployment of all Unified Forces shall be completed within a specified period from the date of signing of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 4.1.4.6 Ensure fair treatment of all the security forces including their remuneration during the training;
- 4.1.4.7 Receive progress reports from mechanisms tasked with security reform processes;
- 4.1.4.8 Report to the National Leadership Council (NLC);

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

(Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, PJ, N.B, G.D, H.M, P.A.G)

- 4.1.4.9 Supervise and oversee the screening of unfit personnel by the JDSB, and coordinate with the DDR Commission on their demobilization and reintegration; and
- 4.1.4.10 Direct and supervise the establishment of the Committees for Defense and Security which shall be Chaired by the respective heads of the Defense and Security Mechanisms in the JDSB;
- 4.1.4.11 The Committees of the JDSB shall be as follows:
 - 4.1.4.11.1 Defense/Military;
 - 4.1.4.11.2 Police Service;
 - 4.1.4.11.3 Prison Service;
 - 4.1.4.11.4 Wildlife Service;
 - 4.1.4.11.5 Civil Defense Service [Fire Brigade]; and
 - 4.1.4.11.6 National Security Service.

4.1.5 There shall be established a force to be known as VIP Protection Units whose functions and duties shall be determined by law.

4.2 *Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB)*

4.2.1 The Joint Defense Board (JDB) shall be renamed as the Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) and shall be reconstituted at the level of Chiefs of Defense Forces/Staff, Inspector General of Police and Directors General of National Security Service and all other organized forces to exercise command and control over all forces during the Transitional Period.

4.2.2 The functions of the JDSB shall be to:

4.2.2.1 Recommend to Commanders in Chief, the reconstitution of Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and Joint

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D., P.S., N.B., S.B.R., H.M., P.A.G.]

- Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) to include representatives of the Armed Opposition Groups;
- 4.2.2.2 Restructure and unify the army and other organized forces in accordance with the provisions of R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus;
- 4.2.2.3 Fast-track general and simultaneous disarmament across the country and destroy the arms collected from the civilians and ensure provision of the state security for all the people in South Sudan;
- 4.2.2.4 Take measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline in the Security Sector; and
- 4.2.2.5 Ensure deployment of Armed Forces across the Country, including at the Borders, to maintain territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.

4.3 *Further Commitments by Parties and Stakeholders on Security Sector Reforms*

- 4.3.1 Development and implementation of a transformational policy framework to govern the security sector institutions on matters including language, recruitment, retirement and oversight, reorganize and professionalize the security sector;
- 4.3.2 Incorporation of a general amnesty for persons who rebelled against the Government into the final outcome of the Tumaini Initiative as an avenue for fostering peace and reconciliation;
- 4.3.3 Taking measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline mechanisms in the Security Sector; and
- 4.3.4 Taking measures including legislative reforms, to address inter-communal violence, child abduction, movement of cattle, cattle-raiding/ rustling in South Sudan.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D., P.S., N.B., S.B.R., H.M., P.A.G.]

5. Protocol on Communal Conflicts, Armed Civilians, and Land Disputes

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders recognize the importance of advancing sustainable peace, security and stability at local levels, acknowledge the intricate connection between national and local conflicts and insecurity, particularly the prevalence of cattle rustling, child abduction, revenge killings, land-related disputes, climate change-induced conflicts and inter-communal violence, and the prevailing inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms.

The Parties and the Stakeholders agree that the Government, through public participation, shall:

- 5.1 Identify the root causes of communal conflicts and violence and land disputes and provide solutions so as to contribute to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;
- 5.2 Conduct a comprehensive inquiry into land- and natural resources-related conflicts and climate change-induced disputes across South Sudan and make recommendations, including policy and legal actions required to address these disputes effectively;
- 5.3 Formulate policies, laws, and establish institutions for addressing root causes of conflict, communal violence, armed civilian groups, and land disputes, thereby contributing to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D., P.S., N.B., S.B.R., H.M., P.A.G.]

- 5.4 Enhance coordination and implementation of community dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing land issues, local conflicts, peacebuilding, reconciliation, social cohesion and integration whose functions and composition shall be determined by law;
- 5.5 Undertake research and analysis on social cohesion, values, peacebuilding and conflict management, and make recommendations to the relevant Government agencies;
- 5.6 Foster partnerships with the relevant state actors, non-state actors, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies on peacebuilding and conflict management;
- 5.7 Establish early warning and response systems for conflicts and put in place an emergency preparedness and response systems to curb imminent conflicts;
- 5.8 Promote peaceful co-existence, tolerance, respect and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of life, and encourage appreciation by all ethnic and religious communities for the social, economic, cultural, spiritual and political life of all communities;
- 5.9 Formulate and implement strategies, plans, educational and training programs to create public awareness and support on the importance of social cohesion, integration, peacebuilding and reconciliation;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus
 [Handwritten signatures and initials: G.D., P.S., N.B., S.B.R., H.M., P.A.G.]

- 5.10 Facilitate nationwide consultations on the management of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians, in order to disarm them in accordance with the law and human rights principles; and
- 5.11 Establish a mechanism for the operationalization of this protocol.



Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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6. Guarantors

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders shall establish internal and external processes and structures that will have a permanent and consistent role in guaranteeing and taking lead responsibility in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus as provided.

The Parties and Stakeholders have resolved to commit to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus with both internal and external guarantors as detailed below:

6.1 Internal Guarantors

6.1.1 The Parties and Stakeholders shall establish the National Leadership Council (NLC) that shall be the national / internal guarantor of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.1.2 The main roles and responsibilities of the NLC shall be to:

6.1.2.1 Provide political stewardship and oversight in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.1.2.2 Provide strategic leadership and guidance to the Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission, the Governance Oversight Commission, and other public agencies whose mandate is relevant to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.1.2.3 Preside over and resolve disputes and conflicts in matters

Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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related to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.1.2.4 Receive reports from all mechanisms established under the R-ARCSS as amended and the Tumaini Consensus; and

6.1.2.5 Coordinate with Tumaini Initiative on implementation of the key elements of this framework and on meeting of the deadlines of scheduled actions.

6.1.3 The NLC shall have a Chairperson, in the absence of whom, the Deputy Chairperson shall act;

6.1.4 The NLC shall hold regular meetings to deliberate and make decisions, including seeking political consensus, regarding the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.1.5 The NLC, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, shall establish measures and systems to carefully track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

6.1.6 Decision-making in the NLC shall be by consensus and, in lieu of that, by two thirds (2/3rd) majority;

6.1.7 The decisions of the NLC shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature;

6.1.8 The NLC shall establish a National Implementation and Oversight Committee (NIOC) composed of members seconded by each party represented at the NLC, nominees of Civil Society Organisations, Faith-Based groups, other Stakeholders, Donors and Partners, and whose mandate shall be to:

Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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6.1.8.1 Act as secretariat of the NLC and, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, provide technical and administrative support to the NLC to enable the Council to carry-out its functions and duties;

6.1.8.2 Manage the day-to-day coordination of activities in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

6.1.8.3 Establish a system to track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus in coordination with Tumaini Initiative.

6.1.9 The NIOC shall have a Head of the Secretariat and a Deputy, whom shall be appointed by the NLC;

6.1.10 The NIOC shall establish its structures and transparently and competitively recruit staff to carry out its day to day activities;

6.1.11 The NIOC shall be funded by the Government, the Tumaini Initiative and Donors;

6.1.12 Funds received for the NIOC shall be deposited into the account of the NIOC and shall be jointly managed by the Head of the Secretariat, Representatives of the Tumaini Initiative and Donors/Partners, who shall be the signatories to the Account;

6.1.13 All public institutions and agencies of Government, civil society and faith-based organisations, and other stakeholders shall provide the necessary assistance and

Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

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 A/A

Annex 27: Withdrawal of SPLM-IO from Tumaini Initiative



RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SPLM/SPLA (IO) FROM THE TUMAINI INITIATIVE

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau met on July 16, 2024 to deliberate on the Protocols of "Tumaini Consensus for Sustainable Peace in South Sudan" that were initialed by the Parties and Stakeholders to the Tumaini Initiative.

The initialed Protocols establish alternative institutions, replacing or running in parallel with those in R-ARCSS besides repeating most provisions in R-ARCSS or existing national laws. The Protocols clearly breach the R-ARCSS and undermine the ongoing peace implementation processes.

The Tumaini Initiative was supposedly a mediation forum. However, in the initialed Protocols, this is not the case. The Initiative has arrogated to itself many roles including being a funder, a supervisor, a coordinator, a convener of a donor conference, a fund manager, a monitor of the implementation, a guarantor and a governing authority. Therefore, the "Tumaini Initiative" undermines the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan.

The proposed Security Sector Reforms/Oversight Commission takes over functions of the following existing mechanisms and institutions of R-ARCSS:

1. Security Supervision Mechanism (SSM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
2. Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
3. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
4. Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB), co-chaired by the Parties to the R-ARCSS and
5. National Transitional Committee (NTC).

The proposed National Leadership Council (NLC) whose decisions "shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature" usurps the powers of:

1. The Presidency.
2. The Council of Ministers.
3. The National Legislature and
4. The National Security Council.

The roles of the guarantors namely; IGAD, AU, CS, UN, EU, Troika, and IGAD Partners Forum, who are seized of the peace process in South Sudan, are muted.


RMTD



In light of the above development, the SPLM/SPLA (IO) rejects the initialed Protocols and declares its withdrawal from the Tumaini Initiative as it has deviated from the intended purpose of being an Annex to R-ARCSS and not a stand-alone Agreement.

In conclusion, we would like reiterate our unwavering commitment to inclusive peace and implementation of the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for attaining sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan.

Sign:



Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon,
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/SPLA (IO), and
First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan,
Juba
16 July 2024

Annex 28: UPDF in Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria State

1.Excerpts of a video of the detention of South Sudanese men by armed UPDF soldiers in August 2024 in Kajo Keji.

Note: the UPDF soldiers' patches are visible. An SSPDF soldier can be heard in the background reporting the event over the phone to his superior.



2. Mediation meeting in the presence of the Kajo Keiji county commissioner, David Lisi Christopher, UPDF, Ugandan police and SSPDF officers on 6 September 2024 in Kajo Keiji county in South Sudan.



Annex 29: Statement by Kajo Keji County Commissioner, 29 August 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2024

TO MJ. GENERAL KULANG MAYEN
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SSPDF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
29/8/2024

AREAS OF KAJO KEJI COUNTY CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN ENCROCHED (GRAPPED) BY UGANDA

Kajo-Keji is a county in central Equatoria state republic of south Sudan that borders the neighboring Uganda in the districts of moyo, and yumbe.

These districts of Uganda had been engaged in encroachment of land of Kajo-Keji and causing insecurity within the border communities.

Find below the areas graphed and re-named by Uganda

S/No	Payam of origin	Name of area taken	New name given by Uganda	Approximate area in kms
1	Liwolo payam	Sokodo/ tirye	Tire village Kerwa SC	25Kms
2		Kaboro village	Kaboro A&B KSC	26kms
3		Kulasar village	Kulasar village KSC	25 kms
4		Mijale village	Mijale, kerwa sub county	20kms
5		Pingo village	Pingp Kerwa sub county	22kms
6		Rodo village	Rodo kerwa sub county	20kms
7		Merewa village	Merwa KSC	30akm
8		Gorbeleng village	Gorbeleng KSC	30km
9		Mokaden village	Mokaden v11	20kms
10		Guruwa village	Woroworo village	28kms
11		Kolorunga village	Kulurung village	20kms
12		Mapu village	Mapu village KSC	20kms
13		Kopionga village	Kapionga parish KSC	22kms
14		Kolorok village	Uturuko village	22kms
15		Erepunga village	Erepunga KSC	21kms
16		Limu village	Limu parish	21kms
17		Kogwo village	Kogwo village KSC	20kms
18		Longolijo village	Longolijo village KSC	21dkms
19		Wangor village	Wangor village KSC	17kms
20		Alidoro village	Alidoro KSC	15kms
21		Tigawate village	Central mijale village	20kms
22		Matkulu village	Markulu KSC	20kms
23		Aludu village	Centre liku village	15kms
24		Buyi village	Uluga village	20kms
25		Kobe village	Usubira village	15kms
26		Gwuto ko tokoyot	Ura village	22kms

	village		
27	Lema village	Lema KSC	24kms
28	Kukuduk village	Kukuduk KSC	4kms
29	Koburuwa village	Koburuwa KSC	23kms
30	Kilaji village	Kilaji KSC	21kms
31	Kupiya village	Loguteleng village	21kms
32	Sisi village	Sisi KSC	20kms
33	Loduwa village	Midigo Sub county	3kms
34	Dukulya village	Ubetiku village midigo	4kms
35	Biyabe village	Gumbiri village	16kms
36	Lobe village	wombe village	5kms
37	Morsak village	Achilaya villageg	4kms
38	Muluwe village	Sere village	5kms
39	Gwongatulu village	Gwongatulu KSC	23kms
50	Letimekor village	Letimekor KSC	23kms
51	Baranya kuto village	Baranyakuto KSC	22kms
52	Kambala village	Ambala village	24kms
Kangapo 2 payam			
1	Gwere village	Gwere sub county	25kms
2	Masaka village	Masaka GSC	25kms
3	Murerya village	Murerya GSC]	25kms
4	Lunyamiro village	Linyamiro GSC	10kms
5	Morod village	Morodo GSC	15kms
6	Lojili village	Lojili village GSC	12kms
7	Manse village	Manse GSC	10kms
8	Worilowoga village	Worilowoga GSC	8kms
9	Tiwoyo Village	Tiwoyo village GSC	7kms
10	Lere village	Lere village GSC	8kms
11	Ebeya village	Ebeya village GSC	13kms
12	Garamba village	Wakale village]	10kms
13	Monikdisi village	Malanga village	18kms
14	Komba village	Mundusaku village	26kms
15	Majaburo village	Elema east	32kms
16	Gorbeleng village	Kamurope villae	30kms
17	Amerok village	Maru village	16kms
18	Ayumani village	Gobor village	35kms
19	Kolipi village	Elema village	17kms
20	Nyaingamuda village	Fitinabaya village	25kms
21	Lepori village	Lefori sub county	19kms
Kangapo 1 payam			
1	Lojore Village	Lojore afoji Sub county	15kms
2	Koru koria	Koruo village ASC	15kms
3	Loruwondi village	Inigo village	18kms
4	Magorlobong village	Magorlobong village	20kms
5	Waalo village	Wano village	18kms
6	Ludara village	Ludara village	13kms
7	Robojo village	Robojo village	12kms
8	Kimu village	Kimu village	9kms
9	Tor-li village	Tor-li village	15kms
10	Danakorwi village	Danakorwi village	10kms
11	Kiyongo village	Edefia village	20kms
12	Koree village	Eriya village	20kms
13	Masalowa village	Macholoa village	25kms



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER



14		Yakjimiji village	Abaya village	19kms
15		Gworong lolyong village	Moi anzo village	19kms
16		Apoji village	Afoji village	17kms
17		Fudia village	Fudia village	15kms
18		Onyire village	Onyire village	13kms
19		Gwulukuk village	Gwulukuk village	16kms
20		Minje village	Minje village	17kms
21		Kongolo village	Kongolo village	18kms
22		Pasokwi village	Pasokwi village	16kms
23		Itiya village	Itiya village	17kms
24		Eduwa village	Edua village	20kms
25		Moipileya village	Moipi lea village	15kms
26		Lugwakiya village	Lugwakia village	17kms
27		Aripijo village	Aripijo village	18kms
28		Kerepi village	Kerepi/arepi	20kms
29		metutametun	Metu sub county	25kms
30		Longirakoru	Lepo village	18kms
31		Kuruse village	Wuruse village	15kms
32		Suluwa village	Soloa village	18kms
33		Marindi village	Mulango/ moyo hospital	25kms

These are real fact from the land lords of the three payams.



David Lisi Christopher
County Commissioner Kajo-Keji County
Central Equatoria State Juba

Annex 30: SSPDF Press Release concerning meeting with UPDF, 2 October 2024

**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES
DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS


OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON


Your Ref: Date:


Our Ref:

Press Release on the meeting between SSPDF and UPDF Chiefs of Defence Forces

On September 28th, 2024, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces travelled to meet with his Ugandan counterpart. The two army chiefs met, held and concluded a very successful meeting. They agreed on immediate implementation of the following points:

1. UPDF stops further encroachment into South Sudan territories. This pause is aimed at giving time to the two governments to find lasting solutions to the recurrent border issues (in other words, allow the High-Levelled Technical Committee, to continue deliberations on Border delimitations and demarcations)
2. Observe & maintain a cordial and harmonious working relationship along the common border.
4. Trade and commerce to continue.
5. SSPDF to deploy additional forces along Juba-Nimule Road to ensure and enhance safety of public road users.
6. SSPDF army chief secured the release of three own servicemen that were arrested and detained by UPDF in July 2024. The army chief had also technically succeeded in securing release of Capt. Machol Major Madol, from South Sudan National Police Service, Department of Traffic Police, who was arrested in July 2024 by Uganda Revenue Authorities while in possession of a fully loaded pistol.

Signed 
Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC(ET)
Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,
SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam



TEL: +211 922 282 534, +211 914 917 786
Email: lul_orcd@hotmail.com

Annex 31: UPDF Press Statement concerning meeting with SSPDF, 28 September 2024

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & VETERAN AFFAIRS
UGANDA PEOPLES' DEFENCE FORCES
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION
 MoDVA Headquarters



Our Ref: UPDF/DDPI/83A
 Your Ref:

28 September 2024

PRESS STATEMENT

BILATERAL RELATIONS

Gen Kainerugaba Discusses Security Cooperation with his South Sudan Counterpart.

The Chief of Defence Forces and Senior Presidential Adviser for Special Operations, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba this afternoon held talks with his South Sudan counterpart Gen Santino Deng Wol.

The meeting at the Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters focused on regional security issues of mutual interest.


The two military leaders acknowledged the longstanding relationship between Uganda and South Sudan, committing to further enhancing military to military relations, that are equally historic.

The meeting was attended by several UPDF leaders including the deputy CDF Lt Gen Sam Okiding, Airforce Commander Lt Gen Charles Okidi, the Deputy Commander Land Forces Maj Gen Francis Takirwa and the Chief of Defence Intelligence and Security Maj Gen James Birungi.

The meeting was also attended by Chiefs of Staff of Services, the 4Division Commander Brig Felix Busizoori and the 5Division Commander Brig Keith Katungyi among others.

The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.




DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC
INFORMATION
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)
Brigadier General
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
VETERAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Annex 32: Pictures of meeting between UPDF and Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004)


On 28 September 2024, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, travelled to Uganda in violation of the travel ban, one of the restrictive measures established by Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015), most recently extended by resolution 2731 (2024).

The meeting was confirmed by a UPDF press release, issued on 28 September 2024. It is available from: https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095



The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.



DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC
INFORMATION
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Brigadier General
VETERAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Additional photographs are also available, depicting the two military leaders meeting at the UPDF Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters. See for example:

Sudan Tribune, Ugandan army chief meets South Sudanese counterpart in Kampala, 28 September 2024:


<https://sudantribune.com/article291467/> see also a video of the event, available from:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3quUP4eZBac>






Annex 33: Partial flight-data for flights between Uganda and South Sudan



Annex 34: SSPDF statement refuting a “vehicles supply deal,” 19 August 2024




Annex 35: Final list of military items requested by Peter Biar AjakSource: US District court for the district of Arizona¹³³

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. AK-47 Rifles (Full Auto)	1,000	\$350.00	\$350,000.00
2. PKM Rifles	300	\$675.00	\$202,500.00
3. RPG-7 launcher	200	\$575.00	\$115,000.00
4. 7.62x39 ammo	2,000,000	\$.17	\$340,000.00
5. 7.62x54 ammo	1,500,000	\$.21	\$315,000.00
6. PG-7 HE round	1000	\$600.00	\$600,000.00
7. PSL Sniper Rifle	70	\$1092.50	\$76,475.00
8. FIM92 Stinger System	10	\$80,000.00	\$800,000.00
9. Satellite phone	20	\$1,200.00	\$24,000.00
10. Handheld Radio	50	\$500.00	\$25,000.00
11. M67 Hand Grenades	500	\$60.00	\$30,000.00
12. PG-7VT/PG-7T AT Round	500	\$800.00	\$400,000.00
13. AN/PVS Monocular	10	\$12,000.00	\$120,000.00
		Subtotal-	\$3,397,975.00
		Transportation-	\$575,000.00
		Total -	\$3,972,975.00

¹³³ See https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al_azdce-24-00394__0022.0.pdf.

Annex 36: Allocation of Nile blend cargos, May and September 2024



Republic of South Sudan (RSS)



MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING (MoFP) 1st Undersecretary of Finance

REF:RSS/MoFP/J/1stUSF/27/08/2024/05

September 10, 2024

Hon. Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel
Undersecretary,
Ministry of Petroleum

Dear Hon. Undersecretary,

RE: Allocation of One (1) Crude Oil Cargo for the Month of April, 2025 to [REDACTED]

Greetings and best wishes from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Reference is made to the aforementioned subject. I am writing to respectfully request your office to purpose allocation of **One (1) Crude Oil Cargo** for the month of **April, 2025** to [REDACTED] as directed by the Minister of Finance and Planning.

Let me avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Hon. Garang Majak Bol
1st Undersecretary
Ministry of Finance and Planning



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
- Hon. Minister of Finance and Planning
- File



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM

RSS/MOP/J/O/U/9/24/061

19th September 2024



RE: REVOCATION OF ALLOCATION OF ONE CARGO OF NILE BLEND FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 2025 TO [REDACTED]

Reference is made to the above-mentioned subject and the letter of the 1st Undersecretary of Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 10th September 2024 with Ref: No. **RSS/MOFP/J/1stUSF/27/8/24/05** to Ministry of Petroleum (MoP) pertaining to the allocation of one (1) Cargo of Nile Blend for the Month of **April 2025 to** [REDACTED]

Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan, scrutinizes and ultimately registers potential oil lifting companies through a set of technical requirements, including, but not limited to, checking their presence in both regional and international oil lifting markets, submission of financial statements, approval by the Bank of South Sudan (BSS). [REDACTED] is not registered as one of the oil marketing companies.

Premised on the foregoing, MoP is hereby informing your reverenced office about the revocation of allocation of one (1) cargo of Nile Blend equivalent to 600,000 bbl due to lack of registration and conflicting schedules.

Please, accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel
Undersecretary
Ministry of Petroleum



Cc: 1st Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Cc: File

The Undersecretary

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J1), Juba- South Sudan
General Line: +211 915177770 | Email: undersecretary@mop.gov.ss | www.mop.gov.ss

Annex 37: Legal framework for oil-related payments and transparency

Extracts from the 2012 Petroleum Revenue Management Act

Councils.

CHAPTER IX TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

30. Transparency as a Fundamental Principle

- (1) The management of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, and any related duty of any relevant party, shall be carried out in an open and transparent manner.
- (2) In the exercise of their functions and competences, and as provided for in this Bill, the National Legislature, Ministry, Bank of South Sudan and Investment Advisory Committee shall take all necessary measures to ensure free access to public information.
- (3) Access to public information shall be in accordance with the Right to Information Act 2013.

31. Declaration of Confidentiality

- (1) Information or data may be declared confidential and not to be disclosed to the public if such information:
 - (a) significantly prejudices the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds;
 - (b) jeopardizes the independence of the Investment Advisory Committee, any of its members, or both;
 - (c) prejudices the freedom of discussion within or among the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan, or the Investment Advisory Committee; or
 - (d) may lead to unfair competition, improper gains or advantage for a third party or unfair disadvantage for the parties involved.
- (2) The declaration of confidentiality shall be made by the Ministry, Bank of South

29

Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee and shall provide:

- (a) a justification based on one or more grounds detailed in subsection (1) of this Section; and
 - (b) the period in which such information shall be declared confidential.
- (3) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this Section, and unless the parties agree to disclose such communication, internal communications within the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall be kept confidential.
 - (4) Any party affected by the disclosure of information on grounds detailed in subsection (1)(d) of this Section may request a declaration of confidentiality of such information to the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee.
 - (5) The Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall issue a decision on the request for declaration of confidentiality under subsection (4) of this Section.
 - (6) In case of denial, the interested party may appeal to the Competent Court within fifteen days from the date in which the decision under subsection (5) of this Section was communicated to him or her.
 - (7) The Minister shall issue regulations on further detail procedures under subsections (4), (5), and (6) of this Section.
 - (8) The justification on the confidentiality of information shall be made available to the public upon request.
 - (9) Upon expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (2) (b) of this Section, and if any grounds on which the declaration of confidentiality was based no longer exist, information shall be disclosed to the public.

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- not financial assets of government and the rate of savings; and
- (f) a list of names of persons holding positions relevant for the operation and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including:
- (i) the Minister;
 - (ii) the director general of accounts of the Ministry;
 - (iii) the chairperson, deputy chairperson and members of the Investment Advisory Committee;
 - (iv) the Governor;
 - (v) the external investment manager(s), if any; and
 - (vi) the designated signatories that are authorized to request transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.

- (3) The sources of the information described in subsection (2) of this Section, in whatever form, including the reports and statements, shall be assessed to the annual report in unedited form.
- (4) The annual report shall be published by the Ministry within fifteen days of its submission to the National Legislature.

15. Annual Disclosure and Publication of Payments

- (1) Licensees, contractors and sub-contractors shall annually disclose information on all payments, monetary or in kind, made to Government agencies in connection with Petroleum Activities. The Government shall disclose the revenue received in connection with Petroleum Activities without regard to any provisions of confidentiality.
- (2) Any disclosure under this Section shall be reported to an independent entity, selected and appointed for this purpose, and the information shall be published and verified in accordance with the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as prescribed in the regulations.
- (3) Confidentiality sections or other sections in a Petroleum Agreement that prevent

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disclosure of information on any payments made and revenues received in connection with Petroleum Activities conducted in South Sudan shall be void to the extent required for disclosure of such information as set out in subsection (1) of this Section.

- (4) The Ministry shall issue regulations respecting all matters relating to disclosure and publication of information under this Section, including orders to administrative agencies requiring them to provide information relating to payments and revenues.

36. Publication of Information

- (1) The Ministry shall ensure that this Bill and any of its regulations, the Investment Policy, the Investment Guidelines, the operational management agreements provided in Section 8 and 14(7) of this Bill, and the rules and procedures of the Investment Advisory Committee provided in Section 21(i) of this Bill, are readily available to the public not later than thirty days after their respective enactment or adoption.
- (2) Appointment of the Investment Advisory Committee shall be published in the Official Gazette.
- (3) Information required to be made public under this Chapter shall also be published online on the website of the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan and the National Legislature.
- (4) The Ministry shall also make copies of the information available at its headquarters.

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32. Records of Petroleum Revenue

- (1) The Ministry shall publish the records of Petroleum Revenue in accordance with Section 6 of this Bill no more than six weeks after the end of each Quarter.
- (2) The records of Petroleum Revenue published under subsection (1) of this Section shall be disaggregated by type of revenue and individual transaction.
- (3) In addition to the records of Petroleum Revenue, the information shall include transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account to the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and the Consolidated Fund, transfers from the Consolidated Fund to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and the balance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.
- (4) The information shall be published simultaneously in the official gazette, the Ministry's website and in at least two national daily newspapers and duly communicated to the National Legislature.

33. Quarterly Reports

- (1) The Bank of South Sudan shall present to the Minister and the Investment Advisory Committee quarterly reports on the in- and outflow and the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds during the Quarter and the value of the assets and where the assets are held at the end of the Quarter, no later than by the end of the ensuing month.
- (2) The Bank of South Sudan shall make the quarterly reports publicly available no later than six weeks after the end of the Quarter.
- (3) The Bank of South Sudan shall ensure that in releasing, or allowing access to, such reports, measures are taken to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.

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34. Annual Reports

- (1) The Minister shall submit an annual report for the Petroleum Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds to the National Legislature no later than four months after the end of the Financial Year.
- (2) The annual report shall be prepared in such manner that makes it readily adaptable for dissemination to the public and shall contain the following information for the Financial Year for which the report is prepared:
 - (a) a report signed by the Minister describing the Investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, any advice received from the Investment Advisory Committee, and any other matter related to the management of Petroleum Revenue and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds that may be of concern or interest to the National Legislative Assembly;
 - (b) a report signed by the Investment Advisory Committee describing the investment Guidelines and any changes made during the Financial Year, a comparison of the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds against the established benchmark indices of the investments and against the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds for the previous three years, and any other matter relevant for the implementation of the Investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including, but not limited to, an assessment of the internal and external audits and risk management and control systems in place by the Bank of South Sudan;
 - (c) the Auditor General's report, including the audited financial statements with notes of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and any report from the independent auditor;
 - (d) a list of all payments of Petroleum Revenue made to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and payments of Petroleum Revenue by the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities to each applicable Local Government Councils, for the Financial Year;
 - (e) the liabilities of government borrowings in a manner that provides an accurate representation of the past and expected future development of the

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Annex 38: Budget for the financial year 2024/25


Panel analysis, based on first draft of budget presented to the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 25 September 2024

Official exchange rate SSP/US\$ (Oct 2024)	3,098		
	SSP	US\$ (est.)	
Projected government revenue			% of total revenue
Projected oil revenues			
DPOC	0	0	
GPOC	943,610,579,883	304,587,017	
SPOC	194,823,738,558	62,886,939	
Total oil revenue	1,138,434,318,441	367,473,957	50.43%
Projected non-oil revenue			
Customs duty	552,284,081,279	178,271,169	
Misc taxes and fees	566,920,329,811	182,995,587	
Total non oil revenue	1,119,204,411,090	361,266,756	49.57%
Total projected government revenue	2,257,638,729,531	728,740,713	
Government expenditure			% of total spending
"Mandatory government expenditure"			
Transfers to Sudan for oil pipeline	157,035,230,468	50,689,229	3.76%
Transfers to oil producing states (2%)	22,768,686,369	7,349,479	0.55%
Transfers to oil producing communities (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Transfers to Ministry of Petroleum (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Debt repayment	286,642,748,700	92,525,096	6.87%
National Revenue Authority Retention	54,957,368,080	17,739,628	1.32%
Oil for roads	0	0	0.00%
Other capital projects	493,482,795,275	159,290,767	11.83%
Total "mandatory expenditure"	1,083,192,887,998	349,642,637	25.96%
Salary payments			
Salaries	773,759,678,293	249,761,032	18.55%
Salary arrears	642,316,055,868	207,332,491	15.40%
Foreign mission salary arrears	96,003,600,000	30,988,896	2.30%
Total salary expenditure	1,512,079,333,961	488,082,419	36.24%
Other expenditure			
Operating expenditure	413,329,279,511	133,418,102	26.21%
Transfers to States for State budgets	419,306,834,843	135,347,590	26.59%
Peace budget	93,794,227,620	30,275,735	5.95%
Constituency Fund for MPs	30,000,000,000	9,683,667	1.90%
December 2024 Elections	257,521,457,127	83,125,067	16.33%
Humanitarian and emergency fund	173,660,000,000	56,055,520	11.01%
Various other budget lines	189,336,691,868	61,115,782	12.01%
Total other expenditure	1,576,948,490,969	509,021,463	37.80%
Total all government spending	4,172,220,712,928	1,346,746,518	
Deficit	-1,914,581,983,397	-618,005,805	

Agency spending:

	Salary budget (SSP)	% of total salary budget	Goods and services (SSP)	% of total goods and services	Total budget (SSP)	% of total Ministry spending
Accountability cluster	894,932,810	0.12%	5,848,736,009	1.45%	7,370,156,266	0.39%
Economic Cluster	19,109,574,136	2.47%	49,631,570,445	12.31%	197,443,429,349	10.48%
<i>Of which Ministry of Finance and Planning</i>	1,832,456,166	0.24%	28,331,191,362	7.03%	32,480,160,993	1.72%
Education cluster	84,975,288,417	11.00%	48,077,271,655	11.92%	225,135,744,981	11.95%
Health cluster	5,326,514,447	0.69%	31,156,159,400	7.73%	54,855,922,636	2.91%
Infrastructure cluster	1,595,558,604	0.21%	8,382,367,085	2.08%	13,336,454,811	0.71%
Natural resources cluster	22,406,328,022	2.90%	33,863,145,894	8.40%	351,649,759,145	18.67%
Public administration cluster	75,991,334,896	9.84%	168,546,330,203	41.80%	290,284,083,280	15.41%
<i>Of which Presidential Affairs</i>	2,577,606,960	0.33%	15,594,234,618	3.87%	23,383,834,620	1.24%
<i>Of which Cabinet Affairs</i>	1,465,091,532	0.19%	7,625,921,167	1.89%	16,773,997,323	0.89%
<i>Of which Foreign Affairs</i>	50,377,424,952	6.52%	4,254,097,101	1.05%	55,111,798,592	2.93%
<i>Of which Parliament</i>	10,277,629,488	1.33%	81,444,261,374	20.20%	114,571,166,718	6.08%
<i>Of which Council of States</i>	6,504,809,940	0.84%	25,000,499,165	6.20%	38,371,858,427	2.04%
Security sector	505,880,647,927	65.51%	35,430,397,122	8.79%	599,433,387,770	31.82%
<i>Of which Police</i>	100,406,257,704	13.00%	4,198,497,310	1.04%	158,507,540,170	8.42%
<i>Of which Ministry of Defence</i>	268,614,128,198	34.78%	15,735,791,888	3.90%	288,412,061,028	15.31%
<i>Of which Veterans Affairs</i>	84,588,459,037	10.95%	6,419,463,234	1.59%	91,007,922,271	4.83%
<i>Of which NSS</i>	51,827,888,804	6.71%	6,812,984,565	1.69%	58,737,678,439	3.12%
Rule of law	56,064,967,796	7.26%	22,327,870,875	5.54%	144,039,451,614	7.65%
Totals	772,245,147,055		403,263,848,688		1,883,548,389,852	

Distribution of salary payments:



Distribution of goods and services spending

